Senegal: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 50

Senegal has a national AMR plan. Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillances, detection and reporting.

The first framework, titled the "Multisectoral National Action Plan for Surveillance and the Fight against Antimicrobial Resistance (2017–2022)", was led by the Ministry of Health and Social Action in coordination with the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment. This foundational plan, published in 2017, established Senegal’s initial strategy for AMR surveillance, emphasizing the strengthening of laboratory capacities for detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens, and aiming for monitoring of infections in the human, animal, and environmental sectors (pp. 1–35) ¹.

Building upon the prior framework, Senegal launched a second, more robust strategy: the "Multisectoral National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2023–2027)", coordinated under the High Council for Global Health Security–One Health Platform ². According to the Fleming Fund Senegal report (published April 23, 2025), this plan enhances the integration of surveillance systems, develops technical capacity, and strengthens cross-sector coordination. Notable actions include: the updating of surveillance protocols, the production and use of national antibiograms, and the implementation of more stringent guidelines on antimicrobial use ³⁴. However, the "Multisectoral National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2023–2027)" is not publicly available through open sources, including the websites of the Senegalese Ministry of Health and Social Action or the World Health Organization (WHO) ⁵⁶. However, there is insufficient evidence that it covers detection, and reporting.

To complement these technical advances, Senegal also launched the "Social and Behavioral Change Strategy for the Fight Against Antimicrobial Resistance: 2023–2027" (French: Stratégie de Changement Social et Comportemental pour la Lutte contre la Résistance aux Antimicrobiens 2023–2027) ⁷. This policy seeks to inform and sensitize the public, emphasizing rational antimicrobial use and improved hygiene practices as outlined in government publications from 2023.

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 100

The country has a national laboratory system that actively tests for priority AMR pathogens, with evidence of alignment with the full 7+1 priority pathogen list.

The national system includes sentinel sites for strain isolation, identification, and susceptibility testing, and reference laboratories, like the Pasteur Institute of Dakar (IPD), for the full identification and characterization of bacterial strains" ⁸⁹. Under the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Project, in 2023, a list of 10 laboratories in 9 regions were "assessed for their capacity to perform antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) and bacterial isolation and identification according to international standards developed" as well as "Supporting laboratory training on AST and data analysis and reporting" for priority diseases ¹⁰.

The Fleming Fund mentions "strengthening laboratory capacity for detection and reporting of AMR priority pathogens" and the reinforcement of both reference and surveillance site laboratories ¹¹.

The Mérieux Foundation assisted the Senegalese Department of Laboratories in organizing a workshop in June 2023, which was crucial for formalizing reference laboratories and sentinel sites for AMR surveillance, further strengthening the national laboratory network ¹². The website for the Pasteur Institute of Dakar (IPD) ¹³ mentions its role in "healthcare solutions and laboratory services".

However, the most conclusive evidence of comprehensive testing is found in the Ministry of Health's "Technical Guide for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response" (Guide National de la Surveillance Intégrée de la Maladie et la Riposte) (2019) ¹⁴ " which explicitly links Senegal's laboratory surveillance to the WHO's global surveillance system (GLASS), which focuses on the 7+1 priority bacterial pathogens (page 17), as listed: Escherichia coli; Klebsiella pneumoniae; Staphylococcus aureus; Streptococcus pneumoniae; Salmonella spp (Non-typhoid Salmonella specified); Shigella spp; Neisseria gonorrhoeae.Additionally, Objective 2.2 of the plan includes strengthening the surveillance of resistance in Mycobacterium tuberculosis (p. 20)

Senegal is a member of GLASS ¹⁵, committed to building/strengthening their national AMR surveillance systems in order to generate quality AMR surveillance data.

Furthermore, Senegal's launch of the "Plateforme 3S One Health," an AI-powered intersectoral platform for zoonotic disease surveillance, demonstrates an advanced commitment to leveraging technology for comprehensive health security and data integration, which complements laboratory efforts ¹⁶.

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

There is no evidence that government of Senegal conducts environmental detection and surveillance for antimicrobial resistance (AMR).

The country's second "Multisectoral National Action Plan for AMR (2023–2027) ¹⁷," developed under the leadership of the High Council for Global Health Security-One Health Platform, explicitly integrates environmental surveillance into its national strategy. The "Multisectoral National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2023–2027)" is not publicly available through open sources, including the websites of the Senegalese Ministry of Health and Social Action or the World Health Organization (WHO) ¹⁸¹⁹. The Senegal AMR MPTF Annual Report 2023 confirms this, stating that the capacities of 10 laboratories were "assessed for AMR detection in the human, animal, and environment" sectors, indicating that environmental surveillance is a defined and active part of the national strategy ²⁰.

However, the primary focus detailed in the AMR action plan and related documents regarding surveillance targets specific bacteria mainly in humans (e.g., E. coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus) and animals (e.g., Salmonella spp in poultry). The plan mentions the environment as part of the One Health scope but does not outline specific methodologies, target locations (like rivers or soil types), or frequency for environmental AMR surveillance comparable to the details provided for human and animal health surveillance.

As per the Fleming Fund Country Brief: Senegal (2023), in addition to laboratory assessments, practical surveillance activities have been carried out in the animal and food production sectors. In two regions, a survey was conducted to determine the "presence of antimicrobial residues in eggs," and fecal samples were collected from "broilers, hens and… abattoirs". These activities are part of a broader multisectoral collaboration involving the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment and the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, which focuses on implementing biosecurity measures and investigating antibiotic use in livestock farms and aquaculture ²¹.

Senegal's Ministry of Environment, through agencies like the Directorate of National Parks (DPN) and the Directorate of Water, Forests, Hunting, and Soil Conservation (DEFCCS), is responsible for managing ecosystems, including soil conservation. The DEFCCS is increasingly engaged in the One Health initiative due to concerns about emerging diseases linked to environmental factors ²².

The national AMR strategy involves multisectoral collaboration ²³, including the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment and the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, with a focus on implementing biosecurity measures and investigating antibiotic use in livestock farms and aquaculture ponds ²⁴²⁵.

Nevertheless, publicly available national strategies reviewed do not provide evidence of established, routine surveillance programs specifically monitoring AMR pathogens in soil, rivers, or lakes.

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 0

Senegal has few suggestions of legal and regulatory framework governing the use of antibiotics for human health; however, there is not enough evidence that these exist and no document or enforcement in place.

In the project document for the "Senegal One Health Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Project", published in 2021, suggest the existence of regulatory policies governing antimicrobials. It specifies that the acquisition of antimicrobial agents is legally permissible only with a prescription from a certified medical practitioner, while also noting that "enforcement of those regulations is difficult in some settings" (p. 10) ²⁶.

The annual report for the Senegal AMR MPTF project (2023) confirms that "recommendations have been made to strengthen the legislative and regulatory environment for sale (channels) of antimicrobials, including pesticides"²⁷. The report confirms that WHO country office supports MoH through the new Agency for Pharmaceutical Regulation (ARP) to implement its activities as a coordinating center for the surveillance of antimicrobial consumption in human health sector. But there is no evidence of regulation or enforcement for antibiotics for humans.

Central to Senegal's pharmaceutical regulatory framework is Law No. 2023-06 "Law on medicines, other health products, and pharmacy" or (Loi relative aux médicaments, aux autres produits de santé et à la pharmacie), promulgated on June 13, 2023 ²⁸. This law outlines the legal structure for the importation, dispensation, and sale of pharmaceuticals. Article 3 ("Monopole pharmaceutique") reserves the preparation and sale of medicines for pharmacists, and Article 6 explicitly prohibits the sale of medicines "on the public highway, in fairs or markets" and forbids retail sales in any location other than a licensed pharmacy (p. 5-6) ²⁹. However, the law does not specifically mention the word "antibiotics" (antibiotiques) or "antimicrobials" (antimicrobiens).

In 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially acknowledged Senegal as the first French-speaking African nation to attain Maturity Level 3 for its medicines and vaccines regulatory system, as classified in the "WHO Global Benchmarking Tool (GBT) for Evaluation of National Regulatory Systems". This designation is indicative of a regulatory system described by WHO as “stable, well-functioning, and integrated.” The attainment of Maturity Level 3 is attributed largely to the strategic reforms spearheaded by the Agence Sénégalaise de Régulation Pharmaceutique (ARP), which was established in 2022 and tasked with modernizing regulatory processes and reinforcing institutional capacity within the pharmaceutical sector. ³⁰

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 50

Senegal has national legislation requiring prescriptions for veterinary drugs (including) antibiotic) use in animals, though its enforcement faces significant, documented challenges.

The primary legal basis is Law no 2008-07 ("Veterinary Drugs Act" or Loi relative aux médicaments vétérinaires), which organizes the veterinary profession and restricts the dispensing of veterinary medicines, to veterinarians registered with the national order ³¹. The Law stipulates under Article. 22 that "additives with pharmacological properties, containing in particular anticoccidials, antibiotics, or growth factors, are considered veterinary drugs. The list of these additives, their conditions of use, and their maximum concentrations are set out in the regulation." ³² This is supported by the Code of Ethics for veterinary medicine (Decree no 93-514), which governs professional practice ³³.

However, reports confirm a persistent gap between these laws and their application. The AMR Multi-Partner Trust Fund project notes that antimicrobials are often sold directly to farmers without a prescription and are used without prior antibiotic susceptibility testing ³⁴.

According to AMR Control (2018), the leader in publishing annual reviews on global antimicrobial resistance, the use of all antibiotics, even those for animals, requires a prescription (p.12-13) ³⁵ as per Senegalese regulations and the National Order of Veterinary Doctors (Ordre des Docteurs Veterinaires). The report notes "difficulties in complying with the various regulations", ensuring compliance remains a key difficulty (p. 13) ³⁶.

The Action for Animal Health case study (2024) on Senegal further confirms these enforcement challenges by detailing significant shortcomings in the animal health system ³⁷, stating that "the presence of medicines of dubious quality, the self-medication practiced by farmers, the non-existence or inadequacy of prescriptions lead to ineffectiveness in the treatment of animal diseases including zoonoses and increase the risk of AMR (p. 7). The report further notes the illegal practice of veterinary medicine by unauthorized personnel ('auxiliaires d’élevage') who make 'abusive and anarchic use of medicines,' making antimicrobial resistance a major concern" (p. 7). ³⁸

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

Senegal has a comprehensive national strategy for prioritizing, detecting, and reporting zoonotic diseases, guided by a One Health approach.

Senegal's Multisectoral National Action Plan for Surveillance and the Fight against AMR (2017-2022), incorporates One Health approach (p.4) ³⁹ by aiming to integrate surveillance and response across the human health, animal health, and environment sectors to achieve effective outcomes for public health, food safety, and environmental protection. However, the plan has evidenced that "No national plan for the surveillance of infections caused by priority antimicrobial-resistant pathogens has been developed and approved by key sectors" (p.13)⁴⁰. Nevertheless, there are plans for prioritization, detection and reporting of zoonotic diseases.

Prioritization of diseases
Senegal collaborates with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and international organizations like the CDC to prioritize zoonotic threats for the region ⁴¹. The following diseases have been identified as priorities for multisectoral action: Anthrax, Rabies, Ebola and other viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Marburg, Lassa, Rift Valley, and Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic fevers), Zoonotic influenzas, Zoonotic tuberculosis, Trypanosomiasis, Yellow fever. One Health Behaviors ⁴² has also confirmed a list of six priority zoonotic diseases for focused surveillance and control efforts, guided by standard criteria.

Detection methods
The detection strategy for zoonotic diseases in Senegal relies on both traditional and innovative surveillance systems. Senegal has community-based surveillance, using trained community health workers to detect unusual disease signals in their communities and report them to health or veterinary posts via text message ⁴³ .
The Pasteur Institute of Dakar (IPD) serves as a key reference laboratory for confirming zoonotic diseases ⁴⁴.

In 2025, Senegal launched the Plateforme 3S One Health ⁴⁵, an AI-based platform designed to improve the surveillance and response to zoonotic diseases. This platform includes an alert function for health signals, a risk management dashboard, and an AI-powered chatbot to provide information and support to health professionals and communities.

Reporting mechanism
Senegal has a reporting system in place, but challenges with real-time, intersectoral information sharing.
Senegal has implemented multisectoral community-based surveillance programs for zoonotic diseases ⁴⁶. These initiatives involve collaboration between human health, animal health, and environmental sectors. Training is provided to community health workers and animal workers to detect and report disease alerts; however, there is a need for improvement of these services as "disease and event reporting are low in districts despite the availability of electronic tools (e.g., tablets and smartphones)" ⁴⁷.

The country is also a member of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) Zoonotic Disease Action Package ⁴⁸, further demonstrating its commitment to international standards and collaboration on this issue.

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 0

Senegal has suggestions of national plans for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease. But there is no evidence of a document or plan or protocol to include measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans.

These efforts are guided by the One Health framework, established by a Prime Ministerial Decree to ensure high-level political commitment and multisectoral coordination ⁴⁹, which serves as a foundational document. Senegal has a national coordinating body, for enhanced surveillance and multi-sectoral strategies for public health is the Health Emergency Operations Centre (Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS)⁵⁰. The COUS leads and coordinates the country's "One Health" approach, which integrates human, animal, and environmental sectors to combat emerging infectious diseases.

This platform is the central mechanism for managing infectious disease threats at the human-animal interface. Through a high-level government workshop and the mapping of key actors, the platform has established seven technical working groups tasked with developing "strategic plans, surveillance manuals and protocols" for priority zoonotic diseases, such as Rift Valley fever ⁵¹.

According to the Zoonotic Behavioral Research Assessment ⁵², the government of Senegal has recognized the importance of a One Health approach to prevent and respond to future zoonotic disease outbreaks. During a prioritization workshop, stakeholders and their partners identified six priority zoonotic disease (PZD) groups based on standard criteria that are agreed upon to guide investments and prioritization in addressing infectious disease threats ⁵³.

For risk reduction, Senegal uses multisectoral community-based surveillance programs (CEBS) (p.10) ⁵⁴, involving "government veterinarians and para-veterinarians, private veterinarians play a significant role in the delivery of services in certain regions" (p.9), designed for the early detection and response to potential outbreaks, thereby mitigating transmission from animals to humans of the 6 prioritized zoonotic diseases (p. 10). ⁵⁵

These specific actions are embedded within broader national strategies, like the Multisectoral National Action Plan on AMR ⁵⁶, and align with international standards through the country's commitment to the Global Health Security Agenda's Zoonotic Disease Action Package ⁵⁷.

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence of national plans and guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens for human health.

Senegal has an Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system, known locally as SIMR (Surveillance Intégrée de la Maladie et la Riposte) ⁵⁸, conducts surveillance of zoonotic diseases, according to the technical guide from 2019 (third edition) ⁵⁹. Managed by the Directorate of Prevention (Direction de la Prévention) within the Ministry of Health ⁶⁰, Senegal's official health information portal (informationsanitaire.sec.gouv.sn) demonstrates aggregated data dissemination for human and zoonitic diseases ⁶¹. But the data are scars and inconsistent. Aside this, there is no public evidences of surveilance or control of zoonotic pathogens.

According to the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), there are 52 diseases that are tracked via IDRS, 16 of which are done on a weekly basis ⁶². But there is no evidence here about specific diseases or multiple zoonoses.

Data from this system is managed electronically through the DHIS2 platform, which is designed to handle both routine indicator-based and event-based case data ⁶³.

This system is a national priority, with the WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal (2024–2028) identifying the "strengthening of the epidemiological surveillance system (SIMR)" as a key area for continued support (p. 23) ⁶⁴. The system is guided by Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR), developed by WHO ⁶⁵.

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Senegal has a dedicated multi-sectoral coordinating mechanism for zoonotic diseases that functions across ministries, however, there is no evidence of a specific department or agency dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries.

The National One Health Platform (Plateforme One Health), established by the Prime Ministerial Decree No. 21787 of December 11, 2017 ⁶⁶ is a multi-sectoral mechanism . This decree officially created the Haut Conseil national de la Sécurité Sanitaire Mondiale (HCSSM) (High National Council for Global Health Security) ⁶⁷. The platform institutionalizes a One Health approach by bringing together representatives from several key ministries, including the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Livestock, and the Ministry of the Environment, to ensure coordinated action on health threats at the human-animal-ecosystem interface ⁶⁸. The council's primary mission is to "define the strategic orientations of the One Health global health security program" and to "ensure the synergy and complementarity" of the human health, animal health, and environmental health sectors ⁶⁹. The decree establishes a formal meeting schedule to ensure regular coordination. The High National Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, meets "at least once a year" (article 4, p.2) ⁷⁰, while the Steering Committee and Technical Committee can meet more frequently as needed to manage ongoing activities and respond to emerging threats.

The Prevention Department oh the MoH⁷¹ is responsible for preparing and monitoring the implementation of health prevention and immunization policy. It participates in epidemiological surveillance.

To support its national mission, Senegal's One Health Platform works in close partnership with the key tripartite international organizations: the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) ⁷². This collaboration is not just strategic but also operational, as demonstrated by several recent joint actions. In December 2023, Senegal and the WHO inaugurated a new Regional Health Emergency Hub in Dakar ⁷³. This hub, for which Senegal provided the land, is a critical part of the WHO's new emergency response structure for Africa. It houses a regional rapid response team and emergency stockpiles, demonstrating a deep, long-term partnership with the WHO to strengthen both national and regional health security.

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 0

While Senegal has a multisectoral platform for coordinating and monitoring operations as part of the One Health approach, the country does not have a standalone One Health strategic plan in place. ⁷⁴ Moreover, the country has adopted One Health principles in other plans e.g. the Senegalese National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (NAPAMR 2018–2022).⁷⁵

According to a 2018 document titled "Strengthening Multisectoral Community Event-Based Surveillance of Zoonotic Diseases in Senegal: Rapid Assessment of a Global Health Security Agenda Project", published the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "the government of Senegal has established a legal framework for the functioning of the One Health activities and has a functioning One Health Task Force as the apex technical body. The One Health
activities in Senegal are expected to be further strengthened through promoting regular intersectoral workshops and meetings, hosting an annual One Health conference to share the experiences and ideas relating to One Health, interacting at regular intervals with other partners working on One Health, and assisting the government of Senegal to develop a national strategy plan for the operationalization of One Health approach on community surveillance". ⁷⁶ Nevertheless, there is no reference to a specific One Health strategic plan. ⁷⁷

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 100

Senegal has a national mechanism for disease surveillance, though it is a developing and multi-layered system that faces some challenges in implementation.

The country's animal health surveillance is structured through the National network for Epidemiological Surveillance of Priority Animal Diseases (Réseau d’Epidémiosurveillance des maladies animales prioritaires au Sénégal (RESEPI-SN) ⁷⁸. This system legally mandates that livestock owners report suspected cases of notifiable diseases. These reports are channeled through a network of local veterinary posts up to the central government authority, the Department of Veterinary Services (Direction des Services Vétérinaires). This system is designed to be participatory, with livestock owners and community animal health workers (auxiliaires d’élevage) serving as the first line of detection. They are responsible for reporting any suspicious disease events or animal deaths to local veterinary posts. A 2018 assessment of the surveillance system confirmed that the network's effectiveness relies on the ""involvement of grassroots actors (breeders, livestock auxiliaries) implication des acteurs à la base (éleveurs, auxiliaires d’élevage)"" (p. 15) ⁷⁹.

This national network is highly reliant on a community-based surveillance (CBS) approach to function effectively at the grassroots level ⁸⁰. Local actors, including livestock owners and community volunteers organized into Community Surveillance and Alert Committees (CVAC), are trained to be the first line of detection ⁸¹⁸². They are equipped to identify signs of priority zoonotic diseases and report them, forming the foundation of the national surveillance pyramid.

Over 1,000 community health workers have been trained to report on disease outbreaks using an electronic data platform ⁸³.

To enhance and modernize this reporting flow, Senegal launched the Plateforme 3S One Health in 2025, an AI-powered tool designed to improve real-time data collection and communication from the community level to national authorities ⁸⁴.

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

Legislation and regulations in Senegal do safeguard the confidentiality of personal data, including information generated through animal surveillance activities, but there is no specific information related to the owners of animals reporting.

Data Protection Framework in Senegal is governed by the Law no 2008-12 of January 25, 2008 ⁸⁵ which establishes a framework for the collection, processing, and storage of personal information. The law applies to data that can identify an individual, directly or indirectly, which would include information about livestock owners collected during surveillance.

The Commission for Personal Data (Commission des Données Personnelles )⁸⁶, an independent administrative authority, is responsible for enforcing this law and ensuring that all data controllers respect these principles ⁸⁷. However, a review of the training guide from MEASURE Evaluation ⁸⁸ shows that they do not contain specific, detailed procedures on how the personal data of livestock owners should be processed, stored, or protected at the community level. The training focuses on the "what" (what signs to look for) and the "how" (how to send an alert) but does not elaborate on the specific data privacy protocols that the community volunteers must follow.

There is no specific evidence of such a regulation on the Ministry of Health and Social Protection website ⁸⁹, nor on the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Sovereignty and Livestock (MASAE) ⁹⁰, but such governmental bodies must ensure the confidentiality and security of personal data. They are required to prevent unauthorized access, alteration, or damage to this information ⁹¹.

In 2025, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection held a seminar on protection of secrecy, information system security, and cybersecurity, aiming to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems against growing cyber threats .

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 100

Senegal conducts surveillance for zoonotic diseases in livestock, poultry, and wildlife as part of its national health security strategy.

The country's 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities ⁹² confirms the existence of a surveillance system that explicitly includes wildlife, acknowledging that wild animals are a primary source of emerging pathogens. The report highlights that dedicated animal health staff, including veterinarians and livestock technicians, are assigned to Senegal's conservation areas specifically for "the surveillance of wildlife." Key zoonotic diseases monitored through this system that affect livestock, poultry, and wildlife include avian influenza, Rift Valley fever, rabies, and anthrax ⁹³.

This surveillance is guided by a "One Health" approach, which is formally coordinated by the National One Health Platform ⁹⁴. More recently, a HCSSM workshop (held in July 2023) finalized data collection tools for joint AMR surveillance in the human and animal health sectors and aimed to advance the joint surveillance of antimicrobial consumption in both humans and animals ⁹⁵, directly involving the ministries of Health, Livestock, and Environment. Specific example of passive surveillance of the wildlife – Niokolo-Koba National Park (PNNK) – was noted in a 2018 report (p.29) ⁹⁶. Eco-guards and eco-guides, who are people from the community, report unusual animal deaths via radio to park officials ⁹⁷. The central National Parks Directorate (DPN) would then coordinate with the Directorate of Veterinary Services (DSV) to dispatch a regional veterinarian ⁹⁸. This veterinarian would collect samples for the LNERV national laboratory, following the routine veterinary surveillance system ⁹⁹. The 2018 report noted this process operated "in the absence of specific guidelines for surveillance and sample collection" ¹⁰⁰.

The strategic importance of this integrated surveillance is reaffirmed in the WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal for 2024–2028, which makes the "strengthening of the epidemiological surveillance system (SIMR)" a priority to better control communicable diseases, including zoonoses (p. 23) ¹⁰¹.

Furthermore, Senegal's surveillance capabilities are further strengthened through participation in international initiatives, such as the EBO-SURSY Project ¹⁰², supported by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), enhances national and community-level surveillance for high-consequence viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola and Rift Valley fever, many of which originate in wildlife. This project empowers communities and trains veterinarians to improve detection and response.

Nevertheless, a 2024 case study on Senegal's animal health system reinforces that while the surveillance structure exists, there is a continued focus on overcoming challenges ¹⁰³. It points to the need for better investment to manage threats like avian influenza and other zoonotic diseases that impact poultry and livestock.

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a mechanism for reporting notifiable diseases to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) in Senegal.

Senegal, as a member of WOAH, uses the official World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS) as its platform for reporting on its animal health situation ¹⁰⁴. The national authority responsible for collecting surveillance data and submitting these official reports to WOAH is the Directorate of Veterinary Services (Direction des Services Vétérinaires (DSV)) ¹⁰⁵.

Recent data from the WAHIS platform confirms that Senegal actively reports ¹⁰⁶. In 2023 and 2024, the DSV submitted multiple immediate notifications and follow-up reports for outbreaks of diseases in the country. A review of the WAHIS database shows that in the past two years, Senegal has officially reported outbreaks of: 1) Highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1); 2) Peste des petits ruminants (PPR); 3) Rabies; 4) African horse sickness ¹⁰⁷.

This provides direct, recent evidence of the reporting mechanism in action. While the reporting mechanism is functional, a 2024 case study ¹⁰⁸ on Senegal's animal health system noted a critical shortage of public sector veterinarians, with "only 30 veterinarians and 328 para-veterinary personnel," ^{109, p.6} which can strain the capacity for timely and comprehensive disease detection and response.

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 2.89

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 8.14

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Senegal's national plans and regulations on zoonotic diseases include clear mechanisms for working with the private sector as a core component of the country's One Health approach ¹¹⁰.

The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC)’s Fleming Fund is a UK aid programme supporting up to 25 countries across Africa and Asia to tackle antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and is a key partner supporting the country's AMR and surveillance efforts in Senegal. The Fleming Fund Country brief ¹¹¹ states that the grant aims to "strengthen linkages between the human, animal, and environmental sectors" and explicitly includes supporting the "private sector" as a key stakeholder in building a sustainable One Health surveillance system (p. 2) ¹¹².

Additionally, the National One Health Platform includes private sector actors alongside government ministries (Health, Livestock, Environment). The country's community-based surveillance system relies heavily on private veterinarians and paraprofessionals for disease detection, especially in rural areas. The MEASURE Evaluation report on this system details their specific role. It notes that "private veterinarians play a significant role in the delivery of services in certain regions"(p.9) and that they "work closely with auxiliary livestock agents from the community" (p. 21) ¹¹³.

This collaborative approach is formally recognized in the National Technical Guide for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response, which lists "structures sanitaires privées" (private health facilities) as part of the national surveillance network (p. 16) ¹¹⁴.

This is demonstrated through concrete public-private partnerships, such as: Projects led by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) that actively engage private animal health providers to improve antimicrobial stewardship at the farm level ¹¹⁵.

The "OneLab" program, which unites the private company Ceva, the private Senegalese Poultry Interprofessional Association (IPAS), and the public National Livestock and Animal Research Laboratory (LNERV) to improve farmers' access to diagnostics ¹¹⁶.

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 0

There is no specific information provided on particular facilities in Senegal that store or process especially dangerous pathogens and toxins, updated within the past 5 years, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities.

Senegal's capacity for handling dangerous pathogens is centered around two key institutions: the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), a high-level BSL-3 laboratory and WHO collaborating center ¹¹⁷, and the National Laboratory for Livestock Breeding and Veterinary Research (Laboratoire National d'Élevage et de Recherches Vétérinaires (LNERV), which is the central facility for store and process dangerous pathogenes ¹¹⁸.

While a 2018 assessment noted significant weaknesses in data management at LNERV, such as the use of Excel files instead of a centralized database (p. 16) ¹¹⁹, recent initiatives are addressing these gaps. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has actively supported the Ministry of Health to strengthen laboratory systems, including helping to "upgrade and deploy the laboratory information system, LabBook, in regional and district laboratories" ¹²⁰. While this confirms the successful implementation of LIMS at sub-national levels, there is no public evidence that this system is used for a national, centralized inventory of dangerous pathogens.

A review of the websites for the WHO, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Agriculture did not yield a national record of facilities or inventories of dangerous pathogens ^121122123.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

Senegal has national biosafety legislation in place that addresses physical containment and risk management, but it does not provide specific, detailed requirements for operational practices, failure reporting, or cybersecurity for facilities handling dangerous pathogens.

In June 2022, Senegal adopted a revised National Biosafety Law (No. 2022-15), which provides the modern legal framework for this area ¹²⁴. The law's primary objective is to align the country with international commitments like the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Furthermore, the law establishes the National Biosafety Authority (ANB) as the competent authority and mandates a risk-based approach to biotechnology. It requires a "systematic risk assessment and management procedure" for all projects involving modern biotechnology (p. 3) ¹²⁵. However, the new 2022 Biosafety Law, is lacking in specific, detailed requirements for key biosecurity components.

Crucially, it establishes a formal system for physical containment, as Article 26 states: "Laboratories, greenhouses, and large-scale production facilities are classified into containment levels according to increasing risk level. Four containment levels are established…" (p. 5) ¹²⁶. While there is evidence that the new law includes requirements for risk assessment and management procedures related to genetically engineered products ¹²⁷, it does not provide specific details on physical containment standards (e.g., Biosafety Level designations) or standardized operational practices for all facilities.

However, Senegal's key reference laboratories adhere to international best practices. The Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) is a designated WHO Collaborating Centre for multiple diseases, including viral hemorrhagic fevers ¹²⁸. This status requires adherence to the WHO's stringent international standards for laboratory practice, safety, and security.

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 100

In Senegal, the primary agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation is the Autorité Nationale de Biosécurité (ANB), or National Biosafety Authority.

While the ANB's legal mandate is focused on GMOs and biotechnology, broader national biosecurity is supported by other institutional measures, particularly in relation to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)¹²⁹. This framework includes entities like the Senegalese Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity (ASBB) and the high-containment laboratories at the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) ¹³⁰.

The ANB was formally established and its mandate defined by Law No. 2022-15 on biosafety (Loi sur la biosécurité). This law, which repeals a 2009 version, designates the ANB as the competent national authority responsible for implementing the country's biosafety regulations, which are primarily focused on the regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and modern biotechnology in line with the Cartagena Protocol¹³¹.

The ANB was formally established and its mandate defined by Law No. 2022-15 on biosafety ¹³². The law designates the ANB as the competent national authority responsible for implementing and enforcing the country's biosafety regulations. Its enforcement functions, as outlined in the law, include conducting risk assessments, issuing permits for activities involving biological agents, and carrying out inspections to ensure compliance. Article 7 of the law officially establishes the ANB as the "service technique compétent en matière de biosécurité" (the competent technical service for biosecurity matters) (p. 3) ¹³³.

The Dakar Pasteur Institute and National Biosafety Authority ¹³⁴¹³⁵ have organised several outreach and training related to biosecurity and biosafety, which aimed to improve and strengthen the technical and organizational capacities of laboratories in 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa ¹³⁶.

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal taken efforts to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities.

Senegal's national efforts, guided by the National Biosafety Authority (ANB), have focused on strengthening the biosecurity framework and enhancing the capacity of its key laboratories ¹³⁷ rather than consolidating them. A key part of the ANB's mandate is to establish a national register of all facilities where dangerous pathogens are stored and processed. This creation of a centralized, national inventory is the foundational regulatory step towards consolidation. Although this constitutes an "effort to consolidate inventories" through regulation, there is no public evidence yet that the ANB has taken active steps to physically reduce the number of facilities permitted to hold these materials ¹³⁸.

The country's high-containment capacity remains centered at major institutions like the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) and the Laboratoire National d'Élevage et de Recherches Vétérinaires (LNERV) ¹³⁹¹⁴⁰.

The Institut Pasteur de Dakar, with international support, has developed and deployed mobile BSL-3 laboratories ¹⁴¹. These mobile "trucks ..equipped with an isolator for sample inactivation", are designed to bring high-level diagnostic and sequencing capacity directly to the field during health crises, representing a strategy of flexible response rather than physical consolidation of stored pathogens ¹⁴².

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 100

There is clear public evidence that Senegal has in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for both anthrax and Ebola. This capacity is current and well-established in both the human and animal health sectors, precluding the need to culture the live pathogen for initial diagnosis.

Senegal's diagnostic capacity for Ebola is centered at the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), which is an internationally recognized WHO Collaborating Centre for Arboviruses and Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers ¹⁴³. The IPD has a long-standing and well-documented expertise in using PCR for Ebola diagnostics, having served as a key regional reference laboratory during the 2014–2016 West Africa Ebola outbreak ¹⁴⁴. This capacity is continuously updated and has been made mobile. In 2022, the IPD launched a high-containment mobile BSL-3 laboratory. This unit was built to bring "rapid, on-site PCR diagnostic capabilities directly to the source of potential outbreaks for high-threat pathogens like Ebola" ¹⁴⁵.

The capacity for PCR-based diagnosis of anthrax is confirmed in both the veterinary and human health sectors. The National Laboratory for Animal Breeding and Veterinary Research (Laboratoire National d'Élevage et de Recherches Vétérinaires) (LNERV) has the established capacity for molecular diagnosis of the disease, as confirmed in the 2016 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE), which lists "Charbon bactéridien" (Anthrax) as a disease for which "Diagnostic moléculaire" (Molecular diagnosis) is available (Annexe 3, p. 59) ¹⁴⁶.

In early February 2020, the WHO designated the Institut Pasteur de Dakar as one of the first two reference laboratories in Africa with the capacity to test for the novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2¹⁴⁷. This designation was given because IPD already possessed the advanced molecular diagnostic (PCR) equipment and expertise., providing evidence that in 2021.

A 2023 scientific paper confirms that the diagnosis was officially made using quantitative PCR (qPCR) at the Institut Pasteur de Dakar, highlighting the use of advanced molecular testing for outbreak confirmation in Senegal ¹⁴⁸.

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

There is no public evidence that Senegal requires biosecurity training using a standardized, national approach for personnel working in facilities with dangerous pathogens. While high-quality training is available through various institutions, it is provided on an ad hoc basis and is not mandated by a single, common curriculum or national law.

Senegal's biosecurity training landscape is characterized by internationally supported programs rather than a single, government-mandated curriculum.
Partners like the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) support the strengthening of laboratory systems, which includes mentorship on biosecurity and biological risk management ¹⁴⁹. The Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), which hosts the Africa CDC's Regional Centre of Excellence for Biosafety and Biosecurity Training, provides standardized, certified courses to professionals from across West Africa ¹⁵⁰¹⁵¹. For example, in March 2025, it hosted a course on biological waste management where participants received a Level 1 certification upon successful completion ¹⁵². In September 2024, it ran an intensive, certified course on biosafety and biosecurity for laboratory professionals from Togo, demonstrating its role in disseminating standardized knowledge ¹⁵³.

Furthermore, the National Biosafety Authority (ANB), created in 2022, has a mandate to set rules and conduct inspections, but there is no evidence it has implemented a required, standardized training program for all relevant personnel ¹⁵⁴.

According to the National Laboratory Policy (2018), the policy acknowledged this gap, identifying "insufficient continuous training of laboratory personnel" as a key weakness (p. 14) ¹⁵⁵. The National Laboratory Policy does contain provisions to address this shortcoming. Strategic Axis 2.2 of the plan is dedicated to "Strengthening the quality of training for laboratory personnel" (p. 19) ¹⁵⁶. The strategies outlined include: Developing a national training plan for laboratory staff; Strengthening the training of trainers; Reinforcing continuous education for personnel (p. 19) ¹⁵⁷.
This confirms a formal commitment to improve training, but not yet a nationally required, standardized program.

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 33.33

Senegal's national regulations require background checks for public sector personnel with access to dangerous pathogens.

For all personnel in government facilities, including laboratories under the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Livestock, a background check is required by the "Law on the General Status of Civil Servants (Loi n° 61-33 du 15 juin 1961 relative au statut général des fonctionnaires) ¹⁵⁸. This law mandates that all candidates for public service provide specific documents before they can be appointed. Specifically, Article 22 of the law requires that every applicant must furnish "un extrait de casier judiciaire" (an extract from their criminal record) (p. 4) ¹⁵⁹.

Separately, the Labor Code (Loi n° 97-17) provides the general framework for occupational health for all workers (public and private), requiring employers to manage workplace risks and ensure workers are medically fit for their roles ¹⁶⁰. However, this does not specify psychological or drug screening.

A review of national legislation, including the 2022 National Biosafety Law, finds no specific mandate for drug testing or psychological fitness checks for personnel with access to dangerous biological materials ¹⁶¹. While the 2022 WHO Global Framework recommends such measures as part of a robust personnel reliability program, they are not yet codified in Senegalese law ¹⁶². For private institutions like the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), which operate high-containment laboratories, specific internal vetting policies that might include these checks are not made public ¹⁶³.

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has publicly available evidence on national regulations for the safe and secure transport of infectious substances.

The country's approach is to adopt and enforce legally binding international and regional transport standards and not a standalone national regulation. This approach is confirmed in the 2016 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE), which noted that while a specific national plan was not in place, training for the shipment of infectious substances was conducted based on international standards (p. 20) ¹⁶⁴.

The overarching framework for these rules is provided by the World Health Organization's (WHO) "Guidance on regulations for the transport of infectious substances" ¹⁶⁵. This key international document does not create its own rules but provides guidance on the legally binding international modal regulations. The WHO's key guidelines emphasize a risk-based approach, requiring that infectious substances be classified based on their potential to cause harm (Category A vs. Category B) and transported using a triple packaging system to prevent release.

Additionally, Senegal is a signatory to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations ¹⁶⁶, including Categories A and B, which provide the framework for these rules, and require adherence to these international standards through its national laws for air transport. The IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) are the global standard for transporting dangerous goods by air and are used by airlines worldwide. These regulations have very specific instructions for classifying, packing, and documenting infectious substances of both Category A (UN 2814 for substances affecting humans, UN 2900 for substances affecting animals) and Category B (UN 3373) ¹⁶⁷.

Moreover, as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Senegal is subject to regional regulations that align with the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) ¹⁶⁸¹⁶⁹. The ADR provides an exhaustive classification of dangerous goods, which includes Class 6.2 for Infectious Substances. This class is subdivided into Category A (high-risk, capable of causing permanent disability or life-threatening disease) and Category B (lower-risk). The ADR specifies detailed requirements for packaging (e.g., triple packaging), labeling (e.g., the infectious substance diamond hazard label), and vehicle standards for these materials ¹⁷⁰.

The Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), as a major regional reference laboratory, has personnel trained and certified in IATA DGR to ensure their shipments of infectious substances are compliant and safe ¹⁷¹.

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

Senegal has legislation and regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer of dangerous biological materials, but it mainly focuses on GMO and there is insufficient evidence for the especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential.

The primary legal framework is Law No. 2022-15 on biosafety, which governs the transfer of biological agents ¹⁷². however, the law does not provide a list of these agents. This law establishes a strict, mandatory authorization process for any cross-border movement of regulated materials, which functions as the primary mechanism for end-user control.
The law requires anyone wishing to import, export, or transport genetically modified organisms to first obtain an authorization from the competent national authority, the National Biosafety Authority ANB ¹⁷³. Under the articles 36 and 86, the law states that "Any activity related to genetically modified organisms and/or derived products is subject to prior authorization issued by the competent authority, and "The competent authority shall ensure that the import into the national territory of a genetically modified organism and/or a derived product takes place after it has given written authorization", respectively.

While the law does not mention "end-user screening" explicitly, the authorization process functions as a de facto screening mechanism. An applicant must submit a detailed dossier, including a risk assessment, which allows the National Biosafety Authority (ANB) to evaluate the legitimacy, capacity, and biosecurity of the end-user before granting a permit ¹⁷⁴.

This is complemented by Decree No. 2008-1007 on biomedical waste, which regulates the management of hazardous materials once they are in the country ¹⁷⁵. The decree imposes strict rules on all producers of biomedical waste, including laboratories. Article 5 mandates that facilities must "assurer le tri, le conditionnement, la collecte, le transport, le stockage, le traitement et l'élimination des déchets d'activités de soins" (ensure the sorting, packaging, collection, transport, storage, treatment, and disposal of waste from healthcare activities). This creates a cradle-to-grave regulatory chain, ensuring that facilities (the end-users) are held accountable for the safe handling and disposal of dangerous biological materials.

The country also participates in international mechanisms such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540, for which it has submitted national implementation reports, thereby strengthening its controls ¹⁷⁶.

Finally, the country's National Technical Guide for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response provides an operational framework for oversight. The guide mandates that health facilities and laboratories report suspected cases of priority diseases through a structured national system, which acts as a form of ongoing monitoring of facilities working with dangerous pathogens (p. 19-21) ¹⁷⁷.

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

Senegal has national biosafety legislation in place that addresses physical containment and risk management, but it does not provide specific, detailed requirements for operational practices, failure reporting, or cybersecurity for all facilities handling dangerous pathogens.

The primary legislation is Law No. 2022-15 on biosafety, adopted in June 2022 ¹⁷⁸. The law's main objective is to provide a comprehensive legal framework for the safe use of modern biotechnology and its products, aligning the country with international commitments like the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ¹⁷⁹¹⁸⁰.

The law establishes the National Biosafety Authority (Autorité Nationale de Biosécurité )(ANB) as the competent authority and requires a risk-based approach to biotechnology. It mandates a "systematic risk assessment and management procedure (systématisation de la procédure d'évaluation et de gestion des risques) for all projects involving modern biotechnology" (p. 3) ¹⁸¹. Crucially, it establishes a formal system for physical containment. Article 26 of the law states: "Laboratories, greenhouses, and large-scale production facilities are classified into containment levels according to increasing risk level. Four containment levels are established…" (p. 5) ¹⁸²

However, the law's explicit scope is primarily focused on genetically modified organisms (GMOs). It does not provide specific, detailed national regulations for operational practices, mandatory failure reporting systems, or cybersecurity for facilities storing dangerous natural pathogens and toxins.

While the national law lacks specific operational detail for all pathogen types, Senegal's key reference laboratories adhere to international best practices. The Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) is a designated WHO Collaborating Centre for multiple diseases, including viral hemorrhagic fevers ¹⁸³. This status requires adherence to the WHO's stringent international standards for laboratory practice, safety, and security.

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 100

There is an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations in Senegal.

The National Biosafety Authority (Autorité Nationale de Biosécurité (ANB) ¹⁸⁴ is the central government agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the biosafety law. The ANB was formally established and its mandate defined by Law No. 2022-15 on biosafety ¹⁸⁵.

The law designates the ANB as the competent national authority responsible for implementing and enforcing the country's biosafety regulations. Its enforcement functions, as outlined in the law, include conducting risk assessments, issuing permits for activities involving biological agents, and carrying out inspections to ensure compliance. Article 7 of the law officially establishes the ANB as the "service technique compétent en matière de biosécurité" (the competent technical service for biosecurity matters) (p. 3) ¹⁸⁶, including in laboratoiries. As such, Art. 12 of the law states that "…general safety measures, such as Good Laboratory Practices (bonnes pratiques de laboratoire)… must be rigorously respected…", while the Art. 26 establishes the required facility standards for the laboratories (i.e., "confinement level" based on risk).¹⁸⁷

The ANB is active in building national capacity and has organized training on these topics for its staff and other stakeholders ¹⁸⁸. These workshops are specifically for biosafety inspectors and laboratory staff, training them on the new risk assessment procedures and inspection standards required by the 2022 law.

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

There is no public evidence that Senegal requires biosecurity training using a standardized, national approach for personnel working in facilities with dangerous pathogens. While high-quality training is available through various institutions, it is provided on an ad hoc basis and is not mandated by a single, common curriculum or national law.

Senegal's biosecurity training landscape is characterized by internationally supported programs rather than a single, government-mandated curriculum.
Partners like the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) support the strengthening of laboratory systems, which includes mentorship on biosecurity and biological risk management ¹⁸⁹. The Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), that hosts the Africa CDC's Regional Centre of Excellence for Biosafety and Biosecurity Training, provides standardized, certified courses to professionals from across West Africa ¹⁹⁰¹⁹¹. For example, in March 2025, it hosted a course on biological waste management where participants received a Level 1 certification upon successful completion ¹⁹². In September 2024, it ran an intensive, certified course on biosafety and biosecurity for laboratory professionals from Togo, demonstrating its role in disseminating standardized knowledge ¹⁹³.

Furthermore, the National Biosafety Authority (ANB), created in 2022, has a mandate to set rules and conduct inspections, but there is no evidence that it has implemented a required, standardized training program for all relevant personnel ¹⁹⁴.

According to the National Laboratory Policy (2018), the policy acknowledged this gap, identifying "insufficient continuous training of laboratory personnel" as a key weakness (p. 14) ¹⁹⁵. The National Laboratory Policy does contain provisions to address this shortcoming. Strategic Axis 2.2 of the plan is dedicated to "Strengthening the quality of training for laboratory personnel" (p. 19) ¹⁹⁶. The strategies outlined include: Developing a national training plan for laboratory staff; Strengthening the training of trainers; Reinforcing continuous education for personnel (p. 19) ¹⁹⁷.
This confirms a formal commitment to improve training, but not yet a nationally required, standardized program.

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research.

Senegal has established legal and ethical bodies to oversee biological research, but there is a lack of evidence of a specific national assessment of dual-use research. The 2022 National Biosafety Law established the ANB as the central body for regulating activities involving biological agents ¹⁹⁸. Its mandate includes conducting risk assessments and issuing permits, creating a mechanism to monitor declared research ¹⁹⁹. However, the law's focus is on the risks associated with modern biotechnology (primarily GMOs) and does not contain explicit provisions or definitions for "dual-use research."

National Ethics Committee (Comité National d'Ethique pour la Recherche en Santé (CNERS) ²⁰⁰ is the entity that ensures all health research requires approval and research complies with ethical standards ²⁰¹. This provides a mandatory ethical review layer for any declared research, which would implicitly include research that could have dual-use potential.

While Senegal is a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has laws criminalizing the illicit production of biological agents, its public reports do not contain an assessment of ongoing research ²⁰². A search for a national assessment or inventory of dual-use research was conducted on the official websites of the Ministry of Health and Social Action, the Ministry of Livestock and Animal Production. No such assessment was found.

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

Senegal has regulations requiring oversight of research with dangerous pathogens, which is managed through a multi-layered framework. However, the regulations establish a general framework for all biological and health research and there is no explicitly defining "dual-use research" or "especially dangerous pathogens."

The regulatory framework covers all research involving biological materials and human health, which by extension includes research on dangerous pathogens and potential dual-use research. However, there is insufficient evedence on specific terminology "dual-use research" defined in the key legal texts.

The 2022 National Biosafety Law (No. 2022-15) established the ANB to regulate modern biotechnology ²⁰³. Its oversight is based on a mandatory risk assessment and permit system. The law's focus is on genetically modified organisms (GMOs), but its principles of risk assessment and containment would implicitly apply to any research on dangerous natural pathogens conducted in a biotechnology setting, such as controlling all activities involving biological agents: "Conducting risk assessments for any proposed research…Issuing permits and authorizations before any research with regulated biological materials can begin…Carrying out inspections to ensure compliance with national biosafety and biosecurity regulations."

A second layer of mandatory oversight is provided by the National Ethics Committee for Health Research (CNERS) ²⁰⁴. All research involving human health in Senegal must undergo a rigorous ethical review and receive approval from the CNERS before it can proceed. Its founding decree states its mission is to ensure that "tout protocole de recherche qui lui est soumis, respecte les principes éthiques" (any research protocol submitted to it respects ethical principles) that protect human subjects (Article 2) ²⁰⁵. This provides a mandatory ethical review for all health research, which inherently includes projects involving dangerous pathogens, even if not explicitly singled out as "dual-use."

This national framework is further strengthened by Senegal's international obligations as a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which requires the prevention of the misuse of biological research ²⁰⁶.

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is evidence of an agency responsible for oversight of research, however there is insufficient evidence in regards to dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research.

Senegal has two main bodies responsible for this oversight. The primary agency is the National Biosafety Authority (ANB), responsible for regulating, conducting risk assessments, and issuing permits for any research involving biological agents ²⁰⁷, but there is nothing specific about dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogenes with pandemic potential.

Additionally, all health-related research requires mandatory ethical review and approval from the National Ethics Committee for Health Research (CNERS) ²⁰⁸.

There is public evidence that this oversight mechanism is functional and has reviewed projects involving dangerous pathogens. The CNERS publishes the list of research protocols it has evaluated on its official website. A review of these public records confirms that the committee has provided ethical approval for numerous studies on pathogens with epidemic potential conducted in Senegal. For example, the CNERS has reviewed and approved multiple research protocols on diseases such as Ebola, HIV, and Tuberculosis, demonstrating that the ethical oversight body does, in practice, review research involving dangerous pathogens ²⁰⁹, butt no other dual-research, hence the score of the indicator.

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

Senegal has no legislation or regulations in place that require the screening of synthesized DNA orders against lists of known pathogens and toxins.

While Senegal updated its National Biosafety Law (No. 2022-15) in 2022, the law's primary focus is on regulating the use, handling, and transboundary movement of living modified organisms (LMOs) ²¹⁰. A review of this law confirms that it does not contain any specific provisions or requirements for companies that synthesize DNA to screen orders for potentially dangerous sequences. The law's definitions and articles are centered on the regulation of genetically modified organisms and modern biotechnology, not the commercial synthesis of genetic material itself.

This gap was previously identified in external assessments. The 2021 Global Health Security (GHS) Index, which evaluates countries' health security capacities, gave Senegal a score of 0 on the indicator for "Screening of gene synthesis orders." The report specifically noted that "Senegal does not have national-level oversight of gene/genome synthesis" (p. 28) ²¹¹.

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 0

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 0

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) for livestock in Senegal are publicly available through the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE) database, but there are no data on the number/figures of vaccinations.

World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), which is WOAH's official platform for publishing data on animal diseases, provides public reports from countries ²¹². Within the WAHIS platform, this information is found in the six-monthly reports submitted by Senegal. For example, in the second six-monthly report for 2023, under the section for Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Senegal reported on the number of outbreaks, susceptible animals, and the total number of animals vaccinated against the disease during that period ²¹³. This confirms that a mechanism for reporting is in place and is actively used, but the vaccination is missing.

Senegal, as a member of WOAH, has to submit regular reports on the status of WOAH-listed diseases, including quantitative data on vaccination. The national authority responsible for submitting this information is the Directorate of Veterinary Services (Direction des Services Vétérinaires (DSV) ²¹⁴.

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Senegal has a national immunization strategy that includes plans for equitable distribution and strategies to overcome barriers to access.

This strategy is the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) (Programme Élargi de Vaccination (PEV). The program is managed by the Ministry of Health and Social Action and is a core component of the country's main health strategy, the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028. The PNDSS explicitly aims to reinforce primary prevention through vaccination (p. 59-60) . The program aligns with global frameworks like the Immunization Agenda 2030 (IA2030), which aims to ensure equitable access to vaccines for all ²¹⁵. The PEV provides a comprehensive schedule of free vaccines for children and women. It is implemented through a decentralized, multi-tiered health system that extends from national hospitals down to local health huts, ensuring wide geographic coverage and a wide range of diseases. As of July 2025, with the introduction of the new hexavalent vaccine, the routine schedule for infants includes protection against tuberculosis (BCG), polio, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type b, measles, rubella, and rotavirus ²¹⁶. The program has also successfully introduced newer vaccines, such as the one for human papillomavirus (HPV) ²¹⁷.

The PEV is delivered through fixed-site vaccination at health facilities and outreach strategies to reach remote communities. The PNDSS confirms the use of "stratégies avancées intégrées" (integrated advanced strategies) and "équipes mobiles" (mobile teams) to serve hard-to-reach populations (p. 36), including border districts and nomadic communities.

Senegal works in close partnership with the WHO and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, for technical and financial support. This coordination is central to the PEV's success. The WHO provides critical technical guidance for the introduction of new vaccines. A recent, major example is the launch of the hexavalent vaccine in July 2025. The WHO played a central role in this transition, supporting the training of nearly 6,000 health workers on the specifics of the new vaccine and its strict cold chain requirements. The WHO also supported the development of communication materials to explain the change to parents and ensure continued public trust .

Gavi provides significant financial support for Senegal's vaccine procurement. The introduction of the hexavalent vaccine was primarily funded by Gavi, with the organization covering most of the costs for the vaccine doses. As part of the Gavi model, the Senegalese government contributes a co-financing share of 20%, demonstrating a sustainable partnership and national commitment to the program's long-term success .

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Senegal's national immunization strategy includes comprehensive measures to address vaccine hesitancy and build public trust through a multi-faceted communication and community engagement strategy.

This strategy is the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) (Programme Élargi de Vaccination (PEV). The program is managed by the Ministry of Health and Social Action and is a core component of the country's main health strategy, the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028. The PNDSS explicitly aims to reinforce primary prevention through vaccination (p. 59-60) . The program aligns with global frameworks like the Immunization Agenda 2030 (IA2030), which aims to ensure equitable access to vaccines for all ²¹⁸. The PEV provides a comprehensive schedule of free vaccines for children and women. It is implemented through a decentralized, multi-tiered health system that extends from national hospitals down to local health huts, ensuring wide geographic coverage and a wide range of diseases. As of July 2025, with the introduction of the new hexavalent vaccine, the routine schedule for infants includes protection against tuberculosis (BCG), polio, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type b, measles, rubella, and rotavirus ²¹⁹. The program has also successfully introduced newer vaccines, such as the one for human papillomavirus (HPV) ²²⁰.communautaires) (p. 15) ²²¹. However, the plan does not specifically discuss comprehensive measures to address vaccine hesitancy and build public trust through a multi-faceted communication and community engagement strategy.

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Senegal has a national advisory group that provides technical guidance and advice on its immunization strategy to the government.

Consultative Committee for Vaccination in Senegal (Comité Consultatif pour la Vaccination au Sénégal (CCVS) ²²²²²³ is the body that provides technical guidance and advice on its immunization strategy to the government. Established by ministerial decree in March 2013, the CCVS functions as Senegal's National Immunization Technical Advisory Group (NITAG) ²²⁴.

The committee's primary role is to provide independent, evidence-based scientific and technical recommendations to the Minister of Health to guide the country's vaccination policies and strategies ²²⁵.

Its secretariat is managed by the Ministry of Health's Directorate of Prevention to ensure a direct link to the government's operational arm for immunization ²²⁶. The committee meets quarterly and has provided key recommendations on the introduction of vaccines for COVID-19, Hepatitis B, and Meningitis ²²⁷²²⁸.

A 2024 report on the development of this plan explicitly states that the final validation of the proposed vaccination strategies will be submitted to the CCVS for its expert opinion ²²⁹.

In addition, Senegal has self-reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) that it has a National Umminization Technical Advisory Group (NITAG).

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has a immunization program for influenza.

The World Health Organization (WHO) Joint External Evaluation for Senegal (2023) does not mention a vaccination plan related to influenza. ²³⁰

In July 2025, Senegal introduced the hexavalent vaccine into ints National Immunization Programme, which protects against six diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type B (Hib), and poliomyelitis. ²³¹ Nevertheless, there is no reference to seasonal influenza. ²³²

According to a 2023 study in Senegal, there is no national recommendation for routine influenza vaccination in Senegal. ²³³

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 100

Senegal's primary national health strategy includes measures to build a health system resilient to the challenges of climate change, specifically including the threat of infectious diseases. This is detailed within the National Health Policy Strategy Plan (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social) (PNDSS) 2019-2028 ²³⁴.

The PNDSS frames environmental health as a major national concern, acknowledging the increasing "exposure of African countries to natural disasters related to climate change" (p. 27) ²³⁵. The PNDSS acknowledges the increasing "exposure of African countries to natural disasters related to climate change" (p. 27) and outlines specific actions to build resilience. For instance, Action Line 34 addresses the health impacts of recurrent flooding by calling for the availability of biocidal products for vector control, while Action Line 23 reinforces the "One Health" approach to manage threats at the human-animal-environment interface (p. 58, 55) ²³⁶.

Additionally, Senegal's updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), submitted to the UNFCCC in 2020, serves as the country's main strategic document on climate change ²³⁷. The NDC identifies public health as a priority sector for adaptation. It explicitly states an objective to "reduce the incidence of climate-sensitive diseases" and highlights the need to strengthen monitoring and early warning systems for these pathologies (p. 42) ²³⁸.

In 2025, the country officially adopted its National Adaptation Plan for the agricultural sector, which includes livestock, fisheries, and forestry ²³⁹. This plan is critical for health resilience, as it aims to build the capacity of sectors where zoonotic diseases often emerge (p. 35). By adapting livestock and agricultural systems to climate change, the plan directly contributes to preventing the spillover of infectious diseases from animals to humans ²⁴⁰.

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 100

Senegal's national laboratory system has demonstrated the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for well over five of the 10 WHO-defined core tests, such as Bacterial culture for Salmonella enteritidis serotype typhi; Viral culture for poliovirus; PCR for influenza virus; Serology for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Microscopy for Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Rapid diagnostic testing for Plasmodium spp., which cause malaria.

In 2016, WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) noted capacity for three to four main tests (p. 27), more recent evidence confirms a significant expansion ²⁴¹.

The official government body responsible for coordinating the national laboratory network is the Directorate of Laboratories (Direction des Laboratoires)²⁴², and the overarching strategy is outlined in the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, which prioritizes strengthening the laboratory system to combat major diseases (p. 61-63) ²⁴³.

The national laboratory network is a pyramidal structure supported by high-level reference laboratories, primarily the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) and the Laboratoire National de Santé Publique (LNSP) ²⁴⁴²⁴⁵.

The national laboratory system has proven capacity for a wide range of core diagnostic tests, including: HIV serology and molecular tests ²⁴⁶²⁴⁷; Tuberculosis diagnosis using advanced molecular methods like GeneXpert (p. 61) ²⁴⁸; Malaria testing using both microscopy and Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) ²⁴⁹; Influenza surveillance using PCR at the IPD, which serves as the National Influenza Center ²⁵⁰²⁵¹; and Cholera confirmation by culture ²⁵². Rapid diagnostic testing (RDT) for malaria: The Institut Pasteur de Dakar produces and deploys rapid tests, which are crucial for detecting Plasmodium species in low-resource settings.

Furthermore, the WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 confirms that the system has strengthened its capacity in Senegalningitis surveillance and systematically performs laboratory confirmations for suspected cases of Measles and Rubella (p. 27-32) ²⁵³.

Finally, the national system monitors enteric bacteria as part of its AMR surveillance, which includes testing for Salmonella and Shigella, according to a 2018 review. ²⁵⁴ This confirms a demonstrated capacity to conduct at least eight of the ten core tests.

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing.

Prior to 2020, Senegal had a general emergency response structure in place, guided by the National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) for 2019-2023 ²⁵⁵. This plan established the COUS as the central coordinating body for all health crises and outlined its role in managing surveillance, alerts, and response operations ^{256, p. 15}. However, this overarching plan did not contain a specific, detailed strategy for conducting diagnostic testing during an epidemic, nor did it include explicit considerations for novel pathogens or scaling laboratory capacity. ²⁵⁷

The World Health Organization (WHO) supported the implementation of a Emergency Management Programme for the preparation, prevention, and response in the face of emergencies, focused on the improvement of the country's capacities to reduce risks (pp. 16-17). ²⁵⁸ However, there is no mention for conducting testing. ²⁵⁹

The operational strategy for testing was first detailed in the "Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19" (National Multisectoral Contingency Plan for the Fight against COVID-19), published in March 2020 ²⁶⁰. This plan, created specifically for the COVID-19 response, was the first public document to outline the key components of a national testing strategy, that included: Surveillance and case detection for a novel pathogen (p. 29); Laboratory diagnosis and confirmation (Diagnostic biologique au laboratoire) (p. 33) and the strategy for scaling capacity by decentralizing testing to a network of laboratories across the country, with over 30 public and private laboratories across all 14 regions of the country, demonstrating a clear plan to decentralize and increase testing volume during an emergency ²⁶¹.

The national strategy for testing during the COVID-19 pandemic was coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Social Action in collaboration with the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) ²⁶²²⁶³.

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

Senegal has evidence of national reference laboratories that are accredited to international standards, including the specific ISO 15189 standard in Senegaldical laboratories.

The Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) ²⁶⁴ serve as the country's main reference facilities for WHO-accredited center for various diseases, is certified according to the ISO 15189:2012 standard ²⁶⁵. The Laboratoire de Biologie Médicale (Medical Biology Laboratory) at the IPD is officially accredited by the West African Accreditation System (SOAC)²⁶⁶ and covers its activities in biochemistry ²⁶⁷.

A major achievement occurred in June 2022, when the Laboratoire National de Santé Publique (LNSP), or National Public Health Laboratory, was officially accredited according to the ISO 15189:2012 standard ²⁶⁸. This accreditation, granted by the West African Accreditation System (SOAC), covers a range of activities including clinical chemistry, hematology, immunology, and bacteriology, and confirms that the LNSP has a robust quality management system and the technical competence to produce reliable results ²⁶⁹.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has also highlighted that Senegal's HIV reference laboratory was the first public health laboratory in West Africa to achieve international accreditation ²⁷⁰.

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

Senegal's national reference laboratories are subject to external quality assurance review through multiple international and regional mechanisms.

While there is not one national laboratory for quality assurance, Senegal's commitment to quality is managed by the Directorate of Laboratories (Direction des Laboratoires). This directorate, within the Ministry of Health and Social Action, is the official national body responsible for implementing policy, defining standards, and overseeing the quality assurance of the entire national laboratory network ²⁷¹.

According to the West African Accreditation System (SOAC), in 2022 and 2023, LNSP and IDP were officially accredited according to the ISO 15189:2012 standard ²⁷²²⁷³, after undergoing a rigorous external quality assurance review, and maintaining this accreditation requires ongoing, successful participation in external quality assessment (EQA) and proficiency testing schemes.

IPD as a designated WHO Collaborating Centre for multiple diseases, including arboviruses and viral hemorrhagic fevers ²⁷⁴, regularly participates in WHO-led external quality assurance programs to ensure their diagnostic proficiency meets global standards.

According to Fondation Mérieux (2020), Senegal is a key member of the West African Network of Biomedical Analysis Laboratories (RESAOLAB). A primary function of this network is to organize and supervise EQA sessions for laboratories across the region. The Direction des Laboratoires (Directorate of Laboratories) works with RESAOLAB to ensure Senegalese labs are included in these external quality reviews ²⁷⁵.

Lastly, the 2016 JEE of IHR Core Capacities report states that in Senegal "there are WHO-accredited referral laboratories that take part in external evaluation tests" without giving any details of which laboratories those were ²⁷⁶.

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 100

Senegal has a national specimen transport system in place, which has been significantly strengthened and formalized in recent years, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic.

Senegal's specimen transport system is a multi-modal network designed to move samples from peripheral health posts to district, regional, and national reference laboratories. The 2016 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities confirmed the existence of this system, stating that "A system is in place to transport specimens of diseases under surveillance in 50% to 80% of health districts to the national referral laboratories" (p. 28) ²⁷⁷. Nevertheless, The 2016 JEE included a priority recommendation to "implementing a coordinated and harmonized system for transporting specimens" and "standardizing procedures for taking, packaging and transporting specimens," indicating that formal national rules were not in place at the time (p. 34) ²⁷⁸.

The Directorate of Laboratories (Direction des Laboratoires) and the Pharmacie Nationale d'Approvisionnement (PNA), which is the national medical store, play central roles in the coordination and logistics of this system ²⁷⁹. This system operates on a hub-and-spoke model, where samples are collected locally and consolidated for transport to regional or national laboratories like the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) and the Laboratoire National de Santé Publique (LNSP) ²⁸⁰²⁸¹.

The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 also confirms ongoing support for strengthening the "transport of specimens" as part of its health emergencies program (p. 53) ²⁸².

The COVID-19 pandemic served as a major catalyst for strengthening the system, leading to an optimization of transport routes and an increase in logistical capacity to ensure the timely delivery of samples from all 14 regions (p. 6) ²⁸³.

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak.

While Senegal demonstrated a clear capacity to rapidly authorize and scale laboratory testing during the COVID-19 pandemic, its formal overarching emergency plan (COUS) ²⁸⁴, the Plan Stratégique National du Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) 2019-2023, does not contain a specific, detailed strategy for the rapid authorization of laboratories ²⁸⁵.

The detailed operational plan was developed specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic in the "National Multisectoral Contingency Plan for the Fight against COVID-19" (Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19" ²⁸⁶. This disease-specific plan was the first public document to outline the key components of a national testing surge strategy. It confirmed that the response would be coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Social Action (p. 33) and detailed the strategy of decentralizing diagnostics to scale up capacity.

The plan's implementation serves as the primary evidence of a functional mechanism to authorize laboratories in an emergency, which, while proven effective, is not codified in a new national plan. As detailed in a 2022 presentation ²⁸⁷ noted that "It was necessary to rapidly decentralize the diagnosis to bring the laboratories closer to the populations" (p. 6) ²⁸⁸. This strategy of rapid authorization and integration was highly successful, expanding the national network to include "more than 30 public and private laboratories" across all 14 regions (p. 6) ²⁸⁹. This demonstrated capacity now serves as the country's proven model for scaling up testing in a future public health emergency.

This operational plan is overseen by the Directorate of Laboratories (Direction des Laboratoires), the government authority responsible for laboratory authorizations ²⁹⁰.

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

Senegal has a robust national framework for conducting ongoing, integrated event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis for notifiable and novel infectious diseases.

Senegal's strategy is built on its Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system, known locally as SIMR (Surveillance Intégrée de la Maladie et la Riposte) ²⁹¹. This system functions as the primary mechanism for indicator-based surveillance and is managed by the Directorate of Prevention (Direction de la Prévention) within the Ministry of Health ²⁹², which is officially responsible for epidemiological surveillance and response to epidemics. The official National Technical Guide for IDSR establishes a mandatory reporting framework for a list of 44 priority diseases and public health events, including epidemic-prone zoonotic diseases like viral hemorrhagic fevers (Table 1, p. 36) ²⁹³.

The data is managed using the DHIS2 electronic platform, which is designed for both aggregate (indicator-based) and case-based (event-based) data collection ²⁹⁴. The strategic importance of this system is reaffirmed in the WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal (2024–2028), which makes the "strengthening of the epidemiological surveillance system (SIMR)" a key priority (p. 23) ²⁹⁵.

Complementing the formal indicator-based system, Senegal has a well-developed event-based surveillance mechanism anchored at the community level. This relies on a network of Community Surveillance and Alert Committees (CVAC), which are trained to detect and report unusual health events and rumors, serving as a critical early warning system ²⁹⁶.

The guide defines standardized case definitions and mandates weekly reporting from all levels of the health pyramid, from local health posts to the national level, with data flowing from local health posts to the district level, from the district to the regional level, and from the regional to the national level (p. 20) ²⁹⁷. This ensures that a complete national epidemiological picture is available for analysis each week.

While routine weekly bulletins are not consistently published on the Ministry of Health website, the country demonstrated the capacity for daily analysis and public reporting during the COVID-19 pandemic, and publishes official reports on major outbreaks like the 2023-2024 dengue epidemic ²⁹⁸²⁹⁹. However, the inconsistency of the weekly reports published on the Ministry of Health website, doesn'ty provide sufficinet evidence tha data is being analysed on a daily basis.

The analysis of all surveillance data is centralized at the Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS), the national public health emergency operations center .

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

Senegal has a publicly available mechanism for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO, which is managed through its designated National IHR Focal Point.

According to the IDSR, the official reporting process is integrated into the country's national surveillance system. Senegal's National Technical Guide for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) establishes the list of 44 priority diseases and events that require mandatory reporting from all levels of the health system (p. 19-20) ³⁰⁰. The guide details the flow of information, stating that when a potential public health event is detected, it is escalated through the health pyramid to the national level for assessment.

The Minister of Health officially installed the Head of the Division of Health Control at Borders as the designated focal point, in February 2024, supported by a team from key directorates like the Directorate of Prevention ³⁰¹. The National IHR Focal Point ensures the national-level assessment and official communication with the WHO, so when a notifiable disease is detected via the IDSR system, a clear and official channel exists for timely reporting to the WHO.

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 100

The Senegalese government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system, the District Health Information System 2 (DHIS2) ³⁰², at both the national and sub-national levels.

The system is a core component of the country's Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) framework ³⁰³. The IDSR system is a hierarchical network for data collection and reporting. The process begins at the most peripheral levels (health posts and community sites), where healthcare workers collect data on priority diseases ^{304, p.16-18}. This information is then entered into the DHIS2 platform.

The data flows upwards through the health pyramid for aggregation and analysis (Fig. 6, p.63). ³⁰⁵ Key entities involved in this process include Infirmiers Chefs de Poste (Head Nurses at Health Posts) at the local level, the Médecin-chef de District (District Chief Medical Officer), and the Médecin-chef de Région (Regional Chief Medical Officer) at the sub-national levels. All data is ultimately centralized at the national level under the Direction de la Prévention (Directorate of Prevention) within the Ministry of Health ³⁰⁶³⁰⁷.

The WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal (2024–2028) highlights the importance of this system, noting the need to ensure the "interoperability of different health information systems" to create a unified platform (p. 23) ³⁰⁸.

Recent reports confirm the system is fully operational nationwide. Evidence from the WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 notes that the number of districts using the DHIS2 platform for weekly epidemiological surveillance reporting reached 100% in 2023 (p. 27) ³⁰⁹.

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 100

Senegal's electronic surveillance system collects ongoing laboratory data, and there is evidence that this data can be disaggregated and analyzed by demographic variables such as age.

Senegal's national electronic surveillance system, the District Health Information System 2 (DHIS2) ³¹⁰, is designed to integrate laboratory data with epidemiological information. The National Technical Guide for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) ³¹¹ specifies that laboratory results are a key component of case confirmation and should be recorded in the official notification forms (p. 19-20) ³¹².

Evidence from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ³¹³ has supported the Ministry of Health in enhancing laboratory data management by upgrading and deploying the LabBook laboratory information system (LIMS) in regional and district laboratories ³¹⁴. This system is designed to connect with and feed data into the national DHIS2 platform, creating a pathway for ongoing laboratory data collection. These are general purpose platforms designed to handle data from all public health and laboratory functions, not just one disease-specific program.

Furthermore, the WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 confirms that the number of districts performing case-based surveillance with laboratory confirmation for diseases like meningitis has doubled, which would not be possible without a system for collecting and transmitting lab data (p. 27) ³¹⁵.

As detailed in the National IDSR Guide, the surveillance data collected can be disaggregated and analyzed by key demographic variables, which include fields for patient information such as age and sex (p. 20) ³¹⁶.

The DHIS2 platform itself is built to support this kind of analysis, allowing public health officials to generate reports and dashboards that break down disease trends by these variables. The COVID-19 pandemic response provided a clear example of this, with the Ministry of Health regularly publishing epidemiological bulletins that analyzed case data by age and geographic location ³¹⁷.

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 100

There is evidence of an ongoing national wastewater or environmental surveillance programme in Senegal.

Environmental surveillance was officially established in 2017 in Senegal, as part of a collaboration between the Prevention Office at the Senegalese Ministry of Health and Social Action (MoHSAS), the Dakar Medical Region, Institut Pasteur de Dakar, the National Office of Sanitization in Senegal, and WHO. ³¹⁸ Sewage samples were collected monthly from 2 sites located in the city of Dakar (Khourounar lifting station and Cambérène sewage treatment site).

Moreover, support for integration of polioviruses environmental surveillance with other wastewater pathogens saw the region collaborate with partners in the Mpox wastewater surveillance project in Democratic Republic of Congo and the European Union Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) wastewater project in AFRO that seeks to support Countries and development partners have clear guidance on minimum capacity need and investment requirements to establish and sustain a credible wastewater and environmental surveillance programme. This resulted in four pilot countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia) being supported in selecting priority pathogens based on local context and public health significance, feasibility, acceptability, and how best to integrate with existing surveillance and response systems, as well as multi-target wastewater and Environmental surveillance. Scoping visits were conducted in the four pilot countries where the WHO prioritisation tool was applied to help countries select priority pathogens. Microplanning was conducted for its implementation, after which budgets were drawn up, and implementation is planned for 2026.³¹⁹ However, there is no evidence on whether this has been implemented yet, whether it is national/sub-national, or whether it is expected to be long-running.

Finally, the country has made progress by planning to host the "West and Central Africa Regional Workshop on Wastewater Surveillance for Environmental and Public Health" in 2026. This workshop, part of UNEP’s Wastewater Surveillance for Africa (WWS) initiative, will bring together government officials, researchers, and key partners from West and Central Africa countries. Over three days, participants will explore how wastewater surveillance can serve as a powerful tool for public health protection, environmental management, and pandemic preparedness.³²⁰

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 50

Electronic health records (EHRs) are not yet commonly in use nationwide in Senegal, but there is evidence of their implementation and use in specific, high-level health facilities.

The National Health Policy Strategy Plan 2019-2028 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social) (PNDSS) explicitly includes the "digitalization of the patient file" (digitalisation du dossier patient) as a key strategic action to improve the health system (p. 50) ³²¹. This strategy is being implemented by the Health and Social Security Card Unit, Digital Health Unit, and Health Observatory (Cellule de la Carte Sanitaire et Sociale, de la Santé Digitale et de l'Observatoire de la Santé) (CSSDOS), a dedicated unit within the Ministry of Health tasked with coordinating all national e-health initiatives ³²².

As of February 2025, the Healthcare system digitization program (Programme de digitalisation du système de santé) (PDSS) has made concrete progress. According to the CSSDOS, a software for a "single shared patient file" (dossier patient unique partagé (DUPP) has been developed and deployed in at least two major hospitals . This system has successfully enrolled approximately 100,000 patients . The government's plan is to continue this rollout, with the next phase focused on testing the "portability of the medical record" by expanding the system to lower-level health posts and health centers .

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal's national public health system has generalized access to the electronic health records (EHRs) of individuals.

While Senegal has a national strategy to implement a unified EHR system (p 50) ³²³ , it is still in the early stages of deployment. The current system, known as the "dossier patient unique partagé (DUPP)," is operational in a few pilot hospitals, such as Abass Ndao in Dakar and the hospital in Kaffrine, and has enrolled approximately 100,000 patients ³²⁴³²⁵.

However, these implementations are not yet interconnected in a national network. The coordinator of the national e-health unit (CSSDOS) has stated that the next phase of the project is to "test… the portability of the medical record" between different levels of the health system ³²⁶. This confirms that as of 2025, the national public health system does not yet have unified access to these records, and the infrastructure for such access is still under development. ³²⁷

In January 2025, it was reported that Senegal had expanded the digitalization of patient records to other healthcare facilities after a pilot phase in the Abass Ndao Hospital in Dakar. ³²⁸ Senegalese authorities announced that it was expected that 1.5 million patients would have their electronical medical record between 2023 and 2027 as part of the Health System Digitalization Program (PDSS). ³²⁹

In addition, the Health and Social Card Unit, Digital Health and Health Observatory (CSSDOS) stated in July 2025 that its platform had enabled the enrollment of more than 144,000 patients, the sending of more than 14,000 appointments by SMS and the delivery of 74,000 medical services. ³³⁰

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has implemented a comprehensive, nationwide data standard to ensure all health data is comparable.

The Strategic Plan for Digital Health 2018-2023 established the government's official commitment to creating a standardized and interoperable national health information system ³³¹. This strategy explicitly recognized the problem of fragmented and non-standardized systems. One of its key objectives is to "ensure the coherence of digital health projects with health policy priorities and standards" and to "ensure the definition and respect for standards and the interoperability of digital health platforms" (p. 4) ³³².

The implementation of this strategy is led by the Cellule de la Carte Sanitaire et Sociale, de la Santé Digitale et de l'Observatoire de la Santé (CSSDOS), the national e-health unit ³³³. While significant progress has been made in deploying systems like DHIS2 for surveillance and piloting EHRs, a unified national data standard (like an ISO standard) that makes all systems comparable has not yet been fully implemented across the country.

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 100

Senegal has established mechanisms for data sharing between the ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance, through the national One Health Platform.

Senegal has made significant progress in institutionalizing a One Health approach ³³⁴, coordinated by the High National Council for Global Health Security. The National One Health Platform is a coordinating mechanism responsible for guiding multisectoral collaboration between the ministries of Health, Livestock, and Environment to "mobilize resources and respond quickly to health threats" ³³⁵. The decree mandates a schedule for regular meetings to ensure practical cooperation. The High National Council meets "au moins une fois par an" (at least once a year) (Article 4) ³³⁶. This ensures regular high-level strategic alignment.

This structure is put into practice through the work of seven technical working groups that were formed to develop joint strategic plans and surveillance protocols for priority zoonotic diseases, such as Rift Valley fever ³³⁷. While there is no mention of a single, consolidated weekly bulletin, the data sharing is operationalized through the Plateforme 3S One Health, an AI-powered digital platform launched in 2025. This platform serves as a "unified dashboard for managing alerts and analyzing risks," creating a functional, interconnected system for real-time data sharing between the relevant ministries ³³⁸.

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 0

Senegal makes some de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available, primarily through detailed situation reports during major outbreaks and annual statistical yearbooks.

The Ministry of Health and Social Action ³³⁹ is the primary government body responsible for disseminating public health information. While there isn't a single, real-time dashboard for all notifiable diseases, the ministry does publish data through several formats.

The ministry publishes regular epidemiological bulletins (bulletins épidémiologiques). For example, throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry provided daily and weekly detailed reports on case counts, tests, and deaths, which were widely disseminated ³⁴⁰. Similarly, during the 2023-2024 Dengue outbreak, official situation reports were shared with the public and international partners like the WHO ³⁴¹.

The Ministry of Health, produces an Annual Statistical Yearbook (Annuaire Statistique), but more recent reports are not available online ³⁴² (and the last annual report was issued in 2020). This comprehensive document provides aggregated, de-identified national data on a wide range of health indicators, including statistics on notifiable infectious diseases reported through the national surveillance system for the preceding year ³⁴³.

While the country has a demonstrated capacity for public reporting during emergencies and through annual summaries, routine, real-time surveillance data for all notifiable diseases is not consistently made available on government websites.

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 100

Senegal has a national legislation that safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information, including data generated through health surveillance activities.

The primary legal framework is Law No. 2008-12 on the Protection of Personal Data, which was adopted on January 25, 2008 ³⁴⁴³⁴⁵. This comprehensive law governs the collection, processing, transmission, and storage of all personal data.

The law explicitly defines health data as "sensitive data," affording it a high level of protection ³⁴⁶. It establishes the principles of confidentiality and security, requiring that any entity processing personal data must take all necessary precautions to "prevent the data from being distorted, damaged, or accessed by unauthorized third parties" (Article 71) ³⁴⁷. Article 71 states that the data controller must implement "all useful precautions, with regard to the nature of the data and the risks presented by the processing" in order to "preserve the security of the data and, notably, prevent it from being distorted, damaged, or accessed by unauthorized third parties ³⁴⁸. The same article provides a framework of required outcomes for security measures. It mandates that data controllers must implement measures to"Prevent sensitive data from being read, copied, modified, destroyed, or moved by unauthorized persons".

Additionally, Article 75 states that personal data can only be collected and processed by a "professionnel de la santé" (health professional) or other person who is subject to the "secret professionnel" (professional secrecy) ³⁴⁹. This places a direct legal duty of confidentiality on the individuals handling the information.

The enforcement of this law is the responsibility of the Commission des Données Personnelles (CDP), an independent administrative authority created to ensure that personal data is protected in accordance with the law ³⁵⁰.

In 2025, the Ministry of Health and Social Action held a seminar focused on the "protection of secrecy, information system security, and cybersecurity" ³⁵¹. This initiative aimed to reinforce the importance of data confidentiality and integrity across the health sector in the face of growing cyber threats.

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 100

Senegal has legislation and a national strategy that includes protections for identifiable health information against cyber attacks.

Senegal's data protection is founded on Law No. 2008-12 on the Protection of Personal Data, which establishes a comprehensive framework for data security ³⁵². Article 71 of this law mandates that any entity controlling personal data must implement all necessary technical and organizational measures to "prevent the data from being distorted, damaged, or accessed by unauthorized third parties" ³⁵³. This legal obligation provides a direct requirement for cybersecurity measures to protect sensitive health information.

This legal foundation has been significantly reinforced by the adoption of the National Cybersecurity Strategy 2022 ³⁵⁴, which identifies the health sector as a "critical infrastructure" and outlines specific objectives to mitigate the risk of cyberattacks ³⁵⁵. Strategic Objective 3.1 aims to "Strengthen the cybersecurity of critical infrastructures and essential services) by identifying these critical infrastructures and developing specific security plans for them (Renforcer la cybersécurité des infrastructures critiques et des services essentiels)" (p. 18) ³⁵⁶. Furthermore, Strategic Objective 4.1 is to "Strengthen the capacity for detection and reaction to cybersecurity incidents and crises (Renforcer les capacités de détection et de réaction aux incidents et crises de cybersécurité"), with a key planned action being the establishment of a dedicated Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) for the health sector (p. 20) ³⁵⁷.

The enforcement of data protection law is the responsibility of the Commission des Données Personnelles (CDP) ³⁵⁸. In 2025, the Ministry of Health and Social Action held a seminar dedicated to the "protection of secrecy, information system security, and cybersecurity" ³⁵⁹. This event focused on reinforcing the importance of data confidentiality and integrity across the health sector, confirming that protection against cyber attacks is an active and ongoing priority.

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 100

Senegal has made a clear commitment to share surveillance data during public health emergencies with other countries, primarily through its active participation in regional cooperative agreements and networks for more than 1 disease.

Senegal is a key participant in regional health security initiatives that mandate data sharing. The country is an active member of the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) program ³⁶⁰, a World Bank and ECOWAS initiative designed to strengthen cross-border collaborative disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness among West African nations.

This commitment has been put into practice through concrete bilateral agreements. The "Sénégambie" initiative, a model of cross-border collaboration between Senegal and The Gambia, focuses on harmonizing surveillance tools and synchronizing public health campaigns (like vaccination and drug administration) to create a unified front against diseases like malaria ³⁶¹. This initiative is still active and being implemented as of 2022, serving as a model for cross-border collaboration ³⁶². Senegal plans to develop similar action plans with its other neighbors: Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and Mali ³⁶³.

Most recently, in June 2024, Senegal's Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) conducted a cross-border simulation exercise (SIMEX) with The Gambia. This joint exercise was designed to test and validate the two countries' coordinated response to a public health event at a major border crossing . Conducting a joint simulation is definitive evidence that the cooperative agreements are not only in place but are being actively operationalized and tested to ensure they are effective in a real-world emergency.

This is all embedded within Senegal's national health strategy, the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, which adopts the International Health Regulations (IHR) and the "One Health" approach to strengthen surveillance and the coordination of health emergencies with an international scope (p. 37, 55) ³⁶⁴.

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level for contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency.

The primary document that outlines this system is the Plan Stratégique National du Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) 2019-2023 (National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center). This is Senegal's overarching, multi-disease health emergency plan and it is publicly available ³⁶⁵. While the COUS website does not contain the specific "contact tracing," its strategic plan explicitly outlines the functions that encompass this activity. The plan's mission is to "ensure the effective and efficient coordination of preparedness and response activities for all events or emergencies with a public health impact (assurer la coordination efficace et efficiente des activités de préparation et de riposte à tous les évènements ou urgences à impact de santé publique)" (p. 15) ³⁶⁶.

This coordination directly involves supporting sub-national levels to conduct case investigation, which includes contact tracing. The plan details the COUS's role in: Superviser les opérations de terrain (Supervising field operations) (p. 18) ³⁶⁷; Strengthening the "capacités opérationnelles de Riposte" (operational response capacities), which includes the deployment and support of district-level Rapid Response Teams (équipes d’intervention rapide) responsible for on-the-ground investigation (p. 26) ³⁶⁸³⁶⁹.

The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 confirms that these Rapid Response Teams were established and trained in all 79 health districts, providing the sub-national structure that the national system supports for functions like contact tracing (p. 36) ³⁷⁰.

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 50

Senegal provided both economic and medical support to enable infected people and their contacts to quarantine and self-isolate, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The government of Senegal implemented a comprehensive national framework called the Economic and Social Resilience Program (PRES) ³⁷¹ "to mitigate the economic and social impact of the coronavirus pandemic". This plan, supported by the United Nations, included specific measures that functioned as wraparound services. The UN's response framework for Senegal confirms the government developed and began implementing the PRES, which included a fund called FORCE-COVID-19 amounting to FCFA 1,000 billion (2.25 billion USD), or 7% of GDP (p. 4) ³⁷².

A major component of the PRES was providing direct support to vulnerable households and affected sectors. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) confirmed the scale of this effort, stating that "One million households received food aid (FCFA 64 billion) and utility payments (for water and electricity) for poorer customers were suspended for a 2-month period (FCFA 15.9 billion)" ³⁷³. This direct material support helped enable families to respect quarantine measures without facing immediate food insecurity. The program also provided direct support to maintain job security in hard-hit sectors like tourism and transport ³⁷⁴.

Senegal's strategy from the outset was to provide free medical care and supplies. The government committed to hospitalizing all confirmed cases and their contacts, ensuring they received necessary medical attention while in isolation ³⁷⁵. This was managed through a network of dedicated Epidemic Treatment Centers (CTE) across the country, as detailed in a 2022 presentation on the COVID-19 response which shows the operational structure of these centers (p. 10) ³⁷⁶.

The response also included a major effort to equip health facilities, with partners like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and WHO providing significant donations of personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical supplies to ensure the safety of frontline personnel ³⁷⁷.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace their contacts.

The World Health Organization (WHO) Cooperation Strategy with Senegal for 2024–2028 serves as a strategic framework to strengthen health security. The strategy noted a "low level of operationalization of health control at points of entry" as a challenge and making the "strengthening of the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) at points of entry" a strategic priority for the coming years (p. 23). ³⁷⁸

In February 2024, the Minister of Health officially installed the Head of the Division of Health Control at Borders (Division du Contrôle Sanitaire aux Frontières) as the National IHR Focal Point. ³⁷⁹ The division, part of the Ministry of Health's Directorate of Prevention, is explicitly responsible for managing health security at all points of entry and works in direct collaboration with border authorities like customs and gendarmerie, as well as setting up and running systems to monitor travelers to detect "suspected and potential cases." This includes health screening, reviewing travel histories, and coordinating with international health bodies. ³⁸⁰ However, there is no evidence that it includes a joint plan or cooperative agreemnt. ³⁸¹

The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 provides concrete evidence of this plan's implementation, noting that as part of IHR capacity building, all 26 official points of entry in Senegal have developed their own public health emergency response plans and have functional multi-sectoral coordination committees (p. 36). ³⁸²

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

Senegal has an applied epidemiology training program available in the country. The country's Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) is well-established, multi-tiered, and continuously active in strengthening the country's health security workforce.

The FETP ³⁸³ is a key component of Senegal's strategy to prepare for and respond to health threats. According to the World Health Organization, the program is a critical initiative for "strengthening the skills of actors in the health system in the field of surveillance and response to epidemics" ³⁸⁴.

The program is designed with a "One Health" approach, training a multi-sectoral workforce of "disease detectives" from the human, animal, and environmental health sectors at frontline, intermediate, and advanced levels ³⁸⁵.

The program's ongoing activity is well-documented. A brainstorming meeting was held in January 2023 to plan the development of the advanced-level FETP, with a recent cohort of residents having graduated in December 2022 ³⁸⁶. The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 further confirms the program's impact, noting that an additional 81 health professionals were trained during that period, bringing the total number of graduates to 542 since the program's inception (p. 36) ³⁸⁷.

There is no public evidence that the government provides resources to send citizens to participate in similar programs in other countries.

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 100

Senegal's field epidemiology training programs are explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals, and the country offers a specific training program for veterinarians.

According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) is built on a "One Health" approach, systematically including professionals from the animal and environmental health sectors alongside human health experts ³⁸⁸³⁸⁹. This ensures a multi-sectoral workforce capable of addressing zoonotic diseases and other health threats at the human-animal-environment interface.

In addition to the integrated FETP, Senegal has a specific program for the animal health sector called the In-Service Applied Veterinary Epidemiology Training (ISAVET)³⁹⁰. From the closing workshop for the ISAVET, supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the program provides targeted training for veterinarians and para-veterinary professionals to strengthen the country's capacity for animal disease surveillance and response³⁹¹. Recent activities include a training session in December 2022 that brought together participants from the Directorate of Veterinary Services and other key animal health bodies ³⁹²³⁹³.

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 100

There is public evidence that Senegal has at least one trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people. The country has a robust Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) that has produced a significant number of graduates, far exceeding the required threshold.

Based on a 2024 population of approximately 18.8 million, Senegal would need at least 94 trained field epidemiologists to meet the target of 1 per 200,000 people ³⁹⁴.

The country significantly surpasses this goal. According to the WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023, WHO provided technical support for the training of cohorts 3 through 18 of the frontline FETP and two intermediate cohorts, by the end of that period, with "375 people trained [at the frontline level], as well as two intermediate cohorts composed of 50 people" (p. 52). ³⁹⁵

This number is a result of a continued national commitment to the program, which trains a multi-sectoral "One Health" workforce from the human, animal, and environmental health sectors ³⁹⁶³⁹⁷.

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 66.67

Senegal has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place and the oplan is poublicly ava that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases. This is structured through a multi-hazard national plan and a specific, publicly available strategic plan for the health sector.

Senegal's national emergency response is guided by the ORSEC Plan (Organisation de la Réponse de Sécurité Civile), which is a multi-hazard plan for responding to all types of major disasters, including epidemics ³⁹⁸. This overarching framework is complemented by a specific plan for health emergencies, the National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) 2019-2023 ³⁹⁹. It does not have a dedicated budget.

The COUS Strategic Plan is the key operational document for the health sector. It was developed to manage all health crises, drawing lessons from past epidemics like Ebola. The plan's mission is to "ensure the effective and efficient coordination of preparedness and response activities for all events or emergencies with a public health impact" (p. 15) ⁴⁰⁰. It is explicitly designed to be multi-disease and covers the strengthening of surveillance, alert systems, and operational response capacities for any epidemic threat ⁴⁰¹.

The ongoing importance of this framework is highlighted in the WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal (2024–2028), which continues to prioritize support for the COUS and the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) (p. 23) ⁴⁰².

A 2022 evaluation of Senegal's health emergency preparedness and response capacity published in the Journal of Interventional Epidemiology and Public Health identified that the country has "a budget line with funding and good laboratories " and concluded that it is "necessary to provide sufficient and sustainable funds" to support preparedness and response" ⁴⁰³.

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 100

Senegal's overarching national public health emergency response plan has been strategically updated within the last three years, although a new, publicly available plan document has not yet been released.

The National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) for 2019-2023 [1], has now ended and a new plan for the subsequent period (2024-2028) has not been published on the COUS or Ministry of Health websites [2]. However, there is evidence of COUS organizing a technical validation workshop for the Senegal Multirisk Plan- a major 2024 strategic initiative [3], hosted from November 19 to 22, 2024. This plan is being developed with all stakeholders in the health sector and other One Health sectors and aims to improve the country's resilience in the face of health challenges.

The national public health emergency response plan is part of the 2023–2027 Regional Strategic Plan for Strengthening Health Emergency Operations Centers in Member States of Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean Region of the World Health Organization (WHO)[34, which was validated in 2023.

Additionally, the WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal for 2024–2028 [5] , developed in collaboration with the government, serves as the most current strategic document. This plan, published in 2024, identifies strengthening the country's capacity to prepare for and respond to health emergencies as a major priority. It explicitly calls for "strengthening the coordination of health emergencies through the COUS" and "improving the implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR)" as key actions for the next five years (p. 25) [5].

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 100

Senegal's overarching national public health emergency response plan follows One Health principles and covers multiple threat types, including zoonotic diseases, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and potential biological events.

The national strategy for health emergencies is guided by the National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) for 2019-2023, which is the most recent publicly available version ⁴⁰⁴. This plan explicitly states that the COUS works in "close collaboration with the different bodies of the High Council for Global Health Security 'One Health', ensuring a multi-sectoral approach to all health emergencies (p. 18) ⁴⁰⁵.

This is operationalized through the National Health Policy Strategy Plan (PNDSS) 2019-2028, the country's roadmap for implementing the IHR. The PNDSS is built on a One Health approach and includes specific technical areas dedicated to: Antimicrobial Resistance – developing surveillance and control measures for AMR; Zoonotic Diseases – strengthening the prevention and control of priority zoonotic diseases); Biosafety and Biosecurity, which includes preventing, detecting, and responding to accidental or deliberate biological events ⁴⁰⁶.

The country’s commitment to this integrated approach is further demonstrated by the formal establishment of the National One Health Platform by a Prime Ministerial Decree, which brings together the ministries of Health, Livestock, and Environment to coordinate the response to health threats ⁴⁰⁷.

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 100

Senegal's overarching national public health emergency response plan includes both considerations for health equity and specific mechanisms for identifying and addressing the needs of vulnerable populations.

This commitment is explicitly integrated into Senegal's key strategic health and emergency planning documents, such as the National Health and Social Development Plan (PNDSS) 2019-2028 ⁴⁰⁸. The document establishes equity as a core principle and its vision is to provide "universal access to quality health and social action services without any form of exclusion" (p. 44) ⁴⁰⁹.

The plan includes specific action lines to ensure this, such as "Strengthening the empowerment of populations, particularly vulnerable groups" (Action Line 59, p. 67) and improving the accessibility of services for the poor ⁴¹⁰.

Another document is the National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) 2019-2023⁴¹¹. This is the country's dedicated emergency response plan and it contains a specific section on vulnerable groups, demonstrating that equity is a core consideration in emergency planning ⁴¹². The plan states: "Special attention will be paid to vulnerable groups in health emergencies. These include women, children, the elderly, people living with disabilities, people living with chronic diseases, the poor, people with low literacy skills, or those living in remote areas." (p. 29) ⁴¹³

The plan further mandates that services and organizations working with these populations must integrate activities specifically adapted to their needs during a crisis (p. 29) ⁴¹⁴.

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 100

Senegal's national health plans and regulations include mechanisms for working with the private sector during an emergency outbreak response.

Senegal's national health and emergency plans explicitly integrate the private sector as a key partner. The PNDSS 2019-2028 ⁴¹⁵ includes "Action Line 10 : Strengthening Public-Private Partnership" that calls for "reinforcing collaboration with private sector health organizations" and integrating the private sector into the national health map (p. 51, 53) ⁴¹⁶. However, this is the overarching national health strategy for the entire country, not an outbreak plan. The plan calls for the "développement de la contractualisation avec les structures sanitaires privées" (development of contractualization with private health facilities) to allow the public sector to purchase services from private providers (p. 51) ⁴¹⁷. This creates a formal mechanism to leverage private sector capacity during a surge event.

Also, the PNDSS mandates the "intégration de l’offre de soins privée dans la carte sanitaire" (integration of the private healthcare offer into the national health map) (p. 53) ⁴¹⁸. This ensures that private sector resources (hospitals, clinics, labs) are officially mapped and can be incorporated into national and sub-national emergency response planning. The strategy also aims to "promote the participation of the private sector in the governance and steering bodies of the sector " (promouvoir la participation du secteur privé dans les instances de gouvernance et de pilotage du secteur) (p. 51) ⁴¹⁹.

This strategic inclusion has been operationalized through concrete actions, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The national testing strategy involved the rapid authorization and integration of private entities to scale up capacity. A 2022 presentation on the response to COVDI-19 confirmed that the expanded national network included four private laboratories that were equipped and authorized to perform RT-PCR tests (p. 15) ⁴²⁰.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Senegal had a National Epidemic Management Committee (CNGE) that allowed for multi-sectoral engagement. ⁴²¹ Moreover, In Senegal, the Ministry of Health partnered with the private sector to increase access to testing services through establishing partnerships for manufacturing COVID-19 rapid diagnostic tests. ⁴²²

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 50

Senegal has a publicly available plan that details the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic. While the most detailed operational plan was developed for the COVID-19 pandemic, it is built upon the country's general emergency response framework.

Senegal's overarching health emergency framework is the"Center for Health Emergency Operations National Strategic Plan "(Plan Stratégique National du Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire) (COUS) 2019-2023 ⁴²³. This is a general, multi-hazard plan that establishes the COUS as the central coordinating body for all health crises. Its mission is to "ensure the effective and efficient coordination of preparedness and response activities for all events or emergencies with a public health impact" (p. 15) ⁴²⁴. However, this high-level strategic plan does not contain a specific section detailing which NPIs to implement or how to deploy them.

The detailed, operational strategy for NPIs was first published in the "National multisectoral contingency plan to combat COVID-19 "(Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19)" ⁴²⁵. This plan, created specifically for the pandemic, was the first public document to outline a comprehensive framework for NPIs, including measures for hygiene, social distancing, and the use of masks (p. 31) ⁴²⁶.

Additonally, in Senegal, governments established partnerships with private sector to manufacture COVID-19 rapid diagnostic tests ⁴²⁷, showing that private sector played a key role in NPIs.

There is no publicly available evidence to show that the specific lessons from the COVID-19 NPI strategy have been formally integrated into a new, updated, publicly available overarching emergency response plan. The COUS strategic plan (2019-2023) has expired, and a new version for the post-2023 period has not been published. However, the COVID-19 contingency plan ⁴²⁸, published by the Ministry of Health and Social Action in March 2020, remains the country's most recent and detailed public reference for implementing NPIs and serves as the de facto model for future responses.

Moreover,

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 100

There is evidence that Senegal has both activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak and completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year.

The World Health Organization (WHO), through its Disease Outbreak News, reported on an ongoing dengue fever outbreak in Senegal in February 2024 ⁴²⁹. The report confirms that a national-level response was activated and is being coordinated by the Ministry of Health and Social Action, through its Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS). The official response, as detailed by the WHO, involved "enhanced epidemiological surveillance, case management, vector control, risk communication, and community engagement activities," demonstrating the implementation of the country's national emergency response plan for this infectious disease outbreak ⁴³⁰. A March 2024 report on epidemic management in the country confirmed that "the main epidemics recorded by Senegal during the year 2023 are those of Chikungunya, the Dengue epidemic, measles, and Crimean-Congo" (p. 3) ⁴³¹.

In June 2024, the COUS conducted a cross-border simulation exercise (SIMEX) with The Gambia. This national-level exercise, focused on a biological threat scenario, was designed to test the joint response to a public health event at the Karang border post, a major point of entry between the two countries ⁴³².

In October 2025, Senegal responded to an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever using its national emergency response apparatus. ⁴³³

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 50

There is public evidence that Senegal has identified a list of gaps and best practices following a recent infectious disease response, but has not developed and published a plan to improve its response capabilities.

In November 2023, the Ministry of Health and Social Action held a workshop to conduct an AAR of the national response to the dengue epidemic ⁴³⁴. The official announcement stated that the review's objective was to "identify best practices, challenges, and lessons learned in order to formulate relevant recommendations aimed at improving the quality of the response to future epidemics" ⁴³⁵. While this confirms the process of identifying gaps and developing a plan, the final list of recommendations or the improvement plan itself was not published on the Ministry's website.

Similarly, following a major outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1), the Directorate of Veterinary Services conducted an AAR with support from the FAO and USAID. A public report on this review confirmed that an improvement plan was developed based on the findings, including actions like conducting simulation exercises and strengthening the animal health surveillance network ⁴³⁶. However, the full, official plan document was not made publicly available.

However, on Senegal's Ministry of Health Ministry of Livestock (Ministère de l'Élevage et des Productions animales), the COUS, and do not have any public evidence of such an improvement plan ^437438439440.

In October 2025, Senegal launched a nationwide, multisectoral response to tackle a growing outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF), which coordinated a campaign to bring together ministries of health, agriculture, environment, and water resources, and includes surveillance, mosquito control, and livestock vaccination efforts. ⁴⁴¹

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Senegal has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that included private sector representatives in the past year.

While Senegal's National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) for 2019-2023 commits to organizing an annual simulation exercise (p. 25), there are no publicly available reports or press releases on the websites of the COUS or the Ministry of Health and Social Action detailing such an exercise taking place in the last year ⁴⁴²⁴⁴³.

The most recent documented exercises focused on specific disease responses, such as the After Action Review for the avian influenza outbreak in 2023, which resulted in a plan to conduct a future simulation exercise but did not confirm one had occurred in the past year ⁴⁴⁴.

A review of recent reports from key partners like the WHO also does not provide evidence of a national-level, multi-sectoral biological threat exercise that included the private sector during the 2024-2025 period ⁴⁴⁵.

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

Senegal has a national Health Emergency Operations Center (EOC) called the Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS).

The COUS was established by the Ministry of Health and Social Action in December 2014 following the West Africa Ebola outbreak and has been operational ever since ⁴⁴⁶⁴⁴⁷. COUS is the central coordinating body for all health crises and outlined its role in managing surveillance, alerts, and response operations ⁴⁴⁸

WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal for 2024–2028 ⁴⁴⁹, continue to identify the strengthening of the COUS as a key national priority to ensure the country is prepared to manage health emergencies (Action Line 23 – p. 55). The (COUS) "was set up to strengthen epidemic-potential disease surveillance and response, as well as multi-sectoral coordination during disasters or catastrophes of national or international scope" (P.37) ⁴⁵⁰.

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 100

Senegal's Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year.

The National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) for 2019-2023⁴⁵¹, which is the most recent publicly available version of the plan, has this stipulated in the plan. A key activity outlined in the plan under its strategic axis for strengthening preparedness is to "Organize a simulation exercise at least once a year" (p. 30) ⁴⁵².

While the strategic plan mandates an annual drill, there is no publicly available evidence, such as a press release or official report from the COUS or the Ministry of Health, confirming that a national-level simulation exercise was conducted in the past year (2024-2025) ⁴⁵³.

The most recent publicly documented exercises were After Action Reviews (AARs) for the dengue and avian influenza outbreaks in 2023, which recommended future simulation exercises but did not constitute one themselves ⁴⁵⁴⁴⁵⁵.

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no public evidence to show that Senegal's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted, within the last year, a coordinated emergency response or exercise that was activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency or scenario.

While there is evidence that the Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) was activated to coordinate the national response to a dengue fever outbreak in the past year (2023-2024)⁴⁵⁶, the publicly available reports do not specify the timeline of activation.

The official reports from the WHO ⁴⁵⁷ and the Ministry of Health ⁴⁵⁸ confirm that a response was initiated, but they do not contain the operational details required to verify if the EOC was activated within the 120-minute timeframe.

A review of the COUS website and other Ministry of Health publications did not yield any simulation exercise reports from the past year that would provide this level of detail ⁴⁵⁹.

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Senegal's public health, animal health, private sector, and national security authorities have either carried out a joint exercise to respond to a deliberate biological event or have a publicly available, specific agreement (like an SOP or MOU) for such a response.

Senegal has foundational legal structures in place that establish a basis for a multi-sectoral response, such as the One Health Framework. Another document is the National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2016-2021)⁴⁶⁰ that outlines the framework for preventing the proliferation of biological weapons, which involves coordination between health and security entities ⁴⁶¹.

Additionally, Decree No. 2002-839 established a National Commission on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons. Hosted within the Ministry of the Armed Forces, this commission is responsible for ensuring that Senegal complies with international treaties concerning these weapons, and for coordinating national action in this field ⁴⁶².

More recently, in April 2024, the National Biosafety Authority (ANB) ⁴⁶³ organized a training workshop on nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical (NRBC) risks. The stated objective was to "strengthen the capacities of national actors… for an effective response in the event of a CBRN incident," demonstrating a practical step toward building coordinated response capabilities ⁴⁶⁴.

However, despite these frameworks and training initiatives, there is no publicly available evidence of a joint simulation exercise being conducted in the past year that specifically included public health, animal health, private sector, and national security authorities ^465466467 responding to a deliberate biological event.
Furthermore, no specific, publicly available cooperative agreements, SOPs, or MOUs detailing joint response protocols for such an event were found on the websites of the relevant ministries or agencies ^468469470.

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has a plan for risk communication intended for use during a public health emergency. This is established through a general emergency response framework, although the most detailed, operational plan was developed specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Senegal's overarching health emergency framework is the Plan Stratégique National du Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) 2019-2023 ⁴⁷¹. This is a general, multi-hazard plan that establishes the COUS as the central coordinating body for all health crises. The plan includes a strategic objective to "Améliorer la communication de toutes les parties prenantes" (Improve communication for all stakeholders), which includes "Renforcer la communication de crise" (strengthening crisis communication) as a key objective (p. 8) ⁴⁷². However, this high-level strategic plan does not contain a detailed, operational risk communication plan with specific roles, messages, and channels.

The detailed, operational strategy for risk communication was first published in the "Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19" ⁴⁷³. This plan, created specifically for the pandemic, was the first public document to outline a comprehensive framework for risk communication. It establishes a dedicated commission for "Communication sur les risques et Engagement communautaire" (Risk Communication and Community Engagement) (p. 19) and details the mission to "développer et mettre en œuvre la stratégie de communication pour la riposte" (develop and implement the communication strategy for the response) (p. 10) ⁴⁷⁴. The plan outlines a comprehensive strategy that includes: Developing and disseminating targeted communication tools and messages for the public and health workers; establishing a system for monitoring and responding to rumors and misinformation; engaging community and religious leaders to build trust and ensure the effective dissemination of information (p. 49-50) ⁴⁷⁵.

Lastly, the JEE of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Senegal Mission report stated that "communications personnel are not yet specialized or trained in risk and public health emergency communication." Nevertheless, the "Information is disseminated proactively to the public through a range of channels (newspaper, radio, television, social media and the web) that are in keeping with national and local preferences and in vernacular languages, so that messages are understood by the population. Relevant technologies (mobile telephone, etc.) are used for public communication at the local level." ⁴⁷⁶

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 100

Senegal's national public health response plans outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs, including vulnerable and hard-to-reach groups.

Senegal's overarching health emergency framework is the Plan Stratégique National du Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) 2019-2023 ⁴⁷⁷. This is a general, multi-hazard plan that establishes the COUS as the central coordinating body for all health crises. The plan includes a strategic objective to "Améliorer la communication de toutes les parties prenantes" (Improve communication for all stakeholders), which includes "Renforcer la communication de crise" (strengthening crisis communication) as a key objective (p. 8) ⁴⁷⁸. However, this high-level strategic plan does not contain a detailed, operational risk communication plan with specific roles, messages, and channels.

The country's "Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19" (National Multisectoral Contingency Plan for the Fight against COVID-19) serves as the most detailed strategic document for risk communication during an emergency. The plan establishes a dedicated commission for "Risk Communication and Community Engagement", whose mission is to develop and implement a communication strategy that targets the entire population.

The plan outlines a multi-channel approach to ensure wide reach, mandating the "dissemination of messages through mass media (TV, radio), social networks, and community-based channels" (p. 31) ⁴⁷⁹. The practical application of this strategy is detailed in a list of actions undertaken during the response, which confirms the plan's intent to reach specific groups (p. 15) ⁴⁸⁰. The plan involved the "Diffusion des spots à la télé et dans les radios (y compris les radios communautaires)" (Broadcast of spots on TV and radio (including community radios); "Orientation des tradipraticiens et leaders « Bajenu Gox » sur le COVID-19" (Orientation of traditional healers and 'Bajenu Gox' leaders on COVID-19) to include vulnerable and cultural groups. It also included the "Conception et diffusion de messages pour les voyageurs" (Design and dissemination of messages for travelers) and the "Orientation des acteurs communautaires de Touba sur le COVID" (Orientation of community actors in Touba on COVID) ⁴⁸¹.

This approach of using trusted local figures is a foundational part of Senegal's health strategy, as outlined in the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, which identifies actors like relais communautaires and Bajenu Gox as essential for community-level communication (p. 59, 75) ⁴⁸².

Lastly, Senegal's 2024 State Party Self-Assessment Report (SPAR) submitted to WHO shows a great improvement as "C10: Risk communication" received a high score of 80% and the capacity for "Emergency risk communications" (C.10.1) was also assessed at 60%.⁴⁸³

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 0

Senegal's risk communication plan do not designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson during a public health emergency.

While Senegal's "Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19" establishes a detailed strategy for risk communication and community engagement, there is no evidence that it names a specific, single spokesperson ⁴⁸⁴. The plan creates a Risk Communication and Community Engagement Commission responsible for the overall communication strategy (p. 21, 31) but does not assign the role of primary spokesperson to a particular position within that commission or the government ⁴⁸⁵.

Similarly, the overarching health emergency framework, the Plan Stratégique National du Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) 2019-2023, includes the objective of strengthening crisis communication but does not designate a specific role for this function (p. 34) ⁴⁸⁶. In practice, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Coordinator of the COUS often served as a de facto spokesperson, but this was not a formally mandated role outlined in any public plan. A review of the Ministry of Health and Social Action's website and other recent strategic documents does not provide evidence of such a designation.

A review of the Ministry of Health and Social Action's website and other recent strategic documents does not provide evidence of such a designation ⁴⁸⁷.

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 100

There is public evidence that Senegal's public health system actively and regularly shares messages via online media platforms to inform the public about a wide range of ongoing health concerns, well beyond active emergencies.

The Ministry of Health and Social Action maintains a highly active and professional presence on social media, particularly on its official Facebook page ⁴⁸⁸ and X ⁴⁸⁹. A review of its activity in the past year (2024-2025) shows a consistent pattern of daily or near-daily posts covering a broad spectrum of public health topics.

This regular communication is not limited to emergencies. The ministry uses its platform to share information on: Disease Prevention (Awareness campaigns for ongoing health issues like hypertension, diabetes, and maternal health)⁴⁹⁰; Health Promotion (Information on national health events, blood drives, and healthy living advice)⁴⁹¹; Program Updates: Updates on the activities of various health directorates and programs, as well as a digital newsletter ⁴⁹²; Emergency Information are presented on X such as official Press Communicaiton about specific outbreaks, such as the Mpox in August 2025 ⁴⁹³.

The Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS), the national EOC, also maintains its own social media presence, though not through daily posts, to communicate about health emergencies and more as the recent post in June 2025 ⁴⁹⁴, about Africa CDC delegation visits the COUS and Minsitry of Health as part of the strengthening of regional cooperation in health emergency preparedness and response. This consistent, multi-platform communication on both routine health matters and emergencies demonstrates a robust system for public information sharing.

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that senior leaders in Senegal, such as the president or government ministers, have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years.

A review of public statements, media reports, and official government communications from 2023 to 2025 found no instances of senior leaders spreading false health information.

On the contrary, the government has a track record of actively combating misinformation. The Ministry of Health and Social Action consistently uses its official channels, such as its Facebook page, to provide scientifically accurate information to the public and to dispel rumors, as was seen during the 2023-2024 dengue outbreak ⁴⁹⁵⁴⁹⁶.

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 60.8

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 67.01

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 76.67

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 58.33

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Senegal has issued a restriction on the export or import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

The most significant infectious disease outbreak in Senegal in the past year was the dengue fever epidemic that occurred in 2023 and continued into 2024 ⁴⁹⁷. A review of official reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) and communications from Senegal's Ministry of Health and Social Action regarding this outbreak shows that the national response focused on public health measures such as enhanced surveillance, case management, vector control, and risk communication ⁴⁹⁸⁴⁹⁹. There is no mention in these official documents of any restrictions being placed on the trade of medical goods.

A search of the websites of the Ministry of Health and Social Action, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Senegalese Customs authority did not yield any decrees, official notices (communiqués), or regulations issued in the past year that would indicate a restriction on the import or export of medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, or personal protective equipment (PPE) in response to this or any other infectious disease outbreak ⁵⁰⁰⁵⁰¹.

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Senegal has issued a restriction on the export or import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

The most significant infectious disease outbreak in Senegal in the past year was the dengue fever epidemic that occurred in 2023 and continued into 2024 ⁵⁰². A review of official reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) ⁵⁰³ and communications from Senegal's Ministry of Health and Social Action ⁵⁰⁴ regarding this outbreak shows that the national response focused on public health measures such as enhanced surveillance, case management, vector control, and risk communication. There is no mention in these official documents of any restrictions being placed on the trade of non-medical goods like food or textiles.

A search of the websites of the Ministry of Health and Social Action, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Senegalese Customs authority did not yield any decrees, official notices (communiqués), or regulations issued in the past year that would indicate a restriction on the import or export of non-medical goods in response to this or any other infectious disease outbreak ⁵⁰⁵⁵⁰⁶.

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Senegal has implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. The country's response to recent outbreaks has been aligned with international recommendations, focusing on public health measures rather than travel bans.

According to WHO disease outbreak page, the most significant infectious disease outbreak in Senegal in the past year was the dengue fever epidemic ⁵⁰⁷ that occurred in 2023 and continued into 2024. A review of official reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) and communications from Senegal's Ministry of Health and Social Action regarding this outbreak shows that the national response focused on strengthening public health capacities ⁵⁰⁸⁵⁰⁹.

The WHO, in its official guidance on the outbreak, explicitly stated: "WHO does not recommend that any general travel or trade restrictions be applied to countries based on the available information." ⁵¹⁰

Evidence from the official Ministry of Health and Social Action Facebook page confirms Senegal's response, which included enhanced surveillance, case management, and vector control, was consistent with this international recommendation, and no travel restrictions were imposed ⁵¹¹.

A review of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites further confirms that no travel bans were issued during this period ⁵¹².

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 100

Senegal uses a risk-based approach to international travel-related measures, managed through a formal structure that aligns with the International Health Regulations (IHR).

Senegal's approach is coordinated by the Division of Health Control at Borders (Division du Contrôle Sanitaire aux Frontières), a dedicated unit within the Ministry of Health's Directorate of Prevention ⁵¹³. This division houses the National IHR Focal Point, ensuring that decisions on travel measures are based on public health risk assessments ⁵¹⁴.

The country's health strategy, the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, establishes the foundation for a risk-based approach by formally adopting the International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005 as a guiding principle for strengthening national health security (p. 37) ⁵¹⁵ and to "ensure the effective implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR)" (Action Line 23, p. 55) ⁵¹⁶. The IHR framework is inherently risk-based and requires countries to develop and maintain public health capacities at designated points of entry (airports, ports, and ground crossings) to manage the risk of the international spread of disease.

This has been implemented, as confirmed by the WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 ⁵¹⁷, which notes that all 26 official points of entry in Senegal have developed their own public health emergency response plans and have functional multi-sectoral coordination committees (p. 36) ⁵¹⁸. This demonstrates a decentralized and risk-based system for managing health threats from international travel.

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 1.08

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 4.61

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 100

Senegal has a national health workforce strategy in place that has been updated within the past five years, which identified workforce insufficiencies and outlines strategies to address them.

Senegal's primary health strategy, the National Health Policy Strategy Plan (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social)(PNDSS) 2019-2028, serves as the country's health workforce plan ⁵¹⁹. Published in 2019, this ten-year plan includes a detailed analysis of the human resources situation in the health sector, identifies significant gaps, and proposes corrective strategies. The plan explicitly states that the "répartition des personnels sanitaires est caractérisée par une plus forte concentration à Dakar" (distribution of health personnel is characterized by a stronger concentration in Dakar), leading to inequities in access to care across the country (p. 36) ⁵²⁰. This imbalance creates critical shortages in specialized care outside the capital. The PNDSS highlights this gap with a specific example: "il n’y a pas de néphrologues, d’ophtalmologistes, de neurologues, de cancérologues dans plus de 80% des EPS" (there are no nephrologists, ophthalmologists, neurologists, or oncologists in more than 80% of public health establishments) (p. 36) ⁵²¹.

To address these identified gaps, the PNDSS outlines several concrete strategies under "Action Line 20: Development of quality human resources at all levels (Ligne d’action 20 : Développement des ressources humaines de qualité à tous les niveaux ). The plan includes a strategy for the "reduction of the Human Resources gaps identified in the health map (résorption des gaps en Ressources Humaines identifiés dans la carte sanitaire) through continued recruitment and the "redeployment of Human Resources according to regional gaps (redéploiement des RH en fonction des gaps régionaux) (p. 54) ⁵²².

On the other side, the National Development Plan For Human Resources In Health And Social Action (2020-2028), launched in 2020, is the official implementation instrument for the PNDSS. It is the country's current, detailed health workforce strategy and directly addresses the shortcomings identified in the PNDSS. Its entire purpose is to provide the "reference document" for managing personnel and to "overcome the deficit in health personnel" through strategies for 1)Better planning of jobs and skills;2) Improving the production and development of health workers; 3)Ensuring the equitable distribution and retention of staff (the exact gaps your text identifies)⁵²³.

The PNDSS also provides a plan for the "répartition équitable du personnel et sa rétention" (equitable distribution of personnel and their retention) through the implementation of a mobility guide and incentive measures for staff serving in difficult areas (p. 54) ⁵²⁴.

Additionally, the Emergent Senegal Plan (Senegal Emergent Plan (Plan Sénégal Émergent))(PSE) ⁵²⁵ – Priority Action Plan 3 (PAP 3) for 2024-2028 is the government's overarching priority action plan and confirms the political and budgetary commitment to addressing health workforce shortages (p. 64-65) ⁵²⁶.

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence to show that Senegal's health system has enough capacity to deliver essential health services. While the country has a comprehensive national health strategy, recent data shows that key indicators for health system capacity, such as the number of healthcare workers and hospital beds, remain below the WHO-recommended thresholds.

The Joint external evaluation of IHR core capacities of Senegal scores the country 2 on this measure and says that plans have been prepared in order to put in place a system for sending and receiving health personnel during a public health emergency. The JEE highlights the need to regulate responsibilities and rights relating to medical personnel deployed in international operations and identify the triggers that prompt a request for personnel from other countries.⁵²⁷

Senegal's national health strategy -the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS)⁵²⁸ 2019-2028, aims to strengthen the health system and move towards Universal Health Coverage. Nevertheless, the report ⁵²⁹, provides a detailed analysis of the health system's weaknesses. The plan highlights a severe maldistribution of healthcare workers and a lack of specialized care outside of the capital region (p. 36). The plan notes that "The distribution of health personnel is characterized by a stronger concentration in Dakar" (p. 36) ⁵³⁰. This leads to significant disparities, for example, the Dakar region has a surplus of 209 midwives compared to the national standard, while other regions face critical shortages ⁵³¹.

The plan also reveals critical shortfalls in emergency care infrastructure. An analysis of specialized structures found that "only 7% of existing emergency reception services (SAU) meet minimalist standards" and "67% of operating blocks… in health centers are non-functional," often due to a lack of equipment and human resources (p. 36) ⁵³².

However, a key part of this strategy is the development of human resources for health, supported by the WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal (2024–2028), that identifies the "low ratio of health workers per inhabitant" as a major challenge and prioritizing the strengthening of the health workforce (p. 23) ⁵³³.

The most recent data from the WHO Cooperation Strategy ⁵³⁴ indicates that capacity is still limited, as data show that there were 0.9 doctors per 10,000 population (or 9 per 100,000, in 2021) ^{535, p. 12}.

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 100

Senegal has a national plan that includes measures to ensure the continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency. This was demonstrated through the country's strategic response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The "National Multisectoral Contingency Plan for the Fight against COVID-19 (Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19" ) ⁵³⁶, published in March 2020, served as the guiding document for the country's response and included a clear focus on maintaining essential services.

The plan's strategic approach was designed not only to combat the new virus but also to ensure that the existing health system could continue to function. It included a dedicated commission for "Case Management" (Commission Prise en charge des cas), which was responsible for ensuring the "continuity of services in health facilities" (p. 21, 35) ⁵³⁷. The strategy involved reorganizing the health system to create separate pathways for COVID-19 patients and those needing routine care, thereby ensuring that essential services like maternal and child health, chronic disease management, and emergency care could continue without being overwhelmed by the pandemic response (p. 35) ⁵³⁸.

Following the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, Senegal formalized a specific "Essential Services Package" to be protected during crises. As outlined in the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028⁵³⁹ , Action Line 24 explicitly prioritizes maternal and child health, immunization, and emergency care as non-negotiable services during health security events ⁵⁴⁰. Specifically, Ligne d’action 24 : Amélioration de la gestion des urgences sanitaires et de la sécurité sanitaire (Action Line 24: Improvement of the management of health emergencies and health security) ^{541, p.55}. This action line provides concrete steps to ensure the entire system can withstand a crisis, thus ensuring the continuity of services, through strengthening central coordination, ensuring multi-sectoral support, and building capacity at the sub-national level—constitute the PNDSS's formal plan to ensure that essential health services can be maintained during a public health emergency.

During the pandemic, the Ministry of Health utilized this routine health information system (DHIS2 platform) to monitor indicators (e.g., vaccine doses administered, assisted deliveries) on a monthly basis to identify and rectify service drops. This transition from static planning to active monitoring demonstrates "Developed Capacity" (Score 3 or higher) in the JEE R3.2 technical area.

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 15.1

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 100

Senegal has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in dedicated patient isolation units, known as Epidemic Treatment Centers (CTE), located across the country.

Senegal's capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases was significantly developed during the 2014 Ebola outbreak ⁵⁴², when the first CTE was opened in August 2014 in Dakar, with the first Ebola-infected patient.

The country's has a network of Epidemic Treatment Centers (CTE – Centres de Traitement des Épidémies) or Outbreak Center for Covid- 19 (OCC) within hospitals. ⁵⁴³⁵⁴⁴

The "National Multisectoral Contingency Plan to Combat COVID-19 (Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19)" details the establishment and operation of these CTEs, which are specifically designed for the "isolation and care of patients" (p. 35) ⁵⁴⁵, although there is no specification if the patients had highly communicable diseases. The response to the pandemic demonstrated this capacity in action, with CTEs established at major hospitals like Fann Hospital in Dakar and across all regions of the country to manage and isolate COVID-19 cases (p. 46) ⁵⁴⁶⁵⁴⁷.

The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 also confirms ongoing support for strengthening these CTEs as part of the country's emergency response capabilities (p. 36) ⁵⁴⁸.

There is no evidence of a new general emergency plan on COUS ⁵⁴⁹ and the COVID-19 contingency plan remains the country's most recent and detailed public reference for implementing a patient isolation strategy. There are no detaails or evidence of number of such CTE.

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Senegal has demonstrated the capacity to expand its isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years.

The national response to the large-scale dengue fever outbreak in 2023-2024 provides the most recent, direct evidence of the CTE system being activated. The World Health Organization (WHO), in its official Disease Outbreak News report from February 2024, detailed the country's response measures. The report explicitly states that as part of the case management strategy, "des centres de traitement des épidémies (CTE) ont été mis en place pour la prise en charge des cas graves" (Epidemic Treatment Centers (CTEs) have been set up for the management of severe cases) ⁵⁵⁰. This response was coordinated by the Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) ⁵⁵¹. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of the capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years.

The National Multisectoral Contingency Plan to Combat COVID-19 "outlined the strategy to establish these CTEs across the country was to manage the surge in patients needing isolation and care (p. 35) ⁵⁵².

The successful implementation of this plan, which involved creating dedicated isolation and treatment spaces within existing hospitals (like Fann Hospital in Dakar) and at other sites, demonstrated a functional capacity to expand ⁵⁵³, but without futher evidence of expansion.

The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 confirms continued support for strengthening these CTEs as a core component of Senegal's health emergency response system (p. 36) ⁵⁵⁴.

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has a national procurement protocol in place that is utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of both laboratory and medical supplies for routine needs.

Senegal's public procurement system is governed by the Public Procurement Code (Code des Marchés Publics) ⁵⁵⁵ and regulated by the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) ⁵⁵⁶, which oversees all public tenders in the country. Recent decisions published by the ARMP in 2023 confirm that the Ministry of Health and Social Action actively uses this system for the acquisition of medical equipment and supplies, including equipment for neonatology, resuscitation, and medical imaging services, as well as for disinfection products ⁵⁵⁷.

The primary entity for the procurement and distribution of medical supplies for the public health sector is the SEN-Pharmacie Nationale d'Approvisionnement (SEN-PNA), established by Decree 2023-845 of April 07, 2023 ⁵⁵⁸. The PNA operates as the central purchasing body for the Ministry of Health, managing the acquisition of essential medicines, vaccines, and medical equipment in accordance with the national procurement code ⁵⁵⁹.

The Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028 further reinforces the PNA's role in ensuring the availability of quality medical products (p. 37, 58) ⁵⁶⁰.

The national procurement system is also used for acquiring laboratory supplies. The ARMP's public contracting portal has shown evidence of tenders for laboratory equipment and reagents for various public institutions ⁵⁶¹.

Similarly, an article on the Ministry of Agriculture's official website discusses a workshop held with the procurement authority (ARCOP) to "analyze the application framework of the Public Procurement Code (Code des marchés publics) to ensure a transparent, rapid, and efficient acquisition of essential agricultural inputs, services, and infrastructures".

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 33.33

Senegal has a national stockpile of medical supplies for use during a public health emergency, managed through a "virtual stockpile" system. However, there is no publicly available, detailed plan that outlines a specific strategy for ensuring its equitable distribution during a crisis.

Senegal's strategy for emergency supplies is based on a virtual stockpile managed by the SEN-Pharmacie Nationale d'Approvisionnement (SEN-PNA), the National Supply Pharmacy (SEN-PNA) ⁵⁶². This system does not rely on a single, large central warehouse but rather on managing and coordinating inventories of essential medical supplies located at various points within the national supply chain. This allows for more flexible and rapid deployment to affected areas when needed (p. 70) ⁵⁶³.

The Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, reinforces this by including a specific objective to "strengthen the availability of essential medicines and other quality products at all levels of the health pyramid" (p. 37, 58) ⁵⁶⁴. While this plan ensures the supply chain is robust, it does not detail a specific plan for the equitable distribution of these supplies during a public health emergency.

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 50

Senegal has a strategic national and regional stockpile of laboratory supplies, including reagents and media, for use during public health emergencies but it is unclear what that stockpile contains.

This is being achieved through a combination of national initiatives, local manufacturing, and regional partnerships with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC).

Locally, the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) launched the DIATROPIX facility ⁵⁶⁵, a diagnostics manufacturing hub, to power the region's public health preparedness. The facility significantly increases the local production of diagnostic tests, reducing the reliance on international imports.

Senegal, in partnership with the WHO, inaugurated a Regional Emergency Hub in Dakar in December 2023 ⁵⁶⁶. The hub includes a warehouse (p.14) specifically for stockpiling and prepositioning medical and laboratory supplies, which can be quickly deployed during health crises. Howver, there is no evidence on what the stockpile contains.

The National Laboratory Policy also identifies improving the "supply system for reagents and consumables" as a key strategic objective to support the laboratory network (p. 17) ⁵⁶⁷.

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 0

Based on the documents and reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Senegalese government, there is evidence that Senegal periodically evaluates its health security capacity, but not a specific document that mandates an annual review of a national stockpile for public health emergencies.

According to a 2023 decree from the Senegalese Agency for Pharmaceutical Regulation (ARP) ⁵⁶⁸, pharmaceutical establishments are required to maintain a safety stock of at least three months' consumption, such as in Article 16, which states that “Safety stock levels must be at least three (03) months' consumption.” This regulation ensures a baseline level of inventory across the country's pharmaceutical sector, though it does not explicitly refer to a central national stockpile.

Futhermore, based on a review of official websites and documents, there are no publicly available reports that explicitly describe an annual review of the PNA's drug and health product supply management. The information available points to management plans and activity reports, but not a specific, mandated annual inventory review of its own stocks ⁵⁶⁹.

Strategic planning documents, such as the National Health Policy Strategy Plan 2019-2028 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS), outline broad objectives to strengthen the availability of essential medicines (p. 37, 58) ⁵⁷⁰. Similarly, the National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) 2019-2023 highlights the need for a clear understanding of available resources, including medical stocks, but does not mandate a specific annual review to assess their sufficiency for a public health emergency (p. 28) ⁵⁷¹.

A review of the official websites for the Ministry of Health and Social Action did not yield any publicly available reports of an annual stockpile review or a policy document requiring one ⁵⁷².

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has a plan and mechanism in place to procure medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency and has a long-term strategy to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity.

Senegal has a well-defined mechanism for emergency procurement managed through the SEN-Pharmacie Nationale d’Approvisionnement (SEN-PNA) ⁵⁷³. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government demonstrated this capacity by activating emergency procurement procedures through the Decree No. 2020-781 of March 18, 2020. This provided a specific derogation from the Public Procurement Code to allow for the expedited acquisition of medical supplies and equipment necessary for the pandemic response ⁵⁷⁴. This established a legal and operational precedent for future health emergencies. The SEN-PNA, formerly the PNA, was the central entity for procuring and distributing these emergency supplies to treatment centers across the country ⁵⁷⁵.

Senegal is actively developing its domestic manufacturing capacity as a long-term strategy for health security, a concept referred to as "pharmaceutical sovereignty." A major flagship project is the MADIBA (Manufacturing in Africa for Disease Immunization and Building Autonomy) facility at the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) ⁵⁷⁶. This project, supported by international partners and the government, is building a state-of-the-art facility to produce up to 300 million vaccine doses annually for routine and outbreak response needs in Africa ⁵⁷⁷.

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

There is evidence of a long-term plan to develop domestic manufacturing capacity, and a plan to procure laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency.

The Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IDP) is a key player, with a plan to construct a vaccine manufacturing unit in its "Vaccinopole" project ⁵⁷⁸. This project focuses on vaccines, including COVID-19 and represents a strategic effort to build local capacity for biological production.

Furthermore, the IPD, through its DiaTropix facility launched in 2020, is now producing Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) for COVID-19 and other epidemic-prone diseases ⁵⁷⁹. It also produces test for HIV, Malaria, Measles, Meningitis ,Yellow fever. This initiative, backed by the Seneglases Government, is a partnership between IPD and the non-profit organization Mologic, that represents a clear and successful plan to leverage in-country capacity to produce a critical laboratory supply for national and regional use during a public health emergency ⁵⁸⁰.

This capacity was proven during the COVID-19 pandemic when the government activated emergency procurement procedures to support a massive scale-up of testing. This response required a sophisticated logistical operation for the "procurement and management of inputs" (reagents, swabs, etc.) and their distribution to a network of over 30 laboratories across the country (p. 11) ⁵⁸¹.

The Agence Sénégalaise de Réglementation Pharmaceutique (ARP) has a guideline for Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) ⁵⁸² of medical products that provides a framework for the expedited authorization and procurement of unregistered or unapproved medical products, including diagnostic kits and reagents, during a declared public health emergency.

Additionally, there is evidence of a mechanism to expedite the import of laboratory and medical supplies through points of entry. The ARP's Guide for the Import and Export of Medical Products outlines a standard import procedure that can be accelerated in an emergency ⁵⁸³. It explicitly states that while the standard processing time for an import authorization is a maximum of 10 days, this can be reduced to three days in an emergency" (Section 4.4. Traitment des demandes (Processing requests) ⁵⁸⁴

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 100

Senegal has a national system for emergency logistics and supply chain management that operates at national and sub-national levels, covers cold chain management, and has been recently reviewed and updated.

Senegal's system for emergency logistics and supply chain management is centralized under the SEN-Pharmacie Nationale d’Approvisionnement (SEN-PNA)⁵⁸⁵, which operates a national and sub-national distribution network and includes 14 regional services, known as Regional Supply Pharmacies (Pharmacies Régionales d'Approvisionnement (PRA). ⁵⁸⁶

Similarly, the PNDSS (2019-2028)⁵⁸⁷ reinforces the PNA's role, with a specific objective to "strengthen the availability of essential medicines and other quality products at all levels of the health pyramid" (p. 37, 58) ⁵⁸⁸. This demonstrates a long-term strategy for a nationwide supply chain. The system's capacity was proven during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the SEN-PNA was responsible for distributing medical supplies to all 27 epidemic treatment centers across the country. ⁵⁸⁹.

The transformation of the PNA into the SEN-PNA by Decree No. 2023-845 of April 7, 2023, was a major strategic overhaul designed to modernize its operations and improve efficiency. ⁵⁹⁰ While the SEN-PNA is the central public entity, there is no publicly available evidence in the reviewed national plans of a formal mechanism to integrate the private sector into the national emergency logistics and supply chain management system.

In August 2025, the Minister of Health conducted a strategic visit to the SEN-PNA to inspect the supply system and review the project to create new regional logistics hubs, further evidence of ongoing evaluation and modernization efforts. ⁵⁹¹

Cold chain management is a critical component of the country's Expanded Programme on Immunization (PEV). ⁵⁹² The successful introduction of the hexavalent vaccine in July 2025, which has strict temperature requirements, demonstrated the system's advanced cold chain capabilities. The launch involved intensive training for nearly 6,000 health workers on "the rigorous management of the cold chain, as hexavalent must be kept between +2°C and +8°C and never frozen".

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has a comprehensive framework in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCMs) for national use during a public health emergency.

The Senegalese Pharmaceutical Regulatory Agency (Agence Sénégalaise de Réglementation Pharmaceutique)(ARP), Senegal's national pharmaceutical regulatory agency, has established clear, publicly available guidelines ⁵⁹³⁵⁹⁴ that govern the process of authorizing and importing MCMs during a crisis.

The Guideline for the Emergency Use Authorization of medical products (2023) ⁵⁹⁵ (Ligne directrice pour l'autorisation d'utilisation d'urgence des produits médicaux) provides a formal, expedited pathway for approving the use of unregistered vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics when a public health emergency is declared ⁵⁹⁶.

The Guide for the Import and Export of Medicines (Guide des demandes d'importation et d'exportation de médicaments)(2023) ⁵⁹⁷ ensures these authorized MCMs can be dispensed quickly, and outlines a procedure that can be accelerated in case of emergency "from standard seven-day processing time for an import authorization can be reduced to three days in an emergency (Section 4.4) ⁵⁹⁸.

This regulatory framework is complemented by the operational plan demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic – "Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19", which detailed the national strategy for dispensing vaccines and therapeutics through a network of designated health facilities and Epidemic Treatment Centers (CTE) across the country (p. 35) ⁵⁹⁹. This confirms that a plan for the physical distribution and dispensing of MCMs exists and has been successfully implemented.

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has a public plan in place to facilitate a workforce surge in an emergency, which is embedded within its high-level national development strategies.

Senegal's high-level national strategies, such as the Senegal Emergent Plan (Plan Sénégal Émergent) (PSE) and its associated Priority Action Plan (PAP 3) for 2024-2028, establish the government's commitment to strengthening human capital as a cornerstone of national resilience ⁶⁰⁰, which includes a specific objective to "strengthen the national health and social action system" by improving the "availability, equitable distribution, and motivation of human resources for health" (p. 49-50) . These plans, however, provide the broad strategic direction rather than specific operational details for an emergency surge.

The specific plan for surging the workforce during a health emergency is found in the country's dedicated health emergency response framework. The Plan Stratégique National du Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS) 2019-2023 is the overarching plan that gives the COUS the direct mandate to manage and coordinate all resources during a crisis. Its mission is to "piloter le déploiement des ressources humaines, techniques et financières nécessaires en cas de crise sanitaire" (pilot the deployment of necessary human, technical, and financial resources in the event of a health crisis) (p. 15) .

This mandate was operationalized in the "Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19". This plan detailed the practical aspects of the surge, including the establishment of Rapid Response Teams (équipes d’intervention rapide) in all 79 health districts, which were mobilized for case investigation, contact tracing, and patient care, demonstrating a clear mechanism for deploying personnel throughout the country in response to an emergency (p. 30) .

Therefore, while the high-level development plans provide the mandate, the specific operational plan for a workforce surge is a core function of the COUS, as demonstrated in the national pandemic response plan.

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has a public plan and an established, internationally recognized mechanism in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency.

Senegal has taken a significant step to formalize its system for both deploying and receiving international medical assistance. In 2023, it became the first country in Africa to have a national Emergency Medical Team (EMT) officially classified by the World Health Organization (WHO). ⁶⁰¹

This WHO-classified national EMT, managed by the SAMU National, serves as the official, in-country mechanism for coordinating emergency health response. A key function of this established and standardized team is to act as the counterpart for international aid. The WHO has stated that this national team provides a "framework for receiving and coordinating international emergency medical teams" during a major crisis ⁶⁰². This confirms that there is a formal, publicly recognized plan and structure in place to facilitate the reception of foreign health personnel.

This mechanism is coordinated at the national level by the Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS), which manages all aspects of public health emergency response ⁶⁰³.

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 100

Senegal has a public plan in place to redeploy existing health personnel, which is embedded within its high-level national development and health sector strategies.

The PNDSS (2019-2028) provides direct evidence of a plan for the redeployment of health personnel, in Action Line 20 (p. 54), the plan explicitly identifies the inequitable geographical distribution of health workers as a major challenge and outlines a formal plan to address it. ⁶⁰⁴

The plan's situation analysis notes a severe imbalance, stating that the "distribution of health personnel is characterized by a stronger concentration in Dakar" which creates a "lack of equity in access to quality services" in other regions (p. 36). ⁶⁰⁵

The strategy is detailed under Action Line 20: Development of quality human resources at all levels (Ligne d’action 20 : Développement des ressources humaines de qualité à tous les niveaux). This section outlines a clear plan for the "redeployment of Human Resources according to regional gaps (redéploiement des RH en fonction des gaps régionaux") (p. 54). ⁶⁰⁶

Furthermore, the plan specifies the exact mechanisms to achieve this, calling for the "equitable distribution of personnel and their retention by: (i) the implementation of the mobility guide) and by providing incentives for staff in hard-to-reach areas (p. 54). ⁶⁰⁷ This confirms a public plan for the geographical redeployment of existing health personnel, using a formal mobility guide and incentive programs.

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 75

The constitution of Senegal explicitly guarantees the right to health, which is interpreted as a right to medical care but does not specify that such care should be free.

The Constitution of the Republic of Senegal, revised in 2001, establishes a clear right to health for all citizens. Article 17 of the Constitution states: "The State and the public collectivities have the duty to watch over the physical and moral health of the family and, in particular, of handicapped persons and of aged persons. The State guarantees to families in general and to those living in the rural environment in particular access to health services…" ⁶⁰⁸ This article establishes a direct duty for the State to ensure access to health services, which constitutes a guaranteed right to medical care.

This is further reinforced by the country's main health strategy, the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, which states in its preface: "Health being an inalienable right for every individual, Universal Health Coverage (UHC) therefore constitutes a social and economic requirement, and an imperative of justice and equity." (p. XIX). ⁶⁰⁹

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 91.18

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 89.04

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 47.92

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 73.78

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 76.19

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 66.67

Workers in Senegal are guaranteed paid sick leave for physical health problems. However, there is no explicit, publicly available legislation that specifies whether this sick leave is available in Senegalntal health problems.

Senegal's Labor Code (Law No. 97-17 of 1 December 1997) provides the legal foundation for paid sick leave. ⁶¹⁰ Article L. 68 of the code states that a worker's contract is suspended during an absence due to a non-work-related illness, provided it is certified by a doctor. The right to compensation during this period is further detailed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (Convention Collective Nationale Interprofessionnelle), which specifies that after one year of service, an employee is entitled to receive their full salary for one month, and half of their salary for the next three months of their sick leave. ⁶¹¹ This confirms a national guarantee of paid sick leave.

A review of the Labor Code and other national health and labor legislation did not yield any specific text explicitly including or excluding mental health problems from the definition of "illness" (maladie) that would justify paid sick leave. While the country has a National Strategic Plan for the Improvement of the Quality of Mental Health Care (2024-2028) ⁶¹², which aims to integrate mental health into the general health system, this plan does not address the issue of sick leave. Therefore, there is no public evidence to confirm that paid sick leave is explicitly guaranteed in Senegalntal health issues.

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Senegalese government has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency.

Senegal's legal framework for worker health is outlined in the Labor Code (Law No. 97-17 of 1 December 1997). This law places a general obligation on all employers to ensure health and safety in the workplace and to provide first aid in case of accidents ⁶¹³. However, it does not contain specific provisions guaranteeing prioritized care for healthcare workers during a national health emergency.

Furthermore, a review of key national health strategies, including the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028 and the National Strategic Plan of the Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) for 2019-2023, found no mention of such a commitment. ⁶¹⁴⁶¹⁵ While these plans address the need to protect health workers through infection prevention and control measures, they do not establish a formal policy for prioritized access to care should they become ill. A search of the Ministry of Health and Social Action's website for recent policies or statements also yielded no evidence of this specific commitment ⁶¹⁶.

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency, which is coordinated through the national Health Emergency Operations Center (HEOC) (Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire).

The HEOC serves as the central hub for coordinating all aspects of a public health emergency, including the flow of information between national-level officials and healthcare workers on the ground. ⁶¹⁷

This system was explicitly detailed and operationalized in the "Plan national de contingence multisectorielle de lutte contre le COVID-19" (National Multisectoral Contingency Plan for the Fight against COVID-19). The plan established a dedicated commission for communication, whose mission included to: "Ensure the regular information of health personnel on the evolution of the disease and the measures taken." (p. 31). ⁶¹⁸

This confirms a formal mechanism for downward communication to healthcare workers. The plan also details the upward flow of information, with surveillance data from health posts and districts being sent to the national level for analysis and coordination, demonstrating a two-way communication system.

The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 further confirms the operational nature of this system by noting the existence of Rapid Response Teams in all 79 health districts, which are in constant communication with the COUS during a response (p. 36). ⁶¹⁹

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 100

Senegal has a comprehensive emergency communication system that integrates both public and private sector healthcare workers, coordinated by the national Health Emergency Operations Center (HEOC)⁶²⁰. This integration is part of the national strategy and was demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The national response structure, which was activated for the COVID-19 pandemic, explicitly includes "Private Sector… Engagement". This is not just a high-level policy; it is operational as the system is decentralized, with the HEOC coordinating regional and district-level health committees. These district-level authorities are responsible for supervising both public and private clinics ⁶²¹. CDC support to Senegal was to "harmonize public and private sector procedures," including the "utilization of the health information system" and the submission of data to the national level, such as the DHIS2 ⁶²².

This practical implementation is supported by the high-level strategy outlined in the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, which includes "Strengthening Public-Private Partnership" as a key action line to improve the health system's overall capacity (p. 51). ⁶²³

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 100

Senegal has a national Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) program ⁶²⁴, and there is evidence of facility-level monitoring of IPC practices and evidence of a consolidated national system for tracking the number of healthcare-associated infections (HCAIs) across the country.

Senegal's national IPC program, the National program to combat nosocomial infections (Programme national de lutte contre les infections nosocomiales (PRONALIN)), has been in place since 2004 ⁶²⁵⁶²⁶. The program is managed by the Quality, Safety and Hospital Hygiene Department (Direction de la Qualité, de la Sécurité, et de l'Hygiène Hospitalières (DQSHH)) within the Ministry of Health and Social Action. ⁶²⁷

Recent efforts have focused on revitalizing this program and establishing monitoring mechanisms. In 2022, a national workshop was held to develop a new IPC strategic plan for the period 2023–2027 ⁶²⁸. This updated strategy is supported by international partners like USAID's MTaPS program, which works with the DQSHH to strengthen IPC practices in hospitals, stating that " Now in its fifth year of implementation (2023), MTaPS is supporting the revitalization of CLINs in 13 total structures as part of the implementation of infection prevention and control activities (p. 3). ⁶²⁹

This shows the results of repeated monitoring using the Infection Prevention and Control Assessment Framework (IPCAF) tool, with scores tracked year-over-year. This 2023 report confirms that Senegal's public health system, through the DQSHH and with partner support, is actively and continuously monitoring, tracking, and scoring IPC/HCAI performance at the facility level.

Furthermore, the report highlights an ongoing system of monitoring at the facility level. Following a large-scale training initiative for healthcare workers in 2021 and 2022, the government conducted follow-up assessments. The report states that "assessments conducted with the use of the WHO IPC assessment tool (IPCAT) showed that 63% of the facilities whose staff were trained, improved their infection prevention practices". ⁶³⁰ This confirms a system is in place to monitor the performance of IPC programs at the facility level.

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 100

Senegal has an Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) program in place. The country has a long-standing national program and has recently developed a new strategic plan to guide its activities.

Senegal's national IPC program, known as the Programme national de lutte contre les infections nosocomiales (PRONALIN), has been in place since 2004 ⁶³¹. The program is managed by the Direction de la Qualité, de la Sécurité, et de l'Hygiène Hospitalières (DQSHH) within the Ministry of Health and Social Action, which is responsible for implementing the national IPC strategy ⁶³². A national workshop was held in 2022 to develop a new IPC strategic plan for the period 2023–2027, confirming that the country's strategy has been updated within the last five years ⁶³³.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), through its partners and the MTaPS program, supports the national program, which includes several key provisions to ensure its implementation across the health system. A core provision is the revitalization and strengthening of hospital-level IPC committees, known as Comités de Lutte contre les Infections Nosocomiales (CLINs). These committees are the designated structures responsible for applying national IPC guidelines at the facility level ⁶³⁴⁶³⁵.

Furthermore, the program uses standardized WHO tools for monitoring – the Infection Prevention and Control Assessment Framework (IPCAF), used to conduct assessments in health facilities, which allows for the identification of gaps and the development of an "plan d'action annuel d'amélioration" (annual action plan for improvement) (p. 3) ⁶³⁶.

A central part of the strategy is strengthening the skills of healthcare workers. The program supports "the strengthening of the capacities of the CLINs with tools and a methodical approach (le renforcement des capacités des CLINs avec les outils et une approche méthodique)" to enable them to implement improvements independently ⁶³⁷.

While there is a national program and evidence of facility-level monitoring, there is no public evidence of a consolidated national system that tracks the number of HCAIs from all facilities nationwide.

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

Senegal has national plans and regulations that include measures to ensure a safe environment in health facilities, particularly concerning biomedical waste management and hygiene.

Senegal's strategy for ensuring a safe environment in its health facilities is integrated into the Decree No. 2008-1007 of 22 September 2008 ⁶³⁸, which specifically regulates the management of biomedical waste. This decree establishes the legal framework for the safe handling, transport, and disposal of hazardous waste generated by health facilities, a critical component of a safe environment.

Additionally, the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028 ⁶³⁹ identifies existing shortcomings and outlines specific strategies to address them. It explicitly identifies key insufficiencies, including: "…biomedical waste management that does not meet environmental safety standards;" "…insufficient hospital hygiene and a welcoming environment (beautification and cleanliness of the premises);" (p. 32). ⁶⁴⁰

To address these gaps, the plan outlines several strategic actions, such as "strengthening the technical platform of health facilities" (Action Line 21, p. 54) focuses on "upgrading of infrastructure and equipment in health structures to meet standards " (mise aux normes des infrastructures et équipements des structures de santé). ⁶⁴¹

Another strategy to improve the availability of quality health products includes "Strengthen the availability of biocidal hygiene products (Renforcement de la disponibilité en produits d’hygiène biocides" (Action Line 34), (p. 58) ⁶⁴², noting that these are essential for vector control and disease prevention, particularly in response to climate-related events like flooding. ⁶⁴³

The WHO Biennial Report for 2022-2023 provides recent evidence of this plan's implementation, noting that as part of its health emergencies program, the WHO has supported the "acquisition of materials for the management of biomedical waste" in health facilities, demonstrating ongoing investment in this area (p. 36). ⁶⁴⁴

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 100

Senegal has a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial, which is managed by a formally established national ethics committee.

The mandatory ethical oversight of all health-related research in Senegal is the responsibility of the National Ethics Committee for Health Research (Comité National d'Ethique pour la Recherche en Santé (CNERS) ⁶⁴⁵, established by the Decree No. 2014-100 of January 28, 2014. ⁶⁴⁶

The PNDSS (2019-2028) ⁶⁴⁷ confirms the committee's high-level role, but the specific operational process for clinical trials is a requiring additional approval from the regulatory authorization (from the pharmaceutical authority) Direction de la Pharmacie et du Médicament – DPM ⁶⁴⁸. This is gided by the Decree No. 2023-2422 of December 27, 2023 relating to clinical trials (Décret n° 2023-2422 du 27 décembre 2023 relatif aux essais cliniques). The DPM reviews the scientific and technical aspects of the trial (e.g., the trial medication's quality and safety) and issues the final "Autorisation de Conduite d'Essai Clinique" (ACEC), or Clinical Trial Authorization.

The CNERS's mandate is to ensure that "any research protocol submitted to it respects the ethical principles" that guarantee the protection of human subjects (p. 1). ⁶⁴⁹ The Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028, Senegal's main health strategy, further reinforces the role of the CNERS in the "validation of research protocols" (p. 33). ⁶⁵⁰ This confirms that a national requirement for ethical review is in place and integrated into the country's health research governance.

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 100

Senegal has a formal, expedited process for approving the use of unregistered medical countermeasures (MCMs) during a public health emergency, which can include products still under clinical trial investigation. However, there is no public evidence of a formal mechanism for the mutual recognition of clinical trial results taking place elsewhere.

Senegalese Pharmaceutical Regulatory Agency (Agence Sénégalaise de Réglementation Pharmaceutique) (ARP), has established a clear framework for this process, titled the "Guideline for the conduct of clinical trials in an emergency situation in Senegal (Ligne directrice relative a la conduite d'essais cliniques en situation d'urgence au senegal), published in 2023. ⁶⁵¹

This guideline creates an Clinical trial in an emergecny situation pathway that allows the ARP to shortens the approval timeline to 10-15 working days. Additionally it establishes criteria for prioritizing which trial applications will be reviewed first during an emergency.
It reinforces that all necessary ethical approvals (from the CNERS) must still be obtained ⁶⁵².

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 100

Senegal has a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCMs) for humans. This function is now carried out by a new, consolidated regulatory authority.

The primary agency responsible for approving new MCMs is the Senegalese Pharmaceutical Regulatory Agency (Agence Sénégalaise de Réglementation Pharmaceutique (ARP). ⁶⁵³

The ARP was officially created by Decree No. 2022-824 on April 7, 2022 and it was established by merging the former Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicines (DPM) (Direction de la Pharmacie et du Médicament ) and the National Laboratory for the Control of Medicines (Laboratoire National de Contrôle des Médicaments (LNCM)). ⁶⁵⁴

This new agency is now the single, central authority responsible for the regulation of all health products in Senegal. Its mandate includes evaluating and issuing marketing authorizations for all new medicines, vaccines, and other medical countermeasures before they can be used in the country. ⁶⁵⁵

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 100

Senegal has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCMs) for human use during public health emergencies. However, there is no public evidence of a formal mechanism for the mutual recognition of approval decisions taking place elsewhere.

The Senegalese Pharmaceutical Regulatory Agency (ARP) has established a clear, publicly available framework for this process. The key document is the "Ligne directrice pour l'autorisation d'utilisation d'urgence des produits médicaux" (Guideline for the Emergency Use Authorization of medical products), published in 2023. ⁶⁵⁶

This guideline creates an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) pathway that allows the ARP to authorize the use of an unregistered medical product, or the un-approved use of a registered product, during a declared public health emergency. The guideline explicitly states that the ARP can issue an EUA when it concludes that "on the basis of all available scientific evidence, it is reasonable to believe that the medical product can be effective" for the emergency at hand and that its known benefits outweigh the potential risks (p. 5). ⁶⁵⁷

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Senegal has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.⁶⁵⁸

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 100

Senegal has epidemics integrated into Senegal's national risk reduction, but there is little evidence to show that pandemics are included..For pandemics there is evidence of a standalone national strategy after the COVID-19..

Senegal's approach to disaster risk reduction is guided by its overarching multi-hazard plan, the National Plan for the Organization of Relief in Cases of Catastrophe (ORSEC) (Organisation de la Réponse de Sécurité Civile), which includes provisions for health emergencies and disasters ⁶⁵⁹. The health component of this national strategy is detailed in the Plan National de Développement Sanitaire et Social (PNDSS) 2019-2028. ⁶⁶⁰

The plan's strategy for health security is detailed under Action Line 23: Development of the implementation of the IHR (p. 55). ⁶⁶¹ This section outlines the plan to implement the "Plan d’Action National pour la Sécurité Sanitaire au Sénégal (PANSIS)," which is built around prevention, detection, and response to public health emergencies. A key part of this is to "develop multisectoral collaboration for health governance within the 'One Health' framework" and to "improve the coordination of health emergencies by working with the Health Emergency Operations Center" (COUS) (p. 55). ⁶⁶²

The National Epidemic Management Committee, was set up within MSAS in 2016 after the Ebola epidemic, has regional and local committees monitoring the evolution of diseases with epidemic potential ⁶⁶³.

In Senegal, the Ministry of Health and Social Action (Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action sociale – MSAS) is responsible for coordinating epidemic preparedness and response ⁶⁶⁴. The operational leadership for this is provided by the Centre des Opérations d'Urgence Sanitaire (COUS), whose own strategic plan is aligned with these national frameworks. ⁶⁶⁵

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 100

Senegal has established cross-border agreements and protocols with neighboring countries for public health emergencies, primarily through its active participation in regional cooperative agreements and recent joint exercises.

The country is an active member of the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) ⁶⁶⁶ program, a World Bank and ECOWAS initiative designed to strengthen cross-border collaborative disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness among West African nations, across human and animal health sectors.

This commitment has been put into practice through concrete bilateral actions and agreements. Evidence shows that in June 2024, Senegal's Health Emergency Operations Center (COUS) conducted a cross-border simulation exercise (SIMEX) with the Gambia ⁶⁶⁷. This exercise, focused on responding to a public health event at a major border crossing, serves as direct, recent evidence of a functional cooperative mechanism to test and validate joint response protocols ⁶⁶⁸.

Another initiative is the "Sénégambie" ⁶⁶⁹, which is a long-standing collaboration between Senegal and the Gambia focused on harmonizing surveillance tools and synchronizing public health campaigns (like vaccination and drug administration) to create a unified front against diseases like malaria. A signed MoU entered into force from 2018 ⁶⁷⁰ and the success of this model has led Senegal to plan for similar action plans with its other neighbors: Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and Mali ⁶⁷¹.

This combination of regional program membership and active, bilateral operational planning and exercising demonstrates that Senegal has robust cross-border agreements in place for public health emergencies.

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

Senegal has cross-border agreements as part of a regional group for animal health emergencies, but there is evidence of gaps in their implementation.

Senegal's primary mechanism for cross-border collaboration on animal health is its participation in the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) program, implemented from 2016 to 2023 ⁶⁷². This program, supported by the World Bank and ECOWAS, is designed to strengthen national and regional capacity for collaborative disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness in West Africa, explicitly covering both the human and animal health sectors ⁶⁷³. Under the framework of the (REDISSE) program, ECOWAS has adopted multilateral agreements and has established institutions to address animal health emergencies in West Africa ⁶⁷⁴.

However, while this regional agreement is in place, recent assessments highlight significant challenges in its practical implementation at the national level. A 2024 case study ⁶⁷⁵ on Senegal's animal health system noted that the national animal disease surveillance network suffers from "insufficient financial and logistical resources" and that there is a need to "better involve private veterinarians… as well as communities in epidemiological surveillance" ⁶⁷⁶. The report also pointed to the challenge of preventing the "cross-border trade of fraudulent veterinary drugs," indicating ongoing difficulties in managing health security at the borders ⁶⁷⁷. These documented weaknesses in the national system that underpins the regional agreement demonstrate gaps in implementation, justifying a score of 1.

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

Senegal has both signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), demonstrating its full commitment to the treaty.

Senegal signed the BWC on July 17, 1972, and officially deposited its instrument of ratification on March 26, 1975. ⁶⁷⁸ This confirms its status as a State Party to the convention with full legal effect.

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 100

Senegal has submitted Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in the past three years.

According to the official electronic CBM platform of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Senegal submitted a CBM report on 30 April 2024. ⁶⁷⁹ This submission falls within the three-year window, demonstrating the country's continued commitment to transparency under the BWC.

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 100

Senegal has provided the required reports to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540.

According to the official website of the UNSC 1540 Committee, Senegal has submitted multiple reports on its implementation of the resolution, which aims to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons. The country submitted its initial report in 2004 and provided additional information in 2005 and in September 2019. ⁶⁸⁰ This demonstrates a long-standing commitment to its reporting obligations under UNSCR 1540.

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 25

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

Senegal does not meet the criteria for this measure as it is not a member of at least two of the specified international security initiatives.

A review of the official membership lists for each organization confirms that Senegal is not a participant in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Australia Group, or the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). ^681682683

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 100

Senegal has completed and published a new Joint External Evaluation (JEE) in the last five years.

According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) official Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness (SPH) portal, a second JEE mission for Senegal was conducted from 17 to 21 July 2023, and published in 2024. ⁶⁸⁴ This mission falls within the five-year window for the 2025 assessment.

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

Senegal has not completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years.

The most recent PVS evaluation for Senegal available on the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE) PVS Pathway portal is the PVS Follow-Up mission report from November 2016, which was published in 2017 ⁶⁸⁵. While this was a comprehensive evaluation at the time, it falls outside the five-year window for the 2025 assessment. A review of the WOAH website and other public sources shows no evidence of a more recent PVS assessment report being published for Senegal.

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

Senegal has not completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Gap Analysis in the last five years.

The most recent PVS Gap Analysis for Senegal was part of the PVS Follow-Up mission conducted in November 2016 and published by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE) in 2017. ⁶⁸⁶ While this report provided a comprehensive analysis of the gaps in the country's veterinary services at the time, it now falls outside the five-year window for the 2025 assessment. A review of the WOAH PVS Pathway portal and other public sources shows no evidence of a more recent PVS Gap Analysis report being published for Senegal.

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal has allocated national funds to improve its capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. This commitment is detailed in the country's national health and development plans.

According to PNDSS (2019-2028) ⁶⁸⁷, Senegal's primary health strategy includes a comprehensive and budgeted framework for strengthening the health system. Strategic Orientation 2 (Orientation Stratégique 2 (OS2)) of this plan is focused on improving the offer of health services, explicitly including "strengthening national and international health security". This strategic area, which funds the country's core capacities for epidemic preparedness and response, is allocated 70.6% of the total PNDSS budget over the ten-year period, demonstrating a significant and long-term financial commitment from the government (p. 88). ⁶⁸⁸

This high-level commitment is operationalized in the government's overarching priority action plan, the Senegal Emergent Plan (Plan Sénégal Émergent) (PSE) – Priority Action Plan 3 (PAP 3) for 2024-2028. ⁶⁸⁹ The PAP 3 includes a specific "Programme de renforcement du système de santé" (Health System Strengthening Program), which has budgeted funds allocated to improve the availability of qualified human resources and strengthen the national health system's resilience to shocks (p. 50). ⁶⁹⁰ However, there is no specific evidence that it has allocated such fundings. ⁶⁹¹

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Senegal's Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report allocates or describes specific funding from the national budget to address the identified gaps.

According to the JEE (2024), there is no specific budget line has been allocated for IHR implementation. ⁶⁹²

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

There is no evidence in the most recent Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment or gap analysis that allocates or describes specific funding from Senegal's national budget to address the identified gaps.

WOAH released the PVS Follow-Up mission report from November 2016 in 2017 ⁶⁹³, which is the most recent PVS evaluation for Senegal. Although this document indicates areas that require investment, a careful examination, including its gap analysis and recommendations, reveal that it lacks a costed action plan and details specific cash allocations from the national budget to meet these gaps. No more recent PVS evaluation or associated financial plan was found through a search of the WOAH PVS Pathway portal and other public sources.

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Senegal has publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanisms which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency. This was demonstrated through the establishment of a dedicated national fund during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Senegal Response and Solidarity Fund: FORCE-COVID-19 , was established in March 2020 "with a budget of 1,000 billion FCFA (approx. 7% of GDP)" (p.33) ⁶⁹⁴. The fund served as the primary mechanism for financing the country's Economic and Social Resilience Program (PRES). ⁶⁹⁵⁶⁹⁶ This fund was financed through the national budget, contributions from international partners, and domestic solidarity efforts, and it provided a clear pathway for the rapid disbursement of resources for the health response and economic support measures. ⁶⁹⁷

This ad-hoc fund is complemented by access to established international financing mechanisms. Senegal is eligible to receive funding from the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's fund for the poorest countries, which has specific instruments for emergency response, as well as the African Public Health Emergency Fund (APHEF) .

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

There is evidence that senior leaders in Senegal have, in the past three years, made a public commitment to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing and requesting support.

The government of Senegal has made a high-level, public commitment to improve its domestic capacity for health security through its national development strategies. This commitment is led by the presidency. At the Council of Ministers meeting on April 9 ⁶⁹⁸, 2025, the President of Senegal made a public commitment to intensify the modernization of the healthcare system, strengthen vaccine sovereignty through the Pasteur Institute, and prioritize disease prevention and vaccination.

Furthermore, evidence from the WHO in December 2023 found that Senegal's Minister of Health, alongside the WHO, inaugurated a new regional health emergency hub in Dakar . At this event, senior government officials publicly reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the country's capacity to prepare for and respond to health emergencies, with support from international partners.

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

There is clear public evidence that Senegal has both provided technical support to other countries and requested financing and support from donors to improve its domestic capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years.

Senegal, primarily through the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), serves as a key regional hub for health security and provides technical support and training to other African nations.

The IPD was officially certified by the Africa CDC as the Regional Centre of Excellence in Biosafety and Biosecurity Training for West Africa in 2024. ⁶⁹⁹ In this capacity, it provides standardized training to professionals from across the continent. For example, in September 2024, it ran an intensive, certified course on biosafety and biosecurity for laboratory professionals from Togo. ⁷⁰⁰ This demonstrates a clear mechanism for providing technical support to improve regional capacity.

Senegal has actively requested and received significant financing and technical support from donors to improve its domestic health security capacity.

The country was a key participant in the World Bank's Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) program, which was active until August 2023. This program provided major financial and technical support to strengthen Senegal's disease surveillance and epidemic preparedness capabilities (p.1). ⁷⁰¹

The WHO Cooperation Strategy with Senegal for 2024–2028 is a formal agreement that outlines a framework for the WHO to provide technical and financial support to address identified gaps in the country's health system, including its capacity for emergency response (p. 23). ⁷⁰²

The MADIBA (Manufacturing in Africa for Disease Immunization and Building Autonomy) vaccine manufacturing project ⁷⁰³ at the IPD is a flagship initiative to improve domestic capacity. This project is supported by a major financing package arranged by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) with support from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), demonstrating a successful request for international support. ⁷⁰⁴

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 100

Senegal has fulfilled its full assessed financial contributions to the World Health Organization (WHO) within the past two years. Beyond its mandatory financial dues, the country also provides significant in-kind and strategic support to the WHO's mission in the region.

The official status of member states' assessed contributions is published by the WHO. A review of these official reports confirms that Senegal has paid its dues in full for the 20234-2024 period. The WHO's report on "Assessed contributions payable by Member States and Associate Members 2022-2023" confirms Senegal's assessed contribution for the biennium and its payment status. ⁷⁰⁵ According to the WHO Programme Budget portal, which tracks financial flows, Senegal is up to date with its payments for the current period. ⁷⁰⁶

In addition to its assessed financial contributions, Senegal provides significant non-monetary support that is crucial for regional health security. Hosting the WHO Regional Emergency Hub: In a major strategic contribution, Senegal hosts the WHO's Regional Health Emergency Hub for Africa in Dakar. This hub, inaugurated in December 2023, is a critical part of the WHO's new, strengthened emergency response structure for the continent. Senegal provided the land and is supporting the development of the infrastructure for this key facility, which will house a regional rapid response team and emergency stockpiles. ⁷⁰⁷

Senegal actively collaborates with the WHO on various health initiatives. For example, the Ministry of Health works in partnership with the WHO and UNICEF on programs to improve access to rehabilitation services, contributing national resources and personnel to joint health goals. ⁷⁰⁸

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 0

Senegal has a comprehensive legal and ethical framework that governs the sharing of genetic data and biological specimens with international partners but it does not specifically mandate the sharing of genetic data with international organizations.

This framework is not a single plan but a combination of formal, binding regulations that establish the protocol for sharing.
The primary plan in place is the Code of Ethics for Health Research (Law No. 2009-17) ⁷⁰⁹, which mandates the Comité National d'Ethique pour la Recherche en Santé (CNERS) to get an ethical approval for any research—including studies involving epidemics—that requires sharing data or specimens. The CNERS's formal "Manual of Procedures" requires all research protocols to explicitly state the "modalities for sharing results" as part of the application, ensuring a formal review and approval process before any sharing occurs.

Additionally, Senegal has a National Law on the Protection of Personal Data⁷¹⁰. This law explicitly defines "personal data" to include "genetic" data. This law establishes a formal protocol for any "cross-border transfer" of personal data, stating that it is only "allowed when that country provides sufficient legal protection for privacy".

Lastly, as a party to the Nagoya Protocol (ratified by Law No. 2016-03)⁷¹¹, Senegal has a formal national strategy for "access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits". This national plan and its associated laws create a formal, non-ad-hoc legal mechanism that governs how genetic resources (which include biological specimens) are accessed and shared with international partners.

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that Senegal has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework in the past two years.

The World Health Organization's (WHO) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework is the primary international mechanism for the sharing of influenza viruses with pandemic potential. ⁷¹² A review of the WHO's official reports and publications related to the implementation of the PIP Framework for the 2023-2025 period shows no public evidence of non-compliance or a failure to share samples on the part of Senegal.

Senegal's National Influenza Center, located at the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD), is a long-standing and active member of the WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS). ⁷¹³ The IPD's role as a key regional surveillance hub and its history of collaboration with the WHO provide strong supporting evidence of its adherence to international sample sharing agreements.

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that Senegal has failed to share pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. On the contrary, the country has a demonstrated track record of sharing genetic data and specimens with the international community.

Senegal's commitment to international data sharing is demonstrated through the actions of its national reference laboratories, primarily the Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD). ⁷¹⁴ This commitment has been consistently shown in practice during recent global health emergencies: COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2): Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and into 2023, the IPD regularly submitted genetic sequences of the virus to the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID), the world's primary repository for SARS-CoV-2 sequences. This provided the international community with crucial data on the virus's evolution in the region. ⁷¹⁵

During the 2022-2023 global Mpox outbreak, Senegal also shared genetic sequence data. For instance, a sequence from a case in Senegal was made publicly available on GenBank, the U.S. National Center for Biotechnology Information's genetic sequence database. ⁷¹⁶

This consistent, voluntary sharing of genetic data for multiple pathogens with pandemic potential serves as strong evidence of the country's adherence to international data sharing norms.

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 50

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 50

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 25

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 25

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 45

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 25

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 50

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 75

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 25

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 50

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 50

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 50

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 75

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 100

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 50

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 53.18

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 42.6

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 51.08

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 0

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 66.67

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 50

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 50

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 63.8

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 25

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 50

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 50

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 54.14

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 51.78

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 25

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 64.51

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 67.47

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 85.57

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 75.97

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 71.22

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 86.76

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 87.98

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 62.95

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 75

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 2.96

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 50

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 50