Morocco: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has a national antimicrobial resistance (AMR) plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens, albeit outdated. Morocco implemented a National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022) supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), which clearly outlined surveillance, detection, and reporting mechanisms for AMR ¹. There is no evidence of a follow-up Plan available, however, on the official websites of the Moroccan government or through the World Health Organization's (WHO) Library of National Action Plans for AMR ²³.

Morocco continues to receive support from the Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (AMR MPTF), which is implemented by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH), WHO and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) ⁴. Since the early 2020s, the MPTF strengthened national AMR capacity by supporting surveillance laboratories, promoting multisectoral governance, advancing regulatory reforms, and expanding awareness and training initiatives and is reported to continue till 2030. Reports from UN partners and media reports by the WHO confirm these activities are ongoing ⁵⁶⁷⁸⁹.

Morocco’s Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities took place in 2016, prior to the adoption of the 2019–2022 national AMR plan ¹⁰. The JEE concluded that although no national AMR plan was then in place, Morocco had the capacity and institutional structures necessary to respond effectively to antimicrobial resistance (Page 11) ¹¹. There has not been a subsequent JEE conducted in Morocco since 2016 ¹².

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that the national laboratory system in Morocco tests for some priority AMR pathogens.

The Department of Microbiology and Food Hygiene (MHA) at the National Institute of Hygiene carries out testing for enterobacteriaceae, staphylococcus aureus, streptococcus β-hemolyticus, and streptococcus thermophilus ¹³. Similarly, the Laboratory of Product Safety, Food & Environment at the Pasteur Institute of Morocco tests for four of the 7+1 priority pathogens, specifically enterobacteriaceae, escherichia coli, staphylococci, and salmonella ¹⁴.

In addition, the Pasteur Institute of Morocco hosts a specialized Laboratory for Genetic and Genomic Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance, which aligns its goals with World Health Organization (WHO) AMR priorities. The Insitutute's website does not specify which or how many of the priority pathogens it currently covers ¹⁵.

Morocco has been an active participant in the World Health Organization's Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) since the early 2020s. The GLASS 2022 report confirms Morocco’s submission of AMR surveillance data ¹⁶ and the GLASS database lists Morocco as having reported data on escherichia coli, acinetobacter spp., klebsiella pneumoniae, salmonella spp., streptococcus pneumoniae, and staphylococcus aureus ¹⁷.

Morocco has implemented a National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022) supported by the WHO. The National Strategic Plan notes that Morocco has operated the gonococcus surveillance program (MOR-GASP) since 2013 as part of its broader AMR surveillance system. The program functions as a sentinel network across five regions, with approximately 150 patient samples collected every five months. All isolates are tested at the National Institute of Hygiene (INH), and the Institute collaborates with the WHO reference center for gonorrhea in Australia for strain control ¹⁸.

Morocco continues to receive support from the Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (AMR MPTF) which is implemented by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH), WHO and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) since the 2020s ¹⁹. The 2023 AMR MPTF Report notes progress in building laboratory capacity, especially in veterinary and environmental labs, though testing in human labs remains limited. ²⁰ However, there is no mention of testing for specific pathogens.

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the government of Morocco conducts environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or antimicrobial resistance (AMR) organisms.

Morocco’s 2019–2022 National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance, supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), outlines surveillance, detection, and reporting mechanisms for AMR in general, but it does not include specific provisions for environmental AMR surveillance ²¹.

Morocco continues to receive support from the Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (AMR MPTF) which is implemented by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH), WHO and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) since the 2020s ²². A 2023 AMR MPTF review confirmed that veterinary and environmental laboratories were assessed using FAO’s Assessment Tool for Laboratories and AMR Surveillance Systems (ATLASS) ²³. However, ATLASS is only a diagnostic and capacity-building tool; its use does not demonstrate that Morocco is conducting routine environmental surveillance of AMR organisms or antimicrobial residues.

The Laboratory of Product Safety, Food & Environment at the Pasteur Institute of Morocco states on its website that it can test environmental samples (air, water, soil), but this is not specific to AMR²⁴.In practice, environmental AMR research in Morocco has been limited to academic or project-based studies (e.g., coastal waters, hospital wastewater, and river systems), rather than systematic, government-led monitoring ^{25 26 27}. Finally, there is no evidence from the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development which indicates that Morocco operates a national program for environmental AMR detection or surveillance ²⁸.

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans.

Morocco adopted a National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), which outlined mechanisms for AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting ²⁹. As part of these efforts, a joint WHO–Morocco mission in April–May 2013 reviewed national structures for AMR coordination and surveillance. Among its recommendations was the need to “enforce existing regulations on antimicrobial use (prescription requirement)”, indicating that such regulations exist but that enforcement was poor. The Plan further cites as relevant legislation the Dahir of December 2, 1922, which regulates the importation, trade, possession, and use of poisonous substances. In principle, antimicrobials are classified under List A medicines, subject to strict dispensing conditions. However, no publicly available version of the Dahir explicitly lists antimicrobials as part of this category ³⁰.

According to the National Council of the Order of Pharmacists, Morocco's regulatory framework includes Law No. 17-04 on the Code of Medicine and Pharmacy and Dahir 1-06-151 promulgating Law No. 17-04 ³¹³². This law governs all categories of medicinal products—such as specialty pharmaceuticals, generics, immunologicals, radiopharmaceuticals, and homeopathic preparations—and sets detailed rules on prescriptions. However, it does not explicitly identify antibiotics or antimicrobials as a separate class.

Research studies show that a significant proportion of Moroccans continue to self-medicate with antibiotics, indicating gaps in implementation and oversight ³³³⁴.

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 50

There is evidence of national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals, however there is no evidence of implementation.

The primary legal basis for veterinary practice and pharmacy in Morocco is Law number 21-80 of 25 December 1980. As per the law, a veterinary prescription is mandatory for the delivery and administration of medications to animals. This prescription must be issued by a veterinarian after a clinical examination or as part of a permanent health monitoring plan. However, there is no evidence of implementation. ³⁵

The National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance was adopted for the period 2019-2022. A key goal of this plan is to "optimize the use of antimicrobials in human and animal health". The plan also includes a protocol to ban the use of antibiotics for growth promotion in livestock and to extend AMR surveillance to other types of animal production.³⁶

The National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA) regulates the veterinary pharmaceutical sector, including the registration of veterinary medicines and the inspection of pharmaceutical establishments. However, there is no indication that it monitors or enforces the use of prescriptions for antibiotics.³⁷

Morocco has been an active participant in the World Health Organization's Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) since the early 2020s. The GLASS country page for Morocco states that the country has self-reported that it has laws or regulations on prescription and sale of antimicrobials for terrestrial animal use. ³⁸

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Morocco, conducted in 2016, does not cite any specific national legislation or regulation requiring veterinary prescriptions for antibiotic use in animals. However, it notes Morocco’s commitment to addressing antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in the animal health sector. The report highlights several positive measures, including the adoption of a national protocol to prohibit the use of antibiotics for livestock growth promotion by July 2017.³⁹

A study conducted in Morocco in 2022 on pharmacists’ dispensing practices revealed shortcomings in the regulation of veterinary antibiotic dispensing ⁴⁰.

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Morocco has national legislation, plans, and strategy documents for zoonotic disease prioritization, detection, and reporting.

The Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA) publishes the laws and ministerial orders governing the detection and reporting of animal diseases, including epizootic lymphangitis, bovine, ovine, and caprine brucellosis, avian influenza, and rabies.⁴¹ ONSSA also outlines regulatory frameworks and programs for other zoonotic threats such as west nile fever and anthrax, including on detection and reporting of outbreaks. ⁴²⁴³

In addition, Morocco has implemented successive National Rabies Control Plans (NRCP) since the 1980s, with a focus on mass dog vaccination and epidemiological surveillance.⁴⁴

One of the objectives of the National Health Plan 2025, published by the Ministry of Health in 2020, is to "Strengthen the program to combat zoonoses transmissible to humans" [page no. 7]⁴⁵. Similarly, one of the objectives of the Strategic Plan of the National Institute of Hygiene is to "strengthen the surveillance and monitoring system based on laboratory data" [page no. 19]⁴⁶. As per the plan, this type of surveillance covers communicable diseases of bacterial or viral origin, zoonoses, and food- and waterborne diseases.

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has a national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans.

There are laws issued by various government departments in Morocco that outline procedures for the prevention and control of zoonotic diseases such as rabies, anthrax, ovine, bovine and caprine brucellosis, avian influenza, salmonella and tuberculosis. ^{47484950515253} These regulations primarily focus on managing and limiting the spread of pathogens within animal populations. However, they do not explicitly address risk identification or reduction measures for zoonotic spillover from animals to humans.

The Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA) monitors animal-origin foods across the entire supply chain, from farms and fisheries to markets, slaughterhouses, and processing facilities to ensure their safety and quality. This surveillance reduces the risk of contaminated products reaching consumers, thereby helping to limit potential zoonotic spillover events from animals to humans. However, this does not indicate the existence of a dedicated national strategy focused specifically on preventing zoonotic spillover events.⁵⁴

One of the objectives of the National Health Plan 2025, published by the Ministry of Health in 2020, is to "Strengthen the program to combat zoonoses transmissible to humans" [page no. 7]⁵⁵. However, the plan does not detail any measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans.

Similarly, one of the objectives of the Strategic Plan of the National Institute of Hygiene is to "strengthen the surveillance and monitoring system based on laboratory data" [page no. 19]⁵⁶. As per the plan, this type of surveillance covers communicable diseases of bacterial or viral origin, zoonoses, and food- and waterborne diseases. However, this plan only details surveillance and not risk identification and reduction of zoonotic disease spillover events.

Furthermore, neither the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities report for Morocco (2016) nor the National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022) adopted by Morocco make reference to a national plan or equivalent strategy specifically aimed at identifying and reducing the risk of zoonotic spillover events.⁵⁷⁵⁸

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern in Morocco.

There are laws issued by various government departments in Morocco that outline procedures for the surveillance, prevention and control of zoonotic diseases such as rabies, anthrax, ovine, bovine and caprine brucellosis, avian influenza, salmonella and tuberculosis. ^{59606162636465} These regulations focus on managing and limiting the spread of pathogens within animal populations, however, and not on the surveillance and control of zoonotic pathogens of public health concern.

Various government departments have issued laws regulating animals and animal by-products such as meat, poultry, milk, and honey. These laws set health and sanitation standards to ensure that meat and other products do not serve as pathways for zoonotic pathogen transmission.⁶⁶ However, they do not account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern.

The Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (Office National de Sécurité Sanitaire des Produits Alimentaires, ONSSA) does monitor animal-origin foods across the entire supply chain to ensure their safety and quality, and reduce the risk of contaminated products reaching consumers. ⁶⁷

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that there is a department, agency, or similar unit functioning as a multi-sectoral co-ordinating mechanism dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries.

In Morocco, a formal multisectoral coordination mechanism exists under the framework of the Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (AMR-MPTF), launched in 2019 by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH), World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). As part of this initiative, Morocco established a technical coordination committee comprised of technical officers from FAO, WOAH, and WHO together with focal points from the Ministries of Health, Environment, and Agriculture. ⁶⁸ As per an AMR-MPTF Report on Morocco published in 2023, the commitee convened monthly to coordinate efforts, strengthen surveillance and information systems, promote biosecurity and infection prevention and control, and increase public and stakeholder awareness to change behaviors regarding antimicrobial use ⁶⁹. The committee, however, is not dedicated to zoonotic disease.

Morocco developed the National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), supported by WHO. This plan explicitly called for the establishment of formal mechanisms of collaboration between ministries and the development of a regulatory framework for intersectoral committees, but not specific to zoonotic diseases. ⁷⁰

The Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA), housed under the Ministry of Agriculture, Maritime Fisheries, Rural Development, Water and Forests, monitors animal-origin foods across the entire supply chain to ensure their safety and quality. ⁷¹ ONSSA also outlines regulatory frameworks and programs for other zoonotic threats such as west nile fever and anthrax. ⁷²⁷³ However, the ONSSA is not a multi-sectoral coordinating mechanism.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) recommended the establishment of a multisectoral coordinating committee across ministries to strengthen surveillance and reporting of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) ⁷⁴.

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence of Morocco having a One Health Strategic Plan in place. ⁷⁵

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Morocco has a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency.

There are laws issued by various government departments in Morocco that outline the procedures for reporting specific notifiable animal diseases such as tuberculosis, rabies, anthrax, avian influenza, and ovine, bovine and caprine brucellosis. Livestock owners, veterinarians, and other actors in the value chain are required to notify suspected cases to the Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA). ^{76777879808182} However, there does not appear to be a single integrated national mechanism that empowers owners themselves to conduct structured surveillance and submit data directly to the government. Instead, the reporting obligation is legally mandatory but routed through veterinarians and local ONSSA offices. Neither the ONSSA website nor the website for the Ministry of Agriculture, Maritime Fisheries, Rural Development, Water and Forests specifies any such mechanism ⁸³⁸⁴.

Neither the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities report for Morocco, conducted in 2016, nor the National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022) adopted by Morocco supported by the World Health Organization includes any indication of a national mechanism for livestock owners to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. ⁸⁵⁸⁶

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

There is no publicly available legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners).

Although the Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA) provides information on ministerial decrees regulating various zoonotic diseases, as well as laws and standards governing animal and animal by-products such as meat, poultry, milk, and honey, these focus primarily on health and sanitation requirements. ⁸⁷⁸⁸

Neither the ONSSA website nor the website for the Ministry of Agriculture, Maritime Fisheries, Rural Development, Water and Forests does not provide any evidence of legislation or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of information generated through animal surveillance activities for livestock owners. ⁸⁹⁹⁰.

Furthermore, neither the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities report for Morocco (2016) nor the National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), supported by the World Health Organization, make reference to confidentiality safeguards for surveillance information related to animals or their owners. ⁹¹⁹²

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Morocco conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors), poultry and livestock.

The Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA) is responsible for the surveillance of animal diseases, including zoonotic diseases, in poultry, livestock and wildlife. ONSSA issues ministerial decrees and regulations covering diseases such as rabies, anthrax, avian influenza, bovine, ovine and caprine brucellosis, tuberculosis and salmonella, and oversees health monitoring of products of animal origin intended for human consumption, from production through sale while ONSSA veterinary inspectors ensure animal health, identification, and movement control. ^{93949596979899100101}

Per its webpages on rabies and west nile fever, ONSSA is also responsible for surveillance of these zoonotic diseases in wildlife. ¹⁰²¹⁰³

According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2016, both the Ministry of Health and the veterinary authorities carry out surveillance activities for zoonotic diseases in wild and domestic animals. ¹⁰⁴

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a mechanism for reporting notifiable diseases to The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).

The National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA) serves as Morocco’s focal point for the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). ¹⁰⁵

ONSSA conducts surveillance of animal diseases such as bluetongue, West Nile fever, peste des petits ruminants (PPR), and foot-and-mouth disease, through its veterinary officers and reports these to WOAH ^{106 107}. The National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), supported by the World Health Organization, also confirms ONSSA’s role as the WOAH focal point.¹⁰⁸

In addition, during a 2022 webinar on combating rabies conducted by WOAH, Morocco was represented by Dr. Ilham Ahamjik, Head of the Epidemiology and Health Surveillance Service at ONSSA. In her role, she develops, implements, and evaluates surveillance and control programs for animal diseases and also serves as Morocco’s WOAH national focal point for animal disease notification.¹⁰⁹

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 8.44

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 2.12

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a national plan on zoonotic disease that includes mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses in Morocco. Other types of documents highlight working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses, however these are neither national plans nor legislation.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco (2016) notes that the National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) engaged over 600 private-sector veterinarians to support public health and disease control activities.¹¹⁰

In 2019, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organization for Animal Health and the World Health Organization (WHO), launched the Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (AMR MPTF). The AMR MPTF report for Morocco, published in 2023, states that training of private and public veterinarians took place in order to enhance the capacity of all stakeholders involved in these industries to mitigate the risks of bacterial infections. ¹¹¹

The ONSSA oversees surveillance, control, and reporting of animal diseases, including zoonoses, and works through veterinary officers. Its website mentions veterinary practitioners in both the public and private sector (with professional orders like National Order of the Veterinarians) but it does not explicitly outline formal mechanisms for private sector coordination in zoonotic disease response. ¹¹²

The National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019-2022) adopted in collaboration with World Health does not mention any mechanism for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses in Morocco. ¹¹³

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 50

There is evidence of a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. However, there is insufficient evidence of details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities.

In 2025, the Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) published a list of approved, authorized, and recognized private laboratories and facilities that handle dangerous pathogens and toxins, among other substances, including the specific components managed by each laboratory as well as a catalogue of Analytical parameters of the approved laboratories. However, the lists does not provide information on inventories or inventory management systems.¹¹⁴¹¹⁵

In addition, ONSSA operates regional laboratories across Morocco as well as a laboratory attached to the veterinary divison of the ONSSA, which are listed on its website along with the pathogens they test for and their areas of activity. Yet, there is no reference to inventory records or inventory management practices for these facilities.¹¹⁶¹¹⁷

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2016, recommended establishing updated records and pathogen inventories for facilities that store or process dangerous pathogens and toxins. It states that while individual laboratories generally maintain their own pathogen inventories, there is no centralized national inventory or mapping of pathogens based on their actual storage status.¹¹⁸ There has not been a subsequent JEE in Morocco since 2016 ¹¹⁹.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence of comprehensive legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed.

The Kingdom of Morocco's Decree No. 2-12-431 of 2013 sets the conditions for the use of substances or preparations likely to harm the health of employees or compromise their safety, and sets biosecurity measures including a requirement for declaration of use of biological agents and for training of personnel working with biological agents. ¹²⁰ Decree No. 1-06-153 of 2006 and Decree No. 2-14-85 of 2015 relates to harardous waste managemnent¹²¹¹²². Decree 2-14-85 includes requiresments for physical containment and facility requirements (Article 29), operational practices (Articles 5-8), failure reporting and corrective measures (Article 27) ¹²³. However, these decrees do not constitute a comprehensive biosecurity legislation.

The Moroccan biosafety and biosecurity guide for veterinary establishments developed by the Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products in 2023 includes specific provisions for biosecurity such as keeping registers, conducting personnel background checks, training personnel and protecting sensitive information. ¹²⁴ This guide, however, does not constitute a comprehensive biosecurity legislation.

Cybersecurity measures for infrastructures of vital importance with sensitive information systems are incorporated in Law No. 05-20 relating to cybersecurity (Dahir No. 1-20-69 of 2020).¹²⁵ However, the decree makes no reference to laboratories being classified as vital infrastructures containing sensitive information systems.

The Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) issued a code of procedures governing the recognition, approval, and authorization of external laboratories, including provisions for regular audits and inspections by ONSSA.¹²⁶

The Law on Private Laboratories Conducting Biomedical Analysis (2002) outlines requirements for qualified personnel, including a requirement that authorization depends on staff competencies, the quality of facilities, and a requirement that assistant biologists and replacements hold appropriate credentials. However, these provisions focus on professional qualifications and training standards rather than establishing a standardized, mandatory biosecurity training program.¹²⁷

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations.

The National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) is the principal agency with authority over animal health, food safety, veterinary laboratories, and veterinary surveillance. It approves and inspects veterinary laboratories, and enforces compliance with veterinary and sanitary regulations. However, the regulations it enforces are primarily on animal health and food safety, not explicitly on biosecurity of dangerous pathogens and toxins.¹²⁸

The Moroccan Biosecurity Association (MOBSA) plays a role in training and awareness-raising on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, but it is a professional association, not a regulatory enforcement body. Its guidelines are informative, not legally binding. ¹²⁹

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities report for Morocco, published in June 2016, states that the country does not have national biosafety or biosecurity legislation, regulation, or guidelines. There is no mention in the report of a national agency responsible for biosecurity. ¹³⁰

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), a London-based non-profit organization that helps countries implement and verify international agreements on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and biosecurity, has a database which lists Morocco’s biosecurity-related laws and regulations, but none of these laws specifically designate an agency responsible for enforcing biosecurity.¹³¹

Since the 2020s, Morocco has received support from the Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (AMR MPTF), jointly implemented by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The 2023 AMR MPTF Report notes that Morocco’s biosecurity system has been strengthened under this program, though it does not identify a dedicated national agency responsible for biosecurity.¹³²

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that shows that Morocco has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities.

In 2025, the Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) published a list of approved, authorized, and recognized private laboratories and facilities that handle dangerous pathogens and toxins, among other substances, including the specific components managed by each laboratory as well as a catalogue of Analytical parameters of the approved laboratories. ¹³³¹³⁴ ONSSA also issued a code of procedures governing the recognition, approval, and authorization of external laboratories, including provisions for regular audits and inspections by ONSSA.¹³⁵ In addition, ONSSA operates regional laboratories across Morocco which are listed on its website along with the pathogens they test for and their areas of activity. ¹³⁶ However, none of these measures mention action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities.

Morocco’s Coordinate Collections of Microorganisms (CCMM) are a central depository where microbiological material is preserved. The CCMM were set up in 1988 with the aid of a network of institutions that chose to deposit their microorganisms and all information relating thereto with them. However, this is only a central depository and there is no evidence that the country has overall taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. ¹³⁷¹³⁸

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities report for Morocco, published in 2016, the National Institute of Hygiene (INH) carried out an inventory and risk assessment, and both the Pasteur Institute and the virology laboratory at Mohammed V University Hospital embarked on the same process. However, the JEE does not elaborate on whether this assessment included consolidation of inventories. ¹³⁹

The National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobiral Resistance (2019–2022), adopted in collaboration with the WHO, identifies as a goal the development of laboratory capacities, including veterinary and food hygiene laboratories. However, there is no mention of consolidation of inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities.¹⁴⁰

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for Ebola and/or anthrax in Morocco, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen.

Per its 2014 Ebola Virus Disease Surveillance and Preparedness Plan, the Ministry of Health conducts PCR-based diagnostic testing for the Ebola virus. ¹⁴¹ According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities report for Morocco, published in 2016, the country’s laboratory system is proficient in PCR testing, and Morocco was recognized for its strong response to the Ebola outbreak.¹⁴²

The National Institute of Hygiene Strategic Plan (2017–2021), which outlines priorities for strengthening public health services, mentions efforts to combat Ebola and anthrax, but does not explicitly reference PCR-based diagnostics for these pathogens.¹⁴³ Similarly, the Moroccan National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products (ONSSA) manages regional laboratories across the country and publishes catalogues of approved diagnostic tests.¹⁴⁴ These include PCR testing for zoonotic diseases such as bluetongue, West Nile fever, and sheep pox.

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

There is no public evidence that Morocco requires biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential, but there is evidence of training being provided on an ad hoc basis.

The Moroccan Biosecurity Association (Association Marocaine de biosécurité, MOBSA) provides general guidelines on laboratory biosecurity for facilities handling toxins, drawing from standards formulated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. These guidelines cover microbiological procedures and the maintenance of laboratory safety equipment to support safe practices. However there is no mandated legislation requiring standardized training. ¹⁴⁵ MOBSA also offers training workshops and capacity-building programs for laboratory staff and researchers. These include sessions on biosecurity principles, often based on international guidelines (e.g., World Health Organization, Centre for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). However, participation is voluntary, and these are not framed as legally required standardized training.¹⁴⁶

The Law on Private Laboratories Conducting Biomedical Analysis (2002) outlines requirements for qualified personnel, including that authorization depends on staff competencies, the quality of facilities, and that assistant biologists and replacements hold appropriate credentials. However, these provisions focus on professional qualifications and training standards rather than establishing a standardized, mandatory biosecurity training program.¹⁴⁷

Morocco has organized biosecurity and biosafety workshops in collaboration with international partners. For example, The World Organization for Animal Health trained Veterinary Services staff on laboratory biosafety, and in 2018 the National School of Public Health (ENSP), with support from Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions NetworK (TEPHINET) and the U.S. Department of State’s Biosecurity Engagement Program, hosted a workshop in Rabat. However, these initiatives are not part of any formal regulations mandating biosecurity training for personnel. ¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁹

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016, there is no systematic national training program for all laboratories and their staff in the country, but training on biosecurity is carried out at some institutes such as the National Institute of Hygiene (INH), which sets up such training through international projects. ¹⁵⁰

The ONSSA (National Office for Health Security of Food Products) conducts training and audits as part of its mandate for food safety, veterinary laboratories, and zoonotic disease surveillance. But there is no evidence of a nationally mandated, standardized biosecurity curriculum specifically for high-risk pathogen facilities.¹⁵¹

Morocco’s National Strategic Plan 2019–2022 for Antimicrobial Resistance states as one of its goals to 'Organize 2 certified training sessions per year for health professionals on infection prevention and control (IPC), biosafety, and biosecurity', suggesting no mandatory training plan was in place. ¹⁵²

The Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute of Morocco (2019-2023), a center for biomedical research, has one of its objectives to 'Develop and implement a biosecurity and biosafety plan', suggesting no such plan was in place.¹⁵³

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks.

The Kingdom of Morocco has a specific legal framework governing the licensing, registration and inspections of facilities working with biological agents and hazardous wastes. Decree No. 2-12-431 of 2013 sets the conditions for the use of substances or preparations likely to harm the health of employees or compromise their safety, and sets biosecurity measures including a requirement training of personnel working with biological agents. ¹⁵⁴ However, the decree makes no mention of background checks for personnel working with dangerous toxins or pandemic potential.

Morocco’s Decree No. 1-06-153 of 2006 and Decree No. 2-14-85 of 2015 relates to hazardous waste managemnent¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁶. Decree 2-14-85 includes requirements for physical containment and facility requirements (Article 29), operational practices (Articles 5-8), failure reporting and corrective measures (Article 27) ¹⁵⁷. However, the decrees do not make mention of background checks, drug testing or mental fitness checks on personnel working with pandemic potential.

In addition, the Moroccan biosafety and biosecurity guide for veterinary establishments developed by the Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products in 2023 includes a specific provision for conducting personnel background checks “Facilities must establish a safe and effective system for the official hiring of new employees, taking into account, among other things, their criminal record, personality, competence, and psychological state” [page no. 37]¹⁵⁸. However, this is not a regulatory or licensing document and it does not specify that background checks must be conducted on personnel working exclusively with dangerous pathogens or pandemic potential.

The Moroccan Biosecurity Association (MOBSA) provides general guidelines on laboratory biosecurity for facilities handling toxins, drawing from standards formulated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. These guidelines cover microbiological procedures and the maintenance of laboratory safety equipment to support safe practices. However, they do not establish any regulatory framework requiring personnel checks such as drug testing, background verification, or psychological assessments for staff working with dangerous pathogens. ¹⁵⁹ MOBSA also offers training workshops and capacity-building programs for laboratory staff and researchers, based on international guidelines (e.g., World Health Organization, Centre for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). Participation in these programs is voluntary, and they are not legally binding requirements. Moreover, they do not address personnel vetting measures such as background checks, drug screening, or psychological fitness evaluations. ¹⁶⁰

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016, there is no systematic national training program for all laboratories and their staff, though training on biosecurity is carried out at some institutes such as the National Institute of Hygiene (INH) through international projects. However, the JEE makes no reference to personnel checks such as drug testing, background screening, or psychological fitness assessments as part of national requirements. ¹⁶¹

The National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) conducts training and audits as part of its mandate for food safety, veterinary laboratories, and zoonotic disease surveillance. Yet, there is no indication that these procedures include mandatory personnel vetting measures such as background checks, drug testing, or psychological evaluations for staff with access to dangerous pathogens. ¹⁶²

Morocco’s National Strategic Plan 2019–2022 for Antimicrobial Resistance sets a goal to organize certified training sessions for health professionals on infection prevention and control (IPC), biosafety, and biosecurity. However, there is no evidence of its implementation, nor does the plan reference mandatory personnel reliability measures like drug screening, background checks, or psychological fitness assessments. ¹⁶³

As per the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute of Morocco (2019–2023), one objective is to develop and implement a biosecurity and biosafety plan. While this indicates intent to strengthen laboratory safety, there is no evidence that the plan includes requirements for personnel vetting measures such as background checks, drug testing, or psychological evaluations. ¹⁶⁴

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B).

In Morocco, the transport of infectious substances is governed by the European Agreement on the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), which sets out detailed requirements for the handling of Category A and Category B infectious substances. The ADR is publicly available on the website of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe ¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁶.

According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2016, the country adheres to international transport regulations, with personnel in public laboratories regularly trained on transporting infectious substances in line with United Nations standards.¹⁶⁷

The Order on the Transport by Air of Dangerous Goods (2003) further highlights the importance of correct classification, packaging, and labeling of infectious substances in accordance with technical instructions. The Order is available online on the website of The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), a London-based non-profit supporting international arms control and biosecurity, which maintains a database that includes Morocco’s biosecurity-related laws and regulations ¹⁶⁸.

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that there is legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential.

In Morocco, the transport of infectious substances is governed by the European Agreement on the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), which sets out detailed requirements for the handling of Category A and Category B infectious substances.¹⁶⁹¹⁷⁰ However, it does not specify any regulation to oversee cross-border transfer and end-user screening of pathogens.

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2016, the country adheres to international transport regulations, with personnel in public laboratories regularly trained on transporting infectious substances in line with United Nations standards.¹⁷¹ The JEE does not specifically mention oversight of the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential.

Morocco's Order on the Transport by Air of Dangerous Goods (2003) highlights the importance of correct classification, packaging, and labeling of infectious substances in accordance with technical instructions, but does not mention anything specific to cross-border transfer and end-user screening of pathogens.¹⁷²

The National Office of Food Safety (ONSSA) has the authority to regulate and control the import and export of products that may be a danger to human or animal health. This suggests a framework for border control, though its application to non-food pathogens is not explicitly detailed.¹⁷³

Morocco is a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has participated in peer review exercises to evaluate its national implementation. These reviews noted that while Morocco has a general commitment under the BWC, there is no evidence of specific legislation regulating the cross-border transfer or end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or materials with pandemic potential.

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no evidence of comprehensive legislation and/or regulations related to biosafety which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed.

The Kingdom of Morocco's Decree No. 2-12-431 of 2013 sets the conditions for the use of substances or preparations likely to harm the health of employees or compromise their safety, and sets measures including a requirement for declaration of use of biological agents and for training of personnel working with biological agents. ¹⁷⁴ Decree No. 1-06-153 of 2006 and Decree No. 2-14-85 of 2015 relates to hazardous waste management. ¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁶ Decree 2-14-85 includes requiresments for physical containment and facility requirements (Article 29), operational practices (Articles 5-8), failure reporting and corrective measures (Article 27) ¹⁷⁷. However, these decrees do not constitute a comprehensive biosafety legislation.

The Moroccan biosafety and biosecurity guide for veterinary establishments developed by the Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) in 2023 includes specific provisions for biosafety such as keeping registers, conducting personnel background checks, training personnel and protecting sensitive information. ¹⁷⁸ This guide, however, does not constitute a comprehensive biosafety legislation.

Cybersecurity measures for infrastructures of vital importance with sensitive information systems are incorporated in Law No. 05-20 relating to cybersecurity (Dahir No. 1-20-69 of 2020).¹⁷⁹ However, the decree makes no reference to laboratories being classified as vital infrastructures containing sensitive information systems.

ONSSA also issued a code of procedures governing the recognition, approval, and authorization of external laboratories, including provisions for regular audits and inspections by ONSSA.¹⁸⁰

The Law on Private Laboratories Conducting Biomedical Analysis (2002) outlines requirements for qualified personnel, including that authorization depends on staff competencies, the quality of facilities, and that assistant biologists and replacements hold appropriate credentials. However, these provisions focus on professional qualifications and training standards rather than establishing a standardized, mandatory biosafety training program.¹⁸¹

The Order on the Transport by Air of Dangerous Goods (2003) further highlights the importance of correct classification, packaging, and labeling of infectious substances in accordance with technical instructions. ¹⁸²

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations.

The National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) is the principal agency with authority over animal health, food safety, veterinary laboratories, and veterinary surveillance. It issues decrees, approves and inspects veterinary laboratories, and enforces compliance with veterinary and sanitary regulations. However, the regulations it enforces are primarily on animal health and food safety, not explicitly on biosecurity of dangerous pathogens and toxins.¹⁸³

The Moroccan Biosecurity Association (MOBSA) plays a role in training and awareness-raising on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, but it is a professional association, not a regulatory enforcement body. Its guidelines are informative, not legally binding. ¹⁸⁴

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in June 2016, states that the country does not have national biosafety or biosecurity legislation, regulation, or guidelines. There is no mention of a national agency responsible for biosecurity. ¹⁸⁵

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) is a London-based non-profit organization that helps countries implement and verify international agreements on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and biosecurity. VERTIC’s database lists Morocco’s biosecurity-related laws and regulations, but none specifically designate an agency responsible for enforcing biosecurity.¹⁸⁶

Since the 2020s, Morocco has received support from the Antimicrobial Resistance Multi-Partner Trust Fund (AMR MPTF), jointly implemented by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The 2023 AMR MPTF Report notes that Morocco’s biosecurity system has been strengthened under this program, though it does not identify a dedicated national agency responsible for biosecurity.¹⁸⁷

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

There is no public evidence that Morocco requires biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential, but there is evidence of training being provided on an ad hoc basis.

The Moroccan Biosecurity Association (MOBSA) provides general guidelines on laboratory biosafety for facilities handling toxins, drawing from standards formulated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. These guidelines cover microbiological procedures and the maintenance of laboratory safety equipment to support safe practices. However there is no mandated legislation requiring standardized training. ¹⁸⁸ MOBSA offers training workshops and capacity-building programs for laboratory staff and researchers. These include sessions on biosafety principles, often based on international guidelines (e.g., World Health Organization, Centre for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). However, participation is voluntary, and these are not framed as legally required standardized training.¹⁸⁹

The Law on Private Laboratories Conducting Biomedical Analysis (2002) outlines requirements for qualified personnel, including that authorization depends on staff competencies, the quality of facilities, and that assistant biologists and replacements hold appropriate credentials. However, these provisions focus on professional qualifications and training standards rather than establishing a standardized, mandatory biosafety training program .¹⁹⁰

Morocco has organized biosecurity and biosafety workshops in collaboration with international partners. For example, The World Organization for Animal Health trained Veterinary Services staff on laboratory biosafety, and in 2018 the National School of Public Health (ENSP), with support from Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions NetworK (TEPHINET) and the U.S. Department of State’s Biosecurity Engagement Program, hosted a workshop in Rabat. However, these initiatives are not part of any formal regulations mandating biosafety training for personnel. ¹⁹¹¹⁹²

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016, there is no systematic national training program for all laboratories and their staff in the country, but there is nonetheless, training on biosafety carried out at some institutes such as the National Institute of Hygiene (INH) that sets up such training through international projects. ¹⁹³

The ONSSA (National Office for Health Security of Food Products) conducts training and audits as part of its mandate for food safety, veterinary laboratories, and zoonotic disease surveillance. But there is no evidence of a nationally mandated, standardized biosafety curriculum specifically for high-risk pathogen facilities.¹⁹⁴

Morocco’s National Strategic Plan 2019–2022 for Antimicrobial Resistance states as one of its goals to 'Organize 2 certified training sessions per year for health professionals on infection prevention and control (IPC), biosafety, and biosecurity', suggesting no mandatory training plan was in place. ¹⁹⁵

The Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute of Morocco (2019-2023), a center for biomedical research, has one of its objectives to 'Develop and implement a biosecurity and biosafety plan', suggesting no such plan was in place.¹⁹⁶

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Morocco has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research.

The Pasteur Institute of Morocco and the National Institute of Hygiene both have departments engaged in research on pathogens, toxins, and other materials with pandemic potential. However, there is no evidence on their websites of a national assessment to review or monitor the scope of this ongoing research.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁸

Morocco has been a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since 2002 and has submitted Confidence Building Measure (CBM) reports, though these are not publicly accessible. The country page for Morocco on the BWC website provides no indication that assessments of research on pathogens are being conducted.¹⁹⁹

The National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), adopted in collaboration with the WHO, identifies as a goal establishing an overview or inventory of existing research structures and thematic areas, which constitutes an evaluation or assessment of ongoing research efforts. However, the plan does not specicy whether this overview would determine whether ongoing research is occuring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins or pathogens with pandemic potential. ²⁰⁰

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2016, does not include evidence of an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research in the country. ²⁰¹

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research in Morocco.

The Pasteur Institute of Morocco and the National Institute of Hygiene both have departments engaged in research on pathogens, toxins, and other materials with pandemic potential. However, there is no evidence of any legislation or regulation requiring oversight of the ongoing research.²⁰²²⁰³

Morocco has been a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since 2002 and has submitted Confidence Building Measure (CBM) reports, though these are not publicly accessible. The country page for Morocco on the BWC website provides no indication of any legislation/regulations for oversight of research on pathogens.²⁰⁴

The National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), adopted in collaboration with the WHO, identifies as a goal establishing an overview or inventory of existing research structures and thematic areas, which constitutes an evaluation or assessment of ongoing research efforts. However, the plan does not specify any legislation or regulation for the overview or whether the overview would determine whether ongoing research is occuring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins or pathogens with pandemic potential ²⁰⁵

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), a London-based non-profit organization that helps countries implement and verify international agreements on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and biosecurity, has a database which lists Morocco’s biosecurity-related laws and regulations, but none of them mention overseeing ongoing research on pathogens. ²⁰⁶

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016, does not include evidence of legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research in Morocco. ²⁰⁷

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research.

The Pasteur Institute of Morocco, and the National Institute of Hygiene (INH) conduct research or surveillance involving pathogens, but their oversight is limited to public health, veterinary health, and food safety functions, rather than dual-use research governance.²⁰⁸²⁰⁹

The Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) is a key player in biosafety, with responsibilities for animal and plant health, and food safety. Its mandate includes regulating and controlling imports and exports of products that may pose a risk to human or animal health, which can include certain biological materials. However, it does not oversee research with pathogens. ²¹⁰

The Moroccan Biosecurity Association (MOBSA) plays a role in training and awareness-raising on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, but it is a professional association, not a regulatory authority.²¹¹

Morocco is a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and participates in Confidence Building Measures, but there is no evidence on its country page for Morocco of a national authority specifically tasked with oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research.²¹²

The National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), adopted in collaboration with the WHO, identifies as a goal establishing an overview or inventory of existing research structures and thematic areas, which constitutes an evaluation or assessment of ongoing research efforts. However, the plan does not specify establihsing an agency for the overview/inventory or whether the overview would determine whether ongoing research is occuring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins or pathogens with pandemic potential .²¹³

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016, does not include evidence of any such agency in the country. ²¹⁴

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold.

The Pasteur Institute of Morocco, and the National Institute of Hygiene (INH) conduct research involving DNA, however, they make no mention of any legislation or regulations requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before it is sold. ²¹⁵²¹⁶

Morocco has been a State Party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since 2002 and has submitted Confidence Building Measure (CBM) reports, though these are not publicly accessible. The country page for Morocco on the BWC website provides no indication of any legislation/regulations for the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid).²¹⁷

While the Moroccan Biosecurity Association (MOBSA) provides guidelines on biosecurity for genetically modified organisms (GMOs), there is no evidence on its website of legislation or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA against lists of known pathogens or toxins before sale. ²¹⁸

The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database lists Morocco’s biosecurity-related laws and regulations, but none of them mention screening of synthesized DNA. ²¹⁹

Neither the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016 nor the National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), adopted in collaboration with the WHO, includes evidence of any such legislations or regulations in the country. ²²⁰²²¹

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 50

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 100

There is evidence that the official vaccination figures for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) are publicly available through the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), formerly known as the OIE.

The data for Morocco's official vaccination figures for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is collected through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), the WOAH's global platform for animal disease data. Member countries are required to submit reports that include quantitative data on the number of animals vaccinated against diseases, including FMD.²²²²²³

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that Morocco has a national immunization strategy in place. One of the objectives of the National Health Plan 2025, developed by the Ministry of Health, is to “Consolidate the National Immunization Program (PNI) and introduce the HPV vaccine for girls aged 9 to 13”[page no.6]²²⁴. However, the plan does not detail a strategy for the consolidation of the PNI nor does it specify measurs to ensure equitable distribution or strategies targeting socioeconomic, geographic, cultural/linguistic, or gender-based barriers. Moreover, the PNI is not publicly available, therefore the country does not score 1.

Morocco has also established a National Immunization Technical Advisory Group (NITAG), a multidisciplinary body of national experts that provides independent, evidence-based recommendations to policymakers and program managers on immunization policies and vaccine-related issues. ²²⁵ However, there is no publicly available evidence of a strategy that the NITAG has published to ensure equitable distribution or strategies targeting socioeconomic, geographic, cultural/linguistic, or gender-based barriers.

Morocco has a national immunization programme, implemented through its Programme National de Vaccination that has existed since the 1980s under the Directorate of Population. There is limited publicly available evidence of the target, monitoring mechanisms, plans to ensure equitable distribution or strategies targeting socioeconomic, geographic, cultural/linguistic, or gender-based barriers. ^226227228

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco (2016) highlights that the country has a robust national immunization strategy, with approximately 97% of the population receiving vaccinations through government programs. ²²⁹

World Health Organization (WHO) country webpages for Morocco provide further data, including the prevalence of infectious diseases, vaccination coverage rates, immunization expenditure, and the legal framework supporting immunization activities. ²³⁰²³¹

The National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), adopted in collaboration with the WHO states that Morocco’s National Immunization Program is considered a model in its WHO region. ²³²

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the national immunization strategy/plan includes measures to address vaccine hesitancy and build public trust in vaccines.

One of the objectives of the National Health Plan 2025, developed by the Ministry of Health, is to “Consolidate the National Immunization Program (PNI) and introduce the HPV vaccine for girls aged 9 to 13”[page no.6]²³³. However, the plan does not detail any measures to address vaccine hsitancy and build public trust in vaccines.

Morocco has a national immunization programme, implemented through its Programme National de Vaccination that has existed since the 1980s under the Directorate of Population. There is limited publicly available evidence of the target, monitoring mechanisms, plans to ensure equitable distribution or strategies to address vaccine hesitancy.^234235236.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco (2016) highlights that the country has a robust national immunization strategy but no evidence of measures to address vaccine hesitancy and build public trust in vaccines. ²³⁷

World Health Organization (WHO) country webpages for Morocco provide further data, including the prevalence of infectious diseases, vaccination coverage rates, immunization expenditure, and the legal framework supporting immunization activities. ²³⁸²³⁹

A 2017 report from the Fondation Mérieux's 7th Middle East and North Africa Influenza Stakeholders Network Meeting explicitly states that there is a "low level of vaccine acceptability” in Morocco and that this is related to "communication gaps and the lack of targeted communication strategies." This shows the problem is recognized by public health professionals in the country. However, there is no evidence of a strategy to address the issue.²⁴⁰

Academic papers on the surveillance of adverse events following immunization (AEFIs) show a system is in place to track and assess potential vaccine reactions, but do not provide evidence to show that there is a national strategy in place to address vaccine hesitancy. ²⁴¹

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

There is evidence of national advisory group that provides technical guidance and advice on the immunization strategy/plan to government.

Morocco has a National Immunization Technical Advisory Group (NITAG) that provides technical guidance and advice to the government on its immunization strategy. This group is a multidisciplinary committee of experts who provide independent, evidence-based recommendations to the Ministry of Health. As per the World Health Organization's database for Morocco, the NITAG conducted its last assessment in 2023. ²⁴²²⁴³

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 100

There is public evidence that Morocco has an immunization programme for influenza.

As per the World Health Organization, the seasonal influenza vaccine was introduced in 2006 for healthcare personnel as part of avian influenza preparedness, and in 2013 Morocco expanded its influenza vaccine policy through a cooperative agreement with the US-Centre for Disease Control. The National Institute of Hygiene in Rabat has been recognized by the World Health Organization as a National Influenza Centre in Morocco since 2000. ²⁴⁴

As per an academic study, the national plan for influenza prevention and control was established by the Ministry of Health with an official vaccination strategy in the 2019/2020 season.²⁴⁵

The World Health Organization’s data summarizes the country’s introduction status of seasonal Influenza vaccine in the national immunization programme over time, showing Morocco’s introduction of the seasonal influenza vaccine since 2014 till 2024. ²⁴⁶ It does not list current availability of seasonal flu vaccines.

In addition, several Moroccan news outlets have reported on Morocco’s seasonal flu vaccination campaigns, particularly targeting at-risk groups.²⁴⁷²⁴⁸

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 100

There is evidence of a plan or strategy to develop a health system that is resilient to the challenges that climate change and changing seasonal weather patterns pose, and it includes considerations that specifically address evolving threat of infectious diseases, changing weather patterns and acute events following extreme weather events.

According to the World Health Organization's Climate and Health Country Profile for Morocco (2015), the country is implementing health adaptation projects to address climate change and has undertaken activities to strengthen the climate resilience of its health infrastructure.²⁴⁹

Morocco’s 2019 National Climate Plan Horizon 2030 integrates health risks from climate change in its plan, noting vulnerabilities to diarrheal, respiratory, and vector-borne diseases, malnutrition, and heat-related stress. The Ministry of Health’s Operational Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change strengthens surveillance with climate indicators, improves prevention and management of climate-sensitive diseases, and develops training tools.²⁵⁰

Morocco’s National Adaptation Plan 2022–2030, published by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development in 2022, includes health-specific measures such as: establishing information and monitoring systems to detect and track climate impacts on health; adapting planning and programs to prevent and control climate-sensitive diseases; strengthening emergency health intervention capacity for extreme climate events; and reinforcing the resilience of health infrastructure (P. 42). The plan also prioritizes vulnerability assessments and disease control for conditions exacerbated by climate change and improving public awareness. These measures confirm that Morocco’s strategy explicitly integrates infectious disease risks with changing weather patterns and acute events linked to climate extremes.²⁵¹

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 50

There is publicly available evidence that Morocco’s national laboratory system can perform at least five of the ten WHO-defined core diagnostic tests, although the specific test names are not always explicitly listed.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco (2016) confirms that the system has the capacity to conduct at least five of these core tests, including those for HIV, tuberculosis, influenza, typhoid, and malaria. In addition, Morocco hosts a WHO-recognized National Influenza Centre, as well as WHO-accredited polio and measles/rubella laboratories within the National Institute of Hygiene (INH).²⁵².

The Pasteur Institute of Morocco (Institut Pasteur du Maroc) conducts a wide spectrum of diagnostic tests including molecular biology (PCR/virology), serology, cell culture, and immunological assays for diseases such as tuberculosis, influenza, rabies, and hepatitis. These tests directly correspond to several of WHO’s core diagnostic categories.²⁵³

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national plan for conducting testing during a health emergency

The 2015 evaluation of Essential Public Health Functions (EPHF) conducted with the World Health Organization recommended the development of a comprehensive, multisectoral preparedness framework and improvements in laboratory functions, emergency response, and intersectoral coordination. While these recommendations emphasize the importance of preparedness and laboratory capacity in general, they do not constitute a national plan for conducting testing during health emergencies, nor do they provide operational guidance on testing for novel pathogens, scaling laboratory capacity, or setting testing targets during emergency situations. ^254255256

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR), with stated objectives including enhancing preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners. However, there is no publicly available official government document setting out the PNASS, and the available references do not describe a dedicated or operational plan for conducting diagnostic testing during health emergencies. The PNASS is referenced in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute of Morocco and in the Ministry of Health’s National Health Plan 2025, but these references do not detail testing strategies, testing capacity benchmarks, or protocols for testing during emergencies. ^257258259260

The Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute of Morocco (2019–2023) highlights the strengthening of medical biology laboratories to improve the detection and characterization of pathogens responsible for epidemic diseases, including emerging threats. While this reflects an intention to enhance laboratory capacity, it does not amount to a national testing plan, nor does it specify how testing would be coordinated, scaled, or prioritized nationwide during a public health emergency. ²⁶¹

The National Health Plan 2025 outlines broad objectives to enhance surveillance and health security, including the launch and implementation of the National Health Security Plan, strengthening alert detection and response capacities, reinforcing sanitary controls at borders, and restructuring the network of national reference laboratories. These objectives remain high-level and do not provide evidence of a concrete national plan for conducting diagnostic testing during health emergencies, such as defined testing strategies, surge capacity arrangements, or protocols for novel pathogens. ²⁶²

The Centre d’Opérations d’Urgence de Santé Publique (COUSP) was established in 2019 to support early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies. The COUSP operates alongside regional emergency operations centers (CROUSP) and rapid intervention teams (EIR). While this institutional framework supports coordination and response, publicly available documentation, including the World Health Organization’s COUSP manual for the African Region, does not describe a national plan for testing during emergencies, nor does it set out testing goals, laboratory surge strategies, or procedures for testing novel pathogens. ^263264265

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

There is evidence of a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited.

The Mohammed VI National Laboratory for Medical Analysis is accredited by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)15189 on quality and competence.²⁶⁶

The food microbiology laboratory at the Pasteur Institute is a national reference laboratory accredited by SEMAC (Moroccan Accreditation Service) to ISO 17025 since 2017 (renewed in 2018). According to the Strategic Plan of the Institut Pasteur of Morocco 2019–2023, the laboratory aims to accredit its medical biology activities under ISO 15189, though this has not yet been achieved as of 2025.²⁶⁷²⁶⁸

According to its Strategic Plan 2017–2021, the National Hygiene Institute (INH) aims to Maintain ISO certification and ensure the effectiveness of its Quality Management System (QMS), to Extend ISO 9001 certification to all its structures and Pursue accreditation of selected laboratory activities under ISO 17025 and ISO 15189. ²⁶⁹

The National Laboratory for Drug Control (LNCM), which ensures the quality of medicines and health products, as per news reports, has received the ISO 17025 certification from the European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines.²⁷⁰²⁷¹

The Regional Laboratory for Analysis and Research of Meknes (LRARMK) operated by the Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) is engaged in the 17025 accreditation process. ²⁷²

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review in Morocco.

The Mohammed VI National Laboratory for Medical Analysis is accredited by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)15189 on quality and competence. ²⁷³ The ISO 15189 certification requires external quality assurance reviews. ²⁷⁴

The food microbiology laboratory at the Pasteur Institute is a national reference laboratory accredited by SEMAC (Moroccan Accreditation Service) to ISO 17025 since 2017 (renewed in 2018). ²⁷⁵²⁷⁶ ISO 17025 requires accreditation from an external quality review such as the SEMAC. ²⁷⁷²⁷⁸

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a nationwide specimen transport system in Morocco.

According to Morocco’s evaluation under the World Health Organization’s Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergencies (SPAR) framework, as of 2024, Morocco scored 80% under Indicator C.5.1: Specimen referral and transport system, suggesting a well-established and functional national system for specimen collection and transport across the country.²⁷⁹

According to the 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, the country has a national specimen transportation system that adheres to international regulations. Public laboratory staff are regularly trained in transporting infectious substances under UN standards. ²⁸⁰

In 2016, the Ministry of Health, in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO), released a report on Morocco’s public health laboratory system. The report notes that the Global Fund works with an authorized courier to handle the transport of specimens for influenza, HIV, TB, polio, and rotavirus within the country ²⁸¹

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a plan in place in Morocco to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak.

The Strategic Plan of the National Institute of Hygiene 2017-2021 focuses on improving communication between the National Hygiene Institute and laboratories at national and international levels. ²⁸² The National Health Plan 2025 prioritizes restructuring the network of national reference laboratories. ²⁸³ Similarly, the 2015 WHO evaluation of Essential Public Health Functions (EPHF) recommended aligning the organization, management, and supervision of laboratory functions with essential public health needs. ²⁸⁴ These initiatives do not establish a mechanism for rapid laboratory authorization in emergencies.

There is no evidence of such a plan or any mention of authorizing laboratories in the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2016, or the National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022), adopted in collaboration with the WHO.²⁸⁵²⁸⁶ The JEE states that the IHR National Focal Point is the Directorate of Epidemiology and Disease Control (DELM). However, DELM does not have a website to confirm whether there is a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak.

Additionally, the websites of The Mohammed VI National Laboratory for Medical Analysis ²⁸⁷, the food microbiology laboratory at the Pasteur Institute ²⁸⁸, and The National Laboratory for Drug Control (LNCM) ²⁸⁹, do not mention any plan in place to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak.

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

There is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis.

Morocco has a national notifiable disease surveillance system coordinated by the Ministry of Health, which tracks diseases such as HIV, TB, influenza, polio, measles, and malaria. Routine data is collected through public health facilities and laboratories. 2019 Order No. 683-95 promulgated by the Ministry of Public Health of Morocco, on the Organization of Epidemiological Surveillance and Management of Health Alerts, makes the reporting of certain diseases compulsory. However, there is no mention of health data being analyzed on a daily basis. ²⁹⁰

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, reported that Morocco has mechanisms to capture unusual health events through media monitoring, hospital reports, and the early warning system. ²⁹¹ The JEE states that the IHR National Focal Point is the Directorate of Epidemiology and Disease Control (DELM). However, DELM does not have a website to confirm whether there is evidence of event-based surveillance or that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis.

According to Morocco’s evaluation under the World Health Organization’s Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergencies (SPAR) framework, as of 2024, Morocco scored 60% under Indicator C.6.1: Early warning function: indicator- and event-based surveillance, confirming that event-based surveillance is in place; but there is no mention of a daily analysis of health data. ²⁹²

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point, IHR NFP) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, states that the IHR National Focal Point is the Directorate of Epidemiology and Disease Control (DELM), whose Director is the primary focal point. The IHR NFP also includes the head of the surveillance section within the DELM. The JEE states that “the contact details of the IHR NFP representatives have been provided to WHO and are continuously updated and annually confirmed", but also states that the roles and responsibilities of the IHR NFP are not sufficiently identified. ²⁹³

The WHO–Morocco Cooperation Strategy (2023–2027) identifies DELM as a key implementing partner responsible for achieving the objectives outlined in the plan to promote the health and well-being of the population.²⁹⁴

According to Morocco’s 2024 evaluation under the WHO Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergencies (SPAR) framework, the country has an Indicator C2: IHR Coordination and NFP Functions, confirming the existence of a National Focal Point (NFP). However, the assessment indicates that Morocco scored low on the functional capacities and performance of the NFP under this indicator. ²⁹⁵

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level.

2019 Order No. 683-95 promulgated by the Ministry of Public Health of Morocco, on the Organization of Epidemiological Surveillance and Management of Health Alerts, makes the reporting of certain diseases compulsory. As per the order, “The Regional Health Directorate and the Provincial or Prefectural Delegation will continue to notify surveillance diseases by electronic mail according to the procedures in force, as stipulated in Ministerial Circular No. 53 dated July 21, 2004.” However, there is no evidence that the Government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level. ²⁹⁶

As per the 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, Morocco has mechanisms to capture unusual health events through media monitoring, hospital reports, and the early warning system. It also states that Morocco has indicated plans to establish an interoperable, interconnected, real-time electronic reporting system for public health and veterinary surveillance; however, there is currently no publicly available evidence that such a system is operational. ²⁹⁷

Neither the Ministry of Health's National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance 2019 nor its National Health Plan 2025 makes a mention of an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level.²⁹⁸²⁹⁹

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the electronic reporting surveillance system in place and that it can collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data.

2019 Order No. 683-95 promulgated by the Ministry of Public Health of Morocco makes the reporting of certain diseases compulsory. As per the order “The Regional Health Directorate and the Provincial or Prefectural Delegation will continue to notify surveillance diseases by electronic mail according to the procedures in force, as stipulated in Ministerial Circular No. 53 dated July 21, 2004.” However, there is no evidence that the Government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level. ³⁰⁰

As per the 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, Morocco has mechanisms to capture unusual health events through media monitoring, hospital reports, and the early warning system. It also states that Morocco has indicated plans to establish an interoperable, interconnected, real-time electronic reporting system for public health and veterinary surveillance; however, there is currently no publicly available evidence that such a system is operational. ³⁰¹

Neither Ministry of Health's National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance 2019 nor its National Health Plan 2025 makes a mention of an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level.³⁰²³⁰³

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 50

There is evidence of some wastewater and environmental surveillance (WES) activity within Morocco. There is evidence of research conducted which demonstrates the effectiveness and feasibility of wastewater genomic surveillance in monitoring pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2 in Morocco, however this seems to be a one-off research programme. ³⁰⁴

The WHO states that at 12 national laboratories in Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia, polioviruses isolated from fecal samples collected from AFP cases are tested using standardized procedures and reagents. However, it states that there are seven environment surveillance laboratories across the Region, in Egypt, Jordan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Pakistan, Sudan and Syria, and does not name Morocco as having an ES labs.³⁰⁵

Moreover, in 2023, the French Development Agency (AFD) (coordinated by the Pasteur Institute in collaboration with the Obépine Scientific Interest Group (GIS)), launched the ATLANTES (Alliance for the Extension of Pathogen Surveillance in Wastewater) project. ³⁰⁶ Phase one of the project focused on the design and preparation of wastewater sampling engineering system. Meanwhile, phase two focused on the operational implementation of wastewater monitoring, and is a pilot project for wastewater monitoring deployed in Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia.

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 50

Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence that they are used.

As per several news reports from recent years, although Morocco has made significant progress in e-health reforms, including legislation requiring health institutions to adopt information systems and the creation of a shared medical record for each patient, in 2025, these measures are still in the process of being rolled out. Pilot initiatives and legal frameworks demonstrate that medical records are in use, but they are not yet commonly implemented across the entire health system.³⁰⁷³⁰⁸

At the Gitex Africa 2025 conference, the Mohammed VI Foundation for Sciences and Health and the French public interest group MipihSIB signed a strategic partnership to support Morocco’s national strategy for modernizing health infrastructure. The collaboration seeks to accelerate the digital transformation of the health system. ³⁰⁹³¹⁰ In addition, while the Mohammed VI National Laboratory for Medical Analysis emphasizes on its official website that it is technologically advanced, it does not mention electronic medical records. ³¹¹

One of the objectives of the World Health Organization–Morocco Cooperation Strategy (2023–2027) is to advance the digitalization of the health system by establishing an integrated information system to collect, process, and use key health data. ³¹²

One of the objectives of the Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025 is to design, computerize, and implement the shared medical record and integrate the private sector into the Ministry of Health’s information system. ³¹³

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in their country.

As per several recent news reports, although Morocco has made significant progress in e-health reforms, including legislation requiring health institutions to adopt information systems and the creation of a shared medical record for each patient, in 2025, these measures are still in the process of being rolled out. Pilot initiatives and legal frameworks demonstrate that medical records are in use, but they are not yet commonly implemented across the entire health system.³¹⁴³¹⁵

At the Gitex Africa 2025 conference, the Mohammed VI Foundation for Sciences and Health and the French public interest group MipihSIB signed a strategic partnership to support Morocco’s national strategy for modernizing health infrastructure. The collaboration seeks to accelerate the digital transformation of the health system for the benefit of Moroccan citizens. ³¹⁶³¹⁷

One of the objectives of the WHO–Morocco Cooperation Strategy (2023–2027) is to advance the digitalization of the health system by establishing an integrated information system to collect, process, and use key health data. ³¹⁸

One of the objectives of the Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025 is to design, computerize, and implement the shared medical record and integrate the private sector into the Ministry of Health’s information system. ³¹⁹

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 0

There is no evidence of data standards to ensure that data is comparable (eg., ISO Standards).

Morocco has adopted ISO standards (e.g., ISO 17025 for testing and calibration, ISO 15189 for medical laboratories) in certain laboratories such as the Mohammed VI National Laboratory for Medical Analysis, the Pasteur Institute, the National Institute of Hygiene, the National Laboratory for Drug Control (LNCM), and the Regional Laboratory for Analysis and Research of Meknes (LRARMK). These demonstrate the use of internationally recognized quality and laboratory competence standards, but not data standards to ensure comparability across systems. ^{320321322323324325}

In its 2020 National Health Plan 2025, the Ministry of Health emphasizes strengthening interoperability and integration of health information systems, which implies movement toward standardized data collection and comparability.³²⁶

The World Health Organization–Morocco Cooperation Strategy (2023–2027) includes objectives to digitize the health system and establish an integrated information system for health data, suggesting a commitment to standardized formats and comparability.

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance) in Morocco.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, noted collaboration between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture (through its Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products, ONSSA) in zoonotic disease surveillance like rabies and brucellosis.³²⁷ It did list similar intersectoral coordination for other zoonotic diseases as a policy need.

Since the publication of the JEE report, the Ministry of Health published a report in 2018, titled the 'National Program against Rabies', which identifies a committee for sharing surveillance data to fight against rabies (the most common zoonotic disease in Morocco); this committee includes the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of the Interior. ³²⁸

ONSSA manages animal health surveillance (including zoonoses such as brucellosis, avian influenza, and rabies) and has mechanisms for reporting and coordination with the Ministry of Health. ³²⁹ The ONSSA’s surveillance focuses primarily on poultry, livestock, and cattle, with no evidence of comprehensive wildlife monitoring.

The data for Morocco's zoonotic diseases is collected through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS), the World Organization for Animal Health's (WOAH) global platform for animal disease data. Member countries are required to submit reports that include quantitative data on the prevalence of zoonotic diseases; Morocco has reported on diseases such as blue tongue, west nile fever, rabies and foot-and-mouth disease. ³³⁰

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar).

The Ministry of Health publishes epidemiological bulletins and reports on priority infectious diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis, influenza, measles, and malaria. These reports contain aggregated, de-identified data which is available on its website. ³³¹

The Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA) provides information on zoonotic disease surveillance, including anthrax, brucellosis, and avian influenza. Reports and updates are published online, typically as de-identified aggregated data. ³³²

Morocco has been an active participant in the World Health Organization's Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS) since the early 2020s. The GLASS database lists Morocco as having reported de-identified data on escherichia coli, acinetobacter spp., klebsiella pneumoniae, salmonella spp., streptococcus pneumoniae, and staphylococcus aureus. ³³³

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 100

There is evidence of legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities.

Law No. 09-08 on the Protection of Personal Data (2009) establishes the legal framework for the protection of personal data, including health information. Health institutions, including the Ministry of Health, public hospitals, and private clinics, are required to comply with Law 09-08 when handling patient records and surveillance data. De-identified data used in surveillance and reporting is consistent with this legal framework to protect individual privacy. The law explicitly defines "sensitive data" to include information related to an individual's health, including genetic data.^334335336

The law also established the National Commission for the Control of Personal Data Protection (CNDP) to oversee compliance with personal data protection laws, including health data, which it actively enforces per a May 2025 Morrocan news report.³³⁷

Per Article 446 of the Criminal Code, health workers are under the obligation to keep medical information confidential. ³³⁸

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 100

There is evidence that there is legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, and it includes mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware).

Law No. 09-08 on the Protection of Personal Data (2009) establishes the legal framework for the protection of personal data, including health information. Health institutions, including the Ministry of Health, public hospitals, and private clinics, are required to comply with Law 09-08 when handling patient records and surveillance data. The law explicitly defines "sensitive data" to include information related to an individual's health, including genetic data.³³⁹ The law mandates that data controllers implement appropriate security measures to protect personal data from unauthorized access, alteration, or destruction. It also requires prior authorization from the National Commission for the Protection of Personal Data (CNDP) for processing sensitive personal data, ensuring that health data is handled with the highest level of confidentiality.³⁴⁰

Law No. 05-20, On Cybersecurity, which was enacted on November 22, 2020, addresses the protection of personal and sensitive data from cyber threats such as ransomware and other malicious attacks. This law establishes a legal framework for securing information systems and outlines the responsibilities of public and private entities in safeguarding digital infrastructure.³⁴¹

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 100

There is evidence that the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data for more than one disease during a public health emergency with other countries.

Morocco is bound under the International Health Regulations to notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, including the timely sharing of surveillance data with WHO and, indirectly, with other countries. ³⁴² For example, for the ongoing measles outbreak since late 2023 and the Meningococcal disease in 2000, Morocco reported epidemic surveillance data, public health response measures, and vaccination coverage figures to the World Health Organization (WHO).³⁴³³⁴⁴ However, this legally binding framework necessitates the sharing of surveillance data with the WHO but does not specify provisions to share with other countries.

The Morocco–WHO Cooperation Strategy (2023–2027) highlights epidemic preparedness, response, and resilience as key priorities. By setting epidemic management and timely information-sharing with WHO as strategic objectives, this document serves as public evidence of Morocco’s commitment to notify WHO of epidemic events and collaborate on international health security.[page no. 5]³⁴⁵

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE, 2016) for Morocco noted that the country has a functioning National IHR Focal Point (NFP) that communicates with WHO. While some capacities were scored low, the mechanism itself demonstrates Morocco’s commitment to data sharing.³⁴⁶ Morocco’s States Parties Self-Assessment Annual Reporting Tool (SPAR) 2024 submission confirmed the existence of the NFP and ongoing reporting to WHO under IHR obligations. Although challenges remain in timeliness and interoperability, the reporting system reflects an official commitment.³⁴⁷

Morocco has engaged in cooperative frameworks, particularly with African Center for Disease Control and Prevention as part of the North African Regional Cooperation Centre (RCC) and the WHO's Eastern Mediterranean Region's Framework for health information systems (2017) that include provisions for data exchange during cross-border health emergencies (e.g., epidemics of influenza, TB, polio).³⁴⁸³⁴⁹

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 50

There is a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing but only in the event of an active public health emergency.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Moroccan government launched a mobile application called "Wiqaytna" to help with contact tracing. This application uses Bluetooth technology to identify if a user has been in close contact with a person who later tests positive for COVID-19. ³⁵⁰³⁵¹

The national system provides support for contact tracing teams. A review of Morocco's COVID-19 experience in the Casablanca region during 2020-2022 highlighted the importance of enhancing the "capacity, ability" of contact tracers to minimize transmission.³⁵²

To support its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including contact tracing efforts, the Moroccan Ministry of Health received significant funding from international partners like the World Bank. This funding was allocated to support "systems to ensure prompt case finding and contact tracing".³⁵³

The Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025 and the World Health Organization–Morocco Cooperation Strategy 2023–2027 both highlight goals to strengthen epidemic preparedness and standardize surveillance and response functions, but they do not explicitly mention improving sub-national contact tracing capacities.³⁵⁴³⁵⁵

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention.

In March 2020, King Mohammed VI ordered the creation of a Special Fund for the Management and Response to COVID-19. This fund, which reached approximately MAD 33 billion (USD 3 billion), was used to finance preventive measures and provide socio-economic support to households and businesses. It enabled a compensation system that reached about 5.5 million households of informal workers. In addition, employees registered with the National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale, CNSS) who lost their jobs due to the pandemic received lump-sum compensation.³⁵⁶ However, this support was directed toward the general population rather than specifically to infected individuals and their contacts. In December 2020, the World Bank approved a USD 400 million program to strengthen Morocco’s social protection system—the COVID-19 Social Protection Emergency Response Project—which provided assistance to poor and vulnerable households during the pandemic.³⁵⁷³⁵⁸ However, this initiative also did not specify targeted medical care or financial support for infected individuals and their contacts.

Social support programs during COVID-19 included a subsidized health care scheme for poor and vulnerable families: Households enrolled in the non-contributory health insurance program (RAMED) received monthly mobile payments of MAD 800–1,200 (USD 80–120) from April 2021, depending on household size, while other households could claim cash support online. Additionally, a special pandemic management fund provided assistance to businesses and households affected by the pandemic ³⁵⁹. However, these measures were aimed at the general population and impacted groups, rather than being specifically directed toward individuals infected with COVID-19 or their contacts.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency.

During the COVID‑19 pandemic, Morocco implemented coordinated measures between the Ministry of Health and border control authorities (airports, ports, and land crossings) to screen incoming travelers, identify suspected cases, and enforce quarantine protocols. Travelers were monitored, and contacts were traced using both digital tools (like the Wiqaytna mobile app).³⁶⁰ However, there was no specific plan or agreement in place to coordinate these efforts.

As per Morocco’s 2016 World Health Organization Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, published 2017, Morocco’s Border Health Services, under the Ministry of Health, are responsible for implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR) and other national guidelines at points of entry. They conduct surveillance, risk assessment, and prevention of disease importation/exportation, with clearly identified authorities for routine and emergency operations. However, although coordination between the Border Health Services and other sectors was noted in the JEE, there is no mention of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency ³⁶¹.

The Border Health Services does not have a website and there is no evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health of a coordinated plan between public health and border authorities to detect suspected cases in travelers and trace their contacts during a public health emergency ³⁶².

The Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025 highlights the need for epidemic preparedness at points of entry and coordination with other agencies, suggesting space for improvement in terms of cooperation. ³⁶³

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP) available in Morocco; however, there is no evidence of resources provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs.

Morocco’s Field Epidemiology Training Program/Epidemiology in Public Health (FETP/ESP) was established in 2010 by the National Institute of Health Administration of Morocco (now the National School of Public Health) and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).³⁶⁴

Morocco’s FETP/ESP is a two-year applied training program designed to develop highly skilled field epidemiologists. Trainees gain competencies in disease surveillance, data analysis for evidence-based decision-making, outbreak investigation, and applied public health research. The program is led by the Ministry of Health (including the National School of Public Health and the Department of Epidemiology and Disease Control) in collaboration with the CDC and occasionally other international partners.³⁶⁵ There is no evidence that the FETP/ESP sends trainees to other countries to participate in applied epidemiology training programs nor is there evidence that the Moroccan government funds such programs.

The 2016 World Health Organization Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Morocco, published 2017, does not provide evidence suggesting that there are resources provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training. ³⁶⁶

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence suggesting that the field epidemiology training programs, available in Morocco, are explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or that there is a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV).

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Morocco, published 2017, indicates that while the country has implemented a national FETP since 2010, there is no evidence suggesting that the program is inclusive of animal health professionals. The JEE recommends that all actors, including veterinarians and laboratory technicians, should be included by opening FETP to other subject matter experts. However, there is no evidence of such inclusivity in the current program. ³⁶⁷³⁶⁸

Morocco’s FETP has occasionally included veterinarians and other animal health professionals in specialized training activities. Specifically, over 130 professionals from both human and animal health sectors, including veterinarians, have participated in biosafety and biosecurity workshops focused on identifying, assessing, and mitigating biological risks in the laboratory and field.³⁶⁹

The website of the National Order of Veterinarians does not provide any evidence of epidemiology training programs for veterinary professionals.³⁷⁰

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 0

There is insufficient public evidence that Morocco has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people.

From 2010 until 2020, the Morocco Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) graduated six cohorts, totaling 106 professionals—76 from advanced programs and 30 from basic or frontline levels. With Morocco’s population of approximately 37 million, achieving the target of 1 field-trained epidemiologist per 200,000 people would require about 185 trained epidemiologists. Therefore, the existing 106 graduates represent only about 57% of the estimated target, suggesting that the country did not meet the benchmark. ³⁷¹

There is no publicly available information past 2020 on the Ministry of Health’s website indicating that Morocco maintains at least one trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 population ³⁷².

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 33.33

There is evidence that Morocco has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential but the plan is not publicly available.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. There is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites³⁷³³⁷⁴. However, it is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025. ³⁷⁵³⁷⁶ As no public documentation exists for the PNASS, there is no available evidence indicating that the program receives government funding.

The Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025 sets out goals to enhance surveillance and health security, with a priority to launch and implement the National Health Security Plan (Page No.7). ³⁷⁷ It also calls for strengthening capacities in surveillance, alert detection, and response to public health emergencies, reinforcing sanitary controls at borders, and restructuring the network of national reference laboratories.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^378379380. However, no policy document for COUSP specifically for Morocco is publicly available on government websites, there is no evidence of a COUSP website, and no information indicating that Morocco's COUSP has received funding from the government was found ³⁸¹³⁸².

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that an overarching national public health emergency response plan in Morocco had been updated in the past three years.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics.It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ³⁸³³⁸⁴ However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites ³⁸⁵³⁸⁶. As per the World Health Organization’s page for National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), Morocco has not updated its NAPHS since 2022. ³⁸⁷

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^388389390. There is no document for COUSP specifically for Morocco publicly available on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ³⁹¹³⁹².

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that an overarching national public health emergency response plan in Morocco follows one health principles by covering multiple threat types, e.g. antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic disease spillover, biological accidents or deliberate acts.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics.It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ³⁹³³⁹⁴ However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites ³⁹⁵³⁹⁶. Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, there is no sufficient evidence that it follows one health principle by covering multiple threat types, e.g. antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic disease spillover, biological accidents or deliberate acts.

Morocco implemented a National Strategic Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022) supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), which outlined surveillance, detection, and reporting mechanisms for AMR in line with the ‘One Health’ approach ³⁹⁷. The AMR plan, however, does not constitute an overarching national public health emergency response plan.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^398399400. There is no document for COUSP specifically for Morocco publicly available on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website, and no evidence that COUSP policy follows one health principles by covering multiple threat types, e.g. antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic disease spillover, biological accidents or deliberate acts ⁴⁰¹⁴⁰².

The Joint External Evaluation for Morocco published in 2016 does not mention an overarching national public health emergency response plan. ⁴⁰³

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that an overarching national public health emergency response plan in Morocco includes consideration of the impact of health equity or mechanisms for identifying and considering the needs of vulnerable populations (e.g. lower socioeconomic status, age, minority ethnic groups, etc.).

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025. ⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁵ However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites ⁴⁰⁶⁴⁰⁷. Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, there is no sufficient evidence that it includes consideration of the impact of health equity or mechanisms for identifying and considering the needs of vulnerable populations (e.g. lower socioeconomic status, age, minority ethnic groups, etc.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^408409410. There is no document for COUSP specifically for Morocco publicly available on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website, and no evidence that COUSP policy includes consideration of the impact of health equity or mechanisms for identifying and considering the needs of vulnerable populations ⁴¹¹⁴¹².

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco reported that the country is in the process of developing a comprehensive emergency response plan that is One Health–oriented, multi-hazard, and multisectoral. It also noted that Morocco already has national legislation and decrees in place to regulate preparedness and response to public health events.⁴¹³

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response.

As per a 2021 academic report, during the COVID-19 pandemic, private clinics were involved in managing some COVID cases and in handling other pathologies to reduce the burden on public hospitals. Manufacturers in Morocco adjusted operations to produce masks, respirators, etc., to support the emergency response. Hotels and catering services volunteered to support convalescent patients or health personnel.⁴¹⁴ However, there is no mention of a specific mechanism for the government to engage with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response.

As per a 2024 World Bank report, Morocco has instituted public-private (dual) mechanisms for disaster (natural hazard) risk financing. For example, private non-life insurance policies have been expanded to include protection against catastrophic events, with the public sector (via a solidarity fund) covering those uninsured. Law 110-14 (2016) provides the legal/institutional framework for this mechanism, which ensures deployment modalities after disasters. ⁴¹⁵ However, this is specific to insurance and financing and does not mention any other mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025. ⁴¹⁶⁴¹⁷ However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites ⁴¹⁸⁴¹⁹. Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, there is no sufficient evidence that it mentions a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics ^420421422. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website, and no evidence whether COUSP includes a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response ⁴²³⁴²⁴.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco recommended formally integrating the private sector into emergency and disaster management plans by assigning them delegated tasks with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. It also advised considering the provision of technical assistance to private sector actors, tailored to their needs, to strengthen their capacity in public health emergency management.⁴²⁵ However, there is no such evidence of the implementation of a national plan.

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 50

There is publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic, only for one disease (Covid-19).

As per academic reports, a national plan was launched in 2020 for monitoring and response to COVID-19, which included NPIs, such as movement restrictions, border controls, mask mandates, lockdowns etc. However, there is no evidence indicating that these preventive measures are embedded within a formal policy or national plan, or that they could be systematically applied in response to future public health emergencies.^426427428

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco reported that the country is in the process of developing a comprehensive emergency response plan that is One Health–oriented, multi-hazard, and multisectoral and that Morocco already has national legislation and decrees that regulate preparedness and response to public health events. ⁴²⁹ However, the policy documents are not publicly available on any government websites ⁴³⁰⁴³¹.

As per the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. ⁴³²⁴³³ Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, there is no evidence that it includes guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic⁴³⁴⁴³⁵.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. ^436437438. There is no document for COUSP specifically for Morocco publicly available on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁴³⁹⁴⁴⁰. Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic.

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco activated the national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year and there is publicly available evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year.

In 2025, Morocco responded to a nationwide measles outbreak by activating its National Center for Public Health Emergency Operations (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) to coordinate surveillance, vaccination, and outbreak control measures. ⁴⁴¹⁴⁴²

In May 2024, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) and U.S. Army Soldiers conducted a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) response demonstration during the African Lion 2024 joint military exercises.^443444445

In May 2025, the National Center for Scientific and Technical Research (CNRST) and the Mohammed V Military Instruction Hospital coordinated an international biological simulation exercise. The exercise used a scenario involving the Mpox virus to strengthen Morocco's response capabilities using innovative technologies like artificial intelligence and augmented reality.⁴⁴⁶⁴⁴⁷ However, no official government reports of this exercise are publicly available.

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities.

The National Health Plan 2025 identifies systemic gaps in health infrastructure, workforce distribution, and governance, and sets out goals to enhance surveillance and health security, with a priority to launch and implement the National Health Security Plan. However, this plan is a broad health strategy and does not formally identify gaps or lessons from past outbreak responses. ⁴⁴⁸

In 2025, Morocco responded to a nationwide measles outbreak by activating its National Center for Public Health Emergency Operations (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) to coordinate surveillance, vaccination, and outbreak control measures⁴⁴⁹. However, there is no mention of a plan to address the gaps and best practices in response to an infectious disease response on government websites ⁴⁵⁰⁴⁵¹.

In May 2024, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) and U.S. Army Soldiers conducted a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) response demonstration during the African Lion 2024 joint military exercises.^452453454 Additionally, In May 2025, the National Center for Scientific and Technical Research (CNRST) and the Mohammed V Military Instruction Hospital coordinated an international biological simulation exercise.⁴⁵⁵⁴⁵⁶ However, neither of these biological threat-focused exercises indicate that the country has developed a plan to improve response capabilities nor are they mentioned on the government websites⁴⁵⁷⁴⁵⁸.

According to the World Health Organization's After-Action Review (AAR) page, the last time Morocco underwent an AAR was in 2018.⁴⁵⁹

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Morocco in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives.

In May 2024, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) and U.S. Army Soldiers conducted a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) response demonstration during the African Lion 2024 joint military exercises.^460461462 However, this was framed as a military and defense sector exercise; public reports highlight international military cooperation, but do not reference any private sector entities as participants.^463464465

According to a May 2025 news report, the National Center for Scientific and Technical Research (CNRST) and the Mohammed V Military Instruction Hospital coordinated an international biological simulation exercise. The exercise, which was part of a European project consisting of experts from 22 countries in Europe used a scenario involving the Mpox virus to strengthen Morocco's response capabilities using innovative technologies like artificial intelligence and augmented reality.⁴⁶⁶ These exercises involved Moroccan medical and military teams along with European partners. However, the report does not mention private hospitals, companies, or NGOs as active participants.

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Morocco has an Emergency Operations Centre in place.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019 ⁴⁶⁷. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. This mechanism also involved the creation of Regional Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response ⁴⁶⁸⁴⁶⁹.

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or that they conduct a drill at least once per year.

According to the 2021 Public Health Emergency Operations Center Manual, published by the World Health Organization and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, the Emergency Operations Centre (COUSP) should develop training programs and conduct regular simulation exercises to maintain and enhance staff skills. While it does not mandate a strict annual schedule for all exercises, it suggests that conducting them regularly is integral to maintaining preparedness.⁴⁷⁰ The Manual provides guidance to countries setting up a COUSP, and is not specific to Morocco.

In May 2024, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) and U.S. Army personnel conducted a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response demonstration during the African Lion 2024 joint military exercises ⁴⁷¹⁴⁷². In September 2024, Morocco held the "Maroc Mantlet 2024" exercise with the U.S. National Guard. This annual disaster preparedness exercise simulated a large-scale earthquake and incorporated scenarios for CBRN response and decontamination.⁴⁷³ In May 2025, Morocco conducted a biological simulation exercise using an Mpox virus scenario to strengthen response capabilities, leveraging innovative technologies such as artificial intelligence ⁴⁷⁴. However, these exercises have been primarily military- or multi-sector–focused, rather than explicitly linked to routine EOC operations or public health scenarios.

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Morocco conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario.

As per the 2021 Public Health Emergency Operations Center Manual published by the World Health Organization and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, the Emergency Operations Centre (COUSP) must be capable of activation within 120 minutes as indicated by the International Health Regulations indicator to remain compliant with minimum operational standards.⁴⁷⁵

In late 2023, in response to a measles outbreak, the Moroccan Ministry of Health activated the COUSP to coordinate the national response. However, it is not mentioned whether the COUSP was activited within 120 minutes of the outbreak.⁴⁷⁶

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016, the EOC can conduct a coordinated emergency response activated within 120 minutes of a public health emergency. ⁴⁷⁷ However, there is no publicly available information suggesting that the EOC in Morocco conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario ⁴⁷⁸⁴⁷⁹.

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco's public health and national security authorities carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack); or that there are publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack).

As per the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. ⁴⁸⁰⁴⁸¹ Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, however, there is no evidence that it includes standard operating procedures or guidelines between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event ⁴⁸²⁴⁸³.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. ⁴⁸⁴⁴⁸⁵ The 2021 Public Health Emergency Operations Center Manual, published by the World Health Organization and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, mentions the role of sector partners and the need for intersectoral collaboration by COUSP. However, it does not detail specific collaborations with animal health or other government sectors⁴⁸⁶. The Manual provides guidance to countries setting up a COUSP, and is not specific to Morocco.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco assessed Morocco's preparedness for public health emergencies, including deliberate biological events. While the JEE identified event-specific protocols for disease outbreaks, points of entry, food contamination, and chemical and radiation hazards, it did not specifically mention deliberate biological events or exercises involving public health and national security authorities.⁴⁸⁷

The World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) has conducted regional simulation exercises, such as Exercise Phoenix in 2023, to enhance cooperation between veterinary services and law enforcement agencies in response to agro-terrorism scenarios ⁴⁸⁸. While Morocco participated in these exercises, they focused on animal health and law enforcement coordination rather than a comprehensive multisectoral approach involving public health, animal health, the private sector, and national security authorities.

In May 2024, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) and U.S. Army personnel conducted a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response demonstration during the African Lion 2024 joint military exercises ⁴⁸⁹⁴⁹⁰. In September 2024, Morocco held the "Maroc Mantlet 2024" exercise with the U.S. National Guard. This annual disaster preparedness exercise simulated a large-scale earthquake and incorporated scenarios for CBRN response and decontamination ⁴⁹¹. In May 2025, Morocco conducted a biological simulation exercise using an Mpox virus scenario to strengthen response capabilities, leveraging innovative technologies such as artificial intelligence ⁴⁹². However, these exercises have been primarily military- or multi-sector–focused and there is no evidence that they included animal health and private sector stakeholders. ^{493494495496497}

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence Morocco has in place in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency.

As per the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. ⁴⁹⁸⁴⁹⁹ Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, however, there is no evidence that it details a risk communication plan during public health emergencies.

The 2021 Public Health Emergency Operations Center Manual by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention provides guidance for Morocco's National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP), and includes a section on communication during public health emergencies. It requires Member States (including Morocco) to establish preparedness measures such as designating trained spokespersons, mapping media contacts; response measures such as issuing press releases, holding media briefings, providing regular updates, monitoring and countering misinformation, ensuring consistent messaging across partners and post-event measures such as evaluating communication activities, reviewing media/social media coverage, and documenting lessons learned ⁵⁰⁰. However, this manual was developed by WHO and not formulated by Morocco itself.

According to a May 2025 WHO Disease Outbreak News publication, in response to a 2025 measles outbreak, Morocco’s Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MOHSP) activated its COUSP and included “Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE)” as a component of the response. This included a national media campaign, social media / digital campaigns, use of local leaders, Q&A, etc ⁵⁰¹. During COVID-19, Morocco deployed an “institutional and risk-based communication strategy” from early stages, with daily press briefings, public awareness campaigns, use of scientific experts etc⁵⁰².

According to Morocco’s evaluation under the World Health Organization’s Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergencies (SPAR) framework, as of 2024, Morocco scored 80% in average capacity under Indicator C.10: Risk Communication, which indicates that the country has resources in place for risk communication.⁵⁰³

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence suggesting that the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach).

As per the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. ⁵⁰⁴⁵⁰⁵ Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, however, there is no evidence that it outlines a risk communication plan or how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs during a public health emergency.

The 2021 Public Health Emergency Operations Center Manual of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention provides guidance for Morocco's National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP), and includes a section on communication during public health emergencies. It requires Member States (including Morocco) to establish preparedness measures such as designating trained spokespersons, mapping media contacts; response measures such as issuing press releases, holding media briefings, providing regular updates, monitoring and countering misinformation, ensuring consistent messaging across partners and post-event measures such as evaluating communication activities, reviewing media/social media coverage, and documenting lessons learned ⁵⁰⁶. However, this manual was developed by WHO and not formulated by Morocco itself.

According to a May 2025 WHO Disease Outbreak News publication, in response to a 2025 measles outbreak, Morocco’s Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MOHSP) activated its COUSP and included “Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE)” as a component of the response. This included a national media campaign, social media / digital campaigns, use of local leaders, Q&A, etc ⁵⁰⁷. During COVID-19, Morocco deployed an “institutional and risk-based communication strategy” from early stages, with daily press briefings, public awareness campaigns, use of scientific experts etc⁵⁰⁸. This indicates that a risk communication strategy is being used in specific emergencies, but there is no evidence that it outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs.

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence suggesting that the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency.

As per the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. ⁵⁰⁹⁵¹⁰ Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, however, there is no sufficient evidence that it outlines designating a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency.

The 2021 Public Health Emergency Operations Center Manual by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention provides guidance for Morocco's National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP), and includes a section on communication during public health emergencies. It requires Member States (including Morocco) to establish preparedness measures such as designating trained spokespersons and mapping media contacts.⁵¹¹. However, this manual was developed by WHO and not formulated by Morocco itself.

In response to the 2025 measles outbreak, Morocco’s Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MOHSP) activated its COUSP and included “Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE)” as a component of the response. This included a national media campaign, social media / digital campaigns, use of local leaders as spokespersons, Q&A, etc ⁵¹². However, there is no evidence that a specific representative from the government was designated as the primary spokesperson during the outbreak.

During COVID-19, Morocco deployed an “institutional and risk-based communication strategy” from the early stages onwards, with daily press briefings, public awareness campaigns, use of scientific experts etc⁵¹³. This indicates that spokespersons are designated during specific health emergencies, but there is no evidence of an overarching legislation or plan that outlines designation of spokespersons.

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence suggesting that in Morocco, the public health system in the past year has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation.

The Ministry of Health and Social Protection is active on Instagram and Facebook and has been frequently and regularly publishing updates on the pandemic situation, public health awareness campaigns, and events on its social media accounts in the past year. ⁵¹⁴⁵¹⁵ However, the Ministry’s website is inactive as of 2025 and its twitter account has not been updated since 2020 ⁵¹⁶⁵¹⁷.

In response to the 2025 measles outbreak, Morocco’s Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MOHSP) activated its National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) and included “Risk communication and community engagement (RCCE)” as a component of the response which included a national media campaign, social media outreach, and digital communication to inform the public and strengthen vaccine uptake. As per the World Health Organization report on the outbreak, videos emphasizing the importance of vaccination were broadcast on television and radio and short form videos (reels) were posted on social media regarding the outbreak ⁵¹⁸.

As per academic reports, during COVID-19, Morocco deployed an “institutional and risk-based communication strategy” from early stages, which included daily press briefings, social media updates, and website postings during COVID-19 to combat misinformation ⁵¹⁹⁵²⁰.

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that senior leaders (president or ministers) in Morocco have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years.

There is no evidence provided on this matter through national news agencies including Morocco World News, Hespress, Moroccan News Agency (Agence Marocaine de Presse), or international news agencies such as Euronews, France 24 or Independent ^{521522523524525526}.

In December 2024, Morocco's Ministry of Health and Social Protection addressed and dismissed rumors concerning the safety of vaccines used in the country. The Ministry clarified that these claims were false and reassured the public about the safety and efficacy of the vaccines ⁵²⁷. In January 2025, Government Spokesperson Mustapha Baitas attributed the spread of measles cases to misinformation about vaccines, emphasizing the role of false information in undermining public health efforts ⁵²⁸. These actions indicate that while misinformation has been a concern, senior leaders have actively worked to counteract it.

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 88.7

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 80.13

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 80

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 45.83

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Morocco has implemented restrictions on export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

The websites of the Pasteur Institute of Morocco, the National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products or the Customs and Indirect taxes Administration do not provide evidence that Morocco issued a restriction on the export/import of medical goods. ^529530531 The Ministry of Health's social media accounts on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter do not provide evidence on such restrictions issued last year either. ^532533534. A review of national and international news agencies including Morocco World News, Moroccan News Agency (Agence Marocaine de Presse), Euronews, France 24 or Independent also do not provide evidence suggesting that Morocco issued a restriction on the export/import of medical goods during the past year. ^{535536537538539}

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has implemented restrictions on export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year, and that it was based on a structured decision mechanism involving specific scientific evidence, expert input and guidelines/policies.

In January 2025, Morocco suspended imports of feed grains from Germany following an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the Brandenburg region. The suspension affected all untreated plant-based feed intended for animal consumption from Germany and was enforced by the Moroccan National Office for Health Security of Food Products (ONSSA). The ban remained in effect until Germany regained its disease-free status or could certify regions that were free of contamination^540541542. The decision to implement these import restrictions was made by ONSSA, Morocco's food safety agency, and was based on scientific evidence regarding the outbreak's potential impact on animal health.

In September 2025, ONSSA "suspended poultry imports from Portugal after health authorities in Lisbon confirmed a dangerous outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1)" as per a media report. ⁵⁴³

The websites of the Pasteur Institute of Morocco, the National Office for the Sanitary Security of Food Products or the Customs and Indirect taxes Administration do not provide evidence that Morocco issued any other restrictions on the export/import of non-medical goods over the last year. ^544545546 The Ministry of Health's social media accounts on Facebook, Instagram and Twitter do not provide evidence on any other restrictions issued over the last year. ^547548549. A review of national and international news agencies including Morocco World News, Moroccan News Agency (Agence Marocaine de Presse), Euronews, France 24 or Independent also do not provide evidence suggesting that Morocco issued a restriction on the export/import of non-medical goods during the past year. ^{550551552553554}

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Morocco has implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

The World Health Organization's (WHO) Disease Outbreak News notes that since late 2023, Morocco has been experiencing widespread measles cases, with several public health responses (vaccination campaigns, surveillance, etc.). However, the WHO report explicitly states that WHO does not recommend restrictions on travel or trade to or from Morocco based on currently available information.⁵⁵⁵

A review of national and international news agencies including Morocco World News, Moroccan News Agency (Agence Marocaine de Presse), Euronews, France 24 or Independent does not provide evidence suggesting that Morocco has implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak.^{556557558559560}

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 100

There is evidence that that Morocco uses a risk-based approach to international travel-related measures.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the country repeatedly adjusted restrictions depending on epidemiological risk in specific countries and the emergence of new variants. For example, in early 2021, Morocco announced the suspension of flights from Australia, Brazil, Ireland, and New Zealand which was directly due to detection of a more contagious variant ⁵⁶¹. During the Omicron emergence in late 2021, the decision to suspend inbound flights was explicitly justified by Morocco’s government citing the risk posed by a new, heavily mutated variant ⁵⁶². These decisions were informed by Morocco’s Scientific, Technical and Advisory Committee for COVID-19 set up by the Ministry of Health, which regularly assessed risks before advising the government ⁵⁶³⁵⁶⁴.

The World Health Organization's (WHO) Disease Outbreak News notes that since late 2023, Morocco has been experiencing widespread measles cases, with several public health responses (vaccination campaigns, surveillance, etc.). Tthe WHO report explicitly states that WHO does not recommend restrictions on travel or trade to or from Morocco based on currently available information.⁵⁶⁵ A review of national and international news agencies including Morocco World News, Moroccan News Agency (Agence Marocaine de Presse), Euronews, France 24 or Independent does not provide evidence suggesting that Morocco has implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to the measles outbreak.^{566567568569570}

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 10.7

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 17.88

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has a health workforce strategy in place which has been updated in the past five years to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings.

Morocco has an updated health workforce strategy under the Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025, formulated within the past five years, to address significant shortages and imbalances in the distribution of healthcare personnel. The plan explicitly identifies gaps in the availability of physicians, nurses, and specialists, particularly in rural and underserved areas, and outlines strategies to expand and redistribute the workforce. These measures include increasing the number of budgeted positions in the Department, strengthening the staff and role of medical auxiliaries and nursing assistants, encouraging contracting with healthcare professionals to operate closed rural health centers, reviewing the training curriculum and introducing specialized master’s programs, and establishing appropriate conditions for the creation of a Health Public Service⁵⁷¹. According to recent news reports, the government has also announced reforms in the health workforce which include shortening medical training from seven to six years, increasing enrollment in faculties of medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, and nursing, opening new medical schools in regions such as Agadir, Laâyoune, Errachidia, and Guelmim, and strengthening residency and placement programs to encourage deployment to underserved areas ^572573574575.

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Morocco has sufficient capacity within the health system to deliver essential health services.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR core capacities scores the country 5 on this measure. The JEE highlights that the country has sustained capacity i.e. the capacity of the system in place for deployment or receiving health personnel has been demonstrated and tested, with documented agreements that outline the criteria, procedures, and SOPs. Morocco’s national personnel deployment plan is established and updated. Deployment procedures are available that outline the system for sending and receiving health personnel during public health emergencies. These procedures also tested and demonstrated decision-making and protocols for deployment of health personnel from other countries during a public health emergency. Morocco participates in a regional/international partnership and has formal agreements with WHO, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Spain, that outline criteria and procedures for sending and receiving health personnel. The country has participated in an exercise within the past year to practice sending and receiving health personnel.⁵⁷⁶

Morocco faces a critical deficit of healthcare professionals. Morocco has 0.73 physicians per 1,000 inhabitants, which is below the World Health Organization's recommended standard of one per 1,000 inhabitants. There is a significant geographical imbalance, with most healthcare workers concentrated in major cities, leaving rural areas underserved. A brain drain of doctors and nurses leaving for better opportunities abroad further exacerbates the shortage ^577578579.

In 2017, Morocco had 1.0 hospital beds per 1,000 people, well below the average for many countries ⁵⁸⁰. However, in July 2025, the Prime Minister announced a multi-billion dollar investment to build eight new regional teaching hospitals, four new university hospitals, and 29 urgent-care hospitals. These projects aim to add thousands of new beds to the system⁵⁸¹.

In 2022, the private sector accounted for 58% of healthcare spending, compared to 42% from the public sector. In 2024, the government allocated USD 3.2 billion to the healthcare sector, a 9.1% increase from the previous year, with a focus on improving infrastructure and human resources. Despite this, out-of-pocket expenses for citizens remain high ⁵⁸².

The Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025 was designed with explicit recognition of key structural and service-delivery gaps: shortages of health professionals, inequities between urban and rural access, under-resourced hospital infrastructure, and weak financial protection ⁵⁸³.

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a plan to ensure continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ⁵⁸⁴⁵⁸⁵. However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites ⁵⁸⁶⁵⁸⁷. Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, there is no sufficient evidence that it aims to ensure continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^588589590. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁵⁹¹⁵⁹². Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP includes a plan to ensure continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency.

There is no evidence provided on the websites of the Ministry of Health that there is a plan to ensure continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency ⁵⁹³.

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 15.27

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 100

There is some publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country.

Morocco did expand ICU and isolation capacity during COVID-19 (e.g., scaling up ICU beds, setting up temporary hospitals and isolation rooms), which shows capability to manage serious respiratory infections at scale. However, these actions were surge responses and do not equate to a permanent, fully equipped biocontainment unit designed for highly communicable diseases ⁵⁹⁴.

Academic and practical studies published in 2020-21 from Morocco discuss level-2/level-3 containment practices, negative-pressure isolation rooms, and biosafety training for staff, indicating infection-control capacity in some hospitals; however, these sources describe infection control and negative-pressure rooms rather than a nationally designated biocontainment high-level isolation unit ⁵⁹⁵⁵⁹⁶.

A study published by the National Center for Biotechnology Information in 2018 refers to media reports indicating that there is an isolation unit in Rabat ⁵⁹⁷; the website of the Rabat Hospital, however, does not provide evidence confirming this information ⁵⁹⁸.

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years, or that Morocco developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years.

Although Morocco did expand ICU and isolation capacity during COVID-19 (e.g., scaling up ICU beds, setting up temporary hospitals and isolation rooms), which shows capability to manage serious respiratory infections at scale, there has been no demonstration of expanding isolation capacity in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic ⁵⁹⁹⁶⁰⁰.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁶⁰¹⁶⁰². However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it aims to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious outbreak ⁶⁰³⁶⁰⁴.

Although the National Health Plan 2025 sets out goals to launch and implement the National Health Security Plan, it does not explicitly include an aim to expand isolation capacity ⁶⁰⁵.

Although the Plan for Public Policies on Health and Social Protection, which was published by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection in 2025, aims to strengthen hospital infrastructure and increase bed capacity in high-priority zones, it does not mention expanding isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak ⁶⁰⁶.

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national and/or international procurement protocol or contract framework in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs.

The legal basis for public procurement in Morocco is primarily defined by Decree No. 2-12-349, which was adopted in 2013 ⁶⁰⁷. This framework governs how public administrations, including the Ministries of Health and Agriculture, acquire goods, services, and works. Morocco overhauled its public procurement rules in 2022; the reformed rules regulate how public authorities award contracts for goods (including medical equipment, reagents, PPE) and set the legal framework the ministries must follow ⁶⁰⁸. However, there is no mention of a specific procurement protocol or contract framework for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) ⁶⁰⁹⁶¹⁰.

Most government contracts, including those by ministries and public health establishments, are tendered through the national public tendering portal managed by the Moroccan treasury (marchespublics) ⁶¹¹. Ministries and public establishments are contracting authorities under the national public procurement law and use that portal for both medical and laboratory supplies and capital procurement. However, the portal does not specific any specific procurement protocol or contract framework. ⁶¹²

There is no mention of a specific procurement protocol or contract framework in place for the acquisition of laboratory and medical supplies for routine needs in Morocco’s National Health Plan 2025 or on the websites of the Ministries of Health or Agriculture ^613614615.

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 33.33

There is evidence that Morocco has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains, and no evidence of a plan to ensure equitable distribution.

As per 2025 news reports, a new national program was launched in May 2025 to create a strategic reserve of essential supplies. This stockpile will contain a variety of critical items, including medicines, food products, and other vital items, designed for immediate deployment during disasters and health emergencies. ⁶¹⁶⁶¹⁷. It is not explicitly mentioned that this stockpile is defined by the national public health emergency plan, and no plan to ensure equitable distribution is mentioned.

In response to disasters such as the 2023 Al Haouz earthquake, the Ministry of Health has mobilized hundreds of tons of medicines and medical supplies, including essential medications, resuscitation / anesthesia drugs, surgical supplies, etc ⁶¹⁸. The “strategic plan for stockpiling medicines and health supplies” was noted to have been activated immediately after the earthquake ⁶¹⁹. It is not mentioned whether this was carried out in line with the national health emergency plan, and no plan to ensure equitable distribution is mentioned.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁶²⁰⁶²¹. However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it aims to have a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency or plan to ensure equitable distribution in an emergency ⁶²²⁶²³.

Although the National Health Plan 2025 sets out goals to launch and implement the National Health Security Plan, it does not explicitly aim to have a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency or plan to ensure equitable distribution in an emergency ⁶²⁴.

As per 2025 news reports, Morocco maintains a national strategic stockpile of essential medicines and pharmaceutical products for use in health emergencies and disasters. During the earthquake in September 2023, the Ministry of Health activated this strategic reserve and distributed over 300 tons of medications and medical devices to affected areas ⁶²⁵. It is not mentioned whether this was carried out in line with the national health emergency plan, and no plan to ensure equitable distribution is mentioned.

According to a 2025 news article and the United States Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration, Morocco aims reduce its reliance on imports and develop local manufacturing for drugs, vaccines, and personal protective equipment (PPE). The government has launched initiatives like the "Marbio" project to produce vaccines domestically, with the goal of meeting 100% of the country's vaccine needs by 2027 ⁶²⁶.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, mentions that there is a plan for the management and distribution of a national stockpile for any priority public health emergencies in the country ⁶²⁷.

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency.

As per 2025 news reports, a new national program was launched in May 2025 to create a strategic reserve of essential supplies. This stockpile will contain a variety of critical items, including medicines, food products, and other vital items, designed for immediate deployment during disasters and health emergencies. ⁶²⁸⁶²⁹. However, it is not explicitly mentioned whether this stockpile would include laboratory supplies.

Additionally, in response to disasters such as the 2023 Al Haouz earthquake, the Ministry of Health has mobilized hundreds of tons of medicines and medical supplies, including essential medications, resuscitation / anesthesia drugs, surgical supplies, etc. The “strategic plan for stockpiling medicines and health supplies” was noted to have been activated immediately after the earthquake ⁶³⁰. However, it is not mentioned whether this stockpile includes laboratory supplies.

The Pasteur Institute of Morocco has a Production Unit for culture media and laboratory reagents, producing many items needed for diagnostics, agri-food, environmental health, etc ⁶³¹. This suggests Morocco has domestic manufacturing capacity for certain laboratory supplies, reducing dependence on imports for those items.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Morocco procured large quantities of medical and laboratory supplies including PCR testing capacity, reagents, PPE, screening tests, and serological tests ⁶³². However, these were acquired in response to the crisis, and there is no evidence that a pre-existing stockpile of laboratory supplies was in place.

Although the National Health Plan 2025 aims to improve emergency preparedness, it does not explicitly aim to have a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency ⁶³³.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, mentions that there is a plan for the management and distribution of a national stockpile for any priority public health emergencies in the country. However, the JEE does not elaborate on the availability of a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency. ⁶³⁴

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency.

As per news reports, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection issued a statement in September 2022 that it is taking preventive action to establish and safeguard the national strategic reserve of medicines and health products that may face shortages or supply disruptions in 2023. As part of that, Ministerial Order 459 of 22 August 2022 established an advisory committee whose tasks included identifying what drugs / health products are to be part of the strategic stock, identifying measures to ensure continuous and uninterrupted supply to health professionals and patients and conducting quarterly assessments of the national strategic stock to decide what measures are required to safeguard it ^635636637. However, the Ministerial Order is not publicly available and there is no evidence that the assessments are conducted to ensure that the national stockpile supply is sufficient during a public health emergency.

The Ministry of Health's 2020 National Health Plan 2025 and the Plan for Public Policies on Health and Social Protection 2025, published by the Ministry of Health in 2025, do not mention any annual audits or reviews of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency ⁶³⁸⁶³⁹.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Kingdom of Morocco, published in 2017, mentions that there is a plan for the management and distribution of a national stockpile for any priority public health emergencies in the country. However, the JEE does not elaborate on the availability of a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency ⁶⁴⁰.

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE), or to procure medical supplies or to expedite medical supplies through points of entry for national use during a public health emergency.

During COVID-19, the country mobilized domestic industries to produce PPE (masks, sanitizers, ventilators) and relied on the Pasteur Institute, which manufactures culture media and laboratory reagents for national use. A key part of the country's strategy, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, is to reduce its reliance on imports and develop local manufacturing for drugs, vaccines, and personal protective equipment (PPE) ⁶⁴¹. The government has launched initiatives like the "Marbio" project to produce vaccines domestically, with the goal of meeting 100% of the country's vaccine needs by 2027 ⁶⁴². However, there is no evidence of a plan or agreement in place to leverage public/private sector domestic (including regional) manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency.

The Ministry of Health has demonstrated the ability to procure large volumes of medical and laboratory supplies (PCR kits, reagents, PPE, vaccines, and medicines) during the COVID-19 pandemic ⁶⁴³. In addition, Ministerial Order 459 (August 2022) was passed to establish a system for identifying needs and conducting quarterly reviews of the national strategic stock of medicines and health products to ensure availability during emergencies⁶⁴⁴. However, there is no evidence of a plan or agreement in place to procure medical and laboratory supplies during a national emergency.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics.It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ⁶⁴⁵⁶⁴⁶ However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites, allowing no confirmation of whether it mentions a plan to leverage public and/or private sector domestic (including regional) manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies, or to procure medical supplies or to expedite medical supplies through points of entry during a national emergency ⁶⁴⁷⁶⁴⁸.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^649650651. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁶⁵²⁶⁵³. There is no evidence whether COUSP mentions a plan to leverage public and/or private sector domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies, or to procure medical supplies or to expedite medical supplies through points of entry during a national emergency ⁶⁵⁴⁶⁵⁵.

A national procurement portal exists in Morocco, however, there is no indication of any mechanism to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity or procure medical supplies for national use specifically during a public health emergency ⁶⁵⁶.

No further evidence is provided either on domestic manufacturing capacity or the procurement of medical supplies during public health emergencies through the website of the Ministry of Health, website of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural Development, Water and Forests, or the Pasteur Institute of Morocco ^657658659.

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media), or to procure laboratory supplies or to to expedite laboratory supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) through points of entry for national use during a public health emergency.

During COVID-19, the country mobilized domestic industries to produce PPE (masks, sanitizers, ventilators) and relied on the Pasteur Institute, which manufactures culture media and laboratory reagents for national use. A key part of the country's strategy, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, is to reduce its reliance on imports and develop local manufacturing for drugs, vaccines, and personal protective equipment (PPE) ⁶⁶⁰. However, there is no evidence of a plan or agreement in place to leverage public/private sector domestic (including regional) manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency.

The Ministry of Health has demonstrated the ability to procure large volumes of medical and laboratory supplies (PCR kits, reagents, PPE, vaccines, and medicines) during the COVID-19 pandemic ⁶⁶¹. In addition, Ministerial Order 459 (August 2022) was passed to establish a system for identifying needs and conducting quarterly reviews of the national strategic stock of medicines and health products to ensure availability during emergencies⁶⁶². However, there is no evidence of a plan or agreement in place to procure laboratory supplies during a national emergency ⁶⁶³⁶⁶⁴.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics.It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ⁶⁶⁵⁶⁶⁶ However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites, allowing no confirmation of whether it mentions a plan to leverage public and/or private sector domestic (including regional) manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies, to procure laboratory supplies or to expedite laboratory supplies through points of entry during a national emergency ⁶⁶⁷⁶⁶⁸.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response ^669670671. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁶⁷²⁶⁷³. Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP mentions a plan to leverage public and/or private sector domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies, to procure laboratory supplies or to expedite laboratory supplies through points of entry during a national emergency.

A national procurement portal exists in Morocco, however, there is no indication of any mechanism to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity or procure laboratory supplies for national use specifically during a public health emergency ⁶⁷⁴.

No further evidence is provided either on domestic manufacturing capacity or the procurement of laboratory supplies during public health emergencies through the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural Development, Water and Forests, and the Pasteur Institute of Morocco ^675676677.

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco has a system or mechanism in place at national and subnational levels for emergency logistics and supply chain management, that the mechanism is exercised, reviewed, evaluated and updated on a regular basis, that it covers specific considerations such as cold chain management for vaccines or that it covers the public and private sector.

Morocco has significantly enhanced its vaccine cold chain infrastructure with support from the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and USAID. In 2022, USAID and UNICEF provided Morocco with seven ultra-cold freezers, increasing the country's storage capacity by 45% and enabling the safe storage of over two million vaccine doses ⁶⁷⁸. Additionally, Haier Biomedical, in partnership with UNICEF and USAID, supplied new-generation vaccine refrigerators equipped with Remote Temperature Monitoring Devices (RTMDs) to health centers across Morocco ⁶⁷⁹. However, this initiative is not part of a larger system or agreement which covers emergency logistics.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics.It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ⁶⁸⁰⁶⁸¹ However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites ⁶⁸²⁶⁸³. Since there is no official government document available for the PNASS, there is no sufficient evidence that it mentions a mechanism or system plan at national and subnational levels for emergency logistics and supply chain management, that the mechanism is exercised, reviewed, evaluated and updated on a regular basis, that it covers specific considerations such as cold chain management for vaccines or that it covers the public and private sector.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response ^684685686. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁶⁸⁷⁶⁸⁸. Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP mentions a mechanism or system plan at national and subnational levels for emergency logistics and supply chain management, that the mechanism is exercised, reviewed, evaluated and updated on a regular basis, that it covers specific considerations such as cold chain management for vaccines or that it covers the public and private sector.

No further evidence is provided regarding a mechanism for emergency logistics and supply chain management through the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Rural Development, Water and Forests, and the Pasteur Institute of Morocco ⁶⁸⁹⁶⁹⁰.

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics).

As per news reports, a new national program was launched in May 2025 to create a strategic reserve of essential supplies. This stockpile will contain a variety of critical items, including medicines, food products, and other vital items, designed for immediate deployment during disasters and health emergencies. ⁶⁹¹⁶⁹². However, it is not explicitly mentioned whether there is a plan in place for dispensing these supplies for national use during a public health emergency.

In response to disasters such as the 2023 Al Haouz earthquake, the Ministry of Health has mobilized hundreds of tons of medicines and medical supplies, including essential medications, resuscitation / anesthesia drugs, surgical supplies, etc. The “strategic plan for stockpiling medicines and health supplies” was noted to have been activated immediately after the earthquake ⁶⁹³. However, there is no evidence of such a plan on government websites ⁶⁹⁴⁶⁹⁵.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Morocco demonstrated its capacity to procure and distribute large volumes of medical and laboratory supplies, including PCR kits, reagents, personal protective equipment (PPE), vaccines, and medicines⁶⁹⁶. However, this capability does not appear to be supported by a formal, structured plan or program.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁶⁹⁷⁶⁹⁸. However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it has guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency ⁶⁹⁹⁷⁰⁰.

Although the National Health Plan 2025, published by the Ministry of Health in 2020, sets out goals to launch and implement the National Health Security Plan, it does not explicitly mention any guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency⁷⁰¹.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^702703704. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website, allowing no confirmation of whether it includes a plan for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during public health emergencies ⁷⁰⁵⁷⁰⁶.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco highlights the country’s “extensive experience in deploying national medical countermeasures within and across its borders” as a key strength [page no.45] . However, the JEE does not provide information on specific plans for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during public health emergencies.

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a public plan in place to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency.

Morocco’s Ministry of Health, under the National Health Plan 2025, has updated its health workforce strategy to address shortages and uneven distribution of healthcare personnel, especially in rural areas. The plan targets gaps in physicians, nurses, and specialists and outlines measures such as increasing staffing levels, strengthening medical auxiliaries and nursing assistants, contracting professionals for rural centers, revising training curricula with specialized master’s programs, and creating a structured Health Public Service ⁷⁰⁷. However, there is no mention of facilitating a workforce surge during an emergency in the plan.

The government has also announced reforms in the health workforce which include shortening medical training from seven to six years, increasing enrollment in faculties of medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, and nursing, opening new medical schools in regions such as Agadir, Laâyoune, Errachidia, and Guelmim, and strengthening residency and placement programs to encourage deployment to underserved areas ^708709710711. Although these reforms will contribute to an overall increase in the health workforce, they do not explicitly mention a plan for facilitating a workforce surge during an emergency.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁷¹²⁷¹³. However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it has a plan in place for facilitating a workforce surge in an emergency ⁷¹⁴⁷¹⁵.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response ^716717718. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁷¹⁹⁷²⁰. Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP mentions guidelines in place to facilitate a workforce surge in an emergency.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE), published in 2016, states that Morocco has a demonstrated and tested capacity for deploying and receiving health personnel during public health emergencies through an established and updated national health personnel plan. However, there is no evidence of such a plan being implemented ⁷²¹⁷²².

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency.

Morocco has participated in the Health Emergency Leaders Network for Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, launched in September 2025 in collaboration with WHO and Africa CDC ⁷²³. This network aims to strengthen regional defenses and reinforce global health security by fostering trust, operational alignment, and shared responsibility among member states. However, this does not specify receiving health care personnel from other member states in the network in a public health emergency.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁷²⁴⁷²⁵. However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it has guidelines in place to receive health personnel from foreign countries ⁷²⁶⁷²⁷.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response ^728729730. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁷³¹⁷³². Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP includes guidelines to receive health personnel from foreign countries.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE), published in 2016, states that Morocco has a demonstrated and tested capacity for deploying and receiving health personnel during public health emergencies through an established and updated national health personnel plan. Also, the country participates in a regional/international partnership and has formal agreements with the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Spain for sending and receiving health personnel [page no.45] ⁷³³. The JEE, however, does not mention details of the plan or measures to facilitate the arrival and movement of foreign personnel during an emergency.

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 100

There is evidence of a public plan in place to redeploy existing health personnel within Morocco.

Morocco’s Ministry of Health, under the National Health Plan 2025, has updated its health workforce strategy to address shortages and uneven distribution of healthcare personnel, especially in rural areas. The plan targets gaps in physicians, nurses, and specialists and outlines measures such as increasing staffing levels, strengthening medical auxiliaries and nursing assistants, contracting professionals for rural centers, revising training curricula with specialized master’s programs, and creating a structured Health Public Service.⁷³⁴

The government has also announced reforms in the health workforce which include shortening medical training from seven to six years, increasing enrollment in faculties of medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, and nursing, opening new medical schools in regions such as Agadir, Laâyoune, Errachidia, and Guelmim, and strengthening residency and placement programs to encourage deployment to underserved areas ^735736737738

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 75

There is public evidence that the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens’ right to medical care.

Morocco's 2011 Constitution explicitly guarantees citizens' right to healthcare. Article 31 states that the State, public establishments, and territorial collectivities shall mobilize all available means to facilitate equal access to conditions permitting the enjoyment of the right to healthcare, social protection, medical coverage, and mutual or organized joint and several liability of the State⁷³⁹. It does not mention a right to free healthcare.

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 80.88

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 66.01

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 87.5

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 4.5

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 25.71

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 66.67

There is publicly available evidence that workers are guaranteed paid sick leave.

In Morocco, employees are entitled to paid sick leave. The sickness benefit is paid after a 3-day waiting period, for up to 52 weeks in a 24-month consecutive period after the onset of sickness/incapacity for work. A medical certificate specifying the reason and expected duration is required ⁷⁴⁰. Paid sick leave in Morocco is primarily administered through the country's social security system, the National Social Security Fund (Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale – CNSS), and is governed by the Labor Code ^741742743744. It is not explicitly mentioned whether paid sick leave covers mental health problems.

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the government has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency.

While there are general labor regulations in Morocco that address sick leave entitlements for employees, including healthcare workers, these provisions do not specifically prioritize healthcare services for those who become ill due to their roles in public health emergencies ⁷⁴⁵.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁷⁴⁶⁷⁴⁷. However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it has a plan in place to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency⁷⁴⁸⁷⁴⁹.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^750751752. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁷⁵³⁷⁵⁴. Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP mentions guidelines in place to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency.

There is no mention of any policies for providing healthcare services to healthcare workers on the websites of the Ministry of Health ⁷⁵⁵. A review of national and international news agencies does not provide evidence suggesting that Morocco issued any statements announcing provision of healthcare services to healthcare workers who became sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency ^756757758759.

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Morocco implemented a comprehensive health communications plan to combat misinformation and facilitate communication between health authorities and the public ⁷⁶⁰. However, this was a temporary measure and does not reflect the existence of a permanent system for communication between public health officials and healthcare workers.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁷⁶¹⁷⁶². However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency ⁷⁶³⁷⁶⁴.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response ^765766767. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁷⁶⁸⁷⁶⁹.

The World Health Organization’s COUSP Manual for the African region outlines the responsibilities of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) for internal communication, including timely information sharing, situation reporting, and regular coordination briefing between the Ministry of Health and healthcare partners. It emphasizes clear notification chains and structured information flows between officials and health workers to ensure effective emergency response ⁷⁷⁰. However, there is no evidence that this system has been adopted and implemented by Morocco.

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in 2016, Morocco was in the process of developing a national risk communication strategy. The draft strategy aimed to establish a ‘multisectoral, multi-level network of risk communicators’ to enable real-time exchange of information, advice, and opinions between experts and officials during public health emergencies [page no. 47] ⁷⁷¹. However, there is no evidence of such a strategy being implemented.

The JEE also noted that the Ministry of Health utilized online forums to facilitate exchanges within different levels and departments during public health emergencies. These platforms served as informal communication mechanisms to support coordination and information sharing among healthcare workers and officials [page no.49] ⁷⁷². However, the JEE does not explicitly mention that these communication mechanisms are part of a national system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers, private or public, to communicate during a public health emergency.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Morocco implemented a comprehensive health communications plan to combat misinformation and facilitate communication between health authorities and the public ⁷⁷³. However, this was a temporary measure and does not reflect the existence of a permanent system for communication between public health officials and healthcare workers.

As per the Strategic Plan for the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025, The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies ⁷⁷⁴⁷⁷⁵. However, since there is no publicly available document for the PNASS, there is insufficient evidence that it provides for a system for public health officials and healthcare workers, either private or public, to communicate during a public health emergency ⁷⁷⁶⁷⁷⁷.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response ^778779780. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁷⁸¹⁷⁸².

The World Health Organization’s COUSP Manual for the African region outlines the responsibilities of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) for internal communication, including timely information sharing, situation reporting, and regular coordination briefing between the Ministry of Health and healthcare partners. It emphasizes clear notification chains and structured information flows between officials and health workers, both private and public, to ensure effective emergency response ⁷⁸³. However, there is no evidence that this system has been adopted and implemented by Morocco.

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in 2016, Morocco was in the process of developing a national risk communication strategy. The draft strategy aimed to establish a ‘multisectoral, multi-level network of risk communicators’ to enable real-time exchange of information, advice, and opinions between experts and officials during public health emergencies [page no. 47] ⁷⁸⁴. However, there is no evidence of such a strategy being implemented.

The JEE also noted that the Ministry of Health utilized online forums to facilitate exchanges within different levels and departments during public health emergencies. These platforms served as informal communication mechanisms to support coordination and information sharing among healthcare workers and officials [page no.49] ⁷⁸⁵. However, the JEE does not explicitly mention that these communication mechanisms are part of a national system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco's national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities.

According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco, published in 2016, a national plan and a notification tool for health care-associated infections are in place to track the number of HCAI that take place in healthcare facilities, and also to prevent this type of infections. The JEE adds that there are regulations that address HCAI in Morocco [page no.12]. ⁷⁸⁶ The plan itself is not publicly available.

Morocco implemented a National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022) supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), which outlined surveillance, detection, and reporting mechanisms for AMR. The plan states that all hospitals are mandated to establish a Committee to Combat Nosocomial Infections (comité de lutte contre les infections nosocomiales, or CLIN) that periodically reports on HCAI within the hospital [page no.10] ⁷⁸⁷. However, there is no evidence that such a committee exists. ⁷⁸⁸⁷⁸⁹

There are multiple academic studies on HCAI in Moroccan hospitals indicating localized studies were conducted.^790791792793

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 0

There is no public evidence of an infection prevention and control programme in place nationally.

Morocco implemented a National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Antimicrobial Resistance (2019–2022) supported by the World Health Organization (WHO), which outlined surveillance, detection, and reporting mechanisms for AMR ⁷⁹⁴. The plan includes a specific objective to reduce the incidence of infections through prevention and control, but with a dedicated focus on limiting antimicrobial resistance specifically. Actions and measures under this programme include strengthening prevention activities against infectious diseases in both human and animal health, through promotion of individual and collective hygiene and vaccination, improving the prevention and control of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs), enhancing hospital hygiene practices, and improving professional standards of care to reduce infections acquired in healthcare settings [page no.19] ⁷⁹⁵.

One of the objectives of the National Health Plan 2025, developed by the Ministry of Health in 2020, is to institutionalize quality and safety in healthcare by establishing a system for evaluating health facilities, creating a hospital performance and evaluation agency, introducing accreditation and certification tools, and implementing a national patient safety policy based on care standards and monitoring systems [page 10]. ⁷⁹⁶ Beyond briefly listing these four aims, however, the Plan does not provide a comprehensive infection prevention and control programme.

No further relevant evidence was identified; the website of the Ministry of Health was inaccessible during August-November 2025. ⁷⁹⁷

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

There is evidence of a plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities nationally.

One of the objectives of the National Health Plan 2025, developed by the Ministry of Health in 2020, is to institutionalize quality and safety in healthcare by establishing a system for evaluating health facilities, creating a hospital performance and evaluation agency, introducing accreditation and certification tools, and implementing a national patient safety policy based on care standards and monitoring systems [page 10]. ⁷⁹⁸

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 100

There is evidence that there is a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial.

As per news reports, Law 28-13 on the Protection of Persons Participating in Biomedical Research of 2015 adopted by the Government of Morocco mandates establishing regional committees for the protection of persons participating in biomedical research. These committees are tasked with evaluating biomedical research projects, especially in terms of ethics. ⁷⁹⁹⁸⁰⁰.

However, the official law decree is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Pasteur Institute ⁸⁰¹⁸⁰².

The National Commission for the Protection of Personal Data (CNDP) is the administrative authority created by Law No. 09-08 (2009) to ensure that the processing of personal data is lawful, legal, and does not violate privacy, fundamental freedoms, and human rights ⁸⁰³.

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 0

There is no evidence of an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) or mutual recognition of clinical trial results taking place elsewhere to treat ongoing pandemics or epidemics.

As per news reports, Law 28-13 (2015) on the Protection of Persons Participating in Biomedical Research sets ethical and procedural requirements for biomedical research in Morocco, including the need for ethics committee approval⁸⁰⁴⁸⁰⁵. However, the official law decree is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Pasteur Institute ⁸⁰⁶⁸⁰⁷. There is no evidence that it explicitly provides for an emergency expedited review process for clinical trials during health crises⁸⁰⁸⁸⁰⁹.

During COVID-19, Morocco participated in international vaccine and therapeutic trials which were approved by national ethics committees and the Ministry of Health under special arrangements. This suggests ad hoc accelerated approvals were possible during emergencies, but not through a dedicated expedited regulatory pathway ⁸¹⁰.

The websites of the Ministries of Health and National Education, Vocational Training, Higher Education and Scientific Research websites do not provide evidence of such expedited process ⁸¹¹⁸¹².

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 100

There is evidence of a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans.

The Moroccan Agency for Medicines and Health Products (Agence Marocaine des Médicaments et des Produits de Santé, AMMSP) was created by Law No. 10.22, promulgated in December 2022. This agency is an independent public establishment with financial autonomy. The AMMSP is the national regulatory authority charged with ensuring the safety, efficacy, and quality of all medicines and health products, including new MCMs like vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics. It is responsible for regulating the entire sector, including manufacturing, import, export, and marketing ^813814815816.

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no evidence of an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use or recognition of approval decisions taking place elsewhere during public health emergencies.

TheMoroccan Agency for Medicines and Health Products (Agence Marocaine des Médicaments et des Produits de Santé, AMMSP) was created by Law No. 10.22, promulgated in December 2022. This agency is an independent public establishment with financial autonomy. The AMMSP is the national regulatory authority charged with ensuring the safety, efficacy, and quality of all medicines and health products, including new MCMs like vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics. It is responsible for regulating the entire sector, including manufacturing, import, export, and marketing ^817818819820. However, there is no evidence that the law provides an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use or recognition of approval decisions taking place elsewhere during public health emergencies.

As per news reports, Law 28-13 (2015) on the Protection of Persons Participating in Biomedical Research sets ethical and procedural requirements for biomedical research in Morocco, including the need for ethics committee approval⁸²¹⁸²². However, the official law decree is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Pasteur Institute ⁸²³⁸²⁴. There is no evidence that it explicitly provides for an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use or recognition of approval decisions taking place elsewhere during public health emergencies⁸²⁵⁸²⁶.

The 2016 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Morocco highlights as a key strength the country’s “extensive experience in deploying national medical countermeasures both domestically and across its borders,” noting, for example, that Morocco sent and received medical countermeasures to support the response to the Ebola outbreak [page no.44] ⁸²⁷. However, the JEE does not mention an expedited process for approving MCMs.

The websites of the Ministries of Health and National Education, Vocational Training, Higher Education and Scientific Research websites do not provide evidence of such an expedited process ⁸²⁸⁸²⁹.

In January 2021, Morocco approved emergency use of China's Sinopharm covid-19 vaccine during the pandemic for a period of 12 months, but this seems to be an extraordinary measure and no standardised proces for approval is listed in the media reports covering this approval ⁸³⁰.

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Morocco has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.⁸³¹

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 0

There is no evidence that epidemics and pandemics are integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or that there is a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^832833834. However, no policy document for COUSP specifically for Morocco is publicly available on government websites, there is no evidence of a COUSP website, and no information indicating that it includes a national risk reduction strategy⁸³⁵⁸³⁶.

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

There is evidence that Morocco has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies. However, there is evidence of gaps in implementation.

In September 2025, Morocco, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) launched the Health Emergency Leaders Network (HELN) in Rabat. This initiative unites health leaders from Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean to accelerate cross-border collaboration in health emergency response, emphasizing trust, solidarity, and operational readiness ⁸³⁷. However, as this is a recent initiative, there is no evidence of active implementation as of September 2025.

In April 2024, Morocco and Djibouti signed two memorandums of understanding (MoUs) to strengthen cooperation in health and social protection. These agreements aim to build the capacity of healthcare professionals from both countries in medical, pharmaceutical, nursing, and administrative fields, fostering bilateral collaboration in public health emergencies ⁸³⁸. However, there is no evidence of active implementation of the MoUs in Moroccan and international news media.

Morocco actively collaborates with European agencies, such as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Recent multi-sectoral training workshops have been held in Rabat to strengthen event-based surveillance and cross-sectoral collaboration (including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Interior, and ONSSA) following a One Health approach ⁸³⁹.

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

There is evidence that Morocco has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. However, there is evidence of gaps in implementation.

Morocco is involved in the Regional Animal Health Center for North Africa (RAHC-NA), established by the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (FAO-ECTAD). This center aims to coordinate and harmonize strategies for monitoring and evaluating activities related to the control of animal diseases, including zoonoses and avian influenza, in the Maghreb region. The RAHC-NA facilitates collaboration among Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania, and also seeks to enhance coordination with Southern European countries through the Mediterranean Network for Animal Health (REMESA) ⁸⁴⁰. However, there is no publicly available evidence of implementation.

The World Organization for Animal Health’s (WOAH) Sub Regional Representation for North Africa has been established to cover the five member countries of WOAH in the region (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia) in conjunction with the Regional Representation for Africa based in Bamako (Mali) and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA )which has its headquarters in Rabat, Morocco. This mechanism supports members by strengthening animal disease surveillance and control, improving information sharing, and harmonizing control methods in collaboration with national and international partners, while also implementing regional strategies and action plans. ⁸⁴¹ However, there is no publicly available evidence of implementation.

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention.

Morocco is a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention, having signed it on April 10, 1972, and ratified it on March 21, 2002 ⁸⁴².

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years.

Morocco has submitted confidence building measures to the BWC every year since 2005, though the reports are not publicly available ⁸⁴³.

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 100

There is evidence that the state has provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee).

Morocco has submitted the required national reports to the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (the 1540 Committee). According to the 1540 Committee’s National Reports Database, Morocco submitted national reports in 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2015 ⁸⁴⁴⁸⁴⁵.

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 0

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

Morocco meets only one of the three criteria as it is a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative only.

Morocco endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2008, committing to cooperate in preventing and interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials ⁸⁴⁶.

However, Morocco is not a member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP) or the Australia Group (AG) ⁸⁴⁷⁸⁴⁸.

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years.

Morocco’s last Joint External Evaluation (JEE) took place in 2016 ⁸⁴⁹. There has not been a subsequent JEE in Morocco since 2016 ⁸⁵⁰. There is no evidence of any other precursor external evaluation having taken place in the last five years.

According to the World Health Organization’s page for Morocco, a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) is currently in progress ⁸⁵¹.

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years.

According to records from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), Morocco's last PVS assessments were completed in 2013 ⁸⁵².

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years.

According to records from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), Morocco's last PVS gap analysis was completed in 2013 ⁸⁵³.

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Morocco has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats within the past three years.

The government has significantly increased the annual budget for the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MoHSP). In the 2025 budget, the MoHSP was allocated 32.6 billion Moroccan Dirhams (USD 3.16 billion) ⁸⁵⁴. This allocation is designed to support the country's health reform and strengthen the health system's capacity; it is not specifically aimed towards improving the nation’s capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats.

As per news reports, in 2025, Morocco announced an investment of MAD 287.5 million (USD 27.9 million) to build a large “first aid / emergency platform” in Sale, including warehouses, shelters, heliport, etc., for responding to disasters including chemical, radiological and other hazards ⁸⁵⁵. Additionally, a broader “disaster response stockpiling” project was planned, allocating MAD 7 billion (USD 679 million) to build storage facilities and stockpile essential supplies to respond to floods, landslides, and other natural disasters ⁸⁵⁶. However, these initiatives do not specifically address pandemic or epidemic threats.

There is no further evidence of national funds allocated to improve capacity to address epidemic threats available through the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Interior or the Pasteur Institute of Morocco ^{857 858 859}.

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years.

Morocco’s last Joint External Evaluation (JEE) took place in 2016 ⁸⁶⁰. There has not been a subsequent JEE in Morocco since 2016 ⁸⁶¹. There is no evidence of any other precursor external evaluation having taken place in the last five years. According to the World Health Organization’s page for Morocco, a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) is currently in progress⁸⁶².

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics. It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ⁸⁶³⁸⁶⁴. However, there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites ⁸⁶⁵⁸⁶⁶.

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Morocco has completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment or PVS Gap Analysis in the last five years.

According to records from the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), Morocco's last PVS assessments were completed in 2013 ⁸⁶⁷.

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 100

There is some evidence of a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which Morocco can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act).

In March 2020, King Mohammed VI ordered the creation of a Special Fund for the Management and Response to COVID-19. This fund, which reached approximately MAD 33 billion (USD 3 billion), was used to finance preventive measures and provide socio-economic support to households and businesses.⁸⁶⁸ In December 2020, the World Bank approved a USD 400 million program to strengthen Morocco’s social protection system—the COVID-19 Social Protection Emergency Response Project—which provided assistance to poor and vulnerable households during the pandemic.⁸⁶⁹⁸⁷⁰ However, these initiatives were allocated specifically in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2025, the World Health Organization’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE) allocated US$225,000 to Morocco to support measles response activities. The funding was used to strengthen risk communication and community engagement, enhance measles surveillance and epidemic intelligence, and train rapid response teams ⁸⁷¹. However, while the CFE provided funding during the measles outbreak, it is not clear whether such funding is consistently available for all emergencies or can be relied upon as a permanent source of emergency financing.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PNASS) 2018–2022 was developed to strengthen Morocco’s compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). Its objectives include enhancing national preparedness for health emergencies and promoting coordination with national and international partners for effective emergency management, including epidemics.It is specifically mentioned in the Strategic Plan of the Pasteur Institute and the National Health Plan 2025 ⁸⁷²⁸⁷³ However, since there is no official government document available for the PNASS on government websites, there is no evidence that the plan contains a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism for the country to access during a public health emergency⁸⁷⁴⁸⁷⁵.

The National Public Health Emergency Operations Center (Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence de Santé Publique, COUSP) was established by the Moroccan government in 2019. It is part of the Ministry of Health's national plan to strengthen the country's capacity for early detection, preparedness, and rapid response to public health emergencies, including epidemics. The COUSP works alongside regional centers (CROUSP) and multidisciplinary rapid intervention teams (EIR) to ensure effective surveillance and response.^876877878. There is no publicly available document for COUSP specifically for Morocco on government websites and no evidence of a COUSP website ⁸⁷⁹⁸⁸⁰. Therefore, there is no evidence whether COUSP includes a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism for the country to access during a public health emergency ⁸⁸¹⁸⁸².

According to the 2016 Joint External Evaluation, Morocco has established, at the national level, an interministerial crisis management committee responsible for setting overall policies and allocating funding for emergency response operations. Additionally, an Administrative and Financial Committee oversees and approves the budgets required to carry out these operations [page no. 41] ⁸⁸³. However, the JEE does not mention whether this committee allocates funding for pandemics or epidemics and there is no publicly available evidence of such committees.

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment to support other countries to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats by providing financing or support, or to improve the country’s domestic capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity.

In 2025 Morocco made its first pledge to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, committing USD 1.39 million for the period 2023-2025⁸⁸⁴. The pledge, however, did not involve a public commitment made by senior leaders of the country. In September 2025, Morocco, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) launched the Health Emergency Leaders Network (HELN) in Rabat. This initiative unites health leaders from Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean to accelerate cross-border collaboration in health emergency response ⁸⁸⁵. In April 2024, Morocco and Djibouti signed two memorandums of understanding (MoUs) to strengthen cooperation in health and social protection. These agreements aim to build the capacity of healthcare professionals from both countries in medical, pharmaceutical, nursing, and administrative fields ⁸⁸⁶. These initiatives and MoUs, however, did not involve a public commitment made by senior leaders of the country.

No evidence of any public commitment made by senior leaders in the last three years on improving the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity is provided through the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Administration Reform, or the Pasteur Institute of Morocco. ^887888889. A review of the websites of national and international news agencies including Morocco World News, Moroccan News Agency (Agence Marocaine de Presse), Euronews, France 24, or Independent did not provide further evidence related to this matter. ^{890891892893894}.

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has, in the past three years, requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country’s domestic capacity to address epidemic threats.

In 2025, the World Health Organization’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE) allocated US$225,000 to Morocco to support measles response activities. The funding was used to strengthen risk communication and community engagement, enhance measles surveillance and epidemic intelligence, and train rapid response teams ⁸⁹⁵.

However, there is no evidence that the country has provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats through the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Administration Reform ⁸⁹⁶⁸⁹⁷. A review of the websites of national and international news agencies including Morocco World News, Moroccan News Agency (Agence Marocaine de Presse), Euronews, France 24, or Independent did not provide further evidence related to this matter ^{898899900901902}.

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 100

There is evidence that Morocco has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years.

As of 31 December 2023, Morocco’s contribution for the 2022–2023 biennium, amounting to USD 131,580, was fully paid ⁹⁰³. Similarly, as of 30 November 2024, Morocco had paid USD 132,446 toward its assessed contribution for the 2024–2025 biennium, indicating full payment ⁹⁰⁴.

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza.

Morocco is a party to the Nagoya Protocol, having signed it in 2012. The Protocol governs Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge and aims to ensure the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources. ⁹⁰⁵ There is no evidence, however, that Morocco has developed a policy or plan under the Protocol or any other plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data. ^906907908909

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence suggesting that Morocco has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years.

Morocco is a beneficiary of the PIP Partnership Contribution, and according to the World Health Organization, countries participating in the PIP framework provide weekly and monthly influenza updates to keep partners and the public informed about epidemiological trends, developments, and events.⁹¹⁰

The website of the National Institute of Hygiene in Rabat, which is the national influenza center in Morocco since 2000, the Pasteur Institute website, and the Ministry of Health websites do not provide evidence suggesting that Morocco did not share samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years. ^911912913

A review of national and international media outlets did not provide further evidence on this matter. ^914915916

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that Morocco has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years.

A 2025 genomic surveillance study confirms that research on SARS-CoV-2 in Morocco has relied on publicly shared genome sequences. Between 2021 and 2024, Moroccan samples were whole-genome sequenced and uploaded to the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID), making them accessible for international research on viral evolution⁹¹⁷⁹¹⁸.

The World Health Organization’s Disease Outbreak News on measles documents Morocco’s engagement in surveillance and reporting activities, with no public mention of sample-sharing refusals⁹¹⁹.

A review of national and international news agencies did not provide evidence on this matter ^920921922.

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 50

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 25

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 50

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 25

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 37

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 25

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 25

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 25

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 25

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 50

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 25

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 50

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 75

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 100

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 50

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 68.03

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 54.44

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 98.81

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 0

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 0

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 50

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 100

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 60.5

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 50

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 75

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 50

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 33.7

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 78.58

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 25

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 94.58

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 60.3

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 46.53

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 51.65

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 44.17

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 18.07

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 91.99

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 87.98

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 0

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 19.4

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 50

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 50