Mauritius: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 100

Mauritius has a comprehensive national AMR plan that covers surveillance, detection, and reporting. The National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance April 2024 to March 2029 (NAP AMR 2024-2029) outlines a clear framework for these activities. A key strategic objective of the plan is to "Enhance AMR surveillance and diagnostic capacity in humans and animals" (page 12). This includes specific interventions to "Support surveillance of AMR capacity" and "Establish antimicrobial use and consumption surveillance system in human and animal sector" (page 12). The plan's situational analysis provides detailed, recent resistance data for all eight GLASS priority pathogens: E. coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Acinetobacter spp., Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp., and Neisseria gonorrhoeae (pages 20–21). The NAP AMR 2024-2029 aims to "Strengthen laboratory capacity in both human, animal, and environmental sector" (page 12). The situational analysis within the plan notes that the surveillance capacity of the Central Health Laboratory (CHL) is adequate for current needs, though it also identifies the need for additional capacity for genotypic testing (page 24). The plan explicitly mentions the submission of surveillance data to GLASS, a global platform for reporting AMR data (page 24) ¹.

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 50

There is evidence that the national laboratory system in Mauritius tests for 7 WHO Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS) priority pathogens, without Mycobacterium tuberculosis being mentioned. The National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance April 2024 to March 2029 provides surveillance data for each of these pathogens, confirming the system's capacity. The "Antimicrobial resistance in Mauritius" section provides specific resistance data for E. coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Acinetobacter spp., Staphylococcus aureus (including MRSA), Streptococcus pneumoniae, non-typhoidal Salmonella, Shigella spp., and Neisseria gonorrhoeae (pages 20–21). The plan identifies key pathogens considered major threats in Mauritius, which include the GLASS priority pathogens Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella, E. coli, and Acinetobacter (page 21). ². The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius, published in 2018, identifies the Central Health Laboratory (CHL) as the main national public health laboratory for the country (page 33). It explicitly states that "Antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) is routinely carried out on clinical isolates at the CHL and in the five regional hospital laboratories" (page 33) ³.

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

The government of Mauritius does not currently conduct systematic environmental surveillance for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. The National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance April 2024 to March 2029 explicitly states, "at present the country does not have a national assessment of antimicrobial pathogens in the environment" (page 20). It further clarifies that while there is a regular monitoring system for drinking water quality, "no mechanism is in place for monitoring antimicrobial compounds in drinking water" (page 20). However, the plan recognizes this as a critical gap and includes it as a future objective. One of the plan's six strategic objectives is to "Enhance AMR surveillance and diagnostic capacity in humans and animals," which includes an intervention to "Strengthen laboratory capacity in both human, animal, and environmental sector" (page 12) ⁴. The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius from 2018 further supports the assessment that environmental surveillance is not an established practice. The evaluation focuses its laboratory-related findings and recommendations on the human, animal, and food sectors, with no mention of any existing capacity or activities for environmental testing of AMR (pages 33-34) ⁵.

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 50

Mauritius has national legislation and regulations requiring prescriptions for the use of antibiotics in humans, although implementation and enforcement are noted as areas for improvement. The primary law governing this is the Pharmacy Act 1983, which stipulates uder Part VI – Therapeutic substances, Section 33 (Sale of antibiotics) that antibiotics can only be sold by retail upon the presentation of a prescription from an authorized person (a medical practitioner, dental surgeon, or veterinary surgeon) ⁶. The National Antibiotic Guidelines of 2024 published by the Ministry of Health and Wellness outline a tiered system for prescribing antibiotics within the public health sector. These guidelines restrict the prescription of certain 'Watch' and 'Reserve' group antibiotics. For instance, drugs like piperacillin/tazobactam and meropenem can only be prescribed by specialists. Other antibiotics, including azithromycin and levofloxacin, are also restricted to prescription by specialists, with very limited exceptions for Medical Health Officers in specific situations (pages 12-13) ⁷. The National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance April 2024 to March 2029 (NAP AMR 2024-2029) acknowledges the need for a stronger regulatory framework. While the law is in place, the plan identifies a "Limited regulatory system" as a weakness in the country's AMR response (page 12). One of the plan's key interventions under Strategic Objective 5 is to "Develop legislation on prescription and sale of antimicrobials" (page 13) ⁸.

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 0

While a foundational legal framework for veterinary prescriptions exists, the overarching national legislation specifically regulating antibiotic use in animals is still under development and considered a key area for improvement in Mauritius. The Pharmacy Act 1983 (last amended June 2017) provides the legal basis for requiring prescriptions for veterinary medicines. Section 21 of this act outlines the requirements for a valid prescription, and it explicitly includes those issued by a veterinary surgeon. It mandates that such prescriptions must be signed, dated, and contain the words "For Animal Treatment Only" ⁹. However, the National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance April 2024 to March 2029 (NAP AMR 2024-2029) highlights significant gaps in the regulation of antimicrobials in the animal sector. The plan's introduction notes that the "unregulated use of antimicrobials in agriculture, veterinary medicine and aquaculture" has contributed to the rise of AMR on the island (page 14) ¹⁰. The NAP AMR 2024-2029 states that Mauritius is still in the process of finalizing its Animal Health, Veterinary Public Health and Livestock Production (AHVPHLP) bill. According to the plan, this new piece of legislation is intended to provide comprehensive provisions for the "authorisation, importation, distribution and use of veterinary medicinal products including antimicrobials" (page 31) ¹¹. No evidence that the bill was converted into law identified on the legislations portal maintained by the Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries ¹².

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

Although Mauritius has in place national legislation and policies on prioritization, detection and reporting, only one policy discusses zoonotic disease explicitly in the context of their being a risk to human health. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018 and published in 2019, specifically states that Mauritius has legislation and official policies and directives on zoonotic disease, including the Animal Disease Act of 1925, the Food Act of 2000, and the Animal Welfare Act of 2013. ¹³ However, these Acts do not discuss zoonotic disease explicitly in the context of their being a risk to human health. ¹⁴¹⁵¹⁶ As per the 2018 JEE, Mauritius was working on a draft veterinary policy which would cover all potentially zoonotic diseases, but salmonellosis, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, and avian infuenza are of high concern. ¹⁷ The NAP AMR 2024-2029 states that Mauritius is still in the process of finalizing its Animal Health, Veterinary Public Health and Livestock Production (AHVPHLP) bill. (page 31) ¹⁸. No evidence that the bill was converted into law identified on the legislations portal maintained by the Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries ¹⁹. The Operational Plan for Leptospirosis 2024 (Ministry of Health and Wellness) outlines active human-case surveillance, environmental sampling of rodents and livestock, and weekly inter-agency data sharing during the rainy season (Sections 2 & 4). It complements generic statutory duties by giving disease-specific detection thresholds (≥5 confirmed cases triggers field investigation) and clarifying laboratory diagnostics at the Central Health Laboratory ²⁰.

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 100

Although Mauritius has in place national legislation and policies on zoonotic disease, only one policy discusses zoonotic disease explicitly in the context of risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018 and published in 2019, specifically states that Mauritius has legislation and official policies and directives on zoonotic disease, including the Animal Disease Act of 1925, the Food Act of 2000, and the Animal Welfare Act of 2013. ²¹ However, these Acts do not discuss zoonotic disease explicitly in the context of their being a risk to human health. ²²²³²⁴ As per the 2018 JEE, Mauritius was working on a draft veterinary policy which would cover all potentially zoonotic diseases, but salmonellosis, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, and avian infuenza are of high concern. ²⁵ The NAP AMR 2024-2029 states that Mauritius is still in the process of finalizing its Animal Health, Veterinary Public Health and Livestock Production (AHVPHLP) bill. (page 31) ²⁶. No evidence that the bill was converted into law identified on the legislations portal maintained by the Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries ²⁷. The Operational Plan for Leptospirosis 2024 (Ministry of Health and Wellness) outlines active human-case surveillance, environmental sampling of rodents and livestock, and weekly inter-agency data sharing during the rainy season. Section 2 designates sugarcane fields and abattoirs as priority environments and schedules pre-emptive rodent-control campaigns each rainy season. Section 4 requires weekly human-animal-environment data sharing and immediate field investigation when ≥5 human cases are confirmed, ensuring early identification and mitigation of spillover risk from rodents and livestock ²⁸.

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has in place legislation and guidelines for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic diseases. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, states that Mauritius has in place a Contingency Plan for Avian Influenza (2016), that regular surveillance and testing takes place for salmonellosis, brucellosis, and tuberculosis, and that the veterinary surveillance system is linked to the human surveillance system, but there is no mention of any legislation or regulations regarding such surveillance, nor of any plan or regulation for the control of any zoonosis beyond Avian Influenza. Mauritius has in place policies for the control of zoonotic diseases, but these are not specific to designated diseases. According to the JEE, "there is no formal policy or SOPs to define the linkage between animal and human health surveillance for pathogens" although control measures are regularly enforced ²⁹. No evidence of a regulation or law for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic diseases identified on the legislations portal maintained by the Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries or the Publications portal maintained by the Ministry of Health and Wellness ³⁰³¹.

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has a standing, multi-sectoral “One Health” secretariat or comparable government unit that permanently coordinates zoonotic-disease policy across ministries. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, states that joint investigations occur on an ad hoc basis—usually between the Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOHW) and the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security (MAIFS)—and that an inter-sectoral committee exists only for avian influenza outbreaks; it explicitly states there is “no formal policy or SOPs to define the linkage between animal and human health surveillance for pathogens” ³². The Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries lists "to ensure public health through the control of zoonotic diseases" as one of its objectives, but does not list any multisectoral collaboration mechanisms on its website ³³³⁴. No further evidence of such a mechanism identified on the Publications portal maintained by the Ministry of Health and Wellness ³⁵.

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 0

Mauritius does not have a standalone One Health Strategic Plan but it is is implementing a "One Health" approach within its National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS). This plan is a multisectoral strategy designed to strengthen the country's ability to detect, prepare for, and respond to public health emergencies, with the "One Health" concept being central to its framework for a comprehensive approach that involves human, animal, and environmental health sectors.³⁶

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 100

Mauritius has in place a national mechanism for livestock owners to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a government agency. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, explicitly states that in Mauritius, animal health services regularly conduct surveillance and monitoring for zoonotic disease, and that governmental veterinary services are in place and offer a "free 24/7 service to farmers." Through this mechanism, any suspected or detected zoonotic outbreak event is immediately reported to the Division of Veterinary Services (DVS) or to the Animal Health Laboratory ³⁷. The Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries lists this helpline number on its website, but does not mention if it is available 24×7 ³⁸. Section 15 of the Animal Diseases Act 1925 (revised 2019) makes it mandatory for “every owner or person in charge of any livestock” to report without delay any “scheduled disease or suspicious symptoms” to the nearest veterinary officer or the police, who must immediately inform the Division of Veterinary Services (DVS). Sections 3-5 empower DVS to investigate, impose quarantine and movement controls, and order slaughter ³⁹.

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritius has in place laws or guidelines to safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, explicitly states that in Mauritius, animal health services regularly conduct surveillance and monitoring for zoonotic disease, and that governmental veterinary services are in place and offer a "free 24/7 service to farmers", however, there is no mention of any measures to safeguard the confidentiality of reporting. ⁴⁰ Mauritius' Animal Diseases Act 1925 (revised 2019) stipulates that the owner of a diseased animal must report the case to the local authorities, but makes no provisions for confidentiality. ⁴¹ The Data Protection Act of 2017 does not mention any provisions for safeguarding the confidentiality of information regarding any animal-related activities. ⁴² Neither the Ministry of Health and Wellness nor the Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries makes any mention of confidentiality as regarding animal disease surveillance. ⁴³⁴⁴⁴⁵

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 100

Mauritius conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors), poultry and livestock. As per the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, the 2006 “Contingency Plan for Avian Influenza” requires monthly sampling of migratory waterfowl at wetlands and local poultry flocks; these tests are performed by the Animal Health Laboratory under the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security (MAIFS) and results are shared with the Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOHW) ⁴⁶. Entomological surveys led by MOHW’s Vector Biology and Control Division monitor invasive mosquito vectors at ports and livestock vehicles; a 2024 peer-reviewed study with contributors affiliated to the division documents 18 airport, 39 seaport and 723 inland larval surveys, plus molecular identification of captured specimens to detect zoonotic arboviruses ⁴⁷.

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 100

Mauritius has a formal mechanism for submitting notifiable-disease data to WOAH through the World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS). WOAH’s Africa roster shows Mauritius has an officially appointed “Animal Disease Notification” Focal Point within the Division of Veterinary Services (DVS), who transmits data under the authority of the national Delegate ⁴⁸. The World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius mission report from October–November 2018 notes that “routine data from quarantine stations, slaughterhouses and government and private veterinarians in the field, are sent to the national OIE focal point through an online system. From there, the focal point directly reports to the OIE” (page 30) ⁴⁹.

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 21.54

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 0.45

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Mauritius has in place a mechanism for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. Section 7.19 of the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2024 (Ministry of Health & Wellness, June 2020) “Inter-sectoral Collaboration and Public-Private Partnership” (page 75) contains no evidence of partnerships in the field of emergency preparedness ⁵⁰. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, mentions that the Division of Veterinary Services, which is responsible for providing the 24/7 service to farmers for the surveillance and detection of zoonoses, is made up of veterinarians from across the country, from both the public and the private sector, but there is no evidence of legislation or regulations outlining the cooperation between the public and private sectors in controlling or responding to zoonoses. ⁵¹ Neither the Ministry of Health and Wellness nor the Division of Veterinary Services under the aegis of Ministry of Agro Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries makes any mention of confidentiality as regarding animal disease surveillance. ⁵²⁵³⁵⁴

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 0

Mauritius does not provide publicly available evidence of a national-level record that lists every facility storing or processing especially dangerous pathogens or toxins and details each site’s inventory-management system. The 2018 “Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities – Republic of Mauritius” recommends that the country “establish a documented inventory of pathogens within facilities that store or process dangerous pathogens and toxins” (p. 29) ⁵⁵. A search of the Ministry of Health and Wellness, the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security, and Mauritius’ legislation portals yielded no results of a subsequent law, regulation, guideline or public report indicating that this recommendation has been implemented ⁵⁶⁵⁷⁵⁸. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004 and the Genetically Modified Organisms Act 2004 require permits and registers for specific activities, yet neither statute publishes or references a consolidated, government-maintained inventory of high-risk biological agents with facility-level details ⁵⁹⁶⁰.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

Mauritius possesses general biosafety statutes and several sector-specific acts, but none lay out the full suite of technical requirements for facilities that store or handle especially dangerous pathogens. Section 5(1) of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act of 2004 prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of biological and toxin weapon, but does not contain an no annex or schedule specifying biocontainment standards or incident-reporting obligations for laboratories ⁶¹. The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 2004 does not prescribe how containment must be achieved, what operating SOPs are mandatory, or how accidental releases must be reported beyond standard environmental-impact provisions ⁶². The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, mentions that Mauritius has instated control measures for dangerous pathogens, including establishing standards for physical containment, operational practices, pathogen containment, and a system for reporting contaimnent failures of dangerous pathogens and toxins ⁶³. However, there is no evidence from the Ministry of Health and Wellness, the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security, or from the VERTIC database, that these measures have been consolidated into legislation. ⁶⁴⁶⁵⁶⁶

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has an agency responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, makes no mention of the existence of such an agency or body. ⁶⁷ In addition, no publicly available information from the Ministry of Health and Wellness, the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security, or from the VERTIC database points to Mauritius having an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. ⁶⁸⁶⁹⁷⁰ The "Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004" does not mention any established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations other than the minister responsible for internal security and defence ⁷¹. Mauritius' reports on Confidence Building Measures submitted until 2024 in accordance with the decisions of BWC Review Conferences are not publicly available ⁷².

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

There is limited public evidence to suggest that Mauritius has taken formal action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. According to the World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius mission report from October–November 2018, some measures have been taken to centrally store dangerous pathogens. The report notes that "Although not documented in a formal action plan, Mauritius has put in place pathogen control measures, which include standards for physical containment and operational practices, and a reporting system for the containment and failure to contain dangerous pathogens and toxins." (p. 28) ⁷³. Searches of the publications sections of the Ministry of Health and Wellness and the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security did not yield any publicly available national biosecurity plans, pathogen inventory lists, or strategies detailing a policy for consolidating dangerous pathogens ⁷⁴⁷⁵. The Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 does not mention any specific actions or targets related to the inventory or consolidation of dangerous pathogens ⁷⁶.

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 0

There is no direct evidence confirming that Mauritius has in-country capacity for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax or Ebola. While the country has demonstrated significant PCR capabilities for other diseases, key assessments do not confirm its application for these specific high-risk pathogens. According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius 2018, the country has "well equipped laboratories with the latest technology (e.g. real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR), gene sequencer, matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization (MALDI)) and a national body in charge of laboratory licensing with a standardized checklist." (p. 23) The report's recommendations under the National Laboratory System section include the "Strong need for the establishment of a new national laboratory services facility. " (p. 34) ⁷⁷. A review of the publications section on the official website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness of Mauritius does not provide any publicly accessible documents, such as laboratory service lists or annual reports, that state a capacity for PCR-based diagnosis of anthrax or Ebola ⁷⁸.

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 0

There is no public evidence to suggest that Mauritius has a standardized, required national biosecurity training program for personnel in facilities that handle especially dangerous pathogens. However, the country does participate in international and regional training initiatives aimed at building this capacity. The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius 2018 highlighted this gap, noting that "biosafety and biosecurity risks in Mauritius have not been systematically assessed and categorized". One of the key recommendations of this report was to "Develop and implement a training plan on biosafety and biosecurity using a One Health approach" (page 28) ⁷⁹. More recently, Mauritius has been involved in capacity-building efforts. In November 2024, the final session of the Second Cohort East Africa Bio-risk Management (BRM) Network Train-the-Trainer (TOT) program was held in Port Louis, Mauritius. This program, a partnership between the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Sandia National Laboratories, was designed to equip animal and public healthcare professionals from Mauritius and other East African nations with the skills to manage bio-risks. The "train-the-trainer" model is intended to enable participants to then disseminate that knowledge within their own countries' health systems ⁸⁰. A search of the publications available from the Ministry of Health and Wellness and the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security did not provide any evidence of a national biosecurity training curriculum or a policy mandating such training for personnel working with dangerous pathogens ⁸¹⁸².

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no public evidence to suggest that regulations or licensing conditions in Mauritius explicitly require personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential to undergo drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. A search of the publications sections of the Ministry of Health and Wellness and the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security websites did not provide any evidence of regulations, guidelines, or licensing conditions that require drug testing, background checks, or psychological fitness evaluations for individuals with access to dangerous biological materials ⁸³⁸⁴.

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 0

There is no publicly available information showing that Mauritius has national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances. The World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius mission report from October–November 2018 states that Mauritius biosafety measures include shipping biological specimens internationally according to International Air Transport Association regulations, but makes no mention of national regulations (page 19). ⁸⁵ No further evidence identified on the websites of the Ministry of Agro-Industry, Food Security, Blue Economy and Fisheries, Ministry of Land Transport, or Ministry of Health and Wellness ⁸⁶⁸⁷⁸⁸.

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

There is currently no evidence that Mauritius has in place legislation to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of dangerous pathogens. There is no evidence of such legislation or regulations in the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018. ⁸⁹ In addition, no publicly available information from the Ministry of Health and Wellness, the Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security, or from the VERTIC database. ⁹⁰⁹¹⁹² The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004, Mauritius has a direct legal framework to control the transfer of dangerous biological agents and toxins. This Act, which gives the force of law to the international convention, explicitly prohibits the transfer of such materials for non-peaceful purposes. Specifically, Section 5(2) of the Act states, "No person shall transfer any biological agent or toxin to another person, where he knows or has reason to believe that the biological agent or toxin is likely to be kept or used otherwise than for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes."The Act further criminalizes the development, production, and stockpiling of these agents for non-peaceful uses (Section 5(1)) and provides the authorities with the power to search, seize, and forfeit any materials held in contravention of the law (Section 6). ⁹³. Mauritius' reports on Confidence Building Measures submitted until 2024 in accordance with the decisions of BWC Review Conferences are not publicly available ⁹⁴.

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Mauritius has in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations on the prevention of accidents that involve the release of harmful biological substances, including measures that are primarily designed to protect the people who work with these substances ⁹⁵. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, mentions that several stakeholders are involved in implementing biosafety and biosecurity, and in enforcing legislation and regulations applicable to biosafety and biosecurity, but no mention is made of any legislation or regulations pertaining specifically to biosafety ⁹⁶. The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 2004 establishes the National Biosafety Committee (NBC), under Section 4. The functions of the NBC, detailed in Section 6, include publishing guidelines and codes of practice for all uses of GMOs, encouraging public participation, and examining applications for GMO permits. A central requirement of the Act, outlined in Section 7, is that no person shall develop, use, market, produce, release, transit, import, or export a GMO without a permit issued by the Permanent Secretary of the responsible Ministry. The application process requires the submission of a detailed risk assessment report and a contingency plan to evaluate potential adverse effects on the environment and human or animal health ⁹⁷. No evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website regarding the NBC or its activities ⁹⁸. The VERTIC database for Mauritius states under the header "Biosafety and Biosecurity", that "Various measures in Mauritius provide control frameworks for items, activities or facilities that may be relevant to the BWC. These measures provide a framework for the licensing, registration and/or inspection of health facilities as well as facilities and individuals working with GMOs, plants pests and wastes. They include the following: the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 2005, the Genetically Modified Organisms Act, 2004, the Waste Management and Resource Recovery Act, 2023, the Public Health Act, 1925, the Plant Protection Act, 2006, the Environment Protection Act, 2002 and the Allied Health Professionals Council (medical Laboratory Technologist) Regulations, 2022. The Allied Health Professionals Council (medical Laboratory Technologist) Regulations 2022 provide a Code of Practice to be complied with by medical laboratory technologists. Part V of the Cybersecurity and Cybercrime Act, 2021 covers the protection of critical information infrastructure." However, none of these legislations specifically deal with biosafety generally ⁹⁹. Mauritius' reports on Confidence Building Measures submitted until 2024 in accordance with the decisions of BWC Review Conferences are not publicly available ¹⁰⁰.

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is evidence that Mauritius has in place national legislation reguring the existence of such a biosafety body, but no evidence that it is operational ¹⁰¹. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, mentions that several stakeholders are involved in implementing biosafety and biosecurity, and in enforcing legislation and regulations applicable to biosafety and biosecurity, but no mention is made of any legislation or regulations pertaining specifically to biosafety ¹⁰². The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 2004 establishes the National Biosafety Committee (NBC), under Section 4. The functions of the NBC, detailed in Section 6, include publishing guidelines and codes of practice for all uses of GMOs, encouraging public participation, and examining applications for GMO permits ¹⁰³. No evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website regarding the NBC or its activities ¹⁰⁴.

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

There is evidence of biosafety and biosecurity training being required for laboratory personnel, particularly regarding handling, containment, and disposal of hazardous biological materials. Training seems to occur as part of institutional or facility-level programs.

Section 7.18.4 on Biosafety of the National Guidelines on Infection Prevention and Control (2025) states that "laboratory supervisor should ensure that adequate training in laboratory safety is provided and that practices and procedures are understood and followed." Section 14.1–14.12 (Biosafety in the Clinical Laboratory, pp. 143–157) outlines biosafety protocols for laboratories handling infectious or high-risk pathogens. Section 14.11 (Waste Management, p. 155) specifies that “laboratory personnel should receive training on waste handling procedures” and that biosafety is ensured through “standard operating procedures and regulatory compliance checks.” Section 18.10.4 on 'Workforce training and support' lists two measures: "Healthcare workers and responders must receive adequate training on IPC protocols tailored to the specific emergency" and "Psychological support and measures to prevent burnout are necessary to sustain workforce effectiveness." However, no explicit evidence was found of a national standardized biosafety training curriculum, train-the-trainer program, or mandatory recertification cycle (e.g., every 5 years) for personnel ¹⁰⁵.

According to a news release titled "Final Training Session of the Second Cohort East Africa Bio-risk Management Network Concludes in Port Louis, Mauritius" (November 22, 2024), experts from Mauritius took part in a regional Bio-risk Management (BRM) "Train-the-Trainer" program. This initiative, spearheaded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), aimed to equip public and animal healthcare professionals with skills to manage bio-risks ¹⁰⁶.

No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ¹⁰⁷.

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that Mauritius has conducted a formal assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research.

The National Action Plan on Infection Prevention and Control for Healthcare Facilities 2022–2023, developed by the Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOHW) and the WHO, outlines strategic objectives to improve infection prevention and control (IPC) in Mauritius. The document explicitly states that research is a component not heavily focused on in the plan, noting that "MOHW lags behind in research; publications in peer-reviewed journals are rare. Once enough support and funding are gathered, research in IPC should be started" (page 14) ¹⁰⁸.

No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ¹⁰⁹.

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

Mauritius has some legislative frameworks that can be applied to the oversight of biological materials and research; however, there is no evidence of a single, comprehensive piece of legislation or regulation specifically mandating the oversight of research involving especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual-use research.

According to the Genetically Modified Organisms Act 2004, Mauritius has a legal framework for the regulation of activities involving genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This Act establishes a National Biosafety Committee (Section 4) responsible for advising the Minister of Agro-Industry and Food Security on policies related to GMOs and for processing applications for GMO permits. The Act defines "contained use" as any operation involving GMOs within a facility where contact with the external environment is limited by specific measures (Section 2). It also requires users to obtain a GMO permit for activities such as trial or general release (Sections 7 and 8). However, its scope does not explicitly extend to research on naturally occurring dangerous pathogens or encompass the broader concept of dual-use research ¹¹⁰.

The Dangerous Chemicals Control Act 2004 provides a framework for managing hazardous chemicals. As per its title and available descriptions, its focus is on chemical agents, and it does not appear to provide specific oversight for research involving biological pathogens or toxins ¹¹¹. Mauritius has enacted the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004, and Section 5(2) of this Act establishes a license requirement for the possession or use of high-risk biological agents and toxins, but there are no provisions listed on the oversight of dual-use research ¹¹².

No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website, the VERTIC database, or the Biological Weapons Convention National Implementation Measures Database. ^113114115.

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

Mauritius has some legislative frameworks that can be applied to the oversight of biological materials and research; however, there is no evidence of an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research.

According to the Genetically Modified Organisms Act 2004, Mauritius has a legal framework for the regulation of activities involving genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This Act establishes a National Biosafety Committee (Section 4) responsible for advising the Minister of Agro-Industry and Food Security on policies related to GMOs and for processing applications for GMO permits. The Act defines "contained use" as any operation involving GMOs within a facility where contact with the external environment is limited by specific measures (Section 2). It also requires users to obtain a GMO permit for activities such as trial or general release (Sections 7 and 8). However, its scope does not explicitly extend to research on naturally occurring dangerous pathogens or encompass the broader concept of dual-use research ¹¹⁶.

The Dangerous Chemicals Control Act 2004 provides a framework for managing hazardous chemicals. As per its title and available descriptions, its focus is on chemical agents, and it does not appear to provide specific oversight for research involving biological pathogens or toxins ¹¹⁷. Mauritius has enacted the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004, and Section 5(2) of this Act establishes a license requirement for the possession or use of high-risk biological agents and toxins, but there are no provisions listed on the oversight of dual-use research ¹¹⁸.

No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website, the VERTIC database, or the Biological Weapons Convention National Implementation Measures Database. ^119120121.

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of legislation or regulation in Mauritius that specifically requires the screening of synthesized deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold.

The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 2004 is the primary legislation governing biotechnology in Mauritius. This Act establishes a framework to regulate the development, use, and release of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and requires a permit for such activities. Key provisions include the need for a risk assessment and a contingency plan to accompany any permit application (Section 7). However, this legislation focuses on the oversight of whole organisms modified by gene technology, rather than regulating the commercial sale of synthetic DNA sequences ¹²².

The DNA Identification Act 2009 focuses on the use of DNA for forensic analysis in criminal investigations and establishing parentage; it does not address the synthesis or commercial sale of DNA sequences ¹²³. The Food Regulations 2024, made under the Food Act 2022, include provisions for the labeling of "genetically modified food" and food produced using "gene technology" (Regulation 2 and 4(1)(n)). These regulations define gene technology as recombinant DNA techniques but are focused on the end food products ¹²⁴.

While Mauritius is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and has enacted the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Act 2004, which includes provisions for licensing the transfer of high-risk biological agents and toxins, publicly available information does not indicate that this extends to mandating the screening of synthetic DNA orders ^125126127128.

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 50

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 100

Foot and mouth disease figures for Mauritius are available on the WAHIS database maintained by WOAH, which states that as of August 2025 there were no reported cases in the country ¹²⁹.

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has a national immunization strategy.

Section 7.9.5 of the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 published by the Ministry of Health and Wellness is on "Vaccination". Strategic Objective 13.1 is to "Develop a National Immunization Policy" ¹³⁰.

No evidence that this strategy was published was identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ¹³¹.

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has a national immunization strategy.

Section 7.9.5 of the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 published by the Ministry of Health and Wellness is on "Vaccination". Strategic Objective 13.2 contains an objective to "Sensitize the community on vaccination programs including SIA", but there are no measures related to public trust or vaccine hesitancy listed ¹³².

No evidence that this strategy was published was identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ¹³³.

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Mauritius has a national advisory group that provides technical guidance on its immunization strategy to the government. This body is the Mauritius National Immunization Technical Advisory Group (MAUNITAG).

According to a World Health Organization (WHO) publication titled "WHO supports Mauritius in assessing and empowering the National Immunization Technical Advisory Group" (May 9, 2025), MAUNITAG was established in 2018. The article describes MAUNITAG as a body of "independent national experts" responsible for translating global immunization guidance into country-specific policies by offering evidence-based recommendations. It explicitly states that MAUNITAG has played a "pivotal role in guiding the national vaccine policy". The report also details a February 2025 external review of the group ¹³⁴.

The role of this advisory group is also formally integrated into national health emergency planning. According to the National-Deployment-Vaccination Plan for COVID-19 Vaccines in the Republic of Mauritius (28 January 2021), a "National COVID-19 Vaccination Committee" was established to provide recommendations on vaccine policy to the Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOHW). The plan specifies that the composition of this committee includes a "Representative of MAUNITAG" (page 10) ¹³⁵.

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 100

Mauritius has a national immunization programme for influenza.

Official announcements regarding the Flu Vaccination Campaign of the Ministry of Social Integration, Social Security and National Solidarity an annual seasonal flu vaccination campaign ¹³⁶¹³⁷.

The World Health Organization Africa Regional Office reports that Mauritius has an official Seasonal Influenza Vaccination Programme since 2019, which targets at-risk populations such as the elderly, people with chronic diseases, immunosuppressed individuals, healthcare workers, and pregnant women, and is offered annually in line with international best practice ¹³⁸.

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 100

There is clear evidence that Mauritius has a strategy and is actively developing plans to create a health system that is resilient to the challenges of climate change, including the threat of infectious diseases.

According to the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 (HSSP) from the Ministry of Health and Wellness, Mauritius has a strategic goal to "Improve health security through a sustainable, effective and efficient national surveillance, response and recovery system" (Strategic Goal 16). The plan proposes the development of a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) and the continuation of the SEGA One Health Programme, which addresses health security in the Indian Ocean region (section on Emergency Preparedness and Response) ¹³⁹.

The Mauritius-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2023–2026 further reinforces this focus. This strategy, which is aligned with the HSSP, identifies "Building resilient health systems" and "Strengthening emergency preparedness and response" as two of its four strategic priorities. The document explicitly acknowledges that as a small island developing state, Mauritius faces a "high risk of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases and climate change threats". Under Strategic Priority 3, the WHO aims to "support (the country) to build a climate resilient health system, and develop a climate informed integrated health surveillance and early warning systems for climate-sensitive diseases" ¹⁴⁰.

Concrete policy actions are outlined in the country's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) framework. According to Mauritius's 2023 input for the UN Secretary-General's report on SDGs, the country is actively implementing policies to "mainstream climate change adaptation in the health sector". This includes strengthening disease surveillance through the aforementioned NAPHS and developing practical training on vector control related to climate-sensitive diseases like malaria (Anopheles Stephensi) ¹⁴¹. These initiatives are built upon a formal assessment, with a 2025 WHO report confirming that Mauritius has undertaken a Health Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment to inform its strategy for a climate-resilient health system ¹⁴².

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 50

The national laboratory system in Mauritius has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests.

According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius (2019), published by the World Health Organization (WHO), the national laboratory system demonstrated the capacity to perform 8 out of the 10 core tests defined by the WHO ¹⁴³.

The Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 details Mauritius's focus on controlling communicable diseases, including HIV, vector-borne diseases, and other emerging threats, which inherently relies on a robust diagnostic laboratory system. The plan also reaffirms a proposal for the construction of a new National Health Laboratory Services Centre to host a Central Health Laboratory with expanded services, but does not list diagnostic capacity ¹⁴⁴.

No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ¹⁴⁵.

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

Mauritius has a national plan for conducting testing during a public health emergency that addresses novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and testing goals, but it is evidenced only in its policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. While there is not a single, overarching public document for all potential emergencies, the government’s specific plans for disease outbreaks serve as the guiding strategy. According to the Ministry of Health and Wellness Operational Plan on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) (revised September 2021), a detailed strategy was established to manage testing for a novel pathogen. The plan explicitly defined goals for laboratory diagnosis, including the development of surveillance tools and protocols for specimen collection and testing at the Central Health Laboratory (Section 2.3.4, Action 4; Section 2.4.1, Action 1). It also addressed scaling capacity through measures such as increasing the surge capacity of health facilities and stockpiling laboratory supplies (Section 2.3.1, Action 1; Section 2.3.2, Action 2). Testing goals were clearly defined based on the epidemiological situation, starting with the testing of suspected cases meeting a specific case definition (Section 2.4) and expanding to routine testing of all patients with Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI) as part of an enhanced surveillance strategy if local transmission occurred (Section 5.1.5, Action 5) ¹⁴⁶. This framework is situated within a broader national strategy. According to the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024, "Emergency Preparedness and Response" is a key strategic priority (Section 7.11, p. 62), which includes strengthening the country's capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats in line with International Health Regulations (IHR) requirements ¹⁴⁷. The successful implementation of this strategy during the pandemic is detailed in the Best practices and experience of Mauritius’ preparedness and response to COVID-19 pandemic Inter-Action Review (IAR) conducted with the WHO. This review highlights the execution of a "Large scale testing strategy" that included testing asymptomatic contacts, frontliners, and other vulnerable groups. It also confirms the scaling of capacity through the expansion of the central laboratory's operations to a 24/7 basis and the introduction of PCR testing in private hospital laboratories to serve as a backup and increase national output (p. 8) ¹⁴⁸. A review of the Ministry of Health and Wellness publications page did not yield a more recent or all-hazards public health emergency testing plan ¹⁴⁹.

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

Mauritius has ISO 15189 accredited medical laboratories under the national accreditation body (Mauritius Accreditation Service, MAURITAS). As per its website, MAURITAS is responsible for checking and awarding ISO 15189 International Standards to accredited laboratories ¹⁵⁰. However, the list of accredited laboratories does not include the Central Health Laboratory (CHL), the country's national reference body, as having ISO 15189 certification in its list of accredited entities ¹⁵¹. The Sir Edgar Laurent TB Laboratory under the Central Health Laboratory serves as the national tuberculosis reference facility and was ISO 15189:2022 accredited by MAURITAS in October 2025 ¹⁵²¹⁵³.

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

Mauritius has a national reference facility, the Central Health Laboratory (CHL), which is subject to external quality assurance (EQA) review on a case-by-case basis. According to the 2021 "Comparative analysis of public health measures implemented related to COVID-19 across first wave (2020) and second wave (2021)," a report by the Ministry of Health and Wellness and WHO, the Central Health Laboratory (CHL) explicitly participated in international EQA to validate its testing during the pandemic. The report states that the "CHL enrolled in COVID-19 International External Quality Assessment scheme organised by WHO AFRO following the first wave. Subsequently, the three private laboratories also enrolled in a similar scheme for free with the support of Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and CHL and participated in a preliminary audit exercise conducted by CHL’s auditors using the WHO Laboratory Assessment Tool" (p. 11) ¹⁵⁴. A May 2021 press report published by the states that during the pandemic, "the Central Health Laboratory participated in inter laboratory comparison with National Institute of Communicable Diseases, South Africa. The Central Health Laboratory also participates in WHO External Quality Assessment (EQA) Programme for detection of SARS-CoV-2 RT PCR through Public Health Laboratory Services, Hong Kong" ¹⁵⁵. The Sir Edgar Laurent TB Laboratory under the Central Health Laboratory serves as the national tuberculosis reference facility and was ISO 15189:2022 accredited by Mauritius Accreditation Service in October 2025 .

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 100

Mauritius has a nationwide specimen transport system in place that links peripheral healthcare facilities to central testing laboratories. According to the Ministry of Health and Wellness’s "National Referral Guideline for Decentralisation of Specialist Services in Public Health Care" (October 2023), there is a structured system for moving samples. The guideline explicitly states that "The Mauritius Postal Services is used for the transport of specimens from health centres to the Central Health Laboratory (CHL)" (p. 14) ¹⁵⁶. According to the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius" (published in 2019 based on a 2018 evaluation), the country received a score of 4 out of 5 for the indicator "Specimen referral and transport system" (Indicator D.1.2) ¹⁵⁷.

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

Mauritius has a demonstrated practice for authorizing laboratories to supplement national capacity during a public health emergency. However, there is no single, standing public document outlining a rapid authorization plan for outbreaks. According to the "Best practices and experience of Mauritius’ preparedness and response to COVID-19 pandemic" Inter-Action Review (IAR) conducted with the World Health Organization, a key successful action/best practice was "Introducing PCR testing in the private hospital laboratory to scale up testing capacity and as back up for the central health laboratory" (p. 8) ¹⁵⁸. The "Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)" (revised September 2021) included provisions for increasing surge capacity and "Liaising with the private health sectors in sharing of informations, guidelines and appropriate actions," but no specific mechanism was listed for authorizing laboratories to supplement national capacity during a public health emergency (Section 2.2.3, function 13; Section 2.3.1) ¹⁵⁹. No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ¹⁶⁰.

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

Mauritius does not have an ongoing, fully implemented event-based surveillance system, though it does have a functioning indicator-based system. According to the "Mauritius: Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report" published by the Ministry of Health and Wellness in October 2024, event-based surveillance is a challenge the government needs to address. The report was developed following a significant dengue outbreak and reviewed the country's response pillars, including disease surveillance. Under the findings for "Disease surveillance, case investigation and contact tracing," the report lists several challenges, stating explicitly that "Event based surveillance is still in the pipeline including Epidemic Intelligence from open sources system". However, already implemented best practices included "Surveillance system between VBCD/laboratory/ ports of entry /facility-based surveillance and CDCU"; "Reporting of cases through daily routines / situational reports/press communique to all stakeholders"; and "Detailed data analysis to inform the response" (page 14). As a prioritized action for immediate implementation, the IAR Report recommends to "Roll out IDSR throughout the country including enhanced Event-based Surveillance to strengthen EWARS [Early Warning, Alert and Response System]" (page 15) ¹⁶¹. A World Health Organization (WHO) article, "Mauritius upscales Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response" (January 17, 2024), corroborates the focus on strengthening indicator-based surveillance. The article details Mauritius's progress in upscaling its Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system, including adapting the 3rd edition of WHO's technical guidelines and revising the list of priority diseases for a "real-time surveillance and early warning system". It highlights that "three out of five regions reporting on IDSR, and 102 participating in IDSR reporting compared to 45 facilities in September 2023. Mauritius has also been reporting to the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) with 100% timeliness compared to early 2023 where no reports were shared. The MOHW is working to ensure that 100% completeness is achieved by 2024." ¹⁶². No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ¹⁶³.

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a mechanism for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the required timelines through the designated International Health Regulations (IHR) National Focal Point (NFP). According to the Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), Section 4.4 of the plan, titled "Inform WHO under the IHR (2005) reporting requirement," "The IHR National Focal Point will inform the WHO of any laboratory-confirmed case" (page 20) ¹⁶⁴. The existence and role of this mechanism are corroborated by the World Health Organization (WHO). In an article titled "Critical importance of International Health Regulations reemphasized with interactive training," published on October 18, 2024, the WHO confirms that Mauritius has an established IHR reporting structure. The article notes that "The Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOHW) is instrumental in ensuring compliance with the IHR. A National Focal Point (NFP) was established following a Joint External Evaluation in 2018" ¹⁶⁵.

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that the government of Mauritius operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national levels, although its implementation is ongoing and not yet universal across all health facilities. According to a 2022 report on the DHIS2 Community of Practice, the Ministry of Health and Wellness has prioritized the digitalization of the health system and is implementing the District Health Information Software 2 (DHIS2) as its national Health Management Information System (HMIS). This implementation is a core component of the Mauritius Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 and aims to create an integrated, real-time electronic reporting system. The system is operational at both the sub-national (regional) and national (central) levels. For example, in the surveillance of Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI), data is collected by regional pharmacists, entered into DHIS2, and assessed by experts at both sub-national and national levels before being stored on a national government-administered database. The report also states that: "Despite the achievements of implementing DHIS2 for AEFI surveillance from regional to the central level, further decentralisation of the system to the district and at primary health care level is required and thus, additional training, human resources and IT infrastructures are required. Additionally, the Republic of Mauritius also consist of Rodrigues and Agalega islands, where accessibility by the health facilities to the DHIS2 Tracker platform is currently limited" ¹⁶⁶. The World Health Organization (WHO) corroborates this in a January 2024 article titled "Mauritius upscales Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response." It reports that the Ministry of Health and Wellness's strategic objectives include building a robust surveillance system "by extending the use of electronic real time reporting system for data collection, transmission, analysis and information-sharing". As of early 2024, three out of five health regions were actively reporting through the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system, with plans to extend the system to the outer island of Rodrigues and train over 7,000 healthcare workers by the end of 2024 ¹⁶⁷. A February 2025 Roadmap for Digital Health Transformation in Mauritius, developed by the UNDP and the Ministry of Health and Wellness, outlines a vision to "Facilitate real-time monitoring and reporting for public health" through an interoperable electronic health records system (p. 2) ¹⁶⁸.

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 0

An electronic system for collecting laboratory data is operational in Mauritius, with a clear strategic direction toward achieving comprehensive real-time reporting. According to A Roadmap for Digital Health Transformation in Mauritius, published in February 2025 by the UNDP and the Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOHW), the country implemented the OpenELIS open-source laboratory information system to manage COVID-19 testing and results. This system is now being scaled up to "support laboratory orders and test results for other diseases" (p. 2) ¹⁶⁹. The Mauritius National HIV Action Plan 2023 – 2027, a Ministry of Health and Wellness publication, explicitly uses disaggregated data in its analysis. Figures 3 and 4 of the report present data on new HIV infections and AIDS-related deaths broken down by age and sex (page 13). The plan contains a recommendation to "Revise the data disaggregation protocol to age bands that make more analytical sense" ¹⁷⁰. The MOHW published Health Statistics 2023 contains a distribution of six notifiable diseases (HIV/AIDS, Food Poisoning, Gonorrhoea, Malaria, Syphilis, and Pulmonary Tuberculosis) in Mauritius, broken down by age group and sex. The data points, reported on an annual basis for 2023, include the number of reported cases for each combination of disease, sex, and age group, with a final total for each category. However, there is nothing in the report that indicates real-time collection or reporting ¹⁷¹.

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 50

There is evidence of some wastewater and environmental surveillance (WES) activity within the country. The WHO and GPEI Q4 2025 Polio ES Bulletin lists the country as having 3 ES sites as of Q4 in 2025, although it is unclear whether these are at the national level and are ongoing.¹⁷²

According to the WHO, expansion of environmental surveillance in the African Region in 2023 resulted in the initiation in four additional countries, (Eswatini, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe). However, there is no further information about this.¹⁷³

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 50

Electronic health records (EHRs) are not yet commonly in use within Mauritius's public healthcare system. The country is in the initial phases of a major, nationwide transition away from a predominantly paper-based system. According to "A Roadmap for Digital Health Transformation in Mauritius", a strategic document published in February 2025 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Health and Wellness, the government's vision is to "replace paper-based processes with a modern and integrated eHealth system". The centerpiece of this effort is the "One Patient, One Record" project, which aims to establish a secure and interoperable EHR system for all citizens (p. 2) ¹⁷⁴. Further details on this transition are provided in a UNDP announcement from January 2024 titled "UNDP supports the launch of the 'One Patient, One Record' eHealth project for enhanced public healthcare." This release highlights the scale of the existing paper-based system, noting that for a population of 1.2 million, there were five million active patient files and nine million casualty cards in circulation. The Rs 600 million (USD 13.25 million) e-Health project was launched to address the challenges of this paper system, with the first phase's results expected to become visible at the Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital from August 2024 before being extended to other public health facilities ¹⁷⁵. No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ¹⁷⁶.

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 0

The national public health system in Mauritius does not currently have widespread access to the electronic health records (EHRs) of individuals. According to A Roadmap for Digital Health Transformation in Mauritius, a February 2025 publication by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Health and Wellness, the health system still relies mostly on paper-based processes with some fragmented digital systems. The report explicitly states that the Ministry of Health and Wellness "does not currently have provisions that adequately address the use of EHRs, data-sharing and more". To address this, the country is in the process of developing comprehensive digital health legislation to regulate data protection and access to health data (p. 2) ¹⁷⁷. The government's primary initiative to solve this is the "One Patient, One Record" project, which aims to create a single, longitudinal health record for every citizen. However, this project is in its infancy. A UNDP announcement from January 2024, titled "UNDP supports the launch of the 'One Patient, One Record' eHealth project for enhanced public healthcare," clarifies that the project is just beginning its rollout. Tangible results from the first phase are not expected until August 2024 at a single pilot hospital ¹⁷⁸. No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ¹⁷⁹.

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 0

While Mauritius does not yet have a single, comprehensive set of data standards like ISO universally applied across its public health system, there is clear evidence of a strategic commitment to adopting international standards as part of its ongoing digital transformation. According to A Roadmap for Digital Health Transformation in Mauritius, published in February 2025 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ministry of Health and Wellness, a core part of the country's vision is "To capitalize on Information and Communication Technologies to create an interoperable national digital health architecture and associated standards". To achieve this, Mauritius is developing a Digital Health Blueprint that will "outline a national digital health architecture… details standards and implementation guidance, and scales data exchange". The plan for the new "One Patient, One Record" system explicitly includes interoperability standards, referencing tools like HL7 (Health Level Seven), a major international standard for exchanging clinical and administrative data between software applications (pp. 2-4) ¹⁸⁰. No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ¹⁸¹.

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 0

There is no evidence of established mechanisms in Mauritius for the ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data. The Mauritius: Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report from October 2024 highlights a challenge of "Feedback mechanisms on data sharing currently absent leading to inefficient data sharing between the departments and relevant agencies" ¹⁸². No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ¹⁸³.

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 100

The Ministry of Public Health and Wellness published Health Statistics 2023 contains de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available. The statistics report from 2023 contains a distribution of six notifiable diseases (HIV/AIDS, Food Poisoning, Gonorrhoea, Malaria, Syphilis, and Pulmonary Tuberculosis) in Mauritius, broken down by age group and sex. The data points, reported on an annual basis for 2023, include the number of reported cases for each combination of disease, sex, and age group, with a final total for each category. It also contains ICD-10 compliant data on "Certain infectious & parasitic diseases", "Gastroenteritis and diarrhoea of presumed infectious origin", "Infectious colitis,enteritis,gastroenteritis and diarrhoea", and Septicaemia and other infectious and parasitic diseases" among others ¹⁸⁴.

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 100

Mauritius has legislation that safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information, including data generated through health surveillance activities. This legal framework is anchored by the Data Protection Act 2017, which is closely aligned with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). According to Section 2 of the Data Protection Act 2017, information related to an individual's "physical or mental health or condition" is classified as a "special category of data". The processing of such sensitive data is subject to stricter conditions than other types of personal data. Section 29 of the Act outlines the specific circumstances under which processing of health data is permitted. This includes processing that is necessary for purposes of "medical diagnosis," the "provision of health care or treatment," or the "management of health care services". The Act applies to any "controller" or "processor" of data in Mauritius, including a "public body" as defined under Section 2 ¹⁸⁵. The Medical Council Act 2016 includes a Code of Practice for medical practitioners that explicitly prohibits the disclosure of any information a patient provides in relation to their treatment. Paragraph 13 of the Code states that a registered medical practitioner shall not disclose such information except with the patient's consent, when compelled by a court of law, or in a medical emergency where the patient cannot consent ¹⁸⁶.

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 100

Legislation in Mauritius safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information and include provisions for protection against cyber attacks, including ransomware. The Data Protection Act 2017 is the primary legislation governing the confidentiality of all personal data, including identifiable health information. The Act classifies information on an individual's "physical or mental health or condition" as a "special category of personal data," which is afforded the highest level of protection in Section 2. Section 31 of the Act, "Security of processing," mandates that any entity controlling or processing personal data (including "public bodies") must implement "appropriate technical and organisational measures" to prevent unauthorized access, disclosure, or destruction of data ¹⁸⁷.

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 100

The government of Mauritius has made a commitment through international agreements, national strategies, and public statements to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries.

According to the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 (HSSP), Mauritius is officially committed to implementing the World Health Organization's (WHO) International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005). As a signatory to the IHR, Mauritius has a legal obligation to report certain public health events to the WHO, which serves as a global mechanism for sharing critical surveillance information ¹⁸⁸. This commitment is further operationalized in the Mauritius-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2023–2026, which identifies "Strengthening emergency preparedness and response" and scaling up IHR capacity as a core strategic priority (Strategic Priority 2) ¹⁸⁹. However, this legally binding framework necessitates the sharing of surveillance data with the WHO but does not specify provisions to share with other countries.

Evidence of this commitment in practice is demonstrated by the country's implementation of the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) system. According to a 2024 report by the WHO, Mauritius has significantly improved its disease surveillance, achieving 100% timeliness in reporting to the WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO). In the report, the WHO Representative in Mauritius, Dr. Anne Ancia, publicly affirmed this commitment, stating that Mauritius has prioritized strengthening its IDSR "not only for the health security of the Mauritian people but also for the rest of world by regular reporting of priority disease of concerns as per the International Health Regulations (2005)" ¹⁹⁰.

Mauritius also participates in regional cooperative agreements that facilitate data sharing. The country is an active member of the SEGA-One Health network, a regional initiative supported by the Indian Ocean Commission that focuses on health security and disease surveillance in the Southwest Indian Ocean islands. This network has been instrumental in setting up an electronic IDSR (e-IDSR) in Mauritius and supports a collaborative response to regional health threats like dengue, demonstrating an established mechanism for inter-country cooperation ¹⁹¹¹⁹².

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 50

There is a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level for contact tracing in response to a public health emergency. According to the Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness (MOHW) on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), revised in September 2021, a clear national framework for emergency response is established. The plan designates the Communicable Disease Control Unit (CDCU) as the national Incident Management Centre, which is responsible for coordinating all field activities related to confirmed cases and contact tracing (Section 2.2.3). This national-level coordination includes the directive to "Activate Rapid Response Team in the periphery through Regional Public Health Superintendents" (Section 2.2.3). The Operational Plan further outlines "contact tracing and zoning" as a key action for the containment of suspected or confirmed cases (Section 4.5) ¹⁹³. The Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report, published in October 2024 by the WHO and MOHW, provides evidence of this system in practice during a recent public health event. The report identifies "Coordination of surveillance between regional and central level" and "Region wise training of medical and paramedical staff on dengue" as best practices observed during the response. However, the IAR Report also noted that "The national public health rapid response team was not fully trained to support surveillance activities" (p. 14) ¹⁹⁴.

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 0

Mauritius has provided medical wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is no evidence of general wraparound services for all diseases, and economic support was only extended to employers to enable them to pay their staff and to self-employed people who were out of work due to the pandemic. According to the Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), revised in September 2021, a core part of the national response is the "Isolation of cases and Quarantine of contacts" (Section 4.2). The plan details the "Treatment of imported cases" (Section 4.3) and the management of patients within designated hospital isolation wards, ensuring that infected individuals receive necessary medical care. It also specifies that all close contacts of a confirmed case must be tested and placed under close surveillance for 14 days (Section 5.1.2). During the COVID-19 pandemic, this was implemented through a mandatory 14-day in-room quarantine at designated hotels for all arriving passengers, which included a strict medical regimen with PCR tests on days 0, 7, and 14, and daily temperature checks by medical staff ¹⁹⁵. This system of medical support extends beyond the COVID-19 response. The Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report of October 2024 identifies "Regular patient monitoring by Domiciliary Monitoring Unit (DMU)" as a best practice during the 2024 dengue outbreak (Page 18). This unit was responsible for monitoring patients at home, although the report notes challenges such as some patients not complying with DMU rules or refusing to be examined ¹⁹⁶. To mitigate the financial impact of quarantine and lockdown measures, the government of Mauritius implemented significant economic support programs. The United Nations Mauritius COVID-19 Socioeconomic Response Plan (SERP) highlights the government's "Plan de Soutien," which was created to support the private sector and individuals through various measures, including the deferral of loan payments (Page 24). This was part of a broader strategy for "Protecting People: Social protection and basic services" (Pillar 2) and ensuring "Economic Recovery: Protecting jobs, SMEs, and productive actors" (Pillar 3) ¹⁹⁷. The Government Wage Assistance Scheme (GWAS), implemented by the Mauritius Revenue Authority (MRA), provided private sector firms with cash transfers to pay their employees' wage bills. This ensured job security and income for employees, with private sector employees earning up to a certain threshold receiving their full basic salaries ¹⁹⁸. The Self-Employed Assistance Scheme (SEAS), also implemented by the MRA, provided monthly financial support to eligible self-employed individuals who were not beneficiaries of other government assistance ¹⁹⁹. No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ²⁰⁰.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 50

There are cooperative arrangements between the public health system and border control authorities in Mauritius to identify, trace, and quarantine suspected cases and their contacts among international travelers during active public health emergencies. The Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), revised in September 2021, establishes an intersectoral committee chaired by the Minister of Health and Wellness, which includes key border control authorities such as the Director of Civil Aviation, the Director General of the Mauritius Port Authority, the Commissioner of Police, and the Passport and Immigration Office (PIO) (Section 2.1.1, Page 7-8). The plan explicitly defines the roles of these stakeholders, charging the Director of Civil Aviation and the Director of the Mauritius Port Authority with implementing health directives at the airport and port, and the PIO with tracking passengers (Section 2.2, Page 8). The Operational Plan outlines detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for points of entry. For airports, it specifies actions for handling sick or suspected cases on a plane, including the commander informing the control tower, the plane being parked at a secure bay, and health authorities boarding to conduct medical assessments (Section 3.1.1, Page 15). Close contacts on the aircraft are identified and sent to quarantine. For seaports, the plan mandates the verification of the Maritime Declaration of Health, a review of the last 10 ports of call, and temperature screening for all passengers and crew before disembarkation (Section 3.2, Page 17) ²⁰¹. The Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report of October 2024 lists "Border Surveillance was strengthened" as a best practice, with "Established working relationships with the port and airport authorities" and "Regular meeting between all stakeholders" listed as enabling factors for the same ²⁰². No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Public Health and Wellness publications database ²⁰³.

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

Applied epidemiology training is available in-country through the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) delivered with the Mauritius Institute of Health (MIH) in partnership with the SEGA–One Health/Indian Ocean Commission network, including a 13‑week FETP‑Frontline and an internationally accredited two‑year FETP master’s degree. According to the Mauritius Institute of Health’s official training page, MIH is the national public health training institute responsible for designing and delivering in‑service and continuing professional education for health personnel, under which the Field Epidemiology Training Programme (FETP Frontline) is hosted as part of government-supported workforce development under the Ministry of Health and Wellness ²⁰⁴. The Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) is part of the SEGA – One Health Network in Mauritius, which is an Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) initiative supported by the AFD – Agence Française de Développement and the European Union, aimed at strengthening regional health security through training health professionals in field epidemiology, surveillance, and response to public health threats. In Mauritius, this training is conducted in collaboration with the Mauritius Institute of Health (MIH) and is designed to equip health, agriculture, and environment ministries with One Health skills to prevent and manage epidemics, disease outbreaks, and zoonotic diseases. The regional FETP offer explicitly lists both FETP‑Frontline (13 weeks, 28 ECTS) and an FETP Master, and names the “Mauritius Institute of Health (MIH)” as one of the training institutions, confirming that delivery occurs in Mauritius; the Frontline course mixes 140 hours of classroom instruction with 347 hours of supervised fieldwork and targets human and animal health agents to strengthen surveillance, outbreak investigation, and response in a One Health framework ²⁰⁵.

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 100

Field Epidemiology Training Programs (FETPs) in Mauritius are explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals. The training is structured around a "One Health" model, which integrates human, animal, and environmental health, rather than offering a separate veterinary-specific program (FETPV). The FETP-Frontline course, a 13-week program offered in Mauritius, is specifically designed for "human and animal health agents," according to the SEGA-One Health network, which coordinates the training. Its objective is to develop a "One Health" approach to strengthen epidemiological surveillance and epidemic response ²⁰⁶. The Mauritius Institute of Health (MIH), the national public health training institute, partners in delivering this training, which aims to create a workforce of "human and animal health professionals" capable of managing surveillance, alerts, and outbreak responses. The launch of the first cohort in 2022 included 30 professionals from both the human and animal health sectors in Mauritius ²⁰⁷.

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Mauritius has a workforce of trained field epidemiologists that exceeds the target of at least one per 200,000 people.

With an estimated population of 1,268,280 in 2025, Mauritius would need to have at least seven trained field epidemiologists to meet the recommended threshold ²⁰⁸.

According to a May 2025 report on regional health initiatives, Mauritius has a workforce of 80 trained health professionals, including 55 certified epidemiologists ²⁰⁹. The calculation shows that Mauritius has approximately 12.6 trained epidemiologists for every 200,000 people.

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 33.33

Mauritius does not have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, and instead has disease-specific plans. The Ministry of Health and Wellness lists the "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025", "Operational plan for the prevention and control of Dengue in the Republic of Mauritius – November 2024", "Mauritius: Surge in Dengue Cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report – 03 – 05 September 2024", and "Operational Plan for Leptospirosis – June 2024" under its national action plans listed under "Communicable Diseases". No further evidence identified on the website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness about the existence of an overarching public health emergency response plan ²¹⁰.

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 0

Mauritius does not have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, and instead has disease-specific plans. The Ministry of Health and Wellness lists the "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025", "Operational plan for the prevention and control of Dengue in the Republic of Mauritius – November 2024", "Mauritius: Surge in Dengue Cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report – 03 – 05 September 2024", and "Operational Plan for Leptospirosis – June 2024" under its national action plans listed under "Communicable Diseases". No further evidence identified on the website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness about the existence of an overarching public health emergency response plan ²¹¹.

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 0

Mauritius does not have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, and instead has disease-specific plans. The Ministry of Health and Wellness lists the "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025", "Operational plan for the prevention and control of Dengue in the Republic of Mauritius – November 2024", "Mauritius: Surge in Dengue Cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report – 03 – 05 September 2024", and "Operational Plan for Leptospirosis – June 2024" under its national action plans listed under "Communicable Diseases". No further evidence identified on the website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness about the existence of an overarching public health emergency response plan ²¹².

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 0

Mauritius does not have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, and instead has disease-specific plans. The Ministry of Health and Wellness lists the "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025", "Operational plan for the prevention and control of Dengue in the Republic of Mauritius – November 2024", "Mauritius: Surge in Dengue Cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report – 03 – 05 September 2024", and "Operational Plan for Leptospirosis – June 2024" under its national action plans listed under "Communicable Diseases". No further evidence identified on the website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness about the existence of an overarching public health emergency response plan ²¹³.

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 0

Mauritius does not have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases, but all disease specific plans contain formal mechanisms to coordinate with the private sector. The "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025" includes the presidents of the Private Clinics’ Association and Private Medical Practitioners Association in its "Composition Of Intersectoral Committee" (Annex 1) ²¹⁴. The "Operational plan for the prevention and control of Dengue in the Republic of Mauritius – November 2024" mentions "representative(s) of Private Sector such as Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry, The Chamber of Agriculture, L’AHRIM and other stakeholders" as important stakeholders for "Overall Planning and coordination for logistic of an outbreak" (Section 4.3) ²¹⁵. Section 12 of the "Operational Plan for Leptospirosis – June 2024" states that "in the event of an outbreak of leptospirosis, a steering committee chaired by the Director Health Services (Public Health) will be set up", and that members will include "Private Medical Practitioners and private health institution representative(s)" ²¹⁶. No further evidence identified on the website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness ²¹⁷.

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 100

Mauritius has plans and guidelines in place for implementing non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic that apply to more than one disease.

According to the Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Influenza A H1N1 (Revised 2021), Mauritius has a detailed, step-by-step plan that explicitly outlines the use of NPIs for managing an influenza pandemic. The plan's strategy includes the aggressive implementation of "all pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions" across different scenarios of an outbreak (page 9). Specific NPIs detailed in this plan include isolation of cases and quarantine of contacts to contain transmission (pages 18, 20); provisions for "zoning and social distancing," which covers the potential closure of schools and other public gathering places (page 20), and; personal and environmental hygiene practices, with standard operating procedures (SOPs) for hand-washing, use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and environmental disinfection (pages 18, 33-35, 40) ²¹⁸. Similar plans exist for leptospirosis, dengue, and viral haemorrhagic fevers ^219220221.

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Mauritius has both activated its national emergency response plan for a significant infectious disease outbreak and participated in national-level biological threat-focused workshops and trainings within the past year. Mauritius activated its national emergency response for a major dengue outbreak in 2024. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the country faced a coordinated response to over 9,000 reported cases of dengue in 2024. ²²² In June 2025, the government of Mauritius, in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), held a national workshop in Port Louis focused on strengthening the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). According to UNODA, the workshop brought together national stakeholders to review Mauritius's existing legislative framework, identify and address gaps, assess the national approach to biosafety and biosecurity, and improve multi-sectoral coordination ²²³. A government of Mauritius news release on the event stated that it is "imperative to reinforce the country’s existing legislative framework" against biological threats ²²⁴.

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 100

Mauritius has identified gaps and best practices in its public health response and has developed concrete plans for improvement within the last year. Mauritius conducted a formal Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report in September 2024, following a dengue outbreak earlier in the year. The express purpose of this review was to "share experiences and collectively analyze the ongoing response… by identifying challenges and best practices" and to "apply lessons learned… to enable health systems strengthening" (Page 7). Immediate actions include updating the dengue operational plan, developing new Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for communication, and strengthening the surveillance system with GIS mapping and enhanced training for response teams (Page 4). Long-term plans include establishing a formal Incident Management System (IMS) and a "One-Health" platform to improve future public health emergency responses (Page 4) ²²⁵.

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is no direct evidence that Mauritius has undergone a national-level, biological threat-focused exercise that included private sector representatives within the past year. The government held a national workshop with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to review and strengthen its implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The workshop aimed to improve multi-sectoral coordination and assess the national approach to biosafety and biosecurity. However, the official announcements describe the attendees as "national stakeholders" and do not explicitly mention the participation of private sector representatives ²²⁶²²⁷.

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

Mauritius has established a Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) focused on public health emergencies. The PHEOC was established in late 2023 through a collaboration between the Ministry of Health and Wellness and the World Health Organization (WHO). Its establishment was officially noted by the Cabinet of Ministers in a meeting on June 21, 2024 ²²⁸²²⁹. The Operational Plan for the Prevention and Control of Dengue also refers to the PHEOC as a key entity in its response structure ²³⁰.

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a specific policy or legislative requirement for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Mauritius to conduct a drill for a public health emergency at least once per year. However, there is clear evidence that drills are conducted as a key component of developing and validating national emergency plans.

According to a World Health Organization (WHO) report from January 2024, Mauritius is in the process of establishing its first formal Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC). As part of this process, the Ministry of Health and Wellness, in collaboration with the WHO, developed an operational handbook and standard operating procedures (SOPs) in late 2023. The report explicitly states that upon completion of training, these procedures were tested through a tabletop exercise for validation ²³¹.

In August 2025, the government, with WHO support, began developing a National Health Emergency Response Operational Plan (NHEROP). The official announcement for this plan states that once the NHEROP is finalized, it will be "followed by simulation exercises and validation workshops to test and refine the plan" before its official launch ²³².

However, no evidence of the PHEOC SOP, handbook, or a requirement for an annual emergency drill was identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ²³³.

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no specific public evidence detailing the exact activation time of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in response to a public health emergency in Mauritius within the last year.

According to a World Health Organization (WHO) report from January 2024, Mauritius is in the process of establishing its first formal Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC). As part of this process, the Ministry of Health and Wellness, in collaboration with the WHO, developed an operational handbook and standard operating procedures (SOPs) in late 2023. The report explicitly states that upon completion of training, these procedures were tested through a tabletop exercise for validation ²³⁴.

In August 2025, the government, with WHO support, began developing a National Health Emergency Response Operational Plan (NHEROP). The official announcement for this plan states that once the NHEROP is finalized, it will be "followed by simulation exercises and validation workshops to test and refine the plan" before its official launch ²³⁵.

The National Emergency Operations Command (NEOC), which serves as the overarching EOC for all disasters, is described as being activated "whenever a disaster or any other major crisis becomes imminent". According to the National Disaster Scheme, the NEOC is a multi-agency body responsible for coordinating all response activities ²³⁶²³⁷.

However, no evidence of the PHEOC SOP, handbook, or details of the exact activation time of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) were identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ²³⁸.

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Mauritius meets either of the specified criteria. The country has not held a publicly documented exercise for a deliberate biological event involving all four specified sectors, nor are there publicly available agreements or standard operating procedures (SOPs) for such a scenario. The national workshop on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) held in June 2025 focused on reviewing the legislative framework with "national stakeholders," but public reports do not confirm the explicit participation of private sector entities in this specific context ²³⁹²⁴⁰. The Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report from September 2024, which analyzed the response to a major natural disease outbreak, identified "Limited involvement of private sectors in coordination" as a key challenge. A prioritized action from the review is to "Develop SOPs for engagement and communication with private institutions and private doctors" ²⁴¹. No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness publications database ²⁴².

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Mauritian disease-specific plans contain risk communication measures. Section 2.7 on "Risk Communication and Community Engagement" of the "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025" contains measures to pass "well- designed messages from an individual or institution to its identified stakeholders or general public at the right time, in the right quantity and to achieve well-defined objectives" ²⁴³. Objective 4.1 (6) of the "Operational plan for the prevention and control of Dengue in the Republic of Mauritius – November 2024" is "Risk Communication and Engagement", but contains no specific measures for the same ²⁴⁴. Section 11.2.3 of the "Operational Plan for Leptospirosis – June 2024" contains a brief, two-line risk communication strategy – "Educate the public about prevention, symptoms, and treatment" and "Promote hygiene and safe practices to reduce risk" without further elaboration ²⁴⁵.

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 100

Mauritian disease-specific plans outline how messages will reach populations and sectors, although vulnerable populations are not explicitly mentioned.

The Ministry of Health and Wellness “STEP-BY-STEP OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR PANDEMIC OF H1N1” mandates an intersectoral pandemic committee and prescribes a standard operating procedure for communication, including centralized directive issuance by the Minister, media liaison via the press attaché, and information flows from outbreak sites to directors to the Minister, who then delegates actions (Section 4.1.2, pp. 11–12; Section 5.1.2, p. 16). The document operationalizes internal and external communication lines during different epidemiologic phases (no cases vs. imported cases), with explicit requirements to channel all outbreak information for action and to keep all committee members informed (Section 5.1.2, p. 16) ²⁴⁶.

Section 2.7 on Risk Communication and Community Engagement of the "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025" identifies different stakeholder groups: healthcare workers, port of entry officers, travelers, passengers from affected areas, doctors in public/private sectors, airport/port staff, and the general public. Multiple communication channels are specified: written media, audiovisual media, electronic media, radio, television, telephone hotlines, press conferences, pamphlets, leaflets, and fact sheets. However, vulnerable populations and hard-to-reach groups are not included into consideration ²⁴⁷.

No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness publications database ²⁴⁸.

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritian risk communication plans designate an official spokesperson during public health emergencies.

The Ministry of Health and Wellness “STEP-BY-STEP OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR PANDEMIC OF H1N1” mandates an intersectoral pandemic committee and prescribes a standard operating procedure for communication, including centralized directive issuance by the Minister, media liaison via the press attaché, and information flows from outbreak sites to directors to the Minister, who then delegates actions (Section 4.1.2, pp. 11–12; Section 5.1.2, p. 16). The document operationalizes internal and external communication lines during different epidemiologic phases (no cases vs. imported cases), with explicit requirements to channel all outbreak information for action and to keep all committee members informed (Section 5.1.2, p. 16). However, no designated media spokesperson is mentioned within the plan ²⁴⁹.

Section 2.7 on Risk Communication and Community Engagement of the "National Preparedness Plan for Viral Heamorrhagic Fever: Ebola Virus Disease and Marburg Virus Disease – February 2025" identifies different stakeholder groups: healthcare workers, port of entry officers, travelers, passengers from affected areas, doctors in public/private sectors, airport/port staff, and the general public. Multiple communication channels are specified: written media, audiovisual media, electronic media, radio, television, telephone hotlines, press conferences, pamphlets, leaflets, and fact sheets. However, no designated media spokesperson is mentioned within the plan ²⁵⁰.

No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness publications database ²⁵¹.

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that the Ministry of Health and Wellness has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation on their website or on their Facebook page ^252253254.

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 100

There is no evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website or on their Facebook page ^255256257.

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 76.5

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 89.38

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 56.67

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 87.5

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Mauritius implemented restrictions on the export or import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. According to the Mauritius: Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report (Ministry of Health and Wellness, 16 October 2024), which documented the comprehensive response to the 2023–2024 dengue outbreak (11 December 2023 to 31 August 2024), challenges includied "intermittent scarcity of rapid dengue antigen test kits during the outbreak" and "regular stockouts of Platelet Concentrates for patient management partly due to overprescription of platelet transfusion by clinicians," but these supply shortages were attributed to procurement delays, inadequate quantification, and gaps in financial resource management and timely settlement of bills, not to export/import restrictions (Section 4.6; page 18) ²⁵⁸. No evidence of any such restrictions being implemented were identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website or on their Facebook page ^259260261.

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Mauritius implemented restrictions on the export or import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. According to the Mauritius: Surge in Dengue cases Intra-Action Review (IAR) Report (Ministry of Health and Wellness, 16 October 2024) extensively documents challenges in medical supply chains such as test kit shortages, but it contains no reference to trade restrictions on non-medical goods such as food, textiles, construction materials, or consumer goods as a response measure, nor any discussion of customs barriers or import/export controls being activated during the outbreak period ²⁶². No evidence of any such restrictions being implemented were identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website or on their Facebook page ^263264265.

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Mauritius implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. According to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs travel advice for Mauritius (updated 15 September 2025), all health-related entry restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic have been lifted; however, the advisory notes that "the Republic of Mauritius is extremely vigilant and reactive in case of pandemic alert" and that "it is possible that visitors arriving directly or indirectly from countries affected by an epidemic may be refused entry, placed in quarantine, or subjected to health monitoring (at home) in the days following their entry to Mauritius," and the advisory confirms that during the 2024 dengue outbreak—which saw a surge of cases in early 2024—no entry or exit restrictions were imposed on travelers despite the epidemic context, with only enhanced health questionnaires required at immigration ²⁶⁶. According to WHO EPI-WIN risk communication briefings on the Dengue Situation in Mauritius (13 June 2024), the country experienced its worst dengue outbreak ever between December 2023 and June 2024 with 8,943 cases and 9 deaths; the WHO documented the multisectoral response including surveillance and case management, but made no reference to travel restrictions, border closures, or entry/exit screening measures being implemented as part of the outbreak response ²⁶⁷. No evidence of such travel restrictions identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness and Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites ^268269270.

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 100

Mauritius employs a risk-based approach to implement international travel-related public health measures. According to the Inter-Action Review of the National COVID-19 Response in Mauritius (August 2021), the WHO commended Mauritius for its "Proactive and risk-based decision-making for public health and social measures (PHSM), including travel measures, guided by the local and global epidemiological situation" (page 11). The report highlights that during the pandemic, the country implemented travel restrictions and quarantine measures for all incoming travelers "based on the level of risk" (page 13) ²⁷¹. The Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) (revised September 2021) provides the specific framework for this risk-based strategy. The plan established a system to identify "high-risk countries" based on the international epidemiology of the virus. Travelers arriving from these designated countries were subject to specific protocols, even if asymptomatic. For instance, Section 3.1.3 of the plan mandated that non-sick passengers arriving from high-risk countries be "placed under surveillance…for a period of 14 days" (page 16). Furthermore, the official case definition for a suspected case of COVID-19 included having a "history of travel to or a person who lived in…high-risk countries in the 14 days prior to symptom onset" (page 13). At seaports, the plan required the verification of the last 10 ports visited by a vessel to assess risk (page 17) ²⁷².

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 21.31

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 40.36

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 0

Mauritius has a health workforce strategy embedded in a broader strategic plan that has been updated within the past five years. Within the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 (Ministry of Health and Wellness), Strategic Priority 7.15 "Human Resources for Health" states that "it is imperative to establish an effective SHRM (Strategic Human Resource Management Function)" and that "a planned approach to succession planning, particularly, in areas of scarce medical expertise and requirements, forecasts of the number and profile of medical, paramedical and other staff requirements for the medium term and long term needs." Strategic Objective 20.1 identifies specific strategies including conducting comprehensive workforce analysis including HRH audits to determine needs, gaps, and competencies and to "Develop and implement a Master Plan on Human Resources focusing on talent development, retention strategies and succession planning" ²⁷³.

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 0

Mauritius has sufficient capacity within its health system to deliver essential health services through a well-structured dual public-private system with comprehensive coverage.

The Joint External Evaluation of IHR core capacities scores the country 1 on this measure. The JEE highlights that no plan exists for sending and receiving deployed personnel during public health emergencies.²⁷⁴ According to the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 (Ministry of Health and Wellness), Mauritius has "a strong, resilient and equitable health system which is founded on the WHO Health System Framework" comprising a dual-tiered system with a government-led and funded public sector that provides free healthcare to 73% of the population and a private sector serving 27% of healthcare needs on a user-fee basis. The public sector operates a three-tier delivery system with 5 specialized hospitals and 2 medical centres at tertiary level, 2 district hospitals and 5 regional hospitals at secondary level, and 2 community hospitals, 7 mediclinics, 19 area health centres, and 114 community health centres at primary level, with all services available free of charge and primary facilities positioned within 1.5–3 km of residents' homes (Section 1.2.2 p. 2; pp. 1–5) ²⁷⁵. According to the National Integrated Care for Older People (ICOPE) Strategic and Action Plan 2022–2026 (Ministry of Health and Wellness, 2022), the Ministry employs around 16,000 officers across 375 different grades, with 85% being technical staff responsible for direct service delivery (medical practitioners including specialists, nurses and midwives, dentists, pharmacists, and other paramedical and allied health professionals) and 15% support staff for administrative functions; this workforce delivers care through peripheral healthcare delivery points catering to approximately 9,000 community members each (p. 8) ²⁷⁶. According to an academic assessment of the national health research system published in BMC Health Services Research (March 2023), Mauritius achieved a UHC service coverage index of 65% in 2019 (measured on a scale of 0–100 using 14 tracer indicators across reproductive/maternal/newborn/child health, infectious diseases, noncommunicable diseases, and service capacity/access) ²⁷⁷.

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has developed plans and strategic frameworks to ensure the continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency. Strategic Goal 16 of the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2024 is to "Improve health security through a sustainable, effective and efficient national surveillance, response and recovery system". To achieve this, Section 7.11 on "Emergency Preparedness and Response" proposes the development and implementation of a National Action Plan for Health Security and the establishment of a permanent Public Health Emergency Operation Centre (PHEOC) to serve as a central command for coordinating emergency responses (page xix, 62). The strategy emphasizes sustaining rapid-response teams to investigate outbreaks and conduct contact tracing within 24 hours ²⁷⁸. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported that the Ministry of Health and Wellness is developing a new National Health Emergency Response Operational Plan (NHEROP). According to a WHO announcement in August 2025, this plan is designed as a "robust and actionable framework to strengthen Mauritius’ capacity to anticipate, respond and recover from public health emergencies". The development process included a multi-sectoral strategic planning workshop in July 2025, with the final plan expected to be validated and launched by the end of 2025 ²⁷⁹. No evidence of the NHEROP being published is available on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ²⁸⁰.

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 100

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 100

According to media reports, Mauritius has two isolation wards to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases, one at the New Souillac Hospital, and another one at the Mahebourg Hospital. ^281282283 The isolation ward at the New Souillac Hospital can accommodate a total of 16 patients at a time. ²⁸⁴ Access to the ward is highly securized and only authorized medical personnel can gain entrance. Patients suspected of having contracted a virus are admitted to the hospital through a separate entrance before being led in the isolation ward. The isolation ward contains six different "bays", including a laboratory and separate units for male and female patients. The isolation facilities have separate entrance and exit chambers for medical staff to don and remove personal protective equipment, as well as systems in place for the proper disposal of the PPE. Blood samples of patients suspected to have highly communicable diseases can be tested within the ward, so as not to risk the spread of disease throughout the facility. ²⁸⁵

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has in place demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak from the past two years. No evidence of the same was identified on the website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness ²⁸⁶.

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 100

In Mauritius, the Ministry of Health and Wellness has a procurement framework for the acquisition of laboratory supplies and medical supplies. According to the Central Medical Procurement Authority Act 2023 (No. IV of 2023), Mauritius has established a dedicated national procurement framework for the Ministry of Health and Wellness through the creation of the Central Medical Procurement Authority. The Central Medical Procurement Authority Act 2023 provides comprehensive provisions for the procurement of medical supplies, which are defined to include pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, laboratory supplies and reagents, hospital consumables, and all materials necessary for health service delivery, as specified in Section 2 of the Act. The Authority is mandated under Part III of the Act to utilize multiple procurement methods including manufacturer's solicitation (Section 18), open competitive bidding (Section 19), restricted bidding (Section 20), request for quotations (Section 21), competitive negotiations (Section 22), direct procurement (Section 23), and emergency procurement (Section 24), with the choice of method determined by prescribed thresholds and procurement circumstances. The Act further authorizes alternative procurement arrangements under Section 25, specifically allowing government-to-government purchase agreements where the Authority may participate as a partner in framework agreements entered by foreign States, agreements with regional or international groups for pooled procurement of commonly used medical supplies, vendor-managed inventory systems, and public-private partnership arrangements. The procurement planning process requires committees of needs to prepare annual specifications for medical supplies by March 31 of each financial year, with the Authority subsequently developing procurement plans that must be published on an electronic procurement system as mandated under Sections 15, 16, and 27 of the Act ²⁸⁷. However, the existence and operationalisation of this body is not reflected in the Ministry of Health and Wellness website, with the law not cited as foundational in the ministry's procurement framework ²⁸⁸.

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 33.33

There is evidence that Mauritius has a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency. The 2018 JEE states that Mauritius has a limited stockpile of personal protective equipment (PPE), and that Mauritius stockpiles vaccines at the Central Store Division, the central warehouse where all medicines and pharmaceuticals are stored, but there is no mention of essential medicines specifically. The JEE also mentions that Mauritius has a contingency plan in place specifically for the stockpiling of medical supplies. ²⁸⁹ There is no additional information on stockpiles from the Ministry of Health and Wellness. ²⁹⁰

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency within the overarching national public health emergency response plan. Section 7.11 of on "Emergency Preparedness and Response" does not contain any evidence of a stockpile, and states that it is imperative for the country to develop an Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan. This Plan includes the development and maintenance of national community/ primary response level health emergency response plans for relevant biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear hazards. Other components of preparedness include mapping of potential hazards, the identification and maintenance of available resources, including national stockpiles and the capacity to support operations at community/primary response levels during a public health emergency" ²⁹¹. The Ministry of Health and Wellness's Procurement and Supply Unit is responsible for the procurement and stock management of "reagents" as part of its non-pharmaceutical duties, and its Stock Control Unit works to prevent routine shortages, but this describes a system for managing regular inventory rather than a dedicated strategic stockpile for emergencies ²⁹².

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. Section 7.11 of on "Emergency Preparedness and Response" states that it is imperative for the country to develop an Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan. This Plan includes the development and maintenance of national community/ primary response level health emergency response plans for relevant biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear hazards. Other components of preparedness include mapping of potential hazards, the identification and maintenance of available resources, including national stockpiles and the capacity to support operations at community/primary response levels during a public health emergency" ²⁹³. The Ministry of Health and Wellness's Procurement and Supply Unit is responsible for the procurement and stock management of "reagents" as part of its non-pharmaceutical duties, and its Stock Control Unit works to prevent routine shortages, but this describes a system for managing regular inventory rather than a dedicated strategic stockpile for emergencies ²⁹⁴.

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Mauritius has a dedicated legal framework to procure medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency. The Central Medical Procurement Authority Act (No. IV of 2023), Section 24, titled "Emergency procurement," authorizes the Central Medical Procurement Authority to purchase medical supplies in cases of emergency, which are defined to include situations where the country is threatened by a disaster, catastrophe, or where life may be seriously compromised. The Act outlines a hierarchical approach to emergency procurement methods, including call-offs from existing framework agreements, modification of ongoing contracts, accelerated competitive bidding, competitive negotiations, and, in cases of extreme urgency, direct awards to suppliers. The Act also allows for alternative procurement arrangements, such as government-to-government agreements and participation in regional or international pooled procurement groups for commonly used medical supplies, in Section 25. Section 18 of the Act, "Manufacturer's solicitation," allows the Authority to procure supplies directly from manufacturers, including local ones. It further mandates competitive negotiation exercises among local manufacturers to establish supply agreements ²⁹⁵.

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no specific, publicly available government plan or agreement to leverage private sector capacity for surge production during a public health emergency. The Central Medical Procurement Authority Act (No. IV of 2023) does contain a provision for "Manufacturer's solicitation" in Section 18, which allows for direct procurement from manufacturers, including local ones. This section provides a legal pathway for the government to engage with domestic producers ²⁹⁶. However, a review of the publications section on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website did not yield a formal plan detailing agreements with local companies to scale up production of laboratory reagents and media specifically for emergency use ²⁹⁷. The Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2024 mentions ensuring access to quality medicine and health technologies but does not detail strategies for domestic manufacturing of laboratory supplies during emergencies ²⁹⁸.

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 100

Mauritius has an emergency logistics and supply chain management system that operates at both national and subnational levels, incorporates cold chain management, and involves the private sector. According to the National Deployment and Vaccination Plan for COVID-19 (2021), Mauritius has a well-defined system for emergency logistics and supply chain management with specific considerations for cold chain management. Section 5 of the plan, "Supply Chain Management, Service Delivery and Health Care Waste Management," details a multi-level distribution process, which states that Mauritius has a "national cold store ( at 2-8 ⁰C) has three operational cold rooms for vaccines and medicines. There is an effective inventory management system for vaccines in place." From this central point, supplies are distributed to the five regional hospitals. The plan designates the Public Health Nursing Officer in each region as responsible for maintaining the cold chain at the hospital level. For last-mile delivery, vaccines are transported daily in cold boxes from regional centers (Mediclinics and Area Health Centres) to Community Health Centres for vaccination sessions (page 20). The plan also addresses future needs by outlining the procurement of an ultra-cold freezer (for -70°C storage), dry ice, and cryogenic gloves to handle new vaccine technologies (page 22) ²⁹⁹. The World Health Organization's report 'Best practices and experience of Mauritius’ preparedness and response to COVID-19 pandemic' (January to August 2020), identifies several best practices under Pillar 8, "Operational support and logistics." These include the "Centralised storage of medical materials for COVID-19 response for better stock management, monitoring and distribution" and "Multisectoral collaboration for efficient delivery of ordered medical materials" (page 11) ³⁰⁰.

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has in place a plan for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October November 2018, explicitly states that Mauritius does not have in place a national framework for the deployment of medical countermeaasures or personnel ³⁰¹. There is no evidence that this has changed since the publication of the JEE in 2019 on the website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness ³⁰².

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 100

There are public plans in Mauritius that address the need for a workforce surge during a public health emergency, with specific mechanisms detailed in operational-level pandemic plans. The clearest provision for a workforce surge is found in the National Operational Plan for H1N1 (now referred to as Seasonal Flu) (2021). This document outlines measures to ensure an adequate workforce during a severe event. Specifically, Section 9.4.3, "Ensure adequate manpower for health and critical services," mandates a key action to "activate roster of available workforce of retirees and volunteers" (page 25) ³⁰³. The Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) (revised September 2021) also addresses the need for a capable workforce, though its focus is more on enhancing the skills of the current workforce rather than outlining a surge mechanism. Under Section 2.3, "Health sector readiness," Action 3 is to "Build the capacity of health manpower" (page 12). This requires that "a team of doctors and health care personnel including nurses, health inspectors and technicians must be trained in the familiarity and competency in the use of all protocols". The specified training areas include surveillance, case management, proper use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and bio-safety, ensuring the existing workforce is prepared for emergency duties. While the plan's executive summary acknowledges that "additional resources will be required for… manpower" (page 5), it does not detail a public mechanism for recruiting surge personnel ³⁰⁴. At a broader strategic level, the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024 aims to ensure a sufficient health workforce for the country, though it does not specify emergency surge protocols. The section on "Human Resources for Health" (Section 7.15) lays out long-term goals to "Ensure availability of adequate, competent, motivated and performing health workforce" (page 69). The strategies to achieve this include developing a new Human Resources for Health (HRH) Strategic Plan, reviewing staffing norms, and establishing a Strategic Human Resource Management function. The plan does mention sustaining "rapid-response teams" for outbreak investigation as part of its emergency preparedness strategy (page 62) ³⁰⁵.

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 0

Mauritius has a framework for receiving health personnel from other countries during a public health emergency, although a detailed public operational plan outlining the specific procedures is not explicitly detailed in the reviewed national strategy documents. The most direct evidence comes from the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius (2018), which notes on page 58 that "Procedures exist for sending and receiving personnel during health emergencies but are not documented" ³⁰⁶. The official website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness lists "Coordinating the visits of foreign medical teams" as a key function of one of its departments ³⁰⁷. While strategic and operational documents like the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2024 and the Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) (revised September 2021) detail plans for domestic workforce surge and capacity building, they do not contain specific sections or protocols on the process for requesting or integrating health personnel from other countries ³⁰⁸³⁰⁹.

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 0

There is no evidence Mauritius has a public plan outlining role deployment of health workers. The most direct evidence comes from the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of Mauritius (2018), which notes on page 58 that "Procedures exist for sending and receiving personnel during health emergencies but are not documented" ³¹⁰. The official website of the Ministry of Health and Wellness lists "Coordinating the visits of foreign medical teams" as a key function of one of its departments, but mentions nothing about role redeployment ³¹¹. While strategic and operational documents like the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2024 and the Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) (revised September 2021) detail plans for domestic workforce surge and capacity building, they do not contain specific sections or protocols on the process for role redeployment ³¹²³¹³.

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 0

The Mauritian constitution does not mention right to healthcare ³¹⁴.

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 100

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 0

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 81.25

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 77.89

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 4.57

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 66.67

Workers in Mauritius are guaranteed paid sick leave. According to The Workers' Rights Act 2019, a worker who has been in continuous employment with the same employer for 12 consecutive months is entitled to 15 working days of sick leave on full pay during each subsequent 12-month period. For employees who have worked for more than six months but less than twelve, the Act provides a pro-rated entitlement. The Workers' Rights Act 2019 defines "good and sufficient cause" for absence from work to include "illness or injury certified by a medical practitioner" (Section 2) However, there is no mention of mental health within the law ³¹⁵.

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

While there is no specific legislation or publicly issued policy explicitly guaranteeing prioritized healthcare services for healthcare workers who fall ill during a public health emergency, government plans and official reviews demonstrate a commitment to providing comprehensive care, protection, and dedicated management pathways for them. According to the World Health Organization's Inter-Action Review of the National COVID-19 Response in Mauritius (August 2021), one of the key best practices identified was the implementation of "Strict IPC measures for the safety of the health care workers" (page 9). The review notes that this system included providing accommodation for healthcare workers, isolating them during their work shifts, and mandating quarantining and testing at the end of their shifts to prevent transmission and manage their health proactively ³¹⁶. The Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2024 includes "Occupational Health" as a key strategic priority (Section 7.12). The stated objective is to "ensure a safe and healthy working environment for all health personnel" (page 64) ³¹⁷. No further evidence identified on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ³¹⁸.

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Mauritius has established systems for communication between public health officials and healthcare workers during a public health emergency. The primary framework for emergency communication is detailed in the Operational Plan of the Ministry of Health and Wellness on Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) (revised September 2021). This plan establishes a clear command structure and communication flow. The Communicable Disease Control Unit (CDCU) is designated to function as the Incident Management System or Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), headed by the Director of Health Services who acts as the Incident Manager (page 10). The plan specifies the communication strategy within the national intersectoral committee. Section 2.2.1 outlines a hierarchical communication protocol where information regarding cases and outbreaks is channeled from the site of occurrence—such as a hospital or airport—"to the Director Health Services of Public Health and RPHS [Regional Public Health Superintendent] of CDCU by phone and fax" (page 9). The Director of Health Services then informs the Minister, Director General of Health Services, and Senior Chief Executive. Directives are then issued from the central command level back down to the operational units. The plan also establishes a hotline (8924) for the public to report information, which is managed by the EOC ³¹⁹. `

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritius has a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompassing healthcare workers in both the public and private sector in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation, the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020-2024, or on the Ministry of Health and Wellness website ^320321322.

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 100

There is definitive evidence that Mauritius' national public health system is establishing a formal system to monitor and track the number of healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) in its facilities. The Ministry of Health and Wellness' National Surveillance Plan on Hospital-Acquired Infections, published in August 2025, explicitly states its purpose is to "set up a national surveillance system for HAIs in Mauritius" . The plan's introduction acknowledges the urgency of this initiative, citing published research showing that the incidence of HAIs in Mauritius has risen to 18 per 100 admitted patients, with rates in intensive care units (ICUs) as high as 44 per 100 patients (Introduction, Page 3) . The key objectives of the plan include accurately estimating the prevalence and incidence of HAIs, evaluating the impact of Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) programs, identifying high-risk populations, and detecting outbreaks (Key Objectives, Page 4) . To achieve this, the plan mandates a methodology of active surveillance, where trained personnel systematically review patient data, rather than relying on passive reporting from clinicians which is deemed unreliable (Surveillance Methodology, Page 12) . Initially, surveillance will focus on high-priority infections including ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP), central-line associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI), catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI), surgical site infections (SSI), and neonatal sepsis (Disease Selection, Page 16) ³²³. The National Action Plan on Infection Prevention and Control For Healthcare Facilities 2022–2023 listed "Initiating a surveillance system for HAIs" as its third strategic objective, aiming to "progressively implement HAI surveillance in all hospitals" ³²⁴.

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 100

There is clear evidence of a national Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) programme in Mauritius. According to the Ministry of Health and Wellness's National Action Plan on Infection Prevention and Control For Healthcare Facilities 2022–2023, published in March 2022, a formal IPC programme has been established to standardize and guide these efforts. The foreword by the Minister of Health and Wellness states this plan is the "cornerstone of safe patient care" (Page 2). The plan's overarching objective is "to promote patient and staff safety by preventing the spread of healthcare-related infections" (Executive Summary, Page 5). To achieve this, it outlines five strategic objectives, including improving the IPC programme, disseminating national guidelines, initiating surveillance of hospital-acquired infections (HAI), implementing multimodal strategies, and monitoring IPC practices (Strategic Objectives, Pages 12-13). The operational plan details 80 specific activities, such as developing a mobile app for IPC materials, establishing a diploma course in IPC at the Mauritius Institute of Health, and procuring specialized equipment to ensure implementation (Strategic and Operational Plan, Pages 15-22) ³²⁵.

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

There is evidence of multiple plans that collectively aim to ensure a safe environment in health facilities nationally in Mauritius, addressing patient safety, occupational health, and the physical environment. According to the Ministry of Health and Wellness's Health Sector Strategic Plan 2020–2024, published in June 2020, ensuring a safe environment is a core component of its strategy . The plan outlines several strategic priorities dedicated to this goal. Strategic Priority 7.4, "Quality Healthcare," explicitly aims to "improve service excellence for the provision of safe and compassionate care" by developing and implementing quality standards for health services, establishing a national patient safety program, and promoting a culture of safety within the healthcare system (Page 42) . Furthermore, Strategic Priority 7.12, "Occupational Health," focuses on ensuring "a safe and healthy working environment for all health personnel" (Page 64) . This is to be achieved through the implementation of a robust occupational health and safety management system, regular workplace risk assessments, provision of personal protective equipment (PPE), and continuous training for staff on safety protocols . The plan also addresses the physical infrastructure through Strategic Priority 7.3, "Hospital and Allied Services," which includes actions to upgrade, renovate, and maintain existing health facilities to modern standards (Page 40) ³²⁶. The National Action Plan on Infection Prevention and Control For Healthcare Facilities 2022–2023, published by the Ministry of Health and Wellness in March 2022, directly addresses environmental safety from an infection control perspective. The overarching objective of this plan is "to promote patient and staff safety by preventing the spread of healthcare-related infections" (Executive Summary, Page 5). It operationalizes this through specific strategies that create a safer physical environment. These include ensuring the availability of materials and equipment for IPC, such as hand hygiene supplies and PPE, and guaranteeing that the healthcare infrastructure supports safety through adequate workload, staffing, and bed occupancy to prevent overcrowding and cross-infection (Strategic Objective 5, Page 13) ³²⁷.

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 100

There is a mandatory national requirement for ethical review before a clinical trial can commence in Mauritius. According to the Clinical Trials Act 2011, no person can conduct a clinical trial without a trial licence issued by the Clinical Research Regulatory Council (CRRC). The Act makes ethical review a non-negotiable step in this licensing process. Specifically, Part III of the Act establishes a national Ethics Committee (EC) . Section 8(1)(a) of the Act mandates that a primary function of this committee is "to give its opinion on every application for a trial licence… submitted to it by the Council". The law further dictates the workflow in Section 12(4), which states that when the CRRC receives a licence application, it "shall refer the application… to the Ethics Committee for an opinion". The CRRC's final decision is legally bound to this ethical review; Section 13(1) stipulates that the Council may only grant an application "after consideration of the opinion of the Ethics Committee" ³²⁸. The Ministry of Health and Wellness' 2025 "Guidelines for application for ethical review on Biomedical Research involving Human Subjects" provides the operational details for this legal requirement. These guidelines confirm that the main function of the National Ethics Committee (which is the same body as the Ethics Committee in the Act) is "to review proposals for human research projects to determine whether they meet all relevant ethical standards prior to granting ethical clearance". The guidelines impose specific requirements on researchers, who must submit a detailed project proposal including a justification for the study, the research protocol, criteria for subject inclusion, an analysis of potential benefits and risks, and the full plan for obtaining informed consent ³²⁹.

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a formal, legislated expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCMs) or a system for the mutual recognition of clinical trial results from other countries during an ongoing pandemic or epidemic in Mauritius. The primary law governing this area is the Clinical Trials Act 2011, which establishes a comprehensive and standardized procedure for the approval of all clinical trials, with no specific provisions for an accelerated pathway in emergency situations. While the Clinical Trials Act 2011 contains a section titled "Emergency measures" (Section 21), this provision does not relate to the expedited approval of new trials. Instead, it allows a sponsor and an investigator who are already conducting an approved trial to take "appropriate emergency measures in order to protect a subject against any immediate hazard to his health or safety." This section provides a framework for managing emergencies within an existing trial, not for fast-tracking the authorization of a new one ³³⁰. Supporting regulations, such as the Clinical Trials (Medical Devices Trials) Regulations 2021, also lay out a standard application and licensing process without mentioning any derogations or expedited procedures for public health emergencies ³³¹. A review of publications from the Ministry of Health and Wellness and the Clinical Research Regulatory Council (CRRC) did not yield any documents describing a specific policy or pathway for expedited approvals or for the mutual recognition of clinical trial data from other jurisdictions in the context of a pandemic ³³²³³³.

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 0

There is no publicly available information showing that there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans. There is no information from the Ministry of Health and Wellness or the the Clinical Research Regulatory Council (CRRC) about the agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans. ³³⁴³³⁵ The Clinical Trials Act of September 2011 established the CRRC as the government agency responsible for approving new medical trials for humans, and an Ethics Committee to advise on these clinical trials. ³³⁶ The Pharmacovigilance Committee monitors clinical trials and the implementation of good clinical practice". There is no information on a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures in the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018.

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence about an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use or recognition of approval decisions taking place elsewhere during public health emergencies. There is no information from the Ministry of Health and Wellness or the the Clinical Research Regulatory Council (CRRC) about the agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans. ³³⁷³³⁸ The Public Health (COVID-19 Vaccines for Emergency Use) Regulations 2021, which was made by the Minister of Health and Wellness under the authority of the Public Health Act explicitly created a pathway for the emergency use of specific COVID-19 vaccines. Section 2 of these regulations defines "vaccine" as certain named products "or such other vaccine as the Minister may approve for emergency use". The consent form within these regulations further clarifies the nature of this approval, stating: "The Ministry of Health and Wellness has made the COVID-19 vaccine available following regulatory approval of its use in the United States, United Kingdom, India and other countries as circumstances justify its use in an emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic". No evidence or reference to formalised pathway for such approval is mentioned within the document ³³⁹.

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Mauritius has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.³⁴⁰

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 100

Epidemics and pandemics are integrated into Mauritius's national risk reduction strategy. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Strategic Framework 2020-2030, which is the country's primary guide for disaster management, explicitly incorporates biological hazards. In its comprehensive list of hazards faced by the Republic, "Epidemic/Pandemic" is categorized under "Biological Hazards" (Page 13) . The framework's introduction acknowledges the unique challenges posed by global health crises, stating, "The COVID-19 pandemic, which began in late 2019, identified new challenges for managing disaster impacts and risks for the country" (Page 7) . The framework aligns itself with key international health security standards by listing the International Health Regulations (IHR) as part of its guiding framework (Section 4.9, Page 35), thus formally linking national disaster management with public health emergency preparedness ³⁴¹.

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 100

Mauritius is part of a regional network that addresses public health emergencies, primarily through its membership in the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). As a member of the Indian Ocean Commission, Mauritius participates in the SEGA – One Health Network (Réseau de Surveillance Epidémiologique et de Gestion des Alertes), which serves as the health security arm of the IOC. This network was established to strengthen regional capacity to anticipate, detect, and respond to epidemics and other health threats ³⁴². According to a 2024 publication on One Health by the IOC, the network facilitates cooperation and coordinated management of health crises among member states (the Union of the Comoros, France/Reunion, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles). The document emphasizes that in the face of recent health crises in the region, including cholera, dengue, and chikungunya, "regional cooperation is no longer an option, it has become essential to anticipate and better manage these health threats" ³⁴³.

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 100

Mauritius has agreements and participates in regional networks that address animal health emergencies. Mauritius is a participant in the SEGA – One Health Network, the health security body of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) ³⁴⁴. According to a 2024 IOC publication, this network was specifically designed to strengthen regional cooperation to "anticipate, detect and respond" to health threats, including epidemics, under a "One Health" approach that integrates human, animal, and environmental health. The SEGA network facilitates coordinated management of health crises among its member states. The publication highlights the network's role in improving animal health surveillance, noting that in Mauritius, a dedicated phone line was established to allow livestock farmers to report issues directly to a public sector veterinarian, creating an "excellent investigative tool" for early detection ³⁴⁵.

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

Mauritius has signatory and ratification status for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), giving the treaty full legal effect within the country. According to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), Mauritius ratified the BWC on May 6, 1972. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also lists Mauritius as a State Party, confirming its status ³⁴⁶³⁴⁷.

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 100

Mauritius has submitted a CBM in 2024 ³⁴⁸.

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 100

Mauritius has provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540. According to a document published by the Security Council Committee, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mauritius to the United Nations submitted its National report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) via a note verbale dated April 30, 2007. This submission fulfills the state's primary reporting obligation under the resolution. The report was officially received by the UN Secretariat on November 2, 2007 ³⁴⁹.

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 25

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

Mauritius is not a member of Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), Australia Group (AG), or in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ^350351352.

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 0

Mauritius last conducted a Joint External Evaluation in 2018 ³⁵³.

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

As per the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) website, Mauritius last conducted a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in 2009 ³⁵⁴.

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

As per the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) website, Mauritius last conducted a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in 2011 ³⁵⁵.

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is evidence that Mauritius has allocated national funds to improve its capacity to improve its health infrastructure within the past three years, but this does not include any specific funds earmarked for epidemic threats. In the Government Budget Speech 2024–2025, the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development announced a total budget of Rs 17.2 billion for the healthcare sector. A significant portion of this allocation, Rs 1.7 billion, is specifically earmarked for the implementation and completion of health infrastructure projects around the island. These projects, scheduled for completion in late 2024 and early 2025, include the operationalization of the New Flacq Teaching Hospital, a New Renal Transplant Unit, and several new Area Health Centres. While not exclusively for pandemics, this investment in modernizing and expanding health infrastructure is a core component of strengthening the country's capacity to respond to large-scale health emergencies by increasing bed capacity, improving specialized care facilities, and enhancing primary healthcare access ³⁵⁶. The Government Budget Speech 2023–2024 also requested substantial funds to the health sector, with specific line items that enhance epidemic preparedness and response. This budget provided Rs 91 million for upgrading works at ten major public hospitals, including national, regional, and specialized facilities. It also allocated Rs 300 million for the acquisition of modern medical equipment for these hospitals and Rs 20 million to increase screening for cancer risk assessments and early detection ³⁵⁷.

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 100

There is no evidence that national strategic health plans in Mauritius describe specific funding allocations from the national budget to address identified gaps in health security, including those identified by the Joint External Evaluation (JEE). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the Mauritius National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) was formally costed and validated in April 2023. This process, undertaken by the Ministry of Health and Wellness with WHO support, was a direct result of findings from the 2018 JEE and other national assessments ³⁵⁸. However, this is insufficient for this indicator.

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

As per the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) website, Mauritius last conducted a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in 2009 and a PVS gap analysis in 2011 ³⁵⁹.

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There are no publicly identified special emergency financing mechanisms and funds which Mauritius can access in the face of a public health emergency. According to a 2023 note verbale submitted by Mauritius to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the government has several special funds for emergency situations. These include the Contingency Fund, which is part of the annual national budget and is designated for unforeseen emergency expenses; the Prime Minister's Relief Fund: Regulated under the Finance and Audit Act, this fund supports victims of accidents and injuries and is one of the two main funding mechanisms for disaster relief in the country, and; the COVID-19 Solidarity Fund, which was was specifically established via the Finance and Audit (COVID-19 Solidarity Fund) Regulations 2020 to finance projects and provide support to individuals and organizations affected by the pandemic ³⁶⁰.

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no evidence from the past three years of public commitments by senior leaders in Mauritius to improve the country's domestic capacity to address pandemic and epidemic threat. The Minister of Health and Wellness, Dr. Kailesh Jagutpal, has also made public commitments to enhance domestic capacity. During the launch of national guidelines for major communicable diseases, developed with financial support from the European Union, the Minister's presence was described as a "testimony to his personal commitment to enhanced capacity of health care workers to infection control". At the event, it was confirmed that the EU's budget support program of €7.8 million (approx. Rs 390 million) was being disbursed directly into the National Treasury for the government to use according to its developmental priorities, including enhancing COVID-19 testing capacity, increasing ICU beds, and training health personnel ³⁶¹. No further evidence was identified ³⁶²³⁶³.

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritius received technical support from the United States to improve its domestic capacity to address public health emergencies. In September 2024, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Defense Institute of Medical Operations (DIMO) organized a five-day workshop in Mauritius with involvement of the Mauritian National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Centre (NDRRMC), the Ministry of Local Government and Disaster Risk Management, and the Ministry of Health and Quality of Life. The event provided technical training to 45 Mauritian emergency managers to "equip health sector administrators and managers with the skills and knowledge necessary to respond effectively to public health emergencies" ³⁶⁴.

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritius has fulfilled its full assessed contribution to the World Health Organization (WHO) within the past two years ³⁶⁵.

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 100

There is evidence of a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evalution (JEE), conducted in October-November 2018, states that there is an arrangement for sharing stool samples with the Pasteur laboratory in Madagascar, for polio culture. ³⁶⁶ The SEGA – One Health Network works closely with international organizations such as WHO, FAO, WOAH (World Organisation for Animal Health), and Africa CDC for information and specimen sharing, as part of a regional health security strategy (pages 16–17 and 50–51). Mauritius also has an arrangement for sharing stool samples with the Pasteur lab in Madagascar. The "Health Security" document published in 2024 by the network emphasizes standard operating procedures, joint laboratory strengthening, and cross-border data and material sharing mechanisms for zoonotic, emerging, and high-risk pathogens such as Rift Valley Fever, rabies, and haemorrhagic fevers (pages 50–55). A BSL-3 laboratory was established in Mauritius (page 52–54) to support safe handling and analysis of pathogenic samples and to enable regional cooperation on specimen-based research and diagnostics ³⁶⁷.

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that Mauritius has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years. There has been no relevant news issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) or top international and local media outlets in the past two years. ³⁶⁸

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that Mauritius has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years. There has been no relevant news issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) or top international and local media outlets in the past two years. ³⁶⁹

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 50

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 50

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 75

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 25

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 51

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 50

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 75

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 100

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 50

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 75

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 100

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 75

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 100

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 100

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 75

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 100

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 74.03

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 99.46

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 50

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 66.67

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 100

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 100

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 63.2

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 50

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 75

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 50

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 66.14

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 79.27

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 50

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 85.96

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 73.26

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 0

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 22.08

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 10.46

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 76.38

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 100

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 97

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 72.92

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 63.48

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 50

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 50