Guinea: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 50

A national AMR plan is in place in Guinea, but it is unclear whether it explictly addresses surveillance, detection and reporting.

From 2019, the Ministry of Health worked with French international assistance, financed by the World Bank's REDISSE disease surveillance project, to develop the National Action Plan for Anti-Microbial Resistance (termed "PAN RAM" per its French-language initials), which was completed early in 2020 and adopted retroactively in August that year ¹². The PAN RAM included a strategic action plan for the period 2020-24, and specific action plan for completion in 2020 ³. The 2020 action plan's objective no. 3 envisages the establishment of an AMR surveillance system, including designation of a national reference laboratory and sentinel sites, conducting surveys on issues such as the use of antibiotics and the prevalence of antibiotic-related diseases, and developing the capacities of staff responsible for AMR in Guinea ^{4, pp. 40-44}. It also called for Guinea to join the WHO's Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS), a step which the country completed by October 2024, according to the WHO website ^{5, p.416}. However, the PAN RAM does not include action related on dectection and reporting ⁷.

In July 2024, the Ministry of Health published a press release on a workshop at which a new PAN RAM for the period 2025-2029 would be validated by a range of staff from the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries, alongside international partners ⁸. However, the full text of the PAN RAM 2025-29 could not be found on the Ministry of Health website, and the WHO website, which published the 2020-24 PAN RAM ⁹¹⁰. It is unclear from the Ministry of Health press release whether the new PAN RAM addresses surveillance, detection and reporting ¹¹.

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 50

A national laboratory system able to test for some, but not all, priority AMR pathogens is in place.

According to the WHO Joint External Evaluation ("JEE") of Guinea conducted in 2017, tests for E. coli, Salmonella spp, Klebsiella, Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Shigella and Neisseria meningitidis could be conducted at the National Public Health Laboratory, the reference laboratory part of the National Institute of Public Health, and three university hospitals ^{12, p.20}.

No more recent information in this regard could be identified. The JEE conducted on Guinea in 2023 states that AMR data is collected for "common pathogens", but does not specify which these are, and further notes that national authorities have not identified any priority or multi-resistant pathogens and that no such pathogens are detected in data generated by laboratories ^{13, pp.29-30}. However, the 2023 JEE also identifies the National Institute of Public Health as the reference laboratory, indicating that it has maintained the capabilities identified in the 2017 JEE ^{14, p.30}. The National Public Health Laboratory's website is offline, and versions of its pages archived in 2023 present no information on the seven priority pathogens ¹⁵. No further information was found on the Ministry of Health website ¹⁶.

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

No evidence was found that the Guinean government conducts environmental detection or surveillance activities for AMR.

The Joint External Evaluation of Guinea conducted in 2023 states that AMR surveillance is conducted only in the human sector, although sporadic surveys are conducted in the animal health sector ^{17, p. 29}. Review of the website of the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment identified no references to AMR surveillance ¹⁸¹⁹.

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 50

National legislation requires prescriptions for antibiotic use in humans.

The Joint External Evaluation ("JEE") of Guinea conducted in 2023 states that the country has legislation in place "relating to the use of medicines, including antibiotics" in humans, although this source does not name the relevant legislation ^{20, p.30}. A Tracking AMR Country Self Assessment Survey for Guinea published in 2022 indicates that this legislation came into force in 2019 ^{21, p.9}. Guinea's regulations on medicine control and the profession of pharmacist are established by law no. 2018/024/AN, article 73.6 of which establishes that only licensed pharmacists may sell medicines for human use ²². Further, article 71 requires dispensation of a medicine or health product to be based upon a prescription, which under article 138 must be done by a doctor or other authorised health worker ²³. However, Law no. 2018/024/AN does not explicitly prohibit the non-prescribed sale of antibiotics ²⁴. Additionally, the 2023 JEE notes that Guinea has produced a guide for the use of antibiotics and distributed it to prescribing health workers ²⁵. However, this guide could not be found on the Ministry of Health website ²⁶.

However, there is evidence that non-prescription sale of antibiotics and other medicines is common in Guinea. The JEE notes that regulations on the dispensation of antibiotics are not followed in pharmacies ²⁷. Media references published in recent years indicate that sale of medicines by unlicensed personnel is common, and that unlicensed or counterfeit medicines are also prevalent ²⁸²⁹³⁰. However, the government has taken action by creating the National Technical Committee against illegal medical and paramedical practices and the trafficking and counterfeiting of medicines and other health products, established in 2022, which has since been responsible for working to close illegally-practising medical "institutions" including medicine sales, and the seizure and destruction of counterfeit medicines ³¹³².

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 50

National legislation requires prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals.

The Joint External Evaluation ("JEE") of Guinea conducted in 2023 states that the country has legislation in place "relating to the use of medicines, including antibiotics in human and animal health", although it does not name the relevant legislation ^{33, pp.18-19}. Additionally, the JEE notes that good practice guides for the use of antibiotics in both animal and human health are in place; these documents were reviewed by the JEE team ^{34, pp.18-19 and 77}. A Tracking AMR Country Self Assessment Survey for Guinea published in 2022 indicates that "laws or regulations on prescription and sale of antimicrobials for terrestrial animal use" came into force in 2022 ^{35, p.9}.

Guinea's regulations on medicine control and the profession of pharmacist are established by law no. 2018/024/AN, articles 56-57 of which require that animal medicines be prescribed by a licensed veterinarian, and dispensed by a licensed pharmacist on the basis of a prescription ³⁶. Additionally, Law no. 2018/026/AN, establishing regulations on animal husbandry, restricts the dispensation of animal medicines to pharmacists and veterinarians in article 94 ³⁷. Further, articles 100-101 institute two categories of animal medicines, either subject to prescriptions, or not; lists of these medicines (respectively named List A and List B) are to be developed separately by the Ministry of Agriculture ³⁸. However, review of the Ministry of Agriculture's website identified no such lists ³⁹. Neither Law no. 2018/024/AN or Law no. 2018/026/AN explicitly prohibits the non-prescribed sale of antibiotics for animal use ⁴⁰⁴¹.

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Guinea has a strategic plan on zoonotic disease prioritization, detection and reporting dated for between 2019 and 2023. A related procedural guide covering the same functions has been in force since 2019.

Guinea created a "One World, One Health" platform in 2017, and adopted a strategic plan under the platform in October 2018, valid for the period 2019 – 2023 ^{42, p.1 and 9}. The strategic plan also set a range of objectives relating to preventing the priority zoonoses, developing integrated surveillance and ensuring an effective response ^{43, p.32}. Under the plan, detection and reporting is to be conducted by local-level One Health platforms, with all alerts to be communicated to other platforms nationwide, and joint investigations conducted following detection, and capacities reinforced through training and simulated exercises ^{44, p.36-37}. The strategic plan identifies five priority zoonoses – avian flu, ebola, brucellosis, anthrax, and rabies but these were previously set under the FAO's Emerging Pandemic Threats programme in 2015; the plan notes that foot-and-mouth disease should also be added to the list of priority zoonoses ^{45, p. 20}. The One Health strategy period lasted until 2023, and no evidence that the strategy was either prolonged or replaced was found on the Ministry of Health website ⁴⁶

However, a Guide for Multisectoral Management of Priority Zoonoses, published as part of the "One World, One Health" platform in 2019, lists nine priority zoonoses for Guinea: rabies, anthrax, ebloa, dengue, brucellosis, avian flu, yellow fever, lassa fever, and rift valley fever ^{47, p.10}. This document also presents annexes on each of the priority diseases including specific instructions on detection and response for each disease ^{48, p.22-57}. The Guide for Multisectoral Management of Priority Zoonoses does not outline a validity period, indicating that it remains in force to this day, directing the zoonoses detection and reporting functions for the One Health platform focal points in place around the country ⁴⁹.

No evidence that Guinea has any other strategy documents in place covering zoonotic disease prioritization, detection and reporting was found on the websites of the Ministry of Health or National Agency for Health Security, or in the JEE conducted in reference to the country in 2023. ⁵⁰⁵¹⁵²

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 100

A national plan including measures for risk identification and spillover risk reduction is in place.

The Ministry of Health's Guide for Multisectoral Management of Priority Zoonoses, published in 2019, lists nine priority zoonoses for Guinea: rabies, anthrax, ebola, dengue, brucellosis, avian flu, yellow fever, lassa fever, and rift valley fever ^{53, p.10}. Annexes to the document include instructions for local One Health platforms on identifying the priority diseases and managing risk ^{54, pp.22-57}. These include disease-specific instructions for reducing spillover risks in cases of specific diseases where relevant, including the use of PPE and disinfection of environments and proper disposal of corpses for anthrax ^{55, pp.23-24}, isolation of cases for rabies ^{56, p.28}, and application of food hygiene measures and culling for brucellosis ^{57, p.31}. ⁵⁸

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 100

A national plan including measures for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern is in place.

The Ministry of Health's Guide for Multisectoral Management of Priority Zoonoses, published in 2019, lists nine priority zoonoses for Guinea: rabies, anthrax, ebloa, dengue, brucellosis, avian flu, yellow fever, lassa fever, and rift valley fever ^{59, p.10}. The document includes instructions on surveillance for local-level One Health platforms ^{60, pp.14-16}. Annexes to the document include instructions for local One Health platforms on surveillance and control for each specific disease ^{61, pp.22-57}.

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 100

A multi-sectorial coordinating mechanism for zoonotic disease is in place.

As part of Guinea's One Health platform, the Multisectoral Coordination Technical Committee ("CTCM") was instituted for the purpose of monitoring and evaluation of the platform ^{62, p.10}. The Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Environment issued Joint Decree no. A/2017/3337/MS establishing the creation, powers, organization and operation of the National One Health Platform in July 2017 ^{63, p.14}; while this document could not be found online, it likely instituted the CTCM as part of the platform. According to a guide on multisectoral zoonoses management issued by the Ministry of Health in 2019, alongside providing guidelines for and coordinating between Technical Working Groups ^{64, p.8}, and also overseeing the Emergency Management Centre which manages outbreak situations ^{65, p.12}.

Guinea's One Health Strategic Plan, adopted for the period 2019-2023, assigns the CTCM various responsibilities, including the designation of various institutional stakeholders for the One Health platform and their roles, and drawing up a cooperation agreement reflecting this ^{66, p.}. While it is unclear whether this specific objective was achieved, the JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 indicates that multi-sectorial coordination continued to function: the CTCM was described as "functional", and the JEE noted that the One Health stakeholders conducted "weekly meetings at the technical level" ^{67, p.33}.

Research was unable to identify a precise list of institutions represented on the CTCM beyond the aforementioned ministries. However, the JEE notes that alongside various One Health stakeholders, it includes "security forces, the army and the ports service", and also notes that the "National Committee for Multisectoral Coordination" [sic.] has a rotating presidency. ^{68, p.33}. A 2022 WHO press release named the CTCM's president as Dr Mohamed Idrissa Doumbouya, who at the time and to this day served as director of the National Veterinary Services department at the Ministry of Agriculture ⁶⁹⁷⁰. However, no more recent reports identifying the CTCM's director were identified.

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 100

Guinea had its One Health Strategic Plan for Guinea (2019-2023), which outlined how the country will implement the One Health approach. ⁷¹ This collaborative strategy focused on human, animal, and environmental health connections to better prevent, detect, and respond to public health events. The plan was used to guide the National One Health Platform (OHP), a multi-sectorial group established in 2017.

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 100

A national mechanism enabling livestock owners to report on zoonoses to Guinea's One Health platform is in place.

Documents produced in relation to Guinea's One Health plan, including the 2018-2023 Strategic Plan and Multisectoral Zoonoses Management Guide, refer to the involvement of livestock owners in reporting practices ⁷²⁷³. The Strategic Plan aims for the establishment of a network of community agents, to be involved in working with communities at the local level, for functions including reporting ^{74, p. 36}. The Multisectoral Zoonoses Management Guide lists livestock owners amongst various stakeholders to be involved in reporting and surveillance at the local level, alongside community agents ^{75, p.14, 17}. Particularly, livestock owners are noted to be key in the detection and reporting of brucellosis cases ^{76, p.30}. Limited information on the implementation of this system was identified, but a 2020 report based on an interview with a FAO representative in Guinea noted plans to train 8,000 community agents ⁷⁷. More recent reports focussing on the community agents system indicate that it is successful at the local level where implemented, but practical concerns such as illiteracy, media and communication network penetration and geography in some areas can limit effectiveness ⁷⁸⁷⁹. Research identified no reports indicating the number of agents actually recruited under One Health. However, despite the end of the One Health Strategic Plan's operational period in 2023, there is evidence of continued development of the community agent system. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture reported launching a "vast campaign" of training for community agents in February 2025 ⁸⁰. International partners such as the French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development and Group for Research and Technological Exchange continue to provide financial support for the system in 2025 ⁸¹⁸².

The JEE conducted in relation to Guinea in 2023 does not refer to the community agent system in relation to zoonoses monitoring ⁸³. However, it gives a poor assessment of results on spreading knowledge regarding zoonoses in the agricultural community, noting that livestock owners and the livestock husbandry sector in general do not "conform to regulations… and international recommendations on public health norms and animal welfare" ^{84, pp. 33-34}.

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

While general personal data protection legislation is in place, no evidence of provisions specifically applicable to animal surveillance activities was found.

No evidence of legislation or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of owner information generated through animal surveillance activities was found on the websites of the Ministry of Health or National Health Security Agency ⁸⁵⁸⁶

Law no. 2016/037/AN on cybersecurity and the protection of personal data criminalises the non-consensual electronic storage of personal data (defined as origins, race, ethnicity, political and religious opinions, trade union membership, health status or sexual orientation) under article 56 ⁸⁷. The law also criminalises the publication of personal data without the data subject's consent, where the publication leads to a violation of their private life, honour or dignity under article 44 ⁸⁸. Additionally, an (untitled) Presidential Decree published in April 2025 to reform the national identification system further developed data protection provisions in Guinea ⁸⁹. This decree's article 4 establishes the principle that processing of personal data must be conducted for clearly-defined, limited, explicit and legitimate purposes, and that the data must be precise, complete and up to date ⁹⁰. Articles 14-16 require data controllers to establish appropriate security measures and provide guarantees of these, and article 17 empowers data subjects to access data held regarding them ⁹¹.

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 0

Whilst epidemiological surveillance of livestock and poultry is conducted, no evidence that Guinea conducts surveillance of zoonoses in wild animals was identified.

Guinea's Animal Epidemiological Surveillance Network (known as REMAGUI), subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture's Department for Veterinary Services, conducts passive surveillance of all zoonoses, and active surveillance of priority zoonoses, identified in 2019 as contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, foot-and-mouth disease, ovine rinderpest, rift valley fever, Newcastle disease and avian flu ^{92, p.2993}. Available weekly reports produced by REMAGUI in 2025 show that records on the aforementioned zoonoses are collected and published ⁹⁴.

Initially established in 1996, according to an FAO report, the REMAGUI was reportedly reactivated in 2019 ^{95, p.296}. However, there is evidence that REMAGUI's reactivation was protracted by capacity limitations. Despite the reported 2019 reactivation date, and donation of vehicles for the REMAGUI from the World Bank in mid-2020, a government decree setting out its powers and responsibilities remained under consideration in early 2021 ⁹⁷⁹⁸. No more recent reports on this decree were identified to verify whether it was adopted, including on the websites of the National Assembly and Ministry of Agriculture ⁹⁹¹⁰⁰.

In a 2024 press release, the Food and Agriculture Organization described the conduct of a workshop considering the REMAGUI's ability to monitor animal diseases; according to this source, the aforementioned government decree "mentions wildlife [but] does not operationalize this" ¹⁰¹. At the workshop, supported by the FAO's Global Health Security Support Project, the Ministries of Agriculture and Environment developed a draft joint decree addressing the gap in the REMAGUI's wildlife surveillance capacity ¹⁰². However, no further references to this draft decree's adaptation or adoption wer found online, including on the websites of the National Assembly and Ministry of Agriculture ¹⁰³¹⁰⁴.

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 100

There is publicly-available evidence that Guinea reports notifiable diseases to the World Animal Health Organization.

The WAHO's World Animal Health Information System lists multiple animal health events reported from Guinea, although none are very recent as of the time of research ¹⁰⁵. Guinea has made eight reports of priority zoonoses since 2006, most recently of avian influenza strain H5N1, reported in May 2023 ¹⁰⁶.

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 1.77

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 0

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

Guinea's national plan on zoonotic disease includes no mechanisms for working with the private sector on zoonotic disease control.

Guinea's "One Health" strategic plan, valid for the period 2019 – 2023, briefly refers to opportunities for the private sector to contribute to prevention, detection and response to zoonotic diseases ^{107, p.39}. The plan goes on to state that, in order to fulfil the strategic plan's objectives "private sector entities will be engaged directly or through umbrella organisations" to provide consulting on policy development, or provide budgetary or material support for the plan ^{108, p.39}. However, the strategic plan's list of objectives does not specify any particular goals for which private sector contributions were to be elicited ^{109, p.33-37}. The Ministry of Health's Guide for Multisectoral Management of Priority Zoonoses, which establishes procedures for surveillance, reporting and management of specific diseases, does not refer to engagement of the private sector ¹¹⁰. The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 does not refer to the involvement of the private sector in management of zoonoses ¹¹¹.

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 0

No evidence that Guinea maintains a record of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed in place was identified.

According to the JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023, at the time of compilation, the country was "beginning to index and maintain a register of pathogens" on hand at various facilities, described as "a restricted number of structures such as the Laboratory of Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers" ^{112, pp.38-39}. Research identified no evidence that the indexing and registering work has been completed, including on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Agency for Health Security, and versions of the currently-offline websites of the National Public Health Institute (under which the national reference laboratory operates) and Virology Research Centre as archived respectively in 2023 and 2024 ^113114115116. Note that Guinea's previous JEE, conducted in 2017, also reported that the country was beginning to develop records on facilities where dangerous pathogens were stored ¹¹⁷.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

No evidence of legislation or regulation ensuring biosecurity in Guinea was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 states that Guinea lacked regulations ensuring the prevention of biotechnical risks at the time of compilation, with a general regulatory framework on biosafety and biosecurity managing the ownership and use of dangerous pathogens under development ^{118, p.38}. However, it does note that national policies establishing biosafety regulations for laboratory work and the transport of samples had been developed, but had not yet been formally adopted or distributed to stakeholders ^{119, p.39}. Research on these regulations found that in July 2024, the Ministry of Health's Laboratories Department presented a Medical Biology Strategic Plan for 2024-2028, but the Ministry press release on this subject noted that the strategy would require USD 35 million in financing, implying that the country was unable to realise it without external support ¹²⁰. Review of the websites of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Environment, alongside the National Agency for Health Security, identified no evidence that the aforementioned policies or any other biosecurity legislation have been developed or adopted since the JEE was conducted ^121122123124. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre legislation database compiling national legislation cites no biosecurity legislation for Guinea. ¹²⁵ While Guinea has submitted two documents as part of its Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, in 2024 and 2025, both are not publicly accessible. ¹²⁶

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 0

Given Guinea's lack of legislation regarding biosecurity, no regulatory agency for this area is in place.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that Guinea has yet to adopt biosecurity legislation, and does not refer to a regulatory agency competent in this area ^{127, pp.38-39}. Review of the websites of the Ministries Health, Agriculture and Environment, alongside the National Agency for Health Security, identified no evidence that a biosecurity regulatory agency is in place ^128129130131. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre legislation database compiling national legislation cites no Guinean legislation referring to a biosecurity regulatory agency. ¹³² While Guinea has submitted two documents as part of its Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, in 2024 and 2025, both are not publicly accessible. ¹³³

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

No public evidence indicating that Guinea has taken steps to consolidate its inventory of biorisks was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 describes the inventory of dangerous pathogens as "consolidated in a restricted number of structures, such as the Laboratory of Hemmorhagic Fevers" ^{134, p.38}, which is further described as a "level 3 biosecurity" facility ^{135, p. 47}. It also notes that Guinea uses diagnostic tests which do not require the culture of dangerous pathogens ^{136, p.38}. While not explicitly stated by the JEE, it may be inferred that the concentration of dangerous pathogens in a small number of facilities is dictated by the comparatively low level of development in this area in Guinea, rather than specific steps taken by the government. Review of archived versions of websites for two laboratories part of the national reference network – the National Public Health Institute (under which the national reference laboratory operates) and Virology Research Centre – as archived respectively in 2023 and 2024 identified no information to indicate that specific action has been taken to limit the number of facilities at which dangerous pathogens are present ¹³⁷¹³⁸. No further information on this subject was identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health and National Health Security Agency ¹³⁹¹⁴⁰

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 100

Public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct PCR testing for ebola and anthrax exists.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that Guinea uses diagnostic tests which do not require the culture of dangerous pathogens ^{141, p.38}. During an ebola epidemic declared by the Ministry of Health between January and June 2021, over 1,000 PCR tests were conducted in the country, and the Hemmorhagic Fever Laboratory in the city of N'Zékoré, located closest to the epidemic area, gained the capacity to manage PCR tests ¹⁴². Review of the Ministry of Agriculture website identified no evidence of capacity for PCR testing for Anthrax ¹⁴³. However, a report on international support provided to Guinea for the renovation of Kankan Regional Veterinary Laboratory in 2021 included reference to capacity for diagnosis of anthrax and other zoonoses, using equipment such as microscopes, reagents, and microbiological incubators and refrigerators ¹⁴⁴.

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has established a standardized approach for training of staff working with dangerous pathogens.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 states that Guinea has analysed requirements for biosafety and biosecurity training, and identified gaps, but had yet to establish a standardized training programme – although standardized modules in biosecurity and biosafety, as well as certified trainers, were available ^{145, p. 39}. The JEE further noted that long-term academic training for staff involved in handling dangerous pathogens was not in place, with financing for regular training in laboratories unavailable ^{146, p.40}. In this regard, it is likely that the Medical Biology Strategic Plan for 2024-2028, presented by the Ministry of Health's Laboratories Department in July 2024, but not published online, includes provisions on laboratory training ¹⁴⁷. However, the Ministry noted that the strategy would require USD 35 million in financing, implying that the country was unable to realise it without external support ¹⁴⁸. No further information on training for staff working with dangerous pathogens was identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the National Health Security Agency ¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰. Research identified the Guinean Biosecurity and Biosafety Association, a professional association created by the government in 2017, for purposes including ensuring the improvement of training for laboratory personnel, but no information on steps to improve training standards was identified on this body's website ¹⁵¹.

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence of regulations or licensing conditions specifying any form of background checks for staff at facilities handling dangerous pathogens.

The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 reported that no overall biosafety and biosecurity regulation is in place in the country, although at the time of compliation, a biorisk management policy considering laboratories had been developed, but not yet adopted ^{152, pp. 38-39}. The JEE notes that biosafety and biosecurity manuals, alongside quality manuals, had been developed and distributed to laboratories, but it does not expand upon the content of these manuals ^{153, p. 39}. The JEE does not refer to any other documents which could contain security standards applicable to laboratories.

It is possible that the Medical Biology Strategic Plan for 2024-2028, presented by the Ministry of Health's Laboratories Department in July 2024, but not published online, includes provisions on laboratory training ¹⁵⁴. However, in its press release, the Ministry noted that the strategy would require USD 35 million in financing, implying that the country was unable to realise it without external support ¹⁵⁵. No further information on prerequisites for staff working with dangerous pathogens was identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Health Security Agency or laboratory working professional association the Guinean Biosecurity and Biosafety Association ^156157158. No information on requirements for prospective employees was identified through review of archived versions of the websites of two key Guinean laboratories – the National Public Health Institute (under which the national reference laboratory operates) and Virology Research Centre – as archived respectively in 2023 and 2024 ¹⁵⁹¹⁶⁰.

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 0

No publicly available information on regulations on the safe transport of infectious materials in Guinea was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 reported that a national policy on the transport of disease samples had been "revised and adopted", and was in line with Guinea's One Health policy; while the JEE provides no further detail on the policy's content, it does assess Guinea's disease sample transport system relatively positively, highlighting training, multisectoral coverage and use of IT systems, although assessing finances, integration and supplies of equipment to require improvement ¹⁶¹. A One Health policy bulletin published in January 2024 shows that the samples transport policy was initially developed through cooperation between the Ministry of Health's National Laboratories Department, the National Public Health Institute, the National Health Security Agency, and the Ministry of Agriculture's Central Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory from 2020, with support from USAID's Infectious Disease Detection and Surveillance project ^{162, p.14}. The new policy was piloted in the area surrounding the town of Faranah in early 2022, before being expanded to the region of the capital Conakry from August 2023 with the help of USAID funding ^{163, pp. 14-15}. A February 2023 press release shows that the policy's adoption was on the agenda at a cabinet meeting that month, although it is unclear whether the adoption occured at this time ¹⁶⁴. However, the One Health bulletin does not provide details of measures applied for safe transport of infectious details ¹⁶⁵. The full policy could not be found on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, National Public Health Institute and National Health Security Agency ^166167168169.

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

No evidence of legislation or regulations on cross-border transfer of dangerous pathogens in Guinea was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 suggests that Guinea had no biosecurity regulations in place at the time, although a general regulatory framework on both biosecurity and biosafety and was under development ^{170, p.38}. National policies on transport of samples had been developed, but were not yet formally adopted ^{171, p.39}. Review of the websites of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Environment, alongside the National Agency for Health Security ("ANSS"), identified no evidence that the aforementioned policies or any other legislation relevant to the issue of cross-border transfers of dangerous pathogens have been developed or adopted since the JEE was conducted ^172173174175. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre database of national legislation lists no biosecurity legislation for Guinea. ¹⁷⁶ In 2024 and 2025, Guinea submitted two documents as Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, but neither is publicly accessible. ¹⁷⁷ Further sources indicate that public health oversight at border crossing points in Guinea is limited, although efforts have been made to improve the situation in recent years. An undated International Organization for Migration ("IOM") press release notes that, following the end of the ebola epidemic in Guinea in 2016, public health oversight measures at border crossing points, which had been supported by the IOM and WHO during the epidemic, were ended ¹⁷⁸. In August 2024, the IOM supported the Ministry of Health and ANSS in updating a roadmap for the reinforcement of biosecurity procedures at priority border crossing points ¹⁷⁹. In April 2025, the ANSS announced that it had reintroduced health security surveillance at Ahmed Sékou Touré International Airport in Conakry, the Autonomous Port of Conakry, and at Kotizou Border Post on the southern border with Liberia ¹⁸⁰.

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

No evidence of biosafety legislation or regulation in Guinea was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 states that a general regulatory framework on biosafety and biosecurity was under development ^{181, p.38}. However, it does note that national policies establishing biosafety regulations for laboratory work and the transport of samples had been developed, but had not yet been formally adopted or distributed to stakeholders ^{182, p.39}. Research on these regulations found that in July 2024, the Ministry of Health's Laboratories Department presented a Medical Biology Strategic Plan for 2024-2028, but the Ministry press release on this subject noted that the strategy would require USD 35 million in financing, implying that the country was unable to realise it without external support ¹⁸³. Review of the websites of the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Environment, alongside the National Agency for Health Security, identified no evidence that the aforementioned policies or any other biosafety legislation have been developed or adopted since the JEE was conducted ^184185186187. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre legislation database compiling national legislation cites no biosafety legislation for Guinea. ¹⁸⁸ While Guinea has submitted two documents as part of its Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, in 2024 and 2025, both are not publicly accessible. ¹⁸⁹

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

Given Guinea's lack of legislation regarding biosafety, no regulatory agency for this area is in place.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that Guinea has yet to adopt biosafety legislation, and does not refer to a regulatory agency competent in this area ^{190, pp.38-39}. Review of the websites of the Ministries Health, Agriculture and Environment, alongside the National Agency for Health Security, identified no evidence that a biosafety regulatory agency is in place ^191192193194. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre legislation database compiling national legislation cites no Guinean legislation referring to a biosafety regulatory agency. ¹⁹⁵ While Guinea has submitted two documents as part of its Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, in 2024 and 2025, both are not publicly accessible. ¹⁹⁶

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has established a standardized approach for training of staff working with dangerous pathogens.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 states that Guinea has analysed requirements for biosafety and biosecurity training, and identified gaps, but had yet to establish a standardized training programme – although standardized modules in biosecurity and biosafety, as well as certified trainers, were available ^{197, p. 39}. The JEE further noted that long-term academic training for staff involved in handling dangerous pathogens was not in place, with financing for regular training in laboratories unavailable ^{198, p.40}. In this regard, it is likely that the Medical Biology Strategic Plan for 2024-2028, presented by the Ministry of Health's Laboratories Department in July 2024, but not published online, includes provisions on laboratory training ¹⁹⁹. However, the Ministry noted that the strategy would require USD 35 million in financing, implying that the country was unable to realise it without external support ²⁰⁰. No further information on training for staff working with dangerous pathogens was identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the National Health Security Agency ²⁰¹²⁰². Research identified the Guinean Biosecurity and Biosafety Association, a professional association created by the government in 2017, for purposes including ensuring the improvement of training for laboratory personnel, but no information on steps to improve training standards was identified on this body's website ²⁰³.

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

No publicly available evidence that Guinea has conducted an assessment of ongoing research involving dangerous pathogens.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that the Guinean research sector has completed research in specific areas relevant to the local epidemic environment, including, in recent years, research on the application of vaccines against ebola and on mortality relating to SARS-COV-2 ^{204, p. 61}. However, the JEE states that overall, such research is limited by structural concerns, including the lack of a regulatory framework managing research on emerging epidemic threats, and a lack of financing ^{205, p.61}. No further information on the government's management of the epidemic-related research environment in Guinea was identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, or the National Health Security Agency ^206207208. Review of the Ministry of Health website found that Guinea's National Health Development Plan for 2015-2024 set the Ministry of Health the objective of devising and adopting a National Strategic Plan for the Development of Medical Research ^{209, p.33 and 63}, and in a budget for the entire National Health Development Plan allocated the medical research area USD 11 million over the ten-year period ^{210, p.120}. However, no further references to the medical research plan were identified.

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

No evidence of legislation requiring oversight of research involving dangerous pathogens in Guinea was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 states that a general regulatory framework on biosafety and biosecurity was under development ^{211, p.38}, but no overall regulatory framework governing medical research was in place ^{212, p.61}. Law no. 2018/024/AN on medicines, health products and the profession of pharmacists, states in article 8 that modalities for scientific and medical research aimed at developing new medicines are to be set by decree ²¹³. Review of the websites of the National Assembly (which published Law no. 2018/024/AN and others), the Ministries of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Health and Agriculture, alongside the National Agency for Health Security, identified no evidence of legislation governing regulations on medical research ^214215216217. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre legislation database compiling national legislation cites no relevant legislation for Guinea. ²¹⁸ In 2024, the Ministry of Health's Laboratories Department presented a Medical Biology Strategic Plan for 2024-2028, which could involve plans to adopt relevant regulations, but the Ministry press release on this subject noted that the strategy would require USD 35 million in financing, implying that the country was unable to realise it without external support ²¹⁹.

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

No evidence was found that an agency responsible for oversight of research on agents with pandemic potential is in place in Guinea.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 does not refer to oversight of dual-use research, but notes that Guinea lacks a regulatory framework establishing overall management of biomedical research ^{220, p.61} Law no. 2018/024/AN on medicines, health products and the profession of pharmacists, states in article 8 that modalities for scientific and medical research aimed at developing new medicines are to be set by decree, but does not refer to the government institution responsible for developing such regulations ²²¹. Review of the websites of the National Assembly (which published Law no. 2018/024/AN and others), the Ministries of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Health and Agriculture, alongside the National Agency for Health Security, identified no evidence of legislation governing regulations on medical research or the existence of an agency responsible for oversight of the area ^222223224225. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre legislation database compiling national legislation cites no relevant legislation for Guinea. ²²⁶

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

No evidence of legislation requiring screening of synthesized DNA in Guinea was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 states that a general regulatory framework on biosafety and biosecurity was under development ^{227, p.38}, but no overall regulatory framework governing medical research was in place ^{228, p.61}. Law no. 2018/024/AN on medicines, health products and the profession of pharmacists, states in article 8 that modalities for scientific and medical research aimed at developing new medicines are to be set by decree, although the institution responsible for adopting these regulations is not identified ²²⁹. Review of the websites of the National Assembly (which published Law no. 2018/024/AN and others), the Ministries of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Health and Agriculture, alongside the National Agency for Health Security, identified no evidence of legislation governing regulations on medical research ^230231232233. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre legislation database compiling national legislation cites no relevant legislation for Guinea. ²³⁴ In 2024, the Ministry of Health's Laboratories Department presented a Medical Biology Strategic Plan for 2024-2028, which could involve plans to adopt regulations relevant to the screening of synthesized DNA, but the Ministry press release on this subject noted that the strategy would require USD 35 million in financing, implying that the country was unable to realise it without external support ²³⁵.

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 50

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 100

Official foot-and-mouth disease vaccination figures for Guinea are available through the World Animal Health Organization website.²³⁶

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 0

Research indicates that a national immunization plan is in place, but the document's full text could not be identified to review whether it includes consideration of equitable and minority-sensitive distribution.

Guinea operates an ongoing Expanded Programme on Immunization ("PEV") alongside NGO Gavi, historically adopting five-year Comprehensive Multi-Year Plans ("CMYP") to direct deployments ²³⁷²³⁸. The Gavi website presents the most recent CMYP as covering the period 2016-2026, but the document upon opening gives the dates 2016-2020 ²³⁹²⁴⁰. Nevertheless, no more recent CMYP for Guinea could be found on the Gavi website or the Ministry of Health website ^241242243. Review of the Ministry of Health website identified a December 2021 PEV Norms and Procedures document, which refers to a CMYP covering the years 2022-2026 ^{244, pp. 11}. The full CMYP 2022-2026 document could not be identified online, including on the Gavi and Ministry of Health websites ²⁴⁵²⁴⁶. Indeed, research identified no references to the CMYP for 2022-2026 published after 2022, indicating that it may not have been adopted in practice. However, the aforementioned PEV Norms and Procedures document refers to planned elements of the CMYP 2022-2026 including the introduction of vaccines against COVID-19 and malaria ^{247, p.11}, alongside pneumonia, rotavirus and human papillomavirus ^{248, p.23}. Reports from recent years show that Guinea's PEV did, indeed, introduce a vaccine against COVID-19 in 2022, and a malaria vaccine in 2025 ²⁴⁹²⁵⁰. Reports and documents related to Gavi and WHO activity indicate that work on introducing the rotavirus vaccine was underway during 2024, and the following year, the Ministry of Health announced plans to introduce the HPV vaccine in 2026 through the PEV ²⁵¹²⁵². While none of these reports explicitly link the introduction of these vaccines to the CMYP 2022-2026, these steps indicate that the CMYP for 2022-2026 was introduced.

In the absence of the CMYP for 2022-2026, the most recent available CMYP, for 2016-2020 was reviewed. This document's objectives on vaccine distribution mention that provision should be equitable, but modalities for achieving this are not outlined ^{253, p.64}. However, a section on distribution strategy describes principles aiming to eliminate geographical inequalities: most target populations for a given vaccine are served through inoculation campaigns at a given health institution (covering 72% of the target population), involving transport of vaccines to target populations within a 15 km radius of a health institution (covering 27%) and targeted travelling vaccine campaigns to serve the final 1% of the target population – although a lack of transport often prevents this ^{254, p.21}. The CMYP also identifies pregnant women and mothers of children aged less than 1 year as specific targets for vaccination communications ^{255, pp.53-54}. Review of the aforementioned 2021 Norms and Procedures for the PEV identified no measures aiming to address socioeconomic inequalities or encourage equitable distribution ²⁵⁶.

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 100

While it is unclear whether the immunization strategy currently in force in Guinea could not be found. Guinea's national immunization strategy for the years 2016-2020 includes measures against vaccine hesitancy. The full text of the strategy currently in force could not be found for review.

Guinea operates an ongoing Expanded Programme on Immunization ("PEV") alongside NGO Gavi, historically adopting five-year Comprehensive Multi-Year Plans ("CMYP") to manage deployments ²⁵⁷. The Gavi website presents the most recent CMYP as covering the period 2016-2026, but the document upon opening gives the dates 2016-2020 ²⁵⁸²⁵⁹. Nevertheless, no more recent CMYP for Guinea could be found on the Gavi website or the Ministry of Health website ^260261262. Review of the Ministry of Health website identified a December 2021 PEV Norms and Procedures document, which refers to a CMYP covering the years 2022-2026 ^{263, p. 11}. The full CMYP 2022-2026 document could not be identified online, including on the Gavi and Ministry of Health websites ²⁶⁴²⁶⁵. However, the 2021 Ministry of Health document indicates that the new CMYP set aims for the introduction of vaccines against COVID-19, malaria, rotavirus and human papillomavirus ^{266, p.23}. Media reports published since 2022 show that steps have been taken towards introducing these vaccines, although these sources do not explicitly mention the CMYP 022-2026 ^267268269270.

In the absence of the CMYP for 2022-2026, the most recent available CMYP, for 2016-2020 was reviewed. The document outlines plans on vaccine communications, particularly identifying pregnant women and mothers of children aged less than 1 year – alongside individuals able to influence the target population's beliefs, such as male relatives and community leaders – as specific targets for communications aimed at reducing vaccine hesitancy ^{271, pp.53-54}. Additionally, the aforementioned 2021 Ministry of Health document setting out Norms and Procedures for the PEV includes a section on strategy for communications aiming to reduce vaccine hesitancy, including a multi-prong approach involving social mobilisation, community engagement, and media communications ^{272, pp.92-98}. The strategy emphasizes interpersonal engagement through individual and group meetings, including home visits, organised social events, and community events ^{273, pp.96-98}.

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

A national advisory group providing guidance on Guinea's immunization strategy is in place.

Guinea operates an ongoing Expanded Programme on Immunization ("PEV") alongside NGO Gavi, historically adopting five-year Comprehensive Multi-Year Plans ("CMYP") to manage deployments ²⁷⁴. The Gavi website presents the most recent CMYP as covering the period 2016-2026, but the document upon opening gives the dates 2016-2020 ²⁷⁵²⁷⁶. Nevertheless, no more recent CMYP for Guinea could be found on the Gavi website or the Ministry of Health website ^277278279. Review of the Ministry of Health website identified a December 2021 PEV Norms and Procedures document, which refers to a CMYP covering the years 2022-2026 ^{280, p. 11}. The full CMYP 2022-2026 document could not be identified online, including on the Gavi and Ministry of Health websites ²⁸¹²⁸². However, the 2021 Ministry of Health document indicates that the new CMYP set aims for the introduction of vaccines against COVID-19, malaria, rotavirus and human papillomavirus ^{283, p.23}. Media reports published since 2022 show that steps have been taken towards introducing these vaccines, although these sources do not explicitly mention the CMYP 2022-2026 ^284285286287. Notably, a 2022 document on the introduction of COVID-19 vaccination under the auspices of the PEV includes the CMYP in an introductory list of abbreviations, but otherwise does not refer to it ^{288, p.10}.

The CMYP which expired in 2020 states that the PEV is coordinated overall by a National PEV Coordination group supported by various technical consultative structures, including the Technical Vaccination Consultative Group ("GTCV"), which was established after the CMYP's launch, by Health Ministry decree in July 2018 ^{289, p.49 and 51}. While no precise information on the GTCV is given in the expired CMYP, it is described in a 2022 document on the rollout of COVID-19 vaccination in Guinea as responsible for providing data-based scientific and technical opinions regarding vaccination policy to the Ministry of Health ^{290, pp.26-27}. However, no further information on the GTCV, particularly its potential participation in the development of the CMYP 2022-2026, was identified on the Ministry of Health website ²⁹¹.

Additionally, Guinea has reported to the WHO that it has a National Immunization Technical Advisory Group in place since 2020 ²⁹².

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 0

No evidence that Guinea has an immunization programme for influenza was identified.

Guinea operates an ongoing Expanded Programme on Immunization ("PEV") alongside NGO Gavi, historically adopting five-year Comprehensive Multi-Year Plans ("CMYP") to manage deployments ²⁹³. The Gavi website presents the most recent CMYP as covering the period 2016-2026, but the document upon opening gives the dates 2016-2020 ²⁹⁴²⁹⁵. Nevertheless, no more recent CMYP for Guinea could be found on the Gavi website or the Ministry of Health website ^296297298. Review of the Ministry of Health website identified a December 2021 PEV Norms and Procedures document, which refers to a CMYP covering the years 2022-2026 ^{299, p. 11}. The full CMYP 2022-2026 document could not be identified online, including on the Gavi and Ministry of Health websites ³⁰⁰³⁰¹. However, the 2021 Ministry of Health document indicates that the new CMYP set aims for the introduction of vaccines against COVID-19, malaria, rotavirus and human papillomavirus ^{302, p.23}. Media reports published since 2022 show that steps have been taken towards introducing these vaccines, although these sources do not explicitly mention the CMYP 022-2026 ^303304305306.

In the absence of the CMYP 2022-2026, the previous plan was reviewed, which lists multiple vaccines covered in the PEV, but does not include influenza. No references to immunization for influenza in Guinea were found on the websites of the Gavi and Ministry of Health ³⁰⁷³⁰⁸.

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 0

No evidence that Guinea has a plan to address the effects of climate change on the health system was found.

Guinea's most recent strategic health plan is the National Health Development Plan for 2015-2024 ³⁰⁹. This plan refers to climate change as a risk factor for transmissible diseases, but does not set out any response measures ^{310, p.21}. Additionally, the AMR Resistance Plan, valid between 2020 and 2024, does not refer to climate change ³¹¹. Following the end of the National Health Development Plan, the Ministry of Health began the development of a new plan for the period 2025-2034, which was reportedly formally adopted in December 2024, followed up by technical-level workshops in April 2025 ^312313314. However, this document could not be found online, including on the Ministry of Health website; available sources describing efforts to develop the new Strategy provide no information about its content ³¹⁵. In the absence of this strategy's availability, the National Strategic Plan for Community Health for 2023-2027 was reviewed, but this document repeats the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024's statement identifing climate change as a risk factor for transmissible diseases .

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 0

No evidence that the Guinean national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct at least five of the ten WHO-defined core diagnostic tests was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that the national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for HIV, COVID-19, Lassa fever, cholera, meningitis, tuberculosis and malaria at the regional health centre level ^{316, p.45}. Only three of these diseases (HIV, tuberculosis and malaria) feature on the WHO-defined list of core diagnosis tests (HIV and tuberculosis). However, sources from the Guinea national health system show that all three of these diseases are tested for in line with the WHO core diagnosis list, namely HIV through serology, tuberculosis through microscopy, and malaria through rapid diagnostic test ^{317318, p.31319, p.75}.

Meanwhile, the JEE conducted in Guinea in 2017 notes that tests for E. coli, Salmonella spp, Klebsiella, Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Shigella and Neisseria meningitidis could be conducted at the National Public Health Laboratory, the reference laboratory part of the National Institute of Public Health, and three university hospitals ^{320, p.20}. However, research, including of versions of the National Institute of Public Health website archived in 2023, did not identify the type of diagnostic test conducted for these disesases ³²¹.

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

No evidence of a national plan on conducting testing during a public health emergency was found.

Review of relevant planning documents, including the National Strategic Plan for Pre, Per and Post-Emergency Medicine (2022), the National Multisectoral Strategic Plan Against Non-Transmissible Diseases 2021-25, and the Stakeholder Mobilisation Plan of the COVID-19 Preparation and Response Project (2021), identified no evidence of a plan setting out measures on this issue ^322323324. A 2022 case study evaluating the capabilities of the country's Public Health Emergency Operations Centres during the COVID-19 pandemic does not refer to plans for testing ³²⁵. No evidence of other relevant information was identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health and National Health Security Agency, and archived versions of the National Public Health Institute website ^326327328. Note that the JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 lists the country's likely-relevant Contingency Epidemic Contingency and Response Plan and Public Health Emergency Response Plan amongst documents reviewed during the evaluation, but these plans could not be found online ^{329, p.89}.

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

There is evidence that Guinea's national reference laboratory is accredited.

The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 notes that "a national reference laboratory is accredited to WHO standards" ^{330, p.46}. While the JEE does not name this laboratory, it does name the National Public Health Laboratory, part of the National Institute of Public Health, as reference laboratory for AMR ^{331, p.30}. The previous JEE conducted on Guinea in 2017 states that three national laboratories serve the country as reference facilities, and all three hold ISO 15189 accreditation ^{332, p.33}. However, the 2017 JEE does not name these laboratories ³³³. Wider research identified no other references to Guinea laboratories holding ISO 15189 accreditation, however, including on the websites of the Ministry of Health and archived versions of the National Institute for Public Health website ³³⁴³³⁵.

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

Guinea's national reference laboratory is subject to external quality assurance.

The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 notes that "national reference laboratories participate in external evaluation and inter-laboratory tests" ^{336, p.46}. It further states that external quality control is provided through the Guinean Laboratory Network ("REGUILAB") and the West African Laboratory Network ("RESAOLAB") ^{337, p.46}. References from the website of the Mérieux Foundation, which supports RESAOLAB, confirm that the network supports international quality control activities ³³⁸³³⁹. A 2024 press release notes that Guinean laboratories participate in annual quality control and external evaluation exercises, but these do not name the laboratories involved ³⁴⁰.

While the JEE does not name any of Guinea's national reference laboratories, it does name the National Public Health Laboratory ("LNSP"), part of the National Institute of Public Health, as reference laboratory for AMR ^{341, p.30}. No references to the LNSP participating in a external quality control were identified, including on the website of the Ministry of Health and archived versions of the National Institute of Public Health website ³⁴²³⁴³. A September 2025 press release on the inauguration of the National Public Health Institute's new headquarters notes that the LNSP is responsible for external evaluation of other laboratories in Guinea ³⁴⁴.

However, the previous JEE conducted on Guinea in 2017 states that three national laboratories serve the country as reference facilities, and all three hold ISO 15189 accreditation ^{345, p.33}. While the 2017 JEE does not name these laboratories, ISO 15189 requires ongoing external quality assurance ^{346, p.36}.

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 100

A nationwide specimen transport system is in place.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 describes the existence of a specimen transport covering all priority diseases, all levels and multiple sectors ^{347, p.46}. The system is managed by a laboratory data management system conforming to District Health Information System Version 2 using the LABOOK software ^{348, p.46}. Additionally, a national specimen transport policy, recently revised as of 2023, developed under the One Health programme, was in place ^{349, p.46}. However, this document could not be found online, including on the Ministry of Health and National Health Security Agency websites ³⁵⁰³⁵¹.

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

No evidence of a national plan on expanding laboratory capacity during a public health emergency was found.

Review of relevant planning documents, including the National Strategic Plan for Pre, Per and Post-Emergency Medicine (2022), the National Multisectoral Strategic Plan Against Non-Transmissible Diseases 2021-25, and the Stakeholder Mobilisation Plan of the COVID-19 Preparation and Response Project (2021), identified no evidence of a plan setting out measures on this issue ^352353354. A 2022 case study evaluating the capabilities of the country's Public Health Emergency Operations Centres during the COVID-19 pandemic does not refer to the expansion of laboratory capacity ³⁵⁵. No evidence of other relevant information was identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health and National Health Security Agency, and archived versions of the National Public Health Institute website ^356357358. Note that the JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 lists the country's likely-relevant Contingency Epidemic Contingency and Response Plan and Public Health Emergency Response Plan amongst documents reviewed during the evaluation, but these plans could not be found online ^{359, p.89}.

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

There is evidence that event-based and indicator-based surveillance is in place in Guinea, but no evidence of daily data analysis was identified.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 reports that both event-based and indicator-based surveillance are in place and functional at the national level ^{360, p.37-38}. However, the JEE notes that limitations exist on the integration between event and indicator-based surveillance at the intermediate and primary levels, alongside capacity for intermediate-level indicator-based surveillance ^{361, p.37}. It also recommends development of intermediate and primary-level event-based surveillance, including by adopting the Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources tool with a view to increasing capacity ^{362, p.40}. A 2021 Ministry of Health document setting out standards for Guinea's Expanded Immunization Programme refers to indicator-based surveillance in the country as comprising the surveillance of various indicators at the level of individual medical institutions ³⁶³. However, neither of this sources refer to the frequency of analysis of data.

Further, there is evidence of efforts to improve event-based surveillance in Guinea. In an October 2024 press release, the National Agency for Health Security stated that, in response to the JEE the previous year, the Ministry of Health had integrated a roadmap of measures for the improvement of event-based surveillance into its National Health Security Action Plan ³⁶⁴. The ANSS began assembling a technical working group charged with considering measures to improve event-based surveillance in October 2024 ³⁶⁵. In July 2025, the Ministry of Health announced a tender seeking a consultant who would be responsible for introducing an electronic event-based surveillance system ³⁶⁶. However, no references to daily data analysis for the surveillance system were identified.

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

Research identified publicly-available evidence that an IHR focal point is in place in Guinea.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that an IHR focal point is in place ^{367, p.14}. The focal point is centred on the National Health Security Agency ("ANSS"), and appointed by the Ministry of Health, and includes 19 separate members responsible for various technical areas of the IHR ^{368, p.14}. The JEE described Guinea's IHR focal point as having sufficient technical and human capacity to maintain communications with the WHO, but noted that legal dispositions prevented it from playing a full role in maintaining communications on the issue across national institutions, and also that financial limitations prevented capacity reinforcement exercises ^{369, p.14}. The JEE identified the current IHR focal point leader as of 2023 as Dr Yakouba Savane ^{370, p.73}. An ANSS press release published in September 2025 named Dr Yakouba Savane as holding the same position, who was part of a delegation to an ECOWAS meeting on public health ³⁷¹.

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 100

Guinea's government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national levels.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that epidemiological data is managed through the District Health Information System 2 (DHIS 2), which operates at the national, local and regional levels at both public and private medical institutions ^{372, p.38-39}. While the EMPRES-I system for surveillance of zoonoses is also in place, the JEE notes that the DHIS 2 system is not interoperable with EMPRES-I or any other electronic systems ^{373, p.39}.

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 0

The electronic reporting surveillance system includes laboratory data, but it is unclear whether this is collected in real time. No evidence of disaggregation was found.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that epidemiological data is managed through the District Health Information System 2 (DHIS 2), which operates at the national, local and regional levels at both public and private medical institutions ^{374, p.38-39}. The JEE further notes that data is uploaded through DHIS 2 in real time, although no explicit references to laboratory data collection in real time is given ^{375, p. 21}. The JEE also notes that laboratory data are managed through both DHIS 2 and the specialty laboratory software LABOOK, but goes on to note that in practice, data entry for laboratory data is not conducted through DHIS 2; the system was also described as not interoperable with any other systems used, indicating that data entered into LABOOK cannot be transferred to DHIS 2 ^{376, p.40}. The JEE does not note any capacity for disaggregation of laboratory data ³⁷⁷. An academic article describing the implementation of DHIS 2 in Guinea indicates that, through a COVID-19 module introduced into DHIS 2 by the National Health Security Agency ("ANSS") in 2020, stakeholders including laboratories were able to view data in real time, but does not specify whether laboratories were able to upload data in real time ³⁷⁸. No references to such capability for the DHIS 2 system, or disaggregation of data, were identified on the Ministry of Health or ANSS websites ³⁷⁹³⁸⁰.

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 50

There is evidence of some wastewater and environmental surveillance (WES) activity within the country. The WHO and GPEI Q4 2025 Polio ES Bulletin lists the country as having 9 ES sites as of Q4 in 2025, although it is unclear whether these are at the national level and are ongoing.³⁸¹

In 2016, under the Polio Environmental Surveillance Expansion Plan (PESEP), the GPEI began initiating ES implementation in six new countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger) but there is no further information regarding this. ³⁸²

Moreover, in 2023, the French Development Agency (AFD) (coordinated by the Pasteur Institute in collaboration with the Obépine Scientific Interest Group (GIS)), launched the ATLANTES (Alliance for the Extension of Pathogen Surveillance in Wastewater) project. ³⁸³ Phase one of the project focused on the design and preparation of wastewater sampling engineering system. Meanwhile, phase two focused on the operational implementation of wastewater monitoring, and is a pilot project for wastewater monitoring deployed in Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia.

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 50

Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used.

The National Strategy for Digital Health 2021-2025, adopted by the Ministry of Health, indicates that electronic health records are not in wide use in Guinea, noting significant challenges. Nevertheless, the Strategy notes that, as of the time of its adoption, some hospitals had introduced internal electronic records using platforms such as OpenMRS, Bahmni, and OpenSPR. The Strategy establishes various measures aiming to introduce electronic health records, such as the creation of standards for such records and introduction of a central database of health system users ³⁸⁴. A key challenge identified is the lack of an existing national ID number system, and the Strategy includes a plan to create a technical committee between the Ministry for Civil Status and Ministry of Health to consider the possibility of creating a single digital identifier, which could in future become the basis for electronic health records ^{385, p.51}. Guinea subsequently developed a national ID number system, with implementing legislation introduced in April 2025. ³⁸⁶ However, no more recent developments regarding the introduction of electronic health records, including with reference to use of the national ID number system, were identified on the Ministry of Health website. ³⁸⁷

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 0

Given that electronic health records are implemented in some hospitals in Guinea but are not yet widespread, the national public health system does not have comprehensive access to individual patient electronic health records.

No references to national public health system access to electronic health records were identified on the Ministry of Health website ³⁸⁸. The National Strategy for Digital Health 2021-2025, adopted by the Ministry of Health, refers to electronic health records, but only to consider paths towards their introduction ³⁸⁹. Specifically, this involved a plan to create a technical committee between the Ministry for Civil Status and Ministry of Health to consider the possibility of creating a single digital identifier, which could in future become the basis for electronic health records ^{390, p.51}. Guinea subsequently developed a national ID number system, with implementing legislation introduced in April 2025. However, no more recent developments regarding the introduction of electronic health records, including with reference to use of the national ID number system, were identified on the Ministry of Health website. ³⁹¹

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 0

Given that electronic health records are implemented in some hospitals in Guinea but are not yet widespread, the national public health system does not have comprehensive access to individual patient electronic health records.

No references to data standards for electronic health records were identified on the Ministry of Health website ³⁹². The National Strategy for Digital Health 2021-2025, adopted by the Ministry of Health, refers to electronic health records, but only to consider paths towards their introduction ³⁹³. This included the development of standards for the use of electronic health records, which could involve data standards ^{394, p. 86}. The National Strategy for Digital Health included the development of standards in an action point to be completed by June 2022 ^{395, p.86}. However, no references to completion of this objective were identified on the Ministry of Health website ³⁹⁶.

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data in Guinea.

The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 states that, as regards zoonoses surveillance, a partnership involving ministries part of the country's One Health programme exists, which fosters collaboration through information-sharing meetings, joint supervision, strategic meetings in cases of emergencies, and other measures ^{397, p.21}. Further, as regards human health, the JEE notes that "sectors of animal raising, environment, fisheries" – presumably referring to ministeries responsible for these areas – participate in weekly meetings alongside technical agencies including the National Public Health Institute, National Health Security Agency and national reference laboratories for animal health and hemorrhagic fevers ^{398, p.39}.

However, these activities primarily reflect planning and coordination efforts rather than a fully operational, routine mechanism for data sharing. No evidence of a nationwide, integrated system that systematically collects, consolidates, and shares surveillance data across human, animal, and environmental sectors is presented in the JEE ³⁹⁹

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 100

De-identified health surveillance reports are published on government websites, but research indicates this occurs very infrequently.

Review of the websites of the Ministry of Health, National Health Security Agency ("ANSS"), and Ministry of Agriculture identified only scattered reports ^400401402. The ANSS website contains a single national epidemiological report, dated April 2025, which details numbers of cases for various priority infectious diseases and zoonoses at the national level sourced from the DHIS 2 medical data surveillance system ⁴⁰³.

Further, the Ministry of Agriculture website contains two archived weekly zoonoses surveillance reports published in March and April 2022, numbered nine and ten, suggesting that at least this many reports were published ⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁵. In 2025, the Ministry of Agriculture has published two such reports to its Facebook page ⁴⁰⁶⁴⁰⁷. The Facebook page had not been used for several years until the appointment of a new minister in July 2025, since which time two reports have been published, in August and September 2025 ⁴⁰⁸⁴⁰⁹.

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 0

While general personal data protection legislation is in place, no evidence of provisions specifically applicable to health surveillance was found.

No evidence of legislation or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals was found on the websites of the Ministry of Health or National Health Security Agency ⁴¹⁰⁴¹¹.

Law no. 2016/037/AN on cybersecurity and the protection of personal data criminalises the non-consensual electronic storage of personal data, which explicitly includes health status, but not health information, under article 56 ⁴¹². The law also criminalises the publication of personal data without the data subject's consent, where the publication leads to a violation of their private life, honour or dignity under article 44 ⁴¹³. Additionally, an (untitled) Presidential Decree published in April 2025 to reform the national identification system further developed data protection provisions in Guinea ⁴¹⁴. This decree's article 4 establishes the principle that processing of personal data must be conducted for clearly-defined, limited, explicit and legitimate purposes, and that the data must be precise, complete and up to date ⁴¹⁵. Articles 14-16 require data controllers to establish appropriate security measures and provide guarantees of these, and article 17 empowers data subjects to access data held regarding them ⁴¹⁶.

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 0

No evidence of provisions safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals and requiring protection of data from cyberattacks was found.

No evidence of legislation or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals was found on the websites of the Ministry of Health or National Health Security Agency ⁴¹⁷⁴¹⁸.

While law no. 2016/037/AN on cybersecurity and the protection of personal data criminalises the non-consensual electronic storage or publication of personal data, it does not refer to data security measures ⁴¹⁹. An (untitled) Presidential Decree published in April 2025 to reform the national identification system further developed data protection provisions in Guinea, with articles 14-16 requiring data controllers to establish appropriate security measures and provide guarantees of these ⁴²⁰. However, this regulation does not explicitly require application of measures protecting data from cyberattacks. ⁴²¹

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 50

The government is required by international agreements to share surveillance data with other countries, and there is evidence that it has done so during a health emergency. However, available sources do not indicate whether Guinea's commitments apply to one or more diseases.

Review of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites, alongside the general government portal, identified no explicit commitments to sharing surveillance data with other countries during a health emergency ^422423424. However, as a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Guinea is committed to sharing surveillance data with fellow ECOWAS members through the West African Health Organization (WAHO), created under Protocol A/P2/7/87 dated 9 July 1987, which includes a commitment to collecting and sharing epidemiological information ⁴²⁵. The Protocol does not specify whether this epidemiological information should be shared for one or more than one diseases, but it may be presumed to apply to all diseases ⁴²⁶. The WAHO maintains a Regional Health Data Warehouse ("RHDW"), managed through the DHIS 2 medical data software, in which data from all 15 ECOWAS members on "epidemic-prone diseases" is publicised ⁴²⁷. While the RHDW portal is accessible only to authorised users, a report on the system from the DHIS 2 website includes a screenshot of data from Guinea ⁴²⁸⁴²⁹. Further, the WAHO maintains the "ECOWAS Epidemic Outbreaks Dashboard" which as of the time of research included data from all member states, but only on COVID-19 cases in the period 2020-2025 ⁴³⁰⁴³¹. Despite the general mention of surveillance data from Protocol A/P2/7/87, and the reference to sharing of data on "epidemic-prone diseases" through RHDW, available sources do not explicitly indicate whether Guinea's commitments apply to more than one disease. ^{432433434435436}

Additionally, Guinea is a signatory to the WHO-led Regional Strategy for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response 2020-2030, adopted alongside other African WHO member states ⁴³⁷. The Regional Strategy includes the objective of producing a disease surveillance bulletin on a weekly or monthly basis, although information is to be shared with the WHO, rather than other nations directly ⁴³⁸.

The country's adherence to the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) serves as a primary legal and operational commitment. As a signatory, Guinea is obligated to notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of public health events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. This legally binding framework necessitates the sharing of surveillance data with the WHO but does not specify provisions to share with other countries. ⁴³⁹

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 0

No evidence of a national system for providing additional resources for contact tracing during a public health emergency were found.

No references to such a system or related plan were identified on the Ministry of Health and National Health Security Agency websites ⁴⁴⁰⁴⁴¹. Available information on the country's response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates that contact tracing resources were limited ⁴⁴²⁴⁴³. Available documents produced as part of Guinea's COVID-19 response also present no information indicating a system to expand contact tracing, although one of these details a number of measures taken and resources supplied under a World Bank-financed project to expand contact tracing ⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁵. No information on contact tracing strategies was identified through review of materials relating to small-scale epidemics which have occurred in Guinea in recent years ⁴⁴⁶.

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 0

No evidence was found that Guinea provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended.

Review of the websites of the Ministry of Health and National Institute for Health Security identified no references to wraparound services. ⁴⁴⁷⁴⁴⁸ Available planning documents relevant to Guinea's response to the COVID-19 pandemic do not indicate whether such services were provided for ⁴⁴⁹⁴⁵⁰. Note that Guinea's social security system, embodied by the National Social Security Fund ("CNSS") for employees in general, and the National Social Contingency Fund ("CNPS") for employees of the state, prioritises support of workers who become ill or are injured at work, and does not appear to provide general illness or unemployment benefits ^{451, pp. 52-53, 6, 7}.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 0

No evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the border authorities and public health system on management of suspected disease cases was identified.

Review of the websites of the Ministry of Health, National Health Security Agency ("ANSS") and Central Directorate of Border Police ("DCPAF") identified no evidence of such a plan or agreement ^452453454. Particularly, the DCPAF includes no references to public health-related responsibilities in a list of activities on its website ⁴⁵⁵. Media reports indicate that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the ANSS collaborated with unspecified border authorities to complete checks at Ahmed Sékou Touré International Airport in Conakry in order to verify arriving passengers' health status, but present no evidence that this was conducted in line with a specific joint plan or agreement ⁴⁵⁶. Notably, an undated International Organization for Migration ("IOM") press release notes that, following the end of the Ebola epidemic in Guinea in 2016, public health oversight measures at border crossing points, which had been supported by the IOM and WHO during the epidemic, were ended ⁴⁵⁷.

Reports on developments in border health security indicate that while efforts to improve oversight have been taken in recent years, these have been led by public health authorities. In August 2024, the IOM supported the Ministry of Health and ANSS in updating a roadmap for the reinforcement of biosecurity procedures at priority border crossing points ⁴⁵⁸. In April 2025, the ANSS announced that it had reintroduced health security surveillance at Ahmed Sékou Touré International Airport, the Autonomous Port of Conakry, and at Kotizou Border Post on the southern border with Liberia ⁴⁵⁹. However, these reports make no reference to participation by the DCPAF or any other law enforcement agency ⁴⁶⁰⁴⁶¹.

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

An applied epidemiology programme is available in Guinea. No evidence of provision of support for public health practitioners to complete programmes abroad was found.

The National Health Security Agency ("ANSS") has organised a Frontline Field Epidemiology Training Programme (FETP) since 2016, and an Intermediate Field Epidemiology Training Programme ("FETP") since 2019, with the support of the US Centers for Disease Control and the African Field Epidemiology Network ("AFENET") ⁴⁶²⁴⁶³. The Frontline course lasts three months, and the intermediate course lasts nine months; both primarily aimed at local and regional-level public health practitioners ⁴⁶⁴⁴⁶⁵. Reports from the AFENET website indicate that, while three cohorts of practitioners had completed the FETP by December 2023, in the following 18 months, an additional nine cohorts were launched; by May 2025, 319 public health practitioners had completed the courses ⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶⁷. The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 assesses Guinea's FETP as "contributing significantly to local capacity reinforcement" ^{468, p.37}, and that staff who have completed the FETP are in place "at every level of the public health pyramid" ^{469, p.42}. In September 2025, the ANSS announced the adoption of a Strategic Plan for Epidemiological Training for the period 2025-2029, replacing a previous document which had applied between 2018 and 2023, incorporating recommmendations made in the JEE ⁴⁷⁰. Review of the Ministry of Health and ANSS websites, alongside the JEE, identified no information regarding the provision of support for public health practitioners to travel abroad to complete epidemiology training ^{471472, 8.}

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 100

An field epidemiology training programme is available in Guinea and open to animal health professionals.

The National Health Security Agency ("ANSS") has organised a Frontline Field Epidemiology Training Programme (FETP) since 2016, and an Intermediate Field Epidemiology Training Programme ("FETP") since 2019, with the support of the US Centers for Disease Control and the African Field Epidemiology Network ("AFENET") ⁴⁷³⁴⁷⁴. The Frontline course lasts three months, and the intermediate course lasts nine months; both primarily aimed at local and regional-level public health practitioners ⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷⁶. Reports on the FETPs published by the AFENET have frequently noted participation of veterinarians in the courses; a May 2025 article stated that of the 11 cohorts and 319 practitioners who had completed the FETP since 2016, 31 were veterinarians ⁴⁷⁷⁴⁷⁸. Additionally, Guinea is part of the In Service Applied Epidemiology Training Programme, conducted under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization and World Animal Health Organization. ⁴⁷⁹

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 100

There is public evidence that Guinea has at least one trained epidemiologist per 200,000 of population.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 states that 72 epidemiologists trained to intermediate or advanced level were available in Guinea, indicating a ratio of over one per 200,000 population, given an estimated population of between 12 and 13 million ^{480, p.42}. For reference, to meet the target ratio at the upper bound of the country's estimated population, 65 trained epidemiologists would be required. A report published in December 2023 by the African Field Epidemiology Network (AFEN) indicates that the number of epidemiologists trained by the country's Intermediate FETP programme rose to 69 following the graduation of a fourth cohort ⁴⁸¹. The AFEN has not since reported on graduations of additional intermediate-level Guinean cohorts, although several cohorts of Frontline-level courses have been launched ⁴⁸².

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 33.33

There is evidence that Guinea has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, but the plan is not publicly available.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization conducted in May 2023 confirmed that Guinea had a National Action Plan for Health Security for 2019-2023, which had expired in April 2023, and which had suffered from a lack of funding (see pages 12, 13 and 15). ⁴⁸³ The JEE recommended Guinea adopt a new National Action Plan for Health Security, taking into account the JEE's findings (see page ix). ⁴⁸⁴

On page 5 of the July-September 2024 issue of the official bulletin of Guinea's One Health Platform, a representative of the National Agency for Health Security announced that a new National Action Plan for Health Security had been adopted for the period 2024-2028. ⁴⁸⁵ This representative described the plan as "a fundamental strategic framework for facing health risks in an integrated and concerted manner, based on the recommendations formulated by the [JEE] of May 2023", but he did not provide any more specific information about what it covers. ⁴⁸⁶

There is no further information about the plan, nor any evidence that it is publicly available, on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security and the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁴⁸⁷⁴⁸⁸

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 100

Guinea has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place that has been updated in the last three years.

Guinea's current National Action Plan for Health Security, covering the period 2024-2028, was developed and adopted in 2024. ⁴⁸⁹

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea's overarching national public health emergency response plan follows one-health principles by covering multiple threat types, e.g. antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic disease spillover, biological accidents or deliberate acts.

There is no detailed information about the contents of the 2024-2028 National Action Plan for Health Security, nor any evidence that the plan is publicly available, on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁴⁹⁰⁴⁹¹

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea's overarching national public health emergency response plan considers the impact of health equity or includes mechanisms for identifying and considering the needs of vulnerable populations.

There is no detailed information about the contents of the 2024-2028 National Action Plan for Health Security, nor any evidence that the plan is publicly available, on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁴⁹²⁴⁹³

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response.

There is no mention of such a mechanism in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) reports that the World Health Organization published in 2023 and 2017. ⁴⁹⁴⁴⁹⁵ There is no evidence of such a mechanism on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁴⁹⁶⁴⁹⁷

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a policy, plan or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions during an epidemic or pandemic.

There is no evidence of a a policy, plan or guidelines for the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions during epidemics or pandemics in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023, nor in the Ebola Virus Disease Response Plan (adopted 2021), or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^498499500501

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 100

There is evidence that Guinea has completed national-level biological threat-focused exercises in the past year, but there is no evidence that it has activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

The website of the World Health Organization (WHO) indicates that a simulation exercise was held in Guinea between 29 July and 2 August 2025, but it does not provide any details about what the exercise entailed. ⁵⁰² In addition, the National Agency for Health Security reports having participated in a one-day online WHO-organised health emergency simulation exercise on 13 November 2024 and a three-day tabletop ebola epidemic simulation exercise from 18 to 20 February 2025. ^503504505

On 3 September 2024, the Guinean government declared an outbreak of mpox (formerly known as "monkeypox"), following the detection of a case in the Koyamah sub-prefecture, in Macenta prefecture. ⁵⁰⁶ The official announcement did not explicitly mention the activation of a national response plan, but it did note that shortly before identifying the case, the government had developed a "National Preparation and Response Plan" for the disease. ⁵⁰⁷ News reports from July and September 2025 stated that the outbreak was still ongoing and that, since September 2024, the government had taken response measures, including the implementation of the aforementioned National Preparation and Response Plan. ⁵⁰⁸⁵⁰⁹ There is no evidence that the government has initiated any outbreak response measures more recently than 3 September 2024 on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, or in the WHO's Disease Outbreak News database. ^510511512

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has, in the past year, undergone an exercise to identify a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response of a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities.

The website of the World Health Organization indicates that Guinea last conducted an "After Action Review" in 2021. ⁵¹³ There is no evidence of more recent efforts to identifiy gaps or best practices in response on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁵¹⁴⁵¹⁵

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has, in the past year, undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private-sector representatives.

The website of the World Health Organization indicates that a simulation exercise was held in Guinea between 29 July and 2 August 2025, but it does not provide any details about what the exercise entailed, and it does not indicate private-sector involvement. ⁵¹⁶ There is no information about this exercise, or evidence of other exercises in the past year, on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁵¹⁷⁵¹⁸

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

Guinea has an emergency operations centre in place.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization conducted in May 2023 confirmed that Guinea has a Public Health Emergency Operation Centre (COU-SP), which is a department of the National Agency for Public Health, operating at the national level and in all 38 healthcare districts (see pages 46-48). ⁵¹⁹ The JEE states that, during public health emergencies, the COU-SP acts as the national focal point for public health and is responsible for implementing emergency response plans, contributing to capacity building, developing an early warning system, participating in response, and ensuring compliance with International Health Regulations (see page 46). ⁵²⁰ It also states that the COU-SP has well-defined operating procedures, reliable electricity supply and communication infrastructure, and sufficient capacity to accommodate representatives of all relevant ministries, state bodies and other partners (see page 47). ⁵²¹ However, the JEE further states that the COU-SP's personnel are not sufficiently trained, especially at the intermediate level, and that its capacities are inadequate compared to current standards (see page 48). ⁵²²

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea's emergency operations centre is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year, nor that it does so in practice.

The website of the World Health Organization (WHO) indicates that a simulation exercise was held in Guinea between 29 July and 2 August 2025, but it does not provide any details about what the exercise entailed. ⁵²³ In addition, the National Agency for Health Security reports having participated in a one-day online WHO-organised health emergency simulation exercise on 13 November 2024 and a three-day tabletop ebola epidemic simulation exercise from 18 to 20 February 2025, but neither of these exercises appear to have constituted a drill. ^524525526

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report that the World Health Organization published in 2023 recommends Guinea to introduce a plan for simulation exercises to reinforce the capabilities of rapid intervention teams (see pages 4, 25, 44 and 47). ⁵²⁷ It notes that some such exercises do take place, but they only cover epidemiology, excluding sectors like animal health and environmental health (see page 43). ⁵²⁸ Moreover, it states that these exercises lack sufficient regularity (see page 46). ⁵²⁹

There is no evidence of a requirement for annual drills, or that drills are conducted anually in practice, on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁵³⁰⁵³¹

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no evidence that, within the last year, Guinea's emergency operations centre has conducted a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario.

The website of the World Health Organization (WHO) indicates that a simulation exercise was held in Guinea between 29 July and 2 August 2025, but it does not provide any information about the speed of response to the scenario. ⁵³² In addition, the National Agency for Health Security reports having participated in a one-day online WHO-organised health emergency simulation exercise on 13 November 2024 and a three-day tabletop ebola epidemic simulation exercise from 18 to 20 February 2025, but there is no evidence that either of these involved responding to a scenario within a specific timeframe. ^533534535

On 3 September 2024, the Guinean government declared an outbreak of mpox (formerly known as "monkeypox"), following the detection of a case in the Koyamah sub-prefecture, in Macenta prefecture. ⁵³⁶ The official announcement did not explicitly mention the activation of a national response plan, but it did note that shortly before identifying the case, the government had developed a "National Preparation and Response Plan" for the disease. ⁵³⁷ News reports from July and September 2025 stated that the outbreak was still ongoing and that, since September 2024, the government had taken response measures, including the implementation of the aforementioned National Preparation and Response Plan, but they did not mention the timeframe within which response measures were initiated. ⁵³⁸⁵³⁹

There is no evidence that Guinea's emergency operations centre has, within the last year, conducted a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁵⁴⁰⁵⁴¹

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 0

No evidence that Guinea has carried out exercises or established plans seeking to manage potential deliberate biological events was found.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 makes no mention of capacity for managing deliberate biological events ⁵⁴². The document states that a protocol exists which governs interactions between the police, civil defence staff and health workers in the event of a public health event ^{543, p.59}. However, neither this document nor any other indicating relevant capacity were identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Security and Civil Defence and National Health Security Agency ^544545546. Public reports on exercises carried out by public health workers or security forces in recent years do not indicate any scenarios considering a deliberate biological event ⁵⁴⁷⁵⁴⁸.

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Guinea has a document detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency.

The National Agency for Health Security has published the Manual of Standard Operating Procedures for Risk Communication and Community Engagement in Emergency Situations in Guinea, which is dated June 2021, and which details the country's risk communication plan for public health emergencies. ⁵⁴⁹

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 0

Guinea's risk communication plan does not outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs.

The Manual of Standard Operating Procedures for Risk Communication and Community Engagement in Emergency Situations in Guinea, adopted by the National Agency for Health Security in 2021, states that risk communication should prioritise "the most vulnerable", identified as including people with physical or mental disabilities, women, people with low income, people with low levels of literacy, and residents of rural areas (see page 33). ⁵⁵⁰ However, the document merely states that, "if necessary", special communication strategies should be implemented to reach these populations (see page 33); it does not explicitly include any specific measures to reach these other other vulnerable groups. The document's communication plan does include enagement of "community leaders" at regional and prefectural levels, as well as use of rural and local radio stations, but these are not explicitly framed as measures to reach specific groups (see pages 37 and 38). The document does not address the language or languages to be used for risk communication.

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Guinea's risk communication plan designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency.

The Manual of Standard Operating Procedures for Risk Communication and Community Engagement in Emergency Situations in Guinea, adopted by the National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) in 2021, states that during public health emergencies the designated spokesperson for media communication at the national level is the ANSS's general director, who may choose to delegate this responsibility to a public communication officer from the Public Health Emergency Operation Centre (a department of the ANSS) or to an authorised official from the One Health platform (see page 29). ⁵⁵¹

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 100

In the past year, Guinea's public health system has regularly shared messages via online platforms to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns, including to dispell rumors, misinformation or disinformation.

In the 12 months preceding 13 October 2025, the National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) principally used its Facebook page to share information about its own activities. [1] However, it has occasionally used the platform to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns.

On four occasions in this period (17 October 2024, 29 October 2024, 4 November 2024 and 13 November 2024), the ANSS made Facebook posts sharing statistics on the spread of mpox (also known as monkeypox) in the country. [1] On seven occasions (20 January 2025, 29 January 2025, 10 February 2025, 19 February 2025, 24 February 2025, 16 June 2025, 7 July 2025), it made Facebook posts sharing information about the parts of the country currently affected by outbreaks of various infectious diseases (namely polio, measles, covid-19, diphtheria, Lassa fever, rabies, yellow fever, dengue fever and mpox).

On 16 occasions in this period, the ANSS made Facebook posts with general information about particular infectious diseases, including descriptions of symptoms and modes of transmission, as well as recommendations for preventative measures (including encouragement to obtain vaccination, where applicable). [1] Six such posts were made about mpox (1 February 2025, 11 February 2025, 3 June 2025, 18 June 2025, 30 June 2025, 9 July 2025). Three such posts were made about measles (7 February 2025, 21 January 2025, 30 January 2025). Two such posts were made about rabies (13 January 2024, 8 February 2024) and Lassa fever (4 February 2024, 6 February 2024) respectively. There was also one such post each about Polio (24 January 2025), diphtheria (3 February 2025) and yellow fever (10 February 2025).

On one occasion (30 May 2025), the ANSS used Facebook to share information about a new covid-19 variant. [1

On three occasions (7 June 2025, 16 June 2025, 8 July 2025), the ANSS made Facebook posts containing advice for people travelling to or returning from Sierra Leone about how to avoid the spread of mpox. [1]

On four occasions, the ANSS made Facebook posts seeking to dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation. On 17 June 2025, it made a post refuting the idea that covid-19 vaccines cause mpox. [1] On 8 July 2025, it made a post refuting the idea that "mpox is just a form of scabies". On 9 July 2025, it made a post refuting the idea that mpox is "a conspiracy to enrich labs and justify new restrictive measures". [K] On 10 July 2025, it made a post refuting the idea that mpox only affects homosexuals. In addition, on 22 July 2025, it made a general post warning people not to trust "stigmatization and rumours" spread by unverified sources, and advising people to trust information from the ANSS instead.

There is no evidence that, in the 12 months preceding 13 October 2025, the ANSS's website, or the website or Facebook page of the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, have been used to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns or dispell rumors, misinformation or disinformation. [2, 3, 4]

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Guinea's president or ministers have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. There is no such evidence in Guinean or international media, or on the websites of the websites of the National Agency for Health Security, the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Presidency, the General Secretariat of the Government, or the Government. ^{552553554555556}

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 37.44

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 0

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 30

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 45.83

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

No evidence was found that Guinea has introduced restrictions on the export or import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

The WHO's Disease Outbreak News pages and websites of the Ministry of Health and National Agency for Health Security show that while infectious disease outbreaks have ocurred in Guinea in the past year, including of mpox, but contain no evidence of imposition of international-level restrictions in response ^557558559560. No evidence that Guinea has introduced restrictions on the export or import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak was found on the websites of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, National Assembly, and the General Directorate of Customs, including the latter's list of import and export prohibitions in force ^561562563.

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

No evidence was found that Guinea has introduced restrictions on the export or import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

The WHO's Disease Outbreak News pages and websites of the Ministry of Health and National Agency for Health Security show that infectious disease outbreaks have ocurred in Guinea in the past year, including of mpox, but contain no evidence of imposition of international-level restrictions in response ^564565566. No evidence that Guinea has introduced restrictions on the export or import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak was found on the websites of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, National Assembly, and the General Directorate of Customs, including the latter's list of import and export prohibitions in force ^567568569.

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

No evidence was identified that Guinea has implemented travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year.

No evidence of such restrictions was identified through review of the WHO's Disease Outbreak Notifications page, or the websites of the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Health Security Agency ^570571572573.

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 100

Guinea uses a risk-based approach to international travel-related measures.

The Civil Aviation Authority (AGAC)'s Aeronautical Regulation, issued in September 2022, instructs "competent state agencies" considering measures against the transmission of infectious diseases to "adopt a multi-level risk-based approach" ^{574, p.85}. The AGAC recommends considering the examples of multi-level risk-based approaches set out in the International Civil Aviation Organization's Manual for managing trans-border risks related to COVID-19, which include compulsory measures such as disease testing prior to travel, use of PPE, and social distancing ^{575, p.85}. The AGAC also instructs "competent state agencies" to consider the need to prioritise travel permission for essential staff, particularly air staff ^{576, p.86}.

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 2.62

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 3.63

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 0

Guinea does not have a health workforce strategy that has been updated in the past five years.

Guinea has the Policy for the Development of Human Resources for Health, which the Ministry of Health published in February 2019. ⁵⁷⁷ Previously, there was the Strategic Plan for the Development of Human Resources in Health, which the MInistry of Health published in February 2013. ⁵⁷⁸ The World Health Organization's 2023 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Guinea did not acknowledge the existence of either of these documents, instead reporting that the development of a "strategic plan" or "strategy" for the development of human resources in health had begun in 2012 and was still underway at the time of the evaluation (see pages 41-42). ⁵⁷⁹

On the websites of the National Agency for Health Security and the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, there is no evidence of any health workforce plan, strategy or policy that has been adopted or updated more recently than February 2019.

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 0

Insufficient evidence is available to indicate that Guinea has sufficient capacity within the health system to provide essential services.

The National Plan for Health Development (PNDS) indicates that, as of 2014, the Guinean health system included 11,527 staff, including approximately 1,384 doctors (equivalent to 18 per 100,000 population), and 2005 nurses and midwives (18.8 per 100,000 population) ^{580, p.26}. The PNDS describes various issues affecting the medical system human resources landscape, including limited capacity in training institutions and training management, poorly-adjusted output of trainees, and insufficient coordination between stakeholders involved in training and deployment ^{581, p.27}. The PNDS does not set precise objectives for the number of medical personnel to be available in 2024, although a range of qualitative aims are set ⁵⁸².

The Healthcare Statistics Annual, published by the National Institute of Statistics, is most recently available for 2022, although evidence exists to show that work on compiling the 2023 edition was ongoing during the following year. ⁵⁸³⁵⁸⁴ The 2022 annual indicates a similar position to that described in the PNDS: in 2022, 1,341 doctors were present, and 2007 nurses and midwives ^{585, p.35}. Given an increase since 2014 in Guinea's population of approximately three million (to 13 261 638 in 2021), this indicates a decrease in the number of medical staff available in proportion to the population; namely, the proportion of doctors fell to 10.1 per 100,000, and the proportion of nurses and midwives fell to 10.5 per 100,000) ^{586, p.35}. The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 noted that a Strategic Plan for the development of human resources in the health system was under development, although the document also states that such a plan had been in development since 2012 ^{587, p.42}. The JEE states that a sufficient number of trained epidemiologists is available in the Guinean health sector, but does not evaluate the number of health sector staff overall ^{588, p.43}.

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 0

No evidence of a plan ensuring continuity of essential health services during a health emergency in Guinea was found.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that Guinea had adopted a COVID-19 response plan which specifically addressed continuity of essential health services during the pandemic, and also that the 2022 Strategic Plan on Pre, Peri and Post-Hospital Medical Emergencies established measures to ensure the continued provision of surgery and maternity care during emergencies ^{589, p.54}. Research could not identify the COVID-19 response plan including a section on continuity of essential health services, including on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene and National Health Security Agency ⁵⁹⁰⁵⁹¹. The Strategic Plan on Pre, Peri and Post-Hospital Medical Emergencies is available through the Ministry website, but review of the document did not identify a specific section or measures aimed at ensuring the continuity of essential health services ⁵⁹². However, a flow chart in the document determining how access to the emergency medical system should be determined shows that ideally, separate pathways should be implemented for access to emergency medical services and emergency surgical, obstetric and pediatric services ^{593, p.25}. No evidence of other strategic documents addressing continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency was found on the websites of the Ministry of Health and National Health Security Agency ⁵⁹⁴⁵⁹⁵.

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 2.91

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 100

Guinea has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in isolation units.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization conducted in 2023 found that epidemiological treatment centres and isolation units were present at entry points in all eight of the country's regions (see page 52), that isolation areas are present in healthcare facilities (see page 57), and that patients suspected of having a disease of epidemic potential are regularly isolated in the Centre for Epidemiological Treatment (see page 57). ⁵⁹⁶

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

No evidence was found that Guinea has updated or adopted a contingency plan on expanding isolation capacity, or demonstrated capacity to do so, in the past two years.

The JEE conducted in respect of the company notes that isolation capacity is available at the Epidemiological Treatment Centres (CTEs) present around the country, alongside border entry points ^{597, p.52}. While suspected cases of epidemic potential diseases were regularly isolated in CTEs (p.57), the JEE noted that border entry points lacked specialised isolation capacity (p.65) ⁵⁹⁸. Research indicates that at least 11 CTEs are available in Guinea, with 10 in place as of August 2020, and a further centre opened in early 2021 as part of the country's COVID-19 response ⁵⁹⁹⁶⁰⁰. Rreview of the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene (MSHP) and National Health Security Agency (ANSS) websites identified no information on the precise number of CTEs in Guinea ⁶⁰¹⁶⁰². The JEE states that procedures for isolation at CTEs are set out in the "Guide for Operations at Epidemiological Treatment Centres and management of diseases with epidemic potential and zoonoses", and also notes that the Guinean health system has response plans in place against the epidemic potential diseases of Ebola, Lassa Fever and Marburg Fever ^{603, p.53 and 80}. These documents could not be found on the MSHP and ANSS websites ⁶⁰⁴⁶⁰⁵.

A response plan developed by the MSHP in early 2021 to coordinate the management of an Ebola epidemic which began in January that year was identified, but does not refer to expansion of isolation capacity, only stating that all suspected cases should be isolated at CTEs in the key cities of Nzérékoré and Conakry within 48 hours of presentation ^{606, p.5}. A WHO evaluation report on Guinea's response to a Marburg Fever outbreak later in 2021 does not refer to measures for the expansion of isolation capacity, though it does note that, in the affected region, only one health centre with adequate isolation capacity was available ^{607, p.15}. Wider review of media and international donor reports on Guinea's response activity to the 2021 Ebola epidemic, the 2023 diphtheria outbreak, and the 2025 mpox outbreak, identified no information on measures to expand isolation capacity ^608609610. An ANSS response plan on the mpox outbreak, adopted in mid-2025, could not be identified on the MSHP and ANSS websites, and available media reports on it do not indicate whether it considers expansion of isolation capacity .

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 0

No evidence of a procurement protocol or contract framework for the acquisition of laboratory or medical supplies was found.

The National Pharmaceuticals Policy, updated in 2014, identifies the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (PCG) as the chief supplier of health supplies to both the public and private sectors, including laboratory reagents ^{611, p.17}. Available evidence from the PCG website shows that it regularly issues general tenders for medical devices and consumables, with the aim of pre-qualifying suppliers for the provision of medical products ^612613614. However, the most recent such general tender identified dates from 2024, and none of those reviewed indicate that laboratory supplies specifically were requested ⁶¹⁵⁶¹⁶. Further, an evaluation of Guinea's health supply procurement system completed in 2019 states that the Ministry of Health was failing to provide the PCG with sufficient funds for it to realise its function ^{617, p.11}. The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 does not describe the procurement system, but notes that procurement of laboratory supplies is one particular issue for the Guinean health system ^{618, p.36}. No further relevant information was identified on the websites of the PCG, the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, or the National Health Security Agency ^619620621.

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 33.33

Guinea has a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains, and there is insufficient evidence of a plan to ensure equitable distribution in an emergency.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 states (on page 48) that Guinea has "a stockpile of medical countermeasures for use during a public health emergency" and "a draft logistical and supply chain management plan for emergency situations". ⁶²² It also notes that during public health emergencies, there is use of "army logistical resources and humanitarian organizations for the delivery of emergency medicines and supplies" (page 49). ⁶²³ However, it highlights "delays in the country's supply of medicines and supplies in emergency situations" and "a delay in finalizing the logistical and supply chain management plan for emergency situations" (page 49). ⁶²⁴

A March 2024 article on the website of the United Nations office in Guinea gives the name of the plan mentioned in the JEE report as the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures. ⁶²⁵ This article states that the National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) drafted the plan in 2019, but the health minister did not initially give it the approval necessary for it to become official policy. ⁶²⁶ In 2023, the World Food Programme requested the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene (MSHP) review the plan, and as a result, a review was conducted, amendments were made to bring it up to date, and it was then officially adopted. ⁶²⁷ In 2024, the ANSS was reportedly disseminating the plan among government bodies. ⁶²⁸ However, there is no evidence on the websites of the ANSS or the MSHP that the plan is available online. ⁶²⁹⁶³⁰

Guinea's current overarching national public health emergency response plan (for the period 2024-2028) is not available online, and there is no information about whether it addresses stockpiles of medical supplies on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ⁶³¹⁶³²

Guinea also has a Manual for Integrated Logistical Management Procedures for Phamaceutical Products, published in 2019, but it does not explicitly mention stockpiles of medical supplies for use during public health emergencies. ⁶³³ In section A.13, this manual refers to the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures, which it describes as establishing "a co-ordination framework for the management of medical countermeasures in response to health emergencies, epidemics and disasters", including description of "the process for acquiring and deploying supplies for managing a health emergency (vaccines, equipment, medication, medical supplies, etc.)" and "the supply chain for medical countermeasures". ⁶³⁴

In addition, there is the National Pharmaceutical Policy, which was adopted in 2014, but it does not explicitly mention stockpiles of medical supplies for use during public health emergencies either. ⁶³⁵

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency.

There is no mention of stockpiles of laboratory supplies in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023. ⁶³⁶ On the contrary, the JEE reports (on page 35) that in Guinea's laboratories there is an "absence of reagents and consumables according to the One World, One Health approach" and (on page 36) that in the diagnostic laboratory network there is a "lack of supply of reagents, equipment and consumables". ⁶³⁷ There is likewise no evidence of relevant stockpiles in the Manual for Integrated Logistical Management Procedures for Phamaceutical Products (published 2019) or the National Pharmaceutical Policy (published 2014), or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^638639640641

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency.

There is no evidence that Guinea conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted by the World Health Organization in 2023, in the Manual for Integrated Logistical Management Procedures for Phamaceutical Products (published 2019), in the National Pharmaceutical Policy (published 2014), or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^{642643644645646}

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a plan, agreement or mechanism to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency, to procure medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency, or to expedite medical supplies through points of entry.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 states (on page 48) that Guinea has "a stockpile of medical countermeasures for use during a public health emergency" and "a draft logistical and supply chain management plan for emergency situations". ⁶⁴⁷ It also notes that during public health emergencies, there is use of "the logistical resources of the army and of humanitarian organizations for the delivery of emergency medicines and supplies" (page 49). ⁶⁴⁸ However, it highlights "delays in the country's supply of medicines and supplies in emergency situations" and "a delay in finalizing the logistical and supply chain management plan for emergency situations" (page 49). ⁶⁴⁹ It recommends "the establishment of agreements for the supply of medical countermeasures at the regional/international level" (page 46). ⁶⁵⁰ It does not mention leveraging domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies, procuring medical supplies, or expediting medical supplies through points of entry.

Guinea's Manual for Integrated Logistical Management Procedures for Phamaceutical Products, published in 2019, includes (on page 44) a description of the procedure for "emergency orders of pharmaceutical products", but this refers to any instance where stocks of a pharmaceutical product have depleted and need to be quickly replenished, rather than being specifically for public health emergencies. ⁶⁵¹ The manual does not include any procedures for public health emergencies, instead simply stating (on page 37) that procedures for health emergencies are in the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures, which it describes as "a co-ordination framework for the management of medical countermeasures in response to health emergencies, epidemics and disasters", including description of "the process for acquiring and deploying supplies for managing a health emergency (vaccines, equipment, medication, medical supplies, etc.)" and "the supply chain for medical countermeasures". ⁶⁵² However, the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures is not available online.

There is no evidence of a plan, agreement or mechanism to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency, to procure medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency, or to expedite medical supplies through points of entry, in the National Pharmaceutical Policy (published 2014) or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^653654655

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a plan, agreement or mechanism to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency, to procure laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency, or to expedite laboratory supplies through points of entry.

There is no mention of such plans, agreements or mechanisms in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023, in the Manual for Integrated Logistical Management Procedures for Phamaceutical Products (published 2019), in the National Pharmaceutical Policy (published 2014), or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^{656657658659660}

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 100

While no evidence of an emergency logistics and supply chain management system was identified, a cold chain system is in place.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 stated (on page 48) that Guinea had "a draft logistical and supply chain management plan for emergency situations", though it noted (on page 49) "a delay in finalizing" this plan. ⁶⁶¹ Nevertheless, the JEE also shows that Guinea has a functioning national system for vaccine management and cold chain logistics, covering all health centers and posts, supperted by both an organized supply system and institutional support from international partners (UNICEF, GAVI, WHO). ⁶⁶² National vaccination programs include vaccine forecasting, stock monitoring, and mass campaigns, including for COVID-19 and Ebola vaccines. ⁶⁶³ Despite this, according to GAVI, challenges for Guinea's cold chain system remain, including low measles vaccine coverage (under 50%), frequent stockouts of some vaccines, insufficient cold chain maintenance, and a shortage of trained personnel. ⁶⁶⁴

A March 2024 article on the website of the United Nations office in Guinea gave the name of Guine's draft emergency logistic plan as the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures. ⁶⁶⁵ This article states that the National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) drafted the plan in 2019, but the health minister did not initially give it the approval necessary for it to become official policy. ⁶⁶⁶ In 2023, the World Food Programme requested the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene (MSHP) review the plan, and as a result, a review was conducted, amendments were made to bring it up to date, and it was then officially adopted. [a] Materials published by the United Nations and World Food Programme in 2024 indicate that the plan specifically covers emergency supply chains, drawing on the ANSS' experience from response to the Ebola and COVID-19 pandemics ⁶⁶⁷⁶⁶⁸. However, there is no evidence on the websites of the ANSS or the MSHP that the plan is available online, preventing determination of whether the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures covers the field of emergency logistics and supply chain management beyond the supply of medical countermeasures ⁶⁶⁹⁶⁷⁰.

According to materials published by the United Nations and World Food Programme in 2024, the ANSS was disseminating the plan among government bodies at the national level, with no mention of the sub-national level. ⁶⁷¹⁶⁷² It is unclear from these materials whether the plan covers vaccine cold chains or activity from both the public and private sectors ⁶⁷³⁶⁷⁴.

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Guinea has a plan for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 stated (on page 48) that Guinea had "a draft logistical and supply chain management plan for emergency situations", though it noted (on page 49) "a delay in finalizing" this plan. ⁶⁷⁵ A March 2024 article on the website of the United Nations office in Guinea gave the name of this plan as the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures. ⁶⁷⁶ This article states that the National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) drafted the plan in 2019, but the health minister did not initially give it the approval necessary for it to become official policy. ⁶⁷⁷ In 2023, the World Food Programme requested the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene (MSHP) review the plan, and as a result, a review was conducted, amendments were made to bring it up to date, and it was then officially adopted. ⁶⁷⁸ In 2024, the ANSS was reportedly disseminating the plan among government bodies. ⁶⁷⁹ However, there is no evidence on the websites of the ANSS or the MSHP that the plan is available online. ⁶⁸⁰⁶⁸¹

Guinea also has a Manual for Integrated Logistical Management Procedures for Phamaceutical Products, published in 2019, but it does not address dispensing medical supplies during public health emergencies. ⁶⁸² Instead, in section A.13, this manual refers to the National Plan for the Supply of Medical Countermeasures, which it describes as establishing "a co-ordination framework for the management of medical countermeasures in response to health emergencies, epidemics and disasters", including description of "the process for acquiring and deploying supplies for managing a health emergency (vaccines, equipment, medication, medical supplies, etc.)" and "the supply chain for medical countermeasures". ⁶⁸³

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 0

Guinea does not have a public plan in place to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 states (on pages 43-44) that Guinea has "a strategy for deploying its human resources to face a public health emergency", including "rapid intervention teams", but there is "no national multisectoral strategic plan for reinforcing staff in emergency situations". ⁶⁸⁴

There is no mention of facilitating workforce surges during emergencies in the Policy for the Development of Human Resources for Health (adopted 2019) or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^685686687

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 0

Guinea does not have a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 states (on pages 43-44) that Guinea has "a strategy for deploying its human resources to face a public health emergency", including "rapid intervention teams", but there is "no national multisectoral strategic plan for reinforcing staff in emergency situations". ⁶⁸⁸ The JEE does not mention receiving health personnnel from other countries during public health emergencies.

There is no mention of receiving health personnnel from other countries during emergencies in the Policy for the Development of Human Resources for Health (adopted 2019) or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^689690691

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has a public plan in place to redeploy existing health personnel within the country.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 states (on pages 43-44) that Guinea has "a strategy for deploying its human resources to face a public health emergency", including "rapid intervention teams", but there is "no national multisectoral strategic plan for reinforcing staff in emergency situations". ⁶⁹² The JEE does not mention redeploy existing health personnel within the country during public health emergencies.

There is no mention of redeploy existing health personnel within the country during emergencies in the Policy for the Development of Human Resources for Health (adopted 2019) or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^693694695

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 0

Guinea does not have a constitution guaranteeing citizens a right to medical care.

Following a coup d'état in 2021, the Guinean military revoked the country's constitution, which had previously been adopted in 2010. ⁶⁹⁶ A referendum on the adoption of a new constitution is scheduled for 21 September 2025. ⁶⁹⁷

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 33.82

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 91.64

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 27.08

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 61.84

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 85.14

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 66.67

Workers in Guinea are guaranteed paid sick leave, but there is insufficient evidence that this covers mental health problems.

As laid out in articles 108-111 and 119-120 of the Social Security Code (adopted 1994), employed people are entitled to daily sick pay, starting from the ninth day of incapacity to work, or from the first day of hospitalisation, or from the day of diagnosis with certain illnesses (to be determined by a ministerial decree), and continuing for a maximum of 13 weeks (or up to 26 weeks for employees who have worked 300 days or more in the 12 calendar months preceding the sick leave, or up to a year in cases of long-term illness where recovery is expected within that timeframe). ⁶⁹⁸ As per article 110, this sick pay is conditional on the person having been employed for at least three months in the quarter preceding the diagnosis of the illness, with each month of employment comprising at least 18 days or 120 hours of paid work. ⁶⁹⁹ As per article 120, the daily sick pay is equal to half of the employee's average daily salary, calculated by dividing by 90 the total amount of remuneration that the employee received in the three calendar months preceeding the month in which the sick leave began. ⁷⁰⁰ The Social Security Code does not specify whether sick pay is available to those unable to work due to mental health problems.

There is no mention of sick pay in the Labour Code (adopted 2014). ⁷⁰¹

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea's government has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency.

There is no mention of such a policy in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023, nor in the Policy for the Development of Human Resources for Health (adopted 2019), or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^702703704705

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

There is no mention of communication between public health officials and healthcare workers in the World Health Organization's 2023 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of Guinea, in the Manual of Standard Operating Procedures for Risk Communication and Community Engagement in Emergency Situations in Guinea (adopted 2021), or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^706707708709

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

There is no mention of communication between public health officials and healthcare workers in the World Health Organization's 2023 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of Guinea, in the Manual of Standard Operating Procedures for Risk Communication and Community Engagement in Emergency Situations in Guinea (adopted 2021), or on the websites of the National Agency for Health Security or the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene. ^710711712713

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea's national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare-associated infections that take place in healthcare facilities.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 states (on page 56) that Guinea has "no national programme or national system for the surveillance of healthcare-associated infections" and requires an " integrated national multidisciplinary group […] to monitor healthcare-associated infections", as well as a "baseline/point prevalence study" and "periodic surveys" on healthcare-associated infections. ⁷¹⁴ Correspondingly, the JEE included the introduction of "a National Plan for the Surveillance of Healthcare-Associated Infections" as one of the "priority actions" that Guinea should take (see page 5). ⁷¹⁵

A document titled Norms and Procedures for Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Institutions (adopted by the Ministry of Health in 2017) has a section (1.7) dedicated to the "surveillance of healthcare-associated infections", but this simply describes procedures for such surveillance; it does not mandate surveillance or mention whether, when or where such surveillance is conducted in practice. ⁷¹⁶

The websites of the National Agency for Health Security and the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene contain no evidence that Guinea's national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare-associated infections. ⁷¹⁷⁷¹⁸

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 100

There is evidence that Guinea has an infection prevention and control (IPC) programme in place nationally.

The Ministry of Health adopted the National Policy for Infection Prevention and Control in Guinea in August 2016. ⁷¹⁹ The document contains a situation analysis, a statement of principles, a list of strategic objectives, a description of its framework for implementation, and a description of mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of its implementation. ⁷²⁰ Accompanying this policy is a document titled Norms and Procedures for Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Institutions, the latest version of which is dated August 2017. ⁷²¹ This latter document details standard operating procedures related to infection prevention and control in healthcare institutions. ⁷²²

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) that the World Health Organization published in 2023 notes (on pages 55-56) the existence of the two documents mentioned above, as well as an "IPC national action plan" adopted in August 2022. It further states (on page 56) that "IPC is integrated into the organizational structure of the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene", that there "hygiene and security committees" in hospitals, that there are "IPC focal points" in health centres, that there is a designated "national IPC focal point", and that "modules on IPC are included in initial and continuing training programmes for healthcare professionals". ⁷²³ However, it states (on page 55) that in practice there is limited observation of IPC, due to "a lack of institutionalization", "insufficient leadership", limited respect for IPC practices among healthcare personnel, a lack of protection for healthcare personnel, and unreliable supply of personal protective equipment. ⁷²⁴ It recommends that "the active IPC programme should be implemented at the national level after validation of the national action plan and various strategic priorities", that "a strategy for protecting healthcare personnel should be implemented at the national level", that "the IPC component of the country's preparedness plan should be revised" and that "Operational Action Plans should be adapted to the IPC priorties of each facility, in accordance with national directives". ⁷²⁵

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

There is evidence that Guinea has a plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities nationally.

In August 2016, the Ministry of Health adopted the National Policy for Infection Prevention and Control in Guinea, which addresses the prevention and control of infections in health facilities. ⁷²⁶ This is complemented by a document titled Norms and Procedures for Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Institutions, the latest version of which is dated August 2017, and which details standard operating procedures related to infection prevention and control in healthcare institutions. ⁷²⁷

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 100

Guinea has a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial.

According to article 303 of the Public Health Code (adopted 1997), all planned health-related research involving human subjects must be submitted to the National Ethics Committee for Research in Health (CNERS) for review before beginning. ⁷²⁸ Article 314 states that if the CNERS identifies ethical issues that the researchers are unable to resolve, CNERS can refuse to let the research to proceed. ⁷²⁹

Correspondingly, according to article 4 of the Decree on the Creation, Responsibilities and Organisation of the National Ethics Committee for Research in Health (adopted 1998), the CNERS must review health research protocols submitted to it and provide an opinion on their acceptability from scientific and ethical perspectives, and it must also monitor health-related research to ensure it complies with the Ethics Code for Research in Health. ⁷³⁰

The Standard Operating Procedure for the Examination of a Protocal for Research in Health (adopted 1999; last amended 2021) lays out the CNERS's procedure for ethical review in detail. ⁷³¹

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 100

Guinea has an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to treat ongoing pandemics or epidemics.

Section 5 of the Standard Operating Procedure for the Examination of a Protocal for Research in Health (adopted 1999; last amended 2021) states that researchers intending to conduct a clinical trial must submit all documents about the planned trial to the National Ethics Committee for Research in Health (CNERS) at least 15 days before the evaluation, but that submission closer to the evaluation can be permitted due to public health emergencies. ⁷³² Section 8.2 states that the CNERS must ordinarily send the results of its ethical review within 10 days of the evaluation, but that this is reduced to 48 hours in emergencies. ⁷³³

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 100

Guinea has a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans.

According to the website of the National Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicine (DNPM), the DNPM's Approval and Import Section is responsible for approving new medicines. ⁷³⁴ There is no evidence on the websites of the DNPM, the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, or the National Agency for Health Security, that the DNPM or any other body is responsible for approving non-pharmaceutical medical countermeasures. ^735736737

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use or recognition of approval decisions taking place elsewhere during public health emergencies.

There is no evidence of such an expedited process on the websites of the National Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicine, the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, or the National Agency for Health Security. ^738739740

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Guinea has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.⁷⁴¹

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 100

Epidemics are integrated into Guinea's national risk reduction strategy.

The National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy 2024-2030, adopted by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, lists epidemics amongst risk factors potentially affecting the country ^{742, pp.39-40}. Based on the country's experience in recent years, epidemics are described as frequent in eight prefectures, placing over 15 key settlements at risk, with COVID-19 and Ebola, alongside endemic malaria, identified as presenting the greatest risk ^{743, p.37-40}. Several other infectious diseases, including measles, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Marburg virus disease and polio, alongside climate-senstive diseases such as meningits, typhoid and Dengue fever, are also included in an exhaustive list of potential risks ^{744, pp.50-53}. The Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy identifies the National Health Security Agency as the main government body responsible for preparing for and responding to epidemic risks, but also notes that the National Centre for Disaster and Environmental Emergency Management is responsible for identifying zones at particular risk from epidemics and zoonoses ^{745, p.76-79}. Additionally, the Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy notes that the Guinean Red Cross can play an important role, by maintaining contingency plans for epidemics ^{746, p.70}.

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 100

Guinea is part of a regional group which has taken collective action against public health emergencies.

As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Guinea is a member of the West African Health Organization (WAHO), whose founding Protocol A/P2/7/87 dated 9 July 1987 includes a collective commitment cooperate "for a collective and strategic combat" against regional health issues ⁷⁴⁷. The WAHO has taken collective action to prepare for and improve epidemic response capacity, implementing the Regional Programme to Support Pandemic Prevention between 2016 and 2021, and establishing the ECOWAS Regional Center for Surveillance and Disease Control in 2018 ⁷⁴⁸⁷⁴⁹. Coordination of responses to pandemics has also been conducted collectively. In 2020, the WAHO's council of national health ministers met regularly to coordinate regional response to the COVID-19 pandemic ⁷⁵⁰⁷⁵¹. In recent years, the WAHO has focussed attention on Lassa Fever, an infectious disease which periodically breaks out in Guinea, organising a "Lassa Coalition" aiming to improve regional response and support the development of a vaccine, and two regional conferences on the disease ⁷⁵²⁷⁵³.

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

Guinea is part of a regional group which has taken collective action to improve response to zoonoses.

As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Guinea is a member of the West African Health Organization (WAHO), whose founding Protocol A/P2/7/87 dated 9 July 1987 includes a collective commitment cooperate "for a collective and strategic combat" against regional health issues – although the founding protocol does not specifically refer to zoonoses ⁷⁵⁴. Nevertheless, ECOWAS and WAHO states have taken collective action to respond to zoonosis outbreaks and improve regional capacity on the issue: following the Ebola outbreak in the region in 2014-2016, ECOWAS states committed to establishing One Health programmes at the national level, and the WAHO began developing a regional One Health Strategic Framework, which was adopted in 2017 ⁷⁵⁵. In 2018, supported by the US Centers for Disease Control, ECOWAS states completed a One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Process, through which they designated seven priority zoonoses for the region: Anthrax, Rabies, viral hemorrhagic fevers (including Ebola, Marburg fever and Lassa fever), zoonotic influenzas, zoonotic tuberculosis, Trypanosomiasis, and Yellow fever ^{756757, p.7}. Concurrently, the World Bank-financed Regional Disease Surveillance Enhancement Project (REDISSE) was conducted through the WAHO, and included consideration of both human and animal health issues; in Guinea, the project included the development of surveillance protocols for zoonoses in slaughterhouses ^{758759, p.14}. In 2024, the OOAS took steps towards improving regional capacity against avian flu and general zoonosis management by organising train-the-trainer sessions ⁷⁶⁰⁷⁶¹.

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

Guinea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2016 ⁷⁶².

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 100

Guinea has submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years.

The Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measures portal shows that Guinea submitted reports in October 2024 and May 2025 ⁷⁶³.

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 0

Guinea has not provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 report.

The UNSC 1540 Committee reports portal lists no reports from Guinea ⁷⁶⁴.

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 0

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

Guinea does not meet any of the criteria set in the question.

Guinea is not a member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction ⁷⁶⁵. Guinea is not a member of the Australia Group ⁷⁶⁶.
Guinea is not a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative ⁷⁶⁷.

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 100

Guinea completed a Joint External Evaluation in 2023, and the full report was published by the WHO in 2024.

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

Guinea has not completed and published a PVS assessment in the last five years.

The World Organization for Animal Health website shows that Guinea completed an initial PVS evaluation in 2007, and a follow-up in 2019 ⁷⁶⁸.

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

Guinea has not completed and published a PVS gap analysis in the last five years.

The World Organization for Animal Health website shows that Guinea completed a PVS gap analysis in 2009, with an update in 2012 ⁷⁶⁹.

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 100

Guinea has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats within the past three years.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 notes that the National Health Security Agency (ANSS) is responsible for allocating funds related to public health emergencies, including reinforcement of capacity ^{770, p.12}. However, the JEE does not describe specific capacity improvement measures financed by the ANSS in recent years ⁷⁷¹. Documents from the Ministry of the Budget show that the ANSS was allocated GNF 8.2 billion (c. USD 945,000) in 2024 and GNF 10.01 billion (USD 1.16 million) in 2025 ^{772, p.293}. However, no information on spending made by the ANSS was found on the websites of the ANSS, Ministry of Budget or Ministry of Health ^773774775.

The ANSS is responsible for managing Guinea's FETP training programme, which has been active in the past three years, but reports from the African Field Epidemiology Network (AFEN) indicate that it is primarily financed by international contributions ⁷⁷⁶⁷⁷⁷. A 2024 report by the AFEN on a working visit the organisation's leaders completed to Guinea shows that financing of the country's FETP was a key issue discussed, identifying the World Bank and USAID as financiers of recently-completed and then-planned new cohorts of FETP students, alongside NGO the Global Fund as a likely financial supporter of upcoming programmes ⁷⁷⁸. The report notes that the FETP delegation recommended that Guinea seek to diversify the sources of funding for the FETP, naming the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Ministry of Defence, and Guinean hospitals as potential contributors ⁷⁷⁹. Two AFEN reports on FETP workshops conducted in spring 2025 name the Global Fund as providing funding towards them, but it is unclear from these sources whether other national sources of funding were also drawn upon ⁷⁸⁰⁷⁸¹. Another AFEN report states that in January 2025, a meeting between the directors of AFEN and ANSS took place in Conakry for a discussion including "strategies for mobilising resources", alongside methods to ensure the FETP remained sustainable in Guinea, in a likely reference to the project's funding ⁷⁸². However, review of the ANSS website identified no further information on the sources of financing used for the FETP ⁷⁸³.

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 0

No evidence that the JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap allocate budget funds to resolve identified gaps was found.

The JEE conducted in respect of Guinea in 2023 makes no commitments regarding allocation of budgetary funds to resolve gaps identified by the JEE, although it frequently notes a lack of financing for efforts towards implementation of the IHRs ⁷⁸⁴. It states that the country's then-current NAPHS, which spanned the period 2018-April 2023, was not financed in its entirety, and that certain areas, for example biosafety and biosecurity, risked being deprived of financing for unstated reasons ^{785, p.12}.

Guinea adopted a new NAPHS in approximately mid-2024 covering the period until 2028. This is demonstrated by several National Health Security Agency (ANSS) press releases and media articles describing work on the NAPHS' development, published in May and June 2024 ⁷⁸⁶⁷⁸⁷. Further, an issue of the ANSS' One Health magazine from September 2024 reproduced the ANSS director's speech on the occasion of the NAPHS' adoption . However, the full NAPHS document could not be found on the ANSS or Ministry of Health websites ⁷⁸⁸⁷⁸⁹. Descriptions of the NAPHS contained in the aforementioned sources indicate that it does respond to the JEE, which recommended the development of a new NAPHS ⁷⁹⁰⁷⁹¹. Additionally, an ANSS press release issued in October 2024 indicates that the agency began working towards the introduction of event-based surveillance, an objective described as recommended by the JEE and adopted in the NAPHS ⁷⁹². However, the sources reviewed do not show whether the new NAPHS specifically allocates budget funds towards addressing gaps identified in the JEE ⁷⁹³⁷⁹⁴. Note that the aforementioned ANSS director's speech included a reference to requirements for funding from international partners to support the NAPHS' completion .

Guinea has not published a GHSA roadmap ⁷⁹⁵.

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

Guinea has not completed a PVS assessment or gap analysis in the last five years.

The World Organization for Animal Health website shows that Guinea's most recent assessement was a follow-up PVS evaluation in 2019 ⁷⁹⁶.

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

No evidence of a special emergency public financing mechanism and funds existing in Guinea was found.

The JEE conducted in respect of the country in 2023 noted that no financial governance policy enabling the ANSS to support activities responding to public health emergencies was in place, but also that "recently", the Ministries of Health and Finance had signed a joint decree on establishing such a policy for the ANSS ^{797, p.12}. Based on sources listed in the JEE, the joint decree is likely Decree no. A/2023/1664/MEF/DGTCP/SGG on the creation of an advance financing policy; a further relevant source is likely Minister of Health Letter no. 0501/MSHP/CAB, described as "requesting the implementation of a special measure creating an advance of one billion Guinean francs for the ANSS" ^{798, p. 77}. However, these sources are not described further in the JEE, and no references to them were identified on the Ministry of Health and ANSS websites ^799800801. An October 2023 document referring to Guinea's local part of the World Bank-financed Health Security and Resilience Reinforcement Project (HeSP) does refer to an activity described as "operationalising the financial governance framework of the ANSS", including creating a mechanism to supervise rapid allocation of funds to applications of the IHRs and "support response activities against public health emergencies" ^{802, p.10}. This activity is one of 21 to be financed under a USD 9 million component of the HeSP, but none of the other actions refer to financing of public health emergency or epidemic response ^{803, p.10}. However, this source presents no further information on the ANSS financial framework referenced ⁸⁰⁴.

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

Evidence of efforts to expand epidemic management financing was identified, alongside statements on the issue by Guinea's Health Minister. However, no explicit statements commiting to expand financing or support other countries in addressing epidemic threats were identified.

Review of public statements made in respect of epidemics by serving President Mamady Doumbouyah (appointed 2021), Prime Minister Amadou Oury Bah (appointed 2024), and Ministry of Health Oumar Diouhé Bah ("Bah"; appointed 2023) identified no explicit commitments to expand financing of Guinea's domestic pandemic or epidemic response, or provide financing or support to other countries experiencing pandemic or epidemic responses. However, within the last three years, Bah has made public statements relating to new initiatives addressing national epidemic and pandemic response capacity, some of which have involved expanded financing.

In June 2024, Bah attended a ceremony at which Guinea signed an agreement joining the Vaccine Independence Initiative, constituting a loan facility made available by UNICEF supplying low-cost vaccines from the GAVI vaccine alliance ⁸⁰⁵. At the ceremony, Bah noted that Guinea was confronted by "multiple simultaneous epidemics" of measles, whooping cough, diphtheria and polio, "all avoidable via vaccination", and stated that Guinea was making efforts to expand immunization by "improving access to vaccines, guaranteeing the quality of products, and optimising financial resources" ⁸⁰⁶. Similarly, in August 2025, upon the inclusion of an anti-malarial vaccine into Guinea's Enlarged Immunization Programme, launched with the support of the GAVI vaccine alliance and World Health Organization, Bah stated that this step played into a strategic aim of "reinforcement of a health system able to protect our population sustainability" ⁸⁰⁷.

In an August 2024, speaking at the 74th Session of the WHO's Regional Committee for Africa, Bah noted that Guinea's experience in responding to the Ebola epidemic had led to "our solicitation to aid the management of certain crises in other African countries" .

Most recently, in July 2025, the Health Minister signed a decree creating a Technical Commission for the Struggle against Mpox, uniting experts from various national spheres and agencies alongside international experts, whose activies were to be financed by the state budget or international partner financing .

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

Guinea has requested financing or technical support to improve epidemic threat management capacity in the past three years.

Guinea's National Health Security Agency (ANSS) manages a Field Epidemiological Training Programme (FETP) for local health practitioners, which has been active since 2016 and in the past three years, with the US CDC network providing technical support ⁸⁰⁸⁸⁰⁹. A report from the African Field Epidemiology Network (AFEN) published in 2024 identify the World Bank and USAID as financiers of recently-completed and then-planned new cohorts of FETP students ⁸¹⁰. In 2024, AFEN representatives participated in discussions between the ANSS and NGO the Global Fund which delivered an unspecified amount of financial support for FETP programmes, with two FETP workshops conducted in spring 2025 naming the Global Fund as a donor ⁸¹¹⁸¹².

The Global Health Security Tracking system shows that in 2022, the last year for which data are available, Guinea received USD 50 million earmarked for epidemic-related capacity-building activity, including in the fields of real-time surveillance (USD 6.5 million), reporting (USD 3 million), and zoonotic disease (USD 1.5 million) ⁸¹³. The Global Health Security Tracking system indicates that, between 2014 and 2022, Guinea provided no funds to other countries ⁸¹⁴.

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 100

Guinea fulfilled its contribution to the WHO in 2023 and 2024.

WHO disclosure of assessed contributions by member states indicate that, by 31 December 2024, Guinea had paid the contribution assigned to it for 2024 and 2023 ⁸¹⁵. Respectively, these amounts were USD 17,230 and USD 14,350 ⁸¹⁶.

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 0

No evidence that Guinea has a policy referring to sharing genetic data or specimens and associated epidemiological data was found.

The JEE conducted in reference to the country in 2023 does not refer to a genetic specimen and/or data sharing policy, including in a list of policy documents reveiewed during the evaluation ^{817, pp.77-81}. No references to such a policy were identified on the websites of the Ministry of Health and National Health Security Agency (ANSS) ⁸¹⁸⁸¹⁹. The 2017 National Health Research Policy refers to sharing clinical specimens, stating that ownership of and responsibility for such specimens remains with the government, including if they were generated through joint research projects, and that the samples may be shared as part of institutional research programmes under specific Material Transfer Agreements ⁸²⁰. Evidence was further identified that Guinea has shared specimens with at least one international organization in recent years. Per a report by French NGO the Pasteur Institute, in 2023, it received 10 samples from the ANSS, in collaboration with the Guinean branch of the Pasteur Institute, and was able to correct an initial diagnosis of infections involving Streptococcus pneumoniae to B. pertussis (whooping cough) ^{821, p.10}.

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

No evidence was found to suggest that Guinea has failed to share samples under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness programme in the past two years.

World Health Organization open data records indicate that in the biennum 2022-2023, Guinea received financing of USD 124,000 to support national laboratories and surveillance systems in contributing data to the Global Influenza Reporting and Surveillance System (GISRS) ⁸²². However, for the 2024-25 biennum, the open data portal lists the financing budget line "Laboratory capacity and resilient surveillance systems are maintained and strengthened through GISRS", indicating that the reporting of data to the GISRS was not a priority during this period ⁸²³.

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

No evidence was found that Guinea has failed to share pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years.

Since 2022, Guinea has been part of the Afroscreen project, which conducts genetic surveillance of epidemic pathogens in 13 states; according to a report published in March 2025, the Guinean project, managed by the Guinean Infectology Research and Training Centre (CERFIG), had by that time begun genetic surveillance of Mpox and Lassa fever ⁸²⁴. Following Guinea's report to the WHO of a diphtheria outbreak in September 2023, the WHO's African directorate provided support to the country, alongside four others experiencing outbreaks, covering case management, contact tracing, anti-toxin treatment and catch-up vaccination ^{825, p.14}. The WHO also provided in-depth guidelines on diagnosis and testing ⁸²⁶. Also in 2023, the Guinean National Health Security Agency, transferred 10 samples to French NGO the Pasteur Institute, through the latter's Guinea branch, requesting support in diagnosis ^{827, p.10}. The Pasteur Institute was able to correct an initial diagnosis of infections involving Streptococcus pneumoniae to B. pertussis (whooping cough) ^{828, p.10}.

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 50

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 0

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 0

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 0

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 28

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 0

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 0

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 0

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 0

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 50

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 50

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 25

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 75

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 100

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 25

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 41.72

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 15.49

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 54.57

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 0

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 0

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 0

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 0

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 70.4

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 0

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 0

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 0

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 69.33

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 57.67

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 50

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 28.48

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 63.13

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 86.97

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 0

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 88.15

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 82.61

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 73.96

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 32.91

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 72.92

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 1.6

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 50

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 0