Zimbabwe: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 100

Zimbabwe has an AMR plan that covers surveillance, detection, and reporting.¹ The Zimbabwe: One Health antimicrobial resistance national action plan 2017-2021, which expired in 2021 but is still relevant, did include evidence of AMR plans to surveil, detect, and report priority AMR pathogens. ² There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has a current national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens, although a plan for the 2024-2028 period has been drafted. ³ The draft plan is not available on a public website, so it is not possible to establish that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. The draft plan is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Health. ⁴⁵

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 50

There is evidence that Zimbabwe has a national laboratory system that tests for some of the 7+1 priority AMR pathogens. The most recent Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Zimbabwe, published in 2018, states that due to funding constraints, the 17 existing sentinel sites are only testing for two priority pathogens, Salmonella spp. and Escherichia coli (p. 10). ⁶ Although an updated national AMR plan has been drafted to cover the 2024-2028 period, it is not publicly available. ⁷⁸⁹. According to an article published by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2022, Zimbabwe has received funding from the Fleming Fund for 14 laboratories to enable AMR surveillance data collection. ¹⁰¹¹ There is no publicly available information on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Health to indicate the current capacity of these laboratories. ¹²¹³ The country has enrolled in the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS), but has not yet submitted surveillance data. ¹⁴ Zimbabwe is in the process of updating their lab plan for 2025-2030 but an official document is not yet publicly available, although the EU-Africa Chamber of Commerce notes the plan specifically aims to fill "Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS) to 80% of facilities, accrediting central, provincial, and district laboratories, and securing at least 70% of required funding," and also to include artificial intelligence, a One Health approach, and public-private partnerships. ¹⁵

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Zimbabwe conducts environmental detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. Although an updated national AMR plan has been drafted to cover the 2024-2028 period, it is not publicly available. ¹⁶¹⁷¹⁸. The country's Environmental Management Agency (EMA) states that services include monitoring the environment and soil testing. Within EMA, the Environmental Management Services (EMS) is mandated to collect, produce and disseminate environmental information to society. ¹⁹ There is, however, no evidence that any of these activities (environmental or soil testing, as relates to AMR) have actually occurred, either on the EMA website or in the Joint External Evaluation report of 2018. ²⁰ An article published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2025 states that the 2024-2028 AMR plan, funded by the UK-based Fleming Fund, includes a focus on the "environmental dimension" of AMR, and includes "specific activities to expand environmental surveillance and monitoring of AMR levels. This will enable the country to implement targeted interventions and strategies to address environmental contamination." ²¹ There is no publicly available information detailing how environmental detection or surveillance activities will be implemented in the 2024-2028 period. ²²²³ The previous AMR strategy (2017-2021) does mention environmental testing for monitoring microbials in crops and the disposal into the environment. ²⁴

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 50

There is national regulation in Zimbabwe requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement. The most recent Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Republic of Zimbabwe (2018) states that while "There is a legal requirement to have a prescription for most antimicrobials used in human medicine," it is not enforced effectively, and there is a lack of data on antimicrobial use for both humans and animals. ²⁵ There is no mention of antibiotic use in the Medicines and Allied Substances Control Act, enforced by the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ), nor on the MCAZ website. The Act details prescription protocol but makes no mention of antibiotics. ²⁶²⁷ A 2023 article published by Healthtimes quotes the Health and Child Care Deputy Minister, Dr. Mangwiro, urging pharmacies to play an important role in encouraging antibiotic prescription enforcement. Furthermore, he states that, "The Ministry will soon be embarking on an Antimicrobial policy that will promote and streamline access to the use of antibiotics." ²⁸ The previous AMR policy, the National Action Plan 2017-2021, notes a widespread availability of unregulated prescriptions and specifically noted that one goal was to strengthen enforcement of prescription regulations and limit public access to unregulated prescription AM preparations. ²⁹

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 0

There is no evidence of national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals. There is no publicly available information on the websites of the Ministries of Agriculture or Health, the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe, nor the Animal Health Act suggesting such regulation. ^30313233 The most recent Joint External Evaluation report, published in 2018, states that antibiotics are widely used in livestock feeds without prescription or veterinary oversight. ³⁴ Neither the Zimbabwe National Medicines Policy nor the Medicines and Allied Substances Control Act makes specific mention of prescriptions for antibiotic use in animals. ³⁵³⁶

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Zimbabwe has national legislation on zoonotic disease. The Animal Health Act, last revised in 2001, was established to "provide for the eradication and prevention of the spread of animal pests and diseases in Zimbabwe, for the prevention of the introduction into Zimbabwe of animal pests and diseases and for incidental matters." ³⁷ According to the Joint External Evaluation report of 2018, the Act lists all important zoonotic diseases as "notifiable diseases," and includes mandated reporting of suspected and confirmed cases. ³⁸ There is no evidence of further strategy documents or plans on the websites of the Ministries of Agriculture or Health. ³⁹⁴⁰

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy documents that include measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. While the country is currently developing its One Health strategic plan, which will tackle the spread of zoonotic diseases, there is no evidence of any concrete measures taken as of June 2025. ⁴¹⁴²⁴³ Despite the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Development's (MOA) mandate to "Prevent the entry, establishment, spread and resurgence of animal diseases and pests of economic and zoonotic importance," there is no available information on their website showing evidence of formal plans to conduct risk identification and reduction. ⁴⁴ As of 2022, Zimbabwe has signed a Declaration of Intent to contribute to the PREZODE (Preventing Zoonotic Disease Emergence) initiative, which "aims at enhancing prevention, early detection, and resilience to avoid or rapidly respond to emerging infectious diseases of animal origin that can turn into pandemics." ⁴⁵ There is no further evidence of their involvement in this project on the PREZODE website or on the websites of the Ministries of Agriculture or Health. ⁴⁶⁴⁷⁴⁸ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) does not include any mention of zoonotic disease spillover events. ⁴⁹ The 2018 JEE mentions zoonotic diseases, the way Zimbabwe deals with outbreaks,and recommends steps for improvement in this area.

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence of national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. There is no explicit mention of zoonotic pathogens of public health concern in the Animal Health Act, which otherwise handles diseases that are common to animals and humans. ⁵⁰ The 2017 Public Health Bill calls for the prevention of zoonotic diseases under the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture, but does not include any mention of specific surveillance and control measures. ⁵¹ There is no further publicly available evidence of such measures on the websites of the Ministries of Health or Agriculture. ⁵²⁵³ Zimbabwe does not appear to have a World Organization for Animal Health Evaluation (OIE-PVS). ⁵⁴ The PACMAN project, active from 2020-2023 and funded by the French Development Agency (AFD), aimed to create a diagnostic platform for animal and zoonotic disease control and surveillance at the University of Zimbabwe. While the university has since opened a biotechnology center thanks to PACMAN funding, there is no evidence of the digital platform's successful implementation on the websites of the AFD or the University of Zimbabwe. ^55565758 The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) does not include any mention of zoonotic pathogen surveillance. ⁵⁹

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries in Zimbabwe. According to the 2018 Joint External Evaluation report, the management of zoonotic diseases is ensured jointly by the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Environment. ⁶⁰ In March 2025, the Ministry of Health took over responsibility of eight Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) previously managed by World Vision Zimbabwe, an international relief organization, in an "official handover". ⁶¹ There is no publicly available evidence on the websites of World Vision Zimbabwe or the Ministry of Health that these PHEOCs operate in the context of zoonotic disease. ⁶²⁶³ There is no further evidence available on the websites of the Ministries of Health or Agriculture suggesting a unit dedicated to zoonotic disease exists. ⁶⁴⁶⁵⁶⁶ In 2024, Zimbabwe self-scored 40% for "Collaborative effort on activities to address zoonoses" on the World Health Organization's (WHO) State Party Self Evaluation Annual Reporting (SPAR), a statistic which reflects the country's lack of a coordinating department, agency, or unit on this issue. ⁶⁷

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 0

Zimbabwe does not currently have a national One Health strategic plan in place, however it is in process of developing one. ⁶⁸ In October 2024, Zimbabwe convened an inception meeting for the development of its national One Health strategic plan. The strategic plan will guide the country's efforts to combat zoonotic diseases, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and other emerging health threats as well as strengthen the health system.

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 0

Zimbabwe does not have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. There is a new system for this, introduced in late June of 2025, which improved on an old analog system that struggled to operate properly ⁶⁹. The Animal Health Act mandates the "reporting of a disease or suspected disease and the death of any animal from any cause whatsoever, including slaughter," it does not include the establishment of any reporting mechanism or enforcement. ⁷⁰ There is no publicly available evidence of such a mechanism on the websites of the Ministries of Health or Agriculture. ⁷¹⁷² The PACMAN project, active from 2020-2023 and funded by the French Development Agency (AFD), aimed to create a diagnostic platform for animal and zoonotic disease control and surveillance at the University of Zimbabwe. While the university has since opened a biotechnology center thanks to PACMAN funding, there is no evidence of the digital platform's successful implementation on the websites of the AFD or the University of Zimbabwe. ^73747576 A recently launched initiative by the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) which includes a physical and digital "stock card" component as an upgrade to a previous system that only used physical cards and therefore was inefficient and abused. Trainings have begun while the govenrment awaits rollout of the program. ⁷⁷ There is evidence that the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has implemented their Event Mobile App (EMA-i) in Zimbabwe to increase animal disease reporting capacity. ⁷⁸

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

There is no evidence of legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals. Neither the Animal Health Act nor the Cyber Security and Data Protection Bill, passed in 2021 and entered into force in 2023, provides any provisions regarding information generated through surveillance activities for animals. ⁷⁹⁸⁰ There is no further information available on the websites of the Ministries of Health or Agriculture. ⁸¹⁸² The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) does not include any mention of surveillance activities for animals. ⁸³

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Zimbabwe conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors), poultry and livestock. There is no explicit mention of zoonotic pathogens of public health concern in the Animal Health Act, which otherwise handles diseases that are common to animals and humans. ⁸⁴ The 2017 Public Health Bill calls for the prevention of zoonotic diseases under the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture, but does not include any mention of specific surveillance and control measures. ⁸⁵ There is no further publicly available evidence of such measures on the websites of the Ministries of Health or Agriculture. ⁸⁶⁸⁷ Zimbabwe does not appear to have a World Organization for Animal Health Evaluation (OIE-PVS). ⁸⁸ The PACMAN project, active from 2020-2023 and funded by the French Development Agency (AFD), aimed to create a diagnostic platform for animal and zoonotic disease control and surveillance at the University of Zimbabwe. While the university has since opened a biotechnology center thanks to PACMAN funding, there is no evidence of the digital platform's successful implementation on the websites of the AFD or the University of Zimbabwe. ^89909192 The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) does not include any mention of zoonotic pathogen surveillance. ⁹³

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a mechanism for reporting notifiable diseases to The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). According to the World Organization for Animal Health's (WOAH's) WAHIS databases, Zimbabwe regularly reports disease outbreaks, with 3 reports of foot and mouth disease, and 1 report of anthrax in 2025. ⁹⁴ Zimbabwe's Animal Health (General) Regulations, 1994 (S. I. No. 289 of 1994) ⁹⁵ were updated in 2017 by the Animal Health (General) (Amendment) Regulations, No. 49 of 2017 ⁹⁶ with a specific list of notifiable diseases; however, neither the general law nor the update specificly require the WOAH to be notified of an outbreak. The 2017 Public Health Bill (H.B. 7, 2017) also does not contain the requirement of notifying the WOAH. ⁹⁷ The websites of the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MOHCC) and the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MOA) do not contain information about a requirement to notify the WOAH of diease outbreaks. ⁹⁸⁹⁹

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 6.63

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 37.65

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans that include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses in Zimbabwe. There is no evidence of active legislation regarding zoonoses, and the current AMR draft (2024-2028) is not publicly available. ^100101102103 While the PREZODE (Preventing ZOonotic Disease Emergence) initiative, for which Zimbabwe signed a Declaration of Intent in 2022, aims to establish a framework for preventing the emergence of zoonotic diseases which would include the private sector, there is no evidence of developments towards this in a legislative or regulatory context. ¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵ A follow up to the CAZCOM project, PACMAN, active from 2020-2023 and funded by the French Development Agency (AFD), aimed to create a diagnostic platform for animal and zoonotic disease control and surveillance at the University of Zimbabwe, and included training private sector training for surveillance techniques. While the University has since opened a biotechnology center thanks to PACMAN funding, there is no evidence of the digital platform's successful implementation on the websites of the AFD or the University of Zimbabwe. ^106107108109 The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) does not include any mention of zoonotic diseases. ¹¹⁰

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of such a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities. Moreover, no relevant information appears on the official websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Agriculture, or the National Biotechnology Authority, nor in relevant reports such as submissions under the Biological Weapons Convention ¹¹¹.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of legislation and/or regulations in Zimbabwe related to biosecurity that address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. Moreover, no relevant information appears on the official websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Agriculture, or the National Biotechnology Authority, nor in relevant reports such as submissions under the Biological Weapons Convention ¹¹².

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no evidence of an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. The National Biotechnology Authority's 2021-2025 Strategic Plan and website contain no specific mention of biosecurity. ¹¹³¹¹⁴ The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Republic of Zimbabwe states that the National Biotechnology Authority only regulates "products," and not "dangerous pathogens". ¹¹⁵ In April 2025, Zimbabwe announced it would begin implementing the Biosafety and Biosecurity (BSBS) legislative framework of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, which includes the development of a regulatory framework for institutions handling "high risk pathogens". ¹¹⁶ There is no publicly available evidence detailing how Zimbabwe will implement the framework moving forward, from any of the relevant bodies, such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and the National Biotechnology Authority. ^117118119

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities, including efforts actively to reduce the number of facilities permitted to hold such materials. Moreover, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report of February 2018 makes no mention of consolidation efforts and instead recommends the development of a national inventory of dangerous pathogens—indicating consolidation has not occurred ¹²⁰. No relevant information appears on official websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Agriculture, the National Biotechnology Authority, or in Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measure submissions ^121122123.

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 0

There is no public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct PCR-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola. While Zimbabwe clearly has the infrastructure necessary to conduct PCR testing, as demonstrated by the use of the technology for Covid-19 diagnoses, there is no evidence that PCR testing has been used for anthrax and/or Ebola. ^124125126 There is no mention of Anthrax or Ebola testing of any kind on the website of the National Microbiology Reference Laboratory. ¹²⁷ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) includes no mention of PCR-based diagnostic testing. ¹²⁸

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

There is some public evidence that Zimbabwe provides biosecurity and biosafety training, but it appears to be delivered on an ad hoc basis, without a clearly established, standardized, required approach, common curriculum, or train-the-trainer program for personnel working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or pandemic-potential materials. The JEE report (2018) explicitly states that “relevant training institutions have included modules on the issue of biosafety and biosecurity in their training curricula … trainings for PPE use, biosafety, and biosecurity is done by the safety officers,” but “there is no comprehensive training programme specifically on biosecurity and biosafety for facilities housing or working with dangerous pathogens. A training needs assessment has not been conducted, and a programme for training of trainers needs to be developed.” ¹²⁹ More recently, Zimbabwe has participated in capacity-building workshops facilitated by Africa CDC and WOAH, including biorisk management training for veterinary laboratory personnel and regional certification efforts for biosafety professionals ^130131132. However, these events do not appear to reflect a nationwide mandatory curriculum or a formal recertification policy every five years. While training occurs, the available information does not indicate it is standardized, required, or part of a train-the-trainer program, and there is no evidence of a recertification requirement according to the websites of WOAH, the Africa CDC and the BWC Implementation Support Unit. ^133134135

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence that regulations of licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. Zimbabwe has no biosecurity legislation or policy framework in place, according to a search of the Zimbabwe National Biotechnology Authority and World Health Organization resources. ^136137138 In 2022, the Ministry of Health published Guidelines for the Prevention, Surveillance and Management of COVID-19 Infection amongst Health Care Workers (HCW) in Zimbabwe. While the report mentions psychological support for HCW, it does not include any mention of drug testing, background checks, or psychological and mental fitness checks. ¹³⁹ There is no mention of such checks on the website of the National Microbiology Reference Laboratory. ¹⁴⁰ Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ¹⁴¹

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 0

Zimbabwe does not have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B). According to the last available Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Republic of Zimbabwe, published in 2018, such procedures have been established and follow International Air Transport Association (IATA) and Lab Safety Manual guidelines. ¹⁴² The report does not cite national regulations applying these international guidelines, and there is no publicly available evidence of such regulations. Zimbabwe does not have biosecurity legislation. ^{143144145146147} A recent parliament proceeding acknowledges that while a legal biosafety framework exists, its scope and implementation remain limited, and it does not amount to a comprehensive biosecurity law. ¹⁴⁸ Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ¹⁴⁹

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

There is no evidence of legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential. Zimbabwe does not have publicly available biosecurity legislation. ^{150151152153154} A recent parliament proceeding acknowledges that while a legal biosafety framework exists, its scope and implementation remain limited, and it does not amount to a comprehensive biosecurity law ¹⁵⁵. Zimbabwe is currently in the process of domesticating the Africa CDC’s Biosafety and Biosecurity (BSBS) legislative framework, but this work is ongoing and has not yet resulted in enacted national law ¹⁵⁶.The last available Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for the Republic of Zimbabwe, published in 2018, lists as a target the establishment of a national biosafety system to include, among other best practices, the safe transfer of biological agents. ¹⁵⁷ Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ¹⁵⁸

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

Zimbabwe does not have a national biosafety legislation and/or regulation in place. There is no evidence of such legislation publicly available on the websites of the National Biotechnology Authority, National Microbiology Reference Laboratory, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Defence. ^{159160161162163}. According to the last available Joint External Evaluation Report, published in 2018, "there is no specific national regulation(s) for biosafety and biosecurity in Zimbabwe." ¹⁶⁴ The National Biotechnology Authority Act does not include any evidence of biosafety legislation or regulation. ¹⁶⁵ Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ¹⁶⁶

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no evidence suggesting the existence of an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations in Zimbabwe. There is no evidence of such legislation publicly available on the websites of the National Biotechnology Authority, National Microbiology Reference Laboratory, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Defence. ^{167168169170171} The National Biotechnology Authority appears to only regulate products, and not dangerous pathogens, and the JEE notes that the National Biotechnology Authority only regulates products. ¹⁷²¹⁷³

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 0

There is no evidence suggesting the requirement of biosafety training using a standardized approach in Zimbabwe. There is no evidence of any such requirement on the websites of the National Biotechnology Authority, National Microbiology Reference Laboratory, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Defence. ^{174175176177178} The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of Zimbabwe's International Health Regulations (IHR) core capacities rated the country's capabilities for "Biosafety and biosecurity training and practices" as 1 out of 5, a score which indicates "No capacity". The report also gave a score of 1 for the country's overall government biosafety and biosecurity system. ¹⁷⁹

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. There is no information regarding such assessments publicly available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defence, the National Microbiology Laboratory, or the National Biotechnology Authority. ^{180181182183184} According to the World Health Organization's 2018 Joint External Evaluation, the National Biotechnology Authority appears to only regulate products, and not dangerous pathogens. ¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁶ In April 2025, Zimbabwe announced it would begin implementing the Biosafety and Biosecurity (BSBS) legislative framework of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, which aims to address a lack of oversight for dual-use research. ¹⁸⁷ There is no publicly available evidence detailing how Zimbabwe will implement the framework moving forward. ^{188189190191192193} Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ¹⁹⁴

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has legislation and/or regulations requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. There is no information regarding such legislation publicly available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defence, the National Microbiology Laboratory, or the National Biotechnology Authority. ^{195196197198199} According to the World Health Organization's 2018 Joint External Evaluation, the National Biotechnology Authority appears to only regulate products, and not dangerous pathogens. ²⁰⁰²⁰¹ In April 2025, Zimbabwe announced it would begin implementing the Biosafety and Biosecurity (BSBS) legislative framework of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, which aims to address a lack of oversight for dual-use research. ²⁰² There is no publicly available evidence detailing how Zimbabwe will implement the framework moving forward. ^{203204205206207208} Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ²⁰⁹

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. There is no information regarding such an agency publicly available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defence, the National Microbiology Laboratory, or the National Biotechnology Authority. ^{210211212213214} According to the World Health Organization's 2018 Joint External Evaluation, the National Biotechnology Authority appears to only regulate products, and not dangerous pathogens. ²¹⁵²¹⁶ In April 2025, Zimbabwe announced it would begin implementing the Biosafety and Biosecurity (BSBS) legislative framework of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, which aims to address a lack of oversight for dual-use research. ²¹⁷ There is no publicly available evidence detailing how Zimbabwe will implement the framework moving forward, and if this will include the establishment of an oversight agency. ^{218219220221222223} Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ²²⁴

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

There is no evidence of legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold. The National Biotechnology Authority Act, which regulates "all measures aimed at minimising the impact of biotechnological processes on national security, human health, animals, plants and the environment," does not include any mention of the screening of synthesized DNA. ²²⁵ There is no evidence of further legislation on the websites of the Ministries of Health, Defence, or Agriculture, nor the National Biotechnology Authority. ^226227228229 Zimbabwe is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, but has not submitted Confidence Building Measures since 2012. The report is not available publicly online. ²³⁰

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 50

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 100

Official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock are publicly available through the OIE database, with the most recently reported figures dating to 2023. ²³¹

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Zimbabwe has a national immunization strategy through its Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI), outlined in the Comprehensive Multi-Year Plan (cMYP) 2015–2019. This plan details objectives for increasing vaccination coverage, improving cold-chain infrastructure, and targeting underserved communities across all provinces (p.13). ²³² Moreover, immunization is referenced in the National Health Strategy 2021-2025, but as a subsection (1.6.7 Immunization). However, this is not nearly the same scope or focus afforded to immunization in the relevant EPI. ²³³ The EPI framework includes provisions for equitable vaccine distribution, such as mobile outreach services to rural areas, expanded provincial logistics, and integration with maternal and child health programs ²³⁴²³⁵. Gavi and WHO reports confirm Zimbabwe’s ongoing focus on equitable access, with specific efforts to strengthen delivery systems in remote and energy-poor areas (p.1). ²³⁶ These include cold-chain expansion, transport provision, and partnerships with community health workers to improve last-mile delivery. Evidence from COVID-19 vaccination campaigns further demonstrates implementation of equitable distribution planning. Vaccine uptake was relatively balanced across provinces, supported by mobile clinics, provincial allocation systems, and public communication strategies designed to reach hesitant or hard-to-reach populations (p.21). ²³⁷ However, while there is strong evidence of geographic and socioeconomic equity measures, publicly available documentation offers limited detail on strategies specifically targeting cultural/linguistic differences or gender-based barriers.

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Zimbabwe's immunization strategy/plan include measures to address vaccine hesitancy and build public trust in vaccines.

The national immunization strategy, developed by the Ministry of Health and Child Care, does include a call to conduct a Baseline Knowledge, Attitudes, Beliefs and Practices (KABP) Study on vaccine hesitancy by 2015 ²³⁸. No publicly available KABP study exists, nor is there any evidence of a plan to build public trust in vaccines. ²³⁹

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Zimbabwe does have a national advisory group—a National Immunization Technical Advisory Group (NITAG)—that provides independent, multidisciplinary technical guidance and evidence-informed recommendations on immunization policy to the Ministry of Health and Child Care. The Zimbabwe NITAG was established in 2011 and continues to submit recommendations on vaccine schedules, new vaccine introductions (e.g., measles-rubella, IPV), AEFI (adverse events following immunization) monitoring, and EPI operations, including logistics and staffing ²⁴⁰. As such, Zimbabwe meets the criterion of having a national advisory group that provides technical guidance on the immunization strategy/plan. There is also very little publicly available evidence of official guidance given by Zimbabwe's NITAG is its COVID-19 guidance, referenced by the Global Nitag Network. ²⁴¹

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 0

There is insufficient public evidence that Zimbabwe has an immunization programme for influenza. According to World Health Organization data, Zimbabwe does not have a seasonal immunization programme for influenza. ²⁴² No evidence for a seasonal influenza program was available on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture ²⁴³ or the Ministry of Health ²⁴⁴.

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 100

Zimbabwe has a national strategy—the National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS)—which explicitly addresses health system resilience to climate change, including the evolving threat of infectious diseases. The strategy outlines measures to strengthen disease surveillance systems, enhance preparedness for water- and vector-borne diseases, and build adaptive capacity following extreme weather events such as floods and droughts, which often trigger outbreaks like cholera and malaria (p 53). ²⁴⁵

Moreover, the National Health Strategy (NHS) 2021–2025 incorporates Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response and prioritizes developing health system resilience through integrated surveillance, early warning systems, and adaptive programming linked to climate-induced risks (e.g. epidemics following floods and droughts). These provisions reflect a targeted approach to mitigating infectious disease threats exacerbated by shifting weather patterns (p. 87). ²⁴⁶

Zimbabwe has also formally joined the WHO-backed Alliance for Transformative Action on Climate Change and Health (ATACH) under the COP26 Health initiative, signaling political commitment to building climate-resilient health systems that explicitly address climate-driven disease risks. ²⁴⁷ Additionally, NGO-supported programs—such as solar-powered vaccine storage and outreach services—offer practical models of climate-adaptive interventions within the health sector. ²⁴⁸

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 100

There is evidence that the national laboratory system in Zimbabwe has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation report, published in 2018, "the laboratory services in Zimbabwe can conduct six core tests (of the 10 listed under the IHR). All six core tests can be done at the national level, and four at the sub-national level." ²⁴⁹ While the website of the National Microbiology Reference Laboratory only cites testing for HIV and TB, there is evidence in NGO reporting that the country also conducts testing for AST, Cholera, and CD4. ^{250251252253254}

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) includes a section on public health emergencies and references the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ²⁵⁵²⁵⁶. The National Health Strategy (NHS) does not include any considerations for testing novel pathogens, scaling capacity, or defining goals for testing. ²⁵⁷ According to the EU-Africa Chamber of Commerce, Zimbabwe has a revised and updated National Health Laboratory Strategic Plan (2025–2030); however, this document is not publicly available. ²⁵⁸²⁵⁹ The outdated plan, active from 2017-2021, does not include any information on testing during a public health emergency. ²⁶⁰ The Ministry of Health and Child Care's website contains general health information, public health bulletins, and some high-level documents (e.g., the National Health Strategy), but no detailed public health emergency testing strategy is listed or accessible. ²⁶¹ Moreover, the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Defense also have no materials published related to health testing strategies or laboratory scale-up planning in emergencies. ²⁶²²⁶³

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

There is a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited. The National Microbiology Reference Laboratory of Zimbabwe has ISO 15189:2012 accreditation through December 2025. ²⁶⁴

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

There is a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility, which is subject to external quality assurance review. The National Microbiology Reference Laboratory of Zimbabwe has ISO 15189:2012 accreditation, and thus is subject to external quality assurance through December 2025. ²⁶⁵

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 100

There is a nationwide specimen transport system in Zimbabwe. Launched in 2021, the Integrated Specimen Transportation system operated in 63 districts and 2000 health facilities as of 2024. The system is implemented by the Ministry of Health and Child Care and funded by the United Nations Development Program. ²⁶⁶²⁶⁷ The only publicly available document of the Integrated Specimen Transportation System from a Zimbabwean government ministry is an undated concept note available on the UNDP website, written by the Ministry of Health and Child Care. ²⁶⁸

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has a formal plan or mechanism to rapidly authorize or license additional laboratories to support the national public health laboratory system during an outbreak.
The Zimbabwe Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report (2018) does not reference any contingency licensing framework for rapidly onboarding new lab capacity in emergencies. ²⁶⁹ Despite notable capacity-strengthening efforts during COVID-19—such as decentralizing PCR testing, deploying antigen rapid diagnostic tests, and leveraging existing PCR platforms (e.g., GeneXpert), partnerships with private and research labs, and quality management system enhancements—these are described post-hoc institutional responses, not part of a pre-existing rapid authorization protocol according to an assessment published in the Pan African Medical Journal in 2022. ²⁷⁰ There was no further evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture ²⁷¹ or the Ministry of Health ²⁷².

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

There is clear evidence that Zimbabwe is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance for notifiable and novel infectious diseases. In June 2025, the Ministry of Health and Child Care launched the National Event-Based Surveillance (EBS) Guidelines, introducing systems such as Public Health Emergency Operations Centres, toll-free reporting hotlines, and community engagement platforms to detect outbreaks in real time, according to the Government of Zimbabwe and the Africa CDC. ^273274275

However, while these guidelines establish robust event-based surveillance mechanisms, there is not yet any public evidence that the collected data are being analyzed on a daily basis. A study in the Pan African Medical Journal evaluating the Weekly Disease Surveillance System in Makonde District in 2020 found that although data reporting was occurring, it was often untimely, incomplete, and underutilized, with less than half of health workers analyzing the data in meetings (p. 2). ²⁷⁶ This same article is the most recent verifiable information on the frequency of surveillance, and shows that Weekly surveillance is undertaken but it remains incomplete and underutilized. ²⁷⁷

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a mechanism for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO. The WHO Disease Outbreak News (DONs) database includes notifications of disease outbreaks in Zimbabwe, as recently as 2018 with reporting of two cholera outbreaks. ²⁷⁸

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 100

Zimbabwe operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both national and sub-national levels, primarily through the DHIS2 platform. According to UNDP, this platform has been deployed across all health facilities from the "district level upwards", for aggregate data reporting and weekly disease surveillance, enabling timely electronic transmission and central analysis of notifiable disease data ²⁷⁹. It integrates multiple systems—including the Weekly Disease Surveillance System and ePMS—into a unified national health information system, supported by enhanced ICT infrastructure and connectivity across administrative levels ²⁸⁰.

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 50

There is an electronic reporting surveillance system that collects ongoing laboratory data, with no evidence of disaggregation by age, ethnicity, etc. Zimbabwe uses the District Health Information Software version 2 (DHIS2) system, which was rolled out nationwide in 2013 and now covers all Ministry of Health offices, 63 district, 10 provincial, and 4 city health information offices (p.10). ²⁸¹ According to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report published in 2022, "the digital platform enables users at all levels to instantly view the data soon after its capture by district staff." The data is also used to inform weekly epidemiological reports (p.10). ²⁸² A subsequent UNDP report suggests that the Ministry of Health has started investing in systems to allow for data disaggregation, but it does not mention at what level, and there is no further evidence of this on the website of the Ministry. ²⁸³²⁸⁴

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 100

There is evidence that Zimbabwe has a national wastewater surveillance programme. In March 2025, Zimbabwe commissioned a state-of-the-art Environmental Surveillance (ES) laboratory unit within the National Polio Laboratory to enable the country to test wastewater for poliovirus, allowing for early detection of the virus and allowing timely response to potential outbreaks. ²⁸⁵ Moreover, in March 2023, Zimbabwe launched its Environmental Surveillance for Polioviruses programme to complement ongoing Polio surveillance through the case based Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) system thereby increasing overall sensitivity of the country’s Polio surveillance to detect poliovirus transmission timely. Initially starting with 4 sites in Harare Province, the programme expanded to 9 sites nationwide. ²⁸⁶

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 50

Electronic health records (EHR) are used in some health facilities in Zimbabwe. The Impilo EHR system, implemented by the Ministry of Health and Child Care, was used in 1,023 of the country's 1,800 health facilities in 2023, with a goal of 100% service. ²⁸⁷ There is indeed a national plan for health services digitization, identified in the National Health Strategy (2021-2025), which identified Implio as a key component of the country’s digital health transformation. It states explicitly that digitizing health information systems, including EHRs, is part of efforts to improve the efficiency and coordination of healthcare delivery.

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 0

The national public health system does not have full access to electronic health records of individuals in Zimbabwe. While the Impilo EHR system is currently being implemented nationwide by the Ministry of Health and Child Care, it has yet to be fully integrated with 100% coverage. In 2023, 1,023 of the country's 1,8000 health facilities used the system. ²⁸⁸ Neither the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) nor accessible health strategy documents explicitly reference user access rights, privacy protections, or role-based permissions tied to the EHR.

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards). There is no evidence of data standards on the Ministry of Health's webpage for Impilo, or in reporting on Impilo's (Zimbabwe's electronic health records system) implementation. ²⁸⁹²⁹⁰

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 100

There is evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation report, published in 2018, the Ministries of Environment, Agriculture, and Health manage zoonotic disease using a One Health approach. The Joint External Evaluation report of 2018 states "The ministries of Agriculture, Health, and Environment are jointly responsible for the management of zoonotic diseases using the One Health approach". However, "Although there is regular exchange of information between the Department of Livestock and Veterinary Services (DLVS) and the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC), there is need to
make this more systematic and improve timeliness." Noted as needing strengthening is "Current coordination between various sectors is informal and based on personal relationships, with no formal MOUs or agreements between public health and other sectors at the national and sub-national levels." Also noted in the report is "The District Health Information
Software version 2 (DHIS2) integrates all reports from different programmes and generates weekly epidemiological reports, health profiles, and situation reports during outbreaks", but "there is no linkage or interoperability between the animal and human health surveillance systems (within DHIS2)." ²⁹¹ Evaluations of the current One Health approach in Zimbabwe specify the need for strengthened coordination mechanisms, stating that the One Health Secretariat established in 2022 is predominantly occupied with AMR efforts, rather than zoonotic diseases. ²⁹²²⁹³ According to an analysis of Zimbabwe's disease prevention mechanisms in the context of malaria, "Despite the existence of committees at all levels, networking on VBDs (vector-borne disease) to coordinate action and enable effective sharing of information and resources has been relatively weak." ²⁹⁴

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 100

The government makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar). The Ministry of Health publishes weekly Disease Surveillance Reports on its social media accounts with information illnesses including influenza/common cold, common diarrhoea, cholera, malaria, dog bites, typhoid, snake bites. ²⁹⁵²⁹⁶ The Ministry of Health does not appear to house these reports on their website. ²⁹⁷

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 100

There is legislation and/or regulation that safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. Section 39 of the 2018 Public Health Act establishes that all medical data is confidential and cannot be disclosed without written consent; this is reaffirmed by the 2021 Data Protection Act, see Section 18 "Security". ²⁹⁸²⁹⁹ Section 25 of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act states that the disclosure of personal information that relates to "medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis, condition, treatment or evaluation" is considered to be an "unreasonable invasion of a third party's privacy." ³⁰⁰

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 100

There is legislation that safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information, including provisions related to cybersecurity. The Cyber and Data Protection Act, 2021 (CDPA) establishes a robust legal framework for protecting personal data, including sensitive health information. It mandates that data controllers—including public health bodies—process data lawfully, fairly, and transparently (PART VIII, Section 30 "Code of Conduct, page 57), and implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data. The Act also institutes breach notification requirements, and mandates data breach reporting to the designated authority (POTRAZ) (Part V "DUTIES OF DATA CONTROLLER AND DATA PROCESSOR," Section 19 "Security breach notification," page 53), and specifies strict conditions for processing sensitive categories of data such as health, biometric, and genetic data (PART IV "General Rules on the Processing of Data," Section 12 "Genetic data, biometric sensitive data and health data," page 50). ³⁰¹³⁰²

The CDPA further aims to enhance cybersecurity through the establishment of a Cyber-Security and Monitoring Centre and the creation of mechanisms to investigate and respond to cybercrimes—providing protection against threats such as ransomware and unauthorized access ³⁰³³⁰⁴. According to the Council of Europe, ZImbabwe's Republic Police have yet to designate a department or unit dedicated to cyber crime, and a National Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRT) has not yet been created. ³⁰⁵

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the government has made a reliable commitment to share data for more than one disease during a public health emergency with other countries. While they have indeed made a public statement commitment, there is no evidence that they have yet to follow through on said commitment. In 2023 Zimbabwe signed the Inter-Governmental Memorandum of Agreement for the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Humanitarian and Emergency Operations Centre (SHOC), joining Mozambique, Namibia and the United Republic of Tanzania. The SHOC coordinates risk preparedness, response and early recovery, including in the context of public health emergencies. ³⁰⁶³⁰⁷ According to the SADC Disaster Risk Management Strategy And Action Plan (2022-2030), a main regional action is to "strengthen national and sub-national capacities and knowledge to better understand disaster risks through mutual sharing of information." ³⁰⁸ However, despite calls for data sharing amongst members in the context of Covid-19 and Mpox, there is no publicly available evidence that there is any actual commitment made by the government of Zimbabwe to do so. ^309310311312 The country has enrolled in the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS), but has not yet submitted surveillance data. ³¹³ Zimbabwe is a participant in the African Union's Southern Africa Regional Collaborating Centre (RCC) of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). Through the RCC, surveillance data is shared through a Regional Integrated Surveillance and Laboratory Network. There is no evidence, however, on the website of the RCC or the Ministry of Health of Zimbabwe's participation or commitment to participate in any such data sharing. ³¹⁴³¹⁵

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency. Zimbabwe uses the District Health Information Software version 2 (DHIS2) system, which was rolled out nationwide in 2013 and now covers all Ministry of Health offices, 63 district, 10 provincial, and 4 city health information offices. ³¹⁶ According to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report published in 2022, "the digital platform enables users at all levels to instantly view the data soon after its capture by district staff." ³¹⁷ While there is evidence of training programs for DHIS2, there is no evidence of a national system in place to provide more comprehensive support. ^318319320

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention. While an Emergency Social Cash Transfer Programme (ESCT) enacted during the Covid-19 pandemic, it appears to be a one-off program, with no evidence of similar initiatives used for those infected with other diseases. ³²¹³²² There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe provides ongoing, formalized wraparound services—such as economic support or medical attention—for individuals required to self-isolate or quarantine. While the Zimbabwe COVID-19 Emergency Response Project outlines general health system support, it does not include targeted provisions for individuals in isolation or quarantine ³²³. The National Health Strategy (2021–2025) focuses on strengthening health service delivery but does not include guidance or support measures for individuals who must self-isolate or quarantine ³²⁴.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency. While the Ministry of Health has Port Health Officers stationed at all points of entry, in part to "ensure that public health nuisances are prevented or dealt with appropriately," there is no evidence of a broader plan or agreement between these officers and border control authorities. ^325326327 The JEE notes specifically that "Zimbabwe has platforms where the security and public health sectors meet to discuss pertinent issues, especially in relation to border control and public health events. However, at present there are no formal
written agreements of cooperation and collaboration between the sectors." ³²⁸

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

Applied epidemiology training is available in Zimbabwe. The Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) was established in Zimbabwe in 1993, and is accredited by the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET). ³²⁹³³⁰ There is no evidence of resources provided by the government for sending citizens to another country for applied epidemiology training programs. ^331332333

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the available field epidemiology training programs are explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or that there are specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV). There is no evidence on the website of the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) that the program is inlusive of animal health professionals or includes curiculum related to animal health. ³³⁴ The JEE does mention FETP, to note that it needs to be revived. ³³⁵ There are, however, specialized animal health training programs beyond the ZFET. These include the Malilangwe Wildlife Capture Course, which delivers hands-on instruction in chemical and physical wildlife restraint, accredited for continuous professional development and dangerous drug licensing in Zimbabwe ³³⁶. Additionally, in 2024, the University of Zimbabwe’s Faculty of Veterinary Sciences organized an intensive wildlife immobilization course, blending theoretical and practical skills—covering capture techniques, surveillance, pathology, and post-mortem procedures for diverse species ³³⁷. Separately, the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) facilitated a biosafety and biosecurity training workshop in early November 2023 to bolster biorisk management capacities within Zimbabwe’s veterinary laboratories ³³⁸.

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 100

There is public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people. According to the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET), the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) has had 248 successful graduates since 1993. Given a national population of abput 16,300,000 people, this calculates to a ratio of about 3 epidemiologists per 200,000 people. ³³⁹

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 33.33

There is no evidence that Zimbabwe has an overarching, publicly available national public health emergency response plan that addresses multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential but there is evidence of a disease-specific plan. Zimbabwe activated a COVID‑19 Preparedness and Response Plan in March 2020, but this was a disease-specific intervention and not part of a broader, integrated public health emergency response framework. ³⁴⁰ Zimbabwe lacks an all-hazards public health emergency preparedness and response plan, and there is no evidence of sustained funding for such a plan. There is no evidence of a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Child Care, the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works, or the Civil Protection Department. ^341342343 The 2018 Joint External Evaluation noted an urgent need for updating Zimbabwe's emergency plans and operations (p. 21). ³⁴⁴

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 0

There is no evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan being in place. Zimbabwe does not appear to have an overarching, publicly available national public health emergency response plan that addresses multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. While Zimbabwe activated a COVID‑19 Preparedness and Response Plan in March 2020, this was a disease-specific intervention and not part of a broader, integrated public health emergency response framework. Zimbabwe lacks an all-hazards public health emergency preparedness and response plan, and there is no evidence of sustained funding for such a plan. ³⁴⁵ There is no evidence of a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Child Care, the Ministry of Local Government and Public Works, or the Civil Protection Department. ^346347348

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place in Zimbabwe. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, published in 2018, "Zimbabwe does not yet have a documented and approved national public health emergency preparedness and response plan that meets the core capacity requirements under Annex 1A, Article of the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005)." ³⁴⁹ There is no evidence of any new plan on the website of the Ministry of Health. ³⁵⁰ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ³⁵¹³⁵²

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place in Zimbabwe. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, published in 2018, "Zimbabwe does not yet have a documented and approved national public health emergency preparedness and response plan that meets the core capacity requirements under Annex 1A, Article of the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005)." ³⁵³ There is no evidence of any new plan on the website of the Ministry of Health. ³⁵⁴ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ³⁵⁵³⁵⁶

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. While the National Health Strategy (2021-2025) seeks to operationalize health sector coordination framework, including the private sector, there is no particular mention of outbreak emergency preparedness. ³⁵⁷ According to World Health Organization (WHO) reporting, in 2023 Zimbabwe launched a Health Sector Coordination Framework with the goal of improving and coordinating health-related interventions. ³⁵⁸³⁵⁹ The framework is not publicly available and thus it is unclear if it addresses outbreak emergency preparedness. ³⁶⁰

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 50

There is evidence that Zimbabwe has put in place policy guidelines for non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during epidemics or pandemics, but these are applicable only to COVID‑19, not to multiple diseases. The country launched a COVID‑19 Preparedness and Response Plan in March 2020, which included stratified public health measures (lockdowns, movement restrictions, tiered response levels), infection control guidance, risk communication, and community engagement interventions ³⁶¹. Additionally, the Africa CDC published a brief titled “Finding the Balance: Public Health and Social Measures in Zimbabwe”, which informed NPI strategies during the COVID‑19 response, focusing on balancing transmission control with social and economic impacts ³⁶².

A search through Ministry of Health and Child Care, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defence sources do not yield publicly available evidence of similar NPI guidance being developed or codified for other communicable diseases through a broader or disease-agnostic policy framework. ^363364365

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 100

There is evidence, according to the World Health Organization and UNICEF, that Zimbabwe has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year, during a cholera outbreak from February 12, 2023 to August 8, 2024. ³⁶⁶³⁶⁷ There is no publicly available evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the World Health Organization. ³⁶⁸³⁶⁹

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response, after action review or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. While there is evidence that Zimbabwe has identified a list of gaps and best practices in the past in the context of a cholera outbreak that took place just over a year ago, there is no evidence of a plan developed to improve response capabilities within the past year. ^370371372373

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. There is no publicly available evidence that the country has completed any national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the World Health Organization. ³⁷⁴³⁷⁵ While there is evidence that an exercise was conducted in 2024 to "strengthen regional coordination for handling complex One Health emergencies, such as droughts, transboundary animal diseases, and public health crises," there is no mention of involvement of private sector representatives. ³⁷⁶

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

Zimbabwe has an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in place. There is evidence of several Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOC) operating in Zimbabwe, including a nation center based in Harare and eight smaller centers throughout the country. ³⁷⁷³⁷⁸

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year, nor that such drills have been conducted annually. The EOC is not mandated to perform annual drills, and no evidence of these drills taking place has been found. ^379380381 The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) recommended conducting after-action reviews and simulation exercises to improve response capabilities; however, there is no evidence confirming that annual drills are held. ³⁸² While Zimbabwe has made progress in public health emergency preparedness—such as establishing Public Health Emergency Operations Centres (PHEOCs) and activating Rapid Response Teams during the COVID-19 pandemic—these measures do not constitute evidence of mandated or routine simulation exercises. ³⁸³

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. Neither the national nor the sub-national PHEOCs have active websites, and there is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or World Vision Zimbabwe, the relief organization that funded the sub-national centers. ³⁸⁴³⁸⁵ No social media accounts exist for the EOC.

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has conducted a joint exercise involving public health, animal health, the private sector, and national security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event, such as a bioterrorism attack. Additionally, there are no publicly accessible standard operating procedures (SOPs), guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other formal agreements between these sectors specifically addressing response coordination for deliberate biological events from any of the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Child Care, or the Ministry of Agriculture. ^386387388 Zimbabwe is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and submits reports related to compliance, but no detailed operational collaboration documents or exercise reports are publicly available. ^389390391

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation report for the Republic of Zimbabwe, published in 2018, "there is no national plan for risk communication but there are multiple entities in the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) that lead elements of risk communication." ³⁹² Neither the national nor the sub-national PHEOCs have active websites, and there is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or World Vision Zimbabwe, the relief organization that funded the sub-national centers, regarding a national public health emergency response plan. ³⁹³³⁹⁴ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ³⁹⁵

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) that outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation report for the Republic of Zimbabwe, published in 2018, "there is no national plan for risk communication but there are multiple entities in the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) that lead elements of risk communication" (p. 44). ³⁹⁶ Neither the national nor the sub-national PHEOCs have active websites, and there is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or World Vision Zimbabwe, the relief organization that funded the sub-national centers, regarding a national public health emergency response plan. ³⁹⁷³⁹⁸ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. There is no further mention of communication planning in this document. ³⁹⁹

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) that designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation report for the Republic of Zimbabwe, published in 2018, "there is no national plan for risk communication but there are multiple entities in the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) that lead elements of risk communication." ⁴⁰⁰ Neither the national nor the sub-national PHEOCs have active websites, and there is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or World Vision Zimbabwe, the relief organization that funded the sub-national centers, regarding a national public health emergency response plan. ⁴⁰¹⁴⁰² The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴⁰³

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 100

There is evidence that Zimbabwe’s public health system regularly shares public health messages via online platforms to inform the public about ongoing health concerns and counter misinformation. For instance, in September 2024, the Ministry of Health and Child Care emphasized the critical importance of managing misinformation during outbreaks, offering guidance on communication strategies through media channels ⁴⁰⁴. Additionally, the Ministry’s official “Newsroom” and “Press Release” web pages constantly publish updates on disease outbreaks (such as cholera vaccine deliveries and malaria research partnerships) and practical advisories like surveillance and response actions ⁴⁰⁵⁴⁰⁶. These demonstrate the ongoing use of online media to disseminate credible and timely health information.

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 0

There is documented evidence that senior leaders in Zimbabwe have shared misinformation or disinformation about infectious diseases, but not within the past two years.

For instance, the former Minister of Environment and Defence, Oppah Muchinguri, described the COVID-19 pandemic as “God’s punishment” on countries that impose sanctions on Zimbabwe—an unfounded theological interpretation rather than scientifically grounded public health communication ⁴⁰⁷. Additionally, she accused China of “botched experiments” being responsible for the global coronavirus outbreak, which further propagated misleading conspiracy narratives ⁴⁰⁸.

These statements by a senior government official fall squarely within the category of misinformation, and there is no indication that they were retracted or corrected through official channels.

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 58.57

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 49.56

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 100

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 79.17

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is evidence that in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic, Zimbabwe implemented export restrictions on medical goods—including pharmaceutical medicines, medical supplies, and personal protective equipment (PPE)—starting in April 2020. Global Trade Alert pointed to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, which issued a statutory instrument mandating export licensing requirements for these items to ensure domestic availability; medical exports required a certificate confirming that the goods were not needed locally ⁴⁰⁹⁴¹⁰. This action followed a structured decision-making process, as it was formalized through legislation (statutory instruments) and guided by public health considerations tied to COVID-19, aligning with precedent in other pandemic responses, according to a review. ⁴¹¹

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Zimbabwe implemented restrictions on the export or import of non-medical goods (such as food, textiles, or other general products) due to an infectious disease outbreak within the past year. Additionally, there is no indication that any such measures were based on international recommendations or a structured decision-making mechanism involving scientific evidence, expert advice, or national guidelines. Likewise, there is no evidence from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on said restrictions. ⁴¹²
While Zimbabwe has enacted export restrictions on goods like raw chrome (2021) and lithium (2022), these were economic or industrial policy decisions unrelated to public health or disease outbreaks. Similarly, import restrictions on items like meat are for general consumer protection or economic reasons, not in response to infectious disease threats, according to a review from the US Department of Commerce. ⁴¹³

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that since the summer of 2024, Zimbabwe has implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak. Zimbabwe lifted its COVID-19 entry requirements—such as PCR testing and proof of vaccination—in mid-2023, and no new travel bans or entry protocols have been announced in the past year, according to local news sources. ⁴¹⁴⁴¹⁵ There is also no indication that any recent interventions have been based on international recommendations or published scientific evidence, based on searches of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Home Affairs websites. ⁴¹⁶⁴¹⁷

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Zimbabwe applies a risk-based approach to international travel-related measures—such as differentiating requirements by travelers' epidemiological risk profiles, emerging variants, or other structured risk assessments. According to an academic study, during the COVID‑19 pandemic Zimbabwe implemented testing requirements at points of entry (e.g., negative PCR tests within 48 hours prior to arrival) consistent with International Health Regulations, these measures were applied uniformly, not tailored based on assessed risk levels such as country of origin or changing global epidemiology ⁴¹⁸. According to the Airports Company of Zimbabwe, established through an Act of Parliament, Port Health operations at airports and transportation hubs maintain standard quarantine and sanitation practices in line with the Ministry of Health, but without evidence of dynamic risk stratification informing policy ⁴¹⁹. There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe demonstrates a risk-based travel policy mechanism based on scientific evidence or international guidance, and searches on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Home Affairs websites show no evidence ⁴²⁰⁴²¹.

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 1.49

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 28.35

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has a strategy health workforce strategy in place, but a policy document is not publicly available. The Health Workforce Strategy for 2023–2030, launched in October 2024, addresses critical workforce gaps and outlines strategies to enhance human resources for health, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). ⁴²² This strategy was developed following a comprehensive assessment that identified significant imbalances in workforce distribution and performance, particularly in rural areas and underserved regions, according to local newspaper reporting. ⁴²³ The strategy outlines five strategic areas: planning and financing; production, training, and development; deployment, utilization, and governance; retention and migration management; and monitoring and evaluation, ICT, and research ⁴²⁴. Additionally, the government signed the Health Workforce Compact (2024–2026), committing to accelerate investments in health workforce development and enhance collaboration across sectors. ⁴²⁵

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 0

There is no evidence to support that there is sufficient capacity within the health system to deliver essential health services.

The Joint external evaluation of International Health Regulations (2005) core capacities states that there are limited procedures exist for sending and receiving medical personnel during a public health emergency but no plans. There are no standing agreements with international partners to send or receive surge personnel during public health emergencies. There is a need for a formal agreement for surge staffing for local deployment during a public health emergency. ⁴²⁶

Reporting by NGO's and aid organizations suggests that Zimbabwe's health system is below capacity to ensure essential services, and is faced with a lack of proper infrastructure and manpower. According to a 2025 Development Aid report, the World Health Organization (WHO) added Zimbabwe to its “red list” of countries facing severe health worker shortages. ⁴²⁷ 2023 WHO reporting found that Zimbabwe had a ratio of 1.36 medical doctors per 10,000 people, compared to the WHO standard of 25 medical doctors per 10,000 people. ⁴²⁸⁴²⁹ Similarly, the average life expectancy is far below the global average: 58.5 in Zimbabwe and 71.4 globally in 2021. The leading cause of death for both men and women is HIV/AIDS, suggesting a lack of basic health services to prevent communicable diseases. ⁴³⁰⁴³¹

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a plan to ensure continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) cites that continuity of service was compromised during the Covid-19 pandemic, and that it requires attention, but does not propose any plan to do so. ⁴³² The National Health Strategy briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴³³ There is no further information regarding the continuity of essential health services on the website of the Ministry of Health. ⁴³⁴

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 51.25

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in designated isolation units within the country. According to the City of Harare website, the Wilkins Infectious Diseases Hospital in the city of Harare serves as the primary facility for treating and isolating patients with infectious diseases, including those caused by bacteria, viruses, fungi, or parasites. This hospital is affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Child Care and is equipped to handle various infectious disease cases. ⁴³⁵

Additionally, the National Microbiology Reference Laboratory (NMRL) at Harare Central Hospital plays a crucial role in diagnosing and managing infectious diseases, supporting the country's capacity to respond to such health threats, according to the NMRL. ⁴³⁶ The World Bank's COVID-19 Emergency Response Project outlines the establishment of isolation areas with in-suite facilities, including single rooms or cohort facilities, designed to manage patients with highly infectious diseases since 2021. ⁴³⁷

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years, nor that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. During the most recent cholera outbreak, there is evidence that the government collaborated with the World Health Organization (WHO) to expand cholera treatment centers, mainly by increasing bed capacity; however, there is no mention of the isolation of patients or isolation capacity. ⁴³⁸ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴³⁹

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 0

While there is evidence of a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs, it does not specifically mention these supplies. Procurement in Zimbabwe is generally regulated by the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, and applied in the context of laboratory supplies and medical supplies by the Procurement Services Department of the Ministry of Health. ⁴⁴⁰⁴⁴¹

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 33.33

There is publicly available evidence that a stockpile of medical supplies exists, but there is limited evidence of what any stockpile contains, so there is insufficient evidence of a plan to ensure equitable distribution. Zimbabwe maintains some stockpiles of medical supplies, including essential medicines, vaccines, and personal protective equipment (PPE), for use during public health emergencies. ⁴⁴² While Zimbabwe has national frameworks for emergency response, including general health security coordination, clear and detailed plans specifically outlining equitable distribution of medical countermeasures during multi-disease outbreaks remain limited or not publicly accessible. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation notes that there are stockpiles controlled by the National Pharmaceutical Company (NatPharm), but that a stockpile for medical countermeasures only pertains to a cholera outbreak. ⁴⁴³ Further searches on the databases for the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defence or the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ) did not show any results. ^444445446447

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

While there is limited evidence suggesting that Zimbabwe maintains some laboratory consumables—such as reagents and related supplies—for emergency preparedness, these do not appear to be part of a formal, nationally organized stockpile documented in a public health emergency plan. A 2019 WHO-led workshop on supply chain logistics noted that Zimbabwe had “emergency supplies including … laboratory consumables” deployed during past outbreaks like cholera, implying some level of pre-positioning or rapid procurement capability ⁴⁴⁸. There is no publicly available evidence on the Ministry of Health website, as well. ⁴⁴⁹

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 0

There is no publicly accessible evidence indicating that Zimbabwe conducts or requires an annual review of its national stockpile to ensure that supplies remain sufficient for public health emergencies. There is no information on annual reviews from sources of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defence, the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ) or the 2018 Joint External Evaluation. ^450451452453

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. ^454455456457 In 2024, the Health Resilience Fund (HRF), a pooled fund of international donations managed by the Ministry of Health, procured USD$9.2 million worth of medical supplies. While the goal of the HRF is not specifically to respond to public health emergencies but rather to support the general public health system, this shows a capacity to leverage funds for important medical supplies such as cholera kits and antibiotics during an emergency. ⁴⁵⁸⁴⁵⁹ There is no further information of such plans in the National Health Strategy (2021-2025) or on the website of the Ministry of Health, nor of a plan/agreement to leverage public and/or private sector domestic (including regional) manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency or a plan/mechanism to expedite medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) through points of entry. ⁴⁶⁰⁴⁶¹ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴⁶²

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a plan and mechanisms to procure laboratory supplies (e.g., reagents, media) for national use during public health emergencies. ^463464465 The USAID Global Health Supply Chain Program supports Zimbabwe in managing procurement through quarterly and biannual coordination meetings, annual quantification exercises, and supply chain monitoring systems. These efforts help ensure the timely procurement and delivery of laboratory commodities in alignment with national needs. However, there is no publicly available evidence of plans to leverage domestic or regional manufacturing capacity for laboratory supplies or to expedite these supplies through points of entry during emergencies, even on relevant ministry websites. ⁴⁶⁶ Likewise, there is no publicly available evidence from the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC), or the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ). ⁴⁶⁷⁴⁶⁸

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence for a system or mechanism for national and subnational levels for emergency logistics and supply chain management that includes regular reviews and cold chain management.

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Zimbabwe Assisted Push System (ZAPS) is the supply chain model used by the Ministry of Child Care to distribute medicine and other health commodities. ⁴⁶⁹ According to USAID, ZAPS undergoes quarterly USAID-supported procurement and supply management committee meetings. ⁴⁷⁰ However, ZAPS is general use system, and is not explicitly for use during public health emergencies. According to UNICEF, there is evidence of cold chain management, including donations made by Japan in 2022 to improve Covid-19 vaccination programs. ⁴⁷¹

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has a formal plan, program, or guidelines for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCMs)—such as antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics—during a public health emergency. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report highlights the absence of formal plans and procedures for managing MCMs during emergencies, indicating limited capacity in this area (p. 5). ⁴⁷² Relevant Ministries such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defence, the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ) do not make specific mention in the Zimbabwe Preparedness and Response Plan. ^473474475 Lastly, the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) has no online presence.

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a plan in place to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency. There is no mention of workforce surge in the National Health Strategy (2021-2025) nor on the website of the Ministry of Health. ⁴⁷⁶⁴⁷⁷ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴⁷⁸ While the Ministry of Health and Child Care announced the launches of a Health Workforce Strategy (2023-2030) and Health Workforce Investment Compact (2024-2026), no publicly available documentation related to these initiatives exists. ⁴⁷⁹

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. There is no mention of redeployment in the National Health strategy (2021-2025) nor on the website of the Ministry of Health. ⁴⁸⁰⁴⁸¹ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴⁸²

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a public plan in place to redeploy existing health personnel within the country. There is no mention of redeployment in the National Health strategy (2021-2025) nor on the website of the Ministry of Health. ⁴⁸³⁴⁸⁴ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴⁸⁵ While the Ministry of Health and Child Care announced the launches of a Health Workforce Strategy (2023-2030) and Health Workforce Investment Compact (2024-2026), no publicly available documentation related to these initiatives exists. ⁴⁸⁶

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 75

Section 76 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) states that "Every citizen and permanent resident of Zimbabwe has the right to have access to basic health-care services, including reproductive health-care services." ⁴⁸⁷

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 79.41

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 100

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 58.33

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 0

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 76

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 66.67

Article 14 of the Labour Act (2016) establishes that "during any one-year period of service of an employee an employer shall, at the request of the employee supported by a certificate signed by a registered medical practitioner, grant up to ninety days’ sick leave on full pay". The act contains no mention of leave for mental health problems. ⁴⁸⁸

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency, however no priority is placed on them over others. In April 2022, the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) released the Guidelines for the Prevention, Surveillance and Management of COVID-19 Infection Among Healthcare Workers in Zimbabwe. These guidelines, developed in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO), outline comprehensive measures to protect healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The guidelines include protocols for infection prevention and control, risk assessment, case management, and psychosocial support. Notably, they specify that all healthcare workers who are exposed to or infected by COVID-19 should receive appropriate medical care, including hospitalization if necessary, and be provided with psychosocial support during their recovery period. The guidelines also emphasize the importance of ensuring that healthcare workers are not penalized for taking sick leave due to COVID-19 infection, thereby prioritizing their health and well-being during public health emergencies (p. 11). ⁴⁸⁹

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Zimbabwe has a comprehensive, formal system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Zimbabwe highlights the absence of formal plans and procedures for managing communication during emergencies, indicating limited capacity in this area ⁴⁹⁰. Official Ministry of Health and Child Care sources and WHO documents do not provide publicly accessible information on communication systems for public health emergencies. ⁴⁹¹⁴⁹²

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency that encompasses healthcare workers in both the public and private sectors. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation, published in 2018, there is no national plan for risk communication in Zimbabwe. ⁴⁹³ There is no further mention of such a plan in the National Health Strategy (2021-2025) nor on the website of the Ministry of Health. ⁴⁹⁴⁴⁹⁵ The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) briefly mentions the full implementation of the National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), which is not publicly available. ⁴⁹⁶

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities, as noted in a 2022 government report ⁴⁹⁷. It states that while prior to COVID, "there was no distinction between HAI and community acquired infections because cases were not systematically investigated. However various efforts to reduce the incidence of HCWI rates were made." Prior to this, according to the most recent Joint External Evaluation report. published in 2018, "healthcare associated infection (HCAI) surveillance programs [were] not operational in Zimbabwe’s health facilities". ⁴⁹⁸

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 100

There is evidence of an infection prevention and control program in place nationally. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation, published in 2018, "there is an infection prevention and control (IPC) policy for healthcare facilities, but the programme is not well developed in Zimbabwe". ⁴⁹⁹ According to recently published news articles, the Ministry of Health has recently relaunched an IPC program. ⁵⁰⁰⁵⁰¹ Neither the updated nor the previous IPC programs are publicly available on the website of the Ministry of Health. ⁵⁰² The National Health Strategy (2021-2025) does not include any specific details regarding the IPC program. ⁵⁰³ An Infection Control and Waste Management Plan for Covid-19 was introduced in 2022, suggesting the infrastructure necessary to implement IPC measures. There is no explicit expiration date for this policy. ⁵⁰⁴

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence of a national plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities in Zimbabwe. The Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) has established quality assurance and patient safety initiatives that include licensing health facilities and implementing Quality Improvement teams nationwide ⁵⁰⁵. The MoHCC’s Quality Assurance and Quality Improvement Policy mandates patient safety guidelines to standardize safety practices across all health institutions (Chapter 4, Page 13). ⁵⁰⁶ Additionally, the Environmental Health Services division oversees inspections to ensure health facilities comply with safety standards, according to the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MOHCC). ⁵⁰⁷

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 100

Zimbabwe requires ethical review before beginning clinical trials. The Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ) mandates that all clinical trials obtain prior authorization, which includes ethical approval from the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe (MRCZ) to ensure adherence to ethical standards. ⁵⁰⁸ Additionally, the Research Council of Zimbabwe (RCZ) requires proof of MRCZ approval for foreign researchers applying to conduct clinical trials. ⁵⁰⁹⁵¹⁰ These processes are clearly outlined in MCAZ’s clinical trial guidelines (p. 17). ⁵¹¹

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 0

There is limited evidence of an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) or mutual recognition of clinical trial results taking place elsewhere to treat ongoing pandemics or epidemics. According to the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe's Guidelines for Good Clinical Trial Practice in Zimbabwe, published in 2022, in the case of emergency preparedness in the context of a public health emergency an "expedited timeline for review and approval may be reduced to 15-30 working days subject to early submission of a complete application" is authorized (p.3). ⁵¹² While the guideline does not specifically mention unregistered MCMs, it does apply to all clinical trials.

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 100

There is a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans in Zimbabwe. Established by the Medicines and Allied Substances Control Act in 1969, the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ) approves and registers all marketing, sales, and distribution of medicinal products for human and animal use in Zimbabwe. ⁵¹³⁵¹⁴

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 100

There is an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies. According to the Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe's Guidelines for Good Clinical Trial Practice in Zimbabwe, published in 2022, in the case of emergency preparedness in the context of a public health emergency an "expedited timeline for review and approval may be reduced to 15-30 working days subject to early submission of a complete application" is authorized. ⁵¹⁵ While the guideline does not specifically mention MCMs, it does apply to all clinical trials.

A February 2025 press release by Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states that a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed among Africa’s WHO Maturity Level 3 National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), including Medicines Control Authority of Zimbabwe (MCAZ). The aim of this MoU is to "create a framework that streamlines regulatory decisions to speed up the approval of medicines, vaccines and medical devices, while promoting collaboration on vaccine lot releases." ⁵¹⁶

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Zimbabwe has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.⁵¹⁷

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that epidemics and pandemics are integrated into the national risk reduction strategy, or of a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics. According to the most recent Joint External Evaluation report, published in 2018, "Zimbabwe does not yet have a documented and approved national public health emergency preparedness and response plan that meets the core capacity requirements under Annex 1A, Article of the IHR (2005)". ⁵¹⁸ While emergency preparedness plans have been developed in the context of Covid-19, there is no evidence of a general disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics in general, according to the Ministry of Health and Child Care. ⁵¹⁹⁵²⁰ A 2022 report by the UN Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) notes that Zimbabwe has an institutional framework for Disaster Risk Management (DRM), which includes a National Epidemics and Zoonotic Crisis Subcommittee. However, the report provides no further details about the sub committee’s role. It also mentions a task force on epidemic-prone diseases that feeds information into the Inter-Agency Coordination Committee on Health (IACCH) to support resource mobilization and response. While these structures exist, they do not constitute a fully integrated pandemic risk reduction strategy. ⁵²¹ Although more recent reporting suggests that Zimbabwe has an active Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) policy, it is not publicly available. ⁵²²⁵²³

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

The country has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regard to public health emergencies, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation. Zimbabwe has been a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Health since 1999, which includes several health-related issues, including public health emergencies. ⁵²⁴ In 2023, Zimbabwe signed the Intergovernmental Memorandum of Agreement for the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Humanitarian and Emergency Operations Centre (SHOC), joining Mozambique, Namibia and the United Republic of Tanzania. The SHOC coordinates risk preparedness, response and early recovery, including in the context of public health emergencies. ⁵²⁵ There is no evidence of the implementation of these agreements on the website of the Ministry of Health or in the 2018 JEE. ⁵²⁶⁵²⁷

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

There is publicly available evidence that Zimbabwe has signed and ratified cross-border agreements, protocols, or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with neighboring countries or as part of a regional group specifically addressing animal health emergencies.

Zimbabwe is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) ⁵²⁸⁵²⁹.

According to a Memorandum of Understanding between the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, signed in March 2024, the State Parties which include Zimbabwe, agree to cooperate in the following areas: animal health, including transboundary animal diseases, zoonoses, emerging infectious diseases, etc; animal Welfare; aquatic animal health and biosecurity (including fisheries); and wildlife health" (pg. 7). ⁵³⁰

A search of relevant ministries (Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health and Child Care) finds no further publicly available evidence of any such program. ⁵³¹⁵³²

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

Zimbabwe acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. ⁵³³

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 0

The country has not submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years. According to the Confidence Building Measures portal, the last submission by Zimbabwe dates to 2012. ⁵³⁴

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 100

Zimbabwe has provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee). It did so in 2017. ⁵³⁵

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 25

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

Zimbabwe is not a member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), the Australia Group (AG), or the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Publicly available records and official international membership lists show that Zimbabwe does not hold membership in any of these three key multilateral initiatives aimed at preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ^536537538.

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 0

Zimbabwe has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years. The most recent JEE was published in 2018. ⁵³⁹

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

Zimbabwe has not completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years. ⁵⁴⁰

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

Zimbabwe has not completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years. ⁵⁴¹

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Zimbabwe has allocated national funds to improve its capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats within the past three years. The 2021 Zimbabwe National Budget included specific allocations for strengthening the health sector’s preparedness and response to epidemics and pandemics, including investments in disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, and emergency response infrastructure (p. 148). ⁵⁴² Additionally, Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health and Child Care reported budgetary commitments towards COVID-19 response activities in 2020 and 2021, demonstrating targeted funding to enhance epidemic preparedness ⁵⁴³. These allocations reflect a national commitment to improving pandemic and epidemic readiness. National Budgets after 2021, notably the 2023 (p. 71) ⁵⁴⁴, 2024 (p. 165) ⁵⁴⁵, and 2025 (p. 160) ⁵⁴⁶, all mention the same general goals of supporting the health sector, however, they do not not explicitly reference pandemic or epidemic crises (while 2021 did distinctly mention a crisis, page 148) ⁵⁴⁷.

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 0

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap do not allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps. The most recent JEE was published in 2018. ⁵⁴⁸ The NAPHS is not publicly available. ⁵⁴⁹

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

There is no Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment that allocates or describes specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps. Zimbabwe has not completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years. ⁵⁵⁰

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act). Zimbabwe is no longer eligible for IDA funds due to protracted non-accrual status. ⁵⁵¹ According to the World Bank, while Zimbabwe can theoretically direct contingency budget funds to public health emergencies, there is no dedicated reserve fund. ⁵⁵²

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment to: support other countries to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats by providing financing or support, or to improve the country’s domestic capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity. In a 2023 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the President of Zimbabwe gave public support to pandemic preparedness, but did not provide any specific commitment to provide financing or concrete support. ⁵⁵³ There is no further evidence of such measures on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the World Health Organization. ⁵⁵⁴⁵⁵⁵ There is even also evidence that leaders have said that complaints of health system weaknesses are overblown.

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

While there is no evidence that the country has, in the past three years, explicitly requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country’s domestic capacity to address epidemic threats, there is evidence that donor financing has been used to address epidemic threats. Zimbabwe received a large amount of health-sector funding from the UNICEF-led Development Fund, which includes pooled funding from the European Union (EU), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA), the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi) and Irish Aid. The fund includes disease prevention and capacity building for epidemic prevention. ⁵⁵⁶ The fund has a budget of $38.4 million USD for the 2021-2025 period. ⁵⁵⁷

A UNICEF report from 2025 states that in 2024, U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Global Fund" committed a combined total of USD 362 million to support Zimbabwe's HIV response". However, the report also notes that, "despite these significant contributions, the country still faces a substantial funding gap of around USD 133 million to meet the resource needs outlined in the Zimbabwe National Strategic Plan for HIV (ZNSP IV)." ⁵⁵⁸

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 100

There is evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years. Zimbabwe is not listed as having a balance owed in the 2023 or 2024 "Status of collection of assessed contributions" reports. ⁵⁵⁹⁵⁶⁰

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. According to searches in the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases database relevant for Zimbabwe, plus Zimbabwe’s Ministry of health and Child Care, and the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe, the import and export of specimens necessitates approval by the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe (MCRZ), but there is no evidence of a specific plan or policy for this type of data/specimen sharing. ^561562563 While a National Health Laboratory Strategic Plan (2025–2030) was announced for Zimbabwe in the summer of 2025, no document is publicly available yet. ⁵⁶⁴

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence indicating that Zimbabwe has failed to share samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework over the past two years. The World Health Organization (WHO) status report on influenza preparedness do not mention Zimbabwe as being in default, and there is no additional evidence of non-compliance on the Ministry of Health’s website. ⁵⁶⁵⁵⁶⁶ Zimbabwe appears to actively participate in WHO influenza preparedness activities. ⁵⁶⁷⁵⁶⁸

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. There is evidence that Zimbabwe shared Mpox specimens with South Africa in 2024. ⁵⁶⁹ The country also appeared to follow all international norms during a recent cholera outbreak, including cooperating with the World Health Organization. ⁵⁷⁰

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 25

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 0

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 0

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 0

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 21

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 0

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 0

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 0

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 0

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 75

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 100

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 0

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 50

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 100

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 75

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 98.86

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 35.99

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 72.5

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 0

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 33.33

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 0

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 0

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 49.7

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 0

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 50

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 0

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 77.01

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 62.26

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 0

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 37.71

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 24.75

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 85.71

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 58.01

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 63.3

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 88.57

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 67.96

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 44.92

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 81.25

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 2.46

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 100

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 100