Mauritania: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence to show that Mauritania has a national antimicrobial resistance (AMR) plan for the surveillance, detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, "Mauritania has no capacity for generating data and reporting on antibiotic resistance and no procedures are in place to validate data on antimicrobial resistance and there is no national plan for detection and reporting of antimicrobial pathogens" ¹. In the absence of a national AMR plan, however, the JEE states that National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP), the Military Hospital, Cheikh Zaed Hospital Centre, the National Hospital Centre, the National Office for Research and Development of Livestock, and Maurilab are laboratories that have the technical capacity for antimicrobial detection and reporting ². In addition, in 2022, a national training and awareness workshop on antimicrobial resistance was organized through a partnership between the INRSP and the Biomérieux Foundation. The workshop was conducted within the framework of a sectoral policy focused on strengthening infection control capacities by equipping the National Institute of Public Health Research with two Fumarey devices, which are specifically designed to help address the challenge of antimicrobial resistance ³. Moreover, the WHO noted in its Cooperation Strategy with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania 2024-2027 that it will support the country to establish an AMR surveillance system, implying that such a system does not yet exist (Section 5, p. 36) ⁴. Nevertheless, The World Health Organization (WHO) library of national action plans does not contain a plan for Mauritania ⁵. A JEE was conducted in 2023, however it has not been published ⁶. There is no publicly available evidence from the Ministry of Agriculture or the INRSP and the Ministry of Health website is currently inaccesible ⁷⁸⁹.

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a national laboratory/laboratory system that tests for priority antimicrobial resistance (AMR) pathogens in Mauritania. A systematic review of surveillance systems for AMR in Africa conducted in 2022 showed that no AMR surveillance system for Mauritania was reported ¹⁰. Although the National Institute of Public Health Research laboratories (INRSP) is capable of conducting core tests for salmonella, shigella and tuberculosis, there is no evidence that this includes AMR testing ¹¹. The 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) states that the "National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP), the Military Hospital, Cheikh Zaed Hospital Centre, the National Hospital Centre, the National Office for Research and Development of Livestock, and Maurilab are laboratories that have the technical capacity for antimicrobial detection and reporting", however there is no mention of tests for AMR pathogens ¹². There is no publicly available evidence about capacity for testing priority AMR pathogens from the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture or the INRSP and the Ministry of Health website is currently inaccessible. ¹³¹⁴¹⁵. The World Health Organization (WHO) library of national action plans does not contain an AMR plan for Mauritania ¹⁶.

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania conducts detection or surveillance activities (for example, in soil, waterways, etc.) for antimicrobial residues or antimicrobial resistance (AMR) organisms. The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (Ministère de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable) does not conduct detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms ¹⁷. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) library of national action plans, Mauritania does not have a national AMR plan ¹⁸. A 2023 review by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) of Mauritania's performance regarding environmental issues does not provide any evidence that Mauritania conducts detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms ¹⁹.

Mauritania's Self-Assessment in the Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country reports the existence of a national AMR action plan but also reports "no national plan for a system of surveillance of AMR" for 2019-2020 ²⁰. No information was found on the contents of the AMR action plan and the plan itself is not publically available. The Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance also states that Mauritania does not have any regulations to prevent contamination of the environment with antimicrobial residues but that regulations do exist to control the release of human sewage into the environment ²¹.

According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, there are "several studies on antibiotic residues in meat and milk and also control procedures to monitor antibiotic residues in milk" ²². However, there is no information on AMR surveillance in water, soil etc. There is no publicly available evidence from the Ministry of Agriculture or the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) and the Ministry of Health website is currently inaccessible ²³²⁴²⁵.

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has national legislation or regulation in place to requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans. Law No. 2004/036 relating to medicines, medical devices, other health products and the practice of pharmacy in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania makes no mention of the use of antibiotics ²⁶. Mauritania's Law No. 2010 022 of 2010 Relating to Pharmacy also makes no such mention ²⁷. There is no evidence of the promulgation of any further laws relating to pharmacy. In August 2025, the Mauritanian government announced that it is implementing legal reforms to health legislation, however no specific mention of antibiotics was made ²⁸. The WHO's library of national AMR action plans does not contain a plan for Mauritania. ²⁹ The 2023 Joint External Evaluation shows that "P.4.4 Optimal use of antimicrobial medicines in human health" achieved the lowest possible score ³⁰. There is no evidence on requirements of prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans on the website of the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) and the Ministry of Health website is inaccessible ³¹³².

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 50

There is evidence that Mauritania has national legislation or regulation in place to requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals. Decree 2009-102 of 6 April 2009 Regulating Veterinary Pharmacy regulates veterinary pharmacy, including the requirement of prescriptions ³³. Article 2 mentions the requirement of prescriptions and Article 22 specifies the penalty for supplying veterinary medicine without a prescription ³⁴. Law No. 2004/036 relating to medicines, medical devices, other health products and the practice of pharmacy in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania makes no mention of the use of antibiotics ³⁵. Mauritania's Law No. 2010 022 of 2010 Relating to Pharmacy also makes no such mention ³⁶. There is no evidence of the promulgation of any further laws relating to pharmacy. In August 2025, the Mauritanian government announced that it is implementing legal reforms to health legislation, however no specific mention of antibiotics was made ³⁷. The WHO's library of national AMR action plans does not contain a plan for Mauritania. ³⁸ The 2023 Joint External Evaluation shows that "P.4.4 Optimal use of antimicrobial medicines in human health" achieved the lowest possible score ³⁹. There is no evidence on requirements of prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans on the website of the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) or the Ministry of Livestock and the Ministry of Health website is inaccessible ⁴⁰⁴¹⁴².

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania has plans for zoonotic disease prioritzation, detection and reporting. In Decree n°2022-011 of 16 February 2022, the Ministry of Livestock lists 12 types of zoonotic diseases (Article 4, p. 272) and notes that "in cases of zoonoses, the administrative authority also informs human health services for the purpose of coordinating investigation and response operations" (Article 7, p. 272) ⁴³. The National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 notes that one of the aims is to strengthen epidemiological surveillance, including zoonoses, according to the "One Health" approach (Section 5.3, p. 78) ⁴⁴.

According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Mission report 27-31 March 2017, Mauritania has a "Rift Valley fever outbreak plan", Avian influenza plan", "Ebola virus disease preparedness and response plan (2014) ⁴⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible for gaining further information ⁴⁶.

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. Decree n°2022-011 of 16 February 2022 by the Ministry of Livestock lists 12 types of zoonotic diseases (Article 4, p. 272) and notes that "in cases of zoonoses, the administrative authority also informs human health services for the purpose of coordinating investigation and response operations" (Article 7, p. 272), but it does not make any mention of measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events ⁴⁷. The country's National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 also does not include any such reference ⁴⁸. Despite the fact that Mauratania experienced a resurgence of the Rift Valley Fever in 2020, there is no evidence that any relevant measures have been drawn up since then ⁴⁹. There is no further evidence from the Ministry of Livestock or the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁰⁵¹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵².

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania has plans that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. In Decree n°2022-011 of 16 February 2022, the Ministry of Livestock lists 12 types of zoonotic diseases (Article 4, p. 272) and notes that "in cases of zoonoses, the administrative authority also informs human health services for the purpose of coordinating investigation and response operations" (Article 7, p. 272) ⁵³. The National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 notes that one of the aims is to strengthen epidemiological surveillance, including zoonoses, according to the "One Health" approach (Section 5.3, p. 78) ⁵⁴.

According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Mission report 27-31 March 2017, Mauritania has a "Rift Valley fever outbreak plan", Avian influenza plan", "Ebola virus disease preparedness and response plan (2014) ⁵⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible for gaining further information ⁵⁶. The country also has in place "Ebola virus disease control standard operating procedures" (Procedures operatoires normalisees dans le cadre de la lutte contre Ebola), the "Ebola virus disease preparedness and response plan" (Plan de preparation et de riposte Ebola), the "National strategic avian influenza prevention and control plan 2006-2007" (Plan stratégique national de prévention et de lutte contre la grippe aviaire), and the "Avian influenza plan" (Plan Grippe aviaire). ⁵⁷ The text of these plans is not available from the websites of the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Livestock ⁵⁸⁵⁹.

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a department, agency, or similar unit functioning as a multi-sectoral co-ordinating mechanism dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. The Integrated and Multisectoral National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases 2018-2022 is the only health plan that has involved a multisectoral approach, however it does not target zoonotic diseases ⁶⁰. Decree n°2022-011 of 16 February 2022 drafted by the Ministry of Livestock mentions that "in cases of zoonoses, the administrative authority also informs human health services for the purpose of coordinating investigation and response operations" (Article 7, p. 272), however this is insufficient to conclude that there is a specific multi-sectoral co-ordinating mechanism dedicated to zoonotic disease ⁶¹.

According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, a joint monitoring unit consisting of the Veterinary Services Department of the Ministry of Livestock, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development for the prevention and response to zoonotic disease was established by Joint Order No. 01403 of 20 July 2013. This inter-ministerial unit updates the responsible authorities in the event of any potential zoonotic disease crisis. It is chaired by the prime minister, who is responsible for co-ordinating activities between Veterinary Services Departments of different ministries. Information is being shared between the National Epidemiological Surveillance Commission and the joint monitoring unit ⁶². However, the joint monitoring unit does not appear to be active during non – crisis periods ⁶³. There is no additional information available in regard to this monitoring unit on the webpages of the Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of the Environment. The Ministry of Health website was not accessible at the time of research ⁶⁴⁶⁵⁶⁶.

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence of Mauritania having a One Health Strategic Plan in place. ⁶⁷

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania has a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. The Mauritanian Animal Disease Surveillance Network (REMEMA) was established by the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment in 1998 with the aim of collecting and analysing epimediological data regarding the spread of disease for both animal and human health. Owners of livestock report to the network which updates the relevant authorities in turn ⁶⁸. In addition, there exists the Sahel Monitoring and Early Warning Program (SIG Sahel) which mainly relates to hunger, but also collects information regarding animal-related diseases and releases bimonthly updates (bulletins) ⁶⁹. Article 9 of the Livestock Code (Law No. 2004-024 of 2004) constitutes the legal basis of animal disease surveillance: "Every owner or person having the care or custody of an animal suffering from or suspected of having one of the diseases deemed to be contagious must immediately make a declaration to the nearest local veterinary authority or to the competent territorial administrator" ⁷⁰. Moreover, according to Article No.1 of Decree No. 65.087 of May 1965 on regulating the importation and exportation of animals and animal products to prevent the spreading of any contagious disease to domestic animals, any sign of such disease must be presented without delay to the veterinary health administrator ⁷¹.

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners). The most recent data protection law (Law No. 2017-020) makes no specific reference to activities by animal owners ⁷². There is no evidence from the 2017 Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania that laws or guidelines on information confidentiality exist ⁷³. There is no further evidence available on the website of the Ministry of Agriculture ⁷⁴.

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors), poultry and livestock. In Decree n°2022-011 of 16 February 2022, the Ministry of Livestock lists 12 types of zoonotic diseases (Article 4, p. 272) and notes that "in cases of zoonoses, the administrative authority also informs human health services for the purpose of coordinating investigation and response operations" (Article 7, p. 272) ⁷⁵. However there is no specific mention of surveillance in wildlife.

The country's National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 notes that one of the aims is to strengthen epidemiological surveillance, including zoonoses, according to the "One Health" approach (Section 5.3, p. 78) ⁷⁶. Nevertheless, surveillance in wildlife is not noted in the Plan.

Following the outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever, the World Health Organization noted in 2022 that "implementing an active surveillance system for animal health is essential" ⁷⁷. However there is no evidence that such steps have been taken. No further information was available from the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture ⁷⁸. The website for the Ministry of Health was inaccessible at the time of research ⁷⁹. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, also provided no further information ⁸⁰.

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a mechanism for reporting notifiable diseases to The World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH). According to the WOAH's database, Mauritania has reported relevant diseases on 10 occasions between 2011-2025 ⁸¹. However there is no information about the mechanism through which the reporting is carried out on the page of the Ministry of Livestock ⁸². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁸³.

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 0

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 0

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the Mauritanian government has mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. Although the Ministry of Health's 2017 National Health Policy – Towards 2030 contains a section on cooperation with the private health sector (section 3.1.3), there is no specific mention regarding zoonoses ⁸⁴. There is no further information from the Ministry of Agriculture or the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) and the Ministry of Health website is currently inaccesible ⁸⁵⁸⁶⁸⁷.

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities. In January 2025, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Health, Alya Yahya Menkouss, stated during a workshop on the development of a law on biosecurity and biosafety that a draft law on pathogens and toxins is in the works, implying that such a law does not yet exist ⁸⁸. The September 2017 Official Journal of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania makes references to waste management, as well as pathogenic microorganisms and toxic substances (Article 24), however there is no direct mention regarding their storage ⁸⁹. The Ministry of Health's National Plan on the Management of Biomedical Waste 2017-2021 makes general references regarding the storage of biomedical waste, but does not specifically mention pathogens and toxins, neither does it mention any record of storage ⁹⁰. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ⁹¹. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) and the Ministry of Health was inaccessible at the time of research ⁹²⁹³.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has legislation and regulations that include requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, and failure reporting systems for especially dangerous pathogens and toxins. Law No. 2022-015 on Biosafety states in Article 1 that the aim of the law is to "regulate the use, including in confined environments, the import, export, transport, transit, release into the environment". Articles 12 and 13 directly refer to the process of reporting to the National Biosecurity Authority when it comes to importing, exporting, transporting bio-products ⁹⁴. The majority of the other articles refer to general operational practices and the transport of genetically modified organisms ⁹⁵. There is no mention of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) and the Ministry of Health was inaccessible at the time of research ⁹⁶⁹⁷.

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 100

There is evidence of an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation. Article 8 of Law No. 2022-015 on Biosecurity states that "an authority called the National Biosecurity Authority, or ANB for short, and an advisory body called the National Scientific Biosecurity Committee, or CSNB for short, are established under the supervision of the Minister for the Environment". Articles 9, 10 and 11 outline the roles played by the ANB and CSNB in activities related to biosecurity and their relationship with the Ministry of Environment and other relevant ministries ⁹⁸. The agencies nevertheless do not have their own publicly available websites. Further evidence could not be found from the Ministry of Environment ⁹⁹. The Ministry of Health website is currently inaccesible ¹⁰⁰.

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

There is no publicly evidence to confirm that Mauritania has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. There is no mention of a plan to consolidate Mauritania's inventories of dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities in the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030, its National Plan on the Management of Biomedical Waste 2017-2021, nor in the National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 ^101102103. No further evidence was found on the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)) and Ministry of Environment ¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ¹⁰⁶.

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 0

There is no public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for Ebola or anthrax. PCR testing was conducted in Mauritania during the COVID-19 pandemic ¹⁰⁷. Nevertheless there is no evidence to suggest that PCR testing capacity is available for Ebola or anthrax. According to the country's Joint External Evaluation (JEE), conducting in March 2017, there is capacity to conduct PCR but no clear evidence that there is in- country capacity to conduct PCR for anthrax and/or Ebola ¹⁰⁸. No further evidence was found from the laboratory of the Nouakchott National Hospital Center (CHN) ¹⁰⁹. National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ¹¹⁰. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ¹¹¹.

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania requires biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. Law No. 2022-015 on Biosecurity makes no mention of any required training ¹¹². It deals only with the transport of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) ¹¹³. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ¹¹⁴. Training workshops on biosecurity have been held by the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2016 and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in 2018 ¹¹⁵¹¹⁶. No further evidence was found on the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) website ¹¹⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ¹¹⁸.

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania has any regulation or licensing conditions specifying that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. Although Law No. 2022-015 on Biosecurity does have a section on risk evaluation (Articles 21-25), it makes no mention of licensing conditions ¹¹⁹. It deals only with the transport of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) ¹²⁰. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ¹²¹. No further evidence was found from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) website ¹²². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ¹²³.

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence to show that Mauritania has publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B). Law No. 2022-015 on Biosecurity mentions the safe and secure transport of genetically modified organisms, however there is no specific mention of Category A and Category B infectious substances ¹²⁴. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ¹²⁵. The 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania reports that Mauritania lacks national regulations on the transport of infectious substances ¹²⁶. No further evidence was found from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) website ¹²⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ¹²⁸.

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania has legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential. Law No. 2022-015 on Biosecurity mentions the safe and secure transport of genetically modified organisms, however there is no specific mention of cross-border transfer or end-user screening of pathogens and toxins ¹²⁹. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ¹³⁰. There is no further evidence from the Ministry of Agriculture or the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ¹³¹¹³². The Ministry of Health webpage was inaccessible at the time of research ¹³³.

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania has a national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. Biosafety measures in Mauritania only relate to genetically modified organisms. Biosafety measures in respect of plant pests and GMOS are incorporated, respectively, in Law 2000-042 of 26 July 2000 on Plants Protection and Law No. 2022-015 of 20 July 2022 on Biosafety, which also provide a specific legal framework governing the licensing, registration and inspections of related activities and facilities. Articles 59, 62, 63, 64 and 65 of Law No. 2022-015 of 20 July 2022 on Biosafety provide specific measures for the safety of facilities working with GMOs, risk assessment and management and incident preparedness and response. ¹³⁴ The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, notes the absence of a national law or regulation on biosafety and recommended "developing and implementing biosafety laws and related regulations" ¹³⁵. There is no indication that the situation has changed since the JEE was conducted; the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique) and Ministry of Agriculture do not contain any information about biosafety ¹³⁶¹³⁷. The website of the Ministry of Health is not available ¹³⁸. Although Mauritania has a "National Biomedical Waste Management Plan" at the level of the Ministry of Health, which outlines the different stages of management of the waste generated by health care activities, this plan does not include any provisions for biosafety ¹³⁹. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ¹⁴⁰.

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania has an agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. Biosafety measures in Mauritania only relate to genetically modified organisms. Biosafety measures in respect of plant pests and GMOS are incorporated, respectively, in Law 2000-042 of 26 July 2000 on Plants Protection and Law No. 2022-015 of 20 July 2022 on Biosafety, which also provide a specific legal framework governing the licensing, registration and inspections of related activities and facilities. Articles 59, 62, 63, 64 and 65 of Law No. 2022-015 of 20 July 2022 on Biosafety provide specific measures for the safety of facilities working with GMOs, risk assessment and management and incident preparedness and response. ¹⁴¹ The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, notes the absence of a national law or regulation on biosafety and recommended "developing and implementing biosafety laws and related regulations" ¹⁴². There is no indication that the situation has changed since the JEE was conducted; the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique) and Ministry of Agriculture do not contain any information about biosafety ¹⁴³¹⁴⁴. The website of the Ministry of Health is not available ¹⁴⁵. Although Mauritania has a "National Biomedical Waste Management Plan" at the level of the Ministry of Health, which outlines the different stages of management of the waste generated by health care activities, this plan does not include any provisions for biosafety ¹⁴⁶. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ¹⁴⁷.

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania requires biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. There is however evidence of ad hoc training. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, notes the absence of a national law or regulation on biosafety and recommended "developing and implementing biosafety laws and related regulations" ¹⁴⁸. There is no indication that the situation has changed since the JEE was conducted. In 2022, a week-long training biosafety training and two-week mobile laboratory deployment exercise took place in Mauritania within the framework of the G5 Sahel project in partnership with Fondation Mérieux, GIZ and IMB ¹⁴⁹. In 2016, a training workshop on biosecurity and biosafety was conducted in collaboration with the WHO ¹⁵⁰. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique) and Ministry of Agriculture ¹⁵¹¹⁵². The website of the Ministry of Health is not available ¹⁵³.

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual use research. The National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) has a "Medical Bacteriology" section dedicated to research on bacterial pathogens, however there is no specific information regarding an assessment on ongoing research ¹⁵⁴. The National Health Development Plan 2022-2023 mentions health research (Section 2.4.6), however it does not include any information about an assessment on ongoing research on pathogens ¹⁵⁵. According to the 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, the country lacks a legal framework regarding biosecurity and a pathogen monitoring system. There is no indication that the situation has changed since the JEE, and no further evidence related to dual-use research in Mauritania can be found ¹⁵⁶. There is no further evidence from the INRSP ¹⁵⁷. The Ministry of Health website was not accessible at the time of research ¹⁵⁸.

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a national policy requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. The National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) has a "Medical Bacteriology" section dedicated to research on bacterial pathogens, however there is no specific information regarding any special oversight of research with pathogens ¹⁵⁹. The National Health Development Plan 2022-2023 mentions health research (Section 2.4.6), however it does not include any information about oversight of research with pathogens ¹⁶⁰. Law No. 2022-015 of 20 July 2022 on Biosafety provides a specific legal framework governing the licensing, registration and inspections of related activities and facilities. Articles 59, 62, 63, 64 and 65 of Law No. 2022-015 of 20 July 2022 on Biosafety provide specific measures for the safety of facilities working with GMOs, risk assessment and management and incident preparedness and response ¹⁶¹. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, conducted in 2017, the country lacks a legal framework regarding biosecurity and a pathogen monitoring system. There is no indication that the situation has changed since the JEE was published ¹⁶². There is no further evidence from the INRSP ¹⁶³. The Ministry of Health website was not accessible at the time of research ¹⁶⁴.

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no evidence that there is an agency reponsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. The National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) is dedicated to research on bacterial pathogens, however there is no evidence that it is responsible for the oversight of research ¹⁶⁵. Its website does not contain detailed information about its research activities, however, other studies have referred to data on pathogens gathered by the INRSP, for instance a 2023 study on arthropod-borne viruses ¹⁶⁶. According to the 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, the country lacks a legal framework regarding biosecurity and pathogen monitoring system. There is no indication that the situation has changed since the JEE was carried out in 2017, and no further evidence related to dual-use research in Mauritania can be found ¹⁶⁷. Although Mauritania is party to the UN Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the BWC. ¹⁶⁸ The Vertic's Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database does not reference any agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. ¹⁶⁹ There is no further evidence from the INRSP ¹⁷⁰. The Ministry of Health website was not accessible at the time of research ¹⁷¹.

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold. There is no evidence of any biosafety legislation or regulation. The websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of National Defence do not provide further information on this subject ^172173174. The webpage of the Ministry of Health was inaccessible at the time of research ¹⁷⁵. Mauritania has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports to the Biomedical Weapons Convention (BWC) between 2023-2025, however they are inaccessible ¹⁷⁶.

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 0

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock are publicly available through the OIE database. ¹⁷⁷

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 0

There is evidence that Mauritania has a national strategy of national immunization, however the plan is not publicly available and there is no evidence that it covers equitable distribution or that it includes equity strategies. The current vaccination drive being promoted in Mauritania is the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) ¹⁷⁸. Coverage rates provided by the WHO show that there is 80-100% coverage for all antigens except for Measles ¹⁷⁹. The Alliance for International Medical Action (ALIMA) notes that "Mauritania has one of the highest immunization rates in sub-Saharan Africa" ¹⁸⁰. The National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) provides vaccines for various diseases, including yellow fever, meningitis, polio, hepatitis A and B, typhoid and tetanus ¹⁸¹. There is no further evidence regarding covering equitable distirbution and equity strategies on the INRSP website ¹⁸². The Ministry of Health webpage was inaccessible at the time of research ¹⁸³.

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the national immunisation strategy includes measures to address vaccine hesitancy and builds public trust in vaccines. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Mauritania was among Arab countries with the highest levels of vaccine hesitancy at 46.5% ¹⁸⁴. There is no evidence from the Minsitry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 or 2017 National Health Policy: Towards 2030 that there is such a strategy ¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁶. There is also no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ¹⁸⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ¹⁸⁸.

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

There is some evidence that there is a national advisory group that provides technical guidance and advice on the immunization strategy/plan to government. Mauritania has self reported having a NITAG to the WHO as of 2024.¹⁸⁹ The Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) is the main programme that deals with vaccination coverage in Mauritania, however there is no evidence that it currently acts as a national advisory group providing guidance and advice on the immunization plan ¹⁹⁰. There last instance where there is some evidence that the EPI provides elements of guidance is from 2011 when it provided microplanning guides (Section 6.2) ¹⁹¹. The National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) provides vaccines for various diseases, however there is no evidence that it acts as an advisory group that provides guidance on the immunisation strategy to government ¹⁹². There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or 2017 National Health Policy: Towards 2030 that there is such an agency ¹⁹³¹⁹⁴. There is also no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ¹⁹⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ¹⁹⁶.

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has an immunization programme for influenza. The WHO's influenza vaccination policy and vaccine availability data show that Mauritania has never had a formal influenza vaccination policy ¹⁹⁷. It also mentions that there is no information regarding influenza vaccines being available in the country ¹⁹⁸. It also does not have information regarding any program involved in delivering influenza vaccination in the country ¹⁹⁹. There is no evidence from the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or the National Health Policy: Towards 2030 that there is such an agency ²⁰⁰²⁰¹. There is also no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁰². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁰³.

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a strategy to develop a health system that is resilient to the challenges that climate change and changing seasonal weather patterns pose that includes the threat of infectious diseases. The WHO's 2023 Health and environment scorecard for Mauritania shows that there is "insufficient data" against metrics such as the existence of a Health National Adaptation Plan (HNAP) and climate-resilient health system indicators ²⁰⁴. Objective 13 in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 is entitled "take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts", however it does not outline any detailed strategy to tackle the issue from a health perspective ²⁰⁵. There is no mention of climate change in the Ministry of Health's 2017 document titled National Health Policy: Towards 2030 ²⁰⁶. The 2004 National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change NAPA-RIM makes only cursory mentions of the link between climate change and disease and does not outline any strategy to tackle issue, rather simply noting that it represents a risk ²⁰⁷. There is also no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁰⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research .

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 50

There is public evidence that the country's national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 World Health Organization (WHO)-defined core tests but the tests are not named. The National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) website shows that it conducts various viral, bacterial and biochemical tests, however those tests are not specifically named ²⁰⁹. The 2017 Joint External Evaulation (JEE) for Mauritania provides a list of diseases for which there are tests, however there is no indication as to what the corresponding tests are. The JEE report states that the country's national laboratory system scored 4 on the "Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases" parameter, and continues to state that "the [National Insitute of Public Health Research] INRSP laboratories are capable of conducting core tests for HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, measles, viral haemorrhagic fevers, dengue, yellow fever, cholera, meningitis, Salmonella and shigella. At regional level, laboratories are capable of conducting core tests to detect HIV, tuberculosis, malaria and meningitis". Laboratories also have the capacity to conduct rapid diagnostic tests for malaria, however, again the names of the corresponding tests were not indicated ²¹⁰. The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 shows that tests are conducted for tuberculosis and HIV ²¹¹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²¹².

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 has a section on "Health security and preparation and responses to public health emergency situations" (Section 2.3), however it makes no mention of a plan for conducting testing ²¹³. According to the 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the country has the capacity of conducting 5 of the 10 World Health Organization (WHO)-defined core tests, however the report indicates that there is "no national plan to test priority pathogens" ²¹⁴. Furthermore, the only national, multisectoral public health emergency contingency plans that are mentioned in the JEE are those for the country's points of entry. There is no other mention of contingency plans for other diseases ²¹⁵. No relevant evidence was found in the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 (Plan d’Action National de renforcement des Capacités en Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes et Préparation et Réponse aux Urgences) ²¹⁶. There is also no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²¹⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²¹⁸.

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 0

There is no evidence that a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility has been accredited. The National Office for Sanitary Inspection of Fishery and Aquaculture Products was accredited in 2013 under ISO/CEI 17025 : 2005 ²¹⁹. The Laboratory of the Mauritanian Society of Refining Industries (SOMIR) received accrediation in 2025 under ISO 17025 ²²⁰. However they are not regarded as health-related laboratories. In July 2025, the Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) received an international certificate of excellence by the Centre for Health Protection of the Hong Kong Government's Department of Health, supported by the World Health Organization, however this does not represent official accreditation ²²¹. There is no evidence that the laboratory of the Nouakchott National Hospital Center (CHN) has received accreditation ²²². There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²²³. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²²⁴.

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review. In July 2025, the Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) received an international certificate of excellence by the Centre for Health Protection of the Hong Kong Government's Department of Health, supported by the World Health Organization, however this does not mean it is consistently subject to external quality assurance review ²²⁵. The March 2017 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania notes that a number of INRSP laboratories are subject to external quality assurance review, but the report does not name them, and further research does not yield confirmation of which laboratories are under external quality assurance review. ²²⁶ There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²²⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²²⁸.

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a nationwide specimen transport system. The 2024 Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness submitted to the World Health Organization shows that "Specimen referral and transport system (C.5.1) scored 20% ²²⁹. The transport of specimens is mentioned in the government's bimonthly official journal of February 2019, however it does not outline a specific system dedicated to this task ²³⁰. According to the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, there are some standard operating procedures in place for specimen collection, packaging and transport that were developed for Ebola virus disease preparedness. However, Mauritania scored '2' in "specimen referral and transport system" (section D.1.2) which demonstrates "system is in place to transport specimens to national laboratories from less than 50% of intermediate level/districts in country for advanced diagnostics" ²³¹²³². There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²³³. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²³⁴.

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a plan in place in Mauritania to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. There is no evidence of such a plan in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or in the 2017 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania ²³⁵²³⁶. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²³⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²³⁸.

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

There is evidence that Mauritania conducts event-based surveillance (EBS) and analysis for infectious diseases, however there is no evidence that it is conducted on a daily basis. Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response is conducted by the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²³⁹ and it has been used for the surveillance and analysis of infectious diseases, for instance for viral hemorrhagic fevers ²⁴⁰. Training sessions are also conducted on integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR), for example in September 2024 ²⁴¹. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that surveillance and analysis is conducted on an ongoing basis for all relevant infectious diseases. The 2024 Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness submitted to the WHO shows that "Early warning function: indicator- and event-based surveillance" (C.6.1) scores 20% ²⁴².

In addition, there exists the Mauritanian Animal Disease Epidemiological Surveillance Network (REMEMA), however it does not have its own dedicated website and there is no evidence that it conducts ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious diseases ²⁴³. There is no further evidence from the INRSP ²⁴⁴. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁴⁵.

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

There is evidence of a mechanism (such as an IHR national focal point (NFP)) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline. The 2024 Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness submitted to the WHO shows that "NFP functions under IHR" (C.2.1) is at 40%, meaning that such a mechanism exists, but implementation is lacking ²⁴⁶. The last time that Mauritania reported a disease to the WHO was in 2020, when it reported COVID-19 ²⁴⁷. In addition, WHO's Disease Outbreak News reported an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in November 2020 ²⁴⁸. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a specific mechanism for reporting the diseases. There is no evidence of such a mechanism in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 ²⁴⁹. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁵⁰. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁵¹.

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level. The 2023 Development of the Digitalization Strategy and Operational Plan (Digital Health) for the Ministry of Public Health in Mauritania provides an outline of workshops dedicated to pushing forward the digitalization of the Ministry of Health, including the surveillance of diseases, epidemics and pandemics (Workshop 5), however there is no mention of the government already operating such a system ²⁵². In addition, the 2017 Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania recommends the following priority action: "Put in place an interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting system that includes laboratory data" (p. 26) ²⁵³, however there is no evidence that this has been put in place. There is no evidence of such a system in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 ²⁵⁴. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁵⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁵⁶.

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 0

There is no evidence of an electronic reporting surveillance system being in place. The 2023 Development of the Digitalization Strategy and Operational Plan (Digital Health) for the Ministry of Public Health in Mauritania provides an outline of workshops dedicated to pushing forward the digitalization of the Ministry of Health, including the surveillance of diseases, epidemics and pandemics (Workshop 5), however there is no mention of the government already operating such a system ²⁵⁷. There is no evidence of such a system in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 ²⁵⁸. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁵⁹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁶⁰.

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 50

There is evidence of some wastewater and environmental surveillance (WES) activity within Mauritania. The WHO and GPEI Q4 2025 Polio ES Bulletin lists the country as having 2 ES sites as of Q4 in 2025, although it is unclear whether these are at the national level and are ongoing.²⁶¹

According to the "Polio this week in Mauritania" updates that GPEI publishes, a circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) has been confirmed in Mauritania. The first cVDPV2 in the country since December 2021, cVDPV2 was isolated from an environmental sample, collected on 6 September 2023 from Tevragh Zeina. Genetic sequencing confirms it is linked to Zamfara (Nigeria) 1 emergence (NIE-ZAS-1), most closely linked to a cVDPV2 environmental sample from Tamanghasset, Algeria, collected in April 2023. ²⁶²

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence to suggest that Mauritania has electronic health records commonly in use. Per a 2024 study on the digitalization of health data in Africa, Mauritania had no accessible data regarding the management of digital health records, while the level of general digitalization of health data in the country was deemed to be insufficient (p. 11) ²⁶³. The Mauritanian government adopted a strategy in November 2024, supported by the European Union (EU) and World Health Organization (WHO) regarding the equitable accessibilty to e-health, however it does not mention e-records ²⁶⁴. There is no evidence in the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Administrative Modernization's 2023 "Development of the digitalization strategy and operational plan (digital health) for the Ministry of Public Health in Mauritania", nor in the World Bank's "Evaluation of Mauritania's Primary Health Care System" from 2023 ²⁶⁵²⁶⁶. There is no evidence regarding the general provision of electronic health records from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁶⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁶⁸.

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in their country. A 2023 World Bank evaluation of the primary healthcare system in Mauritania states that "no primary health care center uses electronic health records" (p. 65) ²⁶⁹. The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 notes an objective of "integration of the public hospital sector through the development of electronic medical records" (Section 5.4.6, p. 97) ²⁷⁰; no evidence was found of the implementation of this objective. Law No. 2017-020 on personal data protection mentions that personal health data can only be handled if the individual in question gives consent (Article 15) ²⁷¹. There is no evidence in the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Administrative Modernization's 2023 "Development of the digitalization strategy and operational plan (digital health) for the Ministry of Public Health in Mauritania" ²⁷². There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁷³. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁷⁴.

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards) in Mauritania as there is insufficient evidence to suggest that electronic health records are in common use. A 2024 study on the digitalization of health data in Africa, Mauritania had no accessible data regarding the management of digital health records, while the level of general digitalization of health data in the country was deemed to be insufficient (p. 11) ²⁷⁵. The Mauritanian government adopted a strategy in November 2024, supported by the European Union (EU) and World Health Organization (WHO) regarding the equitable accessibilty to e-health, however it makes no mention of standards ²⁷⁶. There is no evidence regarding the general provision of electronic health records. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁷⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁷⁸.

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 0

There is no evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance). The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 mentions the "insufficient supervision and information sharing between the central and peripheral levels" (Section 3.1, p. 40) as a significant issue ²⁷⁹. The National Health Insurance Fund organized a seminar in December 2023 on social protection data sharing between relevant institutions, attended by the Minister of Health, Naha Mouknass. The modernization of data management in the health sector was mentioned as an objective ²⁸⁰. A digital data hosting center was opened in Mauritania in May 2025 through a cooperation with the European Union and European Investment Bank ²⁸¹. There is no evidence of an existing mechanism for ministries to share relevant health data. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁸². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁸³.

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 0

There is insufficient public available evidence that the country makes de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks publicly available via reports on government websites. The National Insitute of Public Health Research (INRSP) briefly reported on the COVID-19 and Rift Valley Fever outbreaks in 2020 ²⁸⁴²⁸⁵. However, However, aside from these reports, Mauritania does not appear to make de-identified health surveillance data on other disease outbreaks publicly available. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) or the Nouakchott National Hospital Center (CHN) ²⁸⁶²⁸⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁸⁸.

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Mauritania has a legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. Article 2 of Law No. 2017-020 of 2017, the Protection of Personal Information Act (la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel), defines health information as relating to the physical and mental state of a given person. Article 16 states that personal health information should be obtained only from the given person, and cannot be collected from any other source unless the law authorises otherwise. Article 90 provides that except in the cases required by law or by expressed consent, transferring and saving personal data that directly or indirectly identifies information relating to health, racial or ethnic origins, political, philosophical or religious opinions, or trade union affiliations is punishable by imprisonment or fine ²⁸⁹. Law No. 2007-042 of 2007 on prevention, care and control of HIV/AIDS requires a "relationship of trust and confidentiality between a patient in general or a patient with HIV/AIDS in particular and his/her doctor, any health staff, paramedic, any healthcare worker, laboratory worker, pharmacist, or any other person whose profession allows him to acquire such information" ²⁹⁰.

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware). There are no mentions of protections from cyber attacks in Law No. 2017-020 of 2017, the Protection of Personal Information Act (la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel) ²⁹¹ or in Law No. 2007-042 of 2007 on prevention, care and control of HIV/AIDS ²⁹². There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁹³. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ²⁹⁴.

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the government has made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries. In recent public health emergencies, there is no evidence that Mauritania has made any commitment to share surveillance data with other countries. For instance, in the recent outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever, Mauritania informed its population of the epidemiological situation in the country and publicly revealed statistics regarding the spread of the disease ²⁹⁵²⁹⁶. However there was no evidence to show that it was sharing surveillance data with other countries, despite the international nature of the health emergency. Even in cases where health cooperation agreements with other countries have been signed, for instance a public health cooperation agreement signed between Mauritania and Algeria in 2024, there is no indication of any commitment to sharing surveillance data during an emergency ²⁹⁷. There is no evidence of any plans to make such a commitment in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 ²⁹⁸. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ²⁹⁹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁰⁰. The country's adherence to the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) serves as a primary legal and operational commitment. As a signatory, Mauritania is obligated to notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of public health events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. This legally binding framework necessitates the sharing of surveillance data with the WHO but does not specify provisions to share with other countries. ³⁰¹

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 50

There is evidence that Mauritania has a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing, however, it is not a systematic process in the event of a public health emergency. Support to conduct contact tracing was widely provided during the COVID-19 pandemic, including by the World Bank ³⁰² and Vital Strategies in a project called Resolve to Save Lives (RTSL) ³⁰³. Besides these instances, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that support is provided in preparation for future pyblic health emergencies. The Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC) stated in 2025 that "Mauritania Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) is now better positioned to activate and manage Incident Management System (IMS) for real-world outbreaks, but more skills training is required to further empower the team to respond to threats" and there is no specific mention of contact tracing ³⁰⁴. There is no evidence of any plans to increase support to conduct contact tracing for future emergencies in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 ³⁰⁵. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁰⁶. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁰⁷.

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Mauritania provides both medical and economic support when infected people are subject to quarantine. During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Mauritanian government provided some wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate by creating a dedicated solidarity fund to tackle the medical and socio-economic effects of the pandemic that consisted of 7 major points: "Procuring all the country's needs for medicines, equipment, and medical supplies related to the pandemic; Allocating 5 billion old ouguiyas to support 30,000 families headed by women, the elderly, and people with disabilities, most of whom are in Nouakchott, with a monthly financial aid for three months; The state will bear all taxes and customs duties on wheat, oils, dried milk, vegetables, and fruits for the remainder of the year, which will contribute to reducing the cost of these essential commodities; The state will bear the water and electricity bills for poor families for two months; The state will bear the costs of rural water for all citizens in all villages for the remainder of the year; The state will bear all municipal taxes for small businesses and professionals for two months; The state will bear all taxes and royalties due from this activity for heads of households working in the traditional fishing sector for the remainder of the year." ^308309310 Evidence was only found for the COVID-19 pandemic specifically, however, and not for other instances of public health emergencies that required quarantining, for instance the Rift Valley Fever in 2022 and in 2025 ³¹¹. No further evidence was found from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³¹². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³¹³.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Mauritanian government put in place an inter-ministerial Committee in response to the pandemic, however there was no specific agreement between the health system and border control authorities ³¹⁴. The UNDP also mentions an "interdepartmental emergency management committee, but no mention of an agreement between the health system and border control ³¹⁵. The World Bank's support to the Mauritanian government during the pandemic included a focus on "the country’s capacity to identify, isolate and test suspected cases at border control points, as well as safely transfer them to properly equipped isolation and quarantine centers", however, a specific agreement was not mentioned (Section B.28, p. 15) ³¹⁶. No further evidence was found from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) or the Ministry of the Interior and Decentralization ³¹⁷³¹⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³¹⁹.

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania provides an applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) in country, however there is no evidence that the government is able to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP). FETP was established in Mauritania in 2016 through a partnership between Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), the Ministry of Health, and others including the Africa Field Epidemiology Network (AFENET) and the United States Center for Disease Control ³²⁰³²¹. According to the Joint External Evaluation of Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, a basic-level of Field Epidemiology Training Programme (FETP) is available for health workers, consisting of "a three-month field epidemiology basic level training programme focused on prevention and detection of, and response to, diseases and major public health events at the national or global level" ³²². Mauritania's FETP is not part of the Training Programmes in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) ³²³. Mauritanian citizens can apply to the Morocco Field Epidemiology Training Program, however there is no evidence that the Mauritanian government actively sends its citizens to take part in the programme ³²⁴. There is no evidence via the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) or AFENET that resources are provided by the government to send citizens abroad to participate in applied epidemiology training programmes. ³²⁵³²⁶. The Ministry of Health website was not accessible at the time of research ³²⁷.

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence Mauritania has a field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or that there is a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV). The African Field Epidemiology Network (AFENET) reports the graduation of students of FETP, including those from the animal health sector ³²⁸. The REDISSE project also included animal health epidemiology gradutes ³²⁹, as well as animal health epidemiology professionals on the FELTP 2 programme ³³⁰. According to the Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, field epidemiology training for veterinarians is available in addition to field epidemiology training for health personnel ³³¹. The country's three-month field epidemiology basic-level training programme included two veterinarians in its first cohort ³³².

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 100

There is public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people. 26 graduates joined 133 previous graduates from the epidemiology programme in 2024, amounting to a total of 159 epidemiologists according to the available data ³³³³³⁴. The current population of Mauritania is estimated at 5,315,065 ³³⁵. This would amount to 1 epidemiologist per 32,509 people.

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 33.33

There is evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, however it is not publicly available.

The National Health Security Action Plan (PANSS) 2025-2030 (Plan d’Action National de Sécurité Sanitaire (PANASS) 2025-2030) is run by the Ministry of Health and supported by the World Health Organization, as evidenced through a workshop on the plan conducted in February 2025 ³³⁶. Nevertheless, the plan is not publicly available; the closest that the Mauritanian government has come to a publicly available national public health emergency response plan is the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 (Plan d’Action National de renforcement des Capacités en Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes et Préparation et Réponse aux Urgences), which was drafted in 2015 ³³⁷. Although it is not specifically dedicated to public health emergencies, it includes a short section on epidemic risks (Section 3.8, p. 36-7); nevertheless, it is an outdated document ³³⁸.

The Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 includes a section entitled "Health security, preparedness and response to public health emergencies" (Section 2.7), however it refers specifically to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and does not outline a general public health emergency response plan ³³⁹. Section 5.3 has the same title and it mentions that there is a plan to evaluate the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ³⁴⁰, however there no indication that this has been done.

No National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) for Mauritania is publicly available from the World Health Organization's Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness (SPH) Portal ³⁴¹. An NAPHS workshop was conducted in April 2025, suggesting that a plan is under development ³⁴². There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁴³. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁴⁴.

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 100

There is evidence that an overarching national public health emergency response plan has been updated in the last three years, however it is not publicly available. The National Health Security Action Plan (PANSS) 2025-2030 (Plan d’Action National de Sécurité Sanitaire (PANASS) 2025-2030) is run by the Ministry of Health and supported by the World Health Organization, as evidenced through a workshop on the plan conducted in February 2025 ³⁴⁵. Nevertheless, the plan is not publicly available; the closest that the Mauritanian government has come to a national public health emergency response plan is the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 (Plan d’Action National de renforcement des Capacités en Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes et Préparation et Réponse aux Urgences) drafted in 2015 ³⁴⁶. Although it is not specifically dedicated to public health emergencies, it includes a short section on epidemic risks (Section 3.8, p. 36-7); bevertheless, it is an outdated document ³⁴⁷.

The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 includes a section entitled "Health security, preparedness and response to public health emergencies" (Section 2.7), however it refers specifically to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and does not outline a general public health emergency response plan ³⁴⁸. Section 5.3 has the same title and it mentions that there is a plan to evaluate the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ³⁴⁹, however there no indication that this has been done.

No National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) for Mauritania is publicly available from the World Health Organization's Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness (SPH) Portal ³⁵⁰. An NAPHS workshop was conducted in April 2025, suggesting that a plan is under development ³⁵¹. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁵². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁵³.

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a publicly available overarching national public health emergency response plan in place, therefore it does not include considerations for one health principles by covering multiple threat types, e.g. antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic disease spillover, biological accidents or deliberate acts. The National Health Security Action Plan (PANSS) 2025-2030 (Plan d’Action National de Sécurité Sanitaire (PANASS) 2025-2030) is run by the Ministry of Health and supported by the World Health Organization, as evidenced through a workshop on the plan conducted in February 2025 ³⁵⁴. Nevertheless, the plan is not publicly available ³⁵⁵. The closest that the Mauritanian government has come to a publicly available plan is the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 (Plan d’Action National de renforcement des Capacités en Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes et Préparation et Réponse aux Urgences) drafted in 2015 ³⁵⁶. Although it is not specifically dedicated to public health emergencies, it includes a short section on epidemic risks (Section 3.8, p. 36-7), but it makes no mention of multiple threat types ³⁵⁷. In any case, this concerns an outdated document.

The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 includes a section entitled "Health security, preparedness and response to public health emergencies" (Section 2.7), however it refers specifically to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and does not outline a general public health emergency response plan ³⁵⁸. Section 5.3 has the same title and it mentions that there is a plan to evaluate the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ³⁵⁹, however there no indication that this has been done.

There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁶⁰. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁶¹.

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a publicly available overarching national public health emergency response plan in place, therefore it does not include considerations for equity and vulnerable populations. The National Health Security Action Plan (PANSS) 2025-2030 (Plan d’Action National de Sécurité Sanitaire (PANASS) 2025-2030) is run by the Ministry of Health and supported by the World Health Organization, as evidenced through a workshop on the plan conducted in February 2025 ³⁶². Nevertheless, the plan is not publicly available ³⁶³. The closest that the Mauritanian government has come to a publicly available plan is the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 (Plan d’Action National de renforcement des Capacités en Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes et Préparation et Réponse aux Urgences) drafted in 2015 ³⁶⁴. Although it is not specifically dedicated to public health emergencies, it includes a short section on epidemic risks (Section 3.8, p. 36-7), but it makes no mention of equity and vulnerable populations ³⁶⁵. In any case, this concerns an outdated document.

The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 includes a section entitled "Health security, preparedness and response to public health emergencies" (Section 2.7), however it refers specifically to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and does not outline a general public health emergency response plan or any mention of equity and vulnerable populations ³⁶⁶. Section 5.3 has the same title and it mentions that there is a plan to evaluate the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ³⁶⁷, however there no indication that this has been done.

There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁶⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁶⁹.

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 0

There is no evidence that a specific mechanism exists for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. The National Health Policy: Towards 2030 has a very short section of the private health sector (Section 3.1.3, p. 10) and it makes no mention of such a specific mechanism ³⁷⁰. The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 includes a section on the reinforcement of the public private partnership (Section 4.1.2, p. 82-3), however this also does not make any mention of such a mechanism ³⁷¹. Recently, in May 2025, the public private partnership led to the announcement by the MInistry of Health of the establishment of a hospital ³⁷², nevertheless, this does not demonstration a specific mechanism dedicated to the private sector's role in dealing with public health emergencies. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁷³. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁷⁴.

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic for one or more diseases. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Mauritanian government created a dedicated solidarity fund to tackle the medical and socio-economic effects of the pandemic that consisted of 7 major points: "Procuring all the country's needs for medicines, equipment, and medical supplies related to the pandemic; Allocating 5 billion old ouguiyas to support 30,000 families headed by women, the elderly, and people with disabilities, most of whom are in Nouakchott, with a monthly financial aid for three months; The state will bear all taxes and customs duties on wheat, oils, dried milk, vegetables, and fruits for the remainder of the year, which will contribute to reducing the cost of these essential commodities; The state will bear the water and electricity bills for poor families for two months; The state will bear the costs of rural water for all citizens in all villages for the remainder of the year; The state will bear all municipal taxes for small businesses and professionals for two months; The state will bear all taxes and royalties due from this activity for heads of households working in the traditional fishing sector for the remainder of the year." ^375376377 The fund does not by itself provide a policy, plan and/or guidelines for NPIs.

There is no mention of such a plan in the 2017 Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania ³⁷⁸. The National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 (Section 2.7, Health security, preparation and response to public health emergencies) also does not mention NPIs during an epidemic or pandemic ³⁷⁹. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁸⁰. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁸¹.

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year and there is no evidence that it has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year.

There is no evidence that Mauritania has an overarching national public health emergency response plan that was activated in the past year. The last instance where an emergency response plan was implemented was during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the 2020 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan ³⁸². Nevertheless, this is not a general national emergency response plan and it was implemented in 2020. Mauritania has in place the "National Disaster Risk Management Action Plan (PANGRC)" on prevention and management of disasters and strengthening the co-ordination between different sectors. ³⁸³ PANGRC itself is not available online.

The most recent instance where Mauritania's Ministry of Health was involved in a rapid response case was during an outbreak of diphteria in August 2025 among refugees in Mberra refugee camp. Nevertheless, this was not considered a national emergency and it did not refer to a general national rapid response plan ³⁸⁴.

Mauritania has held workshops on national disaster risk reduction in partnership with the United Naations Development Programe (UNDP) ³⁸⁵, however these did not amount to a national-level biological threat-focused exercise. Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC) has reported that Mauritania is better prepared to handle public health emergencies through the implementation of workshops in 2025 ³⁸⁶, however this was not undertaken as an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁸⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁸⁸.

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Mauritania in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response of a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. An After Action Review was conducted in 2023 for Mauritania, however it is not publicly available ³⁸⁹. An evaluation of primary care was conducted in 2023, but this was undertaken by the World Bank and it was not through an infectious disease response of a biological-threat focused exercise ³⁹⁰. Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC) has reported that Mauritania is better prepared to handle public health emergencies through the implementation of workshops in 2025 ³⁹¹, however this was not undertaken as an infectious disease response of a biological-threat focused exercise. There is no evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ³⁹². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁹³.

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Mauritania in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. There is no public evidence that Mauritania in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. There is no evidence via the World Health Organization (WHO) simulation exercise calendar, which shows that Mauritania has conducted five simulation exercises between 2017-2025, however there is no available evidence that a biological threat-focused exercises was undertaken with private sector representatives ³⁹⁴. The website for the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) also shows no relevant evidence ³⁹⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ³⁹⁶. There is also no evidence that a simulation exercise was conducted via a general media search.

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania has in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The National Center for Public Health Emergency Operations (CNOUSP) was set up in 2016 and operates alongside the Center for Crisis Monitoring, Alerts and Management (COVACC). According to the Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, "emergency operating procedures and plans for all types of IHR-related events still have not been developed. The government needs to implement the CNOUSP action plan and the co-ordination plan between two centers have not been set up" ³⁹⁷. The Council of Ministers continues to appoint the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the CNOUSP as of 2023 ³⁹⁸. The CNOUSP was activated in January 2024 in response to a measles outbreak in the country ³⁹⁹.

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or that they have conducted a drill at least once per year. A virtual simulation exercise aimed at monkeypox was conducted by the National Centre for Public Health Emergency Operations (CNOUSP) in August 2024 ⁴⁰⁰. However, this is not an annual occurrence, as similar drills have not been reported. Mauritania does not have an emergency management agency and its Center for Crisis Monitoring, Alerts and Management (COVACC) does not have a webpage. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁰¹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁰².

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. The last known case where the National Centre for Public Health Emergency Operations (CNOUSP) was activated was in January 2024 during an outbreak of measles and there is no evidence to suggest that it was activated within 120 minutes of the outbreak ⁴⁰³. A virtual simulation exercise aimed at monkeypox was conducted by the CNOUSP in August 2024, however this was no condcuted within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency ⁴⁰⁴. Mauritania does not have an emergency management agency and its Center for Crisis Monitoring, Alerts and Management (COVACC) does not have a webpage. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁰⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁰⁶.

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 100

There is evidence that the public health sector has carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack), however there is no evidence that animal health was included or that the private sector was involved, nor is there evidence of standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health, animal health, the private sector and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. The National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) in 2022 hosted a two-week training exercise as part of the G5 Sahel project in order to reinforce biosafety capacities; as part of the exercise, participants were trained to counter both natural and intentional biological events, including acts of bioterrorism ⁴⁰⁷. There is no evidence of any procedure, guidelines, MOUs or other agreements on the websites of the INRS, Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Agriculture ^408409410. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research and the Center for Crisis Monitoring, Alerts and Management (COVACC) does not have a webpage ⁴¹¹.

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that there is a national public health emergency response plan that contains a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. No such plan was found in Mauritania's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030, the National Health Policy: Towards 2030 or the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ^412413414.

A risk communication campaign was undertaken in 2025 during the spread of diphtheria in the Mberra camp when megaphones, posters and local radio in multiple languages were used to communicate risks to the population ⁴¹⁵. A 2024 document describing the National Centre for Public Health Emergency Operations (CNOUSP) response to a measles outbreak only includes "raising awareness among populations about the need to vaccinate children" as a risk communication measure. ⁴¹⁶ A training session on communication during a public emergency was held in 2016 by the Ministry of Health in partnership with the World Health Organization ⁴¹⁷.

The 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania notes that "CNOUSP needs an implementation plan defining coordination mechanisms and stakeholder responsibilities" (Emergency response operations, p. 34) ⁴¹⁸.

There is a Public Health Emergency Operation Centre (PHEOC) in Mauritania, however there is no evidence that it has developed a public health emergency response plan with a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency ⁴¹⁹.

There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴²⁰. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴²¹.

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence that there is a national public health emergency response plan that contains a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. No such plan was found in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030, the National Health Policy: Towards 2030 or the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ^422423424. A risk communication campaign was undertaken in 2025 during the spread of diphtheria in the Mberra camp when megaphones, posters and local radio in multiple languages were used to communicate risks to the population ⁴²⁵. A training session on communication during a public emergency was held in 2016 by the Ministry of Health in partnership with the World Health Organisation ⁴²⁶. The 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania notes that "CNOUSP [National Centre for Public Health Emergency Operations] needs an implementation plan defining coordination mechanisms and stakeholder responsibilities" (Emergency response operations, p. 34) ⁴²⁷. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴²⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴²⁹.

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that demonstrates that Mauritania has in place a risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) and there is no evidence that a specific position has been designated within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. No such plan was found in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030, the National Health Policy: Towards 2030 or the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ^430431432. A risk communication campaign was undertaken in 2025 during the spread of diphtheria in the Mberra camp when megaphones, posters and local radio in multiple languages were used to communicate risks to the population ⁴³³. A training session on communication during a public emergency was held in 2016 by the Ministry of Health in partnership with the World Health Organisation ⁴³⁴. The 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania notes that "CNOUSP [National Centre for Public Health Emergency Operations] needs an implementation plan defining coordination mechanisms and stakeholder responsibilities" (Emergency response operations, p. 34) ⁴³⁵. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) . The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴³⁶.

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Mauritanian public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (eg social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation. The Ministry of Health's X social media page does not include any posts in the past year regarding public health concerns ⁴³⁷. The National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP) does not use its website to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns ⁴³⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴³⁹. The National Centre for Public Health Emergency Operations (CNOUSP) and Centre for Crisis Monitoring, Alerts and Management (COVACC) do not have websites.

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 100

There is no evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases (in the past two years). Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the Mauritanian President, has not referred to infectious diseases in his social media page ⁴⁴⁰. The Health Minister, Abdallahi Ould Wedih, does not have a social media presence. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁴¹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁴². No other evidence was found in media searches for senior leaders.

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 53.23

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 49.09

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 93.33

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 83.33

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania has implemented restrictions in the past year on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. The most recent public health emergencies include the outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever ⁴⁴³ and diphtheria ⁴⁴⁴. Neither incident led to restrictions on the export/import of medical goods. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁴⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁴⁶. There is no announcement of such a restriction in the past year on the World Health Organization (WHO) Disease Outbreak News or World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Weekly disease information webpages ⁴⁴⁷⁴⁴⁸.

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania has implemented restrictions in the past year on export/import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. The most recent public health emergencies include the outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever ⁴⁴⁹ and diphtheria ⁴⁵⁰. Neither incident led to restrictions on the export/import of non-medical goods. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁵¹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁵². There is no announcement of such a restriction in the past year on the World Health Organization (WHO) Disease Outbreak News or World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Weekly disease information webpages ⁴⁵³⁴⁵⁴.

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Mauritania implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. The absence of restrictions may be based on international recommendations. The most recent public health emergencies include the outbreak of the Rift Valley Fever ⁴⁵⁵ and diphtheria ⁴⁵⁶. Neither incident led to restrictions on inbound or outbound travel. COVID-19 travel restrictions were lifted in March 2023 ⁴⁵⁷. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁵⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁵⁹.

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania uses a risk-based approach to international travel-related measures. The last instance of international travel-related measures were implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to COVID-19 Mauritania has closed borders and air travel to travelers since March 17th. Borders were still reported to be closed in November 2020. There is no evidence, however, that the border closure was implemented with international/bilateral support according to the World Health Organization (WHO) and from a wider web search ⁴⁶⁰. The World Health Organization (WHO) Disease Outbreak News reported the Rift Valley Fever in November 2020, however there was no indication that a ban on travelers was put in place ⁴⁶¹. The 2023 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) in respect of Mauritania, for which no full report was published as of September 2025, shows that "Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures" (PoE. 3) received the lowest score of 1 ⁴⁶². There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁶³. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁶⁴.

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 3.4

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 21.65

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 100

There is evidence that there is a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. A sectorial review was conducted by the Ministry of Health in 2023 which mentions specific shortcomings among the country's health workforce including "inadequate distribution of staff across the regions" and "HR remains one of the major challenges facing the health system (inadequate staff distribution, insufficient qualified personnel, etc.)" ⁴⁶⁵. The review notes that "the number of health personnel distributed across health facilities is estimated at 9,296. However, the country's HR availability profile shows that the ratio of qualified personnel is 15 per 10,000 inhabitants, while the WHO recommends 23 per 10,000 inhabitants." ⁴⁶⁶ The objectives of the plan include "recruitment of 3,114 health personnel over the period, including 358 general practitioners, 407 specialists, 116 dentists, 16 pharmacists and 2,217 paramedics, and on the other hand, to put in place mechanisms to maintain the same recruitment rate over the period 2024-2030 and achieve HR ratios of 25 and 27.8 per 10,000 inhabitants respectively in 2027 and in 2030." ⁴⁶⁷ According to a 2025 government announcement, there is a plan to train 7,500 health professionals nationwide over the next five years ⁴⁶⁸. This plan has not been named. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁶⁹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁷⁰.

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that there is sufficient capacity within the health system to deliver essential health services. The latest available statistics, from the Ministry of Economy's Strategy for accelerated growth and shared prosperity (SCAPP) drafted in May 2025, shows that 20% of the population is covered by health insurance, with a target of 50% for 2030 (Section II, p. 7) ⁴⁷¹. The Secretary General of the National Health Insurance Fund (ICNAM), Sidi Mahmoud Zidane, noted that in 2024, only 21% of the population (1.45 million citizens) was covered by health insurance. Although this represents an improvement from 2019, when 422,000 citizens were covered, it is still a small proportion of the total population. The largest surge occurred in 2022 when it reached 1.2 million. ⁴⁷² In a demographic study conducted between 2019-2021, 9% of women and 8% of men between the ages of 15-49 were found to have health insurance, with a large urban-rural disparity (15% of women in urban centres compared to 2% in rural areas, 11% of men in urban centres compared to 3% in rural areas) ⁴⁷³. World Bank statistics show that there was an average of 1.72 physicians per 1,000 people in Mauritania in 2022 ⁴⁷⁴. There are no statistics provided by the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) in this regard ⁴⁷⁵. The Ministry of Health and National Statistics Office websites were inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁷⁶⁴⁷⁷. The Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 includes a number of objectives that suggests that the health system is in need of improvement in order to deliver essential health services, including "Speeding up the reduction of maternal, neonatal and child mortality" (Section 5.1) and "Reinforcing the foundations of the health system to reach universal health coverage" (Section 5.4) ⁴⁷⁸. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR core capacities for Mauritania gives the country a score of 1 on this measure and highlights the need to identify personnel resources available in other sectors (animal health, environment, agriculture) to be deployed during public health emergencies, and to develop and implement a personnel deployment plan for public health emergencies, and develop procedures to manage deployment. ⁴⁷⁹

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that there is a plan to ensure continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency. There is no mention of such a plan in the World Bank's 2023 evaluation titled Mauritania's Primary Health Care System ⁴⁸⁰. A survey conducted in 2022 asking Mauritanians whether more investments need to be made to prepare for health emergencies, 59% agreed with the statement ⁴⁸¹. There is no evidence of such a plan in the National Health Development Plan 2022-2030, the National Health Policy: Towards 2030 or the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 ^482483484. There was no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁸⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁸⁶.

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 5.75

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Mauritania has patient isolation facilities capable of safely isolating and treating patients with highly communicable diseases. Two isolation and care units were established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Bassikounou and Mbera camp in 2020 for refugees ^487488489. There is no evidence that isolation units have since been established for other population groups. No such evidence was found in the media or on the website of the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁹⁰. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁹¹.

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response or has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. Two isolation and care units were established by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Bassikounou and Mbera camp in 2020 for refugees ^492493494. There is no evidence that isolation units have since been established for the local people. The Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 states that improvements were made to case management capacity in Nouakchott, including increasing the number of hospital and intensive care beds as well as undertaking hygiene and sanitation campaigns for containment sites (Section 2.7, p. 38), however these improvements were made in 2020 and there is no evidence of plans for further improvements ⁴⁹⁵. No such evidence was found in the media or on the website of the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁴⁹⁶. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁴⁹⁷.

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence suggesting that Mauritania has a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministry of Health but not the Ministry of Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs. Mauritania does have a national center responsible for the supply and distribution of drugs and public-sector equipment, the Center for Purchase of Drugs, Equipment and Medical Consumables (Centre d'Achat des Médicaments, équipements et Consommables Médicaux; CAMEC). CAMEC is responsible for acquiring generic essential drugs, laboratory reagents and medical equipment listed on the national list of medicines prepared by the Ministry of Health. On the CAMEC website there is a portal of invitation to tender for laboratory and medical items, and the Ministry of Health acquires its laboratory and medical needs through CAMEC ⁴⁹⁸. The website of the Ministry of Agriculture does not include any additional information on laboratory and medical supply procurement protocol ⁴⁹⁹.

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 33.33

There is evidence to suggest that Mauritania has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. However, there is no evidence of a plan to ensure equitable distribution in an emergency, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains. The Central Purchasing of Medicines, Medical Consumables and Equipment (CAMEC) has a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency, however those supplies are not specified ⁵⁰⁰. CAMEC is responsible for acquiring generic essential drugs, laboratory reagents and quality medical equipment listed on the national list of medicines prepared by the Ministry of Health. On the CAMEC website there is a portal of invitation to tender for medical items, and the Ministry of Health acquires its medical needs through CAMEC ⁵⁰¹. CAMEC is also used to stockpile medical supplies for sexually transmitted diseases ⁵⁰². United Arab Emirates based company Wellcare Medical Equipment LLC also provides medical supplies in Mauritania during emergencies ⁵⁰³. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a plan to ensure equitable distribution. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁰⁴. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁰⁵.

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence to suggest that Mauritania has a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency.

The 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania states that "stockpiles are available to respond to some specific emergencies, and Mauritania has agreements with manufacturers, distributors and partners (e.g., Central Purchasing of Medicines, Medical Consumables and Equipment (CAMEC), Central Purchasing of Livestock Inputs (CAIE), WHO, UNICEF and FAO) to secure additional medical countermeasures if needed. Personnel have been identified to oversee the logistics of sending and receiving supplies" (Medical Countermeasures and personnel deployment, p. 38). However, it is unclear whether the stockpiles that the report are referring to include laboratory supplies. The report goes on to say that "Mauritania has no capacity to produce antibiotics, vaccines, reagents and laboratory supplies" (Medical Countermeasures and personnel deployment, p. 38). ⁵⁰⁶

CAMEC is responsible for acquiring generic essential drugs, laboratory reagents and quality medical equipment listed on the national list of medicines prepared by the Ministry of Health. On the CAMEC website there is a portal of invitation to tender for laboratory and medical items, and Ministry of Health acquires its laboratory and medical needs through CAMEC. ⁵⁰⁷ However, no evidence was found of available stockpiles of laboratory supplies. ⁵⁰⁸ No further evidence was available through the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)), and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research. ^509510511

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that Mauritania conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. The Central Purchasing of Medicines, Medical Consumables and Equipment (CAMEC) is responsible for acquiring generic essential drugs, laboratory reagents and quality medical equipment listed on the national list of medicines prepared by the Ministry of Health. ⁵¹² On the CAMEC website there is a portal of invitation to tender for medical items, and Ministry of Health acquires its medical needs through CAMEC. Nowhere on the CAMEC website was there found any mention of conducting or reviewing national stockpiles to ensure a sufficient supply ⁵¹³. No further evidence was available through the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)), and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research. ^514515516

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

There is evidence to suggest that Mauritania has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce or procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency and to procure medical supplies during an emergency, and no evidence of a plan/mechanism to expedite medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) through points of entry.

The 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania, states that "Mauritania has agreements with manufacturers, distributors and partners (e.g., Central Purchasing of Medicines, Medical Consumables and Equipment (CAMEC), Central Purchasing of Livestock Inputs (CAIE), WHO, UNICEF and FAO) to secure additional medical countermeasures if needed. Personnel have been identified to oversee the logistics of sending and receiving supplies". However, it also notes that "Mauritania has no capacity to produce antibiotics, vaccines, reagents and laboratory supplies" (Medical Countermeasures and personnel deployment, p. 38). ⁵¹⁷

CAMEC is responsible for acquiring generic essential drugs, laboratory reagents and quality medical equipment listed on the national list of medicines prepared by the Ministry of Health. On the CAMEC website there is a portal of invitation to tender for medical items, and Ministry of Health acquires its medical needs through CAMEC. ⁵¹⁸ However, there was no evidence of specific emergency procurement procedures and no evidence was found of a plan to expedite medical supplies through points of entry during a public health emergency. No further evidence was available through the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)), and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research. ^519520521

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Mauritania has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce or to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency.

The 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania, expressly states that "Mauritania has no capacity to produce antibiotics, vaccines, reagents and laboratory supplies". ⁵²² It does also state that "Mauritania has agreements with manufacturers, distributors and partners (e.g., Central Purchasing of Medicines, Medical Consumables and Equipment (CAMEC), Central Purchasing of Livestock Inputs (CAIE), WHO, UNICEF and FAO) to secure additional medical countermeasures if needed", but does not specify if the manufacturers are domestic ones. ⁵²³

Mauritania does have a national center responsible for the supply and distribution of drugs and public-sector equipment, the Center for Purchase of Drugs, Equipment and Medical Consumables (Centre d'Achat des Médicaments, équipements et Consommables Médicaux; CAMEC). CAMEC is responsible for acquiring generic essential drugs, laboratory reagents and quality medical equipment listed on the national list of medicines prepared by the Ministry of Health. On the CAMEC website there is a portal of invitation to tender for laboratory items, and Ministry of Health acquires its laboratory needs through CAMEC. ⁵²⁴ However, it is unclear whether a plan or agreement is in place to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity. No further evidence was available through the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)), and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research. ^525526527

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a system in place for emergency logistics and supply chain management, or of specific considerations such as cold chain management for vaccines. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, conducted in 2023, awarded a score of "1" for the indicator "R.1.5 Emergency logistic and supply chain management"; no full report of this JEE has been publicized as of 2025 ⁵²⁸. The Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 mentions that supply chain management in Mauritania suffers from dysfunctionality (Section 5.4.5, p. 92) and that there is a need to prepare the supply chain for crises (Section 5.3.1, p. 82) ⁵²⁹. It does not provide any evidence of an existing system for emergency logistics and supply chain management or of specific considerations such as cold chain management for vaccines. An ad hoc project called the "Mauritania Cold Chain Development Project" was conducted by the Global Cold Chain Alliance between 2024-2025 in order to assess cold chain facilities ⁵³⁰. There is no mention of a system in place that considers cold chain management for vaccines. No further evidence was available through the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)), and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research. ^531532533

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the country has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency (i.e. antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics). No evidence of such a plan was found in the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or the 2017 Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania ⁵³⁴⁵³⁵. No further evidence was available through the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)), and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ^536537538.

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a public plan in place to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, conducted in 2023, awarded a score of "1" for the indicator "D.3.4 Workforce surge during a public health event"; no full report of this JEE has been publicized as of 2025 ⁵³⁹. A sectorial review was conducted by the Ministry of Health in 2023 which mentions specific shortcomings among the country's health workforce including "inadequate distribution of staff across the regions" and "HR remains one of the major challenges facing the health system (inadequate staff distribution, insufficient qualified personnel, etc.)" ⁵⁴⁰. The review notes that "the number of health personnel distributed across health facilities is estimated at 9,296. However, the country's HR availability profile shows that the ratio of qualified personnel is 15 per 10,000 inhabitants, while the WHO recommends 23 per 10,000 inhabitants." ⁵⁴¹ The objectives of the plan include "recruitment of 3,114 health personnel over the period, including 358 general practitioners, 407 specialists, 116 dentists, 16 pharmacists and 2,217 paramedics, and on the other hand, to put in place mechanisms to maintain the same recruitment rate over the period 2024-2030 and achieve HR ratios of 25 and 27.8 per 10,000 inhabitants respectively in 2027 and in 2030." ⁵⁴² According to a 2025 government announcement, there is a plan to train 7,500 health professionals nationwide over the next five years ⁵⁴³. This plan has not been named. No further evidence was available through the websites of the National Institute of Public Health Research (Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP)), and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ^544545546.

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. The Mauritanian government has made calls at various stages to invite foreign health professionals to the country, for instance in 2012 ⁵⁴⁷ and in 2010 ⁵⁴⁸, however there is no evidence of a specific plan in this regard. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, Mauritania has partnership agreements with the World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) for personnel deployment of health personnel, it does not have any plan or procedure in place ⁵⁴⁹. There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or the National Center for Emergency Operations in Public Health (CNOUSP) ⁵⁵⁰⁵⁵¹. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁵². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁵³.

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 0

There is no evidence of a public plan in place to redeploy existing health personnel within the country.

A 2023 World Bank evaluation document titled Mauritania's Primary Health Care System states that the distribution of health personnel in Mauritania is considered a major obstacle when it comes to the implementation of health services in the country ⁵⁵⁴. The evaluation does not mention a plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country.

According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance's 2025 Annual Sectoral Implementation Note (NASMO) for the Second SCAPP [Strategy for accelerated growth and shared prosperity] Action Plan 2021-2025, between 2023-2024, the proportion of qualified health personnel was 17.6 per 10,000 inhabitants, far from the WHO recommended proportion of 23 per 10,000 (Section II, p. 9) ⁵⁵⁵. The Implementation Note does not mention a plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country.

There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or the National Center for Emergency Operations in Public Health (CNOUSP) ⁵⁵⁶⁵⁵⁷.

There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁵⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁵⁹.

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania's Constitution, as amended in 2017, explicitly guranatees citizens' right to medical care. The constitution mentions the word "health" twice – in Article 19 and Article 57 ⁵⁶⁰. However, there is no explicit mention of a right to medical care.

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 55.88

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 84.61

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 27.08

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 53.03

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 58.1

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that workers are guaranteed paid sick leave. The Labour Code of Mauritania (Law No. 2004-017) makes mentions of paid leave in Title III, however it does not specifically mention sick leave ⁵⁶¹. Third-party sources related to employment in Mauritania state that employees in Mauritania are entitled to up to 3 months of paid sick leave, depending on how contracts are negotiated with employers ⁵⁶². The World Population Review also notes that employers guarantee paid sick leave in Mauritania, but does not provide further detail ⁵⁶³.

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. The Labour Code of Mauritania (Law No. 2004-017) mentions in Article 240 that "The employer is required to notify the labor inspector within forty-eight hours of any workplace accident or any occupational illness observed in the company", but there is no mention of healthcare workers in a public health emergency ⁵⁶⁴. No such evidence could be found within the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or the 2017 Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania ⁵⁶⁵⁵⁶⁶. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁶⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁶⁸.

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. Despite the establishment of the Mauritania Public Health Mergency Operations Center (PHEOC) ⁵⁶⁹, there is no publicly available evidence of the system in place within the PHEOC or of how it operates. The PHEOC does not have its own website. No such evidence could be found within the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or the 2017 Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania ⁵⁷⁰⁵⁷¹. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁷². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁷³.

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. Despite the establishment of the Mauritania Public Health Mergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) ⁵⁷⁴, there is no publicly available evidence of the system in place within the PHEOC or of how it operates. The PHEOC does not have its own website. No such evidence could be found within the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 or the 2017 Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania ⁵⁷⁵⁵⁷⁶. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁷⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁷⁸.

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAIs) that take place in healthcare facilities. As per the World Health Organization (WHO) library of national action plans, Mauritania does not have a national AMR plan. ⁵⁷⁹ According to the Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, Mauritania does not have a comprehensive HCAI monitoring system in place, but there are guidelines for infection prevention and control. Six hospitals have infection control and prevention committees and "more than 300 health professionals trained in prevention and control of healthcare-associated infections". ⁵⁸⁰ There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁸¹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁸².

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has an infection prevention and control programme in place nationally. There are instances of health workers being trained in infection prevention and control measures in hospitals, for instance as part of the SURGE programme led by the World Health Organization ⁵⁸³. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a national programme of such a nature. No such evidence could be found within the National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 or the 2017 Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania ⁵⁸⁴⁵⁸⁵. The National Health Development Plan 2021-2030 has a section on "prevention and control of infections" (Section 5.3.2), however it does not constitute a programme that has been implemented nationally ⁵⁸⁶. The 2023 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) gave "Workforce surge during a public health event" (D.3.4) the lowest score of 1; no full report of this JEE has been publicized as of 2025 ⁵⁸⁷. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁸⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁸⁹.

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

There is evidence of a plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities nationally. Mauritania is listed as having WASH/WASH-in-Health-Care-Facilities (water, sanitation, hygiene measures) national planning ⁵⁹⁰. Order No. 1496 of December 14, 2021, Article 5 notes that the regional health departments are responsible for "quality care and hygiene development service" and Article 10 mentions that the Department for the Development of Access to Quality Healthcare and Hygiene is reponsible for "promoting and monitoring public hygiene and sanitation actions at the regional level" ⁵⁹¹. The Ministry of Health's 2017 National Health Policy: Towards 2030 notes the following as a policy priority: "promoting healthy behaviors and hygiene, and disease prevention, with a particular focus on workplace safety through effective biomedical waste management and the promotion of hygiene rules in healthcare settings and essential family practices at the community level" (Section 5.4.3, p. 28-9) ⁵⁹².

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 100

There is evidence of a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial. Section 5.08.02 of the 2011 "Profile of the Pharmaceutical Sector of Mauritania (Profil du Secteur Pharmaceutique de Pays Mauritania)", carried out by World Health Organisation (WHO) in collaboration with the Global Fund, states that conducting clinical trials requires the agreement of an ethics committee or an institutional review board, and the completion of clinical trials must be authorised by the authority of pharmaceutical regulation, the Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratories. According to the report, no clinical trials have taken place in Mauritania. ⁵⁹³ However, there is evidence an ethics oversight system is in place in country. As an example, in a report on the Non-communicable Diseases Survey carried out by the WHO and Ministry of Health, the ethics authorisation was obtained from the Ministry of Health before the blood samples were acquired ⁵⁹⁴. Order No. 324 dated April 14, 2016, led to the creation of an ethics committee for health research, and then Law No. 2016-027 dated July 29, 2016, relates to the donation, removal, and transplantation of human organs and tissues. ⁵⁹⁵⁵⁹⁶ These documents could nevertheless not be located. There is also no mention of a national requirement for ethical review in the 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania ⁵⁹⁷. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁵⁹⁸. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁵⁹⁹. The National Laboratory for Drug Quality Control (Laboratoire National de Contrôle de la Qualité des Médicaments) does not have any information on this matter ⁶⁰⁰.

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics. There is no evidence of such a process on the website of the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Information and Communication Technologies. ⁶⁰¹ The National Laboratory for Drug Quality Control (Laboratoire National de Contrôle de la Qualité des Médicaments) does not have any information on expedited processes for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to treat ongoing epidemics. ⁶⁰² The Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratories (La Direction de la Pharmacie et des Laboratoire), which operates within the Ministry of Health, does not have a website. The 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania does not mention that an expedited process for applying clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures exists. ⁶⁰³ There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁶⁰⁴. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶⁰⁵.

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 100

There is publicly available evidence that Mauritania has an agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures. According to Ministry of Health's Decree 2023-101 of August 2, 2023, the Department of Pharmacy and Laboratories is responsible for approving any new medicinal product intended for human use. The Department of Pharmacy and Laboratories operates the Registration of Medicines Service, which is responsible for issuing marketing authorisations and the registration for new medicinal products. ⁶⁰⁶ The Department of Pharmacy and Laboratories does not have a website. There is no mention of an agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures in the 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania. ⁶⁰⁷

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies. According to Ministry of Health's Decree 2023-101 of August 2, 2023, the Department of Pharmacy and Laboratories is responsible for approving any new medicinal product intended for human use. The Department of Pharmacy and Laboratories operates the Registration of Medicines Service, which is responsible for issuing marketing authorisations and the registration for new medicinal products. ⁶⁰⁸ The Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratories does not have a website. The 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania states that "Mauritania has no plan that defines the procedures and decision-making process for sending and receiving medical countermeasures during public health emergencies" ⁶⁰⁹. However, there is no mention of an expedited process. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁶¹⁰. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶¹¹.

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Mauritania has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.⁶¹²

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 100

There is evidence that epidemics and pandemics are integrated into the national disaster risk reduction strategy. Mauritania does not have a current national disaster risk reduction strategy, but the last risk reduction strategy was published in 2015 – the National Action Plan for Capacity Building in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness and Response 2015-2018 (Plan d’Action National de renforcement des Capacités en Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes et Préparation et Réponse aux Urgences) ⁶¹³. Epidemic risks are mentioned in Section 3.8, outlining a number of objectives in this regard including strengthening health services for better epidemiological monitoring and better coordination with different structures, strengthening local health services (health centers and posts, community clinics, etc.) for better patient care, and ensuring evacuation of patients by setting up an ambulance system similar to the SAMU (Emergency Medical Service) ⁶¹⁴. The Joint External Evaluation for Mauritania, conducted in March 2017, does not mention a disaster risk reduction plan for pandemics and epidemics ⁶¹⁵. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) or from the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction's list of Mauritania country documents ⁶¹⁶⁶¹⁷. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶¹⁸.

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Mauritania has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies, however there are gaps in implementation. Mauritania is engaged in health-related cross-border networks and projects, such as through the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC), the G5 Sahel and the World Bank ^619620621, however they do not directly relate to public health emergencies and there is no evidence of concrete implementation of any agreements or protocols. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁶²². The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶²³.

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

There is publicly available evidence that Mauritania has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies, however there are gaps in implementation. Mauritania is engaged in health-related cross-border networks and projects, such as through the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfricaCDC), the G5 Sahel and the World Bank ^624625626, however there is no evidence of concrete implementation of any agreements or protocols. The African Union's Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources also provides assistance to Mauritania, but there is no concrete evidence of implementation of any plans ⁶²⁷. In addition, the 2012 Cooperation Framework between the Chief Veterinary Officers of Algeria, Egypt, France, Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia for the creation and the development of the Mediterranean Animal Health Network established joint mechanisms for outbreak information exchange and coordinated preparedness and response for transboundary animal diseases, including zoonoses ⁶²⁸. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁶²⁹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶³⁰.

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania has signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention. The Biological Weapons Convention National Implementation Measures Database shows that Rwanda is a signatory to the convention and that it ratified it on 28 January 2015 ⁶³¹.

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania has submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years. The Biomedical Weapons Convention website states that "Mauritania has submitted BWC CBMs in 2023 and 2024. These have not been made publicly available on the eCBM platform administered by the BWC ISU." ⁶³². No further evidence was found from the Ministry of Defense ⁶³³.

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the state has provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee). The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Biological Weapons Convention website notes that "Mauritania has not submitted national reports to the 1540 Committee ⁶³⁴".

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 25

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania is a member of Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), Australia Group (AG) or the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ^635636637.

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and published a full public report in the last five years. Mauritania has completed a JEE in the last five years, in 2023, however it has not published a full public report ⁶³⁸. The last completed and publicised report was undertaken in 2017 ⁶³⁹.

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years. The last PVS assessment conducted by Mauritania was in 2019 ⁶⁴⁰.

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years. The last PVS gap analysis conducted by Mauritania was in 2010 ⁶⁴¹.

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no evidence that Mauritania has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats within the past three years. Recent budget reports from the Ministry of Finance do not mention any allocation of funds to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats ⁶⁴²⁶⁴³. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) or the Ministry of Finance ⁶⁴⁴⁶⁴⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶⁴⁶.

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps. Mauritania has completed a JEE in the last five years, in 2023, however it has not published a full public report ⁶⁴⁷. The last completed and publicised report was undertaken in 2017 ⁶⁴⁸. Mauritania completed an NAPHS in 2025, however it is no publicly available. The last NAPHS before than was conducted in 2018 ⁶⁴⁹. Mauritania has no GHSA roadmap ⁶⁵⁰.

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps. The last PVS assessment conducted by Mauritania was in 2019 ⁶⁵¹. The last PVS gap analysis conducted by Mauritania was in 2010 ⁶⁵².

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 100

There is evidence of a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds that Mauritania can access in the face of a public health emergency. Mauritania is on the list of countries eligible for International Development Association (IDA) funding, and is therefore also eligible for the World Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility, which provides financing to low-income countries affected by large-scale disease outbreak. ⁶⁵³⁶⁵⁴ The country also operates the Environment Intervention Fund, created by Decree No. 2010-048 of 2010, which is to be released in the case of a public health emergency of chemical origin. ⁶⁵⁵ The 2017 Joint External Evaluation report for Mauritania states that National Centre for Public Health Emergency Operations (CNOUSP), meant to act as a command and coordination centre under the Ministry of Health during crises, allocated and included funds in the Ministry of Health budget for public health emergencies. ⁶⁵⁶

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

There is insufficient evidence that senior leaders in the past three years have made a public commitment to support other countries to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats by providing financing. However, there is evidence that senior officials have made a public commitment to improve the country’s domestic capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity.

Mauritanian senior leaders have engaged in cooperative moves with other countries when it comes to developing health systems in the face of health crises, for instance a cooperation protocol signed by Mauritania with the Middle East Community Health Network in June 2025, and the Ministry of Health, M. Ould Wadih, asserted that Mauritania hopes to participate in regional solutions in the domain of health ⁶⁵⁷⁶⁵⁸, however there has been no direct public commitment to supporting other countries to improve their capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats.

Mauritanian senior leaders have made public statements regarding expanding financing to improve domestic capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats: in April 2025 the Minister of Health made a pledge to self-finance up to 42% of the national vaccination strategy ⁶⁵⁹; in February 2025 he asserted that Mauritania will make it a priority to strengthen epidemic preparedness and response through the National Health Security Action Plan (PANASS) 2025-2030 ⁶⁶⁰.

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

There is no evidence that Mauritania has provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. However, there is evidence that Mauritania has requested financing or technical support from donors in the past three years to improve the country’s domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. A workshop was held under Ministry of Health leadership with World Health Organization (WHO) technical and financial support in Nouadhibou in February 2025 to define priorities for epidemic preparedness. Mauritania called for increased partner mobilization to fund the plan ⁶⁶¹. In April 2024, the Council of Ministers approved a financing agreement with the World Bank’s IDA to improve health infrastructure, workforce, and emergency preparedness ⁶⁶². In 2023, Mauritania joined regional WHO and EU initiatives to strengthen laboratory capacity, disease surveillance, and rapid-response mechanisms in West Africa ⁶⁶³. In April 2025, the Health Minister Abdallahi Ould Wedih announced that Mauritania will self-finance 42% of the strategy and rely on international partners (Gavi, WHO, World Bank) for the rest of the strategy's costs ⁶⁶⁴.

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 100

There is evidence that Mauritania has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years. Between 2023-2024 Mauritania made a total contribution of USD 9,570 while between 2024-2025 the country made a contribution totalling USD 22,970 ^665666667.

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 0

There is no publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, epidemiological data, clinical specimens, or isolated specimens (biological materials) with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza in Mauritania. There is no mention of such a plan in the Ministry of Health's National Health Development Plan 2022-2030 ⁶⁶⁸. Mauritania's National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) is a member of the Sub Regional Network of Sanitary Quality Control; however, there is no evidence of data sharing between the members ⁶⁶⁹. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶⁷⁰.

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that Mauritania has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years. There is no evidence via the World Health Organization (WHO) or media reports of any non-compliance in the past year by Mauritania. ⁶⁷¹⁶⁷²

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

There is no public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. Mauritania has not reported any outbreaks of diseases of pandemic concern in the past two years to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the last time being in October 2022 for the Rift Valley Fever ⁶⁷³. There is evidence that samples have been shared in relation to COVID-19 five years ago. According to a retrospective overview of Maurtania's response to COVID-19, "Regional hospitals throughout the country sent nasal swab and/or blood samples of symptomatic patients for real-time reverse transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR) and/or serologic tests to Institut National de Recherches en Santé Publique (INRSP) in Nouakchott, where diagnostic tests were centralized" ⁶⁷⁴. There is no further evidence from the National Institute of Public Health Research (INRSP) ⁶⁷⁵. The Ministry of Health website was inaccessible at the time of research ⁶⁷⁶.

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 50

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 25

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 25

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 25

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 30

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 50

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 0

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 25

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 50

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 75

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 50

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 50

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 75

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 100

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 50

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 62.95

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 16.86

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 92.36

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 0

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 0

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 50

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 50

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 68

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 0

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 25

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 25

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 43.14

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 75.71

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 75

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 63.6

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 81.13

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 88.93

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 64.75

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 71.71

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 98.07

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 76.97

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 58.94

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 0

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 9.1

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 0

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 0