Libya: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has an officially approved antimicrobial resistance national action plan in force. The World Health Organization hosts the Libya national action plan labeled “National Action Plan on Prevention and Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance 2019–2023,” confirming the last plan’s horizon ended in 2023 ^{1, p. 1}. The Libyan News Agency reported on October 1, 2025 that the Ministry of Health launched the “Contain Antimicrobial Resistance” awareness platform, evidencing ongoing outreach but not a new national action plan or a legal approval notice for a renewed horizon ². The National Center for Disease Control website describes organizational functions relevant to medicines and supplies without publishing an updated national action plan or ministerial decision for 2024–2028 or 2025–2030 ³.

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national laboratory or laboratory system that tests for the full 7 plus 1 priority antimicrobial resistance pathogens. The National Center for Disease Control describes organizational content but does not identify a nationwide antimicrobial resistance laboratory network, designated national reference laboratories for the full panel, or systemwide coverage ⁴. On September 10, 2024, the Libyan News Agency reported Quality Control Directorate hospital evaluations as a step toward establishing a national antimicrobial resistance surveillance network, which evidences preparatory actions rather than an operational national system ⁵. A 2024 peer-reviewed study from Tripoli University Hospital documents facility-level testing and explicitly notes the absence of a coordinated national antimicrobial resistance surveillance system led by the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Disease Control ⁶. Libya’s “National Action Plan on Prevention and Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance 2019–2023,” finalized on December 28, 2018, outlines plans to establish an AMR Surveillance Unit, designate a National Reference Laboratory, and enroll in the Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System, but it does not demonstrate implemented nationwide testing coverage for the full priority panel during the timeframe ^{7, pp. 12–16, 20–22, 34}.

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya conducts environmental detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial residues or antimicrobial resistant organisms. Libya’s “National Action Plan on Prevention and Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance 2019–2023” defines surveillance structures under the National Center for Disease Control, including an antimicrobial resistance surveillance unit, national reference laboratory functions, external quality assessment, and site enrollment, but these measures are limited to human and animal health and do not establish environmental sampling or monitoring for antimicrobial residues or resistant organisms ^{8, pp. 15–16, 21–23}. An official overview, “Libya: Overview of the Environmental Impact Assessment System in Libya, Legislation and Tools,” presented at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s May 2025 Mediterranean sub-regional meeting describes the environmental legal framework, including Law No. 15 of 2003 and Executive Regulations Decision No. 448 of 2009, and states that laboratories endorsed by the Environment General Authority and the National Center for Standards and Specifications conduct tests for environmental control, with results from other laboratories not accepted; however, it does not specify any program for monitoring antimicrobial residues or resistant organisms in environmental media ^{9, pp. 6–7, 10–11}.

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national statute or ministerial regulation that explicitly requires a physician’s prescription for antibiotics. Law No. 106 of 1973 issuing the Health Code establishes a general prescription requirement for medicines and authorizes the Minister of Health to define over-the-counter exceptions, but the operative dispensing text does not mention antibiotics, and no implementing instrument adding such wording is available on the official portal ¹⁰. The Ministry of Justice legal database hosts the Health Code and related laws; none reviewed insert antibiotics into the dispensing clause ¹¹. Cabinet Decree No. 38 of 2012 sets the organizational structure and competencies of the Ministry of Health; it does not create an antibiotics-specific prescription clause ¹². Recent official news reports describe antimicrobial-resistance initiatives and restate that pharmacies should dispense medicines against prescriptions, but these communications do not amend legislation to include antibiotics in the operative clause ¹³.

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya requires veterinary prescriptions for antibiotic use in animals. The Law of 1965 on Prevention of Contagious and Epidemic Animal Diseases remains in force and grants veterinary authorities broad regulatory powers ¹⁴. Its implementation continued through Decree No. 101 of 2012, which assigns the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal and Marine Resources responsibility for veterinary medicines ¹⁵. Decision No. 496 of 2022 by the Ministry of Economy and Trade limited imports of vaccines and sera to prior approval by the National Center for Animal Health but did not mandate prescriptions for antibiotics ¹⁶. In May 2025, the Libyan News Agency reported that the Higher Committee for Registration of Veterinary Drugs was advancing e-registration and pharmacovigilance workshops, again without reference to prescription rules ¹⁷. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean described Libya’s 2024 Antibiotic Awareness Week activities as focused on stewardship and awareness without announcing new laws ¹⁸. The World Organisation for Animal Health 2024 Annual Report on Antimicrobial Agents Intended for Use in Animals lists Libya among its Members and reviews global veterinary antimicrobial governance, but it does not record Libya as having a prescription requirement ^{19, pp. 2, 4–9}.

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents for zoonotic disease prioritization, detection, and reporting. Libya announced adoption of the One Health approach on November 3, 2024, in a ceremony co-chaired by the Minister of Health and the World Health Organization Representative; the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reported that the initiative aims to create a unified work mechanism and a legal framework for multisector coordination, but it did not publish any national plan or legal instrument text ²⁰. The Libyan News Agency reported the same adoption with participating ministries and national bodies, without releasing a law, decree, or strategy document ²¹. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean also documented a 2023 partnership with the Italian Embassy and the Istituto Superiore di Sanità to strengthen surveillance, detection, and preparedness for arboviral and zoonotic diseases, but this is a project agreement, not a national plan or legislative instrument ²². In February 2025, the National Center for Disease Control reported Zoonotic Diseases Administration activities within internal planning, yet no national zoonoses plan or legal text was made public ²³.

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents that include measures for risk identification and reduction of zoonotic spillover from animals to humans. On November 3, 2024, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reported Libya’s adoption of the One Health approach at a ceremony co-chaired by the Minister of Health and the World Health Organization Representative, yet it did not publish a national plan or legal instrument detailing spillover risk measures. ²⁴ The Libyan News Agency reported the same adoption without posting any decree, law, or strategy document. ²⁵ The National Center for Disease Control describes mandates of its Zoonotic Diseases Administration to prepare strategies and conduct surveillance and field studies, but it does not provide a national cross-sector plan that specifies spillover risk identification and reduction measures. ²⁶ In 2025, the National Center for Disease Control documented surveillance activities, including influenza sentinel work, without issuing a national zoonoses spillover risk-reduction plan or law. ²⁷

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. Libya announced adoption of the One Health approach on 3 November 2024 at a ceremony co-chaired by the Minister of Health and the World Health Organization Representative, yet no national multi-pathogen plan or legal instrument was published with the announcement ²⁸. The National Center for Disease Control reported the National International Health Regulations and Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop held in Tripoli on 23 to 26 February 2025 and described broad cross-sector participation, but it did not publish a national plan or guideline text ²⁹. The World Health Organization Human-Animal-Environment Interface newsletter confirms the workshop and states that a unified One Health roadmap was developed, but this roadmap is not publicly accessible as a national instrument specifying surveillance and control provisions across multiple zoonoses ^{30, pp. 4 to 5}. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security news and Libya country pages document the same event and country profile but provide no publicly available national multi-zoonoses law or plan ³¹³².

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Libya has a multi-sectoral coordinating mechanism dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. On November 3, 2024, the Ministry of Health announced adoption of the One Health approach and stated that the initiative establishes a legal framework to increase coordination and information sharing among the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Local Government, the Food and Drug Control Centre, the National Centre for Animal Health, and the National Centre for Disease Control, with support from the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean ³³. The World Health Organization results report country profile further records that a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Tripoli on November 3, 2024 established a One Health governance and coordination mechanism and a joint work plan for prevention, detection, and response ³⁴. From February 23 to 26, 2025, a National International Health Regulations and Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop in Tripoli convened 70 participants from human, animal, and environment sectors and produced a unified One Health roadmap to strengthen coordination and integrated surveillance of zoonotic threats ^{35, p. 4}.

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence of Libya having a One Health Strategic Plan in place, but on in November 2024, the Ministry of Health and WHO hosted a cemerony that marked Libya's adoption of the One Health approach. The ceremony involved the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding that institutes the One Health governance and coordination mechanism, aiming to establish a common strategy on One Health. This includes a joint work plan to enhance prevention, detection, and response to One Health threats, ultimately enhancing health security across Libya.³⁶

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 100

Libya has a national mechanism requiring livestock owners and herders to report suspected animal diseases to a central government veterinary authority. The Law of 1965 on Prevention of Contagious and Epidemic Animal Diseases defines the competent veterinary authority as the veterinary offices under the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Wealth ^{37, p. 2}. Article 8 requires owners, herders, and handlers to immediately notify the veterinary authority or specified local officials when infectious disease signs or sudden animal deaths appear, and it obliges those officials to promptly transmit the notification to the veterinary authority ^{38, p. 5}. Article 26 establishes a penalty for anyone who fails to notify as required by Article 8, confirming the reporting mechanism is mandatory rather than voluntary ^{39, p. 10}. In 2025, the Libyan News Agency reported suspected foot-and-mouth disease cases and explicitly called on all animal owners to immediately notify the authorities, evidencing active implementation of this reporting channel within the timeframe ⁴⁰.

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has legislation or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of information generated through animal health surveillance for livestock owners. The Law of 1965 on Prevention of Contagious and Epidemic Animal Diseases, enacted by the Government of Libya, defines the veterinary authority as the veterinary medicine offices under the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Wealth ^{41, p. 2}. Article 8 requires owners, herders, and handlers to report immediately when signs of infectious disease or sudden animal deaths appear, and requires local officials to transmit such reports to the veterinary authority ^{42, p. 5}. Article 26 establishes penalties for failure to notify as required ^{43, p. 10}. This law does not contain provisions that protect the confidentiality of owner information collected through surveillance activities ⁴⁴. In April 2025, the Libyan News Agency reported suspected cases of foot-and-mouth disease and publicly called on all animal owners to report immediately to authorities, demonstrating that owner-to-authority reporting was being actively implemented during the timeframe ⁴⁵. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Marine Resources organizational structure page, updated in 2025, details functions and divisions of the ministry ⁴⁶, but it does not provide any legislation or regulation on safeguarding owner confidentiality in animal surveillance.

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife, poultry, and livestock. Council of Ministers Decision No. (100) of 2012 establishes the National Center for Animal Health under the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Marine Resources and assigns functions that include epidemiological surveillance, disease surveys, diagnostic testing, and laboratory to field linkage for animal and poultry diseases ^{47, pp. 637–639}, but the decision does not document the implementation of operational surveillance activities or surveillance outputs. No publicly accessible Libyan government document describes active or passive surveillance systems for wildlife populations, including wild animals, insects, or other disease vectors ^{48, pp. 637–639}. Libya submitted immediate notifications of sheep pox and goat pox to the World Organisation for Animal Health on March 12, 2024 ⁴⁹, bluetongue on November 6, 2024 ⁵⁰, rabies on December 20, 2024 ⁵¹, and foot and mouth disease serotype O on January 21, 2025 ⁵².

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 100

Libya has a publicly documented mechanism for reporting notifiable animal diseases to the World Organisation for Animal Health. The World Organisation for Animal Health describes the World Animal Health Information System Early Warning module as the official channel through which Members submit immediate notifications and follow-up reports to meet their reporting obligations ^{53, pp. 7–8}. The same 2025 technical report records Libya’s lumpy skin disease outbreaks reported between April 2023 and June 2024 and states that the event was resolved, confirming Libyan use of the World Animal Health Information System to notify and close events during the timeframe ^{54, p. 19}. The report also notes that Libya detected bluetongue during 2024 to 2025 with the serotype undetermined at publication, further evidencing national notifications flowing through the Early Warning module ^{55, pp. 20–21}. In addition, the World Organisation for Animal Health Regional Representation for Africa publicly lists Libya’s dated immediate notifications for 2024 to 2025, demonstrating active transmission of notifiable disease reports from Libyan veterinary authorities to the World Organisation for Animal Health ⁵⁶.

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 0

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 0

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya includes mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses within a national zoonotic disease plan, legislation, regulation, or other national plan. In November 2024, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean described Libya’s launch of a One Health approach as coordination among government institutions, and it does not describe any private sector engagement mechanism for zoonoses control or response ⁵⁷. In November 2024, the National Center for Disease Control memorandum of understanding on the One Health approach lists only public institutions as parties, and it contains no provision assigning roles to private companies, private veterinary providers, or producers ⁵⁸. In February 2025, the National Center for Disease Control described the National International Health Regulations and Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop as participation by public sector entities, and it does not describe a private sector engagement mechanism ⁵⁹. In the January to March 2025 World Health Organization Human Animal Environment Interface Newsletter, the One Health roadmap for Libya is described as a tool for coordination and surveillance strengthening, and it does not describe private sector engagement mechanisms ^{60, p. 4}. The operative 1965 Law on Prevention of Contagious and Epidemic Animal Diseases sets disease control measures and obligations and does not establish structured collaboration mechanisms with private entities for zoonoses control or response ⁶¹. The World Organisation for Animal Health global and Africa regional animal health reporting documents Libya disease reporting and notifications and do not set out national private sector engagement mechanisms for zoonoses control or response ^{62, pp. 7–8, 19–21; 7}.

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 50

Libya tracks some high-risk laboratory facilities, but there is no publicly available national record that lists all facilities handling especially dangerous pathogens and toxins with inventory-management details. From January 2021 to June 2023, the Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network and Global Health Development implemented Building Regional Capacity in Libya and Tunisia for Safe and Secure Management of Samples Containing Weaponizable Pathogens, developing sample-inventory and security systems with the National Center for Disease Control and the National Center for Animal Health and engaging 8 key Libyan facilities, which demonstrates project-level facility tracking rather than a national register ^{63, p. 2}. On August 29, 2025, a peer-reviewed overview confirmed EMPHNET’s biosecurity and laboratory-capacity initiatives as regional support, not a Libyan national inventory record ^{64, p. 1}. As of September 2025, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Biological Weapons Convention portal shows Libya with total Confidence-Building Measure submissions equal to 0, providing no facility-inventory disclosure for this period ⁶⁵. As of September 2025, the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Disease Control publish no national register of such facilities or inventory systems ⁶⁶⁶⁷. The World Health Organization Public Health Situation Analysis dated March 20, 2025 reports Libya lacks a nationwide information system to collate health data and monitor medical supplies, consistent with the absence of a published biosafety inventory ^{68, p. 15}.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has enacted and implemented national biosafety or biosecurity legislation that sets enforceable facility-level requirements for physical containment, operating practices, failure reporting, or cybersecurity for facilities handling especially dangerous pathogens and toxins. The World Health Organization’s Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Libya confirms that national biosafety and biosecurity legislation and a bio-waste law remained in draft with no governmental decree as of April 2019, establishing a baseline of non-adoption that has not been superseded by a later enactment in the public record ^{69, pp. 19–20}. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research’s BWC National Implementation Measures Database for Libya cites Penal Code Article 305 on epidemics but provides no Libya-wide facility biosafety or biosecurity requirements ⁷⁰. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Biological Weapons Convention electronic Confidence-Building Measures portal lists States Parties’ submissions yet does not provide any publicly accessible Libyan legal instrument specifying such facility requirements in 2022 to 2025 ⁷¹. The Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly’s Progress reports in May 2025 discuss global laboratory biosafety work and standards without identifying any Libya-specific enactment during this period, reinforcing the absence of an adopted framework ^{72, pp. 9–11}.

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has designated and empowered an agency to enforce national biosafety or biosecurity legislation. The World Health Organization (WHO) Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Libya, published in April 2019, records draft national biosafety and biosecurity legislation and a draft bio-waste law with no governmental decree establishing implementation or enforcement arrangements ^{73, pp. 19–20}. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) National Implementation Measures Database summarizes Penal Code Article 305 on epidemic diseases but identifies no Libyan authority with legal powers to inspect facilities or enforce containment, operating practices, failure reporting, or cybersecurity requirements ⁷⁴. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) BWC electronic Confidence-Building Measures portal lists State Party submissions but provides no Libyan instrument creating an enforcement body for 2022 to 2025 ⁷⁵. The WHO Progress reports to the Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly, issued in May 2025, describes global laboratory biosafety work and follow-up to resolution WHA77.7 without any Libya-specific enactment that establishes an enforcement agency ^{76, pp. 9–11}.

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. The World Health Organization Joint External Evaluation for Libya states that a national inventory of pathogens does not exist, and highlights the absence of approved and enforced biosafety and biosecurity legislation as baseline conditions as of 2019, with no mechanism described for consolidating holdings to fewer sites ^{77, p. 25}. The Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly’s 2025 Director-General progress report discusses global advances and gaps in laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, recalls Resolution WHA77.7 on strengthening laboratory biological risk management, and urges Member States to improve legislation, risk management, and containment facilities, but it does not report any Libyan actions to consolidate pathogen inventories or reduce the number of authorized facilities ^{78, p. 10}.

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya maintains in-country Polymerase Chain Reaction testing specifically for Ebola virus disease or anthrax. On March 17, 2025, the National Center for Disease Control convened a meeting with the Acting Minister of Health and the World Health Organization on Ebola developments, but the official readout does not document operational Ebola PCR assays in Libyan laboratories ⁷⁹. On March 21, 2024, the National Center for Disease Control reported delivering a GeneXpert molecular platform to Sabha Medical Center for seasonal influenza and respiratory virus testing, which indicates generic PCR capacity but provides no proof of validated Ebola virus or Bacillus anthracis PCR workflows that would preclude culture ⁸⁰. The World Health Organization’s Public Health Situation Analysis for Libya dated March 20, 2025 identifies surveillance information gaps and calls for analysis of laboratory surveillance data, with no documentation of Ebola or anthrax PCR diagnostics in-country, supporting the absence of published evidence for such capacity ^{81, pp. 17}

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya required standardized, mandatory biosecurity training for personnel working in facilities that handle especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. The World Health Organization’s Public Health Situation Analysis: Libya dated March 20, 2025 provides a current national overview and identifies information gaps but does not document any national requirement, common curriculum, or train-the-trainer mandate for biosecurity training in high-risk laboratories ^{82, pp. 15–17}. The World Health Organization’s Human–Animal–Environment Interface newsletter for January–March 2025 reports that a National International Health Regulations–Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop was held in Tripoli on February 23–26, 2025 to assess collaboration gaps and develop a One Health roadmap; this is a multisectoral planning workshop, not a compulsory, standardized national biosecurity training program for laboratory personnel ^{83, p. 4}. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security 2025 country portal for Libya lists indicators and activities but provides no evidence of a required national biosecurity training scheme or recertification framework ⁸⁴.

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya specifies in regulations or licensing conditions that security or other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to drug testing, background checks, or psychological or mental fitness checks. The World Health Organization’s Public Health Situation Analysis: Libya dated March 20, 2025 outlines health-system status and information gaps but does not identify any laboratory regulatory framework or personnel-vetting standards establishing one or more of these checks ^{85, pp. 15–17}. The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance maintains the Libya Legal Database of national laws and decrees; it contains no statute, regulation, decree, or licensing condition mandating drug testing, background checks, or psychological fitness screening for personnel with access to high-risk biological materials in this timeframe ⁸⁶.

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 100

Libya has publicly available national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances, and these regulations explicitly address infectious substances and incorporate the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions that classify Category A and Category B. The Libyan Civil Aviation Authority Civil Aviation Regulations Part 92 Carriage of Dangerous Goods requires classification, packaging, marking, acceptance, handling, and carriage in accordance with ICAO Doc 9284 and sets operator procedures for packages containing infectious substances, including actions for damaged or leaking packages and notifications to the public health authority ^{87, pp. 12; 24–26}. The World Health Organization transport guidance issued March 2025 confirms that ICAO Technical Instructions apply to infectious substances Categories A and B, which are therefore covered by Libya’s incorporated standard ^{88, pp. 1–2}. In addition, the Libyan Civil Aviation Regulation Air Operations (Amendment 6) dated March 10, 2025 establishes authority requirements for dangerous goods oversight and requires transport to follow ICAO Doc 9284 with operator approvals, training, acceptance checklists, documentation, and reporting, reinforcing national applicability during 2022–2025 ^{89, pp. 31–32; 340–342}.

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has legislation or regulations in force that establish cross-border transfer controls and end-user screening for especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or pathogens with pandemic potential. The Libya Legal Database maintained by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance lists Law No. 10 of 2010 on Customs, which sets general tariff and customs procedures but contains no provisions for export licensing, end-user screening, or agent-specific controls covering high-risk biological materials ⁹⁰. The accompanying Bylaw of Law No. 10 of 2010 and its implementing decisions sets declaration and documentary requirements for imports and exports but likewise does not create screening or licensing mechanisms for dangerous pathogens or toxins ⁹¹. The World Health Organization Public Health Situation Analysis: Libya dated March 20, 2025 describes fragmented regulation and the absence of a defined laboratory regulatory framework, and it does not identify any national measure establishing end-user screening or cross-border transfer controls for high-risk biological materials ^{92, pp. 15 to 17}.

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has enacted national biosafety legislation or regulations establishing a binding, operative framework for laboratory biosafety covering especially dangerous pathogens. The Libyan Authority for Research, Science and Technology records the formation of a Libyan National Committee for Biosafety and Bioethics in 2023 to draft national biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics legislation, which indicates work in progress rather than an adopted law or regulation ⁹³. The Libyan Biotechnology Research Center hosted a February 2025 workshop on a draft Libyan law on biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics, further confirming that the measure remains at draft stage in 2025 ⁹⁴. The Ministry of Environment’s Law No. 15 on Protection and Improvement of the Environment includes definitions touching on biosafety and genetically modified organisms but does not establish a national laboratory biosafety regime or implementing regulations for facilities handling high-risk biological agents ⁹⁵. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Biological Weapons Convention national-measures database describes the national committee and capacity-building but does not list an adopted biosafety law regulating laboratory work with dangerous pathogens ⁹⁶.

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

Libya has an established government agency responsible for enforcing biosafety legislation and regulations, however this is specific to genetically modified organisms. Law No. 15 of 2003, “Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Protection and Improvement of the Environment,” defines biological safety and regulates genetically modified organisms, including requiring prior authorization for import, sale, and use, and requiring prior authorization and risk controls for isolated use of biotechnology outcomes, which creates enforceable biosafety rules within this law’s framework ^{97, pp. 3, 25–26}. The same law establishes an Environmental Police as an enforcement body attached to the competent environmental authority, assigns it responsibility for environmental inspection, and grants its officers judicial police authority for offenses committed in violation of the law, which includes the biosafety provisions ^{98, p. 7}. Cabinet Decision No. 42 of 2022, issued by the Council of Ministers of the Government of National Unity and published January 2022, formalizes this enforcement body by establishing the Environmental Police Service as a public legal entity with independent financial liability under the Ministry of Environment ^{99, p. 1}. A May 2025 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe presentation on Libya’s environmental system further lists the Environmental Police as an affiliated body of the Ministry of Environment, corroborating that it functions as an established enforcement agency within Libya’s governance structure ^{100, p. 10}.

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

Libya provides biosafety training on an ad hoc basis for personnel in high-risk laboratories, but there is no national requirement for a standardized curriculum or periodic recertification. In September 2024 the Health Security Partners organization, working with the Libyan National Committee for Biosafety and Bioethics, conducted a two-day training for Libyan auditors on the draft Security Sensitive Biological Agents guidelines and audit protocols, including a mock audit at the Pasteur Institute of Tunis, which indicates project-based capacity building rather than a mandated national program ¹⁰¹. The BioWeapons Convention Implementation site records that in 2023 Libya organized two workshops for biosafety officers with Sandia National Laboratories and, in 2024, organized training for laboratory audits, further evidencing discrete initiatives rather than a universal training requirement ¹⁰². Libya’s principal legal instrument, Law No. 15 of 2003 regarding environmental protection and improvement, includes a Biological Safety chapter setting authorization, emergency planning, and control measures for biotechnology products, but it does not establish a compulsory standardized biosafety training curriculum or a recertification cycle for laboratory personnel, as reflected on the Ministry of Environment portal in 2025 and summarized in a May 2025 presentation detailing that Biological Safety is covered in Articles 58–63 ^{103104, p. 2}.

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has conducted a national assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research. During February 24–26, 2025, the World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness portal records Libya’s International Health Regulations–World Organisation for Animal Health National Bridging Workshop as conducted, which maps coordination gaps but does not report any inventory or review of ongoing high-consequence biological research ¹⁰⁵. The same portal’s November 2024 One Health launch notes a memorandum of understanding to establish a governance mechanism and joint work plan, but it does not document an assessment of ongoing research on high-risk biological work ¹⁰⁶. The 2025 Libya country page lists activities, indicators, and partners, including a biosafety and biosecurity needs area, yet it contains no national report or dataset evidencing a research-mapping assessment ¹⁰⁷. Academic and conference items in 2025, including Misurata University’s First Libyan International Conference on Chemical and Biological Safety and Security on May 28–29, 2025, are publicized as events rather than a government-commissioned audit of ongoing dual-use research ¹⁰⁸. An official United Nations Economic Commission for Europe presentation in May 2025 summarizes Law No. 15 of 2003 and Biological Safety Articles 58–63 and the 2009 regulations, but it does not evidence any national assessment of ongoing research ^{109, pp. 2, 9–10}.

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has legislation or regulation requiring oversight of research involving especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and or other dual use research. The World Health Organization’s Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulations core capacities for Libya reports that there is still no governmental decree governing implementation of a national biosafety and biosecurity program, and that draft biosafety and biosecurity legislation has been developed but needs approval and institutionalization, including measures to reduce dual use risks and control pathogens and toxins ^{110, pp. 9, 26–27}. Libya’s Minister of Health Decision No. 654 of 1975, which issues the executive regulation of the Health Law, contains operational rules for bacteriological examination of clinical samples, indicating regulation of diagnostic laboratory practice rather than a research protocol oversight requirement ^{111, pp. 6–7}. A 2025 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe overview lists “Biological Safety (Articles 58–63)” within Law No. 15 of 2003 as part of environmental protection law, not as a dual use research oversight instrument ^{112, p. 3}. The Prime Minister’s Decision No. 42 of 2022 establishes the Environmental Police Service for enforcement, without establishing research oversight requirements for dangerous pathogens ^{113, p. 1}.

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a designated agency with a legally defined mandate to oversee research involving especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and or other dual use research. The World Health Organization reports that the Libyan National Committee for Biosafety and Bioethics was founded by the government and functions as a national mechanism for biosafety and biosecurity oversight ^{114, p. 9}. The same report states that there is no governmental decree governing implementation of the national biosafety and biosecurity program ^{115, p. 26}, and that national biosafety and biosecurity legislation has not been approved or institutionalized ^{116, p. 27}. In the absence of an implementing decree and enacted legislation, the committee does not constitute a legally established authority with mandatory powers over high risk pathogen research or dual use research ^{117, pp. 26–27}. Decision No. 42 of 2022 establishes the Environmental Police Service as a public legal entity affiliated with the Ministry of Environment ^{118, p. 1}, but the decision does not assign this body responsibility for oversight of biomedical research, laboratory research, or pathogen related research ^{119, p. 1}. Law No. 15 of 2003 regulates environmental protection and biological safety primarily in relation to environmental harm, genetically modified organisms, and pollution control, rather than oversight of research involving especially dangerous pathogens or dual use research ^{120, pp. 2–4}.

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya requires providers to screen synthesized deoxyribonucleic acid against lists of known pathogens and toxins before sale. The Ministry of Environment’s official page for Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Protection and Improvement of the Environment presents Chapter Ten on Biological Safety and related provisions, but it contains no mandate for pre-sale DNA sequence screening or any reference to pathogen or toxin screening lists as of September 2025 ¹²¹. In May 2025 the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe summarized Libya’s environmental legal architecture, listing Biological Safety under Law No. 15 of 2003 and recalling executive regulations, yet it did not identify any requirement for DNA synthesis sequence screening prior to commercial provision ^{122, pp. 2}. The Biological Weapons Convention national implementation profile for Libya in 2025 outlines national biosafety and biosecurity measures but does not report any statutory or regulatory obligation for DNA synthesis screening at the point of sale ¹²³.

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 50

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 100

There is some publicly available evidence that Libya has official foot and mouth disease vaccination figures accessible through the World Organisation for Animal Health database. The WAHIS dashboard does list previous FMD livestock vaccination figures for 2013-2014. ¹²⁴ The World Organisation for Animal Health technical report to the 92nd General Session, which synthesizes Member reporting to the World Animal Health Information System for 2024–2025, details foot and mouth disease events and regional trends but does not present Libya’s vaccination counts ^{125, pp. 5, 16–18}. The World Organisation for Animal Health’s The State of the World’s Animal Health 2025 provides global and regional analyses and describes vaccination as a control measure, yet it does not publish Libya-specific vaccination numbers for foot and mouth disease in 2022–2025 ^{126, pp. 52–54}. The World Organisation for Animal Health and Food and Agriculture Organization Foot-and-Mouth Disease Reference Laboratory Network quarterly report for October–December 2024, released in January 2025, notes Libya’s situation and characterizes circulating serotypes but does not include any Libya vaccination figures ^{127, pp. 2–6}. Although the World Animal Health Information System public interface explains that six-monthly reports include “animals vaccinated,” no Libya vaccination totals for foot and mouth disease are displayed for 2022–2025 on publicly available outputs ¹²⁸.

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 0

Libya has a national immunization plan for routine vaccination, although the plan itself is not publicly available. The Government of Libya Ministry of Health, through its Health Information and Documentation Center, publishes the “Annual Statistical Report 2021,” which reproduces an “Update to the National Expanded Programme on Immunization” and explicitly anchors the national routine immunization schedule to Minister of Health Decision No. 88 of 2020, presenting an antigen by age schedule that includes Bacillus Calmette Guérin, hepatitis B, oral polio, hexavalent, pneumococcal conjugate, rotavirus, meningococcal conjugate, measles mumps rubella, and human papillomavirus vaccination as part of the national program update for 2020, and therefore provides publicly accessible evidence of an official national plan for immunization beyond emergency deployment arrangements ^{129, p. 24}. The “Annual Statistical Report 2022” reiterates an “Update to the National Expanded Programme on Immunization up to 2022” and again cites Minister of Health Decision No. 88 of 2020 as the legal basis for the standing national schedule ^{130, p. 22}.

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s national immunization strategy or plan explicitly includes measures to address vaccine hesitancy or to build public trust in vaccines. In 2024, the United Nations Children’s Fund reported an Expanded Programme on Immunization desk review and an Effective Vaccine Management assessment supporting development of a multi-year immunization strategic plan, but it did not disclose strategy text with hesitancy or trust provisions ^{131, p. 2}. On February 8, 2024, the United Nations Children’s Fund issued an end-of-year situation report describing the Tahseen platform monitoring 657 vaccination centers and risk communication and community engagement trainings, presented as program activities rather than clauses in a national plan ^{132, pp. 3, 8}. On May 7, 2025, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean announced a comprehensive review of Libya’s National Immunization Programme to inform a new strategy, without publishing plan content addressing vaccine confidence ¹³³. On July 22, 2025, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean documented a measles and rubella campaign across 15 southern municipalities, again without plan-text provisions ¹³⁴. The National Center for Disease Control provides campaign information in 2024 but no strategy text specifying hesitancy or trust measures ¹³⁵.

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Libya has a national advisory group that provides technical guidance and advice to government on the immunization strategy and plan. A Director General decision of the National Center for Disease Control, Ministry of Health, dated November 2022, forms the High Advisory Committee for Vaccinations and assigns it national immunization program functions that include setting immunization program strategies, reviewing and developing the national immunization schedule, and providing technical advice on vaccines and target groups ^{136, pp. 1–2}. On October 4, 2023, the National Center for Disease Control issued a circular to municipal supervisors of the National Immunization Program directing that no vaccine be received or used unless it has been approved by the High Advisory Committee for Vaccinations and formally communicated by the Immunization Department ¹³⁷. On December 31, 2024, the National Center for Disease Control extended the national seasonal influenza vaccination campaign through March 31, 2025, explicitly citing recommendations of the High Advisory Committee for Vaccinations ¹³⁸. On May 7, 2025, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reported that the National Immunization Programme Review will provide evidence to inform development of the National Immunization Strategy for 2025, with findings to be presented to the Ministry of Health and national stakeholders ¹³⁹.

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 100

Libya has an immunization program for seasonal influenza. In December 2023, the National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya announced a nationwide seasonal influenza vaccination campaign with defined risk groups and a fixed campaign window across health facilities ¹⁴⁰. In November 2024, the National Center for Disease Control reported receipt of seasonal influenza vaccine shipments into national cold-chain stores for distribution to facilities, confirming supply for the season ¹⁴¹. On December 31, 2024, the National Center for Disease Control extended the national campaign through March 31, 2025 following recommendations of the High Advisory Committee for Vaccination, ensuring access into early 2025 ¹⁴². In January 2025 and May 2025, the Libyan News Agency reported campaign operations in Benghazi and administration of seasonal influenza vaccine to 2025 pilgrims, evidencing ongoing delivery during 2025 ¹⁴³¹⁴⁴. For protocol inclusion and procurement status, the Ministry of Health Pharmacy Administration listed “Influenza vaccine (seasonal)” in the Libyan Essential Medicines List first edition, April 2019, under Vaccines and Sera ^{145, pp. 56–57}. In November 2022, the Libyan News Agency relayed official guidance urging influenza vaccination ahead of winter, indicating continuity of the program in 2022 ¹⁴⁶.

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a government-adopted national strategy to develop a climate-resilient health system that addresses infectious-disease risks. The World Health Organization’s Public Health Situation Analysis for Libya dated March 2025 describes climatic events, including droughts, floods, and sand and dust storms, and details health risks and response gaps following Storm Daniel, but it does not identify any adopted national climate-resilient health system strategy or policy issued by Libyan authorities ^{147, p. 11}. The United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Libya 2023–2025 outlines UN support to integrate climate resilience across sectors and to enhance the resilience of health facilities and services, yet it frames these as UN-supported outcomes and planned results rather than citing a government-adopted national strategy or plan linking climate change to health system resilience and infectious-disease threats ^{148, pp. 32, 70–72}.

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 100

Libya’s national laboratory system can conduct at least five of the World Health Organization core diagnostic tests, and the tests are named. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean “Libya annual report 2023” states that 33 public laboratories are equipped with reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction machines and 20 laboratories have Cepheid GeneXpert instruments; it also records the provision of 10,000 GeneXpert cartridges for confirmation of coronavirus disease 2019, influenza A, influenza B, and respiratory syncytial virus in 2023, demonstrating named molecular targets in use ^{149, pp. 13–14, 16}. The same report documents tuberculosis diagnostics using GeneXpert, culture, and microscopy within dedicated centers, adding further named core tests to the national menu ^{150, pp. 19–21}. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya” issued in March 2025 notes continued laboratory strengthening and reactivation of tuberculosis diagnostic laboratories, supporting continuity of these capacities through 2025 ^{151, p. 11}. The World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office respiratory virus weekly update for week 35 of 2025 lists Libya among reporting countries within EMFLU-2 and RespiMart platforms, corroborating ongoing multi-pathogen respiratory testing and reporting in 2025 ^{152, pp. 1–2}.

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national plan or strategy for testing during a public health emergency that defines goals for testing, addresses novel pathogens, and sets mechanisms to scale capacity. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” issued in March 2025, summarizes laboratory services and TB diagnostic reactivation but does not present a national emergency testing plan with goals, surge triggers, or novel-pathogen provisions ^{153, p. 11}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean “Monitoring Libya’s Health System” (2025) sets indicator frameworks and information-system functions, not an operational emergency testing strategy ^{154, pp. iv–vi}. The World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean weekly respiratory update for week 35 of 2025 lists Libya in regional reporting platforms but contains no country testing plan content ^{155, pp. 1–2}. The World Health Organization Health Sector Bulletin for February 2022 reports testing volumes and operational updates without citing a national emergency testing strategy that defines goals or scaling mechanisms ^{156, pp. 4–5}.

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national laboratory serving as a reference facility that is accredited under International Organization for Standardization 15189 or the United States Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” issued March 2025, describes laboratory services and the reactivation of tuberculosis diagnostic laboratories but does not identify any accredited national reference laboratory or provide evidence of accreditation for a national reference facility ^{157, p. 11}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean “Monitoring Libya’s Health System: A comprehensive guide to national health indicators,” published 2025, outlines national indicator and data source frameworks for laboratory and antimicrobial resistance reporting but provides no statement that any national reference laboratory is accredited ^{158, pp. 13–15}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean “Eastern Mediterranean Regional respiratory virus activity – weekly update: week 35/2025,” dated September 2025, summarizes respiratory virus surveillance without presenting accreditation evidence for a Libyan national reference laboratory ^{159, pp. 1–2}. Consistent with this absence, the World Health Organization “Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities: Libya Mission Report: 9-15 July 2018” reports that none of the public health and animal laboratories are accredited ^{160, p. 12}.

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national laboratory serving as a reference facility that is subject to external quality assurance review. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” issued in March 2025, describes laboratory services and the reactivation of tuberculosis diagnostic laboratories but does not identify any national reference facility participating in an external quality assessment or proficiency testing scheme ^{161, p. 11}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean “Monitoring Libya’s Health System: A comprehensive guide to national health indicators,” published in 2025, outlines indicator frameworks and data sources for laboratories and antimicrobial resistance yet does not document enrollment of a Libyan national reference laboratory in any external quality assurance program ^{162, pp. iv–vi, 14}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean “Eastern Mediterranean Regional respiratory virus activity – weekly update: week 35/2025,” dated September 2025, provides regional surveillance summaries and country listings without evidence of external quality assurance for a Libyan reference facility ^{163, pp. 1–2}.

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a standardized nationwide specimen transport system that can be utilized across districts. The World Health Organization mission report “Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Libya: Mission Report (9–15 July 2018),” published in April 2019, documents a specimen referral and transport system with trained personnel and available transport instructions, but it explicitly identifies nationwide coverage and standardization gaps, stating the specimen referral system should cover all the country, and that specimen tracking at national and subnational levels and storage and disposal procedures should be developed ^{164, pp. 24–25}. The World Health Organization led “Health Sector Bulletin, August 2022, Libya” reports support to Libya’s National Center for Disease Control rapid response teams with sample collection kits and viral transport medium, and describes training that included sample collection, storage, and transportation, which indicates ongoing capacity building rather than a fully standardized nationwide system ^{165, pp. 8, 45}. A 2024 peer reviewed study describes referral of suspect human samples to the National Center for Disease Control national reference laboratory in Tripoli in a specific border context, but it does not demonstrate a mature nationwide transport system across districts ¹⁶⁶.

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a plan to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the national public health laboratory system during an outbreak. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) – Libya,” dated March 2025, identifies major health system constraints and information gaps, including the absence of nationwide surveillance capabilities, but it does not present any emergency fast-track mechanism for authorizing additional laboratories for surge testing ^{167, pp. 16–17}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean report “Understanding the private health sector in Libya,” published in 2024, describes routine licensing under Health Law No. 106 of 1973 and Cabinet Decrees No. 589 and No. 590 of 1993, administered by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Trade with endorsement by the Ministry of Health, without any outbreak-specific expedited pathway for laboratory authorization ^{168, p. 22}. The Ministry of Health portal contains no decree, circular, or guideline establishing a rapid outbreak authorization process for public, private, university, or veterinary laboratories ¹⁶⁹. The National Centre for Disease Control, Government of Libya, likewise provides no emergency laboratory authorization plan ¹⁷⁰.

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

Libya conducts ongoing event-based surveillance and indicator-based surveillance for notifiable and novel infectious diseases, but there is no publicly available evidence that national authorities analyze surveillance data on a daily basis. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) – Libya,” dated March 2025, describes surveillance and information-system gaps and calls for strengthening an Early Warning, Alert and Response surveillance system and analysis of laboratory surveillance data, without documenting daily analysis at national level ^{171, pp. 16–17}. The World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office “Measles and Rubella Bulletin, January–June 2025,” dated June 2025, lists Libya among countries facing large measles outbreaks during July 2024 to June 2025, evidencing ongoing case-based indicator surveillance and reporting ^{172, p. 5}. The World Health Organization Libya “EWARN & Diseases Surveillance Bulletin, Epi Week 52 (26 December 2022–01 January 2023)” shows continuous event-based signal detection and weekly analysis under the Early Warning, Alert and Response Network, confirming operational event-based surveillance within the timeframe ¹⁷³.

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

Libya maintains a national mechanism to report notifiable diseases to the World Health Organization through the International Health Regulations National Focal Point. The World Health Organization “Joint external evaluation of IHR core capacities of Libya: mission report: 9–15 July 2018,” published in April 2019, states that the National Center for Disease Control is adopted by national authorities as the International Health Regulations National Focal Point with authority to communicate directly with the World Health Organization, and it lists the 2010 decision designating this function ^{174, p. 9, 64}. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) – Libya,” dated March 2025, describes ongoing surveillance coordination and priority data flows, including Early Warning Alert and Response, between national authorities and the World Health Organization and identifies operational public health information focal points, indicating that the reporting pathways remain in active use ^{175, pp. 1–3, 16}.

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 100

Libya operates an electronic reporting surveillance system that functions at the national level with documented sub-national data flows, though it is limited in scope and does not constitute a comprehensive, fully integrated national health information system. Evidence from the World Health Organization confirms that Libya’s Early Warning Alert and Response Network is the sole platform using electronic reporting for human health surveillance, with data entered electronically at sentinel sites and submitted to the National Center for Disease Control, which serves as the national hub for aggregation and analysis ^{176, p. 10}. The World Health Organization further reported in September 2020 that the Early Warning Alert and Response Network was upgraded to a web-based and mobile-based electronic platform covering sentinel sites nationwide, explicitly describing electronic transmission and centralized processing of surveillance data ¹⁷⁷. The National Center for Disease Control publishes routine Early Warning Alert and Response Network bulletins disaggregated by geographic regions, demonstrating operational sub-national reporting and upward electronic data flow during the assessment period ¹⁷⁸. At the same time, the World Health Organization’s Public Health Situation Analysis for Libya, dated March 2025, identifies the absence of a unified nationwide health information system and ongoing gaps in surveillance integration, clarifying that electronic reporting remains confined to Early Warning Alert and Response Network functions rather than all-cause or all-sector surveillance ^{179, pp. 16–17}.

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 100

Libya maintains a real-time electronic disease surveillance system that collects ongoing laboratory-confirmed data and supports demographic disaggregation for analysis. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s “WHO Country Office, Libya: Annual Report 2022” documents that the National Centre for Disease Control operates the national Early Warning and Response Network, which supported 253 sentinel sites nationwide and produced weekly epidemiological bulletins and COVID-19 laboratory assessments during 2022, demonstrating ongoing electronic surveillance operations with laboratory components integrated into national reporting ^{180, p. 17}. The same report confirms that Libya’s national surveillance captured large volumes of laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 data, including confirmed cases and laboratory tests performed, with data attributed to the National Centre for Disease Control data team, establishing that laboratory-confirmed results are incorporated into national surveillance datasets ^{181, pp. 19–20}. The report further states that real-time surveillance information was received from all areas of the country and triangulated by national authorities and the World Health Organization, confirming continuous electronic data flows supporting analysis ^{182, p. 21}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean additionally describes in May 2021 that the Early Warning and Response Network is a real-time electronic surveillance system and the only functioning national disease surveillance mechanism in Libya, reinforcing the system’s real-time operational status ¹⁸³.

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 0

There is no evidence of an ongoing national wastewater or environmental surveillance programme in Libya.

The WHO reported that as of 2022, environmental surveillance is not carried out in Libya, and there have been no further updates or evidence of this changing.¹⁸⁴

The United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and its Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (WHO EMRO), hosted a regional workshop in Cairo, Egypt, from 19–21 October 2025, focused on strengthening wastewater surveillance systems across North Africa. This involved government leaders and key stakeholders from Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The workshop was aimed at exploring how wastewater surveillance can support public health, environmental protection, and ecosystem sustainability.¹⁸⁵

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has electronic health records commonly in use. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s “WHO Country Office, Libya: Annual Report 2022” describes efforts to strengthen the health information system by expanding the District Health Information System 2 and notes its municipal rollout, but it does not document a national electronic patient record platform in routine, common use across facilities ^{186, p. 44}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s 2025 “Monitoring Libya’s Health System: A Comprehensive Guide to National Health Indicators” identifies routine sources as the Health Information Centre’s health management information system and District Health Information System 2 and specifies indicator disaggregation fields, yet it does not confirm that electronic health records are implemented or widely used nationwide ^{187, p. 16}.

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s “WHO Country Office, Libya: Annual Report 2022” describes a fragmented health information landscape and notes that there is still no country-wide information system to gather health data, which indicates the absence of a unified electronic patient record platform accessible to public health authorities ^{188, p. 6}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s 2025 “Monitoring Libya’s Health System: A Comprehensive Guide to National Health Indicators” lists routine sources such as the Health Information Centre’s health management information system and District Health Information System 2 and details indicator disaggregation, but it does not state that national public health authorities can access individual electronic health records in 2023–2025 ^{189, pp. v, 2–6, 14–17}.

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has adopted formal national data standards, such as International Organization for Standardization standards, to ensure comparability of health data across all facilities in 2025. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s April 2025 publication “Monitoring Libya’s Health System: A Comprehensive Guide to National Health Indicators” describes the development of a national indicator list led by the Health Information Centre of the Ministry of Health, with “standard metadata” for each indicator, including definitions, disaggregation fields, methods of measurement or estimation, and specified national data sources, which supports consistency of indicator reporting but does not constitute evidence of nationally adopted formal data standards such as International Organization for Standardization standards for facility-wide comparability ^{190, p. iv}. The same publication’s “Further reading” section points to global methodological resources, including the World Health Organization Indicator Metadata Registry, but does not document any national adoption of International Organization for Standardization standards for health data ^{191, p. 20}. Publicly available operational materials for the District Health Information System 2 in Libya likewise describe system use, not national formal standard adoption ^{192, p. 1}.

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has established mechanisms across the relevant ministries responsible for human, animal, and wildlife surveillance to share surveillance data. A 6 November 2024 news release by the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean states that Libya’s One Health initiative establishes a legal framework to increase interaction, coordination, cooperation, and information sharing across sectors, but it does not describe any operational surveillance data sharing mechanism, platform, protocol, or routine process spanning human, animal, and wildlife surveillance systems that would meet the indicator requirement for established data sharing mechanisms at the responsible ministries ¹⁹³. A World Health Organization Human-Animal-Environment Interface Team newsletter covering January to March 2025 reports that Libya’s National International Health Regulations and Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop, held 23 to 26 February 2025 in Tripoli, focused on assessing collaboration gaps and developing a unified One Health roadmap, with a parallel situation analysis to identify opportunities for reinforcing integrated One Health surveillance, indicating planning and gap assessment rather than documented, established data sharing mechanisms ^{194, p. 4}. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness Portal entry for the same February 2025 workshop likewise describes roadmap development and a situation analysis, without documenting established mechanisms for inter-ministerial surveillance data sharing across human, animal, and wildlife surveillance ¹⁹⁵.

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 100

Libya makes de-identified infectious disease surveillance data publicly available on a government website. On January 22, 2025, the National Center for Disease Control (NCDC) published a statement reporting aggregate laboratory findings for influenza A and B, respiratory syncytial virus, and COVID-19 as totals and percentages without personal identifiers on the official NCDC site ¹⁹⁶. On June 30, 2025, the NCDC issued a clarifying statement on human immunodeficiency virus that provides national cumulative confirmed case counts through December 2024 as de-identified statistics posted for public access on the same portal ¹⁹⁷. Intergovernmental documentation describes NCDC surveillance officers submitting case data to the Early Warning, Alert and Response Network (EWARN) for inclusion in the NCDC’s weekly epidemiological bulletins, corroborating the government practice of producing public reports with aggregated, non-personal surveillance outputs ^{198, p. 11}.

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has legislation or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, including data generated through health surveillance activities. The World Health Organization report “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” published in March 2025, confirms that measles and rubella surveillance and acute flaccid paralysis surveillance were operational during 2024–2025, but it does not reference or cite any Libyan law, regulation, or binding policy establishing confidentiality or privacy protections for identifiable health surveillance data or medical records ^{199, pp. 8–9}. Law No. 6 of 2022 on Electronic Transactions, enacted by the Libyan House of Representatives in October 2022, establishes a general framework for electronic transactions and personal data processing but does not contain explicit provisions specific to health information, medical records, or public health surveillance confidentiality, nor does it designate health-sector oversight or enforcement mechanisms applicable to identifiable health data ²⁰⁰.

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has enacted and implemented legislation or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information generated through health surveillance activities and that also establish explicit protections against cyber attacks such as ransomware. As of 2025, DLA Piper reports that Libya has no comprehensive personal data protection law; Law No. 6 of 2022 on Electronic Transactions imposes limited consent and confidentiality duties on public entities and authentication service providers only, not a health sector framework for surveillance data, breach notification, or security obligations ^{201, pp. 3, 5–7}. A civil society legal brief states that Law No. 5 of 2022 on combating cybercrime was issued in September 2022 and empowers the National Information Security and Safety Authority to control online data and information, yet it does not create sector specific rules to keep surveillance generated health data confidential or resilient against ransomware ^{202, p. 1-2}. The World Health Organization assessment identifies governance gaps, including no standard operating procedures for data and the need to develop an integrated web based health information system, with no evidence of legal protections for patient level confidentiality in surveillance data flows ^{203, p. 5-6}.

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 100

Libya has made public commitments and participates in formal mechanisms to share surveillance information with other countries during public health emergencies. On August 25, 2025, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reported that government representatives from Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia concluded a three day simulation exercise in Cairo and called for standardized cross border public health procedures, formal collaboration frameworks, and real time cross border communication during active outbreaks, consistent with the International Health Regulations 2005 ²⁰⁴. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean weekly respiratory virus bulletin dated February 2, 2025 states that the Region monitors influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 through data reported to FluNet and EMFLU 2.0, and lists Libya among countries reporting in week 04 of the 2024–2025 season ^{205, p. 1-2}. In March 2025, the World Organisation for Animal Health and Food and Agriculture Organization Foot and Mouth Disease Reference Laboratories Network quarterly report documents Libya’s World Animal Health Information System notifications of Foot and mouth disease type O events from An Nuqat Al Khams, Az Zawiyah, and Tripoli, with a January 2025 report and event identifier 6203 ^{206, p. 12}.

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 50

Libya maintains national support that strengthens subnational capacity to conduct contact tracing only in response to active public health emergencies. In December 2024, the World Health Organization reported that rapid response teams from Al Kufra and other municipalities hosting refugees were trained on outbreak investigation and contact tracing, within the World Health Organization’s Sudan conflict external situation reporting for refugee hosting countries, indicating contact tracing support delivered in an active emergency context rather than as routine preparedness programming ^{207, p. 11}. Separately, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reported that Libya’s health authorities, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, adopted Integrated Disease Surveillance as a national strategy in 2023 and expanded standardized municipal reporting through the Real time Alert and Surveillance Electronic Database platform, with training for surveillance officers on digital data management and outbreak response coordination, supporting subnational readiness functions but without documenting a standing national contact tracing support program outside emergencies ^{208, pp. 10–11}. The World Health Organization Results Report 2024–2025 country profile for Libya further characterizes improvements in early outbreak detection through integrated surveillance and response, but does not document ongoing nationwide contact tracing support in non emergency periods ²⁰⁹.

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya provides both economic support and medical attention to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya” dated March 20, 2025 describes a fragile, fragmented health-service environment and does not identify any state wraparound scheme that guarantees paid leave, job protection, or home-isolation support linked to infection control ^{210, p. 17}. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Libya – Operational Update” of May 31, 2025 records medical consultations and limited cash or voucher assistance delivered by United Nations agencies to refugees and asylum-seekers, not a Libyan government program that combines economic benefits with medical follow-up for isolation or quarantine ^{211, pp. 2–4}. Médecins Sans Frontières confirms that its medical activities were suspended on March 27, 2025, which reduced clinical service availability rather than expanding isolation support ²¹². The National Center for Disease Control notice of January 27, 2025 concerns electronic health-certificate issuance points and provides no evidence of paid-leave, job-security, or state-funded isolation assistance for infected people or contacts ²¹³.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected or potential cases in international travelers and to trace and quarantine their contacts. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya” dated March 20, 2025 describes irregular entry points, ad hoc data sharing, and vast remote borders that complicate the tracking of arrivals, without identifying any coordinated border–public health plan for point of entry screening, contact tracing, or quarantine during public health emergencies ^{214, p. 4}. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Libya – Operational Update” dated May 31, 2025 notes interceptions at sea, issuance of Security Registration Cards, and fee based health certificates in Alkufra, but does not present a government agreement that links border authorities with the National Center for Disease Control to systematically screen travelers, trace contacts, or quarantine in emergencies ^{215, pp. 3–4}. The National Center for Disease Control public notice of January 27, 2025 concerns electronic health certificate issuance locations and provides no evidence of a joint border–health plan for traveler screening, contact tracing, or quarantine ²¹⁶.

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

Libya has an applied epidemiology training program available in country. The Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network reports that the National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya operates the Public Health Empowerment Program–Basic Field Epidemiology as part of the Libya Field Epidemiology Training Program, confirming in-country applied epidemiology training and ongoing activities ²¹⁷²¹⁸. The Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network’s Field Epidemiology Training Program newsletter Issue 19, dated May–October 2024, documents that the Libya Field Epidemiology Training Program launched its third Public Health Empowerment Program cohort and completed workshops on outbreak investigation and emergency response, demonstrating program continuity and scale-up immediately preceding 2025 ^{219, p. 14}.

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s field epidemiology training programs explicitly include animal health professionals or that a dedicated veterinary field epidemiology training program is offered. The Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network page LIBYA FETP describes the “Public Health Empowerment Program – Basic Field Epidemiology” for frontline public health workers and does not state participation by veterinarians or animal health authorities ²²⁰. The National Center for Disease Control, Government of Libya, reports the “Training Workshop to Enhance Capacities of Health Workers at Points of Entry” conducted September 9–11, 2025, and the “Training Workshop for Vaccination Supervisors in Municipalities” held August 20–22, 2025, but neither event describes field epidemiology residencies or mixed human–animal cohorts ²²¹²²². The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean notes the “Quarter 1: January–March 2025 — One Health revolution: training to protect all life” convened in Egypt without identifying Libya among participating countries or cohorts ²²³. EMPHNET’s “Field Epidemiology Training Program — Newsletter, Issue 20” (November 1, 2024–April 30, 2025) reports Libya’s third “Public Health Empowerment Program – Basic Field Epidemiology” cohort workshop on page 12 with no mention of veterinary trainees or a veterinary track ^{224, p. 12}.

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 100

Libya has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people. The Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network FETP Dashboard shows Basic Grads 52 for the Libya Field Epidemiology Training Program, providing public evidence of trained field epidemiologists ²²⁵. The Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network country page LIBYA FETP confirms the program modality as the “Public Health Empowerment Program – Basic Field Epidemiology” for frontline public health workers, establishing that these graduates are trained in applied field epidemiology competencies ²²⁶. The United Nations Population Fund “World Population Dashboard — Libya” lists a 2025 total population of 7,500,000, which implies a requirement of 38 trained field epidemiologists to meet the 1 per 200,000 standard ²²⁷. The Eastern Mediterranean Public Health Network country collaboration page Libya documents a 2019 five-year memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Disease Control, confirming the institutional basis for Libya’s program and public reporting of outputs by EMPHNET ²²⁸.

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 33.33

Libya maintains disease-specific public health emergency response planning, but there is no publicly available overarching national public health emergency response plan that addresses multiple communicable diseases. The World Health Organization reports that Libya’s coronavirus response is organized around the 10 pillars of a national COVID-19 preparedness and response plan under the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Disease Control, which evidences a disease-specific plan rather than a multi-disease framework ^{229, p. 98}. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” dated March 20, 2025, summarizes current risks, coordination, and sectoral or international response plans but does not cite any national overarching public health emergency response plan that covers multiple communicable diseases ^{230, pp. 1–3}. The Ministry of Health’s official releases and the National Center for Disease Control’s 2025 updates show advisories and operational news but do not publish an overarching, multi-disease public health emergency response plan ²³¹²³².

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has updated an overarching national public health emergency response plan within the last 3 years. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” dated March 20, 2025, summarizes current risks, coordination, and sectoral response arrangements but does not cite any updated national multi-disease public health emergency response plan for Libya in 2023, 2024, or 2025 ^{233, pp. 1–3}. The World Health Organization’s 2022 “Global Health Emergency Appeal — Libya” describes Libya’s coronavirus response around the 10 pillars of a national COVID-19 preparedness and response plan, which is disease-specific and not an updated overarching multi-disease plan ^{234, pp. 97–99}. The National Planning Council’s “National Strategy for Emergency Management,” issued in June 2020, predates the 3-year window and there is no official update or replacement documented on the cited pages that would constitute an updated overarching national public health emergency response plan ^{235, pp. 42–71}. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the National Center for Disease Control published an updated overarching multi-disease public health emergency response plan ²³⁶²³⁷.

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has an overarching national public health emergency response plan that follows One Health principles and covers multiple threat types, including antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic disease spillover, biological accidents, and deliberate biological events. The World Health Organization report “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” dated March 2025 identifies humanitarian health needs and governance challenges but does not present or reference a national multi-hazard One Health plan, instead highlighting information gaps and the absence of a Health Cluster mechanism ^{238, pp. 2–3, 17}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean announced in November 2024 that Libya launched the One Health approach, but the news release does not publish a national public health emergency response plan ²³⁹. Similarly, the Strategic Partnership for Health Security webpage from 2024 describes One Health coordination but provides no comprehensive emergency response plan ²⁴⁰. Libya’s “Libyan national action plan on antimicrobial resistance 2019–2023” covers antimicrobial resistance governance and surveillance under the National Center for Disease Control but is limited to a single threat type and not an all-hazards plan ^{241, pp. 10–13, 15–16, 20–22}. Official portals of the National Center for Disease Control and the National Center for Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management list functions and news updates but do not provide any national emergency response plan document ²⁴²²⁴³.

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in 2025 that includes explicit consideration of health equity or mechanisms to identify and address the needs of vulnerable populations. The World Health Organization report “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” dated March 2025, describes humanitarian health needs and governance gaps without presenting or referencing any government all-hazards public health emergency response plan with equity or vulnerable-population provisions ^{244, pp. 2–3, 17}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean announced on November 6, 2024 that Libya launched the One Health approach, but the notice does not publish or link to a national public health emergency response plan ²⁴⁵. The National Center for Disease Control and the National Center for Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management official portals list functions and news items and do not provide any downloadable national all-hazards emergency response plan that includes equity or vulnerable-group mechanisms ²⁴⁶²⁴⁷. The “Libyan national action plan on antimicrobial resistance 2019–2023,” issued in December 2018 by the National Center for Disease Control, is single-threat and sectoral and therefore cannot satisfy this indicator’s requirements ^{248, pp. 9–11}.

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a specific government mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. The World Health Organization document “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” dated March 2025, describes the operating context and identifies information gaps for humanitarian health response without presenting any formal government mechanism, such as a decree, framework, memorandum of understanding, or standing platform, to mobilize private companies for outbreak preparedness or response ^{249, pp. 3, 17}. The National Center for Disease Control official portal and its published services do not provide any publicly posted instrument establishing private sector engagement for outbreak operations ²⁵⁰. The National Center for Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management “About Us” page outlines emergency management functions and coordination responsibilities but does not publish a private sector engagement mechanism for outbreak preparedness or response ²⁵¹. A United Nations Development Programme press release dated October 2024 describes consultations and mapping of Libyan companies to strengthen private sector engagement in development and governance contexts, but it does not constitute an outbreak emergency preparedness or response mechanism issued by the Government of Libya ²⁵². The “Libya: National action plan on prevention and containment of antimicrobial resistance 2019-2023,” issued December 2018, is threat specific and does not establish a cross cutting private sector engagement mechanism for outbreaks ^{253, pp. 9-11}.

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national policy, plan, or guidelines to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions during an epidemic or pandemic. The World Health Organization report “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” dated March 2025, outlines governance gaps and humanitarian coordination but does not present or reference national guidance for measures such as mask use, physical distancing, school closures, or restrictions on public gatherings across one or more diseases ^{254, pp. 2–3, 17}. The National Center for Disease Control official portal lists programs and services yet does not publish a national non-pharmaceutical intervention policy, plan, or guideline document ²⁵⁵. The National Center for Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management “About Us” page describes mandates and coordination roles without any decrees, frameworks, or procedures establishing non-pharmaceutical interventions ²⁵⁶. A World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean announcement on November 6, 2024 regarding the launch of the One Health approach is not an NPI policy or guideline ²⁵⁷. The “Libyan national action plan on antimicrobial resistance 2019–2023,” issued in December 2018 by the National Center for Disease Control, is single-threat and does not establish epidemic or pandemic non-pharmaceutical intervention guidance ^{258, pp. 9–11}.

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya activated a national infectious-disease emergency response plan or completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise within the past year. The World Health Organization report “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” dated March 2025, describes governance and coordination gaps and does not report activation of a national infectious-disease emergency plan or completion of a national biological exercise during the past year ^{259, pp. 2–3, 17}. The National Center for Emergency, Crisis and Disaster Management “About Us” page and the National Center for Disease Control official portal outline mandates and services but publish no notices, decrees, after-action reviews, or exercise reports evidencing such activation or a national biological simulation ²⁶⁰²⁶¹. Regional items from the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean document a sub-regional tabletop exercise on cross-border population movement and a related migrant health collaboration during August–September 2025, which are multi-country and therefore not a Libya national-level biological threat-focused exercise ²⁶²²⁶³.

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya in the past year identified gaps and best practices through an infectious disease response or biological-threat focused exercise and developed a national plan to improve response capabilities. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis: Libya” dated March 2025 notes that there is no WHO-led Health Cluster active in Libya and the response has shifted from emergency relief to early recovery and reconstruction, without documenting a national after action review or improvement plan for infectious hazards ^{264, p. 17}. The World Health Organization’s After Action Review Activities database, updated July 2025, lists AAR events by country and year but contains no publicly posted Libya AAR report or improvement plan for 2024–2025 ²⁶⁵. In February 2025, a National International Health Regulations–Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop in Tripoli produced a One Health roadmap, which is a collaboration framework rather than an after action review or a biological-threat focused exercise that yields an implementation plan to improve outbreak response capacities ²⁶⁶.

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya underwent a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that included private sector representatives. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness Simulation Exercise Activities registry, filtered to Libya and updated on September 8, 2025, shows no national exercise entry for Libya involving private sector participants ²⁶⁷. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reports a sub-regional tabletop simulation exercise in Cairo on August 18–20, 2025, with representatives from Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia; the event was regional rather than national, and the report does not state that Libyan private sector actors participated ²⁶⁸. In February 2025, the Strategic Partnership for Health Security reported a National International Health Regulations–Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop in Tripoli that produced a One Health roadmap; a workshop is not a simulation exercise and private sector participation is not specified ²⁶⁹. The National Center for Disease Control of Libya and the Ministry of Health of Libya portals publish no notice or report demonstrating a national biological threat-focused exercise that included private sector representatives ²⁷⁰²⁷¹.

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

Libya has a public health Emergency Operations Center in place. The National Center for Disease Control of Libya reported receiving and establishing the Community Health Emergency Operations Center on December 23, 2019, with handover from the World Health Organization country office to the National Center for Disease Control leadership ²⁷². The National Center for Disease Control announced activation of the Community Health Emergency Operations Center on March 3, 2023, mobilizing the emergency office, rapid response, immunization, research, and risk communication teams to implement an outbreak response plan in the south ²⁷³. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” dated March 20, 2025 and updated in June 2025, reports that the Emergency Operations Center in Al Kufra issued over 140,000 health certificates to adult male refugees during January to December 2024, evidencing ongoing Emergency Operations Center functions during 2025 operations monitoring and coordination ^{274, p. 4}.

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya requires its public health Emergency Operations Center to conduct at least one drill per year, or that it conducted a public health emergency drill. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security Simulation Exercise Activities registry, filtered for Libya and marked “Updated on 08 Sep 2025,” shows no national Emergency Operations Center drill entry for Libya ²⁷⁵. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reports a sub-regional tabletop in Cairo on August 18–20, 2025 with participation from Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia, which is not a national Emergency Operations Center drill in Libya and does not evidence Libyan annual drill requirements ²⁷⁶. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” dated March 20, 2025 and updated June 2025, describes Emergency Operations Center activity in Al Kufra but does not document a national annual drill requirement or a 2025 Emergency Operations Center drill ^{277, pp. 3 to 4}. The National Center for Disease Control of Libya and the Ministry of Health of Libya portals publish no 2025 decree, circular, or report establishing an annual drill requirement or recording a 2025 Emergency Operations Center drill ²⁷⁸²⁷⁹.

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s Emergency Operations Center conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or an emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of identifying the event. The Ministry of Health of the Government of Libya reported participation in a subregional simulation exercise in Cairo on August 18 to 20, 2025, but the notice does not document Emergency Operations Center activation nor a measured two hour threshold ²⁸⁰. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya” dated March 20, 2025 summarizes preparedness and response arrangements and mentions an Emergency Operations Centre in Al Kufra providing service outputs in 2024, yet it contains no record of any Emergency Operations Center exercise or real event activation meeting a 120 minute standard in 2024 or 2025 ^{281, p. 5}. The Emergency Medicine and Support Center’s weekly summaries for September 2025 and August 2025 list 24/7 operations and call volumes, but provide no after action report or official record showing timed Emergency Operations Center activation within the last year ²⁸². The National Center for Disease Control’s 2025 updates describe trainings, campaigns, and surveillance activities, without any statement of an Emergency Operations Center activation time standard or a timed activation log within the last year ²⁸³.

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya conducted a multisectoral exercise for a potential deliberate biological event or maintained publicly available interagency standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding, or other agreements between public health, animal health, the private sector, and national security authorities. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reported a subregional tabletop in Cairo on August 18–20, 2025 on cross-border public health risks from population movement, but it does not document a deliberate-biological scenario or any signed procedures or agreements bridging the required sectors ²⁸⁴. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” dated March 20, 2025, confirms there is no World Health Organization-led Health Cluster active in Libya and notes Emergency Operations Centre outputs in Al Kufra during 2024, yet it provides no evidence of a deliberate-biological exercise or cross-sector procedures ^{285, pp. 3, 16}. The Strategic Partnership for Health Security portal records a National International Health Regulations–Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop in Tripoli on February 23–26, 2025 as a planning exercise, not an operational multisector agreement or standard operating procedure ²⁸⁶. The National Center for Disease Control’s 2025 archive lists routine activities and trainings without any entry evidencing the required deliberate-biological exercise or multisector procedures ²⁸⁷.

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national, all-hazards public health emergency plan or other legislation, regulation, or strategy document that contains a dedicated risk communication section for use during any public health emergency. The Council of Ministers’ “Decision No. 352 of 2022 adopting the organizational structure and defining the competences of the Ministry of Health” lists emergency-related directorates and offices but does not publish a national all-hazards emergency plan or a risk communication section ^{288, pp. 1–2}. The National Center for Disease Control states that it has an Office of Emergencies and Risk Communication, which indicates institutional responsibility, yet no national all-hazards plan with a dedicated risk communication section is posted or linked ²⁸⁹. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” dated March 20, 2025 provides situational context and risks but is not a Libya-issued plan and contains no link to a national all-hazards risk communication section ^{290, p. 1}. The “COVID-19 preparedness and response plan for Libya” dated March 26, 2020 includes “Pillar 2: Risk communication and community engagement,” but it is disease-specific ^{291, pp. 9–10}.

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s risk communication plan or equivalent national strategy outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs, including different languages, geographic locations, media access, vulnerable groups, or hard-to-reach groups. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” dated March 20, 2025, summarizes current risks and response priorities but does not cite or reproduce any Government of Libya plan specifying differentiated risk communication modalities for distinct audiences ^{292, pp. 1–3, 16}. The National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya lists an Office of Emergencies and Risk Communication on its official portal, yet the site did not publish a national risk communication plan or procedures detailing multilingual, geography-specific, or vulnerable-group targeting requirements ²⁹³. The Ministry of Health’s official portal likewise did not post a plan or strategy section that sets out tailored communication channels or audience segmentation for public health emergencies ²⁹⁴.

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s risk communication plan or equivalent national strategy designates a specific government position to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” dated March 20, 2025, outlines hazards and response priorities but does not cite any Government of Libya instrument naming a designated spokesperson role for emergency public communication ^{295, pp. 1–2, 16}. The National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya maintains an Office of Emergencies and Risk Communication on its official portal, yet the site did not publish a plan, decree, or standard operating procedure that assigns a primary spokesperson position or title ²⁹⁶. The Ministry of Health’s official portal similarly lacks any policy, regulation, or strategy text that designates a specific spokesperson for public health emergencies ²⁹⁷.

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 100

Libya’s public health system regularly shares messages via official online platforms to inform the public about health concerns and prevention. The National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya maintains an active website carrying routine advisories and campaign updates, including a March 4, 2025 education post for patients with diabetes and hypertension ahead of Ramadan that provides specific calls to action ²⁹⁸²⁹⁹. The Center also documents ongoing outreach activities such as an August 14, 2025 awareness session with the Passports and Nationality Authority and a breast cancer awareness campaign prepared and posted on August 31, 2025, demonstrating non-emergency public messaging across different topics and audiences ³⁰⁰³⁰¹. The Ministry of Health’s official portal likewise publishes public-facing awareness content, including a World No Tobacco Day item on May 31, 2025, reinforcing routine use of online channels for health education ³⁰². In parallel, the World Health Organization’s Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reports on a July 22, 2025 measles and rubella campaign across 15 southern municipalities, corroborating public information efforts around immunization during the same period ³⁰³.

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 100

Libya’s senior executive leadership has not publicly disseminated misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. The Central Bank of Libya’s official communiqué in August 2025 records a meeting with the Acting Minister of Health focused on automating the health sector and digital transformation, and it contains no ministerial claims about infectious diseases ³⁰⁴. The National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya issued a clarification statement on June 30, 2025 regarding the human immunodeficiency virus that addresses circulating rumors with epidemiologic figures and transmission information, reflecting corrective, evidence-based messaging rather than misinformation from senior officials ³⁰⁵. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” dated March 20, 2025, outlines risks, operations, and coordination with national authorities without reporting instances of infectious-disease misinformation originating from the president or ministers during the period reviewed ^{306, pp. 1–3}.

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 83.91

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 0

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 100

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 58.33

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

Libya did not implement any restriction on the export or import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya” dated March 2025 reports that as of February 2025 there are no mpox cases in Libya or neighboring countries, and it describes health risks and needs without identifying any outbreak-related trade measures affecting medical goods ^{307, p. 9}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean news release on May 7, 2025 documents a comprehensive review of the National Immunization Programme led with the Ministry of Health and the United Nations Children’s Fund from May 3 to May 15, 2025 across 12 municipalities and 48 facilities, demonstrating continuity of vaccine and supply operations rather than restrictions on imports or exports ³⁰⁸.

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

Libya did not implement any restriction on the export or import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” issued in March 2025, reports that as of February 2025 there are no mpox cases in Libya or in neighboring countries and does not record any outbreak-related trade measures affecting non-medical commodities such as food or textiles ^{309, p. 9}. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations “GIEWS Country Brief: The State of Libya,” dated March 24, 2025, notes below-average domestic cereal output and forecasts cereal import requirements of 3.2 million tonnes for the 2024/25 marketing year, indicating continued reliance on international trade without disease-driven import or export controls ^{310, p. 1}.

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya implemented inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis – Libya,” issued in March 2025, states that as of February 2025 there are no mpox cases in Libya or in neighboring countries and does not report any outbreak-driven national entry or exit controls ^{311, p. 12}. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations “GIEWS Country Brief: The State of Libya,” dated March 24, 2025, describes continued cereal import requirements for the 2024/25 marketing year, indicating normal reliance on cross-border trade rather than disease-related restrictions on international movement ^{312, p. 1}.

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 100

Libya has a risk-based approach to international travel-related measures because national authorities apply differentiated entry and isolation requirements based on traveler risk indicators. On 8 November 2022, the Ministry of Health, National Center for Disease Control issued an official update for travelers and arrivals through Libyan ports that conditions requirements on vaccination status and health risk, including requiring unvaccinated or partially vaccinated travelers to present a negative reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test taken within 72 hours, to self-isolate for 10 days, and allowing a reduction to 5 days contingent on a negative rapid test or reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test on day 5, while permitting children under 12 to enter regardless of vaccination status if asymptomatic, with rapid testing at the port for suspected cases ³¹³. A 23 February 2022 Libyan News Agency report reproduces and summarizes the same National Center for Disease Control protocol, confirming differentiated testing and isolation requirements applied to higher-risk traveler categories rather than uniformly to all arrivals ³¹⁴. A 2024 peer-reviewed One Health Outlook article referenced by the reviewer discusses the designation of International Health Regulations points of entry in Libya as part of capacity development, but does not publish or contradict the National Center for Disease Control’s risk-differentiated entry criteria ³¹⁵. The World Health Organization Public Health Situation Analysis dated 20 March 2025 describes continued large-scale cross-border population movement and port-of-entry pressures, underscoring the operational relevance of formal port health measures issued by national authorities ^{316, p. 5}.

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 30.55

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 92.6

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 100

Libya has a national health workforce strategy updated within the past five years that identifies shortage fields and sets strategies to address them. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (WHO EMRO) Annual Report 2021, published in June 2022, states that the Ministry of Health issued the National Human Resources for Health Strategic Plan 2022–2030 following a situation analysis that found uneven distribution and acute shortages of primary health care nurses, midwives, and family physicians alongside a surplus of doctors, dentists, and pharmacists, and it outlines five objectives covering workforce management, continuous professional development, regulatory updating, and public–private partnerships to correct these gaps ^{317, pp. 5–6}. The World Health Organization Public Health Situation Analysis for Libya dated March 2025 records continued workforce constraints and notes that in 2022 the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Higher Education developed national nursing and midwifery education policies, standard curricula, and a regulatory framework, demonstrating implementation aligned with the strategy ^{318, pp. 8, 14–15}.

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has sufficient capacity within the health system to deliver essential health services. A December 2024 nationwide health facility functionality assessment summarized in the World Health Organization March 2025 “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA), Libya” found that 8% of assessed health facilities were nonfunctioning and 84% were only partially functioning, and it documents persistent shortages of essential medicines, medical supplies, equipment, and specialized health workers, with some regions reporting limited or no access to basic medical services, demonstrating reduced functionality of service delivery platforms and constrained availability of core inputs as of 2025 ^{319, pp. 15–17}. The same assessment explicitly characterizes health care as the most significant unmet need nationwide, indicating systemic limitations in service availability and readiness that correspond to the service delivery and workforce components assessed under the R3.2 service capacity criteria ^{320, pp. 15–17}. Population access constraints are further evidenced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees May 2025 “Annual Results Report 2024 | Libya,” which reports that only 50.90% of refugees and asylum seekers had access to health services in 2024 despite targeted support to public facilities, indicating that service reach remained limited for vulnerable populations entering 2025 ^{321, pp. 6–7}.

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has an approved government plan to ensure continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency. The World Health Organization Public Health Situation Analysis for Libya dated March 2025 describes widespread partial functionality of health facilities and persistent unmet health needs, but it does not identify any national continuity plan that guarantees delivery of essential services during emergencies ^{322, pp. 15–17}. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Annual Results Report for Libya issued in May 2025 records continuing access gaps for refugees and asylum seekers despite rehabilitations and support to public facilities, indicating reliance on humanitarian arrangements rather than a codified government continuity plan ^{323, pp. 7, 21–22}.

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 85.53

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit or in negative-pressure isolation rooms within the country. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) — Libya,” dated March 20, 2025, reports a degraded health system and cites a December 2024 functionality assessment finding that 8 percent of facilities are nonfunctioning and 84 percent operate only partially, yet it does not identify any biocontainment unit or negative-pressure isolation capacity in Libyan hospitals ^{324, pp. 14–16}. The same PHSA section details widespread damage, staff and supply shortages, and lack of key infrastructure without listing high-level isolation wards suitable for managing high-consequence pathogens ^{325, pp. 15–16}.

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity or developed, updated, or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity for infectious disease outbreaks in the past two years. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis, Libya” dated March 20, 2025 synthesizes current system status and priority actions but does not report any activation, scale-up, or planning instrument for expanding isolation wards, negative-pressure rooms, or biocontainment units; instead it documents disrupted services, facility constraints, and ongoing humanitarian pressures as of March 2025 ^{326, pp. 1–3}. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs “Libya Humanitarian Profile 2025” issued in May 2025 similarly outlines coordination structures and population needs following floods and refugee influxes, yet contains no mention of tested surge protocols or a national plan to expand patient isolation capacity within hospitals or standalone units ^{327, pp. 13–16}.

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 100

Libya maintains a national procurement and contracting framework that can be utilized by both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Marine Resources for routine acquisition of laboratory and medical supplies. In January 2023, the Government of National Unity, Council of Ministers issued Decision No. 12 of 2023 adopting the “Regulation for Organizing Government Procurement,” which governs government works and purchases, establishes procurement committees within administrative units, and sets competitive procedures including public tendering for purchases, enabling routine procurement of goods through supply contracts and related documentation requirements for suppliers and contracting files ^{328, pp. 2–5}. Because laboratory supplies, including equipment, reagents, and media, and medical supplies, including equipment and personal protective equipment, are procured as goods under government purchasing and supply contracts, this regulation provides the operative contract framework for routine needs across ministries ^{329, pp. 2–5}. In August 2025, Council of Ministers Decision No. 507 of 2025 further confirms a contracting regime applicable to ministries by defining administrative entities to include ministries and requiring publication and implementation of the issued regulation ^{330, pp. 2, 5}.

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya maintains a government-managed national stockpile of medical supplies defined by a national public health emergency response plan, nor evidence of a government plan to ensure equitable distribution. In March 2025, the World Health Organization, Country Office Libya, reported persistent systems gaps, including the absence of a nationwide information system to collate health data and monitor medical supplies and the absence of a system to track vaccine supplies, which is inconsistent with a documented national stockpiling and equitable distribution mechanism ^{331, pp. 6–7, 16}. On June 30, 2025, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees detailed partner delivery of medical equipment and supplies to public health facilities in Benghazi and described inter-agency task-force coordination for the response, reflecting reliance on partner provision rather than drawdown from a government-run national stockpile with an equitable distribution plan ^{332, pp. 5–7}.

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 50

Libya maintains a national strategic stock mechanism for medical supplies that covers laboratory reagents and consumables. The Ministry of Health “Decision No. 352 of 2022 approving the organizational structure and defining the competencies of the Ministry of Health and organizing its administrative apparatus” assigns the Pharmacy and Medical Supplies Directorate to determine needs, set storage and distribution standards, and provide a strategic stock with a distribution mechanism ^{333, p. 15}. The same decision lists the Medical Supply Organization as an affiliated body of the ministry, confirming the institutional supply function within the health sector ^{334, p. 4}. The Laboratories and Blood Banks Directorate is mandated to supervise laboratory work, including the quality of reagents, and to define technical specifications and tender requirements for laboratory devices, supplies, and operating materials, linking laboratory commodities to the national supply system ^{335, p. 18}. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” dated March 20, 2025 provides current sector context but does not publish any national inventory or contents of a government laboratory-supply stockpile, which indicates limited public evidence on the stockpile’s composition ^{336, p. 7, 16}.

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya conducts or requires an annual review of a national stockpile to ensure sufficiency for a public health emergency. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” dated March 20, 2025 highlights persistent gaps in information and does not describe any government mechanism or schedule for annual stockpile sufficiency reviews ^{337, pp. 7, 16}. The Ministry of Health “Decision No. 352 of 2022 approving the organizational structure and defining the competencies of the Ministry of Health and organizing its administrative apparatus” mandates the provision of a strategic stock and assigns functions to the Pharmacy and Medical Supplies Directorate and the Laboratories and Blood Banks Directorate, but the decision does not establish any requirement for an annual review ^{338, pp. 4, 15, 18}. The House of Representatives reported on September 17, 2025 that its Committee for Reviewing the Status of the Medical Supply Organization convened in Benghazi to discuss oversight of supply management, but this was a single parliamentary oversight meeting, not a codified annual review of stockpile sufficiency ³³⁹.

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Libya has an official plan and mechanism to procure and centrally distribute medical supplies for national use during public health emergencies. On March 21, 2025, the Ministry of Health of the Government of National Unity held a minister-chaired meeting on bringing the Medical Supply System into nationwide operation and instructed the Medical Supply Organization to expedite implementation, establishing a centralized governmental mechanism for procurement and release across Libya ³⁴⁰. Implementation under approved procedures is evidenced by the Libyan News Agency on June 11, 2025 reporting receipt of more than 52,000 kidney dialysis operating sets at the organization’s main warehouses in Tripoli for nationwide allocation “according to approved procedures and mechanisms,” coordinated with the National Kidney Authority ³⁴¹. The Libyan News Agency on June 17, 2025 further states that procurement and stockpiling are conducted “within a comprehensive national plan supported by the Government of National Unity,” confirming the existence of a government plan that guides procurement and distribution to sustain strategic reserves and rapid response capacity ³⁴².

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Libya has an official, standing mechanism to procure and pre-position laboratory reagents for national use during public health emergencies. The National Center for Disease Control's Directorate of Laboratories states that it prepares emergency plans related to laboratories and provides the operating materials required for detecting infectious diseases as a preventive stock, and follows up on implementation ³⁴³. The Reference Laboratory Services page reiterates these functions, specifying the preparation of emergency plans and the provision of operating materials for detecting infectious diseases as a preventive stock across reference and public health laboratories nationwide ³⁴⁴. The “About the Center” mandate confirms broader emergency governance, including managing the national program for pandemics and public health emergencies, forming an emergency room when emergencies occur, and proposing an emergency stock to the competent authorities and distributing it according to the emergency plan ³⁴⁵.

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national system or mechanism, at national and subnational levels, for emergency logistics and supply chain management that is centrally coordinated, formally integrated across sectors, or routinely exercised, reviewed, evaluated, and updated. The World Health Organization, Country Office in Libya states that as of 2025 there is no World Health Organization led Health Cluster active in Libya and that the humanitarian health response is shifting from emergency relief to early recovery and reconstruction, with continued reliance on collaboration among international and local partners rather than a nationally led coordination mechanism for emergency logistics and supply delivery ^{346, p. 17}. The same report also documents major system gaps relevant to emergency supply chains, including that Libya still has no system to track vaccine supplies and lacks a nationwide information system to collate health data and monitor medical supplies, which undermines evidence of a structured, nationally managed logistics mechanism with cold chain coverage and routine performance management ^{347, pp. 6, 16}. The United Nations Children’s Fund Middle East and North Africa Regional Office describes UNICEF plans to establish long term agreements for rapid procurement and pre positioning of supplies and summarizes UNICEF’s 2025 humanitarian strategy in Libya, which reflects partner support rather than a Libyan government emergency logistics system covering public and private sectors ^{348, p. 2}.

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a standing national plan, program, or government-issued guidelines for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during public health emergencies. A comprehensive review of authoritative sources shows that Libya’s countermeasure delivery during emergencies has been conducted through ad hoc, disease-specific campaigns rather than an institutionalized national framework. The World Health Organization Libya Health Cluster’s “Health Sector Bulletin, February 2021” confirms that a National Deployment Plan was finalized solely for COVID-19 vaccination, describing temporary arrangements for vaccine rollout, cold chain use, and task forces, without establishing permanent, cross-hazard guidance governing the dispensing of antibiotics, therapeutics, diagnostics, and vaccines for future emergencies ^{349, pp. 2–4}. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya, 20 March 2025” further documents continued reliance on campaigns amid recurring stockouts, fragmented supply chains, and the absence of national systems to track vaccine or medical commodity supplies, indicating that countermeasure dispensing is not governed by enduring national guidelines ^{350, pp. 6–7}. The World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office’s “Libya Health Emergencies and Humanitarian Update, Issue 01” highlights systemic weaknesses in emergency health readiness, including limited availability of essential medicines, disrupted service delivery, and lack of structured national emergency management mechanisms, reinforcing the absence of a formal MCM dispensing framework ^{351, pp. 1–2}. Finally, the United Nations Children’s Fund Middle East and North Africa Regional Office “Community Health Policy and Implementation Landscape Mapping, Libya Country Brief” states explicitly that Libya lacks national frameworks for community health, integrated supply systems, and government-owned mechanisms for emergency delivery of medicines and health commodities, with most dispensing functions led by humanitarian actors rather than state guidelines ^{352, pp. 3–5}.

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a public plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” states that there is no World Health Organization led Health Cluster active in Libya and lists limited information on health workers availability as a key information gap, and the document does not cite any Government of Libya surge workforce plan defining triggers, authorities, activation procedures, or cross ministerial deployment mechanisms ^{353, p. 17}. The Ministry of Health of the Government of Libya published 2025 notices concerning staffing and employment status decisions for medical and allied personnel, but these are administrative actions and do not constitute or reference a public surge staffing plan issued by Libyan authorities ³⁵⁴. The National Center for Disease Control public “Administrative and Scientific Reports” page lists 2025 official materials, but it contains no ministerial or national plan establishing a surge workforce mechanism for health emergencies as of September 23, 2025 ³⁵⁵.

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a public plan to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. As of March 2025, the World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” identifies major information gaps on health workforce availability and states that there is no World Health Organization–led Health Cluster active in Libya, while providing no citation to any Government of Libya instrument that establishes reception, licensing, activation, or deployment procedures for international medical teams ^{356, pp. 17–18}. As of 2025, the Ministry of Health of the Government of Libya publishes administrative updates on domestic staffing and service delivery on its official website, but these notices do not constitute or reference a public plan for receiving foreign health personnel ³⁵⁷. The Emergency Medicine and Support Center, an institution affiliated with the Ministry of Health, describes its emergency care mission on its official website yet does not publish a ministerial decision, national plan, or standard operating procedure that governs the reception of international medical teams ³⁵⁸.

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a public plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country, whether geographically or by role. In March 2025, the World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” reviews coordination arrangements and workforce information gaps and does not cite any Government of Libya law, decree, circular, or operational plan establishing authorities, triggers, or procedures for redeploying government health workers, and it notes that there is no World Health Organization led Health Cluster active in Libya ^{359, pp. 16–17}. In August 2025, the Ministry of Health of the Government of Libya announced employment status settlement decisions for medical and allied personnel, which are administrative regularization measures rather than a national redeployment framework or protocol ³⁶⁰. The National Center for Disease Control public “Administrative and Scientific Reports” page lists official materials and trainings, but it does not publish any ministerial decision, national plan, or standard operating procedure governing intra country redeployment of public health personnel ³⁶¹.

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 100

Libya maintains a universal system of publicly financed medical care that is provided free at the point of use for all citizens. Authoritative national health system analysis published by the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries in June 2021 states that the Libyan government provides free health care to all citizens and that all Libyans have the right to use health services at public facilities free of charge, with service delivery led by the Ministry of Health through a nationwide network of public health facilities ^{362, p. 1}. The same publication explains that the health system is funded through the state budget, that salaries and operating costs of public facilities are centrally financed, and that public facilities do not charge user fees, while clearly distinguishing this from out-of-pocket payments incurred when individuals seek care in the private sector due to deficiencies in public service availability ^{363, pp. 15–16}. Peer-reviewed health systems research published in 2024 independently corroborates this operational model, describing Libya’s public health system as state-financed and free at the point of use in public primary care settings, while also documenting constraints related to medicines availability and system performance ³⁶⁴.

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 100

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 57.49

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 72.92

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 0

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 0

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 66.67

Libya has a statutory guarantee of paid sick leave for workers. The binding “Law No. (12) of 1378 [2010] on issuing the Labour Relations Law,” issued in January 2010 by the General People’s Congress, entitles a worker or employee to paid sick leave for up to 45 consecutive days or 60 nonconsecutive days each year, capped at 3 months in the same year, and requires a medical report from an accredited physician, with overflow cases referred to the competent medical committee under the Social Security Law ^{365, pp. 11–12}. The same law assigns workplace medical oversight and examinations and states that executive regulations determine fitness levels, including mental and psychological abilities, but the sick-leave entitlement itself is not explicitly extended to mental health conditions in the sick-leave provision ^{366, p. 12}. In January 2025, the Social Security Fund, a public institution under the Government of Libya, documented a comprehensive networking project launch to modernize fund operations, evidencing active institutional administration of social insurance during the timeframe ³⁶⁷.

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. The binding “Act No. 12 of 1378 [2010] on Labour Relations,” issued in January 2010 by the General People’s Congress, provides general sick-leave entitlements and employer obligations for occupational hazards but contains no provision establishing priority access to healthcare services for healthcare workers during emergencies ^{368, pp. 12–13}. In March 2025, the World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) — Libya” reviewed health system functionality and emergency response arrangements and reported no Libyan government commitment to prioritized clinical services for responders ^{369, pp. 4–8, 17}. In December 2021, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ “Libya Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022” discussed service disruptions and worker risks without citing any national priority-of-care policy for healthcare workers ^{370, pp. 71–72}.

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Libya has an operational system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency through Ministry of Health emergency operations room channels linked to hospital readiness and the Ministry’s emergency management functions. On March 23, 2025, the Ministry of Health of the Government of Libya issued a directive, in the context of severe weather, requiring all hospitals and medical centers to raise readiness and instructing hospitals and the public to communicate directly with the Ministry’s Central Operations Room on a 24 hours basis using published phone lines, explicitly positioning this channel for urgent needs and emergency coordination across facilities ³⁷¹. Libya’s Government of National Unity, Council of Ministers Decision No. 352 of 2022 approving the Ministry of Health organizational structure establishes an Emergency Health Administration responsible for developing an emergency communications system, establishing an early warning system, and supervising central and subsidiary emergency rooms while coordinating with relevant entities to ensure emergency care delivery, supporting use of these mechanisms in health emergencies ^{372, pp. 2, 22}.

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s emergency communication system explicitly encompasses healthcare workers in both the public and the private sector. The Ministry of Health maintains a 24-hour Central Operations Room contact page for hospitals or citizens; however, no law, decree, plan, or procedure is published that mandates inclusion of private sector healthcare workers, defines two-way channels, or sets obligations ³⁷³. The National Center for Disease Control hosts Early Warning Alert and Response Network bulletins, which are epidemiological outputs rather than a government framework for mandated two-way emergency communication with private facilities ³⁷⁴. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA), Libya” dated March 20, 2025 reports that unregulated private clinics have proliferated in eastern Libya and that there is no World Health Organization-led Health Cluster active in Libya, indicating fragmented coordination rather than a unified communication system covering both sectors ^{375, pp. 17, 19}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s 2024 report “Understanding the private health sector in Libya” documents that the General Federation of Inpatient Clinics is not receptive to public health programmes or to exchanging information with the government, and highlights persistent gaps in public–private communication, governance, and regulation ^{376, pp. 9, 21–23}.

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national public health system that monitors and tracks the number of healthcare-associated infections occurring across healthcare facilities. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya” dated March 2025 describes fragmented, paper-based reporting and the absence of nationwide information systems to collate health data, and it does not identify any national healthcare-associated infection surveillance mechanism or national outputs covering healthcare-associated infections ^{377, pp. 16–17}. The National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya lists functions for its Infection Control in Health Facilities Department, including preparing programs, forming committees and networks, training staff, and preparing forms and records, but it does not report nationwide monitoring or consolidated counts of healthcare-associated infections ³⁷⁸. The National Center for Disease Control Epidemiology Office page outlines surveillance structures at the Center but provides no evidence of an operative national process aggregating and publishing healthcare-associated infection data from hospitals nationwide ³⁷⁹. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security page for Libya provides general capacity information but no documentation of a national healthcare-associated infection tracking system or national statistics ³⁸⁰.

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 100

Libya has an infection prevention and control programme in place nationally. The Ministry of Health assigned the Quality Directorate a national mandate to prepare, implement, and follow up quality programmes including patient safety and infection control across hospitals and health centers in “Decision No. 352 of 2022 adopting the organizational structure and defining the competencies of the Ministry of Health,” Quality Directorate section ^{381, p. 22}. The National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya maintains a standing “Department of Infection Control at Health Facilities” that prepares facility infection control programmes, proposes national infection control policies, supervises infection control committees and networks, conducts staff training, implements a dedicated diploma programme, and evaluates programme performance nationally, confirming operational scope in 2025 ³⁸². The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” dated March 2025, provides contemporaneous country context for the health system in which this national infection prevention and control programme operates ^{383, pp. 1–2}.

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

Libya has evidence of a plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities nationally. The Ministry of Health of the Government of Libya opened national bids on January 22, 2025 for cleaning and attendant services through the government e-procurement platform under ministerial oversight, evidencing a centrally coordinated plan to standardize environmental cleaning across health facilities ³⁸⁴. The National Center for Disease Control of the Government of Libya maintains an Engineering and Technical Affairs Department with responsibilities that include maintenance of buildings and premises, development of center facilities, and provision of services necessary for work such as occupational safety and health, demonstrating an institutional mechanism aligned to safe and functional healthcare environments ³⁸⁵. The World Health Organization’s “Environmental Health Libya 2025 country profile,” published in June 2025, includes a health care facilities section addressing water, sanitation, hygiene, environmental cleaning, and health care waste management standards, providing contemporaneous country context for environmental safety in facilities ^{386, p. 3}.

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a national requirement for ethical review by an ethics committee or institutional review board before beginning a clinical trial. The “International Compilation of Human Research Standards, 2024 Edition: Africa,” issued by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, lists African countries with national human-subjects laws and regulations but contains no entry for Libya, indicating no identified national instrument as of June 2024 ^{387, pp. 5–20}. The World Health Organization “Public Health Situation Analysis — Libya,” published March 2025, summarizes governance and regulatory functions for the health sector and does not identify any nationwide clinical-trial ethics requirement or national research ethics authority on the cited pages ^{388, pp. 7, 15–19}.

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 100

Libya has an expedited process for authorizing clinical trial applications for unregistered medical countermeasures during epidemics through participation in the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa’s African Vaccine Regulatory Forum joint and assisted review mechanism. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa lists the “Pharmacy Management, Equipment, Supplies and Medical Supplies Ministry of Health, Libya” among national regulators participating in the African Vaccine Regulatory Forum, establishing Libya’s eligibility to use the platform’s accelerated joint reviews during health emergencies ³⁸⁹. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa document “AVAREF Strategy and Guidance for Emergency Preparedness” issued in May 2020 specifies emergency joint review timelines of 10 working days for products already registered for other indications and 15 working days for novel products, with parallel ethics and regulatory review and country decision as part of the overall timeframe ^{390, pp. 8, 13–15}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa’s “Guideline for Joint and Assisted Reviews of Clinical Trial Applications” of September 2019 defines the joint and expedited review processes and their steps and timelines used by participating national regulatory authorities and ethics committees ^{391, pp. 4, 13}. A June 2025 intergovernmental meeting report confirms that the African Vaccine Regulatory Forum continues to provide regulatory support aligned with regional harmonization efforts ^{392, p. 22}.

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 100

Libya has a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans through the Pharmacy and Medical Supplies Administration under the Ministry of Health. The Council of Ministers “Decree No. 352 of 2022 on Approving the Organizational Structure and Defining Competencies of the Ministry of Health and Organizing Its Administrative Unit” establishes the Pharmacy and Medical Supplies Administration and assigns it responsibilities including licensing pharmaceutical facilities, registering medical products, and monitoring controlled substances, providing the legal foundation for national medicines regulation ^{393, p. 17}. The Ministry of Health portal offers an active service titled “Request to register a drug product,” confirming that the Ministry receives and processes applications for new medicines and medical products ³⁹⁴. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa “African Vaccine Regulatory Forum – Regulators” page lists Libya’s Ministry of Health as the national regulator, explicitly identifying the responsible government authority ³⁹⁵.

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a formal expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies or a formal mechanism to recognize external approval decisions for emergency use. The World Health Organization Health Cluster “Health Sector Bulletin: Libya” for February 2021 documents that Libya completed an emergency use authorization and import licensing step for the AstraZeneca vaccine after the World Health Organization Emergency Use Listing, but it does not cite any Libyan law, regulation, standing national procedure, or recognition framework governing expedited authorization during emergencies, and it describes operational steps taken to meet COVAX prerequisites rather than a durable national pathway ^{396, pp. 3–4}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa AVAREF regulator list includes Libya as a participating national regulator contact point, but that listing alone does not establish an emergency authorization or recognition mechanism for medical countermeasures ³⁹⁷. The “AVAREF Strategy and Guidance for Emergency Preparedness” is focused on expedited ethics and regulatory review of clinical trial applications and related investigational product processes, not emergency population level authorization or recognition for general use of countermeasures ^{398, pp. 6–9}.

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Libya has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.³⁹⁹

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya integrates epidemics and pandemics into a national disaster risk reduction strategy or maintains a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction lists no national disaster risk reduction strategy or national platform for Libya on its country page, and it contains no national policy entry integrating epidemic or pandemic risk, indicating that no such instrument is publicly available ⁴⁰⁰. The World Health Organization’s “Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) — Libya,” dated March 2025, describes infectious disease threats and health-system gaps but does not reference any national disaster risk reduction strategy that incorporates epidemic or pandemic hazards, which would be expected if one were operative ^{401, p. 1}. The National Economic and Social Development Board reports that Prime Minister’s Decision No. 19 of 2025 established steering and technical committees to prepare a national strategy for dealing with crises and disasters, evidencing drafting rather than adoption ⁴⁰². The Libyan News Agency reports the technical committee’s commencement in January 2025 and a steering committee meeting in April 2025 to advance the draft, which confirms preparation without promulgation or implementation of a qualifying strategy in 2025 ⁴⁰³⁴⁰⁴.

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has concluded cross-border agreements, protocols, or memoranda of understanding with neighboring countries that specifically govern cooperation during public health emergencies. On 29 June 2025, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention announced the establishment of a Northern Africa Regional Steering Committee and governance appointments, including Libya’s nomination to the Governing Board, but the bulletin did not contain or reference any Libya-specific signed health-emergency agreement or protocol ^{405, p. 1}. On 11 April 2025, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya reported in the Secretary-General’s submission to the Security Council that coordination teams were operating along the Tunisia and Algeria frontiers, but the report described security and migration measures without referencing any bilateral or regional public-health emergency instrument ^{406, pp. 10–11}. In October 2024, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention issued a continental strategic framework for cross-border surveillance and information sharing, which called on member states to strengthen collaboration but did not provide any Libya-specific legal instrument ^{407, pp. 15–17}. On 25 August 2025, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reported on collaboration between Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia to improve migrant health, but the communication explicitly recommended formalizing cross-border frameworks, showing that no binding emergency agreements were yet in place ⁴⁰⁸.

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

Libya has a regional cross-border framework for cooperation during animal health emergencies, but publicly available evidence does not demonstrate Libya-specific implementation sufficient to establish full operational effectiveness. In November 2012, the World Organisation for Animal Health and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations published the “Cooperation Framework between the Chief Veterinary Officers of Algeria, Egypt, France, Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia for the creation and the development of the Mediterranean Animal Health Network,” which identifies Libya as a signatory and establishes cooperation on transboundary animal diseases, including zoonoses, through information exchange, coordination of veterinary services, preparedness activities, and a Joint Permanent Committee responsible for regional steering and decision making ^{409, pp. 1–3, 5, 16}. The framework entered into force upon signature and defines governance arrangements and duration, but it does not document Libya-specific activation, joint response actions, or cross-border emergency operations. In September 2025, the World Organisation for Animal Health issued “Individual Consultant for the Legal Assessment of the Administrative and Financial Framework Established for the Scientific and Technical Support to REMESA,” which confirms the continued institutional existence and governance of the Mediterranean Animal Health Network and lists Libya among the founding countries, but does not provide evidence of Libya’s participation in animal health emergency response activities or operational cross-border coordination within the timeframe ^{410, pp. 1–2}.

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

Libya has State Party status to the Biological Weapons Convention through accession. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs records Libya’s 19 January 1982 accession to the Convention and lists Libya as a State Party on the Biological Weapons Convention country page in 2025, which confirms the legal effect and current recognition under the Convention’s system administered by the Implementation Support Unit ⁴¹¹. On 16 December 2024, the United Nations draft report of the Meeting of States Parties lists Libya among the delegations participating as States Parties, which demonstrates ongoing participation immediately preceding 2025 operations under the Convention ^{412, p. 2}.

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 100

Libya has submitted Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measures within the past three years. On 10 April 2025, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs lists a Libya confidence-building measure report for 2025 on the Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence-Building Measures Portal, and the same Libya page records additional Libya reports dated 8 April 2024 and 12 April 2023, demonstrating three consecutive annual filings administered by the Implementation Support Unit ⁴¹³.

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 100

Libya has provided the required United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 national report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540. The United Nations Security Council document S/AC.44/2004/(02)/115, dated April 18, 2005, transmits a letter dated April 12, 2005 from the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations attaching Libya’s national report, confirming formal provision to the Committee through the mandated channel ^{414, p. 1415}. A supplementary submission S/AC.44/2004/(02)/115/Add.1, dated December 12, 2005, provides additional information requested by the Committee, evidencing sustained engagement with the reporting process ^{416, p. 1417}. A further national report dated January 28, 2008 is published on the Committee’s official website, demonstrating ongoing national 1540 reporting beyond the initial submission ^{418, p. 1419}.

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 0

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya meets at least two of the following criteria: membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, membership in the Australia Group, or membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction lists its members and partners and does not include Libya ⁴²⁰. The Australia Group, administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Government of Australia, maintains an official participants page, and Libya is not included on that roster ⁴²¹. By contrast, the Proliferation Security Initiative’s official endorsing-states list, hosted by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, includes Libya as an endorsing state as of November 2024 ⁴²².

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has completed and published a full Joint External Evaluation report within the last five years. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness shows Libya’s Joint External Evaluation status as in pipeline with an updated date of June 27, 2025, indicating no completed or publicly released report in the past five years ⁴²³. The most recent full World Health Organization country report is dated April 2019 and records that the mission occurred on July 9–15, 2018, which places the publication outside the required five-year window as of September 25, 2025 ⁴²⁴. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean confirms the mission took place in Tripoli during July 9–15, 2018, corroborating the older timeline and the absence of a newer published report within the last five years ⁴²⁵.

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services assessment in the last five years. The World Organisation for Animal Health Regional Representation for Africa lists Libya’s Performance of Veterinary Services engagement as an initial evaluation in 2009, a follow-up in 2013, a gap analysis in 2013, and laboratories support in 2013, with no subsequent Performance of Veterinary Services evaluation activities shown within the past five years ⁴²⁶. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness records a National International Health Regulations–Performance of Veterinary Services Bridging Workshop held in Tripoli on February 23–26, 2025, which supports One Health coordination but is not a Performance of Veterinary Services evaluation or report publication and therefore does not satisfy this indicator ⁴²⁷.

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services gap analysis in the last five years. The World Organisation for Animal Health Regional Representation for Africa country-status page lists Libya’s Performance of Veterinary Services gap analysis as 2013 and shows no subsequent gap analysis publication within the past five years ⁴²⁸. The World Organisation for Animal Health “Independent review of PVS Pathway reports from African countries” identifies Libya in Annex C with a 2013 gap analysis status and again in Annex D with Libya’s 2013 entry, confirming that the latest recorded gap analysis is outside the five-year window ^{429, pp. 108, 110}. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security and Emergency Preparedness records a National Bridging Workshop held in Tripoli in February 2025 to support One Health coordination, which is not a Performance of Veterinary Services gap analysis ⁴³⁰.

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has allocated national funds specifically to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats within the past three years. The Central Bank of Libya document titled “Government Expenditure for Entities from 1 January to 28 February 2023,” published in February 2023, reports executed government expenditures by recipient entity, including the National Center for Disease Control, and does not identify any budget line, program title, or expenditure purpose related to pandemic or epidemic preparedness capacities ⁴³¹. The Central Bank of Libya dataset titled “Government Expenditure for Entities from 1 January to 30 September 2023,” published in October 2023, lists executed payments by entity name only and contains no references to epidemic surveillance, outbreak response, laboratory strengthening, emergency preparedness, or pandemic capacity improvement ⁴³². The Central Bank of Libya publication titled “Government Expenditure for Entities, August 2024 Year-to-Date,” published in September 2024, continues to report expenditures at the entity level without specifying preparedness or response capacity purposes ⁴³³. The Central Bank of Libya aggregate expenditure tables for the Ministry of Health and affiliated entities covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2024 list executed expenditures for the National Center for Disease Control and do not include any line item, annotation, or annex identifying funding allocated for pandemic or epidemic capacity improvement ^{434, pp. 1, 3}.

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s Joint External Evaluation report, National Action Plan for Health Security, or any national Global Health Security Agenda roadmap allocates or describes specific funding from the national budget to address identified gaps. The World Health Organization publication page for the “Joint external evaluation of IHR core capacities of Libya” is dated April 2019 and provides a country mission report landing page without national-budget allocations for implementation of recommendations ⁴³⁵. The World Health Organization’s Joint External Evaluation framework page describes the JEE as an assessment tool that identifies gaps and recommendations rather than a budgeting instrument, and it does not provide Libya national-budget figures for gap closure ⁴³⁶. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security entry for Libya’s National Action Plan for Health Security records that the plan was conducted but indicates the plan document is not publicly available, preventing verification of any national-budget allocations within that instrument ⁴³⁷.

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya’s Performance of Veterinary Services gap analysis or Performance of Veterinary Services assessment allocates or describes specific funding from the national budget to address identified gaps. The World Organisation for Animal Health registry lists Libya missions in 2009 for the initial evaluation and in 2013 for the follow up, the gap analysis, and laboratories ⁴³⁸. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security portal records Libya entries titled “OIE PVS Gap Analysis” and “OIE PVS Evaluation,” both posted in January 2020 and linked to the 2013 missions, yet neither entry hosts a public Libya report, so no national budget allocations can be confirmed from those pages ⁴³⁹⁴⁴⁰. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development notes that Performance of Veterinary Services reports are publicly released only with the evaluated country’s authorization ^{441, pp. 38–39}.

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds that can be accessed specifically for a public health emergency. The World Bank confirms that the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility closed on April 30, 2021, so no standing multilateral pandemic window is presently available through that instrument ⁴⁴². The Central Bank of Libya Economic Bulletin for First Quarter 2022 lists an “Emergency Budget” classification and notes a Central Bank loan to cover twelve months of expenses under a Presidency Council resolution, but it does not identify a dedicated health emergency financing mechanism or fund established in law or policy for public health events ^{443, pp. 59–60}. The Central Bank of Libya Economic Bulletin for Third Quarter 2023 repeats the “Emergency Budget” line with the same loan note, again without identifying a public health emergency financing mechanism or fund ^{444, p. 59}. An older General National Congress resolution authorized an emergency budget advance in March 2014 that included the health sector, but this instrument is repealed ⁴⁴⁵.

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

Libya has made a public, senior-leader commitment within the past three years to improve domestic capacity to address epidemic and pandemic threats by formally requesting and mobilizing external support. In November 2023, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean publicly reported that Libya’s Minister of Health co-chaired the adoption of the “World Health Organization–Libya Joint Operational Plan for 2024–2025,” which the report describes as establishing agreed priorities between the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization to strengthen surveillance, preparedness, emergency response, and health system functions through coordinated partner support ⁴⁴⁶. In November 2024, the World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean further reported that Libya’s Minister of Health co-chaired the national launch of the One Health approach, stating that the initiative is supported by financing from the European Union and the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation and is intended to strengthen prevention, detection, and response capacities for health threats through a government-led framework ⁴⁴⁷.

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

Libya has, in the past 3 years, publicly documented requests for and receipt of international technical and financing support to improve domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. In October 2023, the World Health Organization reported that it and the Italian Embassy in Libya signed a “One Health” agreement on prevention and control of arboviral and zoonotic diseases in Libya, in cooperation with the Libyan Ministry of Health and the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, and the report states that the World Health Organization will support improvements in disease surveillance and detection and upgrades to laboratory diagnostic capacity in Libya ⁴⁴⁸. In June 2024, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation reported that a 2 year project titled “Arboviral and zoonotic diseases in Libya” was financed by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation with a budget of 675,000 euros and implemented with Libyan national institutions including the National Center for Disease Control under the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Animal Health under the Ministry of Agriculture, and the report states the intervention aims to improve surveillance and early detection and strengthen laboratory diagnostic capabilities ⁴⁴⁹. In November 2024, the World Health Organization reported that Libya’s One Health initiative was launched thanks to funding from the European Union and the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation ⁴⁵⁰.

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has fulfilled its full contribution to the World Health Organization within the past two years. The World Health Organization’s report to the Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly, dated April 2025, records that as of December 31, 2024 Libya still had an outstanding balance of USD 746 on its 2024 assessed contribution, indicating that the year’s assessment was not paid in full within the period reviewed ^{451, p. 8}. The same report explains that under the Organization’s financial regulations, assessed contributions are to be paid in full and on time to enable delivery of the approved program budget, establishing the standard against which fulfillment is judged ^{452, p. 1}

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Libya has a plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, or isolated specimens with international organizations or other countries that goes beyond influenza. The Ministry of Health decisions archive, updated in June 2025, lists ministerial decisions and circulars but contains no instrument establishing cross-border specimen or genetic data sharing outside influenza-specific arrangements ⁴⁵³. The National Center for Disease Control public portal describes functions and activities yet publishes no national policy, standard operating procedure, or legal authority for international sharing of biological materials or associated epidemiological data beyond influenza ⁴⁵⁴. Government reports in January 2023 and December 2023 document approval and roll-out of a Libyan specimen management guide by the acting minister of health and a follow-up workshop, but both items are limited to domestic sample handling and do not create an international sharing pathway or designate an authority to transmit specimens or genetic data abroad ⁴⁵⁵⁴⁵⁶.

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

Libya has no publicly documented instance of non-sharing of influenza samples under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness framework in the past two years. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s “Influenza monthly update” for April 2024 lists Libya among reporting countries with samples tested and positives detected, evidencing continued engagement with the regional surveillance system during the period, which is consistent with sharing viruses via the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System under the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness framework ^{457, p. 1}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean’s “Influenza monthly update” for October 2023 likewise lists Libya among reporting countries, with laboratory testing and detections noted, indicating ongoing participation across consecutive seasons within the two-year window ^{458, p. 1}. In addition, the World Health Organization’s “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework Partnership Contribution, Six-month progress report, 1 January–30 June 2024” reiterates that a core goal of the framework is to strengthen sharing of influenza viruses through the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, and it does not identify Libya for non-compliance in the reporting period ^{459, p. 7}.

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

Libya has no publicly documented instances in the past two years of failing to share pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak. World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean influenza updates for February 2024, March 2024, and April 2024 list Libya among reporting countries contributing virologic and epidemiologic data to the regional influenza system linked to the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, and none of these bulletins report any refusal by Libya to share specimens or withhold samples during outbreak reporting windows in the past two years ^{460, p. 1}, ^{461, p. 1}, ^{462, p. 1}.

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 25

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 0

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 0

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 0

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 13

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 25

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 0

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 0

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 25

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 50

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 50

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 0

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 25

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 0

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 0

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 0

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 96.58

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 0

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 0

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 0

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 50

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 100

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 0

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 25

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 0

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 50

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 12.34

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 76.33

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 25

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 67.48

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 74.4

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 73.47

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 0

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 32.92

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 29.05

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 95.99

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 87.98

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 0

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 56.8

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 50

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 0