Algeria: Score Justification Summary

1.1.1a National plan for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 100

Algeria has a national antimicrobial resistance plan that explicitly covers surveillance, laboratory detection, and reporting of priority antimicrobial resistance pathogens. The Ministry of Health's National Strategic Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024–2028 includes a dedicated axis on surveillance with Objective 2 to strengthen knowledge through national antimicrobial resistance surveillance, establishing laboratory centered organization for diagnosis and data generation ^{1, p. 13}. The plan identifies that nationally monitored bacterial species align with the World Health Organization (WHO) priority pathogens list, confirming focus on priority pathogens ^{2, p. 6}. It documents participation in the Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System (GLASS), establishing an international reporting pathway, and schedules expansion and integration of additional antimicrobial classes into GLASS ^{3, p. 84, p. 20}. The action plan specifies measures to reinforce diagnostic capacity and national laboratory networks, including a mandatory minimum list of equipment and reagents and regulatory updates for surveillance networks, evidencing systematic detection and sustained data collection ^{5, p. 19}. It also requires publication of annual implementation reports, demonstrating a national reporting mechanism ^{6, p. 28}. The preface confirms continuity from the 2018 to 2023 plan, ensuring coverage across the full 2022 to 2025 timeframe ^{7, p. i}.

1.1.1b Capacity of national lab/lab system to test for AMR priority pathogens

Score: 50

Algeria has a national laboratory system that tests for multiple priority antimicrobial resistance pathogens, but not all seven plus one. The Algerian Antimicrobial Resistance Network coordinated by the Institut Pasteur of Algeria lists participating hospital and veterinary laboratories nationwide and shows geographic coverage in 2022 ^{8, pp. 8, 12}. The same 2022 evaluation report provides susceptibility testing data for Klebsiella pneumoniae, Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus aureus, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Salmonella species, and Acinetobacter species, evidencing detection capacity for these organisms ^{9, pp. 37, 39, 41, 43, 55, 66–70, 94}. The tables and organism-specific sections in the same report do not provide results for Neisseria gonorrhoeae or Shigella species, showing that not all seven plus one World Health Organization Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System priority pathogens are covered ^{10, pp. 5–7}. The Ministry of Health’s National Strategic Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024–2028 confirms Algeria’s continued participation in the World Health Organization surveillance system and describes governance and reinforcement of laboratory networks, demonstrating ongoing national surveillance and laboratory functions within the timeframe ^{11, pp. i, 6, 13}.

1.1.1c National environmental surveillance for AMR residues/organisms

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria conducts government environmental detection or surveillance for antimicrobial residues or antimicrobial resistant organisms in soil, surface water, or wastewater. The Ministry of Health's National Strategic Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024 to 2028 states that actions will be undertaken to collect data in the environment sector and lists training of food control laboratory personnel to detect antibiotic residues as a planned activity, which indicates intent rather than an implemented surveillance mechanism during this period ^{12, pp. 7, 20}. The Algerian Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network reports page contains national reports for clinical and veterinary isolates, with no environmental surveillance reports posted for this timeframe ¹³.

1.1.2a National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (humans)

Score: 50

Algeria has national legislation that requires medical prescriptions for dispensing antibiotics for human use, with documented enforcement gaps. “Law No. 18-11 of 2 July 2018 on Health” limits prescribing of pharmaceutical products to licensed medical practitioners in the exercise of their functions (Article 174), requires that pharmacists dispense pharmaceutical products only on medical prescription with a narrow ministerial list of exceptions after pharmacist advice (Article 179), and forbids executors of prescriptions from prescribing or modifying a physician’s prescription without prior approval (Article 180), establishing a prescription-only framework for antibiotics dispensed in community pharmacies ^{14, p. 17}. The Ministry of Health’s “National Strategic Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024–2028” states there is insufficient control of the application of regulations for the dispensing of antibiotics in human and animal health, confirming enforcement gaps ^{15, p. 18}.

1.1.2b National law(s) requiring prescription for antibiotic use (animals)

Score: 50

Algeria has national legislation requiring veterinarian prescriptions for defined categories of veterinary medicinal products that present specified risks. The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria enacted “Law No. 88-08 of 26 January 1988 relating to the activities of veterinary medicine and to the protection of animal health,” under which Article 41 lists risk-based categories of veterinary medicinal products, including those liable to leave toxic or dangerous residues in foods of animal origin and toxic or poisonous substances; Article 42 requires retail dispensing of Article 41 products on a veterinarian’s written order; and Article 52 forbids dispensing without a prescription when the market authorization specifies this for substances listed in Article 41(c), (e), (f), and (g) ^{16, pp. 9–11}. Antibiotics used in food-producing animals fall within the Article 41 residue and toxic substance categories and are therefore subject to the prescription regime in Articles 42 and 52 ^{17, pp. 9–11}. The Ministry of Health’s “National Strategic Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024–2028” reports insufficient control of the application of regulations for the dispensing of antibiotics in human and animal health, evidencing enforcement gaps as of 2024 ^{18, p. 10}.

1.2.1a Laws/plans on zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Algeria has national legislation and national planning instruments in force that address zoonotic disease prioritization, detection, and reporting through a legally established One Health governance framework. Executive Decree No. 20-341 establishes the National Committee for the Prevention and Control of Zoonoses as a permanent intersectoral body mandated to update and validate the national list of priority zoonotic diseases, approve national prevention and control plans, monitor zoonotic threats, and ensure routine reporting and coordination among responsible authorities, including the human health and animal health sectors ^{19, pp. 12–14}. The decree provides a binding legal basis for zoonotic prioritization and surveillance at the national level and explicitly includes rabies among priority zoonoses subject to coordinated control and reporting mechanisms ^{20, pp. 12–14}. Continued legal operation of this national zoonoses framework within the timeframe is confirmed by a ministerial order published in the Journal Officiel in November 2022 that amended the designation of committee members, demonstrating that the committee remained formally constituted and active beyond its initial establishment ^{21, p. 23}. In addition, the Ministry of Health has publicly confirmed the implementation of a national rabies control plan developed with the World Health Organization and the National Committee for the Prevention and Control of Zoonoses, reinforcing national zoonotic disease prioritization, detection, and reporting within a One Health approach ²².

1.2.1b Laws/plans on zoonotic disease spillover from animals to humans

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national legal framework that establishes a multisectoral committee with defined functions for identifying and reducing zoonotic spillover risk. The Government's 2020 Executive Decree No. 20-341 creates a National Committee for Prevention and Control of Zoonoses and provincial committees, charges them to observe and seek alert in case of epizootic or epidemic threats, to develop and validate national prevention and control programs and intervention plans, to update the list of priority zoonoses, to evaluate human, material, and financial resources, to ensure coherence between sectoral plans, and to produce annual reports on zoonoses and actions undertaken ^{23, pp. 13 and 14}. The decree also sets a national list of priority zoonoses, including rabies, brucellosis, tuberculosis, salmonelloses, echinococcosis hydatidosis, leishmaniases, and Rift Valley fever, which guides targeted risk reduction efforts ^{24, p. 14}. Continued government orders in 2022 and 2023 modify the membership of the national committee, demonstrating that the framework remains active during 2022 to 2025 ^{25, p. 2226, p. 33}.

1.2.1c Laws/plans for surveillance & control of multiple zoonotic pathogens

Score: 100

Algeria has national legislation in force that establishes a multisectoral framework for surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens. Executive Decree No. 20 341 creates a National Committee for Prevention and Control of Zoonoses and provincial committees, places them under the minister responsible for the national veterinary authority, and assigns functions that operationalize surveillance and control, including observing and seeking alert in case of epizootic or epidemic threats, elaborating national prevention and control programs, validating and updating intervention plans, updating the list of priority zoonoses, evaluating human material and financial resources, ensuring coherence between sectoral plans, and elaborating and disseminating an annual report on the evolution of zoonoses and actions undertaken ^{27, p. 13}. The decree also sets a national list of priority zoonoses that guides surveillance and control, including rabies, brucellosis, tuberculosis, salmonelloses, echinococcosis hydatidosis, leishmaniases, and Rift Valley fever, and provides for updating this list by ministerial order ^{28, p. 14}.

1.2.1d Cross-ministerial department/agency/unit for zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Algeria has a multi-sectoral coordinating mechanism dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. Executive Decree No. 20-341 of 22 November 2020 established the National Committee for the Prevention and Control of Zoonoses under the authority of the Prime Minister, with representation from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of the Interior, and other sectors, and tasked it with monitoring zoonotic disease trends, issuing guidance, and coordinating prevention and control measures ^{29, pp. 13–14}. The Committee’s scope explicitly includes rabies, brucellosis, tuberculosis, salmonellosis, echinococcosis, leishmaniasis, and Rift Valley fever as priority zoonoses ^{30, pp. 13–14}. The Committee was made operational when the government issued the Order of 30 November 2021, published in the Journal Officiel on 25 January 2022, formally designating its members in line with Article 8 of the founding decree ^{31, p. 14}.

1.2.1e Presence of One Health strategic plan

Score: 0

There is no evidence of Algeria having a One Health Strategic Plan in place. ³²

1.2.2a Surveillance/reporting mechanism for zoonotic disease for livestock owners

Score: 100

Algeria has a national mandatory mechanism for livestock owners and keepers to report suspected animal diseases to a central veterinary authority ^{33, p. 19}. An interministerial order issued in 2023 on contagious bovine pleuropneumonia requires any person responsible for the care or custody of bovines, even temporarily, to inform immediately the nearest veterinarian or the president of the People’s Communal Assembly when disease signs are observed ^{34, p. 19}. The same order obliges the veterinarian to declare the suspicion by the fastest means to the national veterinary authority, while also notifying local officials, thereby creating a formal reporting channel into the central government system ^{35, p. 19}. The provincial veterinary inspector must communicate investigation results to the national authority, which confirms the upward flow of surveillance information from farms to the national level ^{36, p. 19}.

1.2.2b Laws/regulations on data confidentiality to protect livestock owners

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has legislation or regulations that explicitly safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through animal health surveillance activities for owners. Executive Decree No. 25-77 of 11 February 2025 organizing the central administration of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development assigns the Directorate General of Veterinary Services responsibility for animal identification, registration, traceability, operation of the national animal database, and surveillance of animal diseases, including epidemiological investigations and laboratory surveillance, but the decree does not contain provisions addressing confidentiality or protection of owner-identifying information collected through these surveillance activities ^{37, pp. 23–24}. Law No. 18-07 of 10 June 2018 on the protection of individuals in the processing of personal data establishes general obligations for data controllers to ensure security of personal data and imposes professional secrecy on persons with access to such data, enforced by the National Authority for the Protection of Personal Data, but the law is sector-neutral and does not specifically regulate animal health surveillance systems or owner reporting within veterinary surveillance frameworks ^{38, pp. 17–18}. Law No. 88-08 of 26 January 1988 on Veterinary Medicine and the Protection of Animal Health imposes professional secrecy obligations on veterinarians in the exercise of their duties, but it does not establish confidentiality protections for owners as data subjects whose information is generated or reported through animal disease surveillance activities ^{39, p. 5}.

1.2.2c Wildlife zoonotic disease surveillance

Score: 100

Algeria conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife, poultry, and livestock. The Institut Pasteur d’Algérie states that its veterinary virology laboratory performs animal rabies diagnosis and assures epidemiological surveillance in collaboration with the Directorate of Veterinary Services ⁴⁰. Algeria filed an immediate notification of highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry on 7 October 2022 through the World Organisation for Animal Health system, evidencing active poultry surveillance and official reporting ⁴¹. For livestock, veterinary services report infection rates of about 1 percent in cattle and 5 percent in goats for brucellosis in a national abstract presented in 2024, demonstrating ongoing herd surveillance ^{42, p. 10}. Wildlife surveillance is established by executive decree that creates a local wildlife health surveillance network tasked to observe and detect epizootic diseases in wild fauna, to collect data, and to transmit results to the veterinary authority ^{43, pp. 12–13}. Regional support in 2024 under the PROVNA initiative targeted risk based entomological and serological surveillance for mosquito borne diseases in North Africa including Algeria, reinforcing vector and wildlife linked surveillance capacity ⁴⁴.

1.2.3a Annual reporting to OIE on zoonotic disease incidence

Score: 100

Algeria has a functioning mechanism to report notifiable animal diseases to the World Organisation for Animal Health. The World Organisation for Animal Health lists Algeria’s national Delegate, evidencing the official channel for engagement with the Organisation ⁴⁵. The Organisation’s Africa registry shows an Algeria immediate notification entered through the World Animal Health Information System on 28 April 2022 for foot and mouth disease, which demonstrates active international reporting ⁴⁶. Nationally, the Interministerial order of 20 February 2023, published in the Official Journal, on contagious bovine pleuropneumonia requires a veterinarian, upon suspicion, to declare the suspicion by the fastest means to the national veterinary authority and to the municipal president, establishing the internal escalation that supports timely international notification ^{47, p. 19}.

1.2.4a Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Score: 59.98

1.2.4b Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Score: 0.43

1.2.5a Inclusion of private sector in national plan/law on zoonotic disease

Score: 100

Algeria has a formal mechanism to work with the private sector in controlling and responding to zoonoses. The Official Journal published an order designating the members of the National Committee for the Prevention and Control of Zoonoses, and the list explicitly includes a representative of the President of the National Chamber of Agriculture, thereby institutionalizing participation of agricultural producers in prevention, control, and response activities under the committee created by executive decree cited in the same notice ^{48, pp. 14–15}. In 2024 the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development issued an amending order in the Official Journal that updates specific governmental representatives and states that the remainder of the membership is unchanged ^{49, p. 22}.

1.3.1a Updated national records of especially dangerous pathogen/toxin inventories

Score: 50

Algeria has some evidence of facilities handling especially dangerous pathogens being tracked, but there is no publicly available evidence of a national record updated within the past five years that includes details on inventory management within those facilities. The Institut Pasteur of Algeria reported in January 2022 that, in collaboration with Sandia National Laboratories, it created a harmonized inventory form and collected laboratory data from all institute laboratories that handle pathogens and toxins ⁵⁰. The World Health Organization Joint External Evaluation mission report published in 2023 recommends developing a regulatory framework for a national register of pathogen inventories, indicating that a national record with inventory-management details had not yet been established or demonstrated publicly as of the 2022 assessment period ^{51, pp. 15–16}. The same report notes broader biosafety and biosecurity system actions while underscoring the absence of a national facility-and-inventory register ^{52, pp. 31, 44}.

1.3.1b Biosecurity laws on facility security for especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 50

Algeria has legislation related to biosecurity for veterinary laboratories, but the publicly available texts do not demonstrate specific facility requirements for physical containment, failure reporting systems, or cybersecurity. The “Interministerial Order of 2 August 2023 organizing the internal structure of the National Institute of Veterinary Medicine” expressly establishes a Department for management of quality and biological safety in the laboratory and creates within the Central Veterinary Laboratory and each regional laboratory a “service of quality, biosecurity, and biosafety,” but this order does not specify national physical-containment tiers, laboratory incident or failure reporting systems, or cybersecurity obligations for facilities handling especially dangerous pathogens and toxins ^{53, pp. 20–21}. The “Order of 26 July 2023 fixing the list of activities, works and services that may be carried out by the National Institute of Veterinary Medicine” authorizes “quality-biosecurity and biosafety audit” as a regulated service, yet this order likewise does not set national physical-containment tiers, laboratory incident or failure reporting systems, or cybersecurity obligations for such facilities ^{54, p. 18}.

1.3.1c Agency for enforcement of biosecurity laws/regulations

Score: 100

Algeria has established agencies responsible for enforcing biosecurity legislation and regulations. The Executive Decree No. 24-277 of 13 August 2024, published in the Official Journal, sets the missions, organization, and functioning of the Border Health Control Service, mandating it to enforce health regulations at points of entry, apply legislative and regulatory provisions, and coordinate with customs, veterinary, and phytosanitary services ^{55, pp. 14–15}. The Interministerial Order of 20 February 2023, published in the Official Journal, on prevention and control of sheep pox and goat pox empowers the Ministry of Agriculture and wilaya governors to order slaughter and destruction of infected animals under the control of veterinary services ^{56, pp. 16–17}. The Order of 2 August 2023, published in the Official Journal, on the internal organization of the National Institute of Veterinary Medicine establishes specialized services for biosafety and biosecurity within its laboratories ^{57, p. 21}.

1.3.1d Consolidation of especially dangerous pathogens into minimum # of facilities

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria took action to consolidate national inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. The 2024 Executive Decree No. 24-277, published in the government's Official Journal, establishes the Border Health Control Service under the Ministry of Health, assigning responsibilities for surveillance and enforcement of the International Health Regulations at points of entry, but it does not mandate consolidation of pathogen inventories or reduction in the number of authorized facilities ^{58, pp. 12–16}. The Secretariat General of the Government’s 2023 annual compilation of legislative and regulatory texts lists decrees and ministerial orders adopted during that year for the health sector, including measures on hospitals and administrative bodies, but contains no provision on consolidation or limitation of laboratories holding dangerous pathogens or toxins ^{59, pp. 86–88}.

1.3.1e Capacity to conduct tests for anthrax/Ebola without culturing live pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction diagnostic testing for anthrax or Ebola that would preclude culturing a live pathogen. Executive Decree No. 22-250 Fixing the List of Notifiable Communicable Diseases of 11 July 2022, published in the Official Journal of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, lists anthrax as a nationally notifiable communicable disease and Ebola as an internationally notifiable communicable disease, but it establishes notification and surveillance categories and does not document Polymerase Chain Reaction assay availability, validated test methods, or implementing laboratory capacity for either agent in Algeria ^{60, pp. 12–13}. In April 2024, Radio Algérie reported the expected commissioning of a new laboratory at the Institut Pasteur d’Algérie specialized in viral biological emergencies, but the report does not provide evidence of operational Polymerase Chain Reaction diagnostics for Ebola virus or Bacillus anthracis in service, such as test menus, protocols, or validated workflows ⁶¹. The Institut Pasteur d’Algérie virology department pages describe diagnostic activities but do not publicly list diagnostic test menus or protocols demonstrating Polymerase Chain Reaction capability for Ebola virus or anthrax ⁶². World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa weekly bulletins, including Week 10 of 2025, contain no Algeria entries describing Polymerase Chain Reaction diagnostic activity for Ebola or anthrax ^{63, pp. 1, 9}.

1.3.2a Biosecurity training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

Algeria has publicly available evidence of biosecurity and biosafety training, but there is no law, decree, or regulation requiring a standardized national curriculum or periodic recertification for personnel handling especially dangerous pathogens. The Institut Pasteur of Algeria organized a five day “Course on biological risk management and the transport of infectious substances, 29 June to 3 July 2025” specifying objectives, methods, and certificates of attendance ⁶⁴. The interministerial order of 2 August 2023 on the internal organization of the National Institute of Veterinary Medicine, published in the government's Official Journal, establishes a “service of quality, biosafety and biosecurity” in the central veterinary laboratory and in each regional veterinary laboratory ^{65, pp. 20–21}. The order of 26 July 2023 lists institute activities including “quality biosafety and biosecurity audit” and “training supervision” ^{66, p. 18}. The decree published on 29 December 2024 assigns public health biologists the duty “to ensure biosafety” among other statutory functions .

1.3.3a Personnel checks for permission to access to especially dangerous pathogens

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s regulations or licensing conditions specify mandatory drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks for security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. The government's Official Journal issue No. 86 of 29 December 2024 includes an executive decree concerning the indemnity regime and professional duties for public health biologists, such as biosafety vigilance and training requirements, yet it contains no provisions on personnel drug testing, background vetting, or psychological assessment for access to dangerous biological materials ^{67, pp. 41–42}. The executive decree establishes the border health control service details missions, organization, and coordination with security, customs, civil protection, and veterinary and phytosanitary services, as well as the requirement that the service physician be sworn, but it does not prescribe drug testing, background checks, or psychological fitness screening for personnel with access to dangerous biological materials ^{68, pp. 14–15}. Institut Pasteur d’Algérie training materials outline authorization of personnel, medical follow up, and personnel security concepts for coronavirus disease testing laboratories, without establishing national legal screening mandates ^{69, pp. 1–2}.

1.3.4a National transport regulations for Category A and B infectious substances

Score: 100

Algeria has publicly available national regulation that governs the safe and secure air transport of infectious substances and expressly adopts the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions, which include the Category A and Category B framework. The National Civil Aviation Agency issued Technical Instruction No. 38-25 on 13 February 2025, which requires compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization Doc 9284 for the transport of dangerous goods, prescribes operator authorization, documentation, and acceptance checks, and ties packaging, labeling, and handling to those instructions ^{70, p. 10-13}. The same instruction explicitly covers infectious substances by listing Class 6.2 under the national annexed classification of dangerous goods, confirming scope for Category A and Category B infectious substances carried by air under the adopted International Civil Aviation Organization system ^{71, p. 1772}.

1.3.5a Laws/regulations on cross-border transfer and end-user screening

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has legislation or regulations that establish both cross border transfer controls and end user screening for especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or pathogens with pandemic potential. National Civil Aviation Agency Technical Instruction No. 38-25 requires compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization Doc 9284 for air transport of dangerous goods, and sets operator authorization, documentation, packaging, marking, and acceptance checks, yet it does not create an end user or end use screening regime for consignors or consignees of biological agents ^{73, pp. 10–12; 17}. Executive Decree No. 24-277, published by the prime minister's office, organizes the border health control service at points of entry and mandates coordination with security, customs, civil protection, and veterinary and phytosanitary services, but it does not establish licensing, vetting, purchaser verification, or consignee screening procedures for transfers of dangerous biological materials across borders ^{74, pp. 14–15}.

1.4.1a Biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has national biosafety legislation or regulations newly adopted or in force that establish binding biosafety requirements across laboratories and sectors ^{75, pp. 20–2176, p. 42}. An interministerial order published in the Official Journal No. 65 on October 11, 2023 sets only the internal organization of the National Institute of Veterinary Medicine and creates services for quality, biosafety, and biosecurity within that institute, which are institutional arrangements rather than nationwide biosafety regulations with enforceable standards or licensing provisions ^{77, pp. 20–21}. The Official Journal No. 86 on December 29, 2024 provides staff statutes for public health biologists and includes a duty to ensure biosafety among responsibilities ^{78, p. 42}.

1.4.1b Agency for enforcement of biosafety laws/regulations

Score: 100

Algeria has an established enforcement authority for biosafety through the Ministry of Health public health inspector corps, which is expressly empowered to inspect public and private health facilities, to draw up inspection reports, and to take samples and seize documents necessary to ascertain violations, with the corps tasked to oversee compliance across laboratories and other health structures ^{79, p. 4- 5}. At points of entry, the Border Sanitary Control Service implements legislation and the International Health Regulations, must immediately signal any event that may constitute a public health emergency to the national focal point and to the National Agency for Health Security, and requires the Ministry of Health services to inform the Agency of any such risk, which reinforces biosafety enforcement coverage at borders ^{80, p. 14}. The National Agency for Health Security evaluates risks related to biological and biotechnological products and coordinates sanitary and epidemiological vigilance and alerting nationwide ^{81, p. 5}. A 2022 presidential decree appointed the Agency’s Director of General Administration and an order in 2025 appointed the Agency’s Ethics and Deontology Committee under Article 23 of Decree 20-435 ^{82, p. 1683, p. 10}.

1.4.2a Biosafety training using a standardised, required approach

Score: 33.33

Public evidence shows Algeria provides biosafety and biosecurity training on an ad hoc basis rather than through a nationally standardized required curriculum or a mandated recertification schedule for personnel working with especially dangerous pathogens or biological materials with pandemic potential. The Institut Pasteur of Algeria delivered a Practical Guide based course for laboratory personnel from the southern region on 26 to 27 December 2022, covering risk assessment, laboratory safety levels, biological waste management, and transport of infectious substances, with guides and participation certificates issued to attendees ⁸⁴. In 2023 the institute hosted the International Federation of Biosafety Associations certification examinations in Algiers, demonstrating discrete certification activity without a national legal requirement for all relevant personnel ⁸⁵. In 2025 the institute ran a multi day course on biological risk management and the transport of infectious substances for health sector laboratories, further evidencing continuing event based training ⁸⁶. The Official Journal repositories for 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 contain no law or decree establishing a nationwide compulsory biosafety training curriculum or specifying periodic recertification within a defined interval ^87888990.

1.5.1a Evidence of national assessment of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual use research, based on the Secretariat General of the Government Official Journal repositories for each year in scope and on publicly posted outputs of the National Agency for Health Security ^{9192939495, p. 1}. The yearly Official Journal repositories list laws, decrees, and ministerial instruments, none of which present a nationwide survey, inventory, or mapping of research activities in these categories or cite such an assessment ^96979899. The National Agency for Health Security weekly bulletin is a routine monitoring report and does not contain a national assessment of ongoing research on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or dual use work for the period in scope ^{100, p. 1}.

1.5.1b National law/regulation on oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria issued or implemented a law or regulation requiring national oversight of research involving especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual use research. Presidential Decree No. 20 435 published on January 2, 2021 defines the National Agency for Health Security and lists functions including periodic risk assessment for biological and biotechnological products, clinical studies, and ensuring compliance with good practices; the text does not create a national dual use research oversight system or a requirement specific to research on especially dangerous pathogens ^{101, pp. 5–6}. The Official Journal on January 14, 2024 records the appointment of a Director for Communicable and Noncommunicable Diseases at the National Agency for Health Security, and the Official Journal on April 22, 2025 records the appointment of a Director of General Administration at the same agency; neither notice introduces research oversight requirements ^{102, p. 16103, p. 9}. A public training sheet from the Institut Pasteur d’Algérie cites veterinary Law No. 08 88 and addresses animal experimentation and biosafety education, not national dual use research regulation ^{104, p. 1}.

1.5.1c Existence of agency responsible for oversight of dual-use research

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria designated an agency responsible for oversight of research involving especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual use research ^{105, pp. 4–6} . The presidential decree of 30 December 2020, published on 2 January 2021 in the Official Journal, defines the National Agency for Health Security and lists functions that include periodic risk assessment for biological and biotechnological products and clinical studies, coordination of sanitary and epidemiological surveillance and early alerts, and national management of health emergencies, it does not assign research oversight for dual use work or for especially dangerous pathogens ^{106, pp. 4–6}. The Official Journal on 14 January 2024 records the appointment of a Director for Communicable and Noncommunicable Diseases at the National Agency for Health Security, this notice shows continued institutional activity but does not introduce research oversight ^{107, p. 17}. The Official Journal on 22 April 2025 records the appointment of a Director of General Administration at the same agency, but this notice also does not assign research oversight ^{108, p. 10}

1.5.2a Requirement to screen synthesised DNA against list prior to sale

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria requires providers to screen synthesized deoxyribonucleic acid orders against lists of known pathogens or toxins before sale. The presidential decree published on January 2, 2021 in the Official Journal defines the National Agency for Health Security to conduct periodic risk evaluation for biological and biotechnological products and clinical studies, to coordinate sanitary and epidemiological surveillance with early alerts, and to manage national health emergencies, but it does not prescribe any obligation for commercial or academic providers to screen synthesized deoxyribonucleic acid orders prior to fulfillment ^{109, pp. 4–6}. The Official Journal issue of January 14, 2024 records an appointment of the Director of Communicable and Noncommunicable Diseases at the National Agency for Health Security, but these individual decisions introduce no screening requirement for synthesized deoxyribonucleic acid orders and contain no supplier compliance mechanism ^{110, p. 17}

1.6.1a Immunization rate for humans (measles/MCV2)

Score: 50

1.6.1b Availability of vaccination figures for livestock (FMD) through OIE database

Score: 100

There is that official foot-and-mouth disease vaccination figures for livestock are publicly available for Algeria. In the World Organisation for Animal Health World Animal Health Information System immediate notification record for Algeria’s December 2023 foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in Sétif province, the publicly accessible outbreak tables include a standardized quantitative field labeled “Vaccinated,” alongside “Susceptible,” “Cases,” and “Deaths,” and display the official vaccination figure reported by Algeria for cattle at the event and epidemiological unit levels ¹¹¹. These vaccination figures are visible directly within the World Animal Health Information System public interface and form part of the Organisation’s official surveillance and control reporting outputs for foot-and-mouth disease ¹¹². A United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs technical brief on foot-and-mouth disease in the Middle East and North Africa cites Algeria’s December 2023 outbreaks as notified to the World Organisation for Animal Health, confirming that Algeria’s official outbreak data are disseminated through the Organisation’s public reporting systems used for regional disease monitoring ^{113, pp. 1–2}.

1.6.1c Equitablenature of national immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Algeria has a publicly available national immunization strategy that includes equitable distribution and equity-focused measures. Ministry of Health Instruction No. 19 of 3 October 2023 implements the National Vaccination Calendar, establishes a national strategy with coverage targets of at least 95 percent nationally and in each province, and assigns responsibilities to health authorities ^{114, pp. 1–3}. Equitable distribution is mandated through coordination of vaccine availability, cold chain logistics, safe injection practices, adverse event monitoring with national pharmacovigilance reporting, public information via local media, and development of micro plans at the level of primary health establishments ^{115, p. 6}. In 2023 the Ministry conducted a national Expanded Program on Immunization catch-up campaign targeting children under five across all 58 provinces, using daily data flows and standardized tally forms to track zero dose children, directly addressing coverage gaps and geographic inequities ^{116, pp. 2–4, 8}. A 2022 UNICEF Algeria report notes that equity strategies include risk communication and community engagement, informed by knowledge, attitudes, and practices surveys, as well as the expansion of the electronic vaccination record DEVAC, designed to reduce dropouts and improve follow-up of the new vaccination calendar ^{117, pp. 15–16}.

1.6.1d Vaccine hesitancy and build public trust coverage in vaccines in national immunization strategy/plans

Score: 100

Algeria’s national immunization strategy includes measures to address vaccine hesitancy and build public trust in vaccines. The Ministry of Health’s “Instruction No. 13 of 24 May 2023 on implementing the national catch up vaccination campaign for the Expanded Programme on Immunization from 30 May to 8 June 2023” directs vaccination teams to monitor adverse events following immunization, share daily data, communicate clear session information, and answer parents’ questions with explanations of potential side effects and recommended actions, which are explicit trust building and hesitancy mitigation measures within immunization operations ^{118, p. 4}. In 2022, the United Nations Children’s Fund reports Ministry of Health implementation support for the national coronavirus disease 2019 vaccine deployment plan through adapted risk communication and community engagement messaging, and completion of a knowledge, attitudes, and practices survey to identify reasons for vaccination hesitancy ^{119, p. 8}. In 2023, the United Nations Children’s Fund reports training 430 imams and female religious counselors to respond to vaccine hesitancy and rumors linked to immunization campaigns ^{120, p. 11}. In 2024, the United Nations Children’s Fund reports Ministry of Health collaboration with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, civil society organizations, and youth networks, including training 240 imams and female religious counselors to advocate for immunization and strengthen vaccine confidence ^{121, p. 7}.

1.6.1e National advisory group for immunization strategy/plan

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national advisory group that provides technical guidance and advice to the government on immunization strategy and planning. The World Health Organization’s country specific National Immunization Advisory Mechanism page for Algeria confirms that the country reports the existence of a National Immunization Technical Advisory Group, defined as a formal expert body that provides independent, evidence based recommendations to national authorities on immunization policies, vaccine introduction, and programmatic decisions ¹²². The National Immunization Advisory Mechanism dataset is compiled through standardized annual reporting by governments to the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund using the Joint Reporting Form on Immunization, ensuring that the information reflects an officially recognized national structure rather than an informal or ad hoc committee ¹²³.

1.6.1f Presence of an immunization programme for influenza

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national immunization programme for seasonal influenza, with recurring nationwide vaccination campaigns implemented through the public health system. In October 2022, the Ministry of Health launched the 2022–2023 seasonal influenza vaccination campaign nationwide, supported by the reception of 2.5 million vaccine doses and delivery through public hospitals, primary health care centers, and authorized pharmacies, confirming organized national supply planning and service delivery ¹²⁴¹²⁵. The Ministry of Health subsequently announced the launch of the 2023–2024 seasonal influenza vaccination campaign, reporting the acquisition of 2 million doses and coordinated distribution across provinces, demonstrating continuity of annual influenza immunization activities ¹²⁶. In October 2024, the Ministry of Health again confirmed the start of the 2024–2025 seasonal influenza vaccination campaign, specifying a national launch date in mid October and implementation through the public health system, evidencing sustained annual programming within the assessment timeframe ¹²⁷. Official statements further indicated that the influenza vaccination campaign continues throughout the autumn and winter season and that vaccination is provided free of charge for priority populations, confirming ongoing availability and access to seasonal influenza vaccines as part of routine preventive health measures ¹²⁸.

1.7.1a Strategy/plan for resilience of health system

Score: 50

There is evidence that Algeria has a nationally adopted climate change strategy that includes health sector considerations, but there is insufficient evidence that it constitutes a dedicated strategy or plan to develop a climate-resilient health system that explicitly governs infectious disease preparedness and response. Algeria’s National Climate Plan is identified in national climate reporting as the central government framework guiding climate change mitigation and adaptation across sectors, including public health, with stated objectives to protect populations against climate-sensitive diseases, epidemics, and heat waves, and to integrate climate considerations into sectoral policies ^{129, pp. 94–99}. Health-related adaptation actions described under this framework include strengthening surveillance of waterborne pathogens through microbiological monitoring of aquatic environments and protecting health services during extreme heat events, indicating recognition of climate-driven infectious disease risks ^{130, pp. 97, 175}. These measures are reiterated in Algeria’s international climate transparency reporting, which summarizes national adaptation priorities and institutional responsibilities but functions as a reporting instrument rather than a binding national health system strategy ^{131, pp. 94–99}. While Law No. 24-04 of 26 February 2024 establishes disaster risk prevention and response mechanisms, including strategic reserves of emergency medicines and disinfection products to address epidemics during disasters, it does not establish or operationalize a climate-resilient health system strategy or action plan led by the Ministry of Health ^{132, p. 14}.

2.1.1a Capacity of national lab system to conduct 5 or more WHO core tests

Score: 100

Algeria’s national laboratory system has publicly documented capacity to conduct at least 5 of the 10 World Health Organization core diagnostic tests, and the tests are named. The World Health Organization lists the Institut Pasteur of Algeria Viral Respiratory Unit as the National Influenza Centre for Algeria, confirming national influenza diagnostic capacity ^{133, p. 1}. The Institut Pasteur of Algeria clinical intake form for respiratory viruses specifies polymerase chain reaction testing for influenza viruses, demonstrating a defined influenza diagnostic method ^{134, p. 1}. Ministry of Health Instruction No. 07 of 21 March 2024 requires bacteriological confirmation using culture with antibiotic susceptibility testing and rapid molecular testing including Xpert MTB Rif, establishing tuberculosis diagnostic methods during the timeframe ^{135, pp. 2–3}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean reports that the Institut Pasteur of Algeria functions as a reference laboratory supporting virological analysis of acute flaccid paralysis stool samples, demonstrating poliovirus diagnostic testing capacity ^{136, p. 7}. The Algerian Antimicrobial Resistance Network 2022 surveillance report presents laboratory confirmed cerebrospinal fluid isolates and serogroup distributions for Neisseria meningitidis, evidencing meningococcal meningitis diagnostics, and national biological diagnostic instructions for human immunodeficiency virus specify serological screening using immunoenzymatic or rapid tests with confirmatory testing by Western blot, demonstrating defined human immunodeficiency virus diagnostic methods ^{137, pp. 50–51138, pp. 1–2}.

2.1.1b Plan to conduct testing during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has issued a national plan, strategy, or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency that defines testing goals, includes mechanisms to scale capacity, and addresses testing for novel pathogens. The World Health Organization Algeria Country Office Biennial Report 2020–2021 documents support for variant surveillance through screening polymerase chain reaction and genomic sequencing, training of authorized laboratories to perform reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction for Coronavirus Disease 2019, and procedures at points of entry, which describe capacity building and operational measures rather than a national testing strategy with defined goals and surge triggers ^{139, pp. 41 to 42}. In 2025, the Institut Pasteur of Algeria notice titled Clarifications on the specifications, testing and diagnosis of COVID-19 states that, following presidential authorization, all biology laboratories may perform reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing for Coronavirus Disease 2019, indicating expansion of testing authorization without a published national emergency testing plan that sets goals or scale up criteria ¹⁴⁰. In 2024, state media reporting attributed to the national press agency describes work under the National Agency for Health Security and a permanent committee to prepare the National Health Security Strategy 2025-2030 and a multisector action plan, without identifying any publicly accessible national testing plan for public health emergencies ¹⁴¹.

2.1.2a Existence of an accredited national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a national laboratory serving as a reference facility that is accredited to International Organization for Standardization 15189 for medical laboratories or to the United States Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments. The Algerian Accreditation Body directory section for medical biology does not list any accredited organization or published accreditation certificate identifying a national reference laboratory accredited to International Organization for Standardization 15189 ¹⁴². International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation reports that the Algerian Accreditation Body, ALGERAC, is a signatory to the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation Mutual Recognition Arrangement for testing and calibration under International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission 17025 and for inspection under International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission 17020, without indicating any medical testing scope under International Organization for Standardization 15189 for Algeria ¹⁴³. ALGERAC’s publication announcing the new International Organization for Standardization 15189 standard for medical biology laboratories describes the applicable accreditation framework and transition requirements but does not present any issued certificate or defined accreditation scope for a national reference facility ¹⁴⁴. ALGERAC’s July 03, 2024 communiqué on the International Organization for Standardization 15189 transition likewise provides procedural guidance without identifying any nationally accredited reference laboratory ¹⁴⁵. The Institut Pasteur d’Algérie reports accreditation of its Virology Department to International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission 17025 since 2016, which does not satisfy the indicator’s International Organization for Standardization 15189 or United States Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments accreditation criteria ¹⁴⁶.

2.1.2b External quality assurance of a national lab serving as a reference facility

Score: 100

Algeria has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility and is subject to external quality assurance review. In 2025, the Institut Pasteur d’Algérie identifies its Virology Department as the World Health Organization national reference laboratory for poliomyelitis surveillance ¹⁴⁷. The World Health Organization Disease Outbreak News report dated 13 September 2022 documents that a circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 case in Algeria is notified through the Global Polio Laboratory Network, with stool specimens tested by the Pasteur Institute of Algeria and confirmed by the Pasteur Institute of Paris ¹⁴⁸. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative states that laboratories participating in the Global Polio Laboratory Network are monitored through an annual accreditation program that includes onsite reviews of laboratory practices, performance assessment, and proficiency testing ¹⁴⁹. Peer reviewed evidence further describes external quality assessment mechanisms used by World Health Organization coordinated laboratory networks, including standardized proficiency testing and interlaboratory comparison exercises to verify diagnostic accuracy and maintain accreditation status ^{150, pp. 1–13}.

2.2.1a Nationwide specimen transport system

Score: 100

Algeria has a nationwide specimen transport system for human health laboratories in place for countrywide coverage across provinces. The World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation conducted in March 2022 states that a sample transfer system exists for human and animal health, with human health transport organized by laboratories and the Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine Service, carried out by local health authorities such as hospitals and Health and Population Directorates using ambulances and sanitary vehicles, with air transport through commercial flights for remote areas, and shipment schedules directed by the Ministry of Health for notifiable diseases and accelerated in emergencies ^{151, pp. 15–16}. The same evaluation assigned Algeria a score of 4 for the specimen transport indicator, noting authorities’ responsibility for transfer, international transport managed by national reference laboratories with International Air Transport Association certification, and regular training courses on infectious substance transport ^{152, p. 31}. It further recommended institutionalizing staff training to sustain capacity ^{153, p. 44}. The WHO Algeria Biennial Report 2022–2023 confirms that national laboratory systems and emergency response capacities were supported in line with Joint External Evaluation recommendations, including organization of emergency preparedness and laboratory functions ^{154, pp. 28–33}. In addition, the Institut Pasteur d’Algérie’s influenza and respiratory viruses clinical information form is explicitly attached to a specimen management procedure and records hospital or laboratory sender details and patient address including provincial, showing standardized documentation for interfacility transfer ^{155, p. 1}.

2.2.2a Plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to scale-up testing during an outbreak

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a formal national plan that establishes a rapid emergency procedure to authorize or license additional laboratories to supplement the national public health laboratory system during an outbreak. The World Health Organization's Joint External Evaluation for Algeria identifies a need to update the legislative framework for laboratory homologation, and lists a template for validation of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 laboratories among reference documents ^{156, p. 33, 74}. Health Law No. 18-11, published in the Official Journal, requires ministerial authorization to create and operate medical analysis laboratories, yet it does not provide an expedited or emergency pathway for rapid outbreak time licensing ^{157, p. 25}. The Institut Pasteur d’Algérie clinical information form cites an internal specimen management procedure for respiratory viruses, which governs sample workflow rather than authorization or licensing of laboratories ^{158, p. 1}.

2.3.1a Evidence of ongoing event-based and indicator-based surveillance and analysis

Score: 50

Algeria conducts ongoing event based and indicator based surveillance for notifiable and novel infectious diseases, but there is no evidence that surveillance data are analyzed on a daily basis across the full set of diseases under surveillance. The World Health Organization Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulations Core Capacities in the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, mission conducted 27–31 March 2022 and published in 2023, documents that indicator based surveillance is functioning with immediate and weekly reporting from provincial health directorates, hospitals, and private and veterinary sectors ^{159, p.34}. The same report confirms event based surveillance through a rumor management system, rapid alert detection, temporary surveillance systems for severe acute respiratory syndrome and Middle East respiratory syndrome, and sentinel networks for influenza and antimicrobial resistance ^{160, p.34}. For analysis, the Joint External Evaluation specifies that Algeria’s National Institute of Public Health produced daily then weekly epidemiological bulletins and required daily hospital reporting during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, which demonstrates daily analysis for coronavirus disease 2019 only ^{161, p.4}.

2.3.1b Evidence of a mechanism (such as IHR focal point) for reporting notifiable diseases to the WHO within the set timeline

Score: 100

Publicly available evidence demonstrates that Algeria maintains a national International Health Regulations National Focal Point mechanism that is mandated to report notifiable events to the World Health Organization within the required timeline. A Ministry of Health order dated 6 August 2007 establishes a National Focal Point related to the International Health Regulations within the ministry, assigns it functions including coordinating event analysis, and authorizes it to declare or notify urgent or relevant information to the World Health Organization International Health Regulations contact point ^{162, p. 19}. Algeria’s publication of the International Health Regulations (2005) in the Official Journal states that each State Party designates an International Health Regulations National Focal Point able to communicate at all times with World Health Organization contact points, and requires notification through the National Focal Point within 24 hours of assessment ^{163, pp. 5–6}. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security portal also records Algeria’s State Party Annual Report submissions as submitted for 2022, 2023, and 2024, consistent with an operational reporting interface ^164165166.

2.3.2a Electronic national and sub-national reporting surveillance system

Score: 100

Algeria operates a government electronic reporting surveillance system at national and subnational levels through the National Agency for the Digitization of Health under the Ministry of Health, which is tasked to set up and maintain a health sector digital platform enabling secure exchange of health data and interoperability across users and institutions ^{167, p. 13}. The legal text, published in the Official Journal, places the agency under ministerial tutelage and authorizes the creation of annexes with defined territorial competence, establishing operational presence below the national level ^{168, p. 13}. The decree details responsibilities linked to implementing the digital hospital through a platform centered on the patient and coordinating information system functions across the sector, demonstrating government operation of an electronic reporting capability with subnational reach ^{169, p. 13}.

2.3.2b Collection of ongoing/real-time lab data by electronic surveillance system

Score: 100

Algeria operates a real time electronic reporting surveillance system and the platform integrates the hospital technical platform including the medical analysis laboratory, which establishes ongoing electronic laboratory data flows ^{170, p. 15}. According to the Official Journal, the National Observatory of Health is mandated to analyze health indicators using surveillance and alert networks and to receive routine transmissions from a focal point in every wilaya directorate of health and population ^{171, pp. 7–9}. Government weekly monitoring bulletins show continued publication of provincial-level epidemiological outputs for 2023 and include narrative age based analyses such as young adults and children under ten years being affected, which evidences disaggregation in practice ^{172, pp. 2–4}. A 2025 bulletin further reports notifiable disease patterns with explicit mentions of age groups and regional incidence for 2024, confirming sustained production of disaggregated surveillance outputs using government data sources ^{173, pp. 1–2}.

2.3.3a National wastewater surveillance programme or initiative

Score: 50

There is evidence of some wastewater and environmental surveillance (WES) activity within the country. The WHO and GPEI Q4 2025 Polio ES Bulletin lists the country as having 10 ES sites as of Q4 in 2025, although it is unclear whether these are at the national level and are ongoing.¹⁷⁴

Moreover, the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health (UNU-INWEH) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and its Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean (WHO EMRO), hosted a regional workshop in Cairo, Egypt, from 19–21 October 2025, focused on strengthening wastewater surveillance systems across North Africa. This involved government leaders and key stakeholders from Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The workshop was aimed at exploring how wastewater surveillance can support public health, environmental protection, and ecosystem sustainability.¹⁷⁵

There is evidence that "robust implementation of environmental surveillance has enhanced poliovirus detection" in Algeria but there is insufficient evidence on whether this involved programmes that are ongoing/current, or whether this is conducted in collaboration with the Algerian government or by private companies.¹⁷⁶

2.4.1a Common usage of electronic health records

Score: 50

Electronic health records are used in Algeria, but there is no publicly available evidence that they are commonly used nationwide. Executive Decree No. 22-251 of 30 June 2022 establishes the National Agency for the Digitization of Health Care and assigns it responsibility for implementing a national health information system, including a patient centered digital hospital platform with real time visibility of the care pathway and a shared electronic medical record accessible to health professionals through a patient identifier ^{177, pp. 14-15}. In 2024, the national public broadcaster reported that the Minister of Health presented the electronic patient record to directors of hospital establishments, describing a digital record containing personal and medical data intended for use across public hospital services ¹⁷⁸.

2.4.1b Public health system access to individual electronic health records

Score: 100

Algeria’s national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals. This was established by Executive Decree No. 22-251 of 11 July 2022, published in the Official Journal, creating the National Agency for the Digitization of Health Care under the Ministry of Health ^{179, p. 14}. Article 6 of Executive Decree No. 22-251, published in the Official Journal, explicitly mandates the National Agency for the Digitization of Health Care to implement a patient-centered digital hospital platform providing real-time visibility of the care pathway and integrating modules for the medical analysis laboratory, medical imaging, and hospital pharmacy ^{180, p. 14}. In addition, Executive Decree No. 22-401 of 24 November 2022, in the Official Journal, establishing the National Observatory of Health mandates the Observatory to work on the basis of scientific, epidemiological, demographic, economic, and social data, and to receive routine data transmissions from health directorates at the provincial level, confirming that national public health authorities obtain data derived from clinical records across the country ^{181, p. 8}.

2.4.1c Existence of data standards for health record data comparability

Score: 100

Algeria has formal International Organization for Standardization based national data standards in force that ensure comparability of laboratory and administrative datasets. The Algerian Accreditation Body issued a national transition policy in December 2022 that sets dated milestones for medical laboratories, including readiness for assessments on the 2022 edition from January 1, 2024, submission of transition applications and plans by January 1, 2025, the last possible transition assessment on March 31, 2025, and completion of corrective actions by June 30, 2025 ^{182, p. 1}. ALGERAC’s transition plan dated February 18, 2024 operationalizes implementation of ISO 15189, 2022 edition, by mapping clause requirements to laboratory actions and timelines, reinforcing comparable laboratory data outputs ¹⁸³. For administrative address data, the Ministry of Interior's National Addressing Reference states that the national address model follows Algerian Standard NA ISO 19160 part 1 and that the national addressing platform database schema conforms to NA ISO 19160 part 1, which harmonizes address attributes for interagency exchange and public services ^{184, p. 14}.

2.4.2a Data sharing mechanisms

Score: 100

Algeria has an established interministerial mechanism that enables surveillance data sharing among the veterinary authority, the Ministry of Health, and the Directorate General of Forests, through the National Committee for the Prevention and Control of Zoonoses. The government's Official Journal states this mechanism is permanent, coordinates sector plans, examines sector activity reports, and issues an annual zoonoses report, thereby providing an official channel for intersectoral information exchange ^{185, pp. 13–14}. The Official Journal also provides proof of active operation across all requested years appears in successive ministerial orders that modify the designated members of the national committee, namely the orders of 10 February 2022, 27 June 2023, 5 September 2024, and 20 May 2025, which confirms the continued functioning of the legally constituted platform for data sharing ^{186, p. 22187, p. 22188, p. 22189, p. 19}.

2.4.3a Availability of de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks

Score: 100

Algeria makes de identified infectious disease surveillance data publicly available on a government website. The National Health Security Agency publishes weekly monitoring bulletins that present aggregated surveillance outputs without personal identifiers, including national incidence distributions by province for waterborne diseases and hepatitis A for 2023, with figures attributed to the National Institute of Public Health ^{190, pp. 3–4}. A 2024 National Health Security Agency weekly bulletin reports consolidated results from the national sentinel system for influenza like illness and coronavirus for the 2023 to 2024 season, coordinated by the National Institute of Public Health and the Institut Pasteur of Algeria, again showing counts and rates only in aggregate form ^{191, p. 3}. Another 2025 National Health Security Agency bulletin summarizes national antimicrobial resistance surveillance findings for 2022 from a network of twenty five laboratories, reporting organism specific resistance patterns in aggregated tables only, with no personal identifiers ^{192, p. 6}.

2.4.4a Confidentiality legislation/regulations for identifiable health information

Score: 100

Algeria has legislation and implementing decrees in force that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information. Law No. 18-11 of July 2, 2018 on Health, published in the Official Journal, guarantees respect for private life and the secrecy of medical information, and prescribes criminal penalties for breaches of medical secrecy ^{193, pp. 6, 37}. Law No. 18-07 of June 10, 2018 on the Protection of Individuals in the Processing of Personal Data defines personal data, creates the National Authority, regulates interconnection and health research processing, and establishes sanctions ^{194, pp. 11, 15–16, 21}. Published in the Official Journal, Presidential Decree No. 22-187 of May 18, 2022 appointed the president and members of the National Authority, Presidential Decree No. 23-73 of February 14, 2023 set the missions and operating arrangements of its executive secretariat, and Law No. 25-11 of July 24, 2025 modified and complemented Law No. 18-07, while a 2025 decree cites Law No. 18-11 as in force ^{195, pp. 5–6196, pp. 12–13197, pp. 14–16198, pp. 1–2}.

2.4.4b Inclusion of cyber protections in health data confidentiality law/regulation

Score: 100

Algeria has legislation and regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information and include protections addressing cyber risks. The “Law No. 18-11 on Health” of July 2, 2018 guarantees respect for private life and the secrecy of medical information, and it establishes penalties for breaches, confirming legal confidentiality protections for health data generated by care and surveillance activities ^{199, pp. 6, 37}. The “Law No. 18-07 on the Protection of Individuals in the Processing of Personal Data” of June 10, 2018 requires controllers to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to prevent unauthorized access or disclosure, and it addresses risks arising from data transmissions over networks while binding personnel and processors to confidentiality, thereby covering cyber-risk vectors for personal data including health data ^{200, pp. 18–19}. The “Law No. 25-11” of July 24, 2025 amending Law 18-07 introduces a breach-notification regime and security obligations, requiring controllers and processors to implement measures to protect against destruction, loss, damage, disclosure, or unauthorized access, particularly when processing requires transmission over a network, and to notify the National Authority of any personal-data breach within five days, document remedial actions, and notify affected persons when high risk exists, which directly addresses protections from cyber attacks such as ransomware ^{201, pp. 18–19}.

2.4.5a Cooperative commitments or agreements within regions

Score: 100

Algeria has made public commitments to share surveillance data for more than one disease during public health emergencies. For influenza, the Institut Pasteur d’Algérie Viral Respiratory Unit in Algiers is listed by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a National Influenza Center within the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), which entails routine submission of national influenza surveillance information to WHO platforms that are used internationally ^{202, p. 1}. For poliomyelitis, the International Health Regulations (IHR) Emergency Committee statement dated 8 April 2024 lists Algeria among States infected with circulating vaccine derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) and sets Temporary Recommendations that require sharing of coverage data, regional cooperation and cross border coordination to enhance surveillance, and regular reporting to the Director General during the public health emergency ²⁰³. Algeria notified WHO of cVDPV2 detection in 2022 through acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance and the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN), which evidences international reporting during an emergency event ²⁰⁴. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) archived Algeria country page confirms cVDPV2 presence and reported cases in 2022, and disseminates country surveillance updates to the international community ²⁰⁵.

2.5.1a National support to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency

Score: 50

Algeria’s national government provides subnational support to conduct contact tracing, but evidence ties this support to contact identification activities at points of entry during exceptional health situations rather than a standalone nationwide preparedness system for contact tracing. Executive Decree No. 24-277 of 13 August 2024 establishes a border health control service within each primary public health establishment hosting a point of entry, with the Minister of Health setting attached points of entry for each province, and it requires coordination with epidemiology and preventive medicine services to initiate epidemiologic investigations and search for contacts of suspect or sick travelers ^{206, pp. 14-15}. The decree also requires specialized training and multidisciplinary teams trained in the International Health Regulations, and obliges point of entry managers to provide premises, transport, and communications to enable these missions ^{207, pp. 15-16}.

2.5.1b Provision of wraparound services to enable self-isolation/quarantine as recommended

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria provides wraparound services enabling infected people and their contacts to self isolate or quarantine through quarantine specific economic support, job security guarantees, or dedicated medical attention beyond general sickness care. Law No. 83-11 of 2 July 1983 on Social Insurance establishes daily cash sickness allowances linked to medically certified work stoppage as a general social insurance benefit and does not create quarantine or contact specific indemnities for infectious disease cases or exposed contacts ^{208, p. 1199}. Ordinance No. 96-17 of 6 July 1996 amending and supplementing Law No. 83-11 defines eligibility conditions, benefit calculation, and administrative procedures for sickness insurance without introducing isolation or contact based entitlements or emergency specific supplements ^{209, pp. 5, 7}. Law No. 90-11 of 21 April 1990 on Labor Relations preserves the employment relationship during authorized leave but does not establish quarantine leave, paycheck protection, or job security guarantees targeted to mandatory isolation or quarantine of cases or contacts during infectious disease events ^{210, pp. 5 to 6}. During the COVID-19 period, Executive Decree No. 22-35 of 4 January 2022 and Executive Decree No. 22-40 of 15 January 2022 reconduct and prorogue prevention and control measures but do not create paid quarantine leave, quarantine specific income replacement, or legally binding job protection mechanisms for affected individuals or their contacts ^{211, p. 18212, p. 12}.

2.5.2a Strategy for tracing and quarantining international travelers

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a standing, interagency framework that prepares for future public health emergencies at points of entry and sets out routine cooperation between public health and border control authorities. Executive Decree No. 24-277 of August 2024, published by the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria in the Official Journal, establishes the Border Health Control Service as a medical service responsible for implementing sanitary legislation, coordinating with security services, customs, civil protection, and veterinary and phytosanitary services at points of entry, and conducting epidemiological investigation and the search for contacts of suspected cases, which operationalizes joint surveillance and tracing with border actors outside any single event ^{213, p. 14}. The same decree authorizes isolation and referral of suspected or ill travelers, identification of travelers, transport, baggage, containers, goods, and postal parcels that require quarantine, and organization of quarantine in designated places ^{214, p. 15}. Crucially, it mandates proposing and participating in simulation exercises in exceptional sanitary situations and crises, explicitly demonstrating preparedness for future public health emergencies rather than ad hoc response only ^{215, p. 15}.

2.6.1a Access to field epidemiology training program in country and/or abroad

Score: 100

Algeria has an applied epidemiology training program available in country. This is through the Mediterranean and Black Sea Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training, which lists Algeria as a partner country and requires each partner to establish a national training center and focal point ^{216, p. 1}. The program offers a full time two year field epidemiology fellowship during which selected fellows are placed at a national training site in their home country while attending modules, and also provides ad hoc participation in modules and trainings of trainers for supervisors and nominated participants ^{217, p. 2}. Program cohorts four to six are documented as running from 2021 to 2023, 2022 to 2024, and 2023 to 2025, showing sustained activity ^{218, p. 2}.

2.6.1b Existence of field epidemiology training for animal health professionals

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a field epidemiology training program explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or a dedicated veterinary field epidemiology training program. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control lists Algeria as a partner in the Mediterranean and Black Sea Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training and describes public health fellowships, but it does not specify the eligibility or participation of veterinarians ²¹⁹. A 2024 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control news item documents a One Health module for fellows, noting cross-sector approaches, but it does not confirm the enrollment of animal health professionals or the existence of a veterinary track ²²⁰. Algeria’s National Higher Veterinary School describes academic degree programs and short courses in veterinary medicine, but these are not structured in-service field epidemiology training programs for veterinarians ²²¹.

2.6.2a Evidence of at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has at least one trained field epidemiologist per two hundred thousand people. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control MediPIET country page lists Algeria with supervisors equal to zero, graduated fellows equal to zero, and current fellows equal to zero ²²². According to the World Bank, Algeria’s 2024 population was 46,814,308, which would require at least 235 trained field epidemiologists to satisfy the threshold, a level not evidenced by any source ²²³. The Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network directory filtered to Algeria does not publish Algeria specific graduate counts or workforce totals that could establish attainment of the benchmark ²²⁴.

3.1.1a National emergency response plan for diseases with pandemic potential

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. The Ministry of Health and World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa “National Plan for Preparedness, Alert, and Response in the Event of Health Threats with Epidemic Potential and Public Health Emergencies of International Concern,” which is dated 2017, functions as a preparedness and capacity framework under the International Health Regulations rather than a current national multi disease response plan ^{225, pp. 7, 22–35}. Executive Decree No. 22-115 of March 17, 2022 sets sanitary conditions for travelers at points of entry during an active emergency period, which is a targeted points of entry measure and not an overarching national response plan that covers multiple communicable diseases across sectors ^{226, pp. 10–12}.

3.1.1b National public health emergency response plan published in past 3 years

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria updated its overarching national public health emergency preparedness and response plan. The Ministry of Health's National Plan for Preparedness, Alert, and Response in the Event of Health Threats with Epidemic Potential and Public Health Emergencies of International Concern, shows an implementation timetable for 2014 to 2016 in the core capacity tables and documents World Health Organization supported missions in September and October 2014, which establishes the plan’s 2014 vintage and the absence within this document of any later revision notice or update annex ^{227, pp. 12–13, 22–31, 35}. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security country portal for Algeria does not provide a newer national plan or an update entry for this instrument ²²⁸.

3.1.1c One health principles by covering multiple threat types

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has an overarching national public health emergency response plan that follows One Health principles by jointly covering antimicrobial resistance, zoonotic spillover, and biological accidents or deliberate acts. The 2024 Executive Decree No. 24-277, as published in the Official Journal, establishes and organizes the border health control service at points of entry and tasks it with preventing infectious diseases and addressing nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical threats, which is a points-of-entry instrument rather than a whole-of-government emergency plan ^{229, p. 14}. The World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Regional Committee 2022 paper frames One Health as a multisectoral approach focused on zoonoses, antimicrobial resistance, and food safety, but it is regional guidance and does not constitute an Algerian national plan ^{230, pp. 1–2}. The United Nations in Algeria Annual Report 2022 notes support to strengthen national capacities for nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical risk reduction under governance, which indicates capacity building, not the adoption or publication of an Algerian overarching One Health emergency response plan ^{231, pp. 22–23}.

3.1.1d Vulnerable populations in national public health emergency response plan

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has an overarching national public health emergency response plan that includes consideration of the impact of health equity or formal mechanisms for identifying and considering the needs of vulnerable populations for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. The publicly available “National Plan for Preparedness, Alert, and Response in the Event of Health Threats with Epidemic Potential and Public Health Emergencies of International Concern,” dated 2017, is structured as an International Health Regulations, 2005 core-capacity implementation and strengthening framework, organized around legislation, coordination, surveillance, response, preparedness, risk communication, human resources, laboratory services, and points of entry, and it does not establish equity impact assessment, equity-based prioritization, or defined national mechanisms for identifying vulnerable population groups within emergency response planning or operations ^{232, pp. 22–31}. More recent legally binding instruments identified in the Official Journal, including Executive Decree No. 22-115 of 17 March 2022, regulate sanitary conditions applicable to travelers at points of entry during a specific emergency context and do not constitute an overarching multi-disease emergency response plan, nor do they contain provisions addressing health equity impacts or mechanisms for identifying and prioritizing vulnerable populations within national public health emergency response structures ^{233, p. 10}.

3.1.2a Mechanism to engage private sector in outbreak preparedness/response

Score: 100

Algeria has specific government mechanisms to engage private health providers for outbreak emergency preparedness and response. Executive Decree No. 24-199 of 11 June 2024, published in the Official Journal, fixes the modalities for organizing paramedical training activities provided by private health structures and establishments, lists private hospitals, private care and diagnostic establishments, group practices, community pharmacies, and medical analysis laboratories, and attaches a standard convention with public paramedical institutes, which operationalizes sustained engagement of private providers for surge preparedness ^{234, pp. 12–13}. Executive Decree No. 21-136 of 7 April 2021, published in the Official Journal, requires private health establishments to ensure permanent emergency services, mandates conventions with approved health waste treatment operators, sanitary transport providers, and the blood center, and authorizes conventions in medical and surgical specialties subject to health authority oversight, integrating private capacity into preparedness and response functions ^{235, pp. 5–8}.

3.1.3a Policy/plan/guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)

Score: 100

Algeria has national instruments in force that establish non pharmaceutical interventions for multiple hazards and diseases, including quarantine, isolation and other public health measures at points of entry. Executive Decree No. 24-277 of August 13, 2024, published in the Official Journal, fixes the missions, organization and functioning of the Service of Health Control at Borders, defining the service’s mandate to prevent national and international propagation of infectious diseases and to address nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical threats, and detailing measures such as quarantine of suspect travelers, verification of vaccinations and the authority to refuse entry when risks to public health are identified ^{236, pp. 13–15}. Executive Decree No. 22-115 of March 17, 2022, published in the Official Journal, sets mandatory sanitary conditions for travelers at airports, ports and land borders, including vaccination pass or testing requirements, and specifies adaptation according to epidemiological conditions, demonstrating operational guidance for non pharmaceutical interventions during an epidemic ^{237, p. 12}.

3.2.1a Completion of biological-focused IHR exercise with the WHO in past year

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria activated a national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak or completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. World Organisation for Animal Health materials describe Exercise Phoenix as an international discussion-based simulation focused on deliberate biological threats and agro-terrorism scenarios, conducted in February 2023 with participation from national veterinary services and law enforcement authorities ^{238, p. 18}. A World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa rapid risk assessment reports that Algeria experienced diphtheria outbreaks beginning in September 2024 and continuing through 2025, including laboratory-confirmed cases and response activities, but it does not document activation of Algeria’s national emergency response plan in the past year ^{239, p. 5}. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Algeria 2024 annual report likewise documents malaria and diphtheria outbreaks and humanitarian response actions during 2024, without evidence of activation of a national emergency response plan or completion of a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year ^{240, pp. 3–4}.

3.2.1b Evidence of bio-focused exercise to identify gaps/best practices

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that in the past year Algeria has identified a list of response gaps and best practices through an infectious disease response, an after action review, or a biological threat focused exercise and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. The United Nations Algeria Annual Report 2022 states that an International Health Regulations roadmap is elaborated and validated in November 2022 to implement recommendations, and that risk communication plans, public health emergency intervention plans, and standard operating procedures at points of entry are revised and validated ^{241, p. 33}. The National Health Security Agency press release dated 5 August 2024 states that thematic subcommittees meet to finalize a strategic diagnosis and begin preparing a multisectoral action plan related to the National Health Security Strategy 2025–2030, which evidences preparatory work rather than a finalized 2025 improvement plan developed from a documented review or exercise ^{242, p. 1}. The World Health Organization Joint External Evaluation describes that after action review and simulation exercises are elements of the International Health Regulations monitoring and evaluation framework, but it does not document a 2025 Algeria led review output and national improvement plan ^{243, p. 10}.

3.2.2a Evidence of national-level biological threat-focused exercise that includes private sector

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria conducted a national level biological threat focused exercise in the past year that included private sector representatives. The World Health Organization Simulation Exercise Activities repository Algeria filter, updated on 1 September 2025, lists no Algeria records in 2024 or 2025 that document a national biological exercise with private sector participation ²⁴⁴. The World Health Organization Algeria results page for 2024 to 2025 does not report any such exercise ²⁴⁵. The Institut Pasteur of Algeria course on biological risk management and on transport of infectious substances held in Algiers on 19 to 23 February 2023 describes classroom and laboratory training, not a national exercise, and it does not evidence private sector representatives ^{246, pp. 1–2}. Algeria’s 2025 submission to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs notes European Union chemical biological radiological nuclear workshops in Algiers on 22 to 24 October 2024 and a training of trainers on 24 to 27 February 2025, which were workshops and trainings rather than a national biological threat focused exercise and do not state private sector participation ^{247, p. 8}.

3.3.1a Existence of Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

Score: 100

Algeria has an Emergency Operations Center through the Civil Protection National Operational Coordination Center under the Ministry of the Interior. Executive Decree No. 24-203 of 25 June 2024, published in the Official Journal, establishes the Directorate of Organization and Coordination of Operations and tasks it to ensure the proper functioning of the National Operational Coordination Center, to coordinate operations with national institutions, and to organize operational communications, which together constitute the standing command and coordination capacity expected of an Emergency Operations Center ^{248, pp. 5–6}. The official state news agency reported a headquarters visit on 26 May 2025 that included the National Operational Coordination Center, evidencing that the center is active and used for national level coordination ²⁴⁹. The World Health Organization country profile for Algeria lists Emergency operations center capacities under Emergency Response Operations, confirming that an Emergency Operations Center capability exists within the national system ²⁵⁰.

3.3.1b Requirement for EOC to conduct/evidence EOC conducts at least annual drills

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria requires its Emergency Operations Center to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year, or that drills were conducted at least once per year, based on the World Health Organization Simulation Exercise Activities Algeria filter and the World Health Organization Algeria results page. Executive Decree No. 24-198 of 11 June 2024, published in the Official Journal, establishes the Directorate General of Civil Protection, lists the National Operational Coordination Center among central external services, and tasks the Directorate of Organization and Coordination of Operations with planning and coordinating operations and exercises, however it does not stipulate an annual drill requirement for an Emergency Operations Center ^{251, pp. 5–7}. Executive Decree No. 24-277 of 13 August 2024, published in the Official Journal, sets missions and functioning for Sanitary Control at Borders in implementation of the International Health Regulations, allowing authorities to propose and participate in simulation exercises in exceptional situations, yet it does not mandate annual drills by an Emergency Operations Center ^{252, pp. 12–15}.

3.3.1c EOC activation within 120 minutes of identification of emergency/scenario

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s Emergency Operations Center conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise that was activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency or scenario. The World Health Organization Simulation Exercise Activities repository, updated on 1 September 2025, lists no Algeria entries during 2024 or 2025 that document an activation time within 120 minutes for a public health emergency exercise or response ²⁵³. The World Health Organization Results Report country page for Algeria for 2024 to 2025 reports support to Member States for emergency operations and simulation exercises, however it contains no Algeria specific record demonstrating an Emergency Operations Center activation within 120 minutes during the assessed period ²⁵⁴. State news coverage via the Algeria Press Service in 2025 describes visits and training related to the National Operational Coordination Center of Civil Protection, yet these reports do not document a coordinated public health emergency response or exercise with activation within 120 minutes ²⁵⁵²⁵⁶.

3.4.1a Joint exercise/procedures for potential deliberate biological events

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria conducted a multisector deliberate biological event exercise, or that it published interagency standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding, or other agreements linking public health authorities, animal health authorities, national security authorities, and the private sector for such an event. The Official Journal legal database presents no instrument that issues such procedures or records a qualifying exercise ²⁵⁷. Presidential Decree number 22-292 of 23 August 2022, published in the Official Journal, establishes an interministerial committee under the Ministry of National Defence and assigns planning and coordination roles, but it does not publish interagency procedures, does not include a private sector agreement, and does not document an exercise ^{258, pp. 5 to 6}. The Ministry of National Defence portal presents no announcement of a deliberate biological event exercise or a published interagency biological response arrangement ²⁵⁹. The World Health Organization results profile for 2024 to 2025 lists program outputs and financing, not a multisector deliberate biological exercise or an interagency protocol for Algeria ²⁶⁰.

3.5.1a Risk communication plan for specific use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a section detailing a risk communication plan intended for use during a public health emergency. The Official Journal legal database shows no instrument that establishes or annexes a public health emergency risk communication section within a national emergency response plan or other binding document ²⁶¹. The Ministry of Health national plan hosted by the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa includes a chapter titled Risk Communication that lists activities to identify partners, to elaborate and implement a risk communication plan, and to conduct simulation exercises, which indicates an intention to develop such a plan rather than a published section detailing it for operational use ^{262, pp. 29–30}. The World Health Organization Eastern Mediterranean Region and United Nations Children’s Fund joint technical meeting report records Algeria among countries committing to develop a national risk communication and community engagement strategy and an internal crisis communication plan, confirming that a national section was still to be developed after October 2022 ^{263, pp. 9–10}. The 2025 Executive Decree on modalities for elaboration, amendment, updating and execution of general disaster risk prevention plans, implementing Law No. 24-04 of 26 February 2024, as published in the Official Journal, is multi hazard and non health specific, and it does not supply a public health emergency risk communication section ^{264, p. 3}.

3.5.1b Inclusion of different population & sector needs in risk communication plan

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s risk communication plan or other binding guidance explains how public health messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs, including different languages, location within the country, media reach, vulnerable groups, and hard to reach groups ^{265, pp. 7–8}. The Official Journal published Law No. 24-04 of February 26, 2024 on disaster risk reduction, which mandates a national communication strategy and organization of communications for information campaigns, but it does not set multilingual procedures, tailored delivery channels, or mechanisms to reach specific vulnerable or remote audiences ^{266, pp. 7–8}. The World Health Organization Algeria results page describes effective risk communication and community engagement in general terms and encourages tailoring to local contexts, but it does not provide a national plan text for Algeria detailing modalities for audiences with distinct communication needs during public health response ²⁶⁷. A World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa news item dated July 3, 2024 reports a forum to support national strategies, but it does not publish a plan that specifies the above requirements ²⁶⁸.

3.5.1c Designation of a specific government spokesperson during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s risk communication plan or other binding guidance designates a specific government position as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. Law No. 24-04 of 26 February 2024, as published in the Official Journal, establishes a national communication strategy on disaster risks and mandates information campaigns, but it does not identify any office or title as the primary spokesperson for health emergencies or assign spokesperson duties to a defined position ^{269, pp. 7–8}. The World Health Organization Algeria results page describes support to risk communication and community engagement in general terms and does not provide or link to a national plan that makes such a designation for Algeria in this period ²⁷⁰. The Official Journal records a 2022 presidential decree concerning the Presidency’s official spokesperson, which is a general government role and is not created by or tied to a public health risk communication plan as the designated primary spokesperson for emergencies ^{271, p. 19}.

3.5.2a Government use of media platforms to share info on public health emergencies

Score: 100

Algeria’s public health system actively uses online media platforms to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns at multiple, clearly separated points across the past year, demonstrating sustained communication beyond a single emergency period. In September 2024, the Institut Pasteur of Algeria published a public-facing World Rabies Day page that emphasized prevention, awareness, and public engagement on a priority zoonotic disease, providing online risk communication at the start of the assessment window ²⁷². In October 2024, the Ministry of Health reiterated seasonal influenza vaccination recommendations for at-risk populations through an online communiqué disseminated by the national news agency, reinforcing preventive guidance ahead of winter circulation ²⁷³. In January 2025, the Ministry of Health again used online channels to confirm the continuation of the seasonal influenza vaccination campaign and to identify priority groups, extending public messaging into mid-winter ²⁷⁴. In April 2025, the Institut Pasteur of Algeria published an online article announcing an information day on influenza surveillance and vaccination strategy, describing the current seasonal context and supporting both professional and public awareness outside an acute crisis moment ²⁷⁵.

3.5.2b Evidence that senior leaders have shared mis/disinformation on infectious diseases

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s president or ministers shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases during the past two years, based on official communications issued by the National Agency for Health Security and country news from the World Health Organization. The National Agency for Health Security published a press release on August 26, 2024 on mpox that set out current surveillance status, stated that no mpox cases had been declared in Algeria, and described causes, transmission, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention ^{276, p. 2}. The agency published a press release on August 5, 2024 describing the organization of multisectoral committees for the National Health Security Strategy 2025 to 2030 ^{277, p. 1}. The World Health Organization country news on July 3, 2024 documents collaboration between the Ministry of Health, the National Agency for Health Security, and the World Health Organization, which indicates routine technical communication without evidence of misinformation by senior leaders ²⁷⁸.

3.6.1a Percentage of households with Internet

Score: 92.58

3.6.2a Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Score: 60.36

3.6.3a Gender gap in access to a mobile phone (percentage points)

Score: 76.67

3.6.4a Gender gap in access to the Internet (percentage points)

Score: 70.83

3.7.1a Restrictions on export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

In the past year, Algeria has not implemented outbreak-related export or import restrictions on medical goods. The Official Gazette portal does not show 2025 decrees or orders establishing outbreak-linked prohibitions or restrictions on exports or imports of medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, or personal protective equipment ²⁷⁹. The Directorate General of Customs maintains a coronavirus disease 2019 exceptional measures section focused on facilitation and administrative guidance, and it does not publish new 2025 export or import bans on medical goods ²⁸⁰. Customs also publishes a tariff-classification page listing products that were temporarily suspended from export during the coronavirus disease 2019 crisis, which documents earlier exceptional measures but does not evidence any reinstated or newly implemented 2025 outbreak-driven restrictions affecting medical goods ²⁸¹.

3.7.1b Restrictions on movement and/or exports/imports due to disease outbreak

Score: 100

Algeria did not implement restrictions on export or import of non medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. Executive Decree Number 22 51 of 24 January 2022 reconducted the national coronavirus disease prevention and control system for a limited period without creating or renewing export or import bans on non medical goods ^{282, pp. 4 to 5}. On 31 October 2022 the government lifted the remaining health measures at air, sea, and land points of entry, as publicly noticed by the Consulate of Algeria in Pontoise, and no accompanying trade controls on non medical goods were announced in that notice ²⁸³. Official consular communications focused on traveler facilitation measures and did not introduce outbreak driven trade restrictions on non medical goods, which confirms the absence of such measures during the timeframe ²⁸⁴.

3.7.2a Evidence of travel ban due to an infectious disease outbreak

Score: 100

Algeria did not implement inbound or outbound travel restrictions due to an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. There is no publicly available law or executive decree published in the Official Journal of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria in the past year that mandates entry bans, exit bans, suspension of international routes, or mandatory quarantine of all arrivals due to an infectious disease outbreak ²⁸⁵. Official government travel health information applicable to Algeria confirms that no outbreak-related entry or exit restrictions, including Coronavirus disease testing, vaccination, or quarantine requirements, are in force during the same period ²⁸⁶. While Algeria maintains a standing legal framework authorizing border health measures, including isolation, quarantine, or refusal of entry when justified, the framework does not itself document the activation of outbreak-triggered travel restrictions during the past year ²⁸⁷.

3.7.2b Risk-based approach to international travel-related measures

Score: 100

Algeria uses a risk based approach to international travel related measures by differentiating entry conditions according to traveler health status and by authorizing adjustments based on the epidemiological situation, and by empowering a dedicated border health authority to apply proportionate measures at points of entry. Executive Decree number 22-115 of 17 March 2022, as published by the Official Journal, required either a vaccination pass less than nine months old or a negative reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test within seventy two hours for travelers who were not vaccinated, provided that these conditions would be adapted as needed according to the evolution of the epidemiological situation, with effect from 20 March 2022 ^{288, p. 11}. Executive Decree number 24-277 of 13 August 2024, as published by the Official Journal, established the border health control service, mandated verification of required vaccinations and prophylaxis, and authorized isolation, quarantine, or refusal of entry when warranted, which ties application of measures at airports, ports, and land crossings to assessed risk ^{289, pp. 14 to 15}.

4.1.1a Doctors per 100,000 people

Score: 24.73

4.1.1b Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Score: 2.93

4.1.1c Updated health workforce strategy to address human resource shortfalls

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has an updated national health workforce strategy that identifies shortage fields and sets concrete measures to address them such as targeted training, deployment or retention incentives. Executive Decree No. 22-373 of 27 October 2022, as published in the Official Journal, establishes the health map as a planning instrument for resources and activities and defines human resources for health, and its objectives include determining training needs and ensuring equitable distribution, which is not a national workforce strategy with shortage analysis and remedial actions ^{290, p. 11-12}. The 29 July 2018 Law No. 18-11 on Health, as published in the Official Journal, provides the legal basis for the health map through Articles 269 to 271 on standards of coverage and resource allocation, but this framework does not constitute an updated workforce strategy in the required period ^{291, p. 26}. The World Health Organization biennial report for 2022 to 2023 notes training on labor market analysis and on the Workload Indicators of Staffing Need tool, yet it does not report a published national workforce strategy for the period ^{292, p. 33}.

4.1.1d Health system capacity for essential health services

Score: 100

Algeria has sufficient capacity within the health system to deliver essential health services.

The Joint external evaluation of the International Health Regulations (‎2005) states that the country has a system in place for the activation and coordination of healthcare personnel during a public health emergency. Strong points include the existence of legislation for the acquisition of resources for animal health, existence of a specific budget (emergency fund) and a state subsidy and the availability of adequately trained personnel to manage cases in emergency situations covered by the International Health Regulations (IHR), which includes, but is not limited to, the ability to recognize, treat, and refer infectious diseases.²⁹³

This is evidenced by official International Health Regulations States Parties Self Assessment Annual Reporting country submissions that record the access to essential health services subindicator at 60 in 2022 and 60 in 2023 under the health service provision capacity, rising to 80 in 2024 with a health service provision average of 73 that year, which reflects nationwide availability of facilities, workforce, and core inputs that sustain routine delivery across levels of care ^294295296.

4.1.1e Essential health services continuity plan for public health emergencies

Score: 100

Algeria has a legally established framework that requires continuity of essential services, including health services, during and after emergencies, but it does not publish a dedicated, health sector specific national plan focused exclusively on continuity of essential health services during a public health emergency. Law No. 24-04 of 26 February 2024 on the rules for the prevention, intervention and reduction of disaster risks in the context of sustainable development establishes national and subnational Organization of Emergency Response and Relief plans and explicitly mandates ensuring the continuity of the functioning of essential services during the post-disaster recovery phase, including the provision of health services and the maintenance of strategic reserves of essential goods and medicines ^{297, pp. 13–15}. Law No. 18-11 of 29 July 2018 on Health further guarantees continuity of the public health service as a core principle and authorizes the mobilization of public and private health structures within emergency devices in the event of epidemics or disasters, but it does not define operational procedures, service prioritization, or health system surge mechanisms specific to continuity planning ^{298, pp. 5, 27}. The World Health Organization biennial report for 2022–2023 documents health cooperation priorities and system strengthening activities in Algeria but does not identify or reference a standalone national continuity plan for essential health services during public health emergencies ^{299, p. 9}.

4.1.2a Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Score: 40.88

4.1.2b In-country capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria maintains a biocontainment patient care unit or hospital patient isolation rooms with negative pressure or equivalent engineering controls. No such clinical capacity is described on the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa country page for Algeria despite its summary of national health system information and key resources ³⁰⁰. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention COVID-19 resources hub provides country filters and consolidated technical materials yet yields no Algeria specific documentation confirming hospital based biocontainment or negative pressure isolation capacity in this period ³⁰¹. The Institut Pasteur of Algeria presents its national missions in diagnostics, reference laboratory functions, research, training, biological product distribution, and vaccination advice for travelers, without any indication of inpatient biocontainment or hospital isolation ward infrastructure for highly communicable diseases ³⁰².

4.1.2c Demonstrated capacity / evidence of plan to expand isolation capacity

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria demonstrates expansion of hospital isolation capacity or developed, updated, or tested a plan to expand such capacity during 2024 to 2025. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa country page for Algeria provides national health system information and key resources yet does not describe biocontainment patient care units, negative pressure isolation rooms, or a tested surge isolation plan during these years ³⁰³. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention COVID 19 resources hub, which aggregates Member State materials and allows country level filtering, yields no Algeria specific documentation confirming expansion of hospital isolation capacity or a validated plan to expand ³⁰⁴. The Institut Pasteur of Algeria explains national reference laboratory missions in diagnostics, research, training, and biological product distribution, without any indication of inpatient biocontainment wards or engineered isolation rooms that were expanded or planned for expansion in 2024 to 2025 ³⁰⁵.

4.2.1a National procurement protocol for the acquisition of routine laboratory/medical supplies

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national public procurement framework that is in force. It explicitly provides for publication and management of tenders through the Bulletin of Public Operator Markets and an electronic public procurement portal, which applies to studies, supplies, and services procured by state bodies including health and scientific establishments ^{306, p. 11, 17}. Implementation for routine medical supplies in the health sector is evidenced by the Central Hospital Pharmacy’s May 2025 award notice for laboratory reagents and related medical products under an open national invitation to tender, demonstrating active use of the framework for ongoing supply needs ^{307, pp. 1–2}. Implementation for routine veterinary supplies in the agriculture sector is evidenced by the 2025 listing on the official Bulletin of Public Operator Markets showing the National Institute of Veterinary Medicine’s tender No. 02/INMV/2025 for eighteen million doses of peste des petits ruminants vaccine, confirming operational procurement for veterinary biologicals ³⁰⁸.

4.2.2a Stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 33.33

Algeria publicly documents the existence of a national pharmaceutical emergency stock function, but publicly available evidence is limited regarding the full scope of stockpiled items and the existence of a plan to ensure equitable distribution during a public health emergency defined by the overarching national public health emergency response framework. An Official Journal publication establishes that the Central Hospital Pharmacy is obligated to constitute a strategic stock of pharmaceutical products ensuring 6 months of coverage and to constitute an emergency response stock under the National Organization of Civil Protection Plan, with this emergency stock composed of first-urgency pharmaceutical products as well as disinfection and anti-epidemic products, and with the list and quantities determined by the Ministry of Health ^{309, p. 41}. A subsequent Official Journal publication includes a ministerial order that fixes the list of pharmaceutical products constituting the emergency response stock and publishes the annexed list specifying product names, pharmaceutical forms, and dosages ^{310, pp. 10-28}. However, publicly available sources do not document a broader national emergency stockpile covering vaccines, medical equipment, and personal protective equipment within the same legally defined framework, nor do they document a plan to ensure equitable distribution of stockpiled supplies during a public health emergency as defined by the national emergency response plan ^{311, p. 41312, pp. 10-28}.

4.2.2b Stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria maintains a defined national stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. The World Health Organization catalogue lists supply of Yersinia pestis diagnostic tools and reagents to laboratories in Algeria through a collaborating center during 2022 to 2023, which shows external support to laboratories and does not establish a nationally maintained emergency reserve of laboratory supplies ^{313, pp. 103 to 104}. Executive Decree of 13 August 2024 fixing the missions, organization and functioning of the border health control service of 13 August 2024 under the Ministry of Health and published in the Official Journal describes structures and activities at points of entry without creating a national reserve of laboratory reagents or media or an emergency allocation mechanism ^{314, pp. 13, 15}. The Central Hospital Pharmacy strategy page describes a strategic security stock and a national emergency stock at the level of hospital supply, without documenting a dedicated national laboratory supplies stockpile or an emergency distribution scheme for laboratory reagents or media ³¹⁵.

4.2.2c Annual review of national stockpile to ensure sufficient supply

Score: 100

Algeria requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure sufficiency for public health emergencies. Executive Decree No. 11-457 of 28 December 2011, published in the Official Journal on 14 January 2012, amends the statute of the Central Hospital Pharmacy and mandates that it maintain a six-month strategic stock, a separate ORSEC emergency stock, and submit an annual stock management report to the Minister of Health at the end of each fiscal year ^{316, pp. 40–43}. The same decree obliges the Ministry of Health to oversee compliance with this mandate, creating a standing mechanism for annual review ^{317, p. 41}. The Central Hospital Pharmacy further confirms this duty on its strategy page, stating its responsibility to ensure a strategic security stock and an emergency stock for nationwide availability ³¹⁸. This framework is reinforced by the ministerial order of 6 February 2013, which fixes the list of pharmaceutical products that constitute the ORSEC stock, thereby defining the reserve content for national governance and aligning it with annual reporting obligations ^{319, p. 12}.

4.2.3a Plan/agreement to produce/procure medical supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a documented mechanism to expedite medical supplies through points of entry during a public health emergency. Executive Decree No. 20 109 of 5 May 2020, as published in the Official Journal, establishes exceptional measures to facilitate the supply of the national market with pharmaceutical products, medical devices and detection equipment, grants authorization to non licensed operators to import such items as donations for the Central Hospital Pharmacy and the Institut Pasteur of Algeria, and requires the Customs Administration to implement simplified clearance procedures, with the measures remaining valid until the official declaration of the end of the Coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic ^{320, pp. 8 to 9}. In parallel, the Directorate General of Customs applies expedited entry by assigning green and orange circuits for medical imports, creating a special clearance channel for essential goods and medicines, exempting humanitarian donations from duties and taxes, and participating in the national commission on facilitation chaired by the Prime Minister ^{321, pp. 1 to 2}.

4.2.3b Plan/agreement to produce/procure lab supplies during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a standing national plan, agreement, or mechanism that explicitly covers the procurement, domestic manufacturing, or expedited import of laboratory supplies such as reagents or culture media for national use during a public health emergency. Executive Decree No. 11-457 amending and completing Executive Decree No. 94-293 on the creation, organization and functioning of the Central Hospital Pharmacy establishes national arrangements for procurement, import programming, and stockholding of pharmaceutical products and medical devices, including strategic stocks and Organization of Relief and Rescue emergency stocks, but it does not explicitly reference laboratory reagents, culture media, or laboratory consumables ^{322, pp. 41–45}. Law No. 18-11 of 2 July 2018 relating to health establishes system-wide definitions and principles for the health sector, including definitional coverage of in vitro diagnostic medical devices, but it does not establish a specific emergency procurement mechanism or point-of-entry expediting framework for laboratory supplies ^{323, p. 21}. Official Journal publications contain no decree, order, or regulation establishing a standing laboratory-specific emergency procurement or import-expediting mechanism ³²⁴. Publications issued through the Prime Minister portal contain no nationally applicable laboratory emergency supply framework beyond time-bound Coronavirus disease 2019 measures ³²⁵. Publications issued by the Algerian Customs General Directorate and the Institut Pasteur d’Algérie document pandemic-specific operational actions related to laboratory reagents, rather than standing national mechanisms applicable across public health emergencies ³²⁶³²⁷.

4.2.3c Mechanism emergency logistics and supply chain management

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national and subnational system for emergency logistics and supply chain management that includes cold chain specifications and coverage of public and private health providers. Instruction No. 19 of 3 October 2023 from the Ministry of Health directs provincial governors, national institutes, and directors of private health establishments to implement the National Vaccination Schedule, specifies vaccine conservation between 2 and 8 degrees Celsius with prohibition of freezing, and assigns managers to assure and supervise cold chain logistics ^{328, pp. 1, 4, 8}. Executive Decree No. 25-187 of 13 July 2025, as published in the Official Journal, assigns the Minister of Pharmaceutical Industry to realize import programs that complement national production, regulate distribution across the territory, license importation and distribution establishments, deliver temporary authorizations for use of unregistered medicines, monitor stocks and establish an early warning and risk assessment system, and maintain nationwide databases on fabrication, distribution, importation and exportation activities ^{329, pp. 24–26, 30}.

4.3.1a Plan/program/guidelines for dispensing MCMs during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Algeria has nationally issued legal instruments that establish mechanisms for the availability and dispensing of medical countermeasures during a public health emergency. Executive Decree No. 20-109 of 12 Ramadhan 1441 corresponding to May 5, 2020 sets exceptional measures to facilitate national supply of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and detection equipment in response to the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, explicitly covering products used for patient management, prevention, and control ^{330, pp. 8–9}. The decree authorizes emergency importation and local acquisition of listed countermeasures, validates product lists through a Ministry of Health scientific committee, and routes donated medical countermeasures to the Central Pharmacy of Hospitals or the Pasteur Institute of Algeria, while applying simplified customs procedures to accelerate availability during the emergency ^{331, pp. 8–9}. Separately, a ministerial order of February 6, 2013 fixes the official list of pharmaceutical products constituting the ORSEC stock, thereby establishing a predefined national emergency pharmaceutical reserve intended for deployment in emergency response situations ^{332, pp. 9–16}.

4.3.2a Plan to receive foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a public plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency in 2025. Law No. 24-04 of 26 February 2024 establishes a national legal framework for the prevention, intervention, and reduction of disaster risks through Organization of Relief Plans at national, inter-province, province, municipality, and site levels, and it provides the State with general authority to intervene and requisition persons and material means during disaster response, but it does not define a workforce surge plan or specify operational mechanisms to expand staffing levels during emergencies, such as surge staffing categories, surge rosters, emergency redeployment rules, or temporary recruitment procedures ^{333, pp. 13–15}. Executive Decree No. 25-63 of 28 January 2025 regulates the conditions and modalities for preparing, implementing, and managing particular intervention plans and internal intervention plans, including activation when internal means are insufficient, requirements for simulation exercises, and post-activation or post-exercise evaluation reports, but it likewise does not establish a public plan to facilitate workforce surge or detail mechanisms for increasing human resources during an emergency ^{334, pp. 11, 14–15}.

4.3.2b Plan to facilitate workforce surge in an emergency

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a publicly accessible national legal mechanism that governs the receipt, authorization, and deployment of foreign health personnel to work in Algerian health facilities during emergencies and other defined circumstances. Executive Decree No. 24-327 of 1 October 2024 fixes the conditions of practice and employment of health professionals of foreign nationality within public and private health structures, including contract-based, liberal, and temporary practice arrangements authorized by the Minister of Health ^{335, pp. 7–10}. The decree establishes a formal procedure requiring submission of an administrative file, verification by the provincial health directorate, and ministerial authorization within defined timelines, and it explicitly permits nonresident foreign health professionals to carry out temporary missions for medical services and technical assistance under partnership conventions ^{336, pp. 8–9}. Temporary authorizations are capped at missions of 5 to 15 days within an annual maximum of 90 days, and a standardized model convention specifies the scope of services, training activities, and duration of engagement ^{337, pp. 9–10}. The decree further mandates annual reporting by provincial health authorities on the activities of foreign health professionals deployed under these arrangements, ensuring public oversight of their reception and use ^{338, p. 9}.

4.3.2c Plan to redeploy existing health personnel within the country

Score: 100

A public plan is in place in Algeria during 2024 to 2025 to redeploy existing health personnel by geography and function through rescue organization plans (Organisation of Relief). Law No. 24-04 of 26 February 2024, as published in the Official Journal, establishes ORSEC (Disaster Relief Plan) plans at national, inter-province, province, municipality, and sensitive-site levels, permits their combination for nationwide events, and authorizes the requisition of persons and means necessary for response, which enables movement and reassignment of staff across administrative levels as needed ^{339, p. 13}. The law requires that ORSEC plans define priority intervention segments including the health of affected persons and that plans specify for each responder the missions and responsibilities assigned, which operationalizes role-based redeployment of clinical and support teams ^{340, p. 14}. In 2025, the Civil Protection executed an earthquake simulation exercise in Constantine under the ORSEC framework, demonstrating ongoing implementation of these redeployment mechanisms within the timeframe ³⁴¹.

4.4.1a Constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to medical care

Score: 100

The Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria explicitly guarantees citizens the right to medical care that is free and universal. Article 63 of the Constitution, revised and promulgated in the Official Journal on 30 December 2020, states that all citizens have the right to health protection and that the State ensures prevention and control of epidemic and endemic diseases and provides health protection particularly for indigent persons, establishing health care as a constitutional right owed by the State to the population as a whole ^{342, pp. 16–17}. This constitutional guarantee is given concrete legal effect through binding national legislation that establishes free universal access to medical care. As documented by Chatham House, Algeria enacted a nationwide free healthcare law in 1974 that provides all citizens with free healthcare in public hospitals, covering both general and specialized services and financed by the state budget ^{343, pp. 8–9}. Chatham House further classifies healthcare in Algeria as free, universal, and administered by the Ministry of Health, Population and Hospital Reforms, confirming that this entitlement applies to the entire population rather than to specific groups ^{344, p. 15}.

4.4.1b Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Score: 98.53

4.4.1c Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, PPP (current international $)

Score: 60.71

4.4.1d Coverage of essential health services through universal health coverage

Score: 97.92

4.4.1e Total population pushed below a relative poverty line by household health expenditure (60% of media daily per capita consumption or income)

Score: 0

4.4.1f Rate of mortality amenable to health care

Score: 15.24

4.4.2a Guaranteed paid sick leave

Score: 100

Workers are guaranteed paid sick leave in Algeria, and sick leave is available for mental as well as physical health problems. Law No. 83-11 of 2 July 1983 on Social Insurance, as published in the Official Journal, provides daily cash allowances for medically certified work stoppages at 50 percent of wages from the 1st to the 15th day and 100 percent from the 16th day or from day 1 in cases of hospitalization or long-term illness, establishing a nationwide paid sick leave scheme ^{345, pp. 1199–1200}. Law No. 18-11 of 2 July 2018 on Health, as published in the Official Journal, recognizes mental health within the health system, defines mental health services, requires continuity of treatment, and sets rights and structures for persons with mental disorders, confirming that sickness benefits apply to mental as well as physical conditions ^{346, pp. 13–14, 103–104}. In 2022, the International Social Security Association’s Algeria profile specifies the sickness cash benefit as 50 percent for the first 15 days and 100 percent from day 16 up to 3 years and identifies the National Social Insurance Fund for Employees as the administrator, evidencing active benefit administration in the period ^{347, p. 13}. In 2023, the Algerian Occupational Safety and Health Profile described the National Social Insurance Fund for Employees’ organization and reported nationwide activities in 2022–2023, demonstrating ongoing operational implementation ^{348, pp. 50, 88–99}.

4.4.3a Government prioritisation of care for healthcare workers during response

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. The Official Journal published Presidential Decree No. 22-174 of 26 April 2022 creating a budget chapter to finance medical services intended exclusively for the diagnosis of the COVID-19 virus for insured persons and their dependents, and it contained no clause that prioritizes clinical care for sick healthcare workers responding to an emergency ^{349, p. 6}. Executive Decree No. 22-35 of 4 January 2022, as published in the Official Journal, renews general prevention and control measures for Coronavirus disease but includes no commitment to priority treatment for healthcare workers who fall ill while responding ^{350, p. 19}. Executive Decree No. 24-105 of 7 March 2024, as published in the Official Journal, amends Executive Decree No. 10-250 on the indemnity regime of the permanent researcher, addressing remuneration rather than priority access to healthcare services for sick healthcare workers ^{351, pp. 16–17}. National Algeria Press Service reporting on renewed protective measures lists general public health steps without any commitment to prioritized healthcare services for healthcare workers ³⁵².

4.5.1a Existence of system for communication during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national system for emergency communication that connects public health officials and healthcare workers. In 2025, the United Nations country report describes that the Ministry of Health revises and validates risk communication plans, emergency response plans, and standard operating procedures at points of entry, then operationalizes these through strengthened communication services in all 58 provinces, including training and the use of a dedicated digital health rumor management platform that supports collection, analysis, and interactions among members of the ministry communication network, which includes health sector personnel engaged in emergency response ^{353, p. 33}. The same section reports large scale training for health professionals and the platform’s facilitation of interactions within the network, which together constitute an implemented nationwide channel for real time crisis information exchange between authorities and frontline healthcare workers ^{354, p. 33}. These measures provide an operational system that enables communication during public health emergencies ^{355, p. 33}.

4.5.1b Inclusion of public and private sector in healthcare communication system

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria's emergency communication system for public health officials and healthcare workers encompasses personnel in both the public and private sector. The United Nations Annual Report for Algeria describes that the Ministry of Health strengthens communication services in all 58 provinces through training and a dedicated health rumor management digital platform for interactions among members of the ministry communication network, but it does not specify inclusion of private healthcare providers ^{356, p. 33}. The World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa biennial report details risk communication and community engagement activities and training for health personnel and refers to a rumor management platform, yet it does not indicate participation by private sector providers in an emergency communication system ^{357, pp. 39–40}. Government of Algeria reporting on national systems and sector structure confirms the presence and growth of the private health sector, but it does not state that emergency communication channels formally cover both public and private healthcare workers ^{358, pp. 72–73}.

4.6.1a Evidence of national public health system monitoring and tracking of HCAIs

Score: 100

Algeria has an operational national system to monitor and track healthcare-associated infections in health facilities. On 15 January 2025, the national news agency reported that the National Institute of Public Health will launch a nationwide epidemiological survey on nosocomial infections in February 2025, confirming active surveillance led by the public health authority during the timeframe ³⁵⁹. In parallel, the Ministry of Health’s National Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024–2028 sets national directives for prevention and control of healthcare-associated infections, designates the Infection Prevention and Control Working Group to oversee implementation, and establishes a monitoring and evaluation framework with annual public reporting beginning in 2025, which operationalizes the ongoing tracking of infections across health facilities ^{360, pp. 8–9, 11–13, 35–36}.

4.6.1b Infection prevention and control programme

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national infection prevention and control program, with national directives and an operational inspection system applied across health facilities. The Ministry of Health’s National Strategic Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024–2028 states that national directives for prevention and control of healthcare-associated infections exist, that a system to combat infections related to care is in place, and that facilities must apply the national directives as part of a multisectoral governance framework including an infection prevention and control working group ^{361, pp. 8–10, 15–16, 21–22}. Implementation and coverage are reinforced in law by Executive Decree No. 24-408 of 28 December 2024 establishing the special status of public health medical inspector practitioners, as published in the Official Journal, which assigns inspectors the duty to ensure compliance with hygiene rules and prevention of hospital infections in public and private health structures, and to organize and report on inspection missions ^{362, pp. 4 to 7}.

4.6.1c National plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities

Score: 100

Algeria maintains a national plan to ensure a safe environment in health facilities, with national directives, legal enforcement, and ongoing monitoring in place. The Ministry of Health’s National Strategic Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 2024 to 2028 states that national directives for prevention and control of healthcare associated infections exist, that a system to combat infections related to care is established, and that health facilities must apply the national directives within a multisectoral governance framework ^{363, pp. 8–10, 15–16, 21–22}. Executive Decree No. 24-408 of 28 December 2024, as published in the Official Journal, establishing the special status of public health medical inspector practitioners assigns inspectors to ensure compliance with hygiene rules and prevention of hospital infections in public and private health structures, and to organize and report inspection missions, which provides a nationwide enforcement mechanism in 2025 ^{364, pp. 4–7}. In 2025 the National Institute of Public Health announced a nationwide epidemiological survey on nosocomial infections to be launched in February, evidencing continued national monitoring of hospital hygiene and patient safety conditions ³⁶⁵.

4.7.1a Requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial

Score: 100

Algeria requires ethical review before any clinical trial begins, and this requirement remains in force. Law No. 18-11 on Health, as published in the Official Journal, states that clinical studies are subject to authorization by the minister responsible for health, creates a medical ethics committee for clinical studies, and requires that studies be submitted to this committee for an opinion prior to conduct ^{366, pp. 33–34}. Order No. 20-02 of 30 August 2020, as published in the Official Journal, which amends Law No. 18-11, maintains these safeguards by obligating the sponsor to notify the medical ethics committee for clinical studies of serious and unexpected adverse events and to submit an annual safety report, confirming the committee’s ongoing oversight role during authorized trials ^{367, p. 4}. According to the Algeria Press Service, in 2025, the Ministry of Health publicly installed the National Health Ethics Committee and stated that it is tasked with evaluating research protocols, demonstrating continued operationalization of the national ethics review function in the current period ³⁶⁸.

4.7.1b Expedited approval for clinical trials of unregistered MCMs during epidemics

Score: 100

Algeria has a formally defined expedited pathway for the approval of clinical studies that applies in public health emergency contexts and permits regulatory reliance on foreign decisions. In 2025, the Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry issued the document “Guideline for the Conduct of Clinical Studies in Algeria, Version 01,” which establishes a specific abbreviated evaluation procedure applicable upon a reasoned request by the sponsor in defined cases, including public health emergencies and national health needs ^{369, pp. 14–15}. The guideline specifies an accelerated regulatory timeline, setting a response deadline of 30 days following dossier receivability, with a single possible extension of 30 days where additional information is required, thereby shortening review compared to the standard authorization pathway ^{370, p. 15}. The same abbreviated procedure explicitly applies to studies already authorized by a recognized regulatory authority and states that the evaluation may rely on data or decisions issued by recognized stringent regulatory authorities, enabling regulatory reliance on external assessments within the national review process ^{371, p. 15}.

4.7.2a Existence of agency responsible for approving new human MCMs

Score: 100

There is a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans in Algeria. Executive Decree No. 19-190 of 3 July 2019, as published by the Official Journal, establishes the National Agency for Pharmaceutical Products as the competent authority to register pharmaceutical products and medical devices and to issue regulatory opinions, which constitutes the national marketing authorization function ^{372, p. 6}. Executive Decree No. 25-188 of 13 July 2025, as published in the Official Journal, on the organization of the central administration of the Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry confirms the 2025 governance framework by mandating directorates to set norms and procedures for clinical studies and to issue attestations related to materials involved in clinical studies, situating the agency’s role within the ministry ^{373, pp. 27–28}. The agency’s Note No. 33 of 10 July 2025 published on its official portal demonstrates ongoing regulatory oversight of pharmaceutical products and devices, confirming the agency’s active competence in 2025 ³⁷⁴.

4.7.2b Expedited approval for human MCMs during public health emergencies

Score: 100

There is an expedited process to authorize medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies in Algeria. Executive Decree No. 21-53 of 31 January 2021, as published in the Official Journal, sets the modalities for a Temporary Authorization for Use of unregistered medicines, requiring the National Agency for Pharmaceutical Products to issue its opinion within 8 working days upon receipt, empowering the Minister of Pharmaceutical Industry to grant the authorization including upon a request by the Minister of Health for public health reasons, and limiting validity to up to 1 year with renewal permitted, which establishes a time-bound emergency pathway ^{375, pp. 11–12}. Executive Decree No. 19-190 of 3 July 2019, as published in the Official Journal, fixes the missions of the National Agency for Pharmaceutical Products, including issuing opinions on Temporary Authorizations for Use of unregistered medicines and opinions on rules and methods applicable to clinical studies, which institutionalizes the expedited authorization workflow ^{376, p. 6}. Executive Decree No. 25-188 of 13 July 2025, as published in the Official Journal, organizes the central administration of the Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry and mandates directorates to set norms and procedures for clinical studies, confirming the governance framework under which this emergency pathway operates in 2025 ^{377, pp. 27–28}.

5.1.1a Submission of IHR reports to the WHO in past year

Score: 100

Algeria has submitted an IHR Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) to the WHO for the last calendar year, with the latest submission in 2024.³⁷⁸

5.1.2a Existence of specific risk reduction strategies for epidemics and pandemics

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a national disaster risk reduction strategy that integrates epidemics and pandemics, or a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics, that is issued as an operational strategy document. Law No. 24-04 of 26 February 2024 establishes an overarching disaster risk prevention, intervention, and reduction framework and requires a general prevention plan for each disaster risk to be adopted by decree, with plan elements including surveillance and alert arrangements and designated reference institutions and laboratories ^{379, pp. 8–9}. While the same law specifies that the general prevention plan for risks affecting human health must identify conditions presenting a risk of contagion or epidemics, map vulnerable provinces and municipalities, and define the health establishments involved in diagnosis and prevention measures, the law does not itself publish a national epidemic or pandemic disaster risk reduction strategy ^{380, p. 10}. Executive Decree No. 25-132 of 27 April 2025 sets procedures for elaboration, updating, and execution of general prevention plans and assigns the Ministry in charge of Health as the lead sector for risks affecting human health, but it likewise does not provide a publicly accessible epidemic or pandemic strategy document ^{381, pp. 5, 7}.

5.2.1a Existence of public health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 50

There is publicly available evidence that Algeria is formally engaged in cross-border and regional arrangements relevant to public health emergencies, but there is no publicly documented evidence of implemented cross-border emergency response activities. In June 2025, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention confirmed that Ministers of Health from Northern Africa established the Northern Africa Regional Steering Committee as a regional health security coordination mechanism, and that the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria was appointed Vice Chair at the inaugural meeting held on 23 June 2025 in Cairo, demonstrating Algeria’s participation in a regional governance structure addressing preparedness and response to public health threats, while not documenting any executed joint emergency operations, tested cross-border protocols, or verified implementation outcomes under this mechanism ^{382, p. 1}. Separately, Algeria and Mauritania signed a bilateral health cooperation agreement in Algiers on 2 March 2024 covering public health and prevention, border-level health surveillance, coordination between border health officials, and information exchange, and establishing a joint technical committee mandated to follow up, evaluate, and implement the agreement, with no publicly available evidence in the source of implemented cross-border emergency response activities or documented operational outcomes arising from this framework ³⁸³.

5.2.1b Existence of animal health emergency agreements with regional neighbors

Score: 100

Algeria maintains cross border arrangements for animal health emergencies through a ratified bilateral veterinary agreement with a neighboring country and through an active regional cooperation mechanism. Decree No. 86-214 of August 26, 1986 ratifying the Veterinary Health Convention between the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria and the Republic of Tunisia, signed in Algiers on June 30, 1985, establishes binding cross border cooperation measures, including coordination of animal disease prevention and control operations in border areas, joint programs to combat major animal diseases including zoonoses, regular exchange of animal health information, and immediate notification of outbreaks of notifiable animal diseases with geographic location and applied sanitary measures ^{384, pp. 1013 to 1014}. The convention further provides for direct consultation between the central veterinary authorities of both countries to ensure implementation and resolve operational matters ^{385, p. 1014}. In addition, Algeria participates in the Mediterranean Animal Health Network, a formal regional framework supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Organisation for Animal Health, through which member countries coordinate surveillance, reporting, and management of transboundary animal disease risks in the Mediterranean region ³⁸⁶.

5.3.1a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention status

Score: 100

Algeria acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention on 28 September 2001, giving it full legal effect as a State Party ³⁸⁷. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence-Building Measures portal confirms this accession date and records Algeria’s ongoing implementation, including a Confidence-Building Measures submission dated 15 April 2025 ³⁸⁸. Algeria also demonstrates active participation: the official Procedural report of the sixth session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention lists Algeria among the delegations present in Geneva from 11 to 22 August 2025 ^{389, pp. 2–4}. The companion List of participants for this session specifies Algeria’s delegation, naming officials from the Ministry of National Defense, the Directorate General for National Security, the Directorate General of Civil Protection, the Centre for Biotechnology Research, and the Institut Pasteur of Algeria ^{390, pp. 2–3}.

5.3.1b Submission of CBMs to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Score: 100

Algeria has submitted Biological Weapons Convention Confidence-Building Measures in each of the past three years, specifically 2023, 2024, and 2025 ³⁹¹. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Algeria page lists dated submissions under Reports by year as 17 April 2023, 14 May 2024, and 15 April 2025 ³⁹². The same official page also records a 4 May 2022 submission that falls within the overall 2022 to 2025 timeframe, confirming continuity of annual reporting ³⁹³.

5.3.1c Submission of UNSCR 1540 reports

Score: 100

Algeria has submitted national reports required under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 to the 1540 Committee ³⁹⁴. The Committee’s Algeria entry records the initial national report on 10 November 2004, addenda on 7 September 2005 and 30 April 2008, and an additional report on 27 July 2020, confirming that Algeria has provided the required information ³⁹⁵. In 2025 Algeria is listed as a Vice-Chair of the 1540 Committee, as shown on the official composition page, which demonstrates present-tense engagement with the 1540 reporting regime and confirms that Algeria’s reporting status remains active on the Committee’s registry ³⁹⁶.

5.3.1d Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation on public health emergencies

Score: 25

5.3.2a Membership in global health security and/or biological weapons agreements

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria is a member of at least two among the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Australia Group, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Global Partnership Annual Programming Annex 2024 lists thirty-one members and does not include Algeria; within the same document Algeria appears only as a partner country in a chemical security activity ^{397, p. 92 and 113}. The Australia Group’s official participants page enumerates all participating states and the European Union, and Algeria does not appear on that list ³⁹⁸. The United States Department of State’s official Proliferation Security Initiative page remains active and updated in 2025; there is no official record on that portal indicating Algeria’s endorsement, while contemporaneous 2025 updates document other countries’ endorsements ³⁹⁹⁴⁰⁰.

5.4.1a Completion and publication of JEE (or GHSA pilot external assessment) report

Score: 100

Algeria has completed a Joint External Evaluation and has a full public report available within the last five years. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security Joint External Evaluation activities page lists Algeria with start date 27 March 2022, end date 31 March 2022, and status recorded as conducted ⁴⁰¹. The World Health Organization country report titled Joint external evaluation of International Health Regulations core capacities of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Mission report 27-31 March 2022, published in 2023, confirms the mission dates and provides the complete public report ^{402, p. 10}.

5.4.2a Completion and publication of PVS report (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has completed and published a World Organisation for Animal Health Performance of Veterinary Services assessment within the last five years. The Strategic Partnership for Health Security portal’s World Organisation for Animal Health activities listing for Algeria records only three Performance of Veterinary Services pathway missions, namely a Performance of Veterinary Services Evaluation conducted in 2007, a Performance of Veterinary Services Evaluation Follow Up conducted in 2012, and a Performance of Veterinary Services Gap Analysis conducted in 2013, with no Performance of Veterinary Services assessments listed for Algeria during the past five years, and the portal indicates it was last updated on 6 May 2024 ⁴⁰³. The World Organisation for Animal Health Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway Information System documents portal, which hosts publicly available Performance of Veterinary Services reports, does not contain any Algeria Performance of Veterinary Services assessment report dated within the last five years ⁴⁰⁴.

5.4.2b Completion and publication of PVS gap analysis (past five years)

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services Gap-Analysis during the last five years. The World Organisation for Animal Health Africa PVS Pathway mission status page lists Algeria’s most recent PVS Gap-Analysis as completed in 2013, with no subsequent Gap-Analysis reported through 2025 ⁴⁰⁵. The World Organisation for Animal Health Performance of Veterinary Services document repository, which hosts published PVS Pathway mission outputs, does not list or provide a publicly accessible PVS Gap-Analysis report for Algeria dated within the 2021–2025 timeframe ⁴⁰⁶. The World Organisation for Animal Health report of Regional Commissions meetings held during the 92nd General Session confirms Algeria’s participation in the Regional Commission for Africa meeting in May 2025 but does not announce the completion or publication of a new PVS Gap-Analysis for Algeria ^{407, pp. 3, 8}. The World Organisation for Animal Health Director General Activities Report describes a regional North Africa initiative involving Algeria to review strategic plans and strengthen surveillance capacity, which does not constitute the completion and publication of a country-specific PVS Gap-Analysis ^{408, p. 55}.

5.5.1a Evidence of allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria allocated national funds within the past three years explicitly to improve capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats, as distinct from general health system financing or pathogen specific response expenditures. Executive Decree No. 25-37 of 9 January 2025 distributes commitment authorizations and payment appropriations under the Finance Law for 2025 to the Ministry of Health across personnel, operating, investment, and transfer expenditures, without identifying any budget lines, programs, or chapters explicitly dedicated to pandemic preparedness, epidemic surveillance, public health emergency readiness, or International Health Regulations core capacities ^{409, pp. 76–78}. Presidential Decree No. 22-291 of 22 August 2022 creates Chapter No. 44-07 in the Ministry of Health operating budget to fund procurement of COVID-19 vaccines through the Institut Pasteur of Algeria, which constitutes a pathogen specific response measure and does not establish funding for preparedness systems, surveillance infrastructure, emergency coordination mechanisms, or other capacities intended to strengthen readiness for future epidemics or pandemics ^{410, p. 8}. Within the cited national budget instruments, there are no provisions that explicitly allocate national funds for pandemic or epidemic preparedness capacity during the past three years ^{411, pp. 76–78412, p. 8}.

5.5.2a National budget to address gaps identified in JEE, NAPHS or GHSA roadmap

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s Joint External Evaluation report, National Action Plan for Health Security, or a national Global Health Security Agenda roadmap allocates or describes specific national budget funding. The Joint External Evaluation mission report for Algeria, conducted on 27 to 31 March 2022 and published by the World Health Organization in 2023, notes the State budget funds public health response and mentions a special fund and a vaccine budget line, but it does not present specific national budget allocations for identified gaps and records that there is no dedicated budget line for International Health Regulations implementation ^{413, pp. 8–10}. The World Health Organization Strategic Partnership for Health Security page confirms the 2022 Joint External Evaluation activity for Algeria but does not provide a costed plan or national budget lines ⁴¹⁴. The World Health Organization repository for National Action Plans for Health Security does not list an Algeria plan with budgeted costing for the period ⁴¹⁵.

5.5.2b National budget to address gaps identified in PVS assessment or gap analysis

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis or PVS assessment within the past five years allocates or describes specific funding from the national budget to address identified gaps. The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Africa PVS Pathway missions status page lists Algeria’s most recent PVS activities as a PVS Evaluation follow-up in 2012 and a PVS Gap Analysis in 2013, with no Algeria PVS gap-analysis or assessment publications in the past five years and no Algeria-specific funding allocations described ⁴¹⁶. The Director General (DG) Activities Report (92GS/Adm-02/En) of 2025 cites Algeria with Morocco and Tunisia in a regional project to review national strategic plans, improve surveillance, and enhance communication, but this initiative is supported by an external donor and does not include Algeria national budget lines for PVS implementation ^{417, p. 55}. The WOAH Regional Commissions report (92GS/Adm-05/En) lists Algeria as a Member of the Africa Regional Commission at the May 2025 session, yet it does not describe Algeria PVS funding commitments or allocations from the national budget ^{418, pp. 3, 8}.

5.5.3a Emergency public financing during a public health emergency

Score: 100

Algeria has a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism that is accessible during public health emergencies. The Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Health's joint Interministerial Order of 6 July 2022 fixes the nomenclature of the revenues and expenditures of Special Allocation Account No. 302-096, Fund for Emergencies and Medical Care Activities, and authorizes the Minister of Health and provincial directors of health to commit expenditures for vaccines, reagents, emergency resuscitation equipment, and other supplies to cover medical expenses induced by exceptional events ^{419, pp. 27–28}. The Finance Law for 2024, published in the Official Journal, allocates a dedicated earmark of approximately USD 0.10 [DZD 14] per cigarette pack to the Fund for Emergencies and Medical Care Activities, confirming a standing national revenue stream for this emergency health fund ^{420, p. 29}. The same law shows that the fund had a closing balance of approximately USD 236m [DZD 32.47b], demonstrating published national resources available for epidemic response ^{421, p. 53}. In 2025, the Official Journal published presidential decrees which opened and transferred credits under the State budget, including credit transfers implemented through the unforeseen expenditures title, demonstrating the functioning contingency pathway for rapid budget mobilization during crises ^{422, p. 5}.

5.5.4a Commitments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria’s senior leaders, in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to support other countries in improving capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats through financing or support, or to improve Algeria’s domestic capacity to address pandemic or epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support. Public communications issued by the Presidency of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria do not include a presidential statement or declaration that explicitly commits financing or external support for pandemic or epidemic preparedness within the required period ⁴²³. Public communiqués and announcements issued by the Prime Minister’s Office do not contain an explicit senior leader commitment that links government financing or requests for assistance to pandemic or epidemic threat capacity ⁴²⁴. Public statements and press releases issued by the Ministry of Health do not include an explicit ministerial commitment to expand financing for pandemic or epidemic preparedness or to request external support for such capacity within the required period ⁴²⁵. Legal instruments and decrees published in the Official Gazette of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria do not contain an explicit senior leader commitment ⁴²⁶.

5.5.4b Investments to improve domestic or foreign capacity for epidemic threats

Score: 100

Algeria requested and secured donor financing during 2024 to 2025 to strengthen domestic epidemic response capacity. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS country report for 2022–2023 states that Algeria mobilizes financing from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria for the 2024 to 2026 period to scale up the national HIV response, with support directed to community-based organizations and new government guidelines for social contracting to channel funds to civil society ^{427, p. 1}. The Global Fund Eligibility List 2025 records Algeria’s HIV component as Transition Funding in 2025 ^{428, p. 2}. The notes further specify that Algeria remains eligible to receive a final Transition Funding allocation in 2026 to 2028, reflecting a continued donor support pathway for domestic HIV capacity ^{429, p. 11}.

5.5.4c Evidence that the country has fulfilled its full WHO contribution within the past two years

Score: 100

Algeria has fully paid its assessed contributions to the World Health Organization within the past two years. The World Health Organization “Statement of Account ALGERIA As at 31 May 2025” records that Algeria’s assessed contributions for 2024 and 2025 were paid on 12 May 2025, and the statement shows no assessed contribution receivable outstanding as of 31 May 2025, confirming the assessed contribution balance is settled for the current biennium obligations reflected in the statement ^{430, p. 1}. The World Health Organization “Assessed contributions payable by Member States and Associate Members 2024–2025” lists Algeria’s assessed contributions payable for the 2024–2025 biennium, including the net contribution payable for 2024 and the net contribution payable for 2025, and these listed annual assessed amounts correspond to the 2024 and 2025 assessed contribution amounts shown as paid on 12 May 2025 in the Statement of Account ^{431, p. 1}.

5.6.1a Sharing of genetic/biological data and materials beyond influenza

Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has a publicly available plan or policy that establishes routine international sharing of genetic data, clinical specimens, or isolated specimens, together with associated epidemiological data, beyond influenza. Law No. 18-11 of 2 July 2018 on health regulates biological sample transfers only as a tightly controlled administrative matter limited to clinical studies, requiring a prior declaration to the Minister of Health and the issuance of a transfer attestation, which reflects case-by-case authorization rather than a standing national framework for international sharing across pathogens or data types ^{432, p. 35}. Executive Decree No. 25-188 of 13 July 2025 on the organization of the central administration of the Ministry of Pharmaceutical Industry assigns responsibility for issuing transfer attestations for biological samples intended for analysis or clinical studies, without creating, mandating, or describing any publicly articulated policy governing international sharing of specimens or genetic data with linked epidemiological information ^{433, p. 28}.

5.6.1b Evidence of non-compliance with sample sharing element of PIP framework

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has failed to share influenza virus materials in accordance with the World Health Organization Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework during the past two years. The World Health Organization report of the Meeting of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework Advisory Group held from 1 to 4 April 2025 summarizes global influenza virus sharing activity for the period 1 March 2024 to 28 February 2025 using data from the Influenza Virus Traceability Mechanism and reports aggregate numbers of viruses shared in a timely manner, shared late, or not shared, without attributing instances of non-sharing or delayed sharing to specific countries ^{434, pp. 4–5}. During this reporting period, the World Health Organization Global Influenza Programme states that influenza virus sharing continued in accordance with World Health Organization guidance, with limited delays or non-sharing explained by technical and logistical constraints rather than country-level policy decisions ^{435, pp. 4–5}. In parallel, the World Health Organization Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System directory lists Algeria’s National Influenza Center located at the Institut Pasteur of Algeria in Algiers, confirming Algeria’s ongoing institutional participation in the World Health Organization network responsible for routine influenza virus sharing with World Health Organization Collaborating Centres ⁴³⁶.

5.6.1c Evidence of non-sharing of pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak

Score: 100

There is no publicly available evidence that Algeria has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. The World Health Organization Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework Advisory Group report for 1 March 2024 to 28 February 2025 reviews global sharing of influenza viruses with pandemic potential using the Influenza Virus Traceability Mechanism, records timely sharing, late sharing, and non sharing with stated reasons, and does not identify Algeria for noncompliance during this period ^{437, pp. 4 to 5}. The World Health Organization Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System directory lists the National Influenza Center in Algiers at the Institut Pasteur of Algeria in 2025, indicating ongoing participation in the network that shares viruses with World Health Organization Collaborating Centres ⁴³⁸.

6.1.1a Policy formation

Score: 25

6.1.1b Quality of bureaucracy

Score: 0

6.1.1c Excessive bureaucracy/red tape

Score: 0

6.1.1d Vested interests/cronyism

Score: 0

6.1.1e Corruption

Score: 34

6.1.1f Accountability of public officials

Score: 25

6.1.1g Human rights risk

Score: 25

6.1.2a Orderly transfers of power

Score: 0

6.1.3a Risk of social unrest

Score: 25

6.1.4a Risk of terrorism

Score: 50

6.1.4b Level of illicit arms flows within the country

Score: 25

6.1.4c Risk of organized criminal activity

Score: 50

6.1.5a Presence or risk of armed conflict

Score: 50

6.1.6a Government territorial control

Score: 100

6.1.7a International tensions

Score: 25

6.2.1a Adult literacy rate (15+ years old, both sexes)

Score: 79.58

6.2.2a UNDP Gender Inequality Index score

Score: 53.3

6.2.3a Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%)

Score: 99.46

6.2.3b Share of employment in the informal sector

Score: 50

6.2.3c Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Score: 0

6.2.4a Public confidence in government

Score: 50

6.2.5a Robust, open, diverse local media and reporting

Score: 100

6.2.6a Gini coefficient

Score: 72.4

6.3.1a Adequacy of road network

Score: 50

6.3.2a Adequacy of airports

Score: 50

6.3.3a Adequacy of power network

Score: 50

6.4.1a Urban population (% of total population)

Score: 20.43

6.4.2a Change in forest area (percentage points)

Score: 76.51

6.4.3a Natural disaster risk

Score: 75

6.5.1a Total life expectancy (years)

Score: 98.88

6.5.1b NCD mortality rate

Score: 83.06

6.5.1c Population aged 65+

Score: 59.97

6.5.1d Tobacco use (% of adults)

Score: 20.96

6.5.1e Level of adult obesity (%)

Score: 39.24

6.5.1f Age-standardised prevalence of mental health disorders (per 100 000 people)

Score: 42.24

6.5.2a Access to potable water

Score: 91.99

6.5.2b Access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Score: 85.98

6.5.2c Percentage of health-care facilities with no access to any electricity supply

Score: 0

6.5.3a Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (PPP)

Score: 22.3

6.5.4a Trust medical and health advice from the government

Score: 0

6.5.4b Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Score: 50