

Uruguay

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Uruguay. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Uruguay.

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Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that Uruguay has an antimicrobial residues (AMR) plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens.

The National Plan of Action against Antimicrobial Resistance (Plan Nacional de Acción contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana) from the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) aims to strengthen the knowledge and evidence through surveillance, reduce the incidence of infections through the effective application of infection prevention measures, and, finally, improve awareness and understanding of AMR. Moreover, the plan details both regional and national approaches for the surveillance and detection of AMR pathogens, including laboratory surveillance and reporting [1].

Moreover, the National Antimicrobial Resistance Containment Plan (Plan Nacional de contención de la Resistencia Antimicrobiana de Uruguay) by the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Piscadería) focuses on the potential development and transmission of resistant bacteria from animals through food and the transmission of bacteria with resistant genes from animals to humans [2].

Moreover, Act No. 41/012 the National Code on Mandatory Notification Diseases and Health Events (Código Nacional sobre Enfermedades y Eventos sanitarios de Notificación Obligatoria) considers as mandatory the notification in the case of "outbreaks or public health events of national importance" [3].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). October 2018. "National Plan of Action against Antimicrobial Resistance (Plan Nacional de Acción contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/sites/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/noticias/MSP%20PLAN%20NACIONAL%20ACCION%20CONTRA%20RESISTENCIA%20ANTIMICROBIA%20NA.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca). 2017. "Uruguay's National Antimicrobial Resistance Containment Plan (Plan Nacional de contención de la Resistencia Antimicrobiana de Uruguay)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/sites/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/files/documentos/noticias/plan_nacional_de_contencion_de_la_resistencia_antimicrobiana_de_uruguay.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Executive branch, Ministry of Public Health (Poder Ejecutivo, Ministerio de Salud Pública). Act No 41/012, February 28, 2012. "National Code on Mandatory Notification Diseases and Health Events (Código Nacional sobre Enfermedades y Eventos sanitarios de Notificación Obligatoria)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos-originales/41-2012>]. Accessed December

2020.

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2 , Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has a national laboratory system that tests 5 of the 7+1 pathogens defined by the World Health Organization (WHO). According to the National Plan of Action against Antimicrobial Resistance (Plan Nacional de Acción contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana) the Bacteriology Unit (Unidad de Bacteriología) of the Department of Laboratories of Public Health (Departamento de Laboratorios de Salud Pública) performs the detection and surveillance of *Salmonella* spp. and *Shigella* spp. making two shipments a year to microbiology laboratories throughout the country to assess the quality of bacterial identification and antibiotic susceptibility studies [1,2]. Laboratory surveillance data for *S. pneumoniae* in Uruguay is made through the System of Surveillance Networks of Agents Responsible for Bacterial Pneumonia and Meningitis (Sistema de Redes de Vigilancia de los Agentes Responsables de Neumonias y Meningitis Bacterianas (SIREVA)) [3]. *E. Coli* and *S. aureus* surveillance is performed through notification to the National Hospital Infection Surveillance System (Sistema Nacional de Vigilancia de Infecciones Hospitalarias) [2]. Laboratory surveillance data for *S. pneumoniae* in Uruguay is performed through the System of Surveillance Networks of Agents Responsible for Bacterial Pneumonia and Meningitis (Sistema de Redes de Vigilancia de los Agentes Responsables de Neumonias y Meningitis Bacterianas (SIREVA)) [3]. However, there is no evidence of *K. pneumoniae*, *N. gonorrhoeae*, and *Mycobacterium* surveillance on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) or the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) [4,5]. Uruguay is part of Pulse Net Latinoamérica, a regional network with reference laboratories of 14 countries in the region, under the leadership of the Instituto Nacional de Enfermedades Infecciosas (INEI)—ANLIS Carlos G. Malbrán in Argentina, a laboratory that has all the elements to work as a reference to region. The network has capacitated its participant labs, including the DLSP in Uruguay, to conduct testing of pathogens that include salmonella and shigella [6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2 October 2018. "Laboratory System (Sistema de Laboratorio)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). October 2018. "National Plan of Action against Antimicrobial Resistance (Plan Nacional de Acción contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana)". [[/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/noticias/MSP%20PLAN%20NACIONAL%20ACCION%20CONTRA%20RESISTENCIA%20ANTIMICROBIANA.pdf](https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/noticias/MSP%20PLAN%20NACIONAL%20ACCION%20CONTRA%20RESISTENCIA%20ANTIMICROBIANA.pdf)]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] System of Surveillance Networks of Agents Responsible for Bacterial Pneumonia and Meningitis (Sistema de Redes de Vigilancia de los Agentes Responsables de Neumonias y Meningitis Bacterianas (SIREVA)). "Data from Laboratory Surveillance of *Streptococcus Pneumoniae* in Uruguay (Datos de la vigilancia por laboratorios de *Streptococcus pneumoniae* en Uruguay)". [<https://redsirevanetwork.com/uruguay/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page. Página principal". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Centre of Disease Control (CDC). "PulseNet Latin America & Caribbean".

[<https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/participants/international/pulsenet-latinamerica.html>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that surveillance activities for antimicrobial residues is conducted in Uruguay. According to the National Plan for the Contention of Antimicrobial Resistance in Uruguay (Plan Nacional de Contencion de la Resistencia Antimicrobiana de Uruguay), which is led by the Ministry of Cattle, Agriculture, and Fishing (Ministerio de Ganado, Agricultura, y Pesca, MGAP), the evaluation of the impact of antimicrobial treatments in the environment (soil, waterways, etc.) is among the "actions" to adequately manage the treatments to promote the adequate use of antimicrobials. Another action line is the study of the impact of AMRs in the environment. The action applies to antimicrobial resistance (AMR) research in general and not specifically to any given pathogen [1, 2]. However, this does not appear to have been implemented and instead appears like this is part of a plan for the future.

[1] Ministry of Cattle, Agriculture, and Fishing. 2017. "National Plan for Contention of Antimicrobial Resistance in Uruguay". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/sites/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/files/documentos/noticias/plan_nacional_de_contencion_de_la_resistencia_antimicrobiana_de_uruguay.pdf]. Accessed 14 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Cattle, Agriculture, and Fishing. 2018. "MGAP Defined 100 Actions to Contain Antimicrobial Resistance." <https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/comunicacion/noticias/mgap-definio-100-acciones-para-contener-resistencia-antimicrobianos>. Accessed 14 January 2021.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has national legislation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans; however, there is evidence that there are gaps in its implementation. There are multiple legislative sources that consider the medical prescription as requirement for acceding to antibiotic use for humans. Moreover, Act No. 14.294 (Ley No. 14.294) [1], contains requirements for the distribution and sale of antibiotics in Articles 5, 11, 12, and 14 (Artículos 5, 11, 12 y, 14), such as the sell, use, and delivery of medicines and psychotropic substances require a prescription of a chemical pharmaceutical registered by the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud); Decree No. 18/989 (Decreto No. 18/989) [2], particularly in chapter III, named "Medicines for sale under the prescription of an authorized professional" (Medicamentos de venta bajo receta de profesional autorizado). According to Pharmaceutical situation study (Estudio Situación Farmacéutica) of the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2013, 35% of the medicines in Uruguay are sold without medical prescription in a private drug store (including antibiotics) [3]. This suggests that Uruguay has national legislation requiring prescription for antibiotic use for humans, but there is a lack of recent information to determine if there is an effective national enforcement.

[1] National Registry of Laws and Decrees (Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos). Decree No. 14.294, November 1974. "Narcotics: Their Commercialization and Use Are Regulated and Measures are Established Against the Illicit Trade of Drugs. (Estupefacientes: se regula su comercialización y uso y se establecen medidas contra el comercio ilícito de las drogas.)". [http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/legislations/PDF/UY/ley_14294.pdf]. Accessed January

[2] National Registry of Laws and Decrees (Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos). Decree No. 18/989, January 1989.

"Information and Publicity of Documents (Información y publicidad de documento)". [

<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/18-1989>]. Accessed January 2020.

[3] Global Health Organization. 2013. "Access, Rational Use, and Dispensation of Medicines in Uruguay (Acceso, Uso Racional y Dispensación de Medicamentos en Uruguay)".

[https://www.paho.org/uru/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=publications&alias=411-informe-situacion-farmaceutica-oms-nivel-ii-1&Itemid=307]. Accessed January 2021.

1.1.2b

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that Uruguay has a national legislation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals. In 2011, Act No. 98/0011 was enacted on the prohibition of the use of antibiotics in sheep and cattle food to regulate the risk agents of antimicrobial resistance in animals. The said act mandates that the fundamental objective of controlling the intake of animals constitutes a guarantee of safety and quality of food of animal origin and generates confidence in consumers [1]. Finally, there are no reports or news articles that suggest that gaps in implementation exist. No evidence was found via news articles or the Ministry of Health and Agriculture [2, 3].

[1] National Registry of Laws and Decrees (Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos). Act No. 98/011, March 2011. "Prohibition of the Use of Antibiotics in Sheep and Cattle Food, To Regulate the Risk Agents of Antimicrobial Resistance in Animals (Prohibición del Uso de Antibióticos en la Alimentación para Animales Ovinos y Bovinos)".

[<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/98-2011/1>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

1.2 ZOO NOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a

Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has national strategy on zoonotic disease. Uruguay has a National Honorary Zoonosis Commission (Comisión Nacional Honoraria de Zoonosis) as part of the Ministry of Public Health, which combats hydratic disease, other zoonoses, and vector-borne diseases. The commission coordinates in an inter-institutional, inter-sectoral, and interdisciplinary manner the fight against zoonoses in Uruguay, inserting itself in a regional process [1]. Similarly, the country has a National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Diseases transmitted by "aedes aegypti" (Dengue, Chikungunya, and Zika) carried out by the Epidemiology Division of the Ministry of Public Health (División de Epidemiología del Ministerio de Salud Pública) in order to respond to the 2016 national emergency of these diseases transmitted through a mosquito [2].

Moreover, Uruguay has a National Integrated Plan for Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic (Plan Nacional Integrado de Preparación para una Pandemia de Influenza) issued by the Ministry of Public Health and the Pan American Health Organization (PHO) for prevention, early detection, and control and eradication of influenza [3].

[1] National Honorary Zoonosis Commission (Comisión Nacional Honoraria de Zoonosis). 2005. "About Zoonosis Commission (Acerca De Comisión Zoonosis)". [<https://www.zoonosis.gub.uy/informacion>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). February 2016. "National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una Epidemia De Enfermedades Transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti)". [<http://www.higiene.edu.uy/materiales/Galeria/terminada/MSP.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2007. National Integrated Plan for Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic [https://www.paho.org/hq/images/stories/AD/HSD/CD/INFLUENZA/influenza_uruguay.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed December 2020.

1.2.1b

Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a plan or legislation that explicitly includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. Nevertheless, the country created an Animal Health Police through Act No. 3606, for the control and defense of livestock by the Executive Power against contagious diseases, extending health measures to birds and their usual diseases [1]. Similarly, the Uruguayan Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca) has an Animal Health Division (División de Salud Animal) in charge of preventing, controlling, and eradicating diseases of importance to animal health through health programs and specific control activities. It also carries out the control and certification of the sanitary and hygienic-sanitary conditions of the entry, import, and export of animals, genetic material, products, and by-products of animal origin in order to satisfy the requirements of international markets [2]. However, spillover events are not considered in the regulation and management of strategy documents on zoonotic disease. Moreover, the official websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) or the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) do not present evidence in this regard [3,4].

[1] National Registry of Laws and Decrees (Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos). Act No. 3606, April 1920. "Act of Animal Health Police (Ley de Policía Sanitaria Animal)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/3606-1910>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pesca). "Animal Health Division". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/institucional/estructura-del-organismo/division-sanidad-animal>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

1.2.1c

Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens. In this sense, the National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegyti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional Ante una Epidemia de Enfermedades Transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti" (2016) issued by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública, MSP) defines the general framework for a national response for a dengue, chikungunya, or Zika epidemic, including surveillance and control of said diseases. The plan includes strategies to reduce the density of the vector and increase vigilance and prevention/control measures [1]. Moreover, Uruguay has an Honorary Commission for the Fight Against Tuberculosis (Comisión Honoraria para la Lucha Antituberculosa y Enfermedades Prevalentes) and Prevalent Diseases with a National Program for the Control of Tuberculosis (Programa Nacional de Control de Tuberculosis) in charge of the norms of diagnosis, treatment, and prevention and surveillance of tuberculosis in Uruguay [2]. However, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) do not show information of documents which address control of at least three zoonotic diseases [3,4,5].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2016. "National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegyti". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-de-respuesta-nacional-ante-una-epidemia-de-enfermedades>]. Accessed January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). Animal Health Division (División de Salud Animal), Epidemiology Unit (Unidad de Epidemiología), Health Programs Department (Departamento de Programas Sanitarios). "Zoonotic Diseases Report—Year 2020". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/comunicacion/publicaciones/informe-enfermedades-zoonoticas-ano-2020>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Honorary Commission for the Fight Against Tuberculosis (Comisión Honoraria para la Lucha Antituberculosa y Enfermedades Prevalentes). "Expanded Immunization Program (Programa Nacional Operativo de Inmunizaciones)". [<https://chlaep.org.uy/programa-nacional-operativo-de-inmunizaciones/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. The most important units in the matter are the Commission Responsible for Ownership and Animal Welfare (Comisión de Tenencia Responsable y Bienestar Animal), which is part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) and the National Honorary Zoonosis Commission (Comisión Nacional Honoraria de Zoonosis) part of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) [1,2]. However, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca); and other ministries and systems, such as the Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura) or the previously mentioned commissions do not show information of an operation across ministries and carry out their institutional tasks individually and there [1,2,3,4,5].

[1] National Honorary Zoonosis Commission (Comisión Nacional Honoraria de Zoonosis). 2005. "About Zoonosis Commission (Acerca De Comision Zoonosis)". [<https://www.zoonosis.gub.uy/informacion>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Responsible Ownership and Animal Welfare Commission (Comisión de Tenencia Responsable y Bienestar Animal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/tematica/comision-tenencia-responsable-bienestar-anim>]. Accessed December 2020

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—Institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-educacion-cultura/>]. Accessed December 2020.

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has a national mechanism for livestock owners to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. The National Livestock Information System (Sistema Nacional de Información Ganadera), is an information system with the purpose of ensuring traceability of cattle from the establishment of origin of the animal to the refrigerator, both individually and by groups of animals [1]. Act No. 17,997 created the Animal Identification and Registration System (Sistema de Identificación y Registro Animal), through the traceability of products of animal origin throughout the country, administered and managed by the Ministry. The Act establishes the obligation of individual traceability of cattle through the application of individual identification devices with a national code, the entry of the animal to the official database, and registration of movements, changes of ownership, and other relevant productive, and health events in its life, from birth to death, without interruptions or inconsistencies [2].

[1] National Livestock Information System (Sistema Nacional de Información Ganadera). "Main Page—Institutional. (Página principal—institucional)." [<https://www.snig.gub.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "National Livestock Information System (Sistema Nacional de Información Ganadera)." [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-nacional-informacion-ganadera>]. Accessed December 2020.

1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals and animal's owners. In this sense, Resolution 658/012 from the Regulatory and Control Unit of Personal Data (Unidad Reguladora y de Control de Datos Personales) states that the the National Livestock

Information System (Sistema Nacional de Información Ganadera) is part of the Personal Data Database (Base de Datos Personales); in this sense, the livestock database complies with all personal data standards according to Law No. 18331 on the Protection of Personal Data (Ley No. 18331 de Protección de Datos Personales (2008) [1,2]. Similarly, the Regulatory and Control Unit of Personal Data (Unidad Reguladora y de Control de Datos Personales) has as its mission to "monitor compliance with the legal system, in particular the rules on legality, integrity, reliability, and data security proportionality, by the subjects achieved and may for this purpose take relevant actions over control and inspection for fiscalization purposes." Moreover, the Regulatory and Control Unit of Personal Data (Unidad Reguladora y de Control de Datos Personales) may also "request information from public and private entities, which must provide the background, documents, programs or other elements related to the processing of personal data that are required. In these cases, the authority must guarantee the security and confidentiality of the information and elements supplied" [3].

[1] Regulatory and Control Unit of Personal Data (Unidad Reguladora y de Control de Datos Personales). Resolution 658/012, July 2012. "Request for Inscription of the Personal Data Database of the National Livestock Information System from the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Solicitud de inscripción de la Base de Datos Personales de nombre "SNIG (Sistema de Información de Ganadería) presentada por el Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Piscadería.)". [https://www.gub.uy/unidad-reguladora-control-datos-personales/institucional/normativa/resolucion-n-658012]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). Law No. 18331 on the Protection of Personal Data (Ley No. 18331 de Protección de Datos Personales. 2008. [https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18331-2008#:~:text=%2D%20Toda%20persona%20f%C3%ADsica%20o%20jur%C3%ADdica,de%20la%20que%20es%20titular.]. Accessed February 2021.

[3] Regulatory and Control Unit of Personal Data (Unidad Reguladora y de Control de Datos Personales). "Institucional Page — Commitments (Página institucional—Cometidos)". [https://www.gub.uy/unidad-reguladora-control-datos-personales/institucional/cometidos]. Accessed December 2020.

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. The Division of Animal Health (División de Sanidad Animal) has as its general objective to maintain, protect, and increase the health of animals of economic importance in the country. The Division also carries out the control and certification of the sanitary and hygienic-sanitary conditions of the entry, import and export of animals, genetic material, products and by-products of animal origin. Moreover the Division coordinates prevention control and eradication measures for zoonotic disease like apthose fever, brucellosis, rabies and bird flu, brucellosis, and tuberculosis. The unit conducts active surveillance of animals [1]. Moreover, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) documented the national system for epidemiological surveillance of animals. The system includes both passive and active surveillance of animals, including wildlife. The active surveillance system includes a number of diseases of major relevance and applies to all susceptible populations [2]. Finally, the National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional Ante una Epidemia de Enfermedades Transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti" (2016) issued by the MSP defines the general framework for a national response for a dengue, chikungunya, or Zika epidemic [3].

[1] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Division of Animal Health (División de Sanidad Animal)—Institutional Page (página institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/institucional/estructura-del-organismo/division-sanidad-animal]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). September/October 2007. "Mission Report of the OIE. Evaluation of the Veterinary Services of Uruguay (Informe de Misión de OIE. Evaluación de los Servicios Veterinarios de Uruguay). [https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Support_to_OIE_Members/docs/pdf/OIE_PVS_Uruguay_final_21_04_08.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2016. "National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-de-respuesta-nacional-ante-una-epidemia-de-enfermedades>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 113.76

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 16.9

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has a national plan on zoonotic disease that includes mechanisms for working with the private sector in the control or response to zoonoses.

The National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by *Aedes Aegypti* (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes Aegypti*), developed by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), and the General Directorate of Health Epidemiological Division (Dirección General de Salud División Epidemiológica) is addressed to all public and private institutions involved in the response of the disease.

Moreover, the strategy plan considers mandatory notifications of suspicious cases to all public and private hospitals and public and private schools. Finally, the strategy plan includes public-private coordination for national contention of the disease [1].

Moreover, the National Integrated Plan for Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic (Plan Nacional Integrado de Preparación para una Pandemia de Influenza) (2007), issued by the MGAP, MSP, and Pan American Health Organization (PHO), which establishes a national plan for prevention, early detection, and control and eradication of influenza includes coordination with the private sector. Private medical institutions are included in the planning, organization, and participatory aspect of the plan. Specifically, the private sector is assigned with disseminating information as part of the proposed communication plan in the event of a pandemic and has a role in the financing and coordination of the plan, along with public sector authorities [2].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). February 2016. "National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by *Aedes Aegypti* (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes Aegypti*)". [<http://www.higiene.edu.uy/materiales/Galeria/terminada/MSP.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2007. "National Integrated Plan for Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic". [https://www.paho.org/hq/images/stories/AD/HSD/CD/INFLUENZA/influenza_uruguay.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities.

Furthermore, there is no website of the Central Laboratory of Uruguay; the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry

of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC); and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document a record of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. [1,2,3,4,5].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/]. Accessed January 2021.

[4] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity that address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. In this sense, the Norms for Biosecurity (Normas de bioseguridad) developed by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity that address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed [1,2,3,4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Norms for Biosecurity (Normas de Bioseguridad)". [https://montevideo.gub.uy/sites/default/files/concurso/materiales/anexo_02_-_manual_de_bioseguridad.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/]. Accessed January 2021.

[5] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.1c

Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. In this sense, there is a National System for Biosecurity (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad), but the system only regulates entrance of genetically modified vegetables into the country.[1] The System does not regulate or enforce the protection, control of, and accountability for high-consequence biological agents and toxins, and critical relevant biological materials and information within laboratories to prevent unauthorized possession, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document an agency responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations [2,3,4,5,6].

[1] National Biosecurity System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad). "Who We Are—Institutional Page (Quiénes somos—página institucional)". [<http://www.sistemanacionaldebioseguridad.gub.uy/unidad-organizativa/bioseguridad/institucional/quienes-somos>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[5] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database" [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.1d

Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Uruguay has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. In this sense, the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios), which is part of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), does not document any relevant information [1]. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document any evidence that Uruguay has made efforts to consolidate its inventories of dangerous

pathogens into a minimum number of facilities [2,3,4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[5] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Uruguay has in-country capacity to conduct polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen. In this sense, the Central Laboratory of the Ministry of Public Health (Laboratorio Central del Ministerio de Salud) does not have its own website. The System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios) publishes that the system is implanted in all areas of laboratories, including biochemistry, bacteriology, and virology [1]. Nevertheless, Uruguay has a Contingency Plan for Ebola Cases (Plan de Contingencia ante Casos de Ebola) in order to detect, investigate, and manage Ebola cases and to prevent the spread of the disease in the national territory. However, the plan does not account for in-country capacity to conduct PCR-based diagnostic testing and only has the capacity to conduct blood tests that work with anticoagulants (EDTA) obtained with a vacutainer [3]. Moreover, the National Action Plan against Antimicrobial Resistance a Public Health Approach (Plan Nacional contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana. Abordaje desde la Salud Pública) does not mention in-country capacity to conduct (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola [2]. Finally, the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC); and the Confidence Building Measures Report database database do not publish any information on PCR-based diagnostic of anthrax and/or Ebola [4,5,6,7].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "National Action Plan against Antimicrobial Resistance. A Public Health Approach. (Plan Nacional contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana. Abordaje desde la Salud Pública)". October 2018. [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/sites/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/noticias/MSP%20PLAN%20NACIONAL%20ACCION%20CONTRA%20RESISTENCIA%20ANTIMICROBIA NA.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). April 2020

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[6] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay requires biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. In this sense, the Institute for Training and Formation (Instituto de Capacitación y Formación) and the University of the Republic of Uruguay (Universidad de la República de Uruguay) developed the course "Biosafety in the Laboratory (Bioseguridad en el Laboratorio)"; however, this course was only provided to university staff [1]. Moreover, the country has a National Biosecurity System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad) but it only covers genetically modified organisms (GMOs) [2]. Furthermore, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not provide any evidence of biosecurity training [3,4,5,6,7].

[1] University of the Republic of Uruguay (Universidad de la República de Uruguay). "Course 'Biosafety in the Laboratory' (Curso 'Bioseguridad en el laboratorio')". 2017.

[http://www.capacitacion.edu.uy/images/docs/programas/programa_bioseguridad_basica_en_laboratorio_2017.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad (National Biosecurity System).

[<http://www.sistemanacionaldebioseguridad.gub.uy/unidad-organizativa/bioseguridad>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[6] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. The country has a National Biosecurity System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad), which is tasked with regularizing the entrance of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into Uruguay. Nevertheless, it does not include the conditions that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens need to satisfy [1]. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Piscicultura); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document or publish information on regulations or licensing conditions of personnel with access to dangerous pathogens, toxins or biological materials with pandemic potential [2,3,4,5,6,7].

[1] National Biosecurity System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad). "Institutional Page (Página institucional)".

[<http://www.sistemanacionaldebioseguridad.gub.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio)—Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[6] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B).

However, Resolution No. 50/08 of the MERCOSUR Common Market Group (Resolución No. 50/08 del Grupo Mercado Común del MERCOSUR), adopted by Uruguay through Decree No. 392/011 (Decreto Nº 392/011) approves the "MERCOSUR Technical Regulation for the Transport of Infectious Substances and Biological Samples between the States Parties (Reglamento Técnico MERCOSUR para el Transporte de Sustancias Infecciosas y Muestras Biológicas entre los Estados Parte)". The regulation defines and includes Categories A and B. Noteworthy are the requirements for the Sender, which include that the Sender shall pack, identify, and categorize the infectious substance or biological sample for the purposes provided for in the standard, following the biosafety indications established in the "Guidance on regulations relating to the transport of infectious substances" from the World Health Organization (WHO) 2007-2008. The receiver shall obtain the necessary authorizations from the national authorities for the entry into the States Parties of infectious substances and/or biological samples, informing the expected arrival of the material at least six hours in advance. In addition, the transporter shall not transport infectious material or biological samples in the same compartment in which passengers are transported [1]. However, these arrangements are limited to the market group, and there is no evidence that it includes other countries as well.

Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Piscadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document or publish information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B) [2,3,4,5,6,7].

[1] Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). Decree No. 392/011 (Decreto 392/011) of 8 of December 2011. "MERCOSUR Technical Regulation for the Transport of Infectious Substances and Biological Samples between the States Parties (Reglamento Técnico MERCOSUR para el Transporte de Sustancias Infecciosas y Muestras Biológicas entre los Estados Parte)". [https://www.aduanas.gub.uy/innovaportal/v/8713/1/innova.front/decreto-n%C2%B0-392_011.html]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<http://www.mtop.gub.uy/transporte/sobre-transporte>]. Accessed January 2021.

[6] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential.

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are signatories to "Resolution No. 50/08 MERCOSUR Technical Regulation for the Transport of Infectious Substances and Biological Samples between the States Parties," which includes various measures for cross-border transfer checks and end-user screening [1, 2]. According to the MERCOSUR resolution, the relevant bodies for implementation are Argentina's Ministry of Health, Brazil's Ministry of Health/ANVISA, Paraguay's Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, and Uruguay's Ministry of Public Health [2]. The Resolution includes Categories A and B infectious substances, crops, biological samples, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in its definition of infectious substances [2].

This Resolution places responsibilities on Senders, Receivers, and the relevant health bodies. Specifically, Senders are required to organize a written approval from the receiving institution or organization in advance, determine appropriate transportation including mode of transportation and the most direct route, acquire customs and sanitary clearances from relevant agencies, notify recipients of procedures to be carried out in advance, and follow the World Health Organization's (WHO) "Guide on regulations relating to the transport of infectious substances" for packaging and labelling [2]. The Recipient is also required to obtain necessary authorizations for entry into state, provide the Sender with necessary documentation, and notify the Sender of received materials. Both the Sender and the Receiver are also mandated to get the relevant health authority in the countries to inspect the respective export and import materials [2]. Required documentation as part of this Resolution includes "commercial shipping/invoice list that includes the recipient's address, number of packages, detail of content, weight and value (if any)" as part of its end-user screening procedures [2].

Uruguay incorporated this Resolution in its national laws under EP Decree No. 392/011 of 11/14/11, published in the DO on 11/24/11 [1].

[1] MERCOSUR. 28 November 2008. "MERCOSUR/GMC/RES. No. 50/08: MERCOSUR Technical Regulation for the Transport of Infectious Substances and Biological Samples between the States Parties—Regulations Details".

[<https://normas.mercosur.int/public/normativas/277>]. Accessed 1 June 2021.

[2] MERCOSUR. 28 November 2008. "(Resolution 50/2008): MERCOSUR Technical Regulation for the Transport of Infectious Substances and Biological Samples Between the States Parties (REPEAL OF RES. GMC No. 25/00)".

[https://normas.mercosur.int/simfiles/normativas/4072_RES_050-2008_ES_RTM%20TranspSubst%20Infecciosas.pdf].

Accessed 1 June 2021.

1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a

Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. In this sense, the National Biosafety System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad) analyzes the possible risks associated with the use of genetically modified plants, taking into account the environment, the conservation of natural resources, human and animal health, as well as sustainable productive development [1]. Moreover, Uruguay has several guidelines such as the National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional Ante una Epidemia de por Aedes Aegypti), the National Program for Dental Health (Programa Nacional de Salud Bucal), and the vigilance Protocol for Hantaviruses, which indicate that healthcare and laboratory personnel must uphold "biosafety standards" in the handling of equipment in event of specific diseases. Nevertheless, there is no explanation on the document as to what these biosafety standards are [2,3,4]. Moreover, the system does not oversee issues related with harmful biological substances. Finally, The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document information related to biosafety [5,6,7,8].

[1] National Biosafety System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad). "Who We Are—Institutional Page (Quiénes somos—página institucional)". [<http://www.sistemanacionaldebioseguridad.gub.uy/unidad-organizativa/bioseguridad/institucional/quienes-somos>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2016. "National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional Ante una Epidemia de por Aedes Aegypti)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-de-respuesta-nacional-ante-una-epidemia-de-enfermedades>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2007. "National Program for Dental Health (Programa Nacional de Salud Bucal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/sites/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/publicaciones/PROGRAMA%20SALUD%20BUCAL%202008.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020. Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2010. Hantaviriosis. [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/sites/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/publicaciones/Hantaviriosis_actualizacion_mayo2010.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[7] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database" [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[8] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.4.1b

Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. There is no evidence that the National Biosafety System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad) enforces biosafety regulations related to the the prevention of accidents that involve the release of harmful biological substances [1]. The system only covers genetically modified plants and vegetables. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not document information related to biosafety enforcement [2,3,4,5,6].

[1] National Biosecurity System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad). "Who We Are—Institutional Page (Quiénes somos— página institucional)". [<http://www.sistemanacionaldebioseguridad.gub.uy/unidad-organizativa/bioseguridad/institucional/quienes-somos>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[5] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay requires biosafety training using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. The Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura); Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building

Measures Report database do not publish information regarding biosafety training for personnel working in facilities with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential [1,2,3,4,5,6].

- [1] Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—Institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-educacion-cultura/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.
- [5] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database" [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [6] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay" [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Uruguay has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. The Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura); the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not publish or document any assessment of dual-research with dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential [1,2,3,4,5,6,7].

- [1] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—Institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-educacion-cultura/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [5] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed January 2021.

[6] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay]. Accessed January 2021.

1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. Both the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) and the Central Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratorio Central de Salud Pública) do not have their own website [1]. The Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Piscadería); and the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) Database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report do not publish or document legislation or regulations requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research [2,3,4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio)—Institutional page (Página institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay" [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay]. Accessed January 2021.

1.5.1c

Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. The National Biosafety System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad) only oversees genetically modified plants and vegetables and does not oversee issues pertaining dangerous pathogens and/or dual research [1]. Finally, the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería,

Agricultura y Pescadería); the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) Database; and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not publish or document any agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research [2,3,4,5,6].

- [1] National Biosecurity System. "Who We Are—Institutional Page (Quiénes somos—página institucional)". [<http://www.sistemanacionaldebioseguridad.gub.uy/unidad-organizativa/bioseguridad/institucional/quienes-somos>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [2] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [5] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [6] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay" [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of legislation and/or regulation in Uruguay requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold. In this sense, the National Biosafety System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad) only oversees genetically modified plants and vegetables (GMOs) [1]. There is no evidence in the Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas), the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería), the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database and the Confidence Building Measures Report database do not publish or document any regulations/legislations that require screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold [2,3,4,5,6,7].

- [1] National Biosecurity System (Sistema Nacional de Bioseguridad). "Who We Are—Institutional Page (Quiénes somos—página institucional)". [<http://www.sistemanacionaldebioseguridad.gub.uy/unidad-organizativa/bioseguridad/institucional/quienes-somos>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Ministerio de Transporte y Obras Públicas). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<http://www.mtop.gub.uy/transporte/sobre-transporte>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional

(Página principal—institucional). [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.
[6] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.
[7] Confidence Building Measures. 2020. "Uruguay" [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2019

World Health Organization

1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 tests defined by the World Health Organization (WHO). In this sense, according to the National Plan of Action against Antimicrobial Resistance (Plan Nacional de Acción contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana), the Bacteriology Unit (Unidad de Bacteriología) of the Department of Laboratories of Public Health (Departamento de Laboratorios de Salud Pública) performs the detection and surveillance of *Salmonella* spp., *Shigella* spp making two shipments a year to microbiology laboratories throughout the country to assess the quality of bacterial identification and antibiotic susceptibility studies [1,2]. Laboratory surveillance data for *S. pneumoniae* in Uruguay is made through the System of Surveillance Networks of Agents Responsible for Bacterial Pneumonia and Meningitis (Sistema de Redes de Vigilancia de los Agentes Responsables de Neumonias y Meningitis Bacterianas (SIREVA) [3]. *E. Coli* and *S. aureus* surveillance is performed through notification to the National Hospital Infection Surveillance System (Sistema Nacional de Vigilancia de Infecciones Hospitalarias) [2]. Laboratory surveillance data for *S. pneumoniae* in Uruguay is performed by the System of Surveillance Networks of Agents Responsible for Bacterial Pneumonia and Meningitis (Sistema de Redes de Vigilancia de los Agentes Responsables de Neumonias y Meningitis Bacterianas (SIREVA) [3]. Moreover, tuberculosis is tested at the laboratory of the Honorary Commission for the Antituberculosis and Prevalent Diseases Commission (Comision Honoraria para la Lucha Antituberculosa y Enfermedades Prevalentes, CHLA-EP), which is designated by the Ministry of Public Health [4,5,6]. However, there is no evidence in the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Honorary Commission for the Antituberculosis and Prevalent Diseases Commission (Comision Honoraria para la Lucha Antituberculosa y Enfermedades Prevalentes, CHLA-EP), and the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios) that the tests conducted are diagnostic tests [4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2 October 2018. "Laboratory System (Sistema de Laboratorio)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). October 2018. "National Plan of Action against Antimicrobial Resistance (Plan Nacional de Acción contra la Resistencia Antimicrobiana)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/sites/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/noticias/MSP%20PLAN%20NACIONAL%20ACCION%20CONTRA%20RESISTENCIA%20ANTIMICROBIA NA.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] System of Surveillance Networks of Agents Responsible for Bacterial Pneumonia and Meningitis (Sistema de Redes de Vigilancia de los Agentes Responsables de Neumonias y Meningitis Bacterianas (SIREVA)). "Data From Laboratory Surveillance of *Streptococcus pneumoniae* in Uruguay (Datos de la vigilancia por laboratorios de *Streptococcus pneumoniae* en Uruguay)" [https://redsirevanetwork.com/uruguay/]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Honorary Commission for the Antituberculosis and Prevalent Diseases Commission (Comision Honoraria para la Lucha Antituberculosa y Enfermedades Prevalentes, CHLA-EP). "Main Page (Página principal)". [http://www.chlaep.org.uy/]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio]. Accessed December 2020.

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has a national plan, strategy, or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity.

However, the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) aims "to ensure the availability of SARS-CoV-2 real-time molecular amplification (RT-PCR) diagnostics according to WHO procedures and recommendations" and to "establish the flow and conditions of transport of samples from the clinical analysis laboratories to the Department of Public Health Laboratories (DLSP)" [1].

The contingency plan was drafted for the COVID-19 pandemic, yet there is no previous evidence of a contingency plan that includes considerations for testing, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing according to research in the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería) and the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [2,3,4].

Finally, the contingency plan does not contemplate or include defining goals for testing. Moreover, Uruguay has a national procurement protocol in place, the Agency of Procurement and Contracts of the State (Agencia de Compras y Contrataciones del Estado) that is used for the acquisition of laboratory needs like equipment [5].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database" [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/u/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Agency of Procurement and Contracts of the State (Agencia de Compras y Contrataciones del Estado, ACCE). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.comprasestatales.gub.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA]). In this sense, the System of Laboratory (Sistema de Laboratorio) and the Central Laboratory of the Ministry of Health (Laboratorio Central del Ministerio de Salud) do not have their own websites and the only information available is from the website of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Moreover, the information about the laboratory is extremely limited [1]. In addition, Uruguay is part of the Latin American AMR Surveillance System (Red Latinoamericana para la Vigilancia de la Resistencia a los Antimicrobianos, ReLAVRA), which aims to obtain reliable, timely, and reproducible microbiological data to improve patient care and strengthen surveillance. However, the country does make available information related to national reference facilities [2]. Finally, the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería) does not publish any information regarding reference facilities [3].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio)—Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). "Latin American AMR Surveillance System (Red Latinoamericana para la Vigilancia de la Resistencia a los Antimicrobianos, ReLAVRA)". [<https://www.paho.org/es/temas/resistencia-antimicrobianos/red-latinoamericana-vigilancia-resistencia-antimicrobianos#:~:text=La%20Red%20Latinoamericana%20de%20Vigilancia,fortalecer%20la%20vigilancia%20mediante%20programas>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review. In this sense, the System of Laboratory (Sistema de Laboratorio) and the Central Laboratory of the Ministry of Health (Laboratorio Central del Ministerio de Salud) do not have their own website and the only information available is on the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Moreover, the information about the laboratory is extremely limited and there is no reference or evidence that the laboratory is subject to external quality assurance review [1]. Finally, the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería) does not publish any information regarding facilities that are subject to external review [2].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a

Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a nationwide specimen transport system. Moreover, Decree 129/005 (Decreto 129/005) "Regulation for the Transport of Samples for Clinical Analysis (Regulación para el transporte de muestras para análisis clínicos)" establishes the requirements of the courier system for the safe transport of samples for clinical analysis [2].

Uruguay has a laboratory called Biofast that provides High Complexity (Level D) clinical analysis services; however, it is private and not national; it is located only in Montevideo, Barra de Carrasco, La Tahona, Los Olivos, San Nicolas, and Ciudad de Costa [3].

Moreover, Decree No. 382/014 establishes the Regulation of Operation of Clinical Analysis Laboratories. The norm indicates that specimens allow for "systems and [transportation] companies" that meet the standards of the regulation to provide the service, and dictates minimum requirements for the land transportation nationwide of clinical analysis specimen [4].

Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería) do not document or publish any information of a nationwide transport system [5,6].

In addition, the private laboratory AravanLabs "began to manufacture for national use and export to Latin America the 'viral transport medium' that allows the storage and movement of swab samples to detect COVID-19." The laboratory has a contract with the government of Uruguay to fabricate and transport COVID-19 detection kits; however, the available information does not suggest that the private laboratory has national reach and provides a transport system from the site of collection to the testing laboratory; the information suggests that it only provides the kits for transportation [1].

[1] Agency EFE (Agencia EFE). 29 April 2020. "Uruguay exports to Latin America the 'Means for Viral Transport' for SARS-CoV-2 (Uruguay exporta a Latinoamérica el 'medio de transporte viral' del SARS-CoV-2)." [https://www.efe.com/efe/america/sociedad/uruguay-exporta-a-latinoamerica-el-medio-de-transporte-viral-del-sars-cov-2/20000013-4234331]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). "Decree 129/005 (Decreto 129/005) 2005. Regulation for the Transport of Samples for Clinical Analysis (Regulación para el transporte de muestras para análisis clínicos)". [https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos-reglamento/382-2014/1]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Biofast Análisis Clínico. "Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [http://www.biofast.com.uy/.] Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Registry of Laws and Decrees (Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos). Decree No. 382/014, January 2015.

"Regulation of Operation of Clinical Analysis Laboratories (La Reglamentacion de Funcionamiento de Laboratorios de Analisis Clinicos)". [https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/382-2014]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—Institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional

(Página principal—institucional). [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a

Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. In this sense, the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) does not mention any rapid authorization of laboratories to supplement national capacity [1]. Moreover, the "COVID-19 Laboratory Surveillance and Diagnose (COVID-19 Vigilancia y Diagnóstico Laboratorial)" are both plans developed by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and do not mention rapid authorization of laboratories [2]. Finally, the the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) or the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería) do not publish or document information related to the authorization of laboratories to supplement national capacity during an outbreak [3,4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infleccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "COVID-19 Laboratory Surveillance and Diagnose (COVID-19 Vigilancia y Diagnóstico Laboratorial)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/sites/ministerio-salud-publica/files/documentos/noticias/03_MSP_COVID_19_VIGILANCIA_DIAGNOSTICO_FINAL.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and daily analysis for infectious diseases. The National Code of Diseases and Mandatory Notification Events (Código Nacional de Enfermedades y Eventos de Notificación Obligatoria) developed by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) outlines the list of diseases

and events considered of mandatory notification, notification deadlines, those responsible for notification, and sanctions established in case of non-compliance [1]. Moreover, the National Guide for the Surveillance and Control of Diseases and Health Events of Mandatory Notification (Guía Nacional de Vigilancia y Control de Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificación Obligatoria) also defines the diseases and health events of mandatory notification as all those communicable or non-communicable diseases and events, facts, or circumstances that may be considered a risk to public health, that are identified in the national territory and that concern the health authorities to the preventive, therapeutic, or epidemiological ends. [2] Diseases are categorized into "immediate notification" and "weekly notification." The following agents are responsible for notification: medics, veterinarians, health technicians, and lab technicians. Finally, the websites of the of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería), the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios) provide no evidence that data is being analyzed on a daily basis [3,4,5].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). July 2018. "National Code of Diseases and Mandatory Notification Events (Código Nacional de Enfermedades y Eventos de Notificación Obligatoria)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/codigo-nacional-de-enfermedades-y-eventos-de-notificacion-obligatoria>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "National Guide for the Surveillance and Control of Diseases and Health Events of Mandatory Notification (Guía Nacional de Vigilancia y Control de Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificación Obligatoria)". July 2018. [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/guia-nacional-vigilancia-control-enfermedades-eventos-sanitarios>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the World Health Organization (WHO) within the last two years. In this sense, the Disease Outbreak News (DONs) did not report any news from Uruguay from the period 2018-2020 [1]. In addition, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) do not document or publish information related to a potential public health emergency [2,3]. Finally, there is no evidence of Uruguay reporting COVID-19 as a PHEIC, via the World Health Organization "Disease Outbreak News—Uruguay" [1].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News (DONs—Institutional page". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/en/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional

(Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at the national level. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública, MSP), through the Department of Health Surveillance (Departamento de Vigilancia en Salud) and the National Code of Diseases and Mandatory Notification Events (Código Nacional de Enfermedades y Eventos de Notificación Obligatoria), has an electronic webpage for the Notification of Mandatory Events (Notificación de Eventos Obligatorios). However, the webpage is only addressed to health professionals. A National Code on Disease and Sanitary Events of Compulsory Notification (Codigo Nacional Sobre Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificacion Obligatoria) (2004) and a National Guide for the Surveillance and Control of Diseases and Sanitary Events of Compulsory Notification (Guia Nacional de Vigilancia y Control de Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificacion Obligatoria) (2015) create a list of diseases of compulsory notification and establish that all healthcare professionals, public and private healthcare facilities, other health technicians, and laboratories must notify the MSP via "telephone, fax, telegram, or in person" [1,2,3]. Finally, there is no evidence that the electronic reporting system is separated into sub-systems via the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios) [4,5,6].

[1] President of the Republic. 2004. "National Code on Disease and Sanitary Events of Compulsory Notification".

[<http://archivo.presidencia.gub.uy/decretos/2004022007.htm>. Accessed February 2021.

[2] Public Health. 2015. National Guide for the Surveillance and Control of Diseases and Sanitary Events of Compulsory Notification. [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/guia-nacional-de-vigilancia-y-control-de-enfermedades-y-eventos>]. Accessed February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Notification of Mandatory Events (Notificación de eventos obligatorios)—Institutional Page". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/notificacion-eventos-obligatorios>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). July 2018. "National Code of Diseases and Mandatory Notification Events (Código Nacional de Enfermedades y Eventos de Notificación Obligatoria)". July 2018.

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/codigo-nacional-de-enfermedades-y-eventos-de-notificacion-obligatoria>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio)—Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the electronic reporting surveillance system of Uruguay collects ongoing or real-time laboratory data. In this sense, the electronic webpage for the Notification of Mandatory Events (Notificación de Eventos Obligatorios) is only addressed to health professionals and no more information is accessible to the public in general [1]. Moreover, the National Guide for the Surveillance and Control of Diseases and Health Events of Mandatory Notification (Guía Nacional de Vigilancia y Control de Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificación Obligatoria) does not mention ongoing or real-time surveillance of laboratory data [2]. The National Code on Disease and Sanitary Events of Compulsory Notification (Codigo Nacional Sobre Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificacion Obligatoria) and the National Guide for the Surveillance and Control of Diseases and Sanitary Events of Compulsory Notification (Guia Nacional de Vigilancia y Control de Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificacion Obligatoria) created a list of diseases of compulsory notification and established that all healthcare professionals, public and private healthcare facilities, other health technicians, and laboratories must notify the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) via telephone, fax, telegram, or in person about the disease. Nevertheless, it does not show information on reports about ongoing or real-time laboratory data [3]. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) does not mention information related to the collecting of real-time data of laboratories [4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Notification of Mandatory Events (Notificación de eventos obligatorios)—Institutional Page." [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/notificacion-eventos-obligatorios]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "National Code of Diseases and Mandatory Notification Events (Código Nacional de Enfermedades y Eventos de Notificación Obligatoria)". July 2018. [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/codigo-nacional-de-enfermedades-y-eventos-de-notificacion-obligatoria]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). 2015. "National Guide for the Surveillance and Control of Diseases and Sanitary Events of Compulsory Notification (Guia Nacional de Vigilancia y Control de Enfermedades y Eventos Sanitarios de Notificacion Obligatoria)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/guia-nacional-de-vigilancia-y-control-de-enfermedades-y-eventos]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has electronic health records (EHRs) in use. The main purpose of the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) is to promote and improve the continuity of the care process of the users of the Uruguayan health system, through a mechanism that allows to unify and make available all the clinical information of the EHR user. The Uruguayan strategy for the integration of clinical information of the Health user is supported by a federated system that is based on international standards for the exchange of clinical information. The

federated system is constituted of a central platform, the National Electronic Health Record Platform (Plataforma de Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional), which allows the clinical data that is stored in each institution to be securely exchanged in real time [1]. This process is led by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública, MSP) and mandated by Decree No. 242/017, which binds public and private healthcare facilities to have a database for the clinical history of their patients, which is consolidated within the National Electronic Clinical History database [2].

[1] Agency of Electronic Governance, Society of Information and Knowledge. July 2019. "National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/node/312>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Registry of Laws and Decrees (Registro Nacional de Leyes y Decretos). Decree No. 242/017, September 2017. "Mechanisms for the Exchange of Clinical Information for Health Care Purposes Through the National Electronic Medical Record System (Mecanismos de Intercambio de Informacion Clinica con Fines Asistenciales a Traves Del Sistema de Historia Clinica Electronica Nacional)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/242-2017>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.4.1b

Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the national public health system of Uruguay has access to electronic health records (EHRs) of individuals in their country. In this sense, the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) is a platform on which the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), public and private health service providers, and public and private health organizations have access to and can contribute to individuals' EHRs, according to the website of the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional). Moreover, the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) is based on the pillars and pre-existing technological advances in the organizations that constitute the National Integrated Health System (Sistema Nacional Integrado de Salud). In this manner, the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) is an improvement of the information systems of each organization, adapting them to international interoperability standards and generating a central health platform that orchestrates and audits the safe and controlled exchange of clinical information for healthcare purposes. In conclusion, the National Electronic Health Record Platform (Plataforma de Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) allows access of EHRs to health professionals [1].

[1] Agency of Electronic Governance, Society of Information and Knowledge. July 2019. "National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/node/312>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.4.1c

Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has data standards to ensure data is comparable. In this sense, the website of the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) mentions: "The Uruguayan strategy for the integration of clinical information of the Health user is supported by a federated system, based on international standards for the exchange of clinical information. The selected strategy is based on the pillars and pre-existing technological advances in

the organizations that constitute the National Integrated Health System (Sistema Nacional Integrado de Salud) and respects their technological heterogeneity. In this manner, the system promotes the improvement of the information systems of each organization, adapting them to international interoperability standards and generating a central health platform that orchestrates and audits the safe and controlled exchange of clinical information for healthcare purposes" [1]. However, the website of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and of the Agency of Electronic Governance, Society of Information and Knowledge (Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento) lacks information on which international data standards it is operating with. In conclusion, the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) mentions international standards, yet it fails to mention which international data standards it uses [2,3].

[1] Agency of Electronic Governance, Society of Information and Knowledge (Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento). July 2019. "National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/node/312>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Agency of Electronic Governance, Society of Information and Knowledge (Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a

Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance).

In this sense, the National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by *Aedes Aegypti* (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes Aegypti*), developed by the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) and the General Directorate of Health Epidemiological Division (Dirección General de Salud División Epidemiológica) outlines that official information on the epidemic will be communicated exclusively by the responsible authorities and in accordance with the response level. For this, they will have a Plan of Public Communication for Emergencies and Disasters [1].

Moreover, the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) establishes the following lines of action: i) Advice on communication to the different actors of the institution (National Directorate, Departmental Emergency Committees, Coordinating Centers for Departmental Emergencies, etc.); ii) definition of protocols for the institution's communication processes and instruments that facilitate these processes; iii) comprehensive coordination of public communication in front of citizens and the media before, during, and after emergency situations [2].

Finally, the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud

Pública); Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); and Ministry of Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) do not document or publish evidence on mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data [3,4,5,6,7].

[1] Ministry of Health. February 2016. "National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti)".

[<http://www.higiene.edu.uy/materiales/Galeria/terminada/MSP.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Communication (Comunicación) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/politicas-gestion/comunicacion>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio), Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ambiente/>]. Accessed January 2021.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites. There is no evidence in this regard via the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); or the Ministry of Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) [1,2,3,4,5].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ambiente/>]. Accessed January 2021.

2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Uruguay does make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc.) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites. In this sense, the viewer of coronavirus COVID-19 cases in Uruguay (Visualizador de casos coronavirus COVID-19 en Uruguay) published by the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) publishes desegregated and de-identified data updated daily. The Viewer shows the number of tests since 13 March 2020, number of tests conducted daily, distribution of infected people by region (department), accumulated confirmed cases, new cases, total number of infected people with an ongoing infection, total number of recovered people, total number of diseased people by COVID-19, patients in intensive care, patients in middle care, number of infected healthcare personnel, active infected healthcare personnel, recovered healthcare personnel, diseased healthcare personnel, as well as country by country confirmed, diseased, and recovered cases. The information is updated daily by the Department of Health Surveillance, Epidemiological Division of the ministry of Public Health (Departamento de Vigilancia en Salud, División Epidemeológica, Ministerio de Salud Pública) [1,2].

[1] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Visualizador de casos coronavirus COVID-19 en Uruguay". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/pagina-embedida/visualizador-casos-coronavirus-covid-19-uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Updates on Coronavirus Information of Uruguay". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/comunicacion/noticias/informacion-actualizada-sobre-coronavirus-covid-19-uruguay>]. Accessed January 2021.

2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. In this sense, Act 19355 (Ley 19355) National Budget of Salaries, Expenses, and Investments 2015-2019 (Presupuesto Nacional de Sueldos Gastos e Inversiones 2015-2019)" states in Article 466 (Artículo 466), "The Executive Power has the faculty to determine the mechanisms for the exchange of clinical information for healthcare purposes, through the National Electronic Medical Record System (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional), in order to guarantee the right to the protection of the health of the inhabitants and access to the integrated networks of health services, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 18.211 (Ley 18.211). In the exchange of clinical information, the confidentiality of the information will be ensured in accordance with Act No. 18.331, Act on Protection of Personal Data (Ley de Protección de Datos Personales)" [1]. Finally, Act No.18.331, Protection of Personal Data (Ley de Protección de Datos Personales) establishes in Article 5 that "the actions of those responsible for the databases, both

public and private, and, in general, of all those who act in regarding the personal data of third parties, must comply with the following general principles: Legality, Veracity, Purpose, Prior informed consent, Data security, Reserve and Responsibility [2].

[1] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). "Act 19355 (Ley 19355) National Budget of Salaries, Expenses, and Investments 2015-2019 (Presupuesto Nacional de Sueldos Gastos e Inversiones 2015-2019)". December 2015. [https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/19355-2015/466]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). Act 18.331 (Ley 18.331. "Act on Protection of Personal Data (Ley de Protección de Datos Personales)". August 2008. [https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18331-2008]. Accessed December 2020.

2.4.4b

Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks. In this sense, Act 18331 for the Protection of Personal Data (Ley 18331 de Protección de Datos Personales) does not mention protection of confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals from cyber attacks [1]. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional) from the Agency of Electronic Governance, Society of Information and Knowledge (Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento) do not mention protection of personal data from cyber attacks [2,3].

[1] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). Act 18331 (Ley 18331). Act for the Protection of Personal Data (Ley de Protección de Datos Personales). August 2008. [https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18331-2008]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Agency of Electronic Governance, Society of Information and Knowledge (Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento). "National Electronic Medical Record (Historia Clínica Electrónica Nacional)". July 2019. [https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/node/312]. Accessed December 2020.

2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a

Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease = 2, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is sufficient evidence that Uruguay has made a commitment via public statements, legislation, and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region for more than one diseases.

Uruguay is a member state of the World Health Organization (WHO) and is bound by the International Sanitary Regulation of the WHO, which binds states to provide public health information during a public health emergency: "Its objective is to help the international community prevent and respond to serious risks to public health that may cross borders and threaten the world population. The purpose and scope of the IHR (2005) is to prevent the international spread of diseases and provide protection against them, control them and give them a public health response, all in proportion to the risks they pose to public health and avoiding unnecessary interference with international travel and trade" [1].

Moreover, Uruguay is a member state of the MERCOSUR Common Market (Mercado Común MERCOSUR), the aim of MERCOSUR is to provide aid: "For the development of cooperation programs and projects, the States Parties identify and update different thematic areas considered as priorities, such as: health, education, environment, gender, intra-regional trade, productive integration, among others" [2.] In 2018, the health ministers of the bloc and signed many agreements. "Other advances recorded in the meeting of Ministers of Health were the three agreements signed to increase health and surveillance actions, with the aim of reducing the risks of reintroduction in the region of diseases that have already been eradicated, such as measles, Rubella and polymenitis. In this sense, one of the main commitments is for countries to work to achieve and maintain coverage against polio of over 95%, strengthening epidemiological surveillance and updating polio outbreak response plans, according to local needs" [3].

Finally, the websites of the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional); the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería); Ministry of Environment (Ministerio del Ambiente) do not document or publish evidence on commitments via public statements, legislation, and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region, either for one or more diseases [4,5,6,7,8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "What are the International Health Regulations and the Emergency Committees". June 2016. [<https://www.who.int/features/qa/39/es/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] MERCOSUR Common Market of the South. (MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur). "International Cooperation— Institutional Page (Cooperación Internacional—Página institucional)". [<https://www.mercosur.int/temas/cooperacion-en-el-mercosur/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] MERCOSUR Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur). June 29, 2018. "Advances in the Joint Purchase of Medicines and in Coverage Against Epidemics". [<https://www.mercosur.int/avances-en-la-compra-conjunta-de-medicamentos-y-en-la-cobertura-contra-epidemias/>]. Accessed June 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio), Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page— Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page— Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page— Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[8] Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). "Main Page— Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ambiente/>]. Accessed January 2021.

2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a national system in place to provide support (e.g., training, metrics standardization, and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of either future or active public health emergencies. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) developed the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)). The plan provides guidelines to establish contact tracing in the COVID-19 context. Moreover, the Contingency plan, in the Surveillance (Vigilancia) section establishes the following aspects: "Intensify routine surveillance of severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) and influenza-like illness (ILI). Monitor events and rumors in the press, social networks, and with health services. Reinforce the importance of communication and immediate notification of suspected cases of COVID-19. Promote actions for the detection, notification and management of suspected cases of COVID-19 in health services. Guide and train departmental epidemiology teams in the investigation and monitoring of probable suspected cases of COVID-19" [1]. While the plan calls for training, it does not elaborate further on a system to support sub-national units in this process. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia), and the System of Laboratories do not show information that suggests that there is a national system to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g., training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of either future or active public health emergencies [2,3,4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) By the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and/or medical attention. However, the government implemented a number of measures to provide support to certain groups who have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic; for this, the government approved an economic package of approximately USD22 million for those who need social assistance. Moreover, the government granted a subsidy of 160 USD million to workers in the artistic sector. Further, a postponement for the payment of installments of the Social Security Bank (Banco de Previsión Social) loans for 150,800 retirees and pensioners who receive approximately USD 320 per month. The Uruguay Social Card (Tarjeta Uruguay Social) that consists of monetary transfer to households in extreme situations of vulnerability for access to basic food and products of first necessity, benefited approximately 400,000 people. There was doubling of the amount of food destined to municipal dining rooms in the interior of the country and of food baskets for the territorial offices. There was also expansion of the number of shelters to locate homeless people aged over 65 years, who constitute the nucleus of citizens with high health risk and expansion of the number of shelters to locate homeless people over 65 years of age, who constitute the nucleus of citizens with high health risk. Finally, home medical coverage was provided for patients with suspected coronavirus infection and their families, through the Administration of State Health Services (Administración de los Servicios de Salud del Estado) or private providers in the interior of the country. However, there is no evidence that this medical coverage is generally applicable beyond COVID-19 [1]. Finally, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia), and the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios) do not document or publish evidence related to the provision of wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and/or medical attention [2,3,4].

[1] Presidency of Uruguay (Presidencia de Uruguay). March 2020. "Government Measures to Address the Coronavirus Health Emergency (COVID-19) (Medidas del gobierno para atender la emergencia sanitaria por coronavirus (COVID-19))".

[presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/medidas-gobierno-Sanitaria-emergencia-sanitaria-covid19#navegacion-contenido]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)." [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page (Página principal)". [https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio]. Accessed December 2020.

2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports on government websites. In this sense, the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) publishes a daily report on new cases of COVID, the report includes cases by region and if there are new outbreaks of infection. The data provided is de-identifiable; however, reports

mention that there is an epidemiological trace on all new identified cases. However, the reports do not include percentages of new cases from identified contacts and the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) and the System of Laboratories do not show information about de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 available via daily reports [1,2,3,4]. In conclusion, Uruguay does not make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts available on daily reports; in addition, it does not show the percentage of new cases from identified contacts.

[1] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). Updated Information on Coronavirus COVID-19 in Uruguay (Información actualizada sobre coronavirus COVID-19 en Uruguay). [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/comunicacion/noticias/informacion-actualizada-sobre-coronavirus-covid-19-uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)." [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence in Uruguay of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Decree 104/020 (Decreto 104/020) establishes that the Ministry of Interior (Ministerio del Interior), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores), the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional) and the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de la Salud Pública) have the faculty to enforce article 8 of Decree 93/020 (Decreto 93/020), which establishes the following aspects: "Those persons who: a) have contracted COVID-19 must remain isolated, for at least fourteen days, under control and following the indications of the treating physician or the health authority; b) present fever, and one or more respiratory symptoms (cough, sore throat or respiratory distress) and also, in the last fifteen days, have remained temporarily or permanently in "high risk areas"; c) those who have been in direct contact with confirmed cases of COVID-19; d) people who enter the Eastern Republic of Uruguay after having traveled or stayed in high-risk areas" [1,2]. However, there is no evidence that those decrees include agreements for contact tracing. In addition, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the National Directorate of Migration of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay (Dirección Nacional de Migración de la República Oriental del Uruguay), the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios), and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) do not provide information about a plan or agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify

suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of future or active public health emergencies. The established agreement only responds to a specific event, related to the current COVID-19 pandemic and not to a general emergency situation [3,4,5,6].

[1] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). March 2020. Decree No.104/020 (Decreto No.104/020). [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos-originales/104-2020>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). March 2020. Decree No. 93/020 (Decreto No. 93/020). "Declaration of State of National Health Emergency as a Consequence of the Pandemic Originated by the COVID-19 Virus (Coronavirus) (Declaración de Estado de Emergencia Nacional Sanitaria como Consecuencia de la Pandemia Originada por el Virus COVID-19 (Coronavirus)). [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/93-2020>]. [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/93-2020>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)." [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Directorate of Migration of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay (Dirección Nacional de Migración de la República Oriental del Uruguay). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://migracion.minterior.gub.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) available or that resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETPs). In 2017, Uruguay began to participate in the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET); however, the country has not yet been granted accreditation or member status [1]. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) do not document any applied epidemiology training programs or that the government has available resources to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs [2,3].

[1] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET). Uruguay Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP). [<https://www.tephinet.org/training-programs/uruguay-field-epidemiology-training-program>].

Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Centre for Disease Control. "Main page - institutional". [<https://www.cdc.gov/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has available field epidemiology training programs (FETPs) explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or a specific animal health FETP offered. In this sense, Uruguay began to participate in the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET); however, the country has not yet been granted accreditation or member status. In addition, the website does not mention training of animal health professionals [1]. Moreover, the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) does not records training of animal health professionals in Uruguay. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca) do not record or publish information related to animal health FETP [2,3,4].

[1] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET). Uruguay Field Epidemiology Training Program. [<https://www.tephinet.org/training-programs/uruguay-field-epidemiology-training-program>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Centre for Disease Control. "Main Page—Institutional". [<https://www.cdc.gov/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a

Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. Moreover, Uruguay does have national plans for specific diseases. The National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti) was developed in 2016 by the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) and the General Directorate of Health Epidemiological Division (Dirección General de Salud División Epidemiológica). The National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) are examples of disease-specific plans [1,2]. However, there is no national plan for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) do not have information about an overarching national public health emergency response plan for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential [3,4].

[1] Ministry of Health. February 2016. "National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti)".

[<http://www.higiene.edu.uy/materiales/Galeria/terminada/MSP.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)." [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page (Página principal)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.1.1b

If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?

Yes = 1, No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

Uruguay does not have an overarching plan in place that has been updated in the last three years.

In this sense, the National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti), was developed in 2016 by the Ministry of Health (Ministerio de Salud) and the General Directorate of Health Epidemiological Division (Dirección General de Salud Divisi6n Epidemiol6gica) and the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infecci6n (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) do not count with the characteristics of overarching plans [1,2].

Finally, the Centre for National Emergencies (Centro de Emergencias Nacionales) and the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud P6blica) do not document or publish an overarching plan updated in the last three years [3,4].

[1] Ministry of Health. February 2016. "National Response Plan to an Epidemic of Diseases Transmitted by Aedes Aegypti (Plan de Respuesta Nacional ante una epidemia de enfermedades transmitidas por Aedes Aegypti)".

[<http://www.higiene.edu.uy/materiales/Galeria/terminada/MSP.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud P6blica). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infecci6n (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud P6blica). "Main Page—Institutional (P6gina principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (P6gina principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.1.1c

If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an overarching plan in place that includes considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations. However, the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infecci6n (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) is not an overarching plan, and the National Emergency System (Sistema de Emergencia Nacional) does include considerations for vulnerable populations in the COVID-19 context. Resources for COVID-19 and childhood, older adults, gender perspective, and people with disabilities are available at the website [1,2]. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud P6blica), the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias), and the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios) does not document or publish any overarching plan [3,4,5]. In conclusion, there is no evidence of an overarching plan that includes considerations for vulnerable populations.

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud P6blica). March 2020 "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infecci6n (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Centre for National Emergencies (Centro de Emergencias Nacionales). April 2020. "Resources to Protect Those in Vulnerable Situations in the Context of the Health Emergency (Recursos para proteger a quienes se encuentran en situaci6n de vulnerabilidad en el marco de la emergencia sanitaria)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

emergencias/comunicacion/noticias/recursos-para-proteger-se-encuentran-situacion-vulnerabilidad-marco]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio]. Accessed December 2020.

3.1.1d

Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a

Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak preparedness and response.

However, in the specific case of COVID-19, the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) and the Government measures to address the coronavirus health emergency (COVID-19), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Emergency System (Sistema de Emergencias Nacionales) do not contemplate engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response [1,2,3,4].

Moreover, the National Integrated Plan for Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic (Plan Nacional Integrado de Preparación para una Pandemia de Influenza) (2007), issued by the MGAP, MSP, and Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)—which establishes a national plan for prevention, early detection, and control and eradication of influenza—includes coordination with the private sector alongside medical public institution, with the aim of dispersing the information and providing the emergency response as quickly as possible. Private sector institutions are among those that are automatically informed of the event in the scheme of pandemic alert included in the plan [5].

The private sector is also included in the National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti

(Plan de Respuesta Nacional Ante una Epidemia de por Aedes Aegypti" (2016) issued by the MSP, which defines the general framework for a national response for Dengue, Chikungunya, or Zika epidemic. Private health providers are among the actors that the plan designates as being of 'obligatory notification' in the event of an event [6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Presidency of Uruguay (Presidencia de Uruguay). March 2020. "Government Measures to Address the Coronavirus Health Emergency (COVID-19) (Medidas del gobierno para atender la emergencia sanitaria por coronavirus (COVID-19))". [presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/medidas-gobierno-Sanitaria-emergencia-sanitaria-covid19#navegacion-contenido]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2007. National Integrated Plan for Preparedness for an Influenza Pandemic [https://www.paho.org/hq/images/stories/AD/HSD/CD/INFLUENZA/influenza_uruguay.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed January 2021.

[6] Ministry of Public Health. 2016. National Response Plan for an Epidemic of Disease Transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti. [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-de-respuesta-nacional-ante-una-epidemia-de-enfermedades>]. Accessed January 2021.

3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has a plan in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during a pandemic, but the plan is specific to COVID-19.

In this sense, the Ministry of Public Health developed a protocol for the Prevention of COVID-19, which contains a number of actions to take in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Some of these actions include i) frequent washing of hands; ii) avoiding touching face when hands have not been washed in order to prevent potential infections; iii) use of face masks covering nose, mouth and chin; iv) social distancing of at least two meters; and v) isolation when the patient presents symptoms or if there has been contact with someone infected [1].

Moreover, the government enacted preventive measures in this regard, which include the following aspects: an agreement with the Supermarket Association of Uruguay (Asociación de Supermercados de Uruguay) to prioritize attention from 8:30 - 10:00 am for adults aged over 65 in order prevent infections of vulnerable groups, mandatory use of face masks in public places, and social distancing in public places. [2] Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not document or publish information related to NPI's for

more than one disease [3,4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health. "COVID-19 Prevention Measures Protocol (Protocolo medidas de prevención COVID-19)". July 2020. [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/noticias/protocolo-medidas-prevencion-covid-19>].

Accessed December 2020-

[2] Presidency of Uruguay (Presidencia de Uruguay). "Government Measures to Address the Coronavirus Health Emergency (COVID-19) (Medidas del gobierno para atender la emergencia sanitaria por coronavirus (COVID-19)". March 2020.

[presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/medidas-gobierno-Sanitaria-emergencia-sanitaria-covid19#navegacion-contenido]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. However, there is no evidence that Uruguay has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. With regard to the national emergency response plan, Decree 93/020 (Decreto 93/020) Declaration of State of National Health Emergency as a Consequence of the Pandemic Originated by the COVID-19 Virus (Coronavirus) (Declaración de Estado de Emergencia Nacional Sanitaria como pandemia Originada por el Virus COVID-19 (Coronavirus) was enacted in March 13, 2020 as a response to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The Declaration of Emergency outlines actions that must be taken by the Ministries and the public in general; the declaration states that according to Article 2 of Act 9.202: "In the event of an epidemic or serious threats of invasion of infectious-contagious diseases, the Ministry of Public Health will immediately adopt the measures conducive to keeping the country unscathed or reducing the ravages of the infection, being able to order the intervention of the public force to guarantee the faithful compliance with the measures issued." The Declaration also states that "cleaning and disinfection measures must be taken to extremes in all spaces of public and private establishments, especially those for education, places for work and/or attention to the public, complying with the recommendations provided by the Ministry of Public Health" [1]. The National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) was also developed and implemented [2].

However, there is no evidence in the websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias), and the World Health Organization (WHO) Simulation Exercise that Uruguay has completed a

national-level biological threat-focused exercise [3,4,5].

- [1] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). March 2020. "Decree No. 93/020 (Decreto No. 93/020). "Declaration of State of National Health Emergency as a Consequence of the Pandemic Originated by the COVID-19 Virus (Coronavirus) (Declaración de Estado de Emergencia Nacional Sanitaria como Consecuencia de la Pandemia Originada por el Virus COVID-19 (Coronavirus)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/93-2020>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [5] World Health Organization (WHO). "Simulation Exercise". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed January 2021.

3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay, in the past year, has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. The "Diagnosis of the state of disaster risk reduction (Diagnóstico del estado de la reducción del riesgo de desastre)" of Uruguay, developed by the System of the United Nations (Sistema de Naciones Unidas) does not include After Action Review (AAR) of an infectious disease response or a biological threat [1]. Moreover, the Pan-American Health Organization Uruguay office (Organización Panamericana de Salud Oficina Uruguay), the Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulation (2005), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias), and the World Health Organization's (WHO) After Action Review website do not document or publish evidence regarding AAR or a list of gaps and best practices in an infectious disease response [2,3,4,5,6].

- [1] System of the United Nations (Sistema de Naciones Unidas). "'Diagnosis of the State of Disaster Risk Reduction (Diagnóstico del estado de la reducción del riesgo de desastre)". June 2011. [<https://www.eird.org/publicaciones/informe-uruguay.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [2] Pan-American Health Organization Uruguay office (Organización Panamericana de Salud Oficina Uruguay). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.paho.org/es/uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] World Health Organization (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulation (2005) and Health Security (SPH)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] World Health Organization (WHO). "After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed January 2021.

3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has undergone, in the past year, a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. In this sense, the "Diagnosis of the state of disaster risk reduction (Diagnóstico del estado de la reducción del riesgo de desastre)" of Uruguay, developed by the System of the United Nations (Sistema de Naciones Unidas) does not include a national-level biological threat focused exercise that included private sector representatives [1]. Moreover, the Pan American Health Organization Uruguay office (Organización Panamericana de Salud Oficina Uruguay), the Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulation (2005), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the World Health Organization (WHO) International Health Regulations (IHR), and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not document or publish information related to biological threat-focused exercises, which include private sector representatives [2,3,4,5,6].

[1] System of the United Nations (Sistema de Naciones Unidas). "'Diagnosis of the State of Disaster Risk Reduction (Diagnóstico del estado de la reducción del riesgo de desastre)". June 2011. [<https://www.eird.org/publicaciones/informe-uruguay.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Pan-American Health Organization Uruguay Office (Organización Panamericana de Salud Oficina Uruguay). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.paho.org/es/uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulation (2005) and Health Security (SPH)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO). "International Health Regulations (IHR)". [https://www.who.int/health-topics/international-health-regulations#tab=tab_1]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) specifically dedicated to public health emergencies. Moreover, Act 18.621 (Ley. 18.621) of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias)

defines that "the operation of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) is specified in the set of actions of the competent state bodies aimed at the prevention of risks related to disasters of natural or human origin, foreseeable or unpredictable, periodic or sporadic; to the mitigation and attention of the phenomena that occur; and the immediate rehabilitation and recovery tasks that may be necessary." However Act 18.621 does not mention the creation of a specific public health emergency operations center [1]. Finally, the website of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) and the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) do not document or publish information related to a specific public health emergencies Emergency Operation Center (EOC) [2,3].

[1] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). Act 18621 (Ley 18621). "Creation of the Public and Permanent National Emergency System (Creación del Sistema Nacional de Emergencias Público y Permanente)".

[<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18621-2009/7>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or that they conduct drills at least once per year.

Act 18.621 (Ley. 18.621) of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) defines that "the operation of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) is specified in the set of actions of the competent state bodies aimed at the prevention of risks related to disasters of natural or human origin, foreseeable or unpredictable, periodic or sporadic; to the mitigation and attention of the phenomena that occur; and the immediate rehabilitation and recovery tasks that may be necessary." However, Act 18.621 does not mention the creation of a specific public health emergency operations center [1].

In addition, the Planning Department (Área de Planificación) of the National Emergency System (Sistema de Emergencias Nacionales) mentions that in 2014 a national scale simulation was organized for an indigenous Dengue epidemic, and the exercise made visible many weaknesses in the National Emergency System (Sistema de Emergencias Nacionales) that were addressed. Moreover, over 160 public and private institutions participated in the drill [2]. Finally, the Annual Report of the Ministry of Public Health 2019 (Memoria 2019 del Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) does not document or record public health emergency drills [3,4,5].

[1] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). Act 18621 (Ley 18621). "Creation of the Public and Permanent National Emergency System (Creación del Sistema Nacional de Emergencias Público y Permanente)".

[<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18621-2009/7>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Planning for Response to Emergencies and Disasters (Planificación para la Respuesta a emergencias y desastres)". August 2019. [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/politicas-gestion/planificacion-respuesta-emergencias-riesgos>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Memory 2019 (Memoria 2019)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/institucional/informacion-de-gestion/memorias-anauales/memorias-anauales>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page —Institutional (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that shows that Uruguay's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted, within the last year, a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency. Moreover, Act 18.621 (Ley. 18.621) of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) defines that "the operation of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) is specified in the set of actions of the competent state bodies aimed at the prevention of risks related to disasters of natural or human origin, foreseeable or unpredictable, periodic or sporadic; to the mitigation and attention of the phenomena that occur; and the immediate rehabilitation and recovery tasks that may be necessary." However Act 18.621 does not mention the creation of a specific public health emergency operations center [1]. In addition, the General Coordination Protocol of the National Emergency System (Protocolo de Coordinación General del Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) does not contemplate a timeframe for the activation of the protocol [2]. Finally, there is no evidence in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report, the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias), and the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), as they do not document or publish information related to a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency [3,4,5].

[1] Centre for Official Information (Centro de Información Oficial). Act 18621 (Ley 18621). "Creation of the Public and Permanent National Emergency System (Creación del Sistema Nacional de Emergencias Público y Permanente)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/leyes/18621-2009/7>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "General Coordination Protocol of the National Emergency System (Protocolo de Coordinación General del Sistema Nacional de Emergencias)". August 2019. [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/node/472>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). "Electronic State Parties Self-Assessment Annual Reporting Tool - Uruguay". [<https://extranet.who.int/e-spar/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). August 2019. "Planning for Response to Emergencies and Disasters (Planificación para la Respuesta a emergencias y desastres)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/politicas-gestion/planificacion-respuesta-emergencias-riesgos>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Memory 2019 (Memoria 2019)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/institucional/informacion-de-gestion/memorias-anauales/memorias-anauales>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?
- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has performed an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack). Moreover, there is no evidence that Uruguay has publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not document or publish evidence regarding deliberate biological events [1,2].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has a risk communication plan that includes how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs. The National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)); the digital strategy against the coronavirus COVID-19 (La estrategia digital frente al coronavirus COVID-19); the Protocol of General Coordination of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias, SINAE); and the law No. 18.621 on the National Emergency System (Ley No. 18.621 Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not document evidence on how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs [1,2,3,4,5]. No other evidence was found

via the Ministry of Public Health [6].

[1] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). December 2020. "Updated Information on Coronavirus COVID-19 in Uruguay (Información actualizada sobre coronavirus COVID-19 en Uruguay)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/comunicacion/noticias/informacion-actualizada-sobre-coronavirus-covid-19-uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Electronic Government and Information and Knowledge Society Agency (Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento). April 2020. "The Digital Strategy Against the Coronavirus COVID-19 (La estrategia digital frente al coronavirus COVID-19)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/comunicacion/noticias/estrategia-digital-frente-coronavirus-covid-19>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (SINAE). 2014. "Protocol of General Coordination of the SINAE." [http://sinae.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/pvsinae/8a4105d2-d56a-4f52-874a-54fcd747a41b/Protocolo+de+coordinaci%C3%B3n+general+SINAE.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=8a4105d2-d56a-4f52-874a-54fcd747a41b]. Accessed February 2021.

[4] National Emergency System (SINAE). <http://sinae.gub.uy/>. Accessed February 2021.

[5] National Republic of Uruguay, Legislative Power. 2010. "Law No. 18.621 on the National Emergency System (Ley No. 18.621 Sistema Nacional de Emergencias)" [http://sinae.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/pvsinae/569bfc17-5c21-4c5a-89c9-d9e80d441fd6/Ley_18621.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=569bfc17-5c21-4c5a-89c9-d9e80d441fd6]. Accessed February 2021.

[6] Ministry of Public Health. "Main Page". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed March 2021.

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has a national public health emergency response plan detailing a risk communication strategy. In the framework of the COVID-19 pandemic, the country established a National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)), which has a communication strategy for the dissemination of information, like in the form of situation updates, which are daily reports of the situation on the coronavirus COVID-19 in Uruguay, published on the official page of the National Emergency System via the website and on social media such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) [1]. Similarly, the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) led to a digital strategy that includes the creation of new digital communication channels focused on healthcare using a virtual assistant on the web pages of the State and of public and private health providers with information on the disease and its progress in Uruguay, containment measures and recommendations, and a unique epidemiological questionnaire created by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) for people with possible symptoms. In addition, the Coronavirus UY application was created, which, in addition to providing information and enabling the epidemiological questionnaire, assists the population in contacting health services [2].

Moreover, the Protocol of General Coordination of the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias, SINAE) includes the following aspects: (i) protocol for notification of the Departmental EOCs (Comites Departamentales de Emergencias, CDE) by part of the primary care institution (police, firemen, etc); (ii) protocol for the definition of the level of

response; (iii) protocol for the elaboration of the situation (which includes notifications to the press, social media, and main government agencies); (iii) protocol of support in communication the departmental response (when the CDE assumes the responsibility of public communications, according to each emergency and disaster communications plan within each CDE); and (iv) protocol of support in communication during a national response that is handled by the SINAE's National Response Command (Comando de Respuesta Nacional).

Finally, both the SINAE and Law No. 18.621 on the National Emergency System (Ley No. 18.621 Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) include health emergencies in the definition of "state of disaster" [4,5].

[1] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). December 2020. "Updated Information on Coronavirus COVID-19 in Uruguay (Información actualizada sobre coronavirus COVID-19 en Uruguay)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/comunicacion/noticias/informacion-actualizada-sobre-coronavirus-covid-19-uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Electronic Government and Information and Knowledge Society Agency (Agencia de Gobierno Electrónico y Sociedad de la Información y del Conocimiento). April 2020. "The Digital Strategy Against the Coronavirus COVID-19 (La estrategia digital frente al coronavirus COVID-19)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/comunicacion/noticias/estrategia-digital-frente-coronavirus-covid-19>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (SINAE). 2014. "Protocol of General Coordination of the SINAE." http://sinae.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/pvsinae/8a4105d2-d56a-4f52-874a-54fcd747a41b/Protocolo+de+coordinaci%C3%B3n+general+SINAE.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=8a4105d2-d56a-4f52-874a-54fcd747a41b. Accessed February 2021.

[4] National Emergency System (SINAE). <http://sinae.gub.uy/>. Accessed February 2021.

[5] National Republic of Uruguay, Legislative Power. 2010. "Law No. 18.621 on the National Emergency System (Ley No. 18.621 Sistema Nacional de Emergencias)" [http://sinae.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/pvsinae/569bfc17-5c21-4c5a-89c9-d9e80d441fd6/Ley_18621.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=569bfc17-5c21-4c5a-89c9-d9e80d441fd6]. Accessed February 2021.

3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has designated a specific spokesperson position to the public during a public health emergency. The National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) mandates the appointment of one or more spokespersons responsible for communication with the media. In this sense, the Presidential Spokesperson in the Presidency of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay is mandated to be one of the people who perform the official role of spokesperson regarding a public health emergency; however, there is no specific mention regarding who this spokesperson will be [1]. Nevertheless, the National Policy for Comprehensive Management of Emergency and Disaster Risk in Uruguay (Política Nacional de Gestión Integral de Riesgo de Emergencias y Desastres en Uruguay) does not include the designation of a spokesperson position for the communication of a public health emergency [2]. The websites of the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio), Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca), and Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente) do not document or publish evidence related to a specific designated

spokesperson position to the public during a public health emergency [3,4,5,6,7].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 9, 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). 17 February 2020. "National Policy for Comprehensive Management of Emergency and Disaster Risk in Uruguay (Política Nacional de Gestión Integral de Riesgo de Emergencias y Desastres en Uruguay)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/comunicacion/publicaciones/politica-nacional-gestion-integral-del-riesgo-emergencias-desastres>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ambiente/>]. Accessed January 2021.

3.5.2 Public communication

3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that Uruguay regularly shares information on health concerns via online media platforms. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) has its own website with a communication and news section where they make publications at least once a day on topics related to Public Health and their respective institutions. The page orders its publications by year, which are available to the public for the years 2017–2020 [1]. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health has an Official Twitter Account where they tweet about 15 times a day to spread relevant information about public health and current events [2].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "News (Noticias)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/noticias?field_tematica_target_id=All&year=2020&month=all&field_publico_target_id=All]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Official Twitter Account. [<https://twitter.com/MSPUruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence of senior leaders in Uruguay (president or ministers) sharing misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. The main national or international news outlets present no information related to the spread of fake news from a Uruguayan president or a minister. Moreover, Uruguay is part of the Latam Chequea Coronavirus initiative, an organization of 21 organizations from 15 countries in Latin America that work together in the verification of suspicious content related to COVID-19. Each country in the region has its updated and verified database that can be accessed by anyone. Moreover, there is no information in the Uruguayan or international news outlets with evidence of a fake news event [1,2,3,4].

[1] Animal Político. 2 April 2020. "Latam Checks Coronavirus, a Platform to Verify Information in 15 Countries (LatamChequea Coronavirus, una plataforma para verificar información en 15 países)".

[<https://www.animalpolitico.com/2020/04/latamchequea-coronavirus-una-plataforma-para-verificar-informacion-en-15-paises/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] UY Check. "Main Page (Página principal)". [<http://uycheck.com/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] El País Uruguay. "Main Page". [<https://www.elpais.com.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] El Observador Uruguay. "Main Page". [<https://www.elobservador.com.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020.

3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 76.95

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 138.07

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 1.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There no is evidence that Uruguay has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export and import of medical goods in the past year. Decree No. 122/020 mandates that the Ministries of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social) have the power to import products for diagnostics, medical equipment and/or therapeutic devices in health emergency situations, with approval prior to the competent technical office of the Ministry of Public Health. With this decree, the government seeks to make the records and procedures for the importation of medical supplies and equipment more flexible. However, if the health authority detects that the product registered under this new regime does not provide sufficient guarantees regarding its safety and efficacy, it may be revoked at any time [1,2]. Finally, the websites of the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio), Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca), Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) do not document or publish evidence

related to restrictions, without international/bilateral support on the export and import of medical goods in the past year [3,4,5,6,7,8].

- [1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas), Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining (Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Minería), Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social). Internal Decree No. 001-3-17-13/2020. 8 April 2020. [https://medios.presidencia.gub.uy/legal/2020/decretos/04/msp_34.pdf]. Accessed December 2020
- [2] La Diaria Política. 4 May 2020. "Government Eases Records and Procedures for Importing Medical Supplies and Equipment (Gobierno flexibiliza registros y trámites para la importación de insumos y equipos médicos)". [<https://ladiaria.com.uy/politica/articulo/2020/5/gobierno-flexibiliza-registros-y-tramites-para-la-importacion-de-insumos-y-equipos-medicos/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ambiente/>]. Accessed January 2021.
- [8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/>]. Accessed January 2021.

3.7.1b

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that Uruguay has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods in the past year. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura), the Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) do not show information of restrictions regarding non-medical goods or evidence of any transaction that can represent the import or export of food or textiles within a health emergency [1,2,3,4,5].

- [1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página Principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-educacion-cultura/>]. Accessed December 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Social Development. "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-desarrollo-social/inicio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/>]. Accessed January 2021.

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is evidence that Uruguay has implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country in the framework of the COVID 19 pandemic. The Ministry of the Interior and the National Directorate of Migration drafted an Authorization of exceptional entry to Uruguay. Decree No. 104/020 established an Authorization to Enter the Country only for Uruguayan citizens [1]. The Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del Interior) and the National Directorate of Migration (Dirección Nacional de Migración) issued an Exceptional Entry Authorization to Uruguay, a procedure that all foreign citizens, those who do not carry legal resident status in Uruguay, must apply from outside the country in order to enter the country [2]. Moreover, any person entering Uruguay must submit a negative COVID-19 test and quarantine [3].

[1] Republic President. Decreto No. 104/020, March 2020. "Authorization of the Entry to the Country Only For Uruguayan Citizens and Foreigners Residents from Abroad (Autorización Del Ingreso Al País Únicamente De Ciudadanos Uruguayos Y Extranjeros Residentes Provenientes Del Exterior)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/104-2020>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of the Interior, National Directorate of Migration (Ministerio del Interior, Dirección de Migración) December 2020. "Exceptional Entry Authorization to Uruguay (Autorización de ingreso excepcional a Uruguay)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-gobierno-electronico-sociedad-informacion-conocimiento/comunicacion/noticias/nuevo-tramite-linea-para-ingreso-excepcional-uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Presidency of Uruguay (Presidencia Uruguay). June 2020. "Any Person Entering Uruguay Must Submit a Negative COVID-19 Test and Quarantine. (Toda persona que ingrese a Uruguay deberá presentar un análisis negativo de COVID-19 y realizar cuarentena)". [<https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/garcia-larraniaga-decreto-ingreso-pais>]. Accessed December 2020.

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 507.94

2017

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 194.12

2017

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has a health workforce strategy in place to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings.

The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) together with the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization (WHO) implemented a "PAHO/WHO Cooperation Strategy with the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 2017-2021 (Estrategia de Cooperación de la OPS/OMS con la República Oriental del Uruguay 2017-2021)" identified that the ratio of medical workforce per population is 63 per 10,000 inhabitants, which places Uruguay as the best performer in that statistic in the region; outside the capital, this ratio is on 24 per 10,000 inhabitants. Moreover, the ratio of doctors per nurses is 4:1 opposite to the WHO recommendation of 1:4. However, the document does not describe a clear strategy to face these challenges for Uruguay [1].

Moreover, the country has a Health Personnel Evaluation and Monitoring Division (División Evaluación y Monitoreo del Personal de Salud) and an Observatory of Human Resources in Health of Uruguay (Observatorio de Recursos Humanos en Salud de Uruguay), which identifies and monitors the demographic, political, economic, and social aspects of the training of human resources in health and their labor insertion. However, both the Health Personnel Evaluation and Monitoring Division and the Observatory of Human Resources in Health of Uruguay are not government agencies, even though the Ministry of Health is a party of the Observatory [2].

Finally, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca); the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública); the Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura); the Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social); and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) do not document or publish evidence related to a health workforce strategy in place to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings [3,4,5,6,7].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), World Health Organization (WHO). November 10, 2017. "PAHO/WHO Cooperation Strategy with the Eastern Republic of Uruguay 2017-2021 (Estrategia de Cooperación de la OPS/OMS con la República Oriental del Uruguay 2017-2021)". Taken from the PAHO library [<https://www.paho.org/es/documentos/estrategia-cooperacion-opsoms-con-republica-oriental-uruguay-2017-2021>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Health Personnel Evaluation and Monitoring Division (División Evaluación y Monitoreo del Personal de Salud) and a Observatory of Human Resources in Health of Uruguay (Observatorio de Recursos Humanos en Salud de Uruguay). "About—Main Page (Acerca de—página principal)". [<https://uruguay.observatoriorh.org/about>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio) Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ambiente/>]. Accessed January 2021.

4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 243.0

2017

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has patient isolation room/unit located or capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases. Nevertheless, in the framework of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Public Health established that isolation is an essential measure so that a person suffering from the COVID-19 disease infects, in turn, more people [1]. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health has a guide on the implementation of isolation measures, which establishes how local hospitals have to act upon suspicion of infection, the steps to follow to use an isolation card, and the precautions for infectious diseases that must be taken [2]. However, the guide does not show information of the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases. There is evidence of patient isolation units in several public and private hospitals in Uruguay, such as the Hospital Pereira Rossell and the Hospital de Artigas. However, there is no indication that these are capable of isolating and treating patients with highly communicable diseases, as there is insufficient description of the capacity of these units [3,4]. The official pages of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) do not show evidence of a room/unit located for the isolation of patients with highly communicable diseases [5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 9, 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). April, 2013. "Implementation of Isolation Measures (Implementación de medidas de aislamiento)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/implementacion-medidas-aislamiento>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Administration of Health Services of the State (ASSESALUD). <http://www.asse.com.uy/contenido/Hospital-de-Artigas-inauguro-nuevas-Salas-de-Internacion-Pediatrica-10937>. Accessed December 2020.

[4] La Diaria Health. 2018. Sixteen Isolation Rooms were Opened Yesterday at the Pereira Rossell Hospital. <https://salud.ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2018/7/se-inauguraron-ayer-16-salas-de-aislamiento-en-el-hospital-pereira-rossell/>. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. There is no evidence that Uruguay has developed, updated, or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. In the framework of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Public Health established that isolation is an essential measure so that a person suffering from COVID-19 does not infect, in turn, more people [1]. The Ministry of Public Health has a 2013 guide on implementation of isolation measures, which establishes how local hospitals have to act upon suspicion of infection, the steps to follow to use an isolation card and the precautions for infectious diseases that must be taken [2]. There is evidence of patient isolation units in several public and private hospitals in Uruguay, such as the Hospital Pereira Rossell and the Hospital de Artigas, but no evidence of this capacity having been expanded within the last two years [3,4]. The websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) do not show evidence of demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity nor that Uruguay has developed, updated, or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years [5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 9, 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the New Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed April 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). April, 2013. "Implementation of Isolation Measures (Implementación de medidas de aislamiento)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/implementacion-medidas-aislamiento>]. Accessed April 2021.

[3] Administration of Health Services of the State (ASSESALUD). <http://www.asse.com.uy/contenido/Hospital-de-Artigas-inauguro-nuevas-Salas-de-Internacion-Pediatrica-10937>. Accessed April 2021.

[4] La Diaria Health. 2018. Sixteen Isolation Rooms Were Opened Yesterday at the Pereira Rossell Hospital. <https://salud.ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2018/7/se-inauguraron-ayer-16-salas-de-aislamiento-en-el-hospital-pereira-rossell/>. Accessed April 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed April 2021.

[6] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. April 2021.

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Uruguay has a national procurement protocol in place, the Agency of Procurement and Contracts of the State (Agencia de Compras y Contrataciones del Estado, ACCE). The ACCE serves all government agencies, including the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública, MSP) and the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fishing (Ministerio de Ganado, Agricultura, y Pesca, MGAP), and can be used for the acquisition of laboratory and medical supplies, as shown in the list of

agencies served by the Agency, which includes both laboratories and hospitals [1,2,3].

[1] Agency of Procurement and Contracts of the State (Agencia Reguladora de Compras Estatales). Main Page. <https://www.comprasestatales.gub.uy/>. Accessed February 2021.

[2] Agency of Procurement and Contracts of the State (Agencia Reguladora de Compras Estatales). Main Page. <https://www.comprasestatales.gub.uy/>. Accessed February 2021.

[3] Agency of Procurement and Contracts of the State (Agencia de Compras y Contrataciones del Estado, ACCE). Agencies List. <http://observatorio.arce.gub.uy/eportal/documents/10157/0/Nombre+corto+organismos/1a0eef5-2c8c-4594-81bf-89068be0bc99>. Accessed February 2021.

4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g., medical countermeasures (MCMs), medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE)) for national use during a public health emergency. The websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not show information related to stockpiling of medical supplies or medical countermeasures for national use during public health emergencies [1,2,3,4].

[1] Health Services Administration (Administración de los Servicios de la Salud). "Medication Department (Área de Medicamentos)." [<https://www.asse.com.uy/contenido/Area-de-Medicamentos-8439>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)." [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)." [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional page (Página institucional)." [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.2.2b

Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. Nevertheless, the Molecular Virology laboratory of the Faculty of Sciences of Udelar (of the University of the Republic of Uruguay) and also of the Pasteur Institute of Montevideo carried out over 20,000 COVID-19 tests and began with technology transfer in order to generate a network from public laboratories that may be able to diagnose COVID-19 [1]. However, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not show information related to

laboratory supplies such as equipment used by laboratory workers or other supplies for national use during a public health emergency [2,3,4].

[1] University of the Republic of Uruguay (Universidad de la República Paraguay). October 2020. "Vocation and Capacity of Laboratories and Researchers at Udelar in the Face of the Health Emergency (Vocación y capacidad de laboratorios e investigadores de la Udelar frente a la emergencia sanitaria)". [<https://udelar.edu.uy/portal/2020/10/vocacion-y-capacidad-de-laboratorios-e-investigadores-de-la-udelar-frente-a-la-emergencia-sanitaria/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional (Página—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.2.2c

Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has a national stockpile of medical and laboratory supplies or that it conducts or requires an annual review of such a national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. The websites of the Health Services Administration (Administración de los Servicios de la Salud), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not show information that Uruguay conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency [1,2,3,4].

[1] Health Services Administration (Administración de los Servicios de la Salud). "Medication Department (Área de Medicamentos)". [<https://www.asse.com.uy/contenido/Area-de-Medicamentos-8439>]. Accessed April 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed April 2021.

[3] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed April 2021.

[4] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed April 2021.

4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to procure medical supplies (e.g., equipment, personal protective PPE) nor medical countermeasures (MCMs) (i.e., vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics) for national use during a public health emergency. Moreover, there is no evidence that suggests that Uruguay has a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g., equipment, PPE) nor medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency.

With regard to medical supplies, as part of the Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) implemented a mechanism to leverage domestic manufacturing through public biddings that procure medical supplies from the private sector. But this arrangement is specific to COVID-19. The Centralized Procurement Unit (Unidad Centralizada de Adquisiciones) publishes the bids for medical supplies per year, where any Uruguayan company can participate and provide the government with products, such as analgesics, masks, diagnostic studies, medical supplies and respirators, but there is no evidence specific to public health emergencies [1].

With regard to medical countermeasures (MCMs) in the COVID-19 context, Uruguay is part of the COVAX agreement, a collaboration for global equitable access to vaccines against COVID-19. With this instrument, Uruguay and over 90 low and middle-income countries will have the same access to the vaccine as developed countries. But this arrangement is specific to COVID-19 [2]. Moreover, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas), the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), and the Regulatory Agency for Government Purchases (Agencia Reguladora de Compras Estatales) do not provide information about the leverage of domestic manufacturing capacity to produce or to procure medical supplies nor medical countermeasures for national use in a public health emergency [3,4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Purchases National Plan Coronavirus - Covid-19". [<http://uca.mef.gub.uy/28632/13/areas/compras-plan-nacional-coronavirus---covid-19.html>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] La República. December 19, 2020. "With Delay, the Government of Uruguay Accelerates the Purchase of Millions of Vaccines Against COVID-19 (Con retraso, el gobierno de Uruguay acelera la compra de millones de vacunas contra el covid-19)". [<https://www.larepublica.co/globoeconomia/con-retraso-el-gobierno-de-uruguay-acelera-la-compra-de-millones-de-vacunas-contra-el-covid-19-3104312>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Regulatory Agency for Government Purchases (Agencia Reguladora de Compras Estatales). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-reguladora-compras-estatales/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to procure laboratory supplies (e.g., reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency or evidence of a plan/mechanism to produce laboratory supplies (e.g., reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency.

Moreover, as part of the Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) prompted the private sector to dedicate resources through a series of biddings. The Centralized Procurement Unit (Unidad Centralizada de Adquisiciones) publishes the bids for medical supplies per year, where any Uruguayan company can participate and provide the government with sampling and diagnostic studies COVID-19 [1].

Moreover, the World Bank approved a US\$20 million emergency loan to support the Uruguayan government's efforts to minimize the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health system. The financing will improve the testing capacity, early detection, and treatment of people positive for COVID-19 [2].

Moreover, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas), the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), and the Regulatory Agency for Government Purchases (Agencia Reguladora de Compras Estatales) do not show evidence of any agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies and the emergency loan to support provided by the World Bank do not include information of leverage for domestic manufacturing capacity to procure or produce laboratory supplies [3,4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Purchases National Plan Coronavirus—COVID-19". [<http://uca.mef.gub.uy/28632/13/areas/compras-plan-nacional-coronavirus---covid-19.html>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] World Bank. December 17, 2020. "World Bank response to COVID-19 (Coronavirus) in Latin America and the Caribbean (Respuesta del Banco Mundial a la Covid-19 (Coronavirus) en América Latina y el Caribe)". [<https://www.bancomundial.org/es/news/factsheet/2020/04/02/world-bank-response-to-covid-19-coronavirus-latin-america-and-caribbean>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Regulatory Agency for Government Purchases (Agencia Reguladora de Compras Estatales). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/agencia-reguladora-compras-estatales/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has a guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCMs) for national use during a public health emergency. For the COVID-19 context, the Uruguay Cargo Terminal (Terminal de Cargas Uruguay) designed a Plan for the Management of COVID-19 Vaccines (Plan para la Gestión de Vacunas COVID-19) to guarantee the safe and efficient logistics of the vaccines once they arrive in the country. The plan works in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the National Customs Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Aduanas) to manage the logistics of distribution of vaccines. In addition, it establishes guidelines on precautions for handling products and their respective thermal packaging [1]. However there is no evidence of general guidelines in place for dispensing MCMs for national use during a public health emergency in the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas), Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), and the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) [2,3,4,5].

[1] The Uruguay Cargo Terminal (Terminal de Cargas Uruguay). 2020. "Plan for the Management of Covid-19 Vaccines (Plan para la Gestión de Vacunas Covid-19)". [<https://www.tcu.com.uy/tcu-disena-plan-para-la-gestion-de-vacunas-covid-19/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page —Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Main Page —Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page —Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page —Institutional (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. Moreover, Uruguay has an agreement with Argentina (2010) in terms of defence, which includes assistance for the case of disasters. Uruguay also has agreements with Venezuela (2010), Brazil (2011), and Spain (2015) that

include technical and military cooperation, although it does not mention disasters or emergencies specifically [1,2,3]. In 2010, the Ministries of Defence of the Americas, including Uruguay, agreed to strengthen regional security, articulate programs against natural disasters in the IX Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas [4]. Finally, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional), or the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) do not show information related to a plan or a financial support to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency [5,6,7].

[1] Ministry of National Defense. 2010. "Uruguay Strengthens Defense in Cooperation with Argentina and Venezuela".

[<https://www.mdn.gub.uy/?p=6435&highlight=acuerdo+cooperacion+emergencia&highlight=acuerdo%20cooperacion%20emergencia#.XHNQUuhKgxs>]. Accessed February 2021.

[2] Ministry of National Defense. 2015. "Spain and Uruguay Signed Agreement of Cooperation in Defense".

[<https://www.mdn.gub.uy/?p=3641&highlight=acuerdo+cooperacion+desastres&highlight=acuerdo%20cooperacion%20desastres#.XHNUQehKgxt>]. Accessed February 2021.

[3] Ministry of National Defense. 2011. "Defense Agreement Between Uruguay and Brazil Signed by Rosadilla and Jobin Was Sent to Parliament".

[<https://www.mdn.gub.uy/?p=5898&highlight=acuerdo+cooperacion+desastres&highlight=acuerdo%20cooperacion%20desastres#.XHNUjOhKgxs>]. Accessed February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2010. "America Consolidates Transparency, Cooperation, and Security in Continental Defense".

[<https://www.mdn.gub.uy/?p=6481&highlight=acuerdo+cooperacion+desastres&highlight=acuerdo%20cooperacion%20desastres#.XHNVNOhKgxs>]. Accessed February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[7] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 99.9

2014

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 368.87

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. In this sense, the Protocol of Conditions and Work Environment (Protocolo de Condiciones y Medio Ambiente de Trabajo), developed by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) does not contemplate prioritized healthcare to healthcare workers who become sick [1]. Moreover, Uruguay has general legislation defending the rights and health of workers when on the job, but they are applicable to general commercial, industrial, rural, or service job [2]. There is no evidence of such a commitment in the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias, SINA), which is the instance designated to coordinate public institutions with regard to the management of disaster risk in Uruguay, or the Act No. 18.621 on the National Emergency System [3]. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social), and the National Emergency System

(Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) do not document or publish information related to prioritized healthcare to health workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency [4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "Protocol of Conditions and Work Environment (Protocolo de Condiciones y Medio Ambiente de Trabajo)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/noticias/protocolo-sobre-medidas-proteccion-del-equipo-salud-usuarios-del-snis>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Prevention of Occupational Risks. Uruguay. <https://prl.ceoe.es/informacion/prl-en-el-mundo/uruguay/>. Accessed December 2020.

[4] National Emergency System (SINAE). <http://sinae.gub.uy/>. Accessed December 2020.

[5] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Labour and Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social). "Main Page—Institutional Page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-trabajo-seguridad-social/personas>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a

Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. Moreover, the country's communication strategy works to inform the public in general about the health status of Uruguay through two daily reports. One report comes from the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) and another from the Emergency Committee (Comite de Emergencia), these reports reflect the situation of each departments (states) of Uruguay during a specific time. The purpose is to report with transparency and certainty about the health status around the country. However, the communication strategy does not mention communication specifically with workforce [1]. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health and the National Emergency System do not mention or publish information related to communications with health workforce during a public health emergency [2,3].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). November 2020. "Communication on Communication Strategy— November 18, 2020 (Comunicado sobre estrategia de comunicación - 18 de noviembre 2020)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/comunicados/comunicado-sobre-estrategia-comunicacion-18-noviembre-2020>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "Main Page—Institutional Page (Página institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.5.1b

Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the communication strategy of Uruguay includes healthcare workers in both the public and private sector. Although the communication strategy statement establishes that this communication modality allows reaching a greater number of media and the largest number of citizens, there is no evidence that workers on the private and public health sector are included [1]. The websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) or National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia) do not show information related to an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector [2,3].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). November 2020. "Communication on Communication Strategy—November 18, 2020 (Comunicado sobre estrategia de comunicación—18 de noviembre 2020)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/comunicados/comunicado-sobre-estrategia-comunicacion-18-noviembre-2020>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)".

[<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay is monitoring and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities. The Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) has a National System for the Surveillance of Hospital Infections (Sistema Nacional de Vigilancia de Infecciones Hospitalarias) that established a Manual of the National System of Epidemiological Surveillance of Hospital Infections. The purpose of the manual is to provide information, definitions, and instructions to public and private hospitals to standardize the data collection and reporting procedures for hospital infections (HI), thereby establishing the guidelines of the National System of Epidemiological Surveillance of HI in Uruguay [1]. Moreover, the Decree 436/97, mandates that the National System of Epidemiological Surveillance of HI and the Ministry of Public Health must carry out epidemiological surveillance of hospital infections (HI) with active search for cases [2].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). November 2006. "National System of Surveillance of Hospital Infections (Sistema Nacional de Vigilancia de Infecciones Hospitalarias)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/sistema-nacional-de-vigilancia-de-infecciones-hospitalarias>]. Accessed December 2020

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Decree 436/97, December 1997. "Decree 436/97 Aprobacion Del Reglamento a Aplicar Para El Tratamiento De Las Infecciones Intrahospitalarias (Aprobacion Del Reglamento a Aplicar Para El Tratamiento De Las Infecciones Intrahospitalaria)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos/436-1997>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial. Uruguay has a National Research Ethics Commission (Comisión Nacional de Ética en Investigación), Linked to the General Directorate of Health of the Ministry of Public Health (Dirección General de la Salud del Ministerio de Salud Pública), established by the Decree No. 158/019. The decree establishes that all institutions, both public and private, sponsors and researchers must ensure that all forms of research carried out within them, in which human beings participate, respect regulations related to ethical review before the beginning of a trial [1]. Moreover, Resolution No. 129/1996 indicates that all clinical studies on human beings must be approved by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) [2].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Decree No. 158/019, June 2006. "Approve the Project prepared by the National Commission for Research Ethics, linked to the General Directorate of Health of the MSP, Regarding Research on Human Beings. (Apruébase el Proyecto elaborado por la Comisión Nacional de Ética en Investigación, vinculada a la Dirección General de la Salud del MSP, relativo a la investigación en seres humanos.)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos-originales/158-2019>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Registration/Authorization of Research Projects in Human Beings (Registro / Autorización de proyectos de investigación en seres humanos). [<https://tramites.gub.uy/ampliados?id=4795>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.7.1b

Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCMs) to treat ongoing epidemics. In this sense, Resolution No. 129/1996 indicates that all clinical studies

on human beings must be approved by the MSP [1]. However, the Decree does not establish anything about approving clinical trials for unregistered MCMs and the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia), and the Ethics Committee in Research (Comité de Ética en Investigación) do not show information related to an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered MCMs to treat ongoing epidemics [2,3,4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Decree No. 158/019, June 2006. "Approve the Project Prepared by the National Commission for Research Ethics, Linked to the General Directorate of Health of the MSP, Regarding Research on Human Beings. (Apruébase el Proyecto elaborado por la Comisión Nacional de Ética en Investigación, vinculada a la Dirección General de la Salud del MSP, relativo a la investigación en seres humanos.)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos-originales/158-2019>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). "Ethics Committee in Research on Human Beings". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-educacion-cultura/politicas-y-gestion/comite-etica-investigacion-seres-humanos>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a

Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has an agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCMs) for humans. The National Research Ethics Commission (Comisión Nacional de Ética en Investigación) is the organism in charge of all the process for approving new investigations and MCMs. In accordance with Article 3 of Decree No. 158/019, all research must have the approval of the accredited Institutional Research Ethics Committee, which must be accompanied by its respective research protocol. Similarly, in the case of new medical countermeasures (MCM), Decree No. 158/019 establishes that the results must be made public, whether positive or negative, within a period of no more than two years after completion [1].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Decree No. 158/019, June 2006. "Approve the Project prepared by the National Commission for Research Ethics, Linked to the General Directorate of Health of the MSP, Regarding Research on Human Beings. (Apruébase el Proyecto elaborado por la Comisión Nacional de Ética en Investigación, vinculada a la Dirección General de la Salud del MSP, relativo a la investigación en seres humanos.)". [<https://www.impo.com.uy/bases/decretos-originales/158-2019>]. Accessed December 2020.

4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics. In this sense, Resolution No. 129/1996, indicates that all clinical studies on human beings must be approved by the MSP [1]. However, the Decree does not mention the approving of medical countermeasures (MCMs) or an expedited process. Finally, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia), and the Ethics Committee in Research (Comité de Ética en Investigación), Department of Medicines (Departamento de Medicamentos), and the Department of Technological Evaluation (Departamento de Evaluación Tecnológica) do not provide information related to an expedited approval of MCMs [2,3,4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). Clinical Trials. [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/ensayos-clinicos>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencia). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). "Ethics Committee in Research on Human Beings". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-educacion-cultura/politicas-y-gestion/comite-etica-investigacion-seres-humanos>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Department of Medicines (Departamento de Medicamentos). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/departamento-medicamentos>]. Accessed February 2021.

[6] Department of Technological Evaluation (Departamento de Evaluación Tecnológica). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/evaluacion-tecnologia>]. Accessed February 2021.

Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Epidemics and pandemics are not integrated into the national risk reduction strategy.

In this sense, the National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias) developed the National Risk Management Policy for Emergencies and Disasters in Uruguay (2019-2030) (Política Nacional de Gestión Integral del Riesgo de Emergencias y Desastres en Uruguay (2019-2030)), the Policy defines prospective management of emergencies and disasters as "Prospective Management Refers to the Set of Actions That Are Planned and Carried Out in Order to Avoid and Prevent the Formation of Future Risks That Could Originate With the Development of New Investments and Projects in the Territory, the Growth of Cities, Changes in Technologies and Forms of Production, Among Other Reasons." However, the policy does not make a specific mention of epidemics, pandemics, or public health emergencies. Moreover there is no evidence of a standalone strategy for disaster risk reduction for epidemics and pandemics [1].

Finally, the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture (Ministerio de Ganadería y Agricultura), and the Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) do not document or publish information related to epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy [2,3,4].

[1] National Emergency System (Sistema Nacional de Emergencias). "National Risk Management Policy for Emergencies and Disasters in Uruguay (2019-2030) (Política Nacional de Gestión Integral del Riesgo de Emergencias y Desastres en Uruguay (2019-2030))". February 2020. [<https://www.gub.uy/sistema-nacional-emergencias/sites/sistema-nacional-emergencias/files/documentos/publicaciones/Poli%CC%81tica%20Nacional%20de%20Gestio%CC%81n%20Integral%20del%20Riesgo%20de%20Emergencias%20y%20Desastres%20en%20Uruguay.pdf>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that Uruguay has cross-border agreements with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regard to public health emergencies. In this sense, Uruguay is part of the MERCOSUR Common Market (MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur). In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2020, the leaders of the member countries of MERCOSUL, including Brazil, signed a joint declaration agreeing on collective measures to fight and mitigate the coronavirus and its impact. The measures include facilitation of repatriation of nationals of member countries, facilitate trade of goods and services necessary to combat the pandemic, and promote communication of measures being adopted in each member country to combat the pandemic [1,2]. Moreover, Uruguay is also part of the Pan-American Health Organization (Organización Panamericana de la Salud), the regional organization of the World Health Organization (WHO); in March 2020, the organization donated aid for the acquisition of materials for the protection of health personnel and diagnostic kits for the COVID-19 pandemic to Uruguay [2]. In conclusion, there is evidence that Uruguay has cross-border agreements and is part of regional groups that address public health emergencies.

[1] MERCOSUR Common Market (MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur). "Regional Effort Against the Pandemic: MERCOSUR Approved an Emergency Fund of US\$ 16 Million That Will Be Allocated in its Entirety to the Coordinated Fight Against COVID-19 (Esfuerzo regional contra la pandemia: el MERCOSUR aprobó un fondo de emergencia de US\$16 millones que serán destinados en su totalidad al combate coordinado contra el COVID-19". April 2020. [<https://www.mercosur.int/esfuerzo-regional-contra-la-pandemia-el-mercosur-aprobo-un-fondo-de-emergencia-de-us16-millones-que-seran-destinados-en-su-totalidad-al-combate-coordinado-contra-el-covid-19/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] MERCOSUL. 2020. "The Presidents of MERCOSUL Agree on Measures Against Coronavirus (Os presidentes do MERCOSUL acordam medidas contra o coronavírus)". [<https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/os-presidentes-do-MERCOSUL-acordam-medidas-contra-o-coronavirus/>]. Accessed 30 July 2020.

[3] Presidency of Uruguay (Presidencia de Uruguay). "Government Measures to Address the Coronavirus Health Emergency (COVID-19) (Medidas del gobierno para atender la emergencia sanitaria por coronavirus (COVID-19)". March 2020. [presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/medidas-gobierno-Sanitaria-emergencia-sanitaria-covid19#navegacion-contenido]. Accessed December 2020.

5.2.1b

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has cross-border agreements, protocols, or memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regard to animal health emergencies. The Ministry of Cattle, Agriculture, and Fishing (Ministerio de Ganado, Agricultura, y Pesca, MGAP) is a member of the Permanent Veterinarian Committee of the South Cone (Comite Veterinario Permanente del Cono Sur, CVP), an institution created to establish joint actions to guarantee the commercial common interests regarding regional animal health. The CVP has several working committees, including for apthose fever, bird flu, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, and food and safety. Uruguay is a member of every committee. Other member countries are Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay. The CVP has regular trainings in Uruguay for emergency treatment of apthose fever [1]. This agreement does not appear to include animal health emergencies. There is no other evidence in this regard on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (Ministerio de Ganadería, Agricultura y Pescadería), and the System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorios) [2, 3,4].

[1] Permanent Veterinary Committee of the South Cone (Comité Veterinario Permanente del Cono Sur). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<http://www.cvpconosur.org/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio), Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a

Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b

Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Uruguay has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. However, the National Budget 2020-2024 oversees in Article 639 that in case of a national emergency or

disaster of a national scale, the Central Government (Gobierno Central) can increase its indebtedness by 30%. The Central Government (Gobierno Central) reporting to the General Assembly (Asamblea General) of the Legislative Power (Poder Legislativo) and without altering the cap set for the next exercise. The authorities of the Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) representing the Central Government (Gobierno Central), must appear before the General Assembly, within a period not exceeding 30 (thirty) calendar days, after invoking the safeguard clause, in order to inform the reasons for activating the present clause [1]. Finally, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture (Ministerio de Ganadería y Agricultura), and the Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) do not document or publish evidence related to allocating national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years [2,3,4].

[1] Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "National Budget 2020-2024 (Presupuesto Nacional 2020-2024)." [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/sites/ministerio-economia-finanzas/files/2020-08/proyecto.pdf]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/]. Accessed December 2020.

5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Uruguay has a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds that the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of the emergency act).

Moreover, Uruguay is not eligible for the International Development Association (IDA) from the World Bank fund [1]. In addition, in March 2020, the government created "the Coronavirus Fund (Fondo Coronavirus). The Fund was compromised by US\$12,000,000 from the salaries of approximately 15,000 public servants who earn over \$1900 (USD) by discounting 5%, 10%, and 20% of their paychecks (there is no specification regarding the duration of the measure). The Fund is aimed to provide coverage for the needs generated by the health emergency [1].

Finally, there is no evidence of a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds that the country can access in the face of a public health emergency on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas) [2,3,4].

[1] International Development Association (IDA). "Borrowing Countries". [<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>]. Accessed January 2021.

[2] Presidency of Uruguay. March 2020. "Coronavirus Fund Will Allow to Meet Social and Economic Needs of the Health Emergency (Fondo Coronavirus permitirá atender necesidades sociales y económicas de la emergencia sanitaria)". [<https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/fondo-coronavirus-conferencia>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/>]. Accessed December 2020.

5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support or to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity.

The President of Uruguay made a public commitment of social and economic measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. The measures include flexible credit lines to support employment and small and medium-sized businesses. Moreover, the president committed to addressing measures related to people in a situation of homelessness by adding shelters for elderly people who are in a situation of homelessness [1]. However, this budgetary support has been specific to COVID-19 response [1].

No further evidence has been found via the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) [2,3].

[1] Presidency of Uruguay (Uruguay Presidencia). Marh 2020. "Government Defined Battery of Economic and Social Measures to Face the Effects of COVID-19 (Gobierno definió batería de medidas económicas y sociales para enfrentar efectos de COVID-19)". [<https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/comunicacionnoticias/gobierno-nuevas-medidas-economicas-sociales-ante-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/>]. Accessed December 2020.

5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Uruguay has requested financial and technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. However, there is no evidence that the country has provided other countries with financing or technical support to address epidemic threats.

According to the Global Health Security Tracking Atlas, Uruguay has been committed around US\$28.86m from donors to address epidemic threats between 2014 and 2020, of which some funds have been devoted to zoonotic disease capacity development and workforce development [1]. However, there is no information available regarding the specific use of the funds on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores), the Global Health Security Tracking Atlas, or the World Health Organization (WHO) [1,2,3,4].

Finally, there is no evidence that the country has provided other countries with financing or technical support to address epidemic threats in the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores), the Global Health Security Tracking Atlas, or the World Health Organization (WHO)

[1,2,3,4].

[1] Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking. "Uruguay Profile". [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/1079/recipient>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main page - institutional (Página principal - institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal— institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-relaciones-exteriores/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO). "Main Page—Uruguay—Institutional". [<https://www.who.int/countries/ury/>]. Accessed December 2020.

5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available plan or policy from Uruguay for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that go beyond influenza. However, the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección COVID-19 por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) published by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) explicitly details that the National Liason Centre will share information according to International Health Regulations (IHR) with the World Health Organization (WHO). Moreover, the plan includes in its laboratory objectives: "Define the selection criteria for the samples to be sent to the international reference laboratory (Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, USA)" [1].

Finally, the websites of the ministries of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca), the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Education and Culture

(Ministerio de Educación y Cultura), the Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) do not document or publish evidence related to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza [2,3,4,5,6].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "System of Laboratories (Sistema de Laboratorio)—Institutional page (Página institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/tramites-y-servicios/servicios/sistema-de-laboratorio>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] Ministry of National Defense (Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-defensa-nacional/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ganaderia-agricultura-pesca/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[6] Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Ambiente). "Main page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-ambiente/>]. Accessed January 2021.

5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that suggests that Uruguay has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years. On the contrary, there is evidence that Uruguay regularly updates the PanAmerican Health Organization (Organización Panamericana de la Salud) on the new and current cases of Influenza, as shown in the Weekly Influenza Report [1]. Moreover, the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) and the major news outlet of Uruguay do not document or publish information regarding Uruguay not sharing samples in accordance with the PIP framework [2,3].

[1] PanAmerican Health Organization (Organización Panamericana de la Salud). "Report on the Situation of Influenza (Informe en la situación de Influenza)". [<https://www.paho.org/es/informe-situacion-influenza>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] El País Uruguay. "Main Page (Página principal)". [<https://www.elpais.com.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020.

5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that Uruguay has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. On the contrary, the National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the novel Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2)) published by the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública) contemplates "As established by the (WHO), make international notifications through the National Liaison Center (Centro Nacional de Enlace) for the International Health Regulations (IHR) of all suspected cases" [1]. Finally, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Panamerican Health Organization, and the major international news media outlets do not show any evidence that suggests that Uruguay does not share pandemic pathogen samples [2,3,4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Pública). March 2020. "National Contingency Plan for Infection (COVID-19) by the new Coronavirus (SARS CoV2) (Plan Nacional de Contingencia para la Infección (COVID-19) por el nuevo Coronavirus (SARS CoV2))". [<https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-salud-publica/comunicacion/publicaciones/plan-nacional-contingencia-para-infeccion-covid-19-nuevo-coronavirus>]. Accessed December 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). "Main page—Uruguay—Institutional". [<https://www.who.int/countries/ury/>]. Accessed December 2020.

[3] PanAmerican Health Organization, Uruguay (Organización Panamericana de la Salud Uruguay). "Main Page—Institutional (Página principal—institucional)". [<https://www.paho.org/es/uruguay>]. Accessed December 2020.

[4] El País Uruguay. "Main Page (Página Principal)". [<https://www.elpais.com.uy/>]. Accessed December 2020.

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 3

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 3

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 71

2020

Transparency International

6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 3

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 4

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a

What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b

What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 1

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 98.7

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.72

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 0

According to the National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), the share of employment in the informal sector in the country was 21.6% in October 2020 (without a record in the social security system) [1].

[1] National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay (Instituto Nacional de Estadística). Activity, Employment and Unemployment (Actividad, Empleo y Desempleo).

[<https://www.ine.gub.uy/documents/10181/30865/ECH+Empleo+Octubre+2020/b232408f-196e-49d8-91cb-89348df3d6e9>].

Accessed 28 January 2021.

6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

Current Year Score: 2

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government

6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting

6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality

6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.4

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 95.43

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: 1.89

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 77.77

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook

6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 445.2

2019

WHO

6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 14.94

2019

World Bank

6.5.1d

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 21.8

2018

World Bank

6.5.1e

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 27.9

2016

WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 99

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.2b

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 96.6

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1582.86

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018