

# Timor-Leste

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Timor-Leste. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Timor-Leste.

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## Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

### 1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

#### 1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

##### 1.1.1a

**Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?**

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

The Government of Timor-Leste has a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. Timor-Leste's national AMR plan, entitled, "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017 - 2020" adequately integrates surveillance, detection and reporting [1,2,3]. The AMR Plan states: "NAP AMR will establish an evidence-based public communications programme on a national scale to improve awareness of AMR amongst general public and professionals..." [1] Further, the Plan also states that: "steps [will] be taken to understand how resistance develops and spreads. This will be done by having a nationwide AMR surveillance system in place along with a national early warning system to identify early the emergence of resistance in priority pathogens and to critical antimicrobials by 2019". [1] In addition, the Plan also outlines: "a national AMR containment policy [that will] be announced along with a series of Antimicrobial Stewardship Programmes (AMSP) and Standard Treatment Guidelines (STG) at the national scale for prudent use of antimicrobials".[1]

[1] Ministry of Health and The World Health Organization (WHO). May 2017. "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017 - 2020". [<http://www.haiasiapacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TimorNAP.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic Of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] The World Health Organization (WHO). June 2020. "National Action Plan for Health Security." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/timor-leste-national-action-plan-health-security-naphs>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

##### 1.1.1b

**Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?**

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Although Timor-Leste has a national laboratory, it does not test for all the 7+1 pathogens. There is evidence that the national laboratory has the ability to test for Mycobacterium tuberculosis and E Coli [1,2]. According to the Ministry of Health and Agriculture, as well as the national lab, there is no evidence that the lab tests for the other following 7+1 pathogens: Mycobacterium tuberculosis, K. pneumonia, S. aureus, S. pneumoniae, Salmonella spp., Shigella spp, and N. gonorrhoeae [1, 2,

3, 4, 5]. Further, Timor-Leste does not have a public health institute as such.

[1] Ministry of Health and The World Health Organization (WHO). May 2017. "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017 - 2020". [<http://www.haiasiapacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TimorNAP.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "\_Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic Of Timor-Leste.?" [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020. [5] The World Health Organization (WHO). June 2020. "\_National Action Plan for Health Security.?" [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/timor-leste-national-action-plan-health-security-naphs>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.1.1c

**Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the government of Timor-Leste conducts environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g. in soil, waterways, etc.) for antimicrobial residues (AMR) or AMR organisms. The National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017, states, "The situation analysis revealed that AMR surveillance has not been established in Timor-Leste....AMR surveillance is mainly carried out in disease control programs such [as] TB, HIV where [there is a] collaborations [sic]" [1]. The Ministry of Health website, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019, and the National Action Plan for Health Security do not contain any relevant evidence [2, 3, 4].

[1] Ministry of Health and The World Health Organization (WHO). May 2017. "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017 - 2020". [<http://www.haiasiapacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TimorNAP.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] The World Health Organization (WHO). June 2020. "\_National Action Plan for Health Security.?" [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/timor-leste-national-action-plan-health-security-naphs>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

### 1.1.2a

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is national legislation that requires prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans, however, there are gaps in enforcement. Article 14 of Decree Law No. 2/2004 states, "Except for over-the-counter medicines, the prescription of the various types of medicines may only be issued by health professionals contained in a statute issued by the Minister of Health." [1]. In addition, Decree Law No. 2/2011 specifically bans the sale of antibiotics and antimalarials without prescription: "Ministeriu Saude desidi katak Importadora, Farmasia, Loja, no Kios labele fa'an ai-moruk Antibiotika ne'eb\_laiha reseita tuir lei", translated as "Ministry of Health determines that importers, pharmacists, stores and kiosks are not allowed to sell antibiotics medicine without prescription as regulated by the law." [2] The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019" states that: "The sale and use of antimicrobials solely on a doctor's or veterinarian's prescription should be enforced." [3]

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 12/2004. "Pharmaceutical Activities". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2004-12.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. Decree Law 2/2011. "With Regard to the Contraband Sale of Antibiotics and Malaria Medication without a Prescription (KONA BA KONTRA BANDU FA'AN AI-MORUK ANTIBIOTIKA NO FANSIDAR NE'EBA LA HO RESEITA TUIR)". [[http://www.mj.gov.tl/jornal/public/docs/2011/serie\\_2/serie2\\_no11.pdf](http://www.mj.gov.tl/jornal/public/docs/2011/serie_2/serie2_no11.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020

### 1.1.2b

#### Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is a national regulation that requires prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals, however gaps remain with respect to enforcement. As per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019, "the use of antibiotics in human and animal health requires a doctor or veterinarian's prescription, although enforcing this regulation is a challenge." The "use of antibiotics in human and animal health requires a doctor's or veterinarian's prescription" is noted as a strength/best practice of the country. [1] It is unclear what regulation the Joint External Evaluation is referring to as it does not cite the specific regulation and not further publicly available evidence is available. As per the websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites, as well as relevant legislation and the WHO Library of National Action Plans, there is no publicly available evidence that there is a specific regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotics use for animals [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Lastly, the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019" states that: "The sale and use of antimicrobials solely on a doctor's or veterinarian's prescription should be enforced." [1]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. \_Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.? [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health. 2010. "National Drugs and Medicines Policy".

[[http://www.moh.gov.tl/sites/default/files/Drug\\_policy%202010.pdf](http://www.moh.gov.tl/sites/default/files/Drug_policy%202010.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[5] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 12/2004. "Pharmaceutical Activities". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2004-12.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

- [6] Ministry of Health. May 2017. "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017-2020". [<http://www.haiasiapacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TimorNAP.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [7] World Health Organization (WHO). 20 Mar 2012. "Timor-Leste Pharmaceuticals in Health Care Delivery". [[http://www.searo.who.int/entity/medicines/timor\\_leszte\\_situational\\_analysis.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/entity/medicines/timor_leszte_situational_analysis.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.2 ZOO NOTIC DISEASE

### 1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

#### 1.2.1a

**Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a national law on zoonotic diseases. As per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019, "[t]he areas for strengthening include development of the legal framework and promulgation of the Law on Animal Health, and mapping zoonoses in Timor-Leste." [4] However, there is a law regulating the import and export of animals that contains provisions related to zoonotic diseases. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 of 31 December 2003 of the Government of Timor-Leste, which is entitled "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods Imported and Exported," specifically regulates the import and export of animals that might transmit zoonotic disease. [1] Article 55 of the law states, "The import of any animal showing clinical symptoms of diseases or the import of any animal product deriving from animals that show or showed clinical symptoms of diseases, namely Food-and-Mouth disease, Swine Contagious Paralysis (the Teschen disease), Contagious Bovine Peripneumonia, Bovine Pest, Ovine Catarrhal Fever, Bovine Tuberculosis, Swine Thrush, Cystercus Bovis or Cellulosae, Rabies, Brucellosis, Bactericidal Carbunculus, Enzootic Bovine Leucosis, Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis, Brucella Suis Infection, Transmissible Gastroenteritis, Aujeszky's Disease, Bird Flu, Newcastle's 26 Disease, Salmonella Arizona, Paramyxoviridae Avian Type 2 and 3 Infection, Avian Typhoid, Salmonella Pullorum, and Salmonella Enteritidis Infection shall be prohibited". [1] There is no publicly available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Agriculture about a national law on zoonotic diseases [2,3].

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leszte.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarantine\\_and\\_Sanitary\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leszte.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarantine_and_Sanitary_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

#### 1.2.1b

**Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publically available evidence that Timor-Leste has national plans, guidelines, or laws that address risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans.

Moreover, no such laws or plans exist on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2]. However, there are laws related to the import and export of animals that contain zoonotic regulations. The Government of Timor-Leste's Decree-Law No. 21/2003 of 31 December 2003 entitled "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods Imported and Exported" specifically regulates the import and export of animals that might transmit zoonotic diseases [3]. Specifically, the Decree Law regulates "the import of any animal showing clinical symptoms of diseases or the import of any animal product deriving from animals that show or showed clinical symptoms of diseases, namely Food-and-Mouth disease, Swine Contagious Paralysis (the Teschen disease), Contagious Bovine Peripneumonia, Bovine Pest, Ovine Catarrhal Fever, Bovine Tuberculosis, Swine Thrix, Cystercus Bovis or Cellulosae, Rabies, Brucellosis, Bactericidal Carbunculus, Enzootic Bovine Leucosis, Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis, Brucella Suis Infection, Transmissible Gastroenteritis, Aujeszky's Disease, Bird Flu, Newcastle's 26 Disease, Salmonella Arizona, Paramyxoviridae Avian Type 2 and 3 Infection, Avian Typhoid, Salmonella Pullorum, and Salmonella Enteritidis Infection shall be prohibited" [3].

A National Preparedness and Contingency Plan on Rabies (Version 1.2; January 2018) has been developed by the MoAF and MoH to address any incursion of the disease from neighbouring countries; this plan is awaiting endorsement by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries to the Council of Ministers. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.2.1c

**Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publically available evidence that Timor-Leste has national plans, guidelines, or laws that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. Moreover, no such laws or plans exist on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2]. However, there are laws related to the import and export of animals that contain zoonotic regulations. The Government of Timor-Leste's Decree-Law No. 21/2003 of 31 December 2003 entitled "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods Imported and Exported" specifically regulates the import and export of animals that might transmit zoonotic diseases [3]. Specifically, the Decree Law regulates "the import of any animal showing clinical symptoms of diseases or the import of any animal product deriving from animals that show or showed clinical symptoms of diseases, namely Food-and-Mouth disease, Swine Contagious Paralysis (the Teschen disease), Contagious Bovine Peripneumonia, Bovine Pest, Ovine Catarrhal Fever, Bovine Tuberculosis, Swine Thrix, Cystercus Bovis or Cellulosae, Rabies, Brucellosis, Bactericidal Carbunculus, Enzootic Bovine Leucosis, Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis, Brucella Suis Infection, Transmissible Gastroenteritis, Aujeszky's Disease, Bird Flu, Newcastle's 26 Disease, Salmonella Arizona, Paramyxoviridae Avian Type 2 and 3 Infection, Avian Typhoid, Salmonella Pullorum, and Salmonella Enteritidis Infection shall

be prohibited" [3]. A National Preparedness and Contingency Plan on Rabies (Version 1.2; January 2018) has been developed by the MoAF and MoH to address any incursion of the disease from neighbouring countries; this plan is awaiting endorsement by the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries to the Council of Ministers. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.2.1d

**Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that there is a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. The Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has effectuated Decree-Law No. 21/2003 of 31 December 2003 entitled "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods Imported and Exported", but this does not appear to act as a zoonotic disease unit that functions across multiple ministries [1]. Moreover, there is no publicly available information that the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture has created such an entity [2, 3]. Lastly, as per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019, Timor-Leste was allocated a score of 1 for having a "Coordinated surveillance systems in place in the animal health and public health sectors for zoonotic diseases/pathogens identified as joint priorities [4].

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 13, 2020.

[4] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

### 1.2.2a

**Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0



**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a reporting mechanism for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency, although Decree Law 2005/14 details the government's responsibility with regard to disease surveillance. The law states, "The Authority of Health Surveillance nationwide is the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health. The Authorities of Surveillance districtwide are appointed by the Minister of Health through petition by the Permanent Secretary, for a three-year period, renewable, selecting among health professionals, being doctors as a preference with background in the area of public health" [1]. There is no publically available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Health [2, 3]. Lastly, as per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019, it is recommended that Timor-Leste should, "Develop and strengthen web-based reporting system for both animal and human disease surveillance [4].

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 13, 2020.

[4] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

**1.2.2b**

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners). Data privacy is not addressed in the 2005 Surveillance Law, "Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance" [1]. Moreover, there is no relevant publicly available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3]. However, it is relevant to note that Article 3 of the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09", states that a "System of Epidemiological Surveillance sets forth data confidentiality through the guarantee of confidentiality of personal data collected for this purpose, pursuant to the laws in force, without prejudice to the duty of mandatory notification and professional duty for protection of the right to life and physical integrity of third parties". [4] The article does not address animal surveillance.

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Timor-Leste conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. The 2005 Surveillance Law, "Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance", does not address zoonotic diseases [1]. Moreover, the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09", also does not directly address zoonotic diseases [2]. Further, there is no relevant publicly available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health or Agriculture [3,4]. Lastly, as per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019, it is recommended that Timor-Leste should, "Develop and strengthen web-based reporting system for both animal and human disease surveillance [5].

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[5] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

### 1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

## 1.2.4 Animal health workforce

### 1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: -

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

### 1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: -

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

## 1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

### 1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulation, or plan for controlling or responding to zoonoses that includes mechanisms for working with the private sector. The 2005 Health Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance", does not address working with the private sector to control zoonotic disease [1]. Moreover, the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09", does not address working with the private sector to control zoonotic disease [2]. Lastly, there is no publicly available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4].

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.3 BIOSECURITY

### 1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

#### 1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which particularly dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details of inventories and the inventory management systems of those facilities. Further, there is no publicly available evidence via the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture that indicates a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which particularly dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed [1, 2]. The 2003 Quarantine Law, "Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003, Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods", does address pathogens but does not provide specific information related to storage facilities updated within the last five years [3]. For example, the introduction of the law states, "[T]here is an urgent need to adopt legislative measures establishing effective sanitary control and quarantine mechanisms for ... non-endogenous pathogenic agents" [3]. In addition, the Ministry of Defence does not appear to have a functional website. Lastly, although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [4]. Lastly, there is no evidence as per the VERTIC website [5] or the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [6]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[5] VERTIC, VERTIC. "Website". [[www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/](http://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/)]. Accessed 11 October 2020.

[6] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.".€ [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019-56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.3.1b

**Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity that address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. Further, there is no publicly available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence [1, 2, 6]. It is relevant to note that Timor-Leste has signed and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction as a Resolution of the National Parliament No 16/2002 of November 14 [3]. This Convention specifically addresses requirements such as physical containment and operation practices in the context of biosecurity; however, the Convention has not been implemented as a domestic law. The VERTIC database does not contain any relevant legislation for Timor-Leste. [4] Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. Lastly there is no evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic

Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019".

- [1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [3] Government of Timor-Leste. Resolution of the National Parliament No 16/2002 of November 14. "Ratifying the Convention On The Prohibition of the Development, Production And Stockpiling Of Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin Weapons And On Their Destruction". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Resolutions/Resolution-2002-16.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [4] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 11 October 2020.
- [5] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 5 May 2019.
- [6] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [7] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.3.1c

**Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Timor-Leste has an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. Further, there is no publicly available evidence via the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Defence that suggests that there is an agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations [1, 2, 6]. Although there have been several biosecurity training programs, none of the related documents reference a biosecurity agency, thereby suggesting that Timor-Leste has yet to establish a dedicated agency for biosecurity [3]. The VERTIC database does not contain any relevant legislation for Timor-Leste. [4] Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [5]. Lastly, there is no evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [7]

- [1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [3] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States. "Biosecurity strengthening project for Timor-Leste". [<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/projects/detail/en/c/178735/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [4] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [5] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [7] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.3.1d

**Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. Further, there is no publicly available evidence via the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Defence that suggests that Timor-Leste has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins [1, 2, 7]. Although there have been several biosecurity training programs, none of the related documents reference a biosecurity agency, thereby suggesting that Timor-Leste has yet to establish a dedicated agency for biosecurity that could implement this action [3]. The VERTIC database does not contain any relevant legislation for Timor-Leste.[ 4]. The 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory does not contain any relevant information in this regard [5]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [6]. Lastly, there is no evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [8]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

[3] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States. "Biosecurity strengthening project for Timor-Leste". [<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/projects/detail/en/c/178735/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

[4] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

[5] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[6] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

[7] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

[8] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.3.1e

**Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax or Ebola. While Timor-Leste plans to implement early-warning disease systems and other diagnostics related to diseases, there is no evidence that these mechanisms have been implemented [1]. Moreover, there is no publicly available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture or in the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory of PCR diagnostic testing capacity [2, 3, 4]. Timor-Leste does not have a public

health institute.

- [1] Get Industry Website. "Disease early-warning system to be established in Timor-Leste". [<http://getindustry.com.au/2017/02/27/disease-early-warning-system-established-timor-leste/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [4] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

## 1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

### 1.3.2a

**Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste requires biosecurity training, using a standardized approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. Although there have been several biosecurity training programs, there is no publicly available evidence that biosecurity training is mandatory or standardized as per information provided by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defence, or the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8]. Further, the VERTIC database does not contain any relevant legislation for Timor-Leste [6]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. Moreover, there is no evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019" [9]

- [1] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States. "Biosecurity strengthening project for Timor-Leste". [<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/projects/detail/en/c/178735/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [2] The Crawford Fund. "News: Strengthening biosecurity in Timor Leste and the region, February 2013". [<https://www.crawfordfund.org/news-stories/news-strengthening-biosecurity-in-timor-leste-and-the-region-february-2013/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [5] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [6] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [7] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [8] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.
- [9] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

#### 1.3.3a

**Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?**

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has regulations or licensing conditions that specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. Health surveillance is administered by the Ministry of Health [1]. Further, there is no publicly available evidence that there are regulations pertaining to the conditions upon which personnel with access to dangerous pathogens are hired [1]. This information is not available in the 2005 Health Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance," or the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09" [2, 3]. The VERTIC database does not contain any relevant legislation for Timor-Leste [4]. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence does not appear to have relevant publicly-available evidence, and the Ministry of Health does not contain any additional publicly-available evidence and neither does the National Laboratory [1, 5, 7]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [6]. Lastly, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 does not have any relevant information. [8]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 19 September 19.

[5] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[7] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[8] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.



### 1.3.4 Transportation security

#### 1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has publicly-available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances. The government has regulations set forth in the 2003 law on "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods" pertaining to the transport of infectious substances across borders; however, as per the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there is no evidence that Timor-Leste has national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances within the country [1, 2, 3]. Timor-Leste has had several training sessions related to infectious/toxic substances [4, 5]. The Ministry of Defence publicly-available evidence, and VERTIC and the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory do not contain relevant information [6, 7,9]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [8]. Lastly, there is no relevant information as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [9]

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States. "Biosecurity strengthening project for Timor-Leste". [<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/projects/detail/en/c/178735/>.] Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] The Crawford Fund. "News: Strengthening biosecurity in Timor Leste and the region, February 2013". [<https://www.crawfordfund.org/news-stories/news-strengthening-biosecurity-in-timor-leste-and-the-region-february-2013/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[7] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[8] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[9] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[9] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

#### 1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Timor-Leste has national legislation pertaining to end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential; however, the country has enacted legislation pertaining to the cross-border transfer of dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential. These procedures, focused on imports, are set forth in the 2003 law on "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods," in particular, in Chapter Two of this law [1]. The procedures are as follows: "The present statute shall establish the basis of the juridical regime of quarantine with the objective of preventing and controlling the introduction, establishment and propagation of exotic plagues and diseases and other harmful organisms in the national territory; protecting the environment, agricultural production and livestock as well as aquiculture production originating from the country; controlling the already existing plagues and diseases in the country; protecting human beings and the public health from diseases transmitted by animals, plants or their derivatives, or by other organisms" [2]. The VERTIC database does not contain any relevant legislation for Timor-Leste [3]. There is no other publicly available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Agriculture, and Defence [4, 5, 7]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [6]. Moreover, there is no relevant information as per "the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [8]

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed 19 Septemberr 2020.

[3] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[7] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[8] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.4 BIOSAFETY

### 1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

#### 1.4.1a

**Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has national biosafety legislation or regulations in place. As per the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Defence, there exists no publicly available information regarding national biosafety legislation [1, 2, 7]. Timor-Leste does have legislation pertaining to the import and export of potentially biohazardous materials [3]. VERTIC and the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory do not contain any relevant information [4, 5]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [8]. Lastly, there is no relevant information as per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019".

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>] Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree-Law No. 21/2003 Of 31 December 2003. "Quarantine and Sanitary Control on Goods". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2003\\_21\\_Quarentine\\_and\\_Sanatory\\_Control\\_on\\_Goods\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2003_21_Quarentine_and_Sanatory_Control_on_Goods_.pdf)]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[7] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[8] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.4.1b

**Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. According to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly available information regarding an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations [1, 2]. VERTIC and the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory do not contain any relevant information [3, 4]. The Ministry of Defence does not have publicly-available evidence. [6] Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [5]. Lastly, there is no relevant information as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [7]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[7] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

### 1.4.2a

**Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste requires biosafety training using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. According to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly available information regarding regulations that relate to mandating biosafety training [1, 2]. The 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory and VERTIC do not contain any relevant information [3, 4]. However, there have been ad hoc training sessions related to biosafety [5, 6]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. Moreover, there is no relevant evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [8] Lastly, there is no relevant evidence as per the Ministry of Defence website. [9]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] VERTIC, "Building Trust Through Verification." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States. "Biosecurity strengthening project for Timor-Leste". [<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/projects/detail/en/c/178735/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] The Crawford Fund. "News: Strengthening biosecurity in Timor Leste and the region, February 2013". [<https://www.crawfordfund.org/news-stories/news-strengthening-biosecurity-in-timor-leste-and-the-region-february-2013/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[7] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[8] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[9] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

## 1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

### 1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

#### 1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has conducted an assessment to determine whether there is any ongoing research on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research. According to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly available information regarding whether Timor-Leste is conducting an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research [1, 2]. The 2008 Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory does not contain any relevant information in this regard [3]. The Ministry of Defence does not have any publicly-available evidence [5]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [4]. Moreover, there is no relevant information as per VERTIC. [6] Lastly, there is no evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [7]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] VERTIC, VERTIC. "Website". [[www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/](http://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/)]. Accessed 11 October 2020.

[7] "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

#### 1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has a national policy requiring oversight of dual-use research, such as research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or pathogens with pandemic potential. According to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly available information regarding whether there is a national policy regarding

oversight of ongoing research related to dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research [1, 2]. The 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory does not contain any relevant information [3]. The Ministry of Defence does not have a publicly-available evidence. [5] Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [4]. Moreover, there is no relevant information as per VERTIC. [6] Lastly, there is no relevant information as per "the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [7]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] VETIC. VERTIC Website. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/>]. Accessed 11 October 2020.

[7] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 1.5.1c

**Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has an agency responsible for the oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research. As per the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly available information regarding whether there is an agency responsible for oversight of research related to dangerous pathogens, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual-use research [1, 2]. The 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory does not contain any relevant information [3]. The Ministry of Defence does not have any publicly-available evidence [5]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [4]. Moreover, there is no relevant information as per VERTIC. [6] Lastly, there is no relevant information as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [7]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] VERTIC, VERTIC. "Website". [[www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/](http://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/)].

Accessed 11 October 2020.

[7] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

### 1.5.2a

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

According to the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly available information regarding national legislation, regulations, policies, or other guidance, requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before it is sold [1, 2]. The most relevant legislation is the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory [3]. Although Timor-Leste is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [4]. Moreover, there is no relevant evidence as per VERTIC. [5] Lastly, there is no evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [6]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] VERTIC, VERTIC. "Website". [www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/t/]. Accessed 11 October 2020.

[6] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 1.6 IMMUNIZATION

### 1.6.1 Vaccination rates

#### 1.6.1a

**Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)**

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2019

World Health Organization

### 1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

OIE WAHIS database

## Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

### 2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

#### 2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

##### 2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Timor-Leste is capable of conducting laboratory testing for five of the six core tests except for poliovirus. As per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019" The NHL is capable of conducting laboratory testing for five of the six core tests except for poliovirus. Timor-Leste can therefore conduct polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for Influenza virus (flu); serology for HIV; microscopy for mycobacterium tuberculosis (tuberculosis/TB); rapid diagnostic testing for plasmodium spp. (malaria); and bacterial culture for Salmonella enteritidis serotype Typhi (typhoid). [1]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

##### 2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0



**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste is conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. As per the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly-available information in this regard [1, 2]. The 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory does not contain any relevant information [3]. The Ministry of Defence does not have any publicly-available evidence [5]. Moreover, no relevant information in the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030 or National Action Plan for Health Security [6,7].

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[5] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.

[6] The World Health Organization (WHO). June 2020. "National Action Plan for Health Security." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/timor-leste-national-action-plan-health-security-naphs>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[7] Ministry of Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030" [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

### 2.1.2a

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the National Health Laboratory (NHL) that serves as a reference facility is accredited. As per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 "NHL is not accredited to an international standard, but External Quality Assurance (EQA) programmes are available for some tests performed by NHL. [1] Some EQA programmes offer assessment every three months for some tests." According to the World Health Organization (WHO) Programmatic Management of Drug-Resistant TB (PMDT), "the laboratory is yet to be accredited for Drug Susceptibility Test (DST) for both first and second line drugs" [2]. Further, the Laboratory Strategic Plan (2015-2019) has been developed, however, it is not available on a public website, so it is not possible to confirm the accreditation of the national health laboratory. Lastly, there is no publicly-available evidence as per the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture sites as well as the national laboratory or public health institute. [3,4]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). 2014. "WHO strengthen services at the National Health Laboratory".

[<https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/meetings-and-seminars/pr-who-strengthen-services-national->

health-laboratory.pdf?sfvrsn=87312f6a\_4]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 2.1.2b

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that the national laboratory that serves as a reference facility is subject to external quality assurance reviews. The National Health Laboratory (NHL) reported that between 21-25 January 2019, it received an audit from the Pacific Paramedical Training Centre based in New Zealand. The objective of the audit was to assess the quality of the services provided by the NHL and to identify areas that need improvement in order to strengthen its quality of services [1]. Moreover, as per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 the "NHL is not accredited to an international standard, but External Quality Assurance (EQA) programmes are available for some tests performed by NHL. Some EQA programmes offer assessment every three months for some tests." [2]

[1] Facebook. "Laboratorio Nacional da Saude da RDTL". [<https://www.facebook.com/Laboratorio-Nacional-da-Saude-da-RDTL-1015970821772991/>] Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

### 2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

#### 2.2.1a

**Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Timor-Leste has a national system in place for transporting specimens to a laboratory for testing, however, there is no evidence that it is able to cover at least 80% of the country. There is no publicly-available evidence as per the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the national laboratory that Timor-Leste is able to cover at least 80% of its territory. [1] [2] It is noteworthy that according to the WHO, Timor-Leste has implemented a national system for transporting specimens [3]. Moreover, WHO supported the NHL of Timor-Leste in providing a car to collect specimens from municipalities/districts health facilities to be transported to the NHL in Dili to test for measles, rubella, Japanese encephalitis, influenza, antimicrobial sensitivity, GeneXpert for TB, Thyroid Function test, and others. [4] [5] As stated on the National Laboratory Facebook page, "Kareta refere sei utiliza hodi kolekta amostras klinika sira neebe presika atu halo teste iha Laboratorio Nacional da Saude" [6]. This sentence is translated as, "The car will be utilized to collect clinical samples that are needed to be tested in the National Health Laboratory".

- [1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [3] World Health Organization (WHO). 2017. "PMDT Monitoring Report". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/tuberculosis/pmdt-timorleste-monitoring-support-mission-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=a8d26cd1\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/tuberculosis/pmdt-timorleste-monitoring-support-mission-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=a8d26cd1_2)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.
- [4] World Health Organization (WHO). 2017. "Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) Fact Sheet". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/329991>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.
- [5] World Health Organization (WHO). 2018. "NHL: The influenza journey". [<https://www.who.int/timorleste/news/detail/03-04-2018-nhl-the-influenza-journey>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.
- [6] Laboratorio Nacional da Saude Facebook Page. 22 November 2018. [<https://bit.ly/2RWZVRA>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

### 2.2.2a

**Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. According to the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, there exists no publicly available information regarding scaling-up testing during an outbreak [1, 2]. The 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09", and the 2005 Health Surveillance Law, Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance do not set forth a national emergency operations centre for surveillance [3, 4]. The National Laboratory and national emergency planning documents do not contain any relevant information in this regard [5, 6, 7]. Lastly, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 does not contain any relevant information.[8]

- [1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.
- [3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.
- [4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/timor-leste>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 19 September 2020.
- [6] The World Health Organization (WHO). June 2020. "National Action Plan for Health Security." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/timor-leste-national-action-plan-health-security-naphs>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030" [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed 20 Sept 2020.
- [8] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56->

eng.pdf?sequence=1]." Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

### 2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

#### 2.3.1a

**Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?**

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,  
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis  
= 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis. As per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019" a surveillance system for foodborne disease outbreaks is implemented by the MoH, which has established event-based surveillance (EBS) and indicator-based surveillance (IBS) for foodborne diarrhoeal and hepatitis viral diseases. Any foodborne disease outbreak is a priority notifiable disease and must be reported within 24 hours. The RRT then intervenes at national and all municipal levels". [1] There is no information on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture that this information is analyzed on a daily basis. [2,3]. The 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09", and the 2005 Health Surveillance Law, Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance do not provide said information [3, 4]. Lastly, the National Laboratory and national emergency planning documents do not contain any relevant information in this regard [5, 6, 7].

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance". [http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf]. 20 September 2020.

[5] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance". [http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[6] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[7] United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste. April 2010. "Disaster Risk Management Institutional and Operational Systems Development". [https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/4539]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[8] Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. 2016. "Timor-Leste Disaster Management Reference Handbook". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/disaster-mgmt-ref-hdbk-TimorLeste.pdf]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years.

As per the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 "Timor-Leste has not yet passed legislation or other policies related to procedures or approvals for reporting a potential PHEIC to WHO, and the MoH does not have SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) for approving and reporting a potential PHEIC to WHO." [1] Moreover, the WHO Disease Outbreak News page does not report Timor-Leste reporting a PHEIC including Covid-19. [2]

[1] The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] WHO, Disease Outbreaks by year. [https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/en/]. Accessed 17 October 2020.

## 2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

### 2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national levels. According to the Ministry of Health and the 2008 Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory, there exists no publicly available information regarding an electronic reporting surveillance system; however, as per the National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance 2017-2020, the National Laboratory plans to begin the "processing of information ... initiated in real time or close to real time" [1, 2, 3]. Moreover, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 states that: "An electronic system for surveillance reporting (including equipment and web-based surveillance) for animal and human health is needed [, and T]here are insufficient human resources for electronic surveillance at a national level." [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and The World Health Organization (WHO). May 2017. "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017 - 2020". [http://www.haiasiapacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TimorNAP.pdf]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 2.3.2b

**Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has a system that collects ongoing/real time laboratory data. As per the Ministry of Health and the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory there exists no publicly available information regarding real-time laboratory data; however, as per the National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance 2017-2020, the National Laboratory plans to begin the "processing of information ... initiated in real time or close to real time" [1, 2, 3]. Moreover, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 states that: "An electronic system for surveillance reporting (including equipment and web-based surveillance) for animal and human health is needed", and, "There are insufficient human resources for electronic surveillance at a national level." [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and The World Health Organization (WHO). May 2017. "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017 - 2020". [<http://www.haiasiapacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TimorNAP.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

### 2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

#### 2.4.1a

**Are electronic health records commonly in use?**

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that electronic medical records are commonly in use. While the Government launched Saude Na Familia (Health in the Family, which enters health profiles of each household member into "an integrated digitalized" health system, there is no evidence that this is available for individual patients [1]. Moreover, there is no relevant information as per the Ministry of Health website and the national laboratory and National Public Health Institute do not have websites [2].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "SAUDE NA FAMILIA Part of Comprehensive Primary Healthcare Package Success stories from the field". [<http://origin.searo.who.int/timorleste/saude-na-familia-timor-leste.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 2.4.1b

**Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in Timor-Leste. In 2015, the government launched Saude Na Familia (Health in the Family) [1]. As part of the program, health professionals conduct domiciliary visits to conduct clinical consultations to communities. Thereafter, the health profile of each household member is recorded in "an integrated digitalized" health system [1].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "SAUDE NA FAMILIA Part of Comprehensive Primary Healthcare Package Success stories from the field". [<http://origin.searo.who.int/timorleste/saude-na-familia-timor-leste.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 2.4.1c

**Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is a lack of publicly available evidence that the Health Management Information System (HMIS), a department that is responsible for all the health data in the country, has established data standards. As noted in the National Health Sector Strategic Plan, data availability remains a problem faced by the country[1]. Lastly, the website of the Ministry of Health and the National Laboratory do not contain any relevant publicly available evidence [2,3].

[1] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

### 2.4.2a

**Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that the Ministry of Health, other relevant departments, or relevant legislation that require sharing data through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance or other similar protocols. [1,2,3] Moreover, there is no publicly-available as per the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites. [1] [2] The national laboratory, national public health institute, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Environment do not have websites and there is no relevant information in the organic law for the National Laboratory. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

### 2.4.3a

**Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Timor-Leste does not make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available. There is no publicly available evidence as per the Ministry of Health website and the national public health institute or national laboratory do not maintain public websites. [1] As per the Ministry of Health, the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09", and the 2005 Health Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance", there exists no publicly available information that Timor-Leste makes de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks publicly available or that this information has been regularly updated [1, 2, 3]. However, there are isolated examples of the Ministry of Health providing this information. For example, in May 2011, the Ministry of Health's website reported a measles outbreak, with the number of cases as well as the districts where the outbreak occurred. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health. "Measles Campaign". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/?q=node/113>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

### 2.4.3b

**Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Timor-Leste does not make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate) available via daily reports. There is no relevant evidence as per the Ministry of Health website, however, it should be noted that Timor-Leste does provide information regularly via a Whatsapp "Chatbot." The Ministry of Health's COVID-19 Chatbot provides de-identified health surveillance data to anyone who messages the Chatbot via Whatsapp. [1,2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health, Whatsapp COVID-19 Chatbot. [<https://api.whatsapp.com/send?phone=67075560000%20&text=hello>].



Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

### 2.4.4a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Timor-Leste has laws that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. Article 3 of the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09", states that a "System of Epidemiological Surveillance sets forth data confidentiality through the guarantee of confidentiality of personal data collected for this purpose, pursuant to the laws in force, without prejudice to the duty of mandatory notification and professional duty for protection of the right to life and physical integrity of third parties" [1]. Therefore, this law guarantees privacy for personal data. In addition, the 2004 Private Health Units Law, "Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 18/2004, Private Health Units" states that, "Without prejudice to the patients' right to information regarding their own condition and to the power of control of the Office of Health Inspection, the registry of medical files shall be confidential" [2].

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 18/2004. "Private Health Units". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2004\\_18\\_private\\_health\\_units\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2004_18_private_health_units_.pdf)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 2.4.4b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has laws, regulations, or guidelines safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities from cyber attacks. As per the Ministry of Health, the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09", the 2005 Health Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities for Health Surveillance", there exists insufficient evidence that the confidentiality of public health information of individuals is safeguarded from cyber attacks [1, 2, 3]. However, it is relevant to note that Article 3 of the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09", states that a "System of Epidemiological Surveillance sets forth data confidentiality through the guarantee of confidentiality of personal data collected for this purpose, pursuant to the laws in force, without prejudice to the duty of mandatory notification and professional duty for protection of the right to life and physical integrity of third parties". [3] Therefore, this law guarantees privacy for personal data; however, it is unclear whether this would apply to health data and protection from cyber attacks. In addition, the 2004 Private Health Units Law, "Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 18/2004, Private Health Units" states, "Without prejudice to the patients' right to information regarding their own condition and to the power of control of the Office of Health Inspection, the registry of medical files shall be

confidential" [4]. It is unclear whether this would apply to all health data and cyber attacks. There is no relevant publicly-available evidence in the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory [5].

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 18/2004. "Private Health Units". [[http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL\\_2004\\_18\\_private\\_health\\_units\\_.pdf](http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/DL_2004_18_private_health_units_.pdf)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[5] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.4.5 International data sharing

### 2.4.5a

**Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?**

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region.

According to the Ministry of Health and the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory, there exists no publicly available information that the government has made a commitment via public statements, legislation, or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region; however, as per the National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance 2017-2020, the National Laboratory plans to subscribe to the "Thailand EQAS network" [1, 2, 3]. Moreover, there is not evidence as per the "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019". [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and The World Health Organization (WHO). May 2017. "National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance: Timor-Leste 2017 - 2020". [<http://www.haiasiapacific.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/TimorNAP.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

### 2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

#### 2.5.1a

**Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency.

As per the Ministry of Health website, as well as legislation related to the national laboratory and national public health institute there is no publicly-available evidence related to contract tracing in the event of a public health emergency. [1] It should be noted, however, that as per the World Health Organization, "Protocols for case detection and contact tracing have been updated based on the new revised surveillance guidelines. Surveillance teams and rapid responders at national and municipality level have been trained and are on standby to detect and respond to COVID-19 alerts in the country." [2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization "Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report - 15 Timor-Leste". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/03-03-2020-tls-sitrep-15-ncov-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=e7702ec7\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/03-03-2020-tls-sitrep-15-ncov-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=e7702ec7_2)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

#### 2.5.1b

**Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?**

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste provides provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention.

There exists no publicly-available evidence as per the Ministry of Health website or legislation related to the national laboratory or national public health institute that Timor-Leste provides said services. [1] It is noteworthy that as per the US Embassy website in Timor-Leste, "Timorese citizens and foreign nationals can obtain COVID-19 testing at the National Hospital, free of charge." [1] Moreover, Timor-Leste requires cases and suspected cases to self-isolate as recommended, however, it does not provide economic support. [2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] US Embassy Website. "COVID-19 Information." [<https://tl.usembassy.gov/covid-19-information/>]. Accessed 20 September

2020.

### 2.5.1c

**Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Timor-Leste does not make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports. As per the Ministry of Health website as well as relevant laws related to the national laboratory and national health institute there is no evidence that Timor-Leste provides de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19. [1] It should be noted that the Ministry of Health's COVID-19 Chatbot provides daily data on COVID-19 cases in Timor-Leste, including the number of active cases, number of recovered cases, and relevant public health information. [2]

[1] Ministry of Health, Whatsapp COVID-19 Chatbot. [<https://api.whatsapp.com/send?phone=67075560000%20&text=hello>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] The Lancet. "Screening and triage at health-care facilities in Timor-Leste during the COVID-19 pandemic". [<https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanres/article/PIIS2213-2600>]

[20] 30183-1/fulltext]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.5.2 Point of entry management

### 2.5.2a

**Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency. As per the Ministry of Health, border control authorities and relevant legislation related to the National Laboratory there is no evidence that Timor-Leste has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency. [1] [2] It should be noted, however, as per Relief Web, Timor-Leste Red Cross (CVTL) is urgently ramping up COVID-19 prevention in remote areas bordering Indonesia. [3] Moreover, according to local news sources Timor-Leste "decided to open the border once every seventeen (17) days in order to control the quarantine sites." [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Immigration. "Immigration Service of Timor-Leste." [<https://migracao.gov.tl/>]. Accessed October 17, 2020.

[3] Relief Web. "Timor-Leste COVID-19 threats: Red Cross prioritizes border areas". [<https://reliefweb.int/report/timor->

leste/timor-leste-covid-19-threats-red-cross-prioritizes-border-areas]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] Tatoli. "COVID-19: Timor Leste border set to open every 17 days". [<http://www.tatoli.tl/en/2020/08/11/covid-19-timor-leste-border-set-to-open-every-17-days-says-pm/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

### 2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

#### 2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has FETP or applied epidemiology training programmes in the country at the national level, but does provide resources to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs. The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019"states that: "all levels of staff participate in a programme hosted abroad through an existing agreement (at any level). The MoH uses the capital development fund to send epidemiologists and veterinarians to complete their higher education abroad. "[1] Timor-Leste participated in the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) in 2018 in New Delhi, India [2]. According to the website of the Ministry of Health and the websites of the FETP program provider, there is no publicly available evidence that applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP) are available in Timor-Leste.[2,3]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). "Regional Field Epidemiology Training Programme". [<https://www.ncdc.gov.in/WriteReadData/l892s/52719717761528958906.pdf>]. Accessed 17 October 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

#### 2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV). There is no evidence as per that he Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 states that: "The MoH uses the capital development fund to send epidemiologists and veterinarians to complete their

higher education abroad. The MoH uses the capital development fund to send epidemiologists and veterinarians to complete their higher education abroad." [1] This is insufficient to demonstrate what programs are covered. Moreover there is no relevant information available on the Ministry of Health websites or the CDC, TEPHINET, AFENET, EMPHNET, RedSur, SAFETYNET, EPIET/EUPHEM websites. [2]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>].

## 2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

### 2.6.2a

**Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

### 3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

#### 3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

##### 3.1.1a

**Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?**

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. According to the Ministry of Health and the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, there exists no publicly available information regarding a national public health emergency response plan that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential [1, 2]. Further, there is no evidence of an emergency management agency in Timor-Leste.

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".

[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 3.1.1b

**If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. According to the Ministry of Health and the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, there exists no publicly-available information regarding a national public health emergency response plan that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential [1, 2]. Further, there is no evidence of an emergency management agency in Timor-Leste.

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".

[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 3.1.1c

**If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. According to the Ministry of Health and the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, there exists no publicly-available information regarding a national public health emergency response plan that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential [1, 2]. Further, there is no evidence of an emergency management agency in Timor-Leste.

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".

[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 3.1.1d

**Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

### 3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

#### 3.1.2a

**Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. As per the Ministry of Health and the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, there exists no publicly available information regarding engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. The lack of engagement with the private sector is addressed as an issue in the 2008 National Disaster Risk Management Policy [1, 2, 3]. Further, there is also no evidence that Timor-Leste has an emergency management agency.

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".

[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Ministry Of Social Solidarity. 2008. "National Disaster Risk Management Policy".

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114\\_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

#### 3.1.3a

**Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?**

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease= 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Timor-Leste does not have a policy in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic with specific criteria outlined for when NPIs are implemented. As per the Universal Health Coverage Partnership, the Prime Minister set up a crisis management centre and multisector task force, which then developed a national COVID-19 Preparedness Action Plan with support from WHO and other partners in order to implement NPIs, however, this is focused on COVID-19 and not broader epidemics. [1] Moreover, there is no relevant information as per the Ministry of Health website or other relevant agencies. [1][2]

[1] Universal Health Coverage Partnership. "Stories from the field: Special series on the COVID-19 response – Timor-Leste". [<https://www.uhcpartnership.net/story-timor-leste/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] [1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.



## 3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

### 3.2.1 Activating response plans

#### 3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year, however, there is evidence that it has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (with the WHO) in the past year.

As per the Ministry of Health's website, there is no relevant publicly available evidence on a national emergency plan or a covid-19 specific plan. Additionally, the relevant emergency management agency does not have a website. [1] As per the WHO, Simulation Exercise information Timor-Leste has simulated "an outbreak of avian influenza in municipality X of Timor-Leste [in December 2019]. Through a facilitated discussion, participants [will] review the processes involved for an efficient coordination of the response, from the deployment of an investigation team up until the declaration of the end of the epidemic." [2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude." [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed 16 October, 2020.

[2] WHO. "WHO Simulation Exercise." Available at [https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

#### 3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has in the past year identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. As per the WHO IHR, After Action Review, WHO Tmor-Leste websites, and the Ministry of Health website there is no relevant publicly-available evidence and the relevant emergency management agency does not have a website [1] [2] [3] [4]

[1] World Health Organization. "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH)." [https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise.]. Accessed 17 October 2020.

[2] World Health Organization. "World Health Organization- Timor-Leste. [<https://www.who.int/timorleste>]. Accessed 17 October 2020.

[3] World Health Organization. "After Action Review." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed October 21, 2020.

## 3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

### 3.2.2a

**Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector. As per the the WHO Simulation Exercise page , as well the WHO Timor-Leste and the Ministry of Health's websites, Timor-Leste has not undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector. [1,2,3] There is evidence that Timor-Leste has simulated "an outbreak of avian influenza in municipality X of Timor-Leste," however, there is no evidence that this included the private sector. [1]

[1] World Health Organization. "Simulation Exercise: Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security."

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed on 18 October 2020. World Health Organization. "World Health Organization: Timor-Leste." [<https://www.who.int/timorleste>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude." [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

## 3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

### 3.3.1 Emergency response operation

#### 3.3.1a

**Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Timor-Leste does not have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). As per "the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019: "Timor-Leste is in the process of establishing a public health EOC." Moreover, it states that: "Currently there is an informal coordination system with many of the functions of a public health EOC to support emergency responses." [1] There is no evidence as per the Ministry of Health website or emergency management agency. [2] [3] [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste. April 2010. "Disaster Risk Management Institutional and Operational Systems Development". [<https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/4539>]. Accessed 20 September

2020.

[4] Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. 2016. "Timor-Leste Disaster Management Reference Handbook". [<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/disaster-mgmt-ref-hdbk-TimorLeste.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 3.3.1b

**Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Timor-Leste does not have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). As per "the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019: "Timor-Leste is in the process of establishing a public health EOC." Moreover, it states that: "Currently there is an informal coordination system with many of the functions of a public health EOC to support emergency responses." [1] There is no evidence as per the Ministry of Health website or emergency management agency. [2] [3] [4]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste. April 2010. "Disaster Risk Management Institutional and Operational Systems Development". [<https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/4539>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. 2016. "Timor-Leste Disaster Management Reference Handbook". [<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/disaster-mgmt-ref-hdbk-TimorLeste.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 3.3.1c

**Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Timor-Leste does not have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). As per "the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019: "Timor-Leste is in the process of establishing a public health EOC." Moreover, it states that: "Currently there is an informal coordination system with many of the functions of a public health EOC to support emergency responses." [1] There is no evidence as per the Ministry of Health website or emergency management agency. [2] [3] [4]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste. April 2010. "Disaster Risk Management Institutional and Operational Systems Development". [<https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/4539>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. 2016. "Timor-Leste Disaster Management Reference Handbook". [<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/disaster-mgmt-ref-hdbk-TimorLeste.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

### 3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

#### 3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?
- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Timor-Leste's public health and national security authorities have conducted an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. Moreover, there are no publicly-available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandum of understanding (MOUs) or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. Further, there exists no publicly-available information that public health authorities or other related agencies have conducted an exercise to respond to a deliberate biological event or indicating that there are Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or MOUs between relevant government bodies related to bioterrorism on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Justice [1, 2]. Timor-Leste has attended training related to bioterrorism, for example, an INTERPOL training in New Zealand [3]. Timor-Leste does not have an Emergency Management Agency. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence does not appear to have a website.

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Justice. "Ministerio da Justica". [<http://www.mj.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Interpol. "Enhancing regional anti-bioterrorism efforts focus of New Zealand INTERPOL training session". [<https://www.interpol.int/ar/1/1/2010/Enhancing-regional-anti-bioterrorism-efforts-focus-of-New-Zealand-INTERPOL-training-session>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

### 3.5.1 Public communication

#### 3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has a risk communication plan that outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communication needs. As per the WHO,"one of the WHO Timor-Leste COVID-19 Strategic Objectives [is to] Communicate critical risk and event information to all communities and counter misinformation." [1] This appears to be an "objective and not communication plan. Moreover, as per the Ministry of Health there is no publicly available evidence and the emergency management agency does not have a website. [2]

[1] World Health Organization. "Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report - 56 Timor-Leste." [https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/04-08-2020-tls-sitrep-56-ncov-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=76c6dad2\_2]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] ] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 3.5.1 Risk communication planning

#### 3.5.1a

**Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has a risk communication plan or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health responses. As per the WHO,"one of the WHO Timor-Leste COVID-19 Strategic Objectives [is to] Communicate critical risk and event information to all communities and counter misinformation." [1] This appears to be an "objective and not communication plan. Moreover, as per the Ministry of Health there is no publicly available evidence and the emergency management agency does not have a website. [2]

[1] World Health Organization. "Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report - 56 Timor-Leste." [https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/04-08-2020-tls-sitrep-56-ncov-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=76c6dad2\_2]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] ] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

#### 3.5.1c

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has a risk communication plan or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response that designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. As per the WHO,"one of the WHO Timor-Leste COVID-19 Strategic Objectives [is to] Communicate critical risk and event information to all communities and counter

misinformation." [1] This appears to be an "objective and not communication plan. Moreover, as per the Ministry of Health there is no publicly available evidence and the emergency management agency does not have a website. [2]

[1] World Health Organization. "Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report - 56 Timor-Leste." [https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/04-08-2020-tls-sitrep-56-ncov-eng.pdf?sfvrsn=76c6dad2\_2]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

## 3.5.2 Public communication

### 3.5.2a

**In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?**

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the public health system shares information on health concerns (related to COVID-19) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation. The Ministry of Health actively uses social media in this regard. [1] For instance, the official chatbot of the Ministry of Health dedicated for COVID-19 has a section on "mythbusters" that states "taking a hot bath does not prevent the coronavirus." [2]

[1] Facebook. "Palácio das Cinzas". [https://www.facebook.com/MinisteriodaSaudeTL] Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. "Ministry of Health launches instant messaging service by WhatsApp (Chatbot) for information on COVID-19", 27 April 2020. http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=24197&lang=en&n=1 Accessed 20 September 2020..

### 3.5.2b

**Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?**

No = 1, Yes = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is publicly available evidence that the then Vice-Minister of Health of Timor-Leste shared misinformation on ways to prevent getting COVID-19 by sunbathing at 10 a.m. for 15 minutes for three times a week. This information was disseminated via social media in April 2020.[1]

[1] Facebook. "Palácio das Cinzas". [https://www.facebook.com/MinisteriodaSaudeTL/posts/1549466235209479] 2 April 2020. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

### 3.6.1 Internet users

#### 3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 27.49

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

#### 3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 110.22

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

#### 3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.87

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

### 3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

#### 3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.44

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

## 3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

### 3.7.1 Trade restrictions

#### 3.7.1a

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that in the past year Timor-Leste has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak. This is supported by the Government's website. [1] [2] [3] As per the ministries of Health, Agriculture, there is no publicly available evidence that in the past year Timor-Leste has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods. [4] [5] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have a dedicated website.

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. "Press Release: Exceptional and temporary measures relating to the epidemiological situation of the new Coronavirus". 20 March 2020. [<http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=23793&lang=en>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste. "Government signs agreement with Airnorth to ensure continued air services connectivity", 8 April 2020. [<http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=24046&lang=en&lang=en>]. Accessed on 20 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Arrival of the first aircraft resulting from the agreement between the Government and Airnorth", 10 April 2020. [<http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=24061&lang=en&lang=en>]. Accessed on 20 September 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

#### 3.7.1b

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that in the past year, Timor-Leste has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. This is supported by the Government's press release communications [1]. This is also supported by the ministries of Health and Agriculture. [2] [3] There is currently no dedicated website for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. "Press Release: Exceptional and temporary measures relating to the epidemiological situation of the new Coronavirus". 20 March 2020. [<http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=23793&lang=en>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.



[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

### 3.7.2 Travel restrictions

#### 3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that in the past year, Timor-Leste has implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from foreign countries due to the infectious disease outbreak of COVID-19. This is supported by the Government's communications press release. [1] This is also supported by the Government's State of Emergency legislation that bars travel from all countries via commercial flights and limited travel at the land border with Indonesia. [2] The only flights that currently are allowed are a World Food Programme humanitarian assistance flight. [3]

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. "Exceptional and temporary measures relating to the epidemiological situation of the new Coronavirus", 20 March 2020. [<http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=23793&lang=en&lang=en>]. Accessed on 20 September 2020.

[2] Government of Timor-Leste, Office of the Prime Minister. Timor-Leste Government Website. [<http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=25535&lang=en&n=1>] accessed 18 October 2020.

[3] Reliefweb. Reliefweb website. [<https://reliefweb.int/report/timor-leste/wfp-timor-leste-country-brief-july-2020>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

## Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

### 4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

#### 4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

##### 4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 72.24

2018

WHO; national sources

#### 4.1.1b

**Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 166.8**

2018

WHO; national sources

#### 4.1.1c

**Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the country have updated its health workforce strategy to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. The "Government of Timor-Leste, 2017: National Employment Strategy" was published in 2018 and identifies fields in which the workforce is insufficient and provides strategies to address these shortcomings. However, the strategy does not address the public health workforce [1]. Further, the Ministries of Health and Education do not contain any relevant publicly available information [2,3]. Timor-Leste does not have a Ministry of Labour.

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. 2017. "National Employment Strategy". [<http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/National-Employment-Strategy-2017-20301.pdf>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[3] Ministry of Education. "Ministerio da Educacao". [<http://www.moe.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

### 4.1.2 Facilities capacity

#### 4.1.2a

**Hospital beds per 100,000 people**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 590**

2010

WHO/World Bank; national sources

#### 4.1.2b

**Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is lack of sufficient publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable disease in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country. The Guido Valadares National Hospital, the biggest hospital in the country, does not have a website nor do the referral hospitals. There is also no information provided in this regard by the Ministry of Health's National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030 or the Ministry of Health website or relevant public health journal articles [1] [2] [3].

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".

[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[3] The Lancet Respiratory Medicine. "Screening and triage at health-care facilities in Timor-Leste during the COVID-19 pandemic," 22 April 2020. [<https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanres/article/PIIS2213-2600>

[20] 30183-1/fulltext]. Accessed on 20 September 2020.

#### 4.1.2c

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has developed a plan to expand its isolation capacity in response to COVID-19 outbreak in the country. The Ministry of Health's website is inaccessible at time of research. [1] The WHO Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Reports do not provide sufficient evidence on expansion of isolation capacity. [2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[2] WHO. "Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) situation reports - Timor-Leste".

[[https://www.who.int/timorleste/emergencies/novel-coronavirus-2019/novel-coronavirus-\(2019-ncov\)-situation-reports](https://www.who.int/timorleste/emergencies/novel-coronavirus-2019/novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)-situation-reports)]. Accessed 26 June 2021.

## 4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

### 4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

#### 4.2.1a

**Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?**

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that there is a national procurement protocol in place that can be utilized by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs.

There is no publicly-available evidence on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture website or the 2008 Organic Statute of the National Health Laboratory that indicates that such a procurement protocol exists [1, 2, 3]. Timor-Leste does not have a public health institute. As per Article 5 of the decree law No. 2/2004 on the Principle Management of the Autonomous Drug and Medical Equipment Service (SAMÉS), there is some relevant information in this regard but it is insufficient to constitute a protocol. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[4] The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Government. "Decree No. 2/2004 of Autonomous Drug and Medical Equipment Service". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Gov-Decrees/Gov-Decree-2004-02.pdf>]. Accessed on 19 September 2020.

## 4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

### 4.2.2a

**Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE, medical countermeasures) for national use during a public health emergency as per the website of the Ministry of Health. As stated in the JEE report published in 2019, "While there is no stockpile of medicines, a mechanism is in place, supported by international donors, to address medicine logistics during an emergency." [2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude." [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 16 October, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Mission report: 19-23 November 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed on 16 October 2020.

### 4.2.2b

**Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use for any type of public health emergency, beyond COVID-19 according to the website of the Ministry of Health. It is noteworthy that as evidenced by the JEE report that "While there is no stockpile of medicines, a mechanism is in place, supported by international donors, to address medicine logistics during an emergency." This said mechanism is being implemented to address COVID-19 public health emergency.

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude." [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 16 October, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization. "Joint external evaluation of IHR core capacities of the Democratic republic of Timor-Leste. Mission report: 19-23 November 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

#### 4.2.2c

**Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency.

Timor-Leste does not have a stockpile of medical countermeasures (MCM) (i.e. vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics) for national use during a public health emergency, beyond COVID-19, as per the website of the Ministry of Health.[1] It is noteworthy that under the current public health emergency of COVID-19, international agencies such as UNICEF and WHO in Timor-Leste have managed to "reprogramm[ed] certain funding, including from GAVI, The Vaccine Alliance, to the Ministry of Health, to support the maintenance of immunization during the pandemic." [2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 21 October 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".

[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 5 April 2021.

### 4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

#### 4.2.3a

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. However, there is evidence that Timor-Leste has a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency.

Local non-profit organizations as well as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) were able to produce a limited number of face shields as PPE for health professionals who work on the COVID-19 response. [1] Moreover, the Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019 states: "although there is no stockpile of medicines, a mechanism is in place, supported by international donors, to address medicine logistics during an emergency." [2] There is no further evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health.[3]

[1] Tatoli. "UNDP, Catalpa ho Parseiru Apoiu Ekipamentu Preve COVID-19 ba MS (UNDP, Catalpa and Partners supported PPE for COVID-19 to the Ministry of Health)," 30 April 2020. [<http://www.tatoli.tl/2020/04/30/ong-catalpa-apoiu-ekipamentu-prevene-covid-19-ba-ms/>]. Accessed on 20 September 2020.

[2] "The Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste published in 2019." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude." [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 16 October, 2020.

#### 4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency or plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency such as the current COVID-19 pandemic. There is no publicly-available evidence in this regard as per the Ministries of Health and Defense. [2] [3] There is no website for the emergency planning agency. There is evidence that Timor-Leste has leveraged domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies as per COVID-19 in a limited capacity (masks/faceshields). [1]

[1] Tatoli. "UNDP, Catalpa ho Parseiru Apoiu Ekipamentu Preve COVID-19 ba MS (UNDP, Catalpa and Partners supported PPE for COVID-19 to the Ministry of Health)," 30 April 2020. [<http://www.tatoli.tl/2020/04/30/ong-catalpa-apoiu-ekipamentu-prevene-covid-19-ba-ms/>]. Accessed on 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Defence. "Ministry of Defence Website." [<https://defesa.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

## 4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

### 4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

#### 4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that Timor-Leste has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics). The plan is not available on the website of the Ministries of Health and Defence while the emergency planning agency does not have a website. [1,2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude." [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Defence. "Ministériu da Defesa." [https://defesa.gov.tl/]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

### 4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

#### 4.3.2a

**Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no specific publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. As per the websites of the websites of the Ministries of Health and Defence, there is no relevant publicly available evidence and the relevant emergency planning agency does not have a website. It is noteworthy that under the current COVID-19 public health emergency, Timor-Leste receives health personnel from other countries such as Australia to help with responding to a public health emergency. [1,2]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude." [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Defence. "Ministériu da Defesa." [https://defesa.gov.tl/]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

[3] ABC News. "Australian doctors aim to stop COVID-19 from 'tearing through' Timor-Leste," 16 April 2020.

[https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-16/australian-doctors-help-stop-covid-timor-leste/12147180]. Accessed on 18 September 2020.

## 4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

### 4.4.1 Access to healthcare

#### 4.4.1a

**Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?**

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

**Current Year Score: 3**

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

#### 4.4.1b

##### Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 56.7

2016

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

#### 4.4.1c

##### Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 22.02

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 4.4.2 Paid medical leave

#### 4.4.2a

##### Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

### 4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

#### 4.4.3a

##### Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the government has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. As per the Ministry of Health, National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, and the National Disaster Risk Management Policy there exists no publicly available information regarding a policy or a public statement committing to provide prioritized health care services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. [1, 2, 3]



- [1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 18 October 2020.
- [3] Ministry Of Social Solidarity. 2008. "National Disaster Risk Management Policy". [[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114\\_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf)]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

## 4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

### 4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

#### 4.5.1a

**Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. While communication is included in Timor-Leste's National Risk Management Policy, it does not directly relate to healthcare workers. [1] As per the Ministry of Health's website and the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, there exists no additional publicly available information regarding a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. [2,3]

- [1] Ministry Of Social Solidarity. 2008. "National Disaster Risk Management Plan". [[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114\\_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf)]. Accessed 18 October 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

#### 4.5.1b

**Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers in both the public and private sector to communicate during a public health emergency. As noted, while communication is included in Timor-Leste's National Risk Management Policy, it does not directly relate to healthcare workers. [1] As per the Ministry of Health's website and the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, there exists no additional publicly available information regarding a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. [2,3]

- [1] Ministry Of Social Solidarity. 2008. "National Disaster Risk Management Plan". [[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114\\_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/22114_microsoftword15500nationaldisasterr.pdf)]. Accessed 18 October 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".  
[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

## 4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

### 4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

#### 4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the national public health system monitors and tracks the number of healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities from the Ministry of Health or the World Health Organization's (WHO) Country Cooperation Strategy for Timor-Leste. There is on evidence in the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030; the WHO Country Cooperation Strategy Timor-Leste 2015-2019; the Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory; Decree Law 09/2005: System of Epidemiological Surveillance; or on the Ministry of Health's website [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].

[1] Ministry of Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030".  
[[http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national\\_health\\_sector\\_plan.pdf?ua=1](http://www.searo.who.int/timorleste/publications/national_health_sector_plan.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 18 October 2020. [2] World Health Organization. 2016. "WHO Country Cooperation Strategy Timor-Leste 2015-2019".  
[<https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/246258>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.  
[3] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.  
[4] Government of Timor-Leste. "Organic Statute Of The National Health Laboratory". [<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law%2039-2008.pdf>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.  
[5] Democratic Republic of East Timor Timor. "Decree Law 09/2005: System of Epidemiological Surveillance."  
[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

## 4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

### 4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

#### 4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial. One of the competencies of the National Health Institute (Instituto Nacional de Sa\_de/INS) is "to coordinate human health and medical research; and to manage Health Research Ethics in Timor-Leste" [1]. However, there is no explicit requirement or evidence that there is a mandate for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial. Further, the website of the Ministry of Health does not contain any relevant information, and Timor-Leste does not have a Ministry of Research. [2]

[1] Ministerio da Saude Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste. 2015. " Instituto Nacional de Saude".

[[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282868045\\_National\\_Health\\_Institute-Ministry\\_of\\_Health\\_Timor-Leste\\_Five\\_Year\\_Strategic\\_Plan\\_2015-2019](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282868045_National_Health_Institute-Ministry_of_Health_Timor-Leste_Five_Year_Strategic_Plan_2015-2019)]. Accessed 17 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 17 September 2020.

#### 4.7.1b

**Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that there is an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat any ongoing epidemics. There is no evidence of this as per National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030 and the Ministry of Health website. [1,2]

[1] World Health Organization. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed on 16 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. 20 September 2020.

### 4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

#### 4.7.2a

**Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that there is a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans. There is no evidence of this as per National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030 and the Ministry of Health website. [1,2]

[1] World Health Organization. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed on 16 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. 20 September 2020.

#### 4.7.2b

**Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies. As per the National Health Sector Strategic Plan and the Ministry of Health website there is no publicly available evidence that an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures during public health emergencies. [1] [2]

[1] World Health Organization. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed on 16 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

## Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

### 5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

#### 5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

##### 5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2020

World Health Organization

#### 5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

##### 5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Timor-Leste has integrated pandemics into the national risk reduction strategy nor is there evidence of a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics. According to the Ministry of Health, the National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030, the 2005 Epidemiological Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/09", and the 2005 Health Surveillance Law, "Government of Timor-Leste, Decree Law 2005/14, Authorities

for Health Surveillance," pandemics are not integrated into the national risk reduction strategy, and there does not exist a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics [1, 2, 3, 4]. Further, the 2008 National Disaster Risk Management Policy refers to pandemics only once in the policy [2].

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/14. "Authorities for Health Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-14.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] Government of Timor-Leste. Decree Law 2005/09. "System of Epidemiological Surveillance".

[<http://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/RDTL-Law/RDTL-Decree-Laws/Decree-Law-2005-09.pdf>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

### 5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

#### 5.2.1a

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has cross-border agreements as part of a regional group with regard to public health emergencies. Further, Timor-Leste is part of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme (WHE) at the Southeast Asia Regional Office (SEARO), which plans cross-border protocols for Southeast Asia related to public health emergencies; however, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that this would constitute a cross-border agreement [1]. Moreover, there is no relevant information available on the website of the Ministry of Health website, and Timor-Leste does not have emergency management agency [2].

[1] World Health Organization. "Regional Consultation for Networking and Coordination of Health Partners for Emergency Response". [<https://www.who.int/southeastasia/news/events/detail/2017/11/28/default-calendar/regional-consultation-for-networking-and-coordination-of-health-partners-for-emergency-response>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

#### 5.2.1b

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Timor-Leste has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. There is no relevant information available on the website of the Ministry of Health website, and Timor-Leste does not have a legal framework or Law on Animal Health. [1,2]

[1] The World Health Organization (WHO). November 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/324829/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.56-eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [http://www.moh.gov.tl/]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

### 5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

#### 5.3.1a

**Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?**

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1b

**Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1c

**Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1d

**Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:**

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

## 5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

### 5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

## 5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

### 5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

#### 5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

## 5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

### 5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

### 5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5 FINANCING

### 5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

#### 5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly-available evidence Timor-Leste has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. As per the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture websites, as well as the national budget priorities there is no publicly-available has allocated national funds for epidemic threats in the past three years. [1][2][3] However, Timor-Leste did allocate US\$150 million to improve capacity to address epidemic threats of COVID-19 in the past year. This is supported by news reporting by a local NGO that monitors Government expenditures. [4] [5]

[1] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. "Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries". [<http://gov.east-timor.gov.tl/>]. Accessed September 13, 2020.



timor.org/MAFF/]. Accessed September 13, 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste Government Website. [http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?cat=39&lang=en]. Accessed October 18, 2020.

[4] La'o Hamutuk. "2020 General State Budget". [http://laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE20/19OGE20.htm]. Accessed on 15 September 2020.

[5] La'o Hamutuk. "Detalho Ezekusaun Fundo Covid 19 ate 31 Maio 2020 Pur Programa - Sub Programa - Actividades (Details of execution of COVID-19 funds until 31 May 2020 by program - sub program- Activities".

[http://laohamutuk.org/Justice/2020/Ezekusaun-Fundo-Covid19-31Maiu2020te.pdf]. Accessed on 15 September 2020.

## 5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

### 5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

### 5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which Timor-Leste can access in the face of a public health emergency through multilateral emergency funding mechanism during a public health emergency such as COVID-19. This is supported by the Asian Development Bank's communications website. [1] Moreover, all the eligible borrowing countries of the International Development Association (IDA) are eligible for the World Bank pandemic financing facility [2]. As such, Timor-Leste, which is eligible for IDA financing, is also eligible to avail itself of the World Bank pandemic financing facility [3].

[1] Asian Development Bank. "ADB Grant to Help Ensure Food Security in Timor-Leste Amid COVID-19," 22 June 2020. [https://www.adb.org/news/adb-grant-help-ensure-food-security-timor-leste-amid-covid-19]. Accessed on 14 September 2020.

[2] The World Bank. December 2017. "Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF)". [http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

[3] World Bank Group. "International Development Association Borrowing Countries". [http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

## 5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

### 5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly-available evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment to improve Timor-Leste's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support or by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity. As per the Ministry of Finance and the WHO there is no evidence that Timor-Leste of either category of support. [1] [2] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have a website. It should be noted that Timor-Leste has requested support for COVID-19. [3]

[1] Ministry of Finance. Government of Timor-Leste [https://www.mof.gov.tl/?lang=en] accessed 18 October 2020.

[2] World Health Organization, Timor-Leste. WHO Website [https://www.who.int/timorleste]. Accessed 18 October 2020.

[3] Government of Timor-Leste, Ministry of Finance. "Government of Timor-Leste and the Government of Australia Agreement to Support Timor-Leste's Covid 19 Economic Recovery. [https://www.mof.gov.tl/government-of-timor-leste-and-the-government-of-australia-agreement-to-support-timor-lestes-covid-19-economic-recovery/?lang=en]. Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?

**- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?**

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Timor-Leste has requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats but has not provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats .

According to the website of the Government of Timor-Leste, it is committed to improve "the quality of malnutrition education, treatment and prevention, and the coverage of child vaccination against polio,... diphtheria and hepatitis. [It] will continue the programs seeking to raise awareness and educate the populations on transmissible diseases like ... malaria and others" [1]. Moreover, according to the GHS Tracking Dashboard, there is evidence that the country has received funds [2]. A sum of 130.21M USD in funds were disbursed from 2014 to 2020 according to the Dashboard, with funds dedicated to improve workforce capacity, the national laboratory system, immunization, real time surveillance, and zoonotic disease preparedness, among other capacities [2].

Further, Timor-Leste has in the past three years requested financing or technical support from donors to improve its domestic capacity to address epidemic threats, as per the Ministry of Finance they have requested financing from Australia to address epidemic threats. [3]

[1] Government of Timor-Leste. 2019. "Program of the Sixth Constitutional Government". [<http://timor-lete.gov.tl/?cat=39&bl=11688&lang=en>]. Accessed 17 October 2020.

[2] Global Health Security Funding Tracker. [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/#/data>]. Accessed 17 October 2020.

[3] Ministry of Finance. "Government of Timor-Leste and the Government of Australia Agreement to Support Timor-Leste's COVID-19 Economic Recovery". [<https://www.mof.gov.tl/government-of-timor-lete-and-the-government-of-australia-agreement-to-support-timor-lestes-covid-19-economic-recovery/?lang=en>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 5.5.4c

**Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## 5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

### 5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

#### 5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. However, during the ongoing pandemic of COVID-19, clinical specimens were sent to Darwin, Australia for laboratory testing. [1,2,3]

[1] World Health Organization. "National Health Sector Strategic Plan 2011-2030". [[https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/searo/timor-leste/national-health-sector-plan.pdf?sfvrsn=70870918_2)]. Accessed on 16 September 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Ministeriu Saude". [<http://www.moh.gov.tl/>]. Accessed 13 September 2020.

[3] Menzies Website. "Capacity building in Timor-Leste".

[[https://www.menzies.edu.au/page/News\\_and\\_Events/Latest\\_News/Capacity\\_building\\_in\\_Timor-Leste/](https://www.menzies.edu.au/page/News_and_Events/Latest_News/Capacity_building_in_Timor-Leste/)] Accessed 13 September 2020.

#### 5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no publically available evidence via the WHO or media coverage that suggests that Timor-Leste has not shared samples in accordance with the PIP framework in the past two years. [1]

[1] The World Health Organization. "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework".

[<https://www.who.int/influenza/pip/en/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

#### 5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There exists no publicly available information through the WHO or media coverage that Timor-Leste has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years, including COVID-19. [1] During the ongoing pandemic of COVID-19, clinical specimens were sent to Darwin, Australia for laboratory testing.

[1] The World Health Organization. "Alert & Response Operations". [<http://www.who.int/csr/alertresponse/en/>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

## Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

### 6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

#### 6.1.1 Government effectiveness

##### 6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

**6.1.1d**

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

**6.1.1e**

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 40

2020

Transparency International

**6.1.1f**

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

**6.1.1g**

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

**6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power**

**6.1.2a**

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

#### 6.1.3a

**What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?**

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

#### 6.1.4a

**How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?**

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

**Current Year Score: 3**

2021

Economist Intelligence

#### 6.1.4b

**What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?**

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

**Current Year Score: 4**

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

### 6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.5 Armed conflict

### 6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.6 Government territorial control

### 6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.7 International tensions

### 6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence



## 6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

### 6.2.1 Literacy

#### 6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 68.07

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);  
The Economist Intelligence Unit

### 6.2.2 Gender equality

#### 6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.5

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

### 6.2.3 Social inclusion

#### 6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.4

2014

World Bank; Economist Impact

#### 6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Approximately 60% of the workforce in Timor-Leste work in the informal sector. According to the ILO more than 60% of the workforce in Timor-Leste work in the informal sector. [1]

[1] ILO. "Informal economy in Indonesia and Timor-Leste". [<http://www.oit.org/jakarta/areasofwork/informal-economy/lang-en/index.htm#:~:text=In%20both%20Indonesia%20and%20Timor,per%20cent%20of%20the%20workforce>]. Accessed 20 September 2020.

### 6.2.3c

#### Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

**Current Year Score: 0**

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.2.4 Public confidence in government

### 6.2.4a

#### Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.5 Local media and reporting

### 6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.6 Inequality

### 6.2.6a

#### Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

**Current Year Score: 0.29**

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

### 6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

#### 6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

#### 6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

#### 6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

### 6.4.1 Urbanization

#### 6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 30.95

2019

World Bank

## 6.4.2 Land use

### 6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: -0.94

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

## 6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

### 6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

### 6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

#### 6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 69.26

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
World Factbook

#### 6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 570.4

2019

WHO

### **6.5.1c**

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.29

2019

World Bank

### **6.5.1d**

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 38.2

2018

World Bank

### **6.5.1e**

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 3.8

2016

WHO

## **6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation**

### **6.5.2a**

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 78.34

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### 6.5.2b

**Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 53.52**

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

## 6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

### 6.5.3a

**Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 213.78**

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

## 6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

### 6.5.4a

**Trust medical and health advice from the government**

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

### 6.5.4b

**Trust medical and health advice from medical workers**

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018