

Suriname

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Suriname. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Suriname.

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Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Suriname has a national action plan on antibiotic microbial resistance (AMR), however, the plan does not appear to be publicly available. The World Health Organization (WHO) library of countries with existing and publicly available national action plans on AMR does not include Suriname. [1] In 2018, The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reported that such a plan was presented at a workshop and described it in the following way: “This plan indicates the strengths of existing activities in Suriname and outlines the current situation regarding AMR among humans and animals, proposing a comprehensive, integrated approach for future surveillance; research and development; and education, extension, and outreach activities.” [2] In the Global Database for AMR of 2019-2020 and the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028, the existence of the Anti-microbial Resistance (AMR) Action Plan 2018-2021 is confirmed. [3, 4] However, the plan is not publicly available on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Public Health, or the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). [5, 6, 7]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 2018. “Library of Antibiotic Microbial Resistance National Action Plans”.

[<http://www.who.int/drugresistance/action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2018. “AntiMicrobial Resistance (AMR) A GLOBAL THREAT?”.

[https://www.paho.org/sur/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=577:antimicrobial-resistance-amr-a-global-threat&Itemid=563]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[3] Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance. 2020. “Country Self Assessment: Suriname”.

[<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. “National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028”.

[<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. “Documents”. [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[6] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. “Documents”. [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[7] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. “Situation Reports”.

[<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2 , Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence to suggest that Suriname has a national laboratory or laboratory system that can test for any of the 7+1 World Health Organization (WHO) Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) priority pathogens. Based on the Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment of 2019-2020, the national laboratory performs only susceptibility testing for common bacterial pathogens. No data is available for microbes such as *N. gonorrhoea*, *Shigella* or *Klebsiella pneumoniae*. [1] The Ministry of Public Health website mentions the existence of a national reference laboratory, the Central Laboratory of Suriname at the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG) in Paramaribo, but no information on the laboratory's capacity for AMR pathogen susceptibility testing is available, and the Suriname Central Laboratory does not appear to maintain an online presence. There is no evidence in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [2, 3, 4] The World Health Organization (WHO) library of countries with existing and publicly available national action plans on AMR does not include Suriname. [5]

[1] Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance. 2020. "Country Self Assessment: Suriname".

[<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports".

[<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[5] World Health Organization (WHO). 2018. "Library of Antibiotic Microbial Resistance National Action Plans".

[<http://www.who.int/drugresistance/action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname conducts detection or surveillance activities (e.g. in soil, waterways, etc.) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. Neither the NIMOS, the National Institute for Environment and Development, or any other government agency in Suriname conducts surveillance for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. [1] There is also no evidence on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [2] There is no National Action Plan for Suriname in the World Health Organization (WHO) Library of AMR National Action Plans. [3] According to the Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance of 2019-2020, Suriname has a national Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) program or operational plan available. National IPC as well as water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and environmental health standards exist, but no evidence for detection or surveillance activities has been documented. [4]

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2018. "Environment: NIMOS". [<http://www.gov.sr/themas/milieu-en-omgeving/nimos.aspx>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 2018. "Library of Antibiotic Microbial Resistance National Action Plans".

[<http://www.who.int/drugresistance/action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[4] Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance. 2020. "Country Self Assessment: Suriname".
[<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Suriname has national legislation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans. According to the Suriname Pharmaceutical Country Profile published by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2010, the Pharmaceutical Act of 1896 states that dispensing of human antibiotics without prescription is not permitted. [1] The Registration Committee (Registratie Commissie) is in charge of enforcing the guidelines on the use of human medicines. [2] However, at the end of 2015, Minister of Public Health Patrick Pengel resolved to control sales of medicines in supermarkets and other non-pharmaceutical shops, including antibiotics, without prescription. [3] There is no evidence regarding the ineffectiveness of these controls on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Public Health Office; and as such, gaps in enforcement were not found. [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]

[1] World Health Organization. 2010. Suriname: Pharmaceutical Country Profile Suriname
[http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/suriname_pharmaceutical_profile_April_2011.pdf]. Accessed 11 February 2021.

[2] Government of the Republic of Suriname. January 2021. "Medicine Registration Committee Installed".
[<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/2021/geneesmiddelen-registratie-commissie-ge%C3%AFnstalleerd/>]. Accessed 11 February 2021.

[3] Starnieuws Online Newspaper Suriname. 27 December 2015. "Pengel: Controls on Sales of Medicines Next Year".
[<https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/32989>]. Accessed 11 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 11 February 2021.

[5] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports".
[<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 11 February 2021.

[6] Waterkant News Suriname. "Antibiotics: Search Results". [<https://www.waterkant.net/?s=antibiotica>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[7] Suriname Herald. "Antibiotics: Search Results". [<https://www.srherald.com/?s=antibiotica>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[8] Starnieuws Suriname. "Antibiotics: Search Results". [<https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/zoeken>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

1.1.2b

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence about legislation or regulation requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals in Suriname. According to the Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment of 2018-2019, data is collected on the sale of antibiotics for therapeutic or growth promotion uses in animals. [1] However, there is no information on a legal framework available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal

Husbandry and Fisheries. [2, 3]

[1] Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance. "Country Self Assessment: Suriname". [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 22 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

1.2 ZONOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a

Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Suriname has a plan on zoonotic disease. The 1954 Law on Animal Disease does not establish any specific procedures for zoonotic disease. [1] However, the 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan (Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid), which relates to influenza, covers zoonotic varieties of influenza, namely swine influenza and avian influenza, explicitly addressing them as risks to human health, and considering risks of spillover events from animals to humans. [2] The plan determines different phases of national pandemic preparedness and response by following the World Health Organization's (WHO) six phases of the evolution of avian influenza into human influenza. Measures include surveillance of influenza in poultry and other animals, surveillance of mortality rates in poultry and pigs, cooperation between the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) and the Veterinary Service (Veterinaire Dienst), preparations for zoonotic outbreak investigations, as well as guidelines for persons in contact with animals, including testing facilities and isolation measures. [2] Furthermore, according to a 2018 report, the World Health Organization (WHO) Veterinary Public Health program is supporting Suriname in the prevention and control of rabies and other zoonoses. [3]

[1] Government of Suriname. "Law of 3 April 1954 on Animal Disease" ("Landsverordening van 3 April 1954 ter koming in bestrijding van dierziekten").

[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Suriname/SR_Law_Animal_Diseases.pdf]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 2018. "WHO/PAHO Caribbean Subregional Program Coordination on Veterinary Public Health". [https://www.paho.org/ocpc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=391:veterinary-public-health&Itemid=0&showall=1]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

1.2.1b

Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Suriname has a plan which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. In the 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan (Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid), Suriname delineates steps to be taken in situations where there is a risk of zoonotic spillover events, specifically regarding avian and swine influenza. [1] Measures include surveillance of influenza in poultry and other animals, surveillance of mortality rates in poultry and pigs, cooperation between the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) and the Veterinary Service (Veterinaire Dienst), preparations for zoonotic outbreak investigations, as well as guidelines for persons in contact with animals, including testing facilities and isolation measures. [1] There is no further evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or Ministry of Agriculture Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [2,3]

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

1.2.1c

Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Suriname has national plans or laws that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. In the 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"), Suriname delineates steps to be taken regarding surveillance and control of influenza viruses including bird flu and swine flu. [1] The World Health Organization (WHO) Veterinary Public Health program is supporting Suriname in the prevention and control of rabies and other zoonoses. [2] There is no further information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [3, 4]

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). "Veterinary Public Health". [https://www.paho.org/spc-crb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=391:veterinary-public-health&Itemid=0]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Suriname has a department or agency dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. The Ministry of Public Health in Suriname focuses solely on human health while the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries focuses on animal health. There is no public information available about collaborative efforts on the monitoring or the control of zoonotic diseases on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. [1, 2]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a voluntary or mandatory mechanism for owners of livestock to report diseases to a central government agency in Suriname. There is no information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [1, 2]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners) in Suriname. There is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [1, 2] There is evidence of a Privacy and Data Protection Law presented in 2018, but it is not available on the aforementioned websites or the website of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. [1, 2, 3, 4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries.. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 17

February 2021.

[3] Paolo Balboni. 15 May 2018. "The New Surinamese Privacy and Data Protection (SPDP) Law".

[<https://www.paolobalboni.eu/index.php/2018/05/15/the-new-surinamese-privacy-and-data-protection-spdp-law/>].

Accessed 17 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Trade and Industry. "Documents". [<http://tradeandindustry.gov.sr/documenten/wetgeving/juridische-zaken-jz/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname conducts surveillance of zoonotic diseases in wildlife. There is no evidence of such activity on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [1, 2]

[1] Ministry of Public Health.. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 9.29

2018

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.41

2018

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a national plan on zoonotic disease that includes mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. In the 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”), no mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses are detailed. [1] There is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries and the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). [2, 3, 4]

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. “Documents”. [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. “Documents”. [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). “Protocols”. [<https://bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a record of facilities dealing with high-risk biological material. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] The government year plan for 2013 mentioned the preparation of a

biosecurity law and the 2016 year plan mentioned the adaptation of the National Biosafety System. [6, 7] In 2017, a newspaper called the Suriname Herald reported the creation of a Commission for Biotechnology and Biosafety in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries focusing on food security and food safety, but none of the aforementioned government websites mention this event or documents the Commission's responsibilities. [1, 2, 3, 4, 8] Furthermore, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the Confidence Building Measure Return (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [9] However, while these reports might contain information about facilities dealing with high-risk biological material in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible. Finally, in 2019, Suriname reported to the UN a National Action Plan for the implementation of security council resolution 1540 (2004), in which it resolves to undertake a national survey of the use of chemical, biological or nuclear materials. [10] No further information on this survey is available. [1, 2, 3, 4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Land and Forest Management. "Services". [<http://rgb.gov.sr/diensten/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2013. "Year Plan 2013". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/JAARPLAN-2013.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[7] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2016. "Year Plan 2016". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/JAARPLAN-2016.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[8] Suriname Herald Newspaper. June 2017. "Installation of the Commission Biotechnology and Biosecurity for Food Security and Food Safety". [<https://www.srherald.com/suriname/2017/06/02/lvv-installatie-commissie-biotechnologie-en-bioveiligheid-voor-voedselzekerheid-en-voedselveiligheid/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[9] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[10] United Nations 1540 Committee. 2019. "Suriname National Action Plan". [https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/Suriname_national_action_plan.pdf]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has national legislation or regulations related to biosecurity. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] The government year plan for 2013 mentioned the preparation of a biosecurity law and the 2016 year plan mentioned the adaptation of the National Biosafety System. [6, 7] In 2017, a newspaper called the Suriname Herald reported the creation of a Commission for Biotechnology and Biosafety in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries focusing on food security and food safety, but none of the aforementioned

government websites mention this event or documents the Commission's responsibilities. [1, 2, 3, 4, 8] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [9] However, while these reports might contain information on biosecurity legislation in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible. In 2019, Suriname reported to the UN a National Action Plan for the implementation of security council resolution 1540 (2004), in which it resolves to consider new legislation on biosecurity. [10] No further information on such legislation is available. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Land and Forest Management. "Services". [<http://rgb.gov.sr/diensten/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2013. "Year Plan 2013". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/JAARPLAN-2013.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[7] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2016. "Year Plan 2016". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/JAARPLAN-2016.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[8] Suriname Herald Newspaper. June 2017. "Installation of the Commission Biotechnology and Biosecurity for Food Security and Food Safety". [<https://www.srherald.com/suriname/2017/06/02/lvv-installatie-commissie-biotechnologie-en-bioveiligheid-voor-voedselzekerheid-en-voedselveiligheid/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[9] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[10] United Nations 1540 Committee. 2019. "Suriname National Action Plan". [https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/Suriname_national_action_plan.pdf]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

1.3.1c

Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has an agency responsible for enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. The country does not have national legislation related to biosecurity. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] The government year plan for 2013 mentioned the preparation of a biosecurity law and the 2016 year plan mentioned the adaptation of the National Biosafety System. [6, 7] In 2017, a newspaper called the Suriname Herald reported the creation of a Commission for Biotechnology and Biosafety in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries focusing on food security and food safety, but no government website mentions this event or documents the Commission's responsibilities. [8] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [9] However, while these reports might contain information on biosecurity legislation in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Land and Forest Management. "Services". [<http://rgb.gov.sr/diensten/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.
- [5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.
- [6] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2013. "Year Plan 2013". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/JAARPLAN-2013.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [7] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2016. "Year Plan 2016". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/JAARPLAN-2016.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [8] Suriname Herald Newspaper. June 2017. "Installation of the Commission Biotechnology and Biosecurity for Food Security and Food Safety". [<https://www.srherald.com/suriname/2017/06/02/lvv-installatie-commissie-biotechnologie-en-bioveiligheid-voor-voedselzekerheid-en-voedselveiligheid/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [9] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.3.1d

Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Suriname has taken action to consolidate its inventories of dangerous pathogens into a minimum number of facilities. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information on biosecurity legislation in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Land and Forest Management. "Services". [<http://rgb.gov.sr/diensten/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.
- [5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.
- [6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax or Ebola. Since February 2020, the Public Health Office's (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) Central Laboratory in Paramaribo is equipped to conduct PCR tests for COVID-19. [1] However, there is no evidence that this capability exists for anthrax or Ebola testing; there is no information available on website of the General Hospital Paramaribo. [2] The Regional Health Care Service (Regionale Gezondheidsdienst), a private institute in the capital Panmaraibo, does not list Ebola or Bacillus Anthracis diagnosis under its services. [3] Suriname Newspaper Starnieuws reported in 2020 that the BOG Central Laboratory has accreditation for diagnostics in the context of HIV, microbiology, Malaria and intestinal bugs and is making an effort to receive ISO 17025 accreditation for its chemistry department. [3] However, no website for the Central Laboratory was found in order to check whether the institution tests for anthrax or Ebola. There is no further information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [4, 5, 6]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. [<http://health.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 22 February 2021.

[2] General Hospital Paramaribo in Suriname. [<http://www.azp.sr/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[3] Regional Health Care Service in Paramaribo, Suriname. "Lab". [<http://www.rgd.sr/nl/zorg-aanbod/lab>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[6] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence to suggest that biosecurity training is required in Suriname. The national Labor Law lists contact with pathogenic microorganisms in laboratories as a work-related hazard, but does not give guidelines or requirements on related training. [1] There is no additional information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [7] However, while these reports might contain information about a requirement for biosecurity training in Suriname, they are

not publicly accessible.

- [1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2012. "Theory and practice of the Suriname Labor Law". [<http://atm.gov.sr/media/1107/theorie-en-praktijk-de-arbeidswet-2012.pdf>]. Accessed 31 October 2018.
- [2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Land and Forest Management. "Services". [<http://rgb.gov.sr/diensten/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.
- [6] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.
- [7] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname performs any security checks on personnel working with especially dangerous biological material and toxins. There is no information on checks available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] The government year plan for 2013 mentioned the preparation of a biosecurity law and the 2016 year plan mentioned the adaptation of the National Biosafety System. [6, 7] In 2017, a newspaper called the Suriname Herald reported the creation of a Commission for Biotechnology and Biosafety in the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries focusing on food security and food safety, but no government website mentions this event or documents the Commission's responsibilities. [8] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [9] However, while these reports might contain information on biosecurity legislation in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Land and Forest Management. "Services". [<http://rgb.gov.sr/diensten/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.
- [5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2013. "Year Plan 2013". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/JAARPLAN-2013.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[7] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2016. "Year Plan 2016". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/JAARPLAN-2016.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[8] Suriname Herald Newspaper. June 2017. "Installation of the Commission Biotechnology and Biosecurity for Food Security and Food Safety". [<https://www.srherald.com/suriname/2017/06/02/lvv-installatie-commissie-biotechnologie-en-bioveiligheid-voor-voedselzekerheid-en-voedselveiligheid/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[9] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public information on the secure transport of infectious substances (categories A and B) in Suriname. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Tourism, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information about regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Transport, Communication and Tourism. "Home". [<http://www.mintct.sr/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a national legislation in Suriname to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and pathogens with pandemic potential. The law of 12 March 2002 on Safety and Security of Transport mentions regulations on dangerous goods briefly, no specifications on pathogens or toxins are available. [1] No information on cross-border transfer of dangerous pathogens is available from the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Tourism, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] According to the National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018 for Suriname, the central reference Public Health Laboratory of the Bureau Openbare Gezondheid (BOG, Public Health Office) is certified to send and transport (pack and ship) test material (specimens) to referral laboratories abroad. [7] The BOG laboratory does not have an official website to confirm this or specify if this involves especially dangerous biological material. Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [8] However, while these reports might contain information about national legislation, regulation, or other guidance in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Law Book of the Republic of Suriname. Law 12 March 2012. "Law Safety and Security Civil Aviation" ("Wet Veiligheid en Beveiliging Burgerluchtvaart"). [<http://www.mintct.sr/wetten/sb200224.htm>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Transport, Communication and Tourism. "Home". [<http://www.mintct.sr/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[6] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[7] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[8] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a

Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Suriname has national biosafety legislation. A Decree in the country's Labor Law added on 13 December 2010 mentions that minors should not be working with dangerous biological materials, yet a general legal framework on biosafety is lacking. [1] The Ministry of Public Health's National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018 does not mention implementation of a biosafety legislation, and the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database does not mention it. [2, 3] However, according to the Plan, the Public Health Office's (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG)

Central Laboratory in Paramaribo meets the quality and biorisk international standards level II+. Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [4] However, while these reports might contain information about biosafety regulation in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2012. "Theory and Practice of the Labor Law".

[http://www.gov.sr/media/597073/theorie_en_praktijk_de_arbeidswet_2012.pdf]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[4] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.4.1b

Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations in Suriname. The 1963 national Labor Law lists contact with pathogenic microorganisms in laboratories as a work-related hazard, but does not give guidelines or requirements on related training. [1] There is no information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [2, 3, 4,5] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information about an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2012. "Theory and Practice of the Labor Law".

[<http://atm.gov.sr/media/1107/theorie-en-praktijk-de-arbeidswet-2012.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols".

[<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that biosafety training is required by law in Suriname. The 1963 national Labor Law lists contact with pathogenic microorganisms in laboratories as a work-related hazard, but does not give guidelines or requirements on related training. [1] There is no information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [2, 3, 4, 5] Finally, Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information about biosafety training in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2012. "Theory and Practice of the Labor Law".

[<http://atm.gov.sr/media/1107/theorie-en-praktijk-de-arbeidswet-2012.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols".

[<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has conducted any assessments on dual use research. There is no relevant information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR),

which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information about such an assessment in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a national policy requiring oversight of dual use research. There is no relevant information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information about such a policy in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.5.1c

Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens. There is no relevant information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information about such an agency in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a national legislation requiring screening of synthetic DNA before it is sold. There is no relevant information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Land and Forest Management, or the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] Suriname reports to the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) every year for the "Confidence Building Measure Return" (CBMR), which is a reporting mechanism set by the Biological Weapons Convention. CBMR reports for Suriname are available for the years 2017, 2018 and 2020. [6] However, while these reports might contain information about such legislation in Suriname, they are not publicly accessible.

[1] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Home". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 13 February

2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols".

[<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] VERTIC database. "BWC Legislation Database: S". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

[6] Biological Weapons Convention: Confidence Building Measure Return. "Suriname: Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/suriname>]. Accessed 27 February 2021.

1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

World Health Organization

1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the national laboratory system in Suriname can perform at least 5 out of the 10 World Health Organization (WHO)-defined core tests. There is only publicly available evidence that the national laboratory system can conduct four of the WHO-defined core tests. The Medical Scientific Institute (Medisch Wetenschappelijk Instituut, MWI) in Paramaribo can detect and type Influenza A and B via real-time polymerase chain reaction. [1] According to the National Health Care Sector Plan 2011-2018, the Central Laboratory at the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) in Paramaribo is the referral laboratory in-country for malaria, Tuberculosis (TB), and HIV/AIDS and does quality control and confirmation of tests done by other laboratories. The same Plan confirms that a polio elimination program is in place in Suriname but no additional information on the diagnostic test and/or the reference laboratory is given. [2] According to the Malaria Program Suriname, the country performs malaria diagnosis via blood smear microscopy and rapid diagnostic tests. [3] Moreover, according to the 2015 “AIDS Response Progress Report” by the Ministry of Public Health, Suriname can diagnose HIV via serology in hospital and private laboratories. [4] A 2012 report by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) states that the country has the capacity to perform both sputum smears and culture for diagnosis of Mycobacterium tuberculosis. [5] There is no information on the typhoid test, nor any additional information on the 4 country-defined tests on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, and the Suriname Central Laboratory of the BOG does not appear to maintain an online presence. [6]

[1] Medical Scientific Institute. “Detection and typing of Influenza type A and B”. [<http://www.mwi.sr/testen/real-time-pcr-detectie-en-typing-influenza-b-en-a/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. “National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018”. [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[3] Malaria Program Suriname. “Information for professionals”. [<http://www.malariasuriname.com/for-professionals/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[4] UNAIDS. 2015. “Suriname report”. [http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/country/documents/SUR_narrative_report_2015.pdf]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[5] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2012. “Tuberculosis surveillance in Suriname”. [<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2012/Tuberculosis-surveillance-in-Suriname.pdf>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[6] Ministry of Public Health. “Recent”. [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Suriname has a plan for conducting testing during a public health emergency, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens. The 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan and the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 in Suriname do not include considerations for testing for novel pathogens. [1, 2] The 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan does include plans to expand testing, for example into the less populated hinterlands, and assigns parties that are responsible for opening new testing sites. [2] Both the 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan and the 2020 plan follow the stages of pandemic disease and response strategies as listed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in determining when to increase testing capacity. [1, 2] No information on testing for novel pathogens can be found on the websites of the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, and the Suriname Central Laboratory does not appear to maintain an online presence. [3, 4, 5]

[1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

One of the national laboratories that serves as a reference facility in Suriname is accredited. In 2016, the Jamaica National Agency for Accreditation confirmed that the Central Laboratory of Suriname in Paramaribo conforms to the ISO 15189:2012 international standard. [1] In June 2020, the WHO designated the same laboratory as a National Influenza Center and a member of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System. [2]

[1] Jamaica National Agency for Accreditation. "Central Laboratory of Suriname". [<https://www.janaac.gov.jm/accredited-cabs/labs/21-central-laboratory-of-suriname.html>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[2] Starnieuws Online Newspaper Suriname. 26 June 2020. "Laboratory BOG receives WHO Accreditation". [<https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/59331>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility is subject to external quality assurance review. In 2016, the Jamaica National Agency for Accreditation confirmed that the Central Laboratory of Suriname in Paramaribo confirms to the ISO 15189:2012 international standard, which includes external quality assurance. [1]

[1] Jamaica National Agency for Accreditation. "Central Laboratory of Suriname". [<https://www.janaac.gov.jm/accredited-cabs/labs/21-central-laboratory-of-suriname.html>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a

Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that Suriname has a nationwide system for the transport of infectious samples across the country. There is no public evidence of a national system. According to a 2012 report of the South American Institute of Governance in Health, the Suriname Central Laboratory at the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) in Paramaribo is the national reference laboratory for malaria, HIV and tuberculosis and performs quality controls for other laboratories. [1] There is no public evidence of a national system for the transport of infectious samples from the site of collection to the lab or to the BOG. [2, 3] No specific guidelines are available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries or the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Tourism. [4, 5, 6] However, the Public Health Laboratory at BOG is certified by the IATA (International Air Transport Association) to send and transport specimen samples to reference laboratories abroad. [7] However, there is no evidence of a transport system within Suriname.

[1] South American Institute of Governance in Health. 2012. "Health System in Suriname". [https://issuu.com/isagsunasur/docs/chapter_11_surinam]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[2] Planning Office of the Republic of Suriname. 2016. "Year Plan 2016". [<http://www.planningofficesuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/JAARPLAN-2016.pdf>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Transport, Communication and Tourism. "Services". [<http://www.mintct.sr/>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[6] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a

Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. In the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname, which does not function as an overarching national public health emergency response plan, the country announces identifying and supporting additional testing sites (e.g., flu clinics) apart from the national reference laboratory. [1] There is no further information available on the websites of the Public Health Office, the Ministry Public of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fishery, and the Suriname Central Laboratory does not appear to maintain an online presence [2, 3, 4].

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Suriname is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease. There is no information available on the website of the National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (NCCR). [1] The Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) publishes bi-weekly situation reports of a traditional indication-based nature. [2] There is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry Public of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fishery, and the Suriname Central Laboratory does not appear to maintain an online presence [3, 4].

[1] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. "Disaster Information". [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=505>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Suriname reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the World Health Organization (WHO) within the last two years, including for Covid-19. The WHO Disease Outbreak News page does not mention reports by Suriname in 2020 and 2019. [1, 2] There is no additional information available on the website of the Suriname Ministry of Public Health. [3]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News: 2020". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2020/en/>]

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News: 2019". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2019/en/>]

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Suriname operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national level. The National Health Information System (NHIS) Unit of the Ministry of Public Health is responsible for official national health data, which is gathered via a sentinel surveillance system partly relying on electronic reporting and "telephonade system", which appears to consist of a hotline at the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). [1] Different parties such as the BOG, the Medical Mission (MM) and the Regional Health Office (Regionale Gezondheidsdienst) report health information to the NHIS unit, but the surveillance system is nationally operated. [1] Monitored diseases include influenza, meningitis, yellow fever, and SARS. [1] Furthermore, the BOG publishes daily reporting on COVID-19 on its online dashboard. [2] In the Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname, published in June 2020, the country resolves to implement its data system to report cases to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) within 24 hours. [3] The first article published on the national COVID-19 website "www.covid-19.sr", which updates daily at 8.30 pm, is dated 15 March 2020. [4]

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [2] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 3 February 2021. "COVID Dashboard". [<https://bogsuriname.com/dashboard/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.
- [4] COVID-19 We Do It Together (COVID-19 We Doen Het Samen). 15 March 2020. "Conora in Suriname". [<https://covid-19.sr/corona-in-suriname/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the surveillance system in Suriname collects ongoing or real-time laboratory data. The National Health Information System (NHIS) Unit of the Ministry of Public Health is responsible for official national health data, which is gathered via a sentinel surveillance system partly relying on electronic reporting and "telephonade system", which appears to consist of a hotline at the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). [1] Different parties such as the BOG, the Medical Mission (MM) and the Regional Health Office (Regionale Gezondheidsdienst) report health information to the NHIS unit, but the surveillance system is nationally operated. [1] There is no information provided in the National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018 of the Ministry of Public Health or the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028. [1, 2] The website of the Ministry of Public Health and the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) also do not offer any information on this issue. [3, 4] In the Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname, published in June 2020, the country resolves to implement their data system to report cases to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) within 24 hours. [5] The national COVID-19 website "www.covid-19.sr" publishes updates daily at 8.30 pm. [6]

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [4] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.
- [6] COVID-19 We Do It Together (COVID-19 We Doen Het Samen). 15 March 2020. "Conora in Suriname". [<https://covid-19.sr/corona-in-suriname/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that electronic health records are commonly used in Suriname. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [1] According to a Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) report on Suriname from 2017, limited progress has been made in developing an integrated health information system, including electronic medical records. [2] The Suriname government has developed an e-Government Strategy for 2012-2016, but this strategy does not explicitly mention electronic health records. [3] The National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 lists an integrated health information system (Information System for Health, IS4H) as a goal that is still to be achieved. [4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2017. "Suriname Country Profile". [<https://www.paho.org/salud-en-las-americas-2017/?p=4307>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[3] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2012. "E-government Strategy 2012-2016: Working Document". [http://gov.sr/media/1035/120529_egov_strategie_2012_2016_werkdocument.pdf]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.4.1b

Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the national public health system in Suriname can access electronic health records. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [1] Electronic health records are not commonly used in Suriname. According to a Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) report on Suriname from 2017, the country has a National Basic Health Insurance Law since 2014 and a network of government-subsidized primary health care facilities, but limited progress has been made in developing an integrated health information system, including electronic medical records. [2] The Suriname government has developed an e-Government Strategy for 2012-2016, but this strategy does not explicitly mention electronic health records. [3] There is no legal framework on personal data protection in Suriname which can detail if, when, and how the government can access e-health files. [4] There is evidence of a Privacy and Data Protection Law presented in 2018, but it is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Trade and Industry. [1, 5, 6] The National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 formulates an integrated health information system (Information System for Health, IS4H), where electronic health records will be accessible to the national public health system as a goal that is still to be achieved. [7]

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2017. "Suriname Country Profile". [<https://www.paho.org/salud-en-las-americas-2017/?p=4307>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [3] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2012. "E-government Strategy 2012-2016: Working Document". [http://gov.sr/media/1035/120529_egov_strategie_2012_2016_werkdocument.pdf]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [4] Starnieuws Online Newspaper Suriname. 12 March 2018. "Legislation on Privacy and Personal Data Use in Preparation" ("Wetgeving privacy persoonsgegevens in de maak". [<http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/46077>]. Accessed 4 February 2021.
- [5] Paolo Balboni. 15 May 2018. "The New Surinamese Privacy and Data Protection (SPDP) Law". [<https://www.paolobalboni.eu/index.php/2018/05/15/the-new-surinamese-privacy-and-data-protection-spdp-law/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.
- [6] Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2021. "Documents". [<http://tradeandindustry.gov.sr/documenten/wetgeving/juridische-zaken-jz/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.
- [7] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.4.1c

Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has data standards in place to ensure that electronic health data is comparable. There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [1] According to a Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) report on Suriname from 2017, limited progress has been made in developing the electronic medical record system in general. [2] Moreover, according to a 2006 report by Electronic Health Records, the country does not feature on the list of countries with ISO 18308 "Requirements for an Electronic Health Record Reference Architecture". [3] There is no legal framework on personal data protection in Suriname which can detail if, when, and how the government can access e-health files. [4] There is evidence of a Privacy and Data Protection Law presented in 2018, but it is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Trade and Industry. [1, 5, 6] The National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 formulates an integrated health information system (Information System for Health, IS4H) as a goal that is still to be achieved. [7]

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2017. "Suriname Country Profile". [<https://www.paho.org/salud-en-las-americas-2017/?p=4307>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [3] Open Electronic Health Records. 2006. "ISO 18308 Conformance Statement". [https://www.openehr.org/releases/1.0.2/requirements/iso18308_conformance.pdf]. Accessed 4 February 2021.
- [4] Starnieuws Online Newspaper Suriname. 12 March 2018. "Legislation on Privacy and Personal Data Use in Preparation" ("Wetgeving privacy persoonsgegevens in de maak". [<http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/46077>]. Accessed 4 February 2021.
- [5] Paolo Balboni. 15 May 2018. "The New Surinamese Privacy and Data Protection (SPDP) Law". [<https://www.paolobalboni.eu/index.php/2018/05/15/the-new-surinamese-privacy-and-data-protection-spdp-law/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.
- [6] Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2021. "Documents". [<http://tradeandindustry.gov.sr/documenten/wetgeving/juridische-zaken-jz/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[7] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a

Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human and wildlife surveillance to share data in Suriname. There is clear evidence that mosquito surveillance data is shared between ministries and other government actors. The Ministry of Public Health has formulated a program for the elimination of malaria. [1] For technical advice in the complex matters of malaria prevention, diagnosis, treatment and vector control, the Ministry of Public Health relies on the National Malaria Board, which is a sub-committee of the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM). The National Malaria Board has representatives from the Ministry of Public Health, from the Regional Health Services, the armed forces, the Ministry of Regional Development, the University of Suriname, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and the Medical Mission (MM). [2] Thus, mosquito surveillance data for malaria is shared by the Ministry of Public Health as well as the Ministry of Regional Development.

[1] Malaria Program of the Ministry of Public Health. "National and international partnerships".

[<http://www.malariasuriname.com/strategies/national-and-regional-partnerships/>]. Accessed 4 February 2021.

[2] H el ene Hiwat - Van Laar. 2011 PhD thesis. "Malaria in Suriname: A New Era Impact of modified Intervention Strategies on Anopheles Darlingi Populations and Malaria Incidence". [<http://edepot.wur.nl/185039>]. Accessed 4 February 2021.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname makes de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks publicly available via reports on government websites. The National Health Information System (NHIS) Unit of the Ministry of Public Health is responsible for official national health data, which is gathered via a sentinel surveillance system, partly relying on electronic reporting and "telephonade system", which appears to consist in a hotline at the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). [1] Monitored diseases include influenza, meningitis, yellow fever, and SARS, but there is no evidence that this surveillance data is publicly available via reports on government websites. [1] No further information can be found on the websites of the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Public Health, or the Suriname General Statistics Office, and the Suriname Central Laboratory does not appear to maintain an online presence. [2, 3, 4]

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [2] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 3 February 2021. "COVID Dashboard". [<https://bogsuriname.com/dashboard/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.
- [4] General Statistic Office. "Data Availability Matrix". [<https://statistics-suriname.org/nl/databeschikbaarheidsmatrix/>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Suriname makes de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data available via daily reports on government websites. On the website of the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the country has published daily updates based on de-identified health surveillance data, describing developments in the last 24 hours. [1] The updates mention numbers of new cases, persons in isolation, hospitalizations, persons on intensive care, tests, positive and negative results, and recovered and diseased persons. [1]

- [1] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 3 February 2021. "COVID Dashboard". [<https://bogsuriname.com/dashboard/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has guidelines in place to safeguard the confidentiality of health data of individuals generated through surveillance activities. There is no legal framework on personal data protection in Suriname which can detail if, when, and how the government can access e-health files. [1] There is evidence of a Privacy and Data Protection Law presented in 2018, but it is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Trade and Industry. [2, 3, 4] There is no information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [3, 5, 6, 7]

- [1] Starnieuws Online Newspaper Suriname. 12 March 2018. "Legislation on Privacy and Personal Data Use in Preparation" ("Wetgeving privacy persoonsgegevens in de maak". [<http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/46077>]. Accessed 4 February 2021.
- [2] Paolo Balboni. 15 May 2018. "The New Surinamese Privacy and Data Protection (SPDP) Law". [<https://www.paolobalboni.eu/index.php/2018/05/15/the-new-surinamese-privacy-and-data-protection-spdp-law/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2021. "Documents". [<http://tradeandindustry.gov.sr/documenten/wetgeving/juridische-zaken-jz/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[5] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 3 February 2021. "COVID Dashboard". [<https://bogsuriname.com/dashboard/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[6] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[7] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

2.4.4b

Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has guidelines in place to safeguard the confidentiality of health data of individuals generated through surveillance activities, including mention of protections from cyber-attacks. There is no legal framework on personal data protection in Suriname which can detail if, when, and how the government can access e-health files. [1] There is evidence of a Privacy and Data Protection Law presented in 2018, but it is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Trade and Industry. [2, 3, 4] There is no information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG), the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [3, 5, 6, 7]

[1] Starnieuws Online Newspaper Suriname. 12 March 2018. "Legislation on Privacy and Personal Data Use in Preparation" ("Wetgeving privacy persoonsgegevens in de maak".

[<http://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/46077>]. Accessed 4 February 2021.

[2] Paolo Balboni. 15 May 2018. "The New Surinamese Privacy and Data Protection (SPDP) Law".

[<https://www.paolobalboni.eu/index.php/2018/05/15/the-new-surinamese-privacy-and-data-protection-spdp-law/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Trade and Industry. 2021. "Documents". [<http://tradeandindustry.gov.sr/documenten/wetgeving/juridische-zaken-jz/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[5] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 3 February 2021. "COVID Dashboard". [<https://bogsuriname.com/dashboard/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[6] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[7] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a

Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease = 2, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the government has made a commitment via public statements, legislation, or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency for one or more diseases with other countries in the region. There is some evidence that Suriname closely cooperates with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and shares data with other countries via them. During the Zika virus outbreak in Suriname of 2015-2016, surveillance data was shared with (PAHO). [1] Also, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Suriname participated in PAHO-organized talks on regional cooperation. [2] However, there is no evidence that Suriname has committed to sharing surveillance data with PAHO during COVID-19 in the context of these talks, and there is no evidence for a specific commitment to share surveillance data during public health emergencies with other countries in the region on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [2, 3]

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2017. "Report on Zika in Suriname".

[<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2017/2017-phe-zika-situation-report-sur.pdf>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[2] Starnieuws Online Newspaper Suriname. 2 March 2020. "Caricom Reaches Regional COVID Protocol".

[<https://www.starnieuws.com/index.php/welcome/index/nieuwsitem/57318>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is a national system in place in Suriname to provide support at the sub-national level to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency, but only in response to active public health emergencies. In the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname, a Rapid Response Team is assigned responsibility for contact tracing and receives members, training and equipment. [1] The country's Medical Mission is made responsible for contact tracing in the hinterland. [1] The 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan requires Suriname to identify and address gaps in contact tracing, but does not describe a system to provide support at the sub-national level. [2] The website of the Ministry of Public Health, the 2009 plan and the 2020 plan do not provide information about supporting sub-national systems to prepare for future health emergencies. [1, 2, 3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22

January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended. There is no evidence of either medical attention or economic support for isolating or quarantining persons on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health or the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG). [1, 2]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

[2] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols".

[<https://bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites. This information does not appear on the COVID-19 dashboard of the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG). [1] There is also no de-identified data on contact tracing efforts included in the BOG's Situation Reports. [2] There is no information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health.

[1] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG). 3 February 2021. "COVID Dashboard". [<https://bogsuriname.com/dashboard/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[2] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<https://bogsuriname.com/situation-reports/>]. Accessed 3 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Suriname has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to monitor suspected and potential cases for international travelers.

The Suriname National Port Health Committee consists of representatives of the public health system and border control authorities. [1] Furthermore, the National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (NCCR) has the responsibility to "develop policies on early detection, quick response & control and medical care in public health emergencies". [2] In the Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname, it is stipulated that the Ministry of Defense cooperates with the NCCR and guards the borders of Suriname to protect against importation of COVID-19. [3] However, there is no evidence that the measures against COVID-19 importation can be extended to other public health emergencies, or that the National Port Health Committee follows a publicly available cooperative agreement to monitor suspected and potential cases for international travelers applicable to future public health emergencies. There is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Public Health Office, or the Directorate National Security, which is responsible for border control. [4, 5, 6]

[1] Suriname Herald. 19 September 2018. "New Health Port Commission installed".

[<https://www.srherald.com/suriname/2018/09/19/nieuwe-port-health-commissie-geinstalleerd/>]. Accessed 5 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 5 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 5 February 2021.

[4] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). "Protocols". [<https://bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 1 March 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[6] Directorate National Security. "National Coordination Immigration and Border Control".

[<https://nationaleveiligheid.sr/nationale-coördinatie-immigratie-grensbewaking/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

In Suriname, an applied epidemiology training program is available in country. The Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) launched the Caribbean Regional Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (CR-FELTP) in 2014 and Suriname was one of the first six countries to join the program. [1, 2] In April 2015, the first cohort of trainees, including from Suriname, completed the CR-FELTP in Saint Lucia, another country in the Caribbean. [2] The Ministries of Health of the different countries, assisted by CARPHA, select the appropriate candidates for the CR-FELTP. [1] The Ministries are supported by the Caribbean Public Health Agency, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and University of the West Indies in the development of the CR-FELTP in the region. [3] However, there is no evidence of a domestic FELTP program available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [2, 3]

- [1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). 2014. "Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (CR-FELTP): Overview". [<http://carpha.org/What-We-Do/FELTP/Overview>]. Accessed 5 February 2021.
- [2] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). 9 March 2015. "CR-FELTP Trains New Mentors in Jamaica". [<https://carpha.org/More/Media/Articles/ArticleID/97/CR-FELTP-Trains-New-Mentors-in-Jamaica>]. Accessed 5 February 2021.
- [3] Government of Saint Lucia. April 2015. "Ten to Graduate from Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/ten-to-graduate-from-epidemiology-and-laboratory-training-program>]. Accessed 5 February 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Public Health. [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FELTP)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the available field epidemiology training programs in Suriname are explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals. Citizens of Suriname can participate in the Caribbean Regional Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (CR-FELTP), launched in 2014 by the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). CR-FELTP has the following official background requirements for trainees: "Have a health background and/or be working in public health". [1] Thus, it does not especially include animal health professionals. There is no evidence of a domestic FELTP program available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [2, 3]

- [1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). 2014. "Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (CR-FELTP): Overview". [<http://carpha.org/What-We-Do/FELTP/Overview>]. Accessed 5 February 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a

Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Suriname has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. The Health Disaster Plan ("Rampenplan Volksgezondheid") was established in March 2009 by the Ministry of Public Health with support of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Special Health Disaster Plan Project for Suriname. [1] An annex to the Disaster Plan is the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid") which is concerned with different influenza viruses in particular. [2] The plan follows the different phases of national pandemic preparedness as stipulated by the World Health Organization (WHO) and lists the tasks of the Ministry of Health, the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) and the National Disaster Management Coordination Centre (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). While the Ministry of Public Health describes the macro-level policy of reasoning to epidemic emergencies in the Health Disaster Plan, the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan is a further elaboration on this topic. [1, 2] The Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheid, BOG) has, among other things, the task of continuing to work with stakeholders at institutional and regional levels on development of district disaster plans, hospital emergency plans, veterinary sector plans, training courses and drills. The Plan describes the collaboration between boards of directors, institutes, departments, hospitals, departments, etc. within the Public Health sector, which is mandatory and must be in accordance with the policies and strategies coordinated by the NCCR. [3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. "National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. Health Disaster Plan" ("Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. Rampenplan Volksgezondheid"). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische

Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2018. “About us”. [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=505>]. Accessed 8 November 2018.

3.1.1b

If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has updated its overarching national public health emergency response plan in the last three years. The Public Health Disaster Plan and the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan have not been updated since 2009. [1, 2] There is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and the National Disaster Management Coordination Centre. [3, 4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. “National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN” (“Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID”). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. “Recent”. [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[4] Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing (NCCR, National Disaster Management Coordination Center) of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. A Comprehensive National Preparedness And Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.1.1c

If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

Suriname's overarching national public health emergency response plan does not include considerations for pediatric or other vulnerable populations. The Health Disaster Plan and the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan (both adopted 2009) do not include any information on how these populations should be handled or treated. [1, 2] There is no more information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health. [3] However, the Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname (a disease-specific response plan for COVID-19, which was adopted in June 2020) does include considerations for “vulnerable and indigent populations affected by the COVID-19 Pandemic”. [4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. “National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN” (“Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID”). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. “Recent”. [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.1.1d

Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a

Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. There is no mention of the private sector in the 2009 Public Health Disaster Plan or in the 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan, and there is no relevant evidence on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [1, 2, 3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. “National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN” (“Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID”). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Suriname has plans in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic for more than one disease. The 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan outlines guidelines for implementing NPIs during a pandemic. [1] The Pandemic Preparedness Plan follows six phases in the development of pandemics stipulated by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2004. This framework offers guidelines for when NPIs are implemented, such as the scenarios of infections only in animals, human infection but no human-to-human transmission, local transmission, and community transmission. The plan lists NPIs such as systems for early detection, quarantine measures, elimination of infected poultry, closing of schools, border control and isolation of travelers using port health systems. [1] The plan is directed at different forms of pandemic influenza, including swine influenza and avian influenza. [1] In addition, the June 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname lists NPIs such as surveillance, border control, infection prevention and case management, relying on the WHO's nine pillars of preparedness and response. [2]

[1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan". ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?
- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Suriname has activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. In June 2020, the government adopted the National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19, which

outlines Suriname's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. [1] A preparatory document published in May 2020 states that the plan was developed using "basic approaches from the National Disaster and Response Organization (NCCR) and the previous influenza response plan", and the National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 confirms that it builds on the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan. [1, 2] In addition, the COVID-19 plan recommends extending the organizational structure of the COVID-19 response to that for all public health emergencies, and updating the National Pandemic Influenza Readiness Plan and the Health Disaster Plan. [1] There is no public evidence that Suriname has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year. There is no mention of such exercise on the World Health Organization's (WHO) webpage for Suriname, the WHO simulation exercise page, or on the websites of the Surinamese Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Health. [3, 4, 5, 6]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. May 2020. "A Comprehensive Needs List For COVID-19 Preparedness and Response". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1364/final-comprehensive-needs-list-preparedness-and-response-for-covid-19.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] World Health Organization. 2021. "Suriname". [<https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/countries/country-details/GHO/suriname?countryProfileId=eb5b6aa2-ce1a-48f2-b57b-53b1f12baae6>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[4] World Health Organization. 2021. "Simulation Exercise: Suriname". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise?region=All&country=270>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten/>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[6] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that Suriname has in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. In spring 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Suriname identified gaps and needs in its pandemic response capabilities, in particular noting a lack of standard operating procedures and a lack of clear organization and leadership. [1] As a result of this assessment, in June 2020 Suriname published the Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname, which outlines measures to improve response capacity and fill the gaps identified. [2] In addition to guiding response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the plan also recommends extending the organizational structure of the COVID-19 response to that for all public health emergencies, and updating the National Pandemic Influenza Readiness Plan and the Health Disaster Plan. [2]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. May 2020. "A Comprehensive Needs List For COVID-19 Preparedness and Response". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1364/final-comprehensive-needs-list-preparedness-and-response-for-covid-19.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness And Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22

January 2021.

3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. Neither the World Health Organization (WHO) After Action Review page of Suriname, the WHO simulation exercise page, the Suriname's information on the International Health Regulations Annual Reporting website, nor the Pan American Health Organization website lists any such evidence. [1, 2, 3, 5] Nor is there evidence that such an exercise is planned. [5]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review?region=All&country=270>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] World Health Organization. 2021. "Simulation Exercise: Suriname". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise?region=All&country=270>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

[3] WHO International Health Regulations. "Capacity Score Suriname". [<https://extranet.who.int/e-spar#capacity-score>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[4] PAHO. "Suriname". [<https://www.paho.org/en/suriname>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Suriname has an Emergency Operations Centre in place. As part of the Suriname government's policy aimed at strengthening national disaster response capacity, the National Coordination Centre for Disaster Management (NCCR) was established in May 2003. [1,2] The National Disaster Plan was developed by the NCCR, and the Ministry of Public Health's 2009 Health Disaster Plan is an integral part of it. [3] According to the 2009 Plan Pandemic Preparedness, an annex to this Plan specifically on infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics, cooperation between boards of directors, institutes, departments, hospitals, department within the Public Health sector is mandatory and must take place in accordance with the policies and strategies that will be implemented coordinated by the NCCR. [4]

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "NCCR and Emergency Fund" ("NCCR en Noodfonds"). [<http://www.gov.sr/themas/veiligheid-en-orde/nccr-en-noodfonds.aspx>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. "Disaster Information". [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=505>].

Accessed 23 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. "National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN" ("Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID"). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[4] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Emergency Operations Centre in Suriname is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year. The 2009 Health Disaster Plan and the annex Pandemic Preparedness Plan issued by the Ministry of Public Health both state that all government organizations responsible for disaster and crisis management must have a yearly drill, and the Pandemic Preparedness Plan explicitly states that they have to do so by assessing risks and response mechanisms concerning pandemic influenza and other epidemics. [1, 2] The drills mentioned in the Pandemic Preparedness Plan include operational procedures and communication between stakeholders during outbreaks of pandemic influenza. [2] The Suriname National Coordination Centre for Disaster Management (NCCR) is required to perform simulations at least once per year, though no reports about this actually occurring are available on the websites of the NCCR or the Ministry of Public Health. [3, 4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. "National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN". ("Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID"). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. "Disaster Information". [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=505>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence to show that the EOC in Suriname can conduct a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency. There is no information on the response time available on the Government website on disaster response, the National Disaster Management Coordination Center, or the Ministry of Public Health. [1, 2, 3] The Ministry of Public Health's 2009 Health Disaster Plan or the pandemic-specific annex Plan Pandemic Preparedness only mention that timely response of health care service to the crisis is essential, but do not stipulate a time frame. [4, 5]

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "NCCR and Emergency Fund" ("NCCR en Noodfonds").

[<http://www.gov.sr/themas/veiligheid-en-orde/nccr-en-noodfonds.aspx>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[2] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. "Disaster Information". [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=505>]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. "National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN" ("Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID"). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[5] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that public health and national security authorities in Suriname have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. There is no such information available on websites of the Government on disasters and crisis, the National Disaster Management Coordination Center, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Justice and Police. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] In addition, there are no publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, MoUs or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. The National Disaster Management Coordination Center, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice and Police have not published such information, and the 2009 Health

Disaster Plan does not mention anything about a biological event or attack. [6]

- [1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. “NCCR and Emergency Fund” (“NCCR en Noodfonds”). [http://www.gov.sr/themas/veiligheid-en-orde/nccr-en-noodfonds.aspx]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [2] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. “Disaster Information”. [http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=505]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. “Recent”. [http://health.gov.sr/actueel/]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Defense. 2021. “Home”. [http://defense.gov.sr/]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Justice and Police. 2021. “Recent”. [http://www.juspol.sr/home/index.php/actueel]. Accessed 23 January 2021.
- [6] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. “National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN” (“Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID”). [http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The public health crisis communication strategy of Suriname outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs. The Ministry of Public Health’s 2009 Health Disaster Plan and the pandemic-specific annex “Plan Pandemic Preparedness” contains a section on communication between government, local health services and the general public. [1, 2] While this plan does not explain how messages will reach various populations, the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname does, mentioning messaging in local languages, through different channels of communication, and using community-based networks and key figures. [3] Furthermore, since the COVID-19 plan recommends extending the organizational structure of the COVID-response to that for all public health emergencies, there is evidence that the COVID-19 plan’s risk communication strategy is perceived as Suriname’s most up to date strategy for all public health emergencies. [3]

- [1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. “National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN” (“Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID”). [http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html]. Accessed 22 January 2021.
- [2] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. “A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In

Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

In the national public health emergency response plan of Suriname, there is a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. The Ministry of Public Health's 2009 Health Disaster Plan has a section on crisis communication. [1] This section lists means of communication such as a hotline, an educational program and robust transfer of information to the media. [1] Furthermore, Suriname's 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 includes a section on risk communication and community engagement, which details key actions for different responsible parties in the different phases of the pandemic. [2] The COVID-19 plan recommends extending the organizational structure of the COVID-response to that for all public health emergencies. [3] In addition, a general health emergency risk communication plan was developed during the Zika virus outbreak in Suriname of 2015-2016. [3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. "National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN" ("Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID"). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2015. "Suriname boosts risk communication for Zika and beyond". [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11868:suriname-boosts-risk-communication-zika-beyond&Itemid=40264&lang=en]. Accessed 23 January 2021.

3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Suriname's risk communication plan designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. The 2009 Health Disaster Plan mentions the Public Relations Officer of the Ministry of Public Health as centrally responsible for contact with the media, while the minister of Public Health may also address the media. [1] However, the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname designates the minister of Public Health alone as the primary spokesperson. [2] Since the COVID-19 plan

recommends extending the organizational structure of the COVID-response to that for all public health emergencies, there is evidence that the COVID-19 plan's risk communication strategy is perceived as Suriname's most up to date strategy for all public health emergencies.

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2009. "National Public Health Program. Prevention and Control of Disasters in the Sector of Public Health. HEALTH DISASTER PLAN" ("Nationaal Public Health Programma. Preventie en Beheersing van Rampen in de Sector Volksgezondheid. RAMPENPLAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID"). [<http://docplayer.nl/9824933-Preventie-en-beheersing-van-rampen-in-de-sector-volksgezondheid.html>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

3.5.2 Public communication

3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that the Suriname public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns in the past year. The government of Suriname utilizes various media platforms to inform the public about public health emergencies and other public health concerns. The Ministry of Public Health actively uses its website to publish communications on public health concerns such as safety issues with medicines, changes in opening hours of public health institutions, newly installed committees, renewed accreditations of public health institutions, Suriname's malaria program, test capacities for COVID-19, and the COVID-19 vaccination program. [1] The Ministry of Public Health also has a Facebook page (created 20 April 2016, evidence of publications between 2018-2021) where it posts regular updates. [2] In addition, the Ministry produces a regular COVID-19 news video, which it publishes on YouTube and shares on Facebook. [3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

[2] Facebook page of the Ministry of Public Health. 2021. [<https://www.facebook.com/VolksgezondheidSuriname/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] LIME Tv Suriname Ch26.2. 22 January 2021. "COVID 19 News 128, 21 January 2021" ("Het COVID 19 Journaal Aflevering 128 21 Januari"). [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Shcqs_ZVDAs] Accessed 26 January 2021.

3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that senior leaders have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. Desi Bouterse was replaced by Chan Santokhi as President of Suriname in July 2020. Bouterse, Santokhi and other government officials have been reported to violate COVID-19 preventative measures themselves. [1, 2] Despite this, there is no public evidence that these leaders have themselves shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases. Bouterse has no Facebook account and appears not to have used Twitter since 11 August 2015. [3] Santokhi has only rarely published official messages on Twitter in the past two years, while his Facebook publications appear to be in line with official public health policy. [4, 5] Vice President Ronnie Brunswijk shares government information on COVID-19 on Facebook, claiming his mission is to "fight fake news". [6]

[1] Leeuwarder Courant. 24 January 2021. "Suriname President Has Corona". [<https://www.lc.nl/buitenland/Surinaamse-president-heeft-corona-26398963.html>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[2] Twitter.com. "Bouterse". [<https://twitter.com/DBouterse>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[3] Twitter.com. "Santokhi". [<https://twitter.com/CSantokhi>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[4] Facebook.com. "Brunswijk". [<https://www.facebook.com/RonnieBrunswijk>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[5] Facebook.com "President of Suriname". [<https://www.facebook.com/presidentsuriname>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 48.95

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 139.99

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 3.14

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.24

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that Suriname has restricted the export/import of medical goods across its borders due to an infectious disease outbreak in the last year. There is no evidence of a restriction available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries or the World Health Organization (WHO) Disease Outbreak News. [1, 2, 3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture. 2021. "Recent". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021. [<http://foreignaffairs.gov.sr/>]. Currently not accessible.

3.7.1b

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that Suriname has issued a restriction without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. There is no evidence of a restriction available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries

and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [1, 2, 3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture. 2021. "Recent". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021. [<http://foreignaffairs.gov.sr/>]. Currently not accessible.

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

Suriname has implemented a ban on travelers arriving from foreign countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. In March 2020, Suriname closed all its borders due to the COVID-19 outbreak and did not allow travelers from foreign countries to enter Suriname. [1, 2, 3]

[1] Dutch Broadcast Foundation (De Nederlandse Omroep Stichting). 13 March 2020. "Flights Banned and Borders Closed to Fight Corona". [<https://nos.nl/artikel/2327053-vluchten-geweerd-en-grenzen-gesloten-om-corona-tegen-te-gaan.html>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Dutch Broadcast Foundation (De Nederlandse Omroep Stichting). 31 May 2020. "Reporting on the Suriname Elections at a Distance". [<https://nos.nl/artikel/2335752-door-corona-op-afstand-verslag-doen-van-verkiezingen-suriname.html>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. May 2020. "Growing Threat from Border Regions".

[<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/2020/groeiende-dreiging-vanuit-grensgebieden-1/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021. [<http://foreignaffairs.gov.sr/>]. Currently not accessible.

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 121.01

2018

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 275.69

2018

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Suriname has a health workforce strategy in place to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce. A health workforce strategy was adopted in 2018. In July 2018, the Ministry of Public Health, supported by PAHO, organized a three-day workshop with the aim of developing a Suriname health workforce plan. [1] In February 2019, the Ministry of Public Health published a National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028. [2] This plan addresses problems related to insufficient workforce in rural areas and aims for a general increase in workforce of at least 10% to reach the minimum of 25 health care workers per 10,000 citizens. [2] To achieve this, a new healthcare model should redefine regional networks to address geographical differences, while supporting systems should be further centralized in order to save resources. Additionally, the National Strategic Plan proposes improving the workforce's (primary and secondary) terms of employment. [2]

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2018. "Strong health workforce to ensure universal access to health". [https://www.paho.org/sur/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=598:strong-health-workforce-to-ensure-universal-access-to-health&Itemid=4770]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 300

2017

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available information to confirm that Suriname has the capacity to isolate contagious patients in biocontainment units. The 2009 National Pandemic Preparedness Plan foresees the construction of facilities for isolation and quarantine, particularly in ports, but it does not describe any existing capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases. [1] The National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 does not mention such capacity either. [2] In March 2020, multiple health care facilities appointed as isolation units for returning travelers stated they were not sufficiently protected to fulfil this task. [3, 4] No further information on isolation in biocontainment units could be found on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [5]

[1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Waterkant News Suriname. 22 March 2020. "Everyone in Government Quarantine Sent Home". [<https://www.waterkant.net/suriname/2020/03/22/iedereen-uit-overheidsquarantaine-naar-huis-gestuurd/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] De West. Daily News from and for Suriname. "Nurses not Sufficiently Protected against COVID-19". [<https://dagbladdewest.com/2020/03/16/verpleegkundigen-niet-voldoende-beschermd-tegen-covid-19/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

In the past two years, Suriname has developed a plan to expand isolation capacity and has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak. In June 2020, the government adopted the National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19, which outlines Suriname's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. [1] The plan foresees the expansion of isolation capacity in different phases of COVID-19 outbreak in Suriname. In March 2020, multiple health care facilities appointed as isolation units for returning travelers had stated they were not sufficiently prepared and protected to fulfil their task. [2, 3] From August 2020, there is evidence that Suriname had expanded isolation capacity for travelers and for infected persons, although there were complaints about the logistics. [4, 5]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname". [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Waterkant News Suriname. 22 March 2020. "Everyone in Government Quarantine Sent Home". [<https://www.waterkant.net/suriname/2020/03/22/iedereen-uit-overheidsquarantaine-naar-huis-gestuurd/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] De West. Daily News from and for Suriname. "Nurses not Sufficiently Protected against COVID-19". [<https://dagbladdewest.com/2020/03/16/verpleegkundigen-niet-voldoende-beschermd-tegen-covid-19/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Waterkant News Suriname. 27 August 2020. "Second Isolation Tent Constructed at Wanica Hospital". [<https://www.waterkant.net/suriname/2020/08/27/tweede-isolatie-tent-bij-ziekenhuis-wanica-in-de-maak/>]. Accessed 29 April 2021.

[5] Telegraaf. 9 October 2020. "Chaos around Rules for Quarantine in Suriname". [<https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/1076897873/chaos-rond-quarantaineregels-in-suriname>]. Accessed 29 April 2021.

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a national procurement protocol in Suriname which can be utilized by the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries for the acquisition of laboratory supplies such as equipment, reagents and media and medical supplies (equipment, PPE) for routine needs. There is no information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the national government, or the Public Health Office. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] The Central Laboratory does not appear to maintain an online presence.

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Services". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "Government". [<http://www.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[5] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Protocols".

[<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Suriname does not maintain a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. According to the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan issued by the Ministry of Public Health in 2009, the Central Office Public Health (Centraal Kantoor Volksgezondheid) should stockpile strategic supplies of vaccines and medication and personal protective equipment for pandemic influenza. [1] According to a report by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) on Suriname's response to the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak, the government only started buying antiviral drugs and personal protective equipment once the outbreak had already begun. [2] In addition, there is no evidence that Suriname stockpiles medical supplies or countermeasures for any other type of infectious disease in the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028, although this plan does mention the aim of designing a logistical system for stockpiling medical supplies and countermeasures. [3] There is also no evidence that Suriname has agreements with manufacturers for medical supplies or countermeasures, as no such agreement is mentioned in the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan and the WHO National Planning Cycles Database. [1, 4] The 2020 Comprehensive Needs List For COVID-19 Preparedness and Response includes no information in the section "current/ in stock" of its tables "required drug package" and "summary of PPE needs COVID-19". [5] There is no additional information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, or the National Disaster Management Coordination Center. [6, 7, 8]

[1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. "Pandemic Preparedness and Implementation in Suriname". [https://www.paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=pandemicinfluenza2009-carib&alias=930-pandemic-preparedness-implementation-in-suriname&Itemid=1179&lang=en]. Accessed 27 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO) National Planning Cycles Database. 2011. "National Health Planning Cycles. Suriname." [<https://extranet.who.int/countryplanningcycles/planning-cycle/SUR>]. Accessed 27 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. May 2020. "A Comprehensive Needs List For COVID-19 Preparedness and Response." [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1364/final-comprehensive-needs-list-preparedness-and-response-for-covid-19.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[6] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[7] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Services". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[8] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor

Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. "Planning Ahead". [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=506>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.2.2b

Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Suriname does not maintain a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence that Suriname stockpiles laboratory supplies in the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028. [1] The Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname does not mention an already existing stockpile of laboratory supplies. [2] There is no additional information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, or the National Disaster Management Coordination Center. [3, 4, 5]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname." [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Services". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[5] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. "Planning Ahead". [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=506>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.2.2c

Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Suriname conducts or requires an annual review of an national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. According to the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan issued by the Ministry of Public Health in 2009, the Central Office Public Health (Centraal Kantoor Volksgezondheid) should stockpile strategic supplies of vaccines and medication for pandemic influenza. [1] However, according to a report by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) on Suriname's response to the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak, the government only started buying antiviral drugs once the outbreak had already started. [2] In addition, there is no evidence that Suriname stockpiles or requires annual reviews of stockpiles of medical countermeasures for any other type of infectious disease in the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028, although this plan does mention the aim of designing a logistical system for stockpiling medical countermeasures. [3] There is also no evidence that Suriname has agreements with manufacturers for medical countermeasures, as no such agreement is mentioned in the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan, the PAHO and the WHO National Planning Cycles Database. [1, 2, 4] The 2020 Comprehensive Needs List For COVID-19 Preparedness and Response includes no information in the section "current/ in stock" of its table "required drug package". [5] There is no

additional information regarding reviews of a national stockpile available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, or the National Disaster Management Coordination Center. [6, 7, 8] The Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 in Suriname reports that the Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG) received the first COVID-19 test kits from the PAHO on 5 February 2020. [9]

- [1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.
- [2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. “Pandemic Preparedness and Implementation in Suriname”. [https://www.paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=pandemicinfluenza2009-carib&alias=930-pandemic-preparedness-implementation-in-suriname&Itemid=1179&lang=en]. Accessed 27 January 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. “National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028”. <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [4] World Health Organization (WHO) National Planning Cycles Database. 2011. “National Health Planning Cycles. Suriname.” [<https://extranet.who.int/countryplanningcycles/planning-cycle/SUR>]. Accessed 27 January 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Public Health. May 2020. “A Comprehensive Needs List For COVID-19 Preparedness and Response.” [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1364/final-comprehensive-needs-list-preparedness-and-response-for-covid-19.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.
- [6] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. “Recent”. [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [7] Ministry of Defense. 2021. “Services”. [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [8] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. “Planning Ahead”. [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=506>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [9] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. “A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname.” [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a plan or agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency, or a plan or mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. In its 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19, Suriname commits to developing a plan to manage the procurement and donations of personal protective equipment and medical countermeasures. [1] In the same document, key actions are determined concerning pooled

procurement, coordination with United Nations (UN) agencies and strengthening logistics management information systems. Medical supplies mentioned include PPEs, basic hygiene supplies and support equipment. The Medicine Supply Company Suriname (BGVS) is designated as the central coordination unit for COVID-19 pharmaceuticals. [1] In 2020, the Suriname Outbreak Management Team has published multiple reports of donations of equipment and PPE by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and governments and businesses from other countries. [2, 3, 4] However, there is no evidence that the COVID-19 plan holds for other public health emergencies as well. No further information is available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the safety page of the Government of Suriname, or the Public Health Office. [5, 6, 7, 8]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname." [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2020. "Update Outbreak Management Team 27 October 2020". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Update-van-het-Outbreak-Management-Team-27-oktober.pdf>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2020. "Update Outbreak Management Team 10 November 2020". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Persbericht-Update-van-het-Outbreak-Management-Team-10-november-juiste-versie.pdf>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 9 January 2021. "Situation Report 47". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/SITREP-47-Suriname-on-COVID.pdf>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[6] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Services". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[7] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "Safety and Order". [<http://www.gov.sr/themas/veiligheid-en-orde/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[8] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no public evidence that Suriname has a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. There is no information available on websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, the safety page of the Government of Suriname, or the Public Health Office. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Services". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed

26 January 2021.

[4] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "Safety and Order". [<http://www.gov.sr/themas/veiligheid-en-orde/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[5] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Suriname has a plan in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency. In its 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19, Suriname listed guidelines for dispensing medicines in regional health centers while preventing exposure to risks of infection. [1] No further information is available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Defense. [2, 3]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname." [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Services". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence to confirm Suriname has a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. No such plan is included in the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 in Suriname, nor is there evidence that Suriname received health personnel from other countries during the COVID-19 crisis on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Government page on Safety and Order, the Ministry of Defense or the Public Health Office. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] The country did receive humanitarian aid, including medical staff, from the Red Cross during the floods of 2008. [6]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname." [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

- [2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Defense. 2021. "Services". [<http://defense.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [4] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "Safety and Order". [<http://www.gov.sr/themas/veiligheid-en-orde/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.
- [5] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezondheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports". [<http://www.bog-suriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.
- [6] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 2008. "Emergency appeal: floods in Suriname". [<http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/08/MDRSR002EA.pdf>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 80

2015

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 249.65

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Suriname government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. No such policy is included in the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 in Suriname. [1] Nor is there information to suggest the existence of such a policy in the National Pandemic Preparedness Plan issued by the Ministry of Public Health in 2009 or the 2009 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) report on pandemic preparedness [1, 2] There is no additional evidence from the Ministry of Public Health. [4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. "A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname." [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. "Pandemic Preparedness and Implementation in Suriname". [https://www.paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=pandemicinfluenza2009-carib&alias=930-pandemic-preparedness-implementation-in-suriname&Itemid=1179&lang=en]. Accessed 27 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a

Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public information about a system or a plan in place in Suriname to coordinate communication between health officials and health care workers during a public health emergency. The National Pandemic Preparedness Plan issued by the Ministry of Public Health in 2009 only mentions that a communication plan for regular exchange of information between healthcare authorities and between government agencies should be developed. [1] However, no such communication plan is available in the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028. [2] There is also no information in the 2009 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) report on pandemic preparedness in Suriname. [3] The 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 in Suriname does designate responsible parties for communication with healthcare workers and includes a “command structure”, but there is no evidence of a system for two-way communication between public health officials and healthcare workers. [4] There is no additional information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [5]

[1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. “National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028”. <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. “Pandemic Preparedness and Implementation in Suriname”. [https://www.paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=pandemicinfluenza2009-carib&alias=930-pandemic-preparedness-implementation-in-suriname&Itemid=1179&lang=en]. Accessed 27 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. “A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname.” [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. “Recent”. [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.5.1b

Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public information about a system or a plan in place in Suriname to coordinate communication between health officials and health care workers during a public health emergency. The National Pandemic Preparedness Plan issued by the

Ministry of Public Health in 2009 only mentions that a communication plan for regular exchange of information between healthcare authorities and between government agencies should be developed. [1] However, no such communication plan is available in the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028. [2] There is also no information in the 2009 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) report on pandemic preparedness in Suriname. [3] The 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 in Suriname does designate responsible parties for communication with healthcare workers in both the public and private sector, but there is no evidence of a system for two-way communication between public health officials and healthcare workers. [4] There is no additional information available on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [5]

[1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. “National Pandemic Preparedness Plan” (“Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid”). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. “National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028”. <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. “Pandemic Preparedness and Implementation in Suriname”. [https://www.paho.org/disasters/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=pandemicinfluenza2009-carib&alias=930-pandemic-preparedness-implementation-in-suriname&Itemid=1179&lang=en]. Accessed 27 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. “A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname.” [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. “Recent”. [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the public health system in Suriname monitors the number of healthcare associated infections in the country. There is no information on monitoring of HCAs mentioned in the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 or the 2020 Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 in Suriname, nor is it mentioned on the websites of the Public Health Office and the Ministry of Public Health. [1, 2, 3, 4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. “National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028”. <http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. June 2020. “A Comprehensive National Preparedness and Response Plan For COVID-19 In Suriname.” [<http://health.gov.sr/media/1363/final-national-covid-19-preparedness-and-response-plan.pdf>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[3] Public Health Office (Bureau Openbare Gezonheidszorg, BOG). 2021. "Situation Reports".

[<http://www.bogsuriname.com/protocollen/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

In Suriname, there is a legal requirement for ethical review before starting a clinical trial. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Decree C-46 no. 75 include details on consent that the Director of Health has to grant for medical investigative examinations to be conducted on persons. There are Laws requiring the agreement by an ethics committee/institutional review board of the Clinical Trials to be performed. The committee was established by an ordinance of the Ministry of Public Health, advising the Director of Health, who has the legal mandate to take decisions related to research. [1, 2]

[1] World Health Organization. 2011. "Suriname: Pharmaceutical country profile".

[http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/suriname_pharmaceutical_profile_April_2011.pdf]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Services". [<http://health.gov.sr/diensten-en-instellingen/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

4.7.1b

Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Suriname has an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to address treat ongoing pandemics. Although Suriname has a National Ethics Committee, it does not have a website with any details provided. The website of the Ministry Public of Health does not provide information about approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures either. [1, 2] The World Health Organization (WHO) 2011 document titled "Guidelines on regulatory preparedness for human pandemic influenza vaccines" describes accelerated regulatory approval for market authorization in five countries, but does not include Suriname, the Caribbean or South-America. [3]

[1] World Health Organization. 2011. "Suriname: Pharmaceutical country profile".

[http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/suriname_pharmaceutical_profile_April_2011.pdf]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Services". [<http://health.gov.sr/diensten-en-instellingen/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 2011. "Guidelines on regulatory preparedness for human pandemic influenza vaccines". [http://www.who.int/biologicals/vaccines/Annex_2_WHO_TRS_963-3.pdf]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a

Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Suriname has a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans. This is the responsibility of the Registration Committee (Registratie Commissie, RC). [1] The RC can also provide advice on clinical trials for testing medicines. The RC is tasked with the assessment of medicines intended for use in Suriname, including their preparation, composition and indication; however, there is no explicit mention of medical countermeasures. [2]

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. January 2021. "Medicine Registration Committee Installed".

[<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/2021/geneesmiddelen-registratie-commissie-ge%C3%AFnstalleerd/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[2] World Health Organization. 2011. "Suriname: Pharmaceutical country profile".

[http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/suriname_pharmaceutical_profile_April_2011.pdf]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Suriname has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies. There is no information about an expedited process provided on the website of the Ministry of Public Health or in news on the tasks of the Registration Committee. [1, 2] The RC is tasked with the assessment of medicines intended for use in Suriname, including their preparation, composition and indication. [2, 3] It does not have its own website.

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Services". [<http://health.gov.sr/diensten-en-instellingen/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[2] Government of the Republic of Suriname. January 2021. "Medicine Registration Committee Installed".

[<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/2021/geneesmiddelen-registratie-commissie-ge%C3%AFnstalleerd/>]. Accessed 28 January 2021.

[3] World Health Organization. 2011. "Suriname: Pharmaceutical country profile".

[http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/suriname_pharmaceutical_profile_April_2011.pdf]. Accessed 28 January 2021. ?

Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Suriname does not have a national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics. No disaster risk reduction plan could be found on the website of the Ministry of Public Health or the National Disaster Management Coordination Centre (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). [1, 2]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Documents". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/>]. Accessed 22 February 2021.

[2] National Disaster Management Coordination Center of the Republic of Suriname (Nationaal Coördinatie Centrum voor Rampenbeheersing, NCCR). 2021. "Planning Ahead". [<http://www.nccr.sr.org/smartcms/default.asp?contentID=506>]. Accessed 22 February 2021.

5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that Suriname has cross-border agreements as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies. Suriname is a member of the Trinidad-based Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), which, among other functions, coordinates responses to public health crises in the Caribbean. [1] For example, CARPHA has conducted extensive work on Zika, a virus that is a major concern in the region. [2] CARPHA is a body of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM. [1] In response to COVID-19, CARPHA activated its Incident Management Team (IMT), coordinated the regional preparedness and response, issued situation reports and published guidelines and press releases. [3] Suriname is one of the 18 members of the Barbados-headquartered Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), which has a mandate to be the "facilitator, driver, coordinator and motivating force for the promotion and engineering of Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM)" in all member states. However, CDEMA does not specifically include public health emergencies in its mandate. [4]

[1] Caribbean Public Health Association (CARPHA). 16 January 2012. "Terms of Reference for The Caribbean Public Health Laboratory Network". Version II.

[http://carpha.org:8086/Portals/0/docs/MEETINGS/Epid_LabDir/Caribbean%20Public%20Health%20Laboratory%20Network.pdf]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[2] Caribbean Public Health Association (CARPHA). "Zika Virus Infection". [<http://carpha.org/zika>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[3] Caribbean Public Health Association (CARPHA). 2020. "COVID-19 Background". [<https://www.carpha.org/What-We-Do/Public-Health/Novel-Coronavirus/COVID-19-Background>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[4] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). "About Us". [<https://www.cdema.org/about-us>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

5.2.1b

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Suriname has a cross-border agreement as part of a regional group with regards to animal health emergencies. Suriname is a partner to CaribVET, the Caribbean animal health network. [1] CaribVET, among other functions, coordinates responses to animal health emergencies and leads regional planning on the topic. For example, CaribVET's mandate includes "Strengthen national capacities related to preparedness, surveillance, monitoring and management of animal and zoonotic diseases" and to assist in early detection and response to such diseases. [2]

[1] CaribVET. "Home". [<https://www.caribvet.net/>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[2] CaribVET. "About the Network: Objectives". [<https://www.caribvet.net/about-the-network/objectives>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a

Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b

Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. The National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 does not mention allocating such funds, and there is no information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, or the national government. [1, 2, 3, 4]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028".

<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed

26 January 2021.

[4] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "Government". [<http://www.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism that Suriname can access in the face of a public health emergency. The National Pandemic Preparedness Plan does not mention a national funding mechanism. [1] Similarly, there is nothing about a pandemic funding mechanism mentioned in the Pan American Health Organization's (PAHO) Strategic and Operational Plan for Responding to Pandemic Influenza. [2] Finally, Suriname is not eligible to borrow funds from the World Bank pandemic financing facility. [3, 4] No further information could be found on the website of the Ministry of Public Health. [5]

[1] Pan American Health Organization. 2009. "National Pandemic Preparedness Plan" ("Nationaal Plan Pandemische Paraatheid"). [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=national-influenza-plans-2343&alias=46452-suriname-pandemic-preparedness-national-plan&Itemid=270&lang=en]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2005. Pan American Health Organization's (PAHO) Strategic and Operational Plan for Responding to Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.thecompassforsbc.org/sites/default/files/strengthening_tools/PAHO_Plan_PandemicInfluenza_Eng.pdf]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[3] World Bank Group. 2021. Borrowing countries. [<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[4] World Bank Group. December 2017. Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) Operational Brief for Eligible Countries. [<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that senior leaders in Suriname have made a public commitment either to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support in the past three years or to improve its own domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. The Suriname Government does not have a Development Aid Ministry that could improve the capacity of other countries to respond to epidemic threats, nor has the Ministry of Health made public any statements about this. [1, 2] The National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 does not mention improving the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats, and there is no information available on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries, or the national government. [1, 2, 3, 4]

[1] Government of the Republic of Suriname. 2021. "Government". [<http://www.gov.sr/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[2] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028".

<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publikaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>. Accessed 26 January 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten/>]. Accessed 26 January 2021.

5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

In the past three years, Suriname has invested finances from international donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats, but there is no evidence that it has provided support to other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats. The Global Health Security Funding Tracker has evidence of funds used to improve domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. [1] Funds disbursed to Suriname for this purpose include Institutional Support from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria between 2017-2019 and Support to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance between 2016-2020 and Integrated Health Systems in Latin America and the Caribbeans between 2016-2019. [1] In addition, in 2016, the government described vector-borne diseases as increasingly important public health problems, and to address this problem, the Ministry of Public Health received SRD 2 million (USD 260,000) in 2016 to improve the control of mosquitoes (such as *Anopheles gambiae*) and vector-borne diseases (such as Zika, chikungunya and dengue). [2] There is also evidence that the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) has received funds that were used to improve Suriname's domestic capacity to address COVID-19. [3] There is no evidence that the country has provided support to other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. [4]

[1] Global Health Security Funding Tracker. "Recipient Profile: Suriname".

[<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/table/1058/recipient>]. Accessed 29 April 2021.

[2] Law Book of the Republic of Suriname (Staatsblad van de Republiek Suriname). S.B. 2016 No. 87. "Law of 15 December 2016, concerning the budget and income for the year 2016 regarding the Ministry of Public Health".

[http://www.dna.sr/media/201398/SB_2016_no._170.pdf]. Accessed 2 March 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 11 June 2020. "Government of Canada contributes \$5.3 million to PAHO for response to COVID-19". [<https://www.paho.org/en/news/11-6-2020-government-canada-contributes-53-million-paho-response-covid-19>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[4] Global Health Security Funding Tracker. "Funder Profile: Suriname". [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/1058/funder>]. Accessed 29 April 2021.

5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Suriname has a policy in place for sharing clinical specimens and isolates with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. According to the "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018" issued by the Ministry of Public Health, Suriname is a member of CAREC, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) Caribbean Epidemiology Centre. [1] This center provides strong support for activities related to disease surveillance and laboratory support. Suriname laboratories report weekly sentinel surveillance to CAREC, with notification of reported cases of Acute Flaccid Paralysis and Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI). CAREC shares such surveillance data with other countries in the Caribbean. [2] However, it is not clear from these sources whether these networks share clinical microbiological samples in addition to routine surveillance data. There is no further evidence in the National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028 or on the website of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. [3, 4, 5]

[1] Ministry of Public Health. 2011. "National Health Sector Plan 2011-2018". [https://kennisbanksu.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Volksgezondheid_Sectorplan_MVGZ_2011_2018.pdf]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). "Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC)". [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/2961>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. 2019. "National Strategic Plan for Health and Wellbeing 2019-2028". [<http://health.gov.sr/documenten-en-publicaties/publicaties/nationaal-strategisch-plan-voor-gezondheid-en-welzijn-2019-2028/>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Public Health. 2021. "Recent". [<http://health.gov.sr/actueel/>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries. 2021. "Documents". [<http://lvv.gov.sr/documenten>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that Suriname has not shared samples in accordance with the PIP framework in the past two years. The World Health Organization (WHO) has not reported any non-compliance in the past two years by Suriname, nor

did a search for media articles on this produce any results. [1]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Virus sharing". [http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus_sharing/en/]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that Suriname has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. The country shared epidemiological surveillance data and samples of Zika Virus with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) during the 2017 Zika outbreak in South America. [1] There is no evidence that Suriname has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during COVID-19. [2]

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 25 September 2017. "Zika epidemiological report Suriname".

[<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2017/2017-phe-zika-situation-report-sur.pdf>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2021. "Suriname". [<https://www.paho.org/en/suriname>]. Accessed 2 February 2021.

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 3

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 38

2020

Transparency International

6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a

What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b

What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 3

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 94.38

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.53

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1.1

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Employment in the informal sector in Suriname lies around 50%. According to the International Labor Organization's ILOSTAT data for 2016, Suriname's "share of employment outside the formal sector" is 45.7%. [1] There is no further information available on the website of the World Bank or the Suriname Ministry of Labor. [2, 3]

[1] International Labor Organization. "ILO Data Explorer".

[https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer43/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=EMP_PIFL_SEX_RT_A]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[2] World Bank Data. "Country: Suriname". [<https://data.worldbank.org/country/SR>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Labor. "Documents". [<http://atm.gov.sr/documenten/>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

Current Year Score: 2

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government

6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting

6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality

6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.58

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 66.09

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: -0.56

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 71.57

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook

6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 665.4

2019

WHO

6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 7.02

2019

World Bank

6.5.1d

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 14.78

2018

World Bank

6.5.1e

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 26.4

2016

WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 95.42

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.2b

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 84.46

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 777.75

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018