

# St Lucia

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for St Lucia. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for St Lucia.

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## Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

### 1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

#### 1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

##### 1.1.1a

**Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?**

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. There is no national AMR action plan available through the World Health Organization library of National Action Plans, the Ministry of Health, or the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2, 3]. Furthermore, Saint Lucia has not completed an Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment [4]. In December 2014, the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) hosted a workshop on Combatting Antimicrobial Resistance in the Caribbean. Although this workshop outlined the next steps that are needed to develop a regional response and action plan for combatting AMR, there is no evidence that such a plan has been put in place [5].

[1] World Health Organization. "Antimicrobial resistance - Library of national action plans".

[<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia.

[<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[4] World Health Organization. "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment 2018-2019".

[<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Combatting Antimicrobial Resistance in the Caribbean: CARPHA and Public Health England Tackle the Threat of Antimicrobial Drug Resistance in the Region".

[<https://carpha.org/More/Media/Articles/ArticleID/86/CARPHA-and-Public-Health-England-Tackle-the-Threat-of-Antimicrobial-Drug-Resistance-in-the-Region>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

##### 1.1.1b

**Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?**

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a national laboratory/laboratory system that can test for some, but not all, of the 7+1 priority AMR pathogens. The country's 2006 National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual details the process for active and passive reporting from sentinel sites to the Epidemiology Unit [1]. The manual includes the following tests in the list of tests conducted at public laboratories in Saint Lucia: Salmonella (Typhi and "other"), Shigella, S. aureus, N. gonorrhoeae, S. pneumoniae, TB smear [1]. Although not included on the list of tests, E. Coli and Bacterial

Pneumonias are listed as being under surveillance in Saint Lucia [1.] A 2013 peer-reviewed publication of a study on acute gastroenteritis in Saint Lucia indicates that the Ezra Long Laboratory conducted testing for Salmonella, Shigella, S. aureus, and E. Coli [2]. However, there is no indication that tests are conducted on AMR strains of these pathogens. In addition, there is no national action plan available through the World Health Organization library of National Action Plans, and there is no additional information regarding laboratory testing for AMR pathogens through the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4, 5].

- [1] Government of Saint Lucia. 2006. "National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia". [https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector\_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [2] Gabriel, O.O., Jaime, A., et al. 2013. "Estimating the burden of acute gastrointestinal illness: a pilot study of the prevalence and underreporting in Saint Lucia, Eastern Caribbean". Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition, 31(4 Suppl 1), p.S3. [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4022001/]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [3] World Health Organization. "Antimicrobial resistance - Library of national action plans". [http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

### 1.1.1c

**Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the government of Saint Lucia conducts detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. There is no evidence of AMR detection or surveillance activities on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor on the one of the Ministry of Sustainable Development, Energy, Science and Technology [1, 2, 3]. Furthermore, there is no AMR national plan for Saint Lucia available on the website of the World Health Organization (WHO) library of National Action Plans and Saint Lucia has not completed a WHO Self Assessment for AMR [4, 5].

- [1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Sustainable Development, Energy, Science and Technology of Saint Lucia. [http://sustainabledevelopment.govt.lc/]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [4] World Health Organization. "Antimicrobial resistance - Library of national action plans". [http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.
- [5] World Health Organization. "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment 2018-2019". [http://amrcountryprogress.org/]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

## 1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

### 1.1.2a

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has national legislation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans, however there is also evidence that this legislation is not always strictly enforced. Saint Lucia's Pharmacy Act, revised in 2008, lists a number of antibiotics in its Schedule 4—including penicillin derivatives and amoxicillinas—as prescription only drugs, but there is no indication that prescriptions are required for all antibiotics [1]. Furthermore, a 2012 report by the Pan American Health Organization on pharmaceuticals in Saint Lucia states that "antibiotics are occasionally sold over the counter without a prescription" [2]. In addition, there is no information available on whether this legislation is strictly enforced on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor on the one for the Pharmacy Council. [3, 4, 5]. Moreover, there is no AMR national plan for Saint Lucia listed on the website of the World Health Organization (WHO) library of National Action Plans [6].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. Chapter 11.21, 2008 Revised Edition of Act No. 8 of 2003. "Pharmacy Act".

[<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/17feb/Pharmacy%20Act%20-%20Cap.11.21.pdf>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). "Pharmaceutical Situation in Saint Lucia: WHO Assessment of Level II - Health Facilities Survey". [<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2012/HSS-MT-PharmStLucia-2012.pdf>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[5] The Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/index.php>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[6] World Health Organization. "Antimicrobial resistance - Library of national action plans".

[<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

### 1.1.2b

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has national legislation or a regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals. There is no such information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor on the one for the Pharmacy Council [1, 2, 3]. In addition, there is no national AMR action plan listed in the World Health Organization (WHO) library of National Action Plans [4]. Saint Lucia's Pharmacy Act, revised in 2008, lists a number of antibiotics in its Schedule 4—including penicillin derivatives and amoxicillinas—as prescription only drugs, with drugs defined to include substances or mixture of substances for animals. However, there is no indication that prescriptions are required for all antibiotics for use in animals [5]. In 2016, the Minister of Commerce for Saint Lucia highlighted concerns of antimicrobial resistance when antibiotics are used for animal growth, feed efficiency, or routine disease prevention, and called for an interagency collaboration on the topic, yet no action steps were defined, and no further information is available [6].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[3] The Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/index.php>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[4] World Health Organization. "Antimicrobial resistance - Library of national action plans".

[<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia. Chapter 11.21, 2008 Revised Edition of Act No. 8 of 2003. "Pharmacy Act".

[<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/17feb/Pharmacy%20Act%20-%20Cap.11.21.pdf>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[6] Ministry of Sustainable Development, Energy, Science and Technology of Saint Lucia. "Antibiotics off the Menu".

[<http://sustainabledevelopment.govt.lc/news/antibiotics-off-the-menu>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

## 1.2 ZOOONOTIC DISEASE

### 1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

#### 1.2.1a

**Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a national law, plan, or equivalent strategy document, on zoonotic disease. According to the Saint Lucia Government Information Services, in November 2014, the country had a National Ebola Plan approved by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) [1]. However, the National Ebola Plan, or any other plan for zoonotic diseases, is not available on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one for the Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3]. There is evidence that the country is party to planning and strategy regarding zoonotic disease as part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In 2012, CARICOM, of which Saint Lucia is a Member State, signed an agreement with the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) "to prevent the spread of animal diseases, to improve the animal health", and to "harmonize legislation and regulations on animal diseases and zoonoses" [4]. Saint Lucia also participates in the Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET), which aims to improve animal and veterinary public health in all the countries and/or the territories of the Caribbean, including strengthening national capacities related to preparedness, surveillance, monitoring and management of animal and zoonotic disease [5]. The CARICOM One Health Policy—which urges collaboration between the public health, agriculture and wildlife/environment sectors—includes zoonotic disease considerations [6]. In addition, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) division of the World Health Organization (WHO) refers to strategic planning around zoonotic disease in the Caribbean sub-region, including specific mention of Saint Lucia in regards to prevention and control of zoonoses [7].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. "PAHO Approves National Ebola Plan". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/paho-approves-national-ebola-plan>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[4] The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). 2012. "Agreement Between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)".

[[http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About\\_us/docs/pdf/accords/CARICOM\\_ANG.pdf](http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About_us/docs/pdf/accords/CARICOM_ANG.pdf)]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[5] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "Network Objectives". [<https://www.caribvet.net/about-the-network/objectives>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[6] One Health One Caribbean One Love. 2014. "Technical Note - CARICOM One Health Policy".

[[https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one\\_health\\_one\\_caribbean\\_one\\_love](https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one_health_one_caribbean_one_love)]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[7] Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). "Veterinary Public Health".

[[https://www.paho.org/spc-crb/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=391:veterinary-public-](https://www.paho.org/spc-crb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=391:veterinary-public-)

health&Itemid=0&showall=1]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

### 1.2.1b

**Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. According to the Saint Lucia Government Information Services, in November 2014, the country had a National Ebola Plan approved by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) [1]. However, there is no evidence of this plan, nor that it includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans, on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one for the Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3]. There is evidence that the country is party to planning and strategy regarding zoonotic disease as part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). In 2012, CARICOM, of which Saint Lucia is a Member State, signed an agreement with the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) "to prevent the spread of animal diseases, to improve the animal health", and to "harmonize legislation and regulations on animal diseases and zoonoses" [4]. Saint Lucia also participates in the Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET), which aims to improve animal and veterinary public health in all the countries and/or the territories of the Caribbean, including strengthening national capacities related to preparedness, surveillance, monitoring and management of animal and zoonotic disease [5]. The CARICOM One Health Policy—which urges collaboration between the public health, agriculture and wildlife/environment sectors—includes zoonotic disease considerations [6]. In addition, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) division of the World Health Organization (WHO) refers to strategic planning around zoonotic disease in the Caribbean sub-region, including specific mention of Saint Lucia in regards to prevention and control of zoonoses [7].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. "PAHO Approves National Ebola Plan". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/paho-approves-national-ebola-plan>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[4] The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). 2012. "Agreement Between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE)".

[[http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About\\_us/docs/pdf/accords/CARICOM\\_ANG.pdf](http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/About_us/docs/pdf/accords/CARICOM_ANG.pdf)]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[5] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "Network Objectives". [<https://www.caribvet.net/about-the-network/objectives>]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[6] One Health One Caribbean One Love. 2014. "Technical Note - CARICOM One Health Policy".

[[https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one\\_health\\_one\\_caribbean\\_one\\_love](https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one_health_one_caribbean_one_love)]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

[7] Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). "Veterinary Public Health".

[[https://www.paho.org/spc-crb/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=391:veterinary-public-health&Itemid=0&showall=1](https://www.paho.org/spc-crb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=391:veterinary-public-health&Itemid=0&showall=1)]. Accessed 04 February, 2021.

### 1.2.1c

**Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?**



Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a national plan, guidelines, or law that accounts for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. The Animals Act of 2005—whose purpose includes "proper control of animals and for related matters"—does not mention zoonotic disease [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a document provided by the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3]. The CARICOM One Health policy urges collaboration between the public health, agriculture and wildlife/environment sectors, including for joint surveillance and information sharing, joint outbreak investigation, and joint emergency planning and response to emerging issues such as outbreaks of zoonotic or food borne diseases [4, 5]. According to a 2016 post by the Ministry of Health, "Saint Lucia is hoping to join CARICOM member countries to promote the One Health Concept", however, there is no evidence that Saint Lucia has signed on to the CARICOM One Health policy since then [6]. In addition, one of the coordinated actions of the Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET) is epidemiological surveillance, but CaribVET does not have publicly available plans or guidelines on surveillance and control of zoonotic pathogens [7].

- [1] Government of Saint Lucia. Chapter 3.11, 31 December 2005. "Animals Act". [<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/AnimalsAct.pdf>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [4] One Health One Caribbean One Love. 2016-2017. [[https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one\\_health\\_one\\_caribbean\\_one\\_love](https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one_health_one_caribbean_one_love)]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [5] Pan American Health Organization. "One Health: From Ideas to Action". [[https://www.paho.org/trt/images/stories/PWR\\_TRT/one%20health%20workshop%20report.pdf?ua=1&ua=1](https://www.paho.org/trt/images/stories/PWR_TRT/one%20health%20workshop%20report.pdf?ua=1&ua=1)]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [6] Ministry of Health of Saint Lucia. "CARICOM promotes One Health Concept". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/caricom-promotes-one-health-concept>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [7] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "About the Network". [<https://www.caribvet.net/about-the-network>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

### **1.2.1d**

**Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a department, agency or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. According to the Government of Saint Lucia, the Veterinary and Livestock Services Division of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the protection of Saint Lucia from the entry and spread of zoonotic diseases [1]. However, no further information is available, and there is no indication from the Ministry of Agriculture that the division functions across ministries [2]. In addition here is no evidence of a cross-ministry group on the website of the Ministry of Health [3].

- [1] Government of Saint Lucia. "Veterinary Import Permit". [<http://www.govt.lc/services/veterinary-import-permit>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia.



[<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

## 1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

### 1.2.2a

**Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a national mechanism for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. There is no evidence of such a mechanism on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2]. According to the Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVet), in 2016 there was an Animal Disease Recognition and Response workshop held in Saint Lucia, which trained veterinary services personnel and "selected livestock producers" to recognize, diagnose and respond to animal and zoonotic diseases [3]. However, no further or more recent information is available on CaribVet's website [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[3] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVet). "Animal Disease Recognition and Response Training". [<https://www.caribvet.net/news/animal-disease-recognition-and-response-training>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[4] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVet). [<https://www.caribvet.net/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

### 1.2.2b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has legislation or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners), as there is no evidence that the country has a national mechanism for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. There is no evidence of such a mechanism on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2]. According to the Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVet), in 2016 there was an Animal Disease Recognition and Response workshop held in Saint Lucia, which trained veterinary services personnel and "selected livestock producers" to recognize, diagnose and respond to animal and zoonotic diseases [3]. However, no further or more recent information is available CaribVet's website [4]. There is a Data Protection Act, No. 11 of 2011, which covers regulating the collection, use, and processing of personal information [5, 6]. However, only the 2009 bill version and 2015 amendment to the Act are available, and there is no mention of data protections pertaining to animals as property of owners [5, 7].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

- [3] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVet). "Animal Disease Recognition and Response Training". [https://www.caribvet.net/news/animal-disease-recognition-and-response-training]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [4] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVet). [https://www.caribvet.net/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [5] Government of Saint Lucia, National Printing Corporation of Saint Lucia. Act No. 2 of 2015. "Data Protection (Amendment) Act, 2011". [http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\_for\_sale/laws/3547/Act%20%20of%202015.pdf]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [6] Government of Saint Lucia. "Privacy & Data Protection Act". [http://www.govt.lc/privacy-data-prot]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [7] Government of Saint Lucia. 2009. "Privacy and Data Protection Bill, 2009". [http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/PrivacyAndDataProtectionBill.pdf]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

### 1.2.2c

**Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient available evidence that Saint Lucia conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. According to the Ministry of Health, activities of the Department of Environmental Health Vector Control Unit to control the mosquito and rodent population include entomological surveillance towards combatting the spread of zoonotic diseases such as Dengue Fever, Chikungunya and Zika virus. However, there is no indication that this surveillance includes testing to identify that zoonotic diseases are present in these wildlife populations [1]. Saint Lucia is also a member of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), and CARPHA conducts surveillance on vector-borne diseases, including dengue, chikungunya, and malaria [2, 3]. In 2017, CARPHA launched the regional Caribbean Vector-Borne Diseases Network (CariVecNet), which acts as an exchange centre for surveillance information on vector-borne diseases [4]. A representative from Saint Lucia serves on the CariVecNet Surveillance/Epidemiology Working Group [5]. Furthermore, there is no additional information regarding surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife available on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [6, 7].

- [1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. "Zika Virus Disease". [http://health.govt.lc/zika]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [2] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Surveillance Communicable Diseases". [https://www.carpha.org/What-We-Do/Communicable-Diseases]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [3] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory Services and Networks". [https://www.carpha.org/What-We-Do/LABS/Overview]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [4] Caribbean Vector-Borne Diseases Network (CariVecNet). [http://carivecnet.carpha.org/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [5] Caribbean Vector-Borne Diseases Network (CariVecNet). "CariVecNet Surveillance/Epidemiology Working Group Members". [http://carivecnet.carpha.org/Surveillance-Epidemiology]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [6] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [7] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

### 1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

#### 1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

### 1.2.4 Animal health workforce

#### 1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 8.21

2018

OIE WAHIS database

#### 1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 5.47

2018

OIE WAHIS database

### 1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

#### 1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a national plan, legislation, or regulation on zoonotic disease hence there is no evidence of one which would include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. There is no evidence of such a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, and The Animals Act of 2005 does not mention zoonotic disease [1, 2, 3]. The CARICOM One Health policy framework from 2014—which urges collaboration between the public health, agriculture and wildlife/environment sectors—

mentions the private sector and requests that the private sector be engaged in One Health initiatives as part of multidisciplinary and multi-sector collaboration [4]. According to a 2016 post by the Ministry of Health, "Saint Lucia is hoping to join CARICOM member countries to promote the One Health Concept", however, there is no evidence that Saint Lucia has signed on to the CARICOM One Health policy since this declaration [5]. Regional private sector groups are members of the Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET [6]. The report from the first external evaluation of CaribVET, which took place in 2017, indicated that private sector involvement with CaribVET would be limited to an advisory capacity, and no additional information is available on specific mechanisms to working with the private sector [7].

- [1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [3] Government of Saint Lucia. Chapter 3.11, 31 December 2005. "Animals Act". [<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/AnimalsAct.pdf>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [4] One Health One Caribbean One Love. 2014. "Technical Note - CARICOM One Health Policy". [[https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one\\_health\\_one\\_caribbean\\_one\\_love](https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one_health_one_caribbean_one_love)]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Health of Saint Lucia. "CARICOM promotes One Health Concept". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/caricom-promotes-one-health-concept>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [6] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). [<https://www.caribvet.net/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [7] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). 18-21 June 2017. "Evaluation of the Caribbean Animal Health Network - Report of the External Review Panel, Montego Bay, Jamaica". [[https://collaboratif.cirad.fr/share/s/6JcRB\\_nvTdOc9mX6Rh9\\_QA](https://collaboratif.cirad.fr/share/s/6JcRB_nvTdOc9mX6Rh9_QA)]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

## 1.3 BIOSECURITY

### 1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

#### 1.3.1a

**Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems. There is no evidence of such a record on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2, 3]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995. Furthermore, there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [4]. In addition, there is no relevant information on the VERTIC legislation database [5].

- [1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia.

[<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[4] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[5] VERTIC Database. "Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

### 1.3.1b

**Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has in place legislation related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, and cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. The Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act of 1985 and the Shipping Act of 1994 are potentially relevant legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database [1]. Saint Lucia's Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act states that the manufacture, use and handling of toxic substances "shall not exceed such permissible limits as may be prescribed" [2]. The Shipping Act of 1994 has a section of regulations of dangerous goods, stating that the minister responsible for shipping may make regulations on the packing and other precautions regarding the carriage of dangerous substances [3]. However, there is nothing more in these acts related to biosecurity, and there is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, nor on the one of the Ministry of Home Affairs [4, 5, 6]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995. In addition, there is no relevant information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [7].

[1] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 10 of 1985, revised 31 December 2005. "Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act". [[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint\\_Lucia/LC\\_Employees\\_Act.pdf](https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint_Lucia/LC_Employees_Act.pdf)]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 11 of 1994, revised 31 December 2001. "Shipping Act". [[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint\\_Lucia/LC\\_Shipping\\_Act.pdf](https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint_Lucia/LC_Shipping_Act.pdf)]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[6] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[7] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

### 1.3.1c

**Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has an established agency responsible for enforcement of biosecurity legislation, as there is no evidence that the country has in place legislation related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, and cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. The Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act of 1985 and the Shipping Act of 1994 are potentially relevant legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database [1]. Saint Lucia's Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act states that the manufacture, use and handling of toxic substances "shall not exceed such permissible limits as may be prescribed" [2]. The Shipping Act of has a section of regulations of dangerous goods, stating that the minister responsible for shipping may make regulations on the packing and other precautions regarding the carriage of dangerous substances [3]. However, there is nothing more in these acts related to biosecurity, and there is no further information available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor on the one of the Ministry of Home Affairs [4, 5, 6]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995. In addition, there is no relevant information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [7].

[1] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 10 of 1985, revised 31 December 2005. "Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act". [https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint\_Lucia/LC\_Employees\_Act.pdf]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 11 of 1994, revised 31 December 2001. "Shipping Act". [https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint\_Lucia/LC\_Shipping\_Act.pdf]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[6] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

[7] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

**1.3.1d**

**Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that shows that Saint Lucia has taken action to consolidate its inventories of dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. There is no evidence of such action taken on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2, 3]. There is also no indication of such a consolidation by the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) Laboratory of which Saint Lucia is a member [4]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [5]. Furthermore, there is no relevant information on the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [6].

- [1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [4] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory Services and Networks". [<https://www.carpha.org/What-We-Do/LABS/Overview>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [5] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.
- [6] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 05 February, 2021.

### 1.3.1e

#### Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen. The Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), in conjunction with the Pan American Health Organization of the World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO), has facilitated access to laboratory facilities at the WHO-Collaborating Centres at the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Public Health Agency Canada for diagnosis of Ebola cases [1]. As of 2014, the Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3) laboratory at CARPHA was being prepared to receive and test clinical samples from suspected Ebola patients, using molecular diagnostic methods; however Ebola viral culture cannot be conducted at this laboratory, since this can only be done safely in a BSL4 laboratory facility [1]. Furthermore, there is no information about diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3, 4]. Anthrax is not listed among the CARPHA laboratory testing services, however, CARPHA directs that in suspected cases of cutaneous anthrax, specimens may be taken from the skin lesions and blood cultures [5].

- [1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). 15 December 2014. CARPHA Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa". [[https://new.carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/Ebola-What\\_is\\_CARPHA\\_Doing\\_FINAL\\_15122014.pdf](https://new.carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/Ebola-What_is_CARPHA_Doing_FINAL_15122014.pdf)]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory User Manual". [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/GUL-Q05-001-05\\_User%20Manual\[1452\].pdf?ver=2020-04-16-180718-920](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/GUL-Q05-001-05_User%20Manual[1452].pdf?ver=2020-04-16-180718-920)]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.



## 1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

### 1.3.2a

**Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia requires biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. However, there is evidence of regional trainings related to biosecurity. In 2014, Saint Lucia participated in two Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) sponsored workshops, on shipping of infectious substances and biosafety practices in a clinical laboratory that year [1]. In 2016, the Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET) hosted three workshops on poultry biosecurity [2]. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture of required standardized biosecurity training [3, 4, 5]. In addition, although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [6]. Moreover, there is no evidence of biosecurity training in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [7].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "CARPHA Trains Laboratory Personnel to Better Manage Outbreak Situations in the Region". [<https://carpha.org/More/Media/Articles/ArticleID/85/CARPHA-Trains-Laboratory-Personnel-to-Better-Manage-Outbreak-Situations-in-the-Region>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[2] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "April: the month of Biosecurity, April 2016, Guyana, Trinidad, Tobago". [<https://www.caribvet.net/training/training-workshops/april-the-month-of-biosecurity>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[6] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021

## 1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

### 1.3.3a

**Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?**

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has regulations or licensing conditions specifying that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. There is no evidence of such requirements on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2, 3]. There is also no mention of personnel checks on the website of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) laboratory [4]. Furthermore, Saint Lucia's Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act of 1985 does not cover personnel checks for those with access to especially dangerous pathogens [5]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [6]. In addition, there is no evidence of personnel checks in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database [7].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[4] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory Services and Networks". [<https://www.carpha.org/What-We-Do/LABS/Overview>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 10 of 1985, revised 31 December 2005. "Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act ". [<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/EmployeesOccupationalHealthandSafetyAct.pdf>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

### 1.3.4 Transportation security

#### 1.3.4a

**Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient available evidence to demonstrate that Saint Lucia has regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (Categories A and B). Although the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) issues guidance on the transport of infectious substances, it is unclear if this is a recommendation or a requirement. The CARPHA Laboratory User Manual provides guidelines and requirements for the preparation, packaging, and shipping of specimens, including Category A and B infectious substances [1]. The guidelines define Category A and B infectious substances and include them under one of four classes of dangerous goods, Toxic and Infectious Substances [1]. The guidelines are according to Annex 2 of the World Health Organization (WHO) Guidance on regulations for the Transport of Infectious Substances 2011-2012 [1]. The Shipping Act of 1994, revised in 2001, does not have information on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances [2]. Furthermore, there is no available information regarding the safe and secure transport of infectious substances on the

websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4, 5, 6]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [7]. In addition, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [8].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory User Manual - Guidelines for Preparation, Packing and Shipping Specimens". [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/GUL-Q05-001-05\\_User%20Manual\[1452\].pdf?ver=2020-04-16-180718-920](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/GUL-Q05-001-05_User%20Manual[1452].pdf?ver=2020-04-16-180718-920)]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 11 of 1994, revised 31 December 2001. "Shipping Act". [[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint\\_Lucia/LC\\_Shipping\\_Act.pdf](https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint_Lucia/LC_Shipping_Act.pdf)]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation of Saint Lucia. [<http://externalaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[7] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

### 1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

#### 1.3.5a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has national legislation, regulation, or other guidance in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and pathogens with pandemic potential. A working paper titled, "International Activities of the Government of Canada related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Update 2015", out of the United Nations Office at Geneva", indicates that, beginning in 2015, Canada has been supporting the enhancement of export controls and border security measures to prevent the proliferation and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including biological materials, in the Caribbean [1]. However, there is no evidence of such legislation, regulation, or guidance available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3, 4, 5]. In addition, the Shipping Act of 1994, revised in 2001, does not mention the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and pathogens with pandemic potential [6]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [7]. Furthermore, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database

[8].

- [1] The United Nations Office at Geneva. "Working Paper 3: International Activities of the Government of Canada related to Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Update 2015".  
[[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/3BAB21866EC7F6B1C1257F17002CF205/\\$file/2015+MSP+WP+3+CANADA+Adv\\_Ver.pdf](https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/3BAB21866EC7F6B1C1257F17002CF205/$file/2015+MSP+WP+3+CANADA+Adv_Ver.pdf)]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [4] Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation of Saint Lucia. [<http://externalaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [6] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 11 of 1994, revised 31 December 2001. "Shipping Act".  
[[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint\\_Lucia/LC\\_Shipping\\_Act.pdf](https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Saint_Lucia/LC_Shipping_Act.pdf)]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [7] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.
- [8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 06 February, 2021.

## 1.4 BIOSAFETY

### 1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

#### 1.4.1a

**Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. The Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act of 1985, revised in 2005, gives the Minister of Labour the authority "to make regulations for the prevention of accidents and injuries to health in places of employment and for the provision of the safety, health and welfare" of workers, including the handling of "noxious or offensive substances" and the provision of protective equipment and clothing. However, there is no evidence that such regulations exist [1]. A 2017 post on the Global Environmental, Health & Safety blog reported that the country's first official Occupational Safety and Health Policy "as part of the new Labour Act" and provides guidance on the International Labour Organization occupational health and safety regulations [2]. However, the website that posted this blog was not accessible at the time of conducting this research. Furthermore, the policy is not publicly available and no further details are available, including on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4]. A Caribbean regional forum in 2017, mentioned the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)'s role in assisting Member States in areas of biosafety and biosecurity [5]. In 2014, CARPHA received a Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory, and there is evidence that CARPHA has conducted biosafety trainings [6, 7]. There is also a Regional Project for Implementing National Biosafety Frameworks in the Caribbean Sub-Region, which pertains to biotechnology [8]. Saint Lucia does have a Biosafety Act that applies to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) [9]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995. There is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [10]. Furthermore, there is no relevant

information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [11].

- [1] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 10 of 1985, revised 31 December 2005. "Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act". [<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/EmployeesOccupationalHealthandSafetyAct.pdf>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [2] Global Environmental Health & Safety Blog. 29 May 2017. "St. Lucia Launches New Occupational Safety and Health Policy". [<http://www.cc-global.com/blog/2017/st-lucia-launches-new-occupational-safety-and-health-policy>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Regional Laboratories Prepare to Detect and Respond to New and Emerging Diseases". [<https://carpha.org/More/Media/Articles/ArticleID/192/Regional-Laboratories-Prepare-to-Detect-and-Respond-to-New-and-Emerging-Diseases>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [6] CARICOM. 14 May, 2014. "CARPHA's New Laboratory Promises Faster Detection and Response to Control Disease Outbreaks in the Caribbean". [<https://caricom.org/carphas-new-laboratory-promises-faster-detection-and-response-to-control-disease-outbreaks-in-the-caribbean/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [7] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "CARPHA Trains Laboratory Personnel to Better Manage Outbreak Situations in the Region". [<http://carpha.org/articles/ID/41/CARPHA-Trains-Laboratory-Personnel-to-Better-Manage-Outbreak-Situations-in-the-Region>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [8] Regional Project for Implementing National Biosafety Frameworks in the Caribbean Sub-Region. [<https://caribbeanbiosafety.org/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [9] Government of Saint Lucia. May 2006, Final Draft. "Biosafety Act". [<https://bch.cbd.int/database/record.shtml?documentid=43478>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [10] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.
- [11] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

### 1.4.1b

**Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that there is an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. The Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act of 1985, revised in 2005, states that the "Minister to whom responsibility for labour is assigned"—which would fall under the Ministry of Infrastructure, Ports, Energy and Labour—is responsible for making regulations for employee safety, including items pertaining to biosafety, such as the safety of employees who work with dangerous substances [1]. However, there is no evidence that such regulations exist. A 2017 post on the Global Environmental, Health & Safety blog reported that the country's first official Occupational Safety and Health Policy "as part of the new Labour Act" and provides guidance on the International Labour Organization's occupational health and safety regulations [2]. However, the website that posted this blog was not accessible at the time of conducting this research. Furthermore, the policy is not publicly available and no further details are available, including on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4]. A Caribbean regional forum in 2017 mentioned the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)'s role in assisting Member States in areas of biosafety and biosecurity [5]. Although Saint

Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [6]. Furthermore, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [7].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 10 of 1985, revised 31 December 2005. "Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act". [<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/EmployeesOccupationalHealthandSafetyAct.pdf>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[2] Global Environmental Health & Safety Blog. 29 May 2017. "St. Lucia Launches New Occupational Safety and Health Policy". [<http://www.cc-global.com/blog/2017/st-lucia-launches-new-occupational-safety-and-health-policy>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Regional Laboratories Prepare to Detect and Respond to New and Emerging Diseases". [<https://carpha.org/More/Media/Articles/ArticleID/192/Regional-Laboratories-Prepare-to-Detect-and-Respond-to-New-and-Emerging-Diseases>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

## 1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

### 1.4.2a

**Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia requires biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. The Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) has a Training Unit with a strategic framework for the agency's training function, including Laboratory Quality Assurance and Management as part of the Public Health priority area, however there is no indication that this involves standardized, mandatory training. [1] A 2014 news post by the CARPHA mentions training workshops for participants from 12 Caribbean countries on the shipping of infectious substances and biosafety practices in clinical laboratory. [2] There is no evidence of standardized biosafety training provided by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Infrastructure, Ports, Energy and Labour. [3, 4, 5] Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995. There is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [6]. Furthermore, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [7].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Monitoring and Evaluation - Training Strategy". [<http://carpha.org:8086/What-We-Do/Research-Training-and-Policy-Development/Monitoring-and-Evaluation>]. Accessed 08



February, 2021.

[2] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). 27 November 2014. "CARPHA Trains Laboratory Personnel to Better Manage Outbreak Situations in the Region". [<https://carpha.org/More/Media/Articles/ArticleID/85/CARPHA-Trains-Laboratory-Personnel-to-Better-Manage-Outbreak-Situations-in-the-Region>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Infrastructure, Ports, Energy and Labour. [<http://infrastructure.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

## 1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

### 1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

#### 1.5.1a

**Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual use research. A summary of 2013 activities of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) indicates that need assessments and capacity building for bio-risk management was conducted in five CARPHA member states, however, no additional details are available [1]. This was followed up by a 2018 report by CARPHA entitled "Capacity Building Initiatives For Reducing Biological Risks- The CARICOM Perspective". The report mentions, among other priorities, to work with member states in the "Assessment, feedback and monitoring national capacities for sustained compliance with the IHR requirements for Core Capacity 8.2 - Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity linked to SDG 3, Target 3.D". However, no details are available as to whether these assessments have been carried out in CARPHA's member states [2]. In addition there is no information regarding dual use research or an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4, 5]. A presentation in April 2018 from a regional workshop on developments relevant to the BWC for Latin America and the Caribbean indicates that CARICOM Member States have not prioritized the development of regulatory frameworks to prevent the misuse of science and technology [6]. Furthermore, although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [7]. Moreover, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [8].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory Services and Networks - 2013 Activities at a Glance". [<http://carpha.org:8086/What-We-Do/Laboratory-Services-and-Networks>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[2] CARPHA. Ms. Sacha Wallace-Sankarsingh, 17 April, 2018. "Capacity Building Initiatives For Reducing Biological Risks- The CARICOM Perspective".



[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C69D3EF5B49FFB07C125827C00442E1C/\$file/CARPHA\_SnT+Works+hop+LAC.pdf]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[6] The United Nations Office at Geneva. "Regulatory Frameworks to Prevent the Misuse of Science and Technology - Regional Workshop on Science and Technology: Developments Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) for Latin America and the Caribbean".

[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8D3E81383571A952C125827C00441E47/\$file/CARICOM\_SnT+Wor+kshop+LAC.pdf]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[7] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

### 1.5.1b

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has legislation or a regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. There is no evidence of such legislation or regulation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2, 3]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [4]. A presentation in April 2018 from a regional workshop on developments relevant to the BWC for Latin America and the Caribbean indicates that CARICOM Member States have not prioritized the development of regulatory frameworks to prevent the misuse of science and technology [5]. Furthermore, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [6].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[4] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[5] The United Nations Office at Geneva. "Regulatory Frameworks to Prevent the Misuse of Science and Technology - Regional Workshop on Science and Technology: Developments Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) for Latin America and the Caribbean".

[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8D3E81383571A952C125827C00441E47/\$file/CARICOM\_SnT+Wor+kshop+LAC.pdf]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[6] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

### 1.5.1c

**Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual use research. There is no evidence of such an agency on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2, 3.] The Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) states that CARPHA is responsible for the "conduct of relevant research on public-health priorities in the Caribbean" [4]. There is no evidence that CARPHA is responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, but CARPHA is equipped to investigate communicable diseases through security laboratories, as well as specialized units, such as an experimental mosquito colony [5]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [6]. A presentation in April 2018 from a regional workshop on developments relevant to the BWC for Latin America and the Caribbean indicates that CARICOM Member States have not prioritized the development of regulatory frameworks to prevent the misuse of science and technology [7]. In addition, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [8].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[4] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)". [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA\\_IGA.pdf](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA_IGA.pdf)]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Public Health Activities - Communicable Diseases". [<https://www.carpha.org/What-We-Do/Communicable-Diseases>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[7] The United Nations Office at Geneva. "Regulatory Frameworks to Prevent the Misuse of Science and Technology - Regional Workshop on Science and Technology: Developments Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) for Latin America and the Caribbean".

[[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/8D3E81383571A952C125827C00441E47/\\$file/CARICOM\\_SnT+Worshop+LAC.pdf](https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8D3E81383571A952C125827C00441E47/$file/CARICOM_SnT+Worshop+LAC.pdf)]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

## 1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

### 1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has national legislation, regulation, policy, or other guidance, requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before it is sold. There is no evidence of such legislation or regulation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Home Affairs, or on the one of the Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation [1, 2, 3, 4]. In addition, there is no evidence that the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) has relevant legislation, regulation, policy or other guidance [5, 6]. Although Saint Lucia is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it has not shared Confidence Building Measures since 1995 and there is no additional information on this subject shared via reports to the BWC [7]. Furthermore, there is no relevant information in the legislation listed for Saint Lucia in the VERTIC BWC Legislation Database [8].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation of Saint Lucia. [<http://externalaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 6 February 2019.

[5] Caribbean Community (CARICOM). [<https://www.caricom.org/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021

[6] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). [<http://carpha.org/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[7] United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Saint Lucia". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/saint-lucia>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database - Saint Lucia." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/s/>]. Accessed 08 February, 2021.

## 1.6 IMMUNIZATION

### 1.6.1 Vaccination rates

#### 1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

World Health Organization

### 1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

## Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

### 2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

#### 2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

##### 2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the national laboratory system of Saint Lucia has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. However, there is evidence that in-country laboratories can conduct at least one of the tests. The 2006 National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia indicates that laboratory tests include serology for HIV [1]. The manual also indicates that influenza, poliovirus, tuberculosis/TB, malaria, and typhoid are under surveillance, but the types of tests that can be conducted for these is not indicated [1]. Furthermore, no evidence is available on the Ministry of Health's website that Saint Lucia has publicly defined the four country-specific tests [2].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. 2006. "National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia".

[[https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector\\_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf](https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf)]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 09 February 2021.

##### 2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. On March 17, 2020, Saint Lucia's government activated its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan. However, there is no mention in this plan of conducting testing during a public health emergency nor one which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing [1]. Furthermore, the full text of this plan could not be found online, nor on the website of the Ministry of Health or the government's main portal [2, 3]. In addition, on March 21, 2020, the Minister of Health announced that a training session for Covid-19 testing took place at the Ezra Long Laboratory and that of March 23, testing for the coronavirus would be available throughout the country. However, there is no evidence that this was part of a national plan [4].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/ccc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. [http://www.govt.lc/]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[4] Government of Saint Lucia: "Testing for Covid-19" by Fernelle Neptune, Ministry of Health. 21 March, 2020.

[http://www.govt.lc/news/testing-for-covid-19]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

## 2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

### 2.1.2a

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia's national laboratory which serves as a reference facility is accredited. There is no evidence available on the website of the Ministry of Health or from the "Strengthening Laboratory Management Toward Accreditation" (SLMTA) that any laboratory in Saint Lucia has achieved accreditation [1, 2]. Furthermore, the 2006 National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia indicates that the Ezra Long Laboratory at Victoria Hospital is the national laboratory, but there is no evidence the laboratory serves as a reference facility, and there is no website and limited information for the Ezra Long Laboratory [3]. According to a 2017 peer-reviewed publication in the African Journal of Laboratory Medicine, it has been a challenge to implement quality management systems and accredit laboratories in the Caribbean [4]. An article posted by the Ministry of Health in August of 2017 indicated that the Saint Lucia Bureau of Standards (SLBS) was working towards ISO 15189 accreditation of medical laboratories in Saint Lucia. However, there is no further evidence that this has been achieved as in January of 2021, the government of Saint Lucia tendered a call for the "Accreditation of Public Health Laboratories in Saint Lucia" [5, 6].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[2] Strengthening Laboratory Management Toward Accreditation (SLMTA). "SLMTA Laboratories that have achieved accreditation". [https://slmta.org/accredited-labs/]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. 2006. "National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia".

[https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector\_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[4] Alemnji G, Edghill L, Guevara G, et al. 2017. "Development and implementation of the Caribbean Laboratory Quality Management Systems Stepwise Improvement Process (LQMS-SIP) Towards Accreditation". African Journal of Laboratory

Medicine. 6[1] , a496. [<https://doi.org/10.4102/ajlm.v6i1.496>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. "Medical labs working towards accreditation".

[<http://health.govt.lc/news/medical-labs-working-towards-accreditation>]. Accessed 9 February 2021.

[6] Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). 25 January, 2021. "Government of Saint Lucia - Accreditation of Public Health Laboratories in Saint Lucia". [<https://www.oecs.org/en/work-with-us/procurements/current-tenders/government-of-saint-lucia-accreditation-of-public-health-laboratories-in-saint-lucia>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

### 2.1.2b

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia's national laboratory which serves as a reference facility is subject to external quality assurance review. The 2006 National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia indicates that the Ezra Long Laboratory at Victoria Hospital is the national laboratory, but there is no evidence the laboratory serves as a reference facility or external quality assurance, and there is no website and limited information for the Ezra Long Laboratory [1]. Furthermore, a 2017 peer-reviewed publication in the African Journal of Laboratory Medicine states that implementing quality management systems in the Caribbean laboratory has been a challenge [2]. A 2008 health systems profile on Saint Lucia by the Pan American Health Organization indicates that laboratories in the country have quality assurance officers, however, there is no mention of external quality assurance review [3]. In addition, there is no evidence of a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [4, 5].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. 2006. "National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia".

[[https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector\\_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf](https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf)]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[2] Alemnji G, Edghill L, Guevara G, et al. 2017. "Development and implementation of the Caribbean Laboratory Quality Management Systems Stepwise Improvement Process (LQMS-SIP) Towards Accreditation". African Journal of Laboratory Medicine. 6[1] , a496. [<https://doi.org/10.4102/ajlm.v6i1.496>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization. (PAHO/WHO). "Health Systems Profile - Saint Lucia". [[https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2010/Health\\_System\\_Profile-St\\_Lucia\\_2008.pdf](https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2010/Health_System_Profile-St_Lucia_2008.pdf)]. Accessed 9 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 9 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 9 February 2021.

## 2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

### 2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

#### 2.2.1a

**Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of a nationwide specimen transport system in Saint Lucia. The 2006 National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia indicates that information on specimen collection and transport

can be found in the "Ezra Long Laboratory Specimen Collection Procedure Manual of 2000" but this manual is not available online [1]. However, the Director of the National Ezra Long Laboratory of the Victoria Hospital serves as board chair for the Caribbean Med Labs Foundation (CMLF), a non-governmental organization dedicated to assisting governments around best practice in medical laboratory services in the Caribbean region [2]. In addition, a study was conducted by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in 2009 on specimens being weekly transported from the Ezra Long Laboratory to Barbados, yet this only involved HIV specimens and there is no evidence that this was part of a nationwide transport system [3]. Laboratory Services and Consultations Limited—a private laboratory in Saint Lucia—describes requirements for the transport of specimens, but does not mention a specimen transport system [4]. Furthermore, the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) laboratory provides detailed instructions on preparation, packaging and shipping, and indicates that all specimens must be routed through the relevant National Reference/Public Health Laboratory or the Ministry of Health [5, 6]. However, there is no information on specimen transport systems on the website of the Ministry of Health [7].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. 2006. "National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia".

[[https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector\\_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf](https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf)]. Accessed 9 February, 2021.

[2] Caribbean Med Labs Foundation (CMLF). "Meet the Board". [<http://cmedlabsfoundation.net/index.php/about-us/cmlfboard>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2009. "Ezra Long Lab Experience with Lady Meade Lab".

[<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2012/Gabriel-Ezra-Long-HIV-VL-&-Lady-Meade.pdf>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[4] Laboratory Services and Consultations Limited. "Specimen Collection". [<http://www.slulabservices.com/healthcare-professionals/specimen-collection/>]. Accessed 9 February 2021.

[5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory User Manual - Guidelines for Preparation, Packing and Shipping Specimens". [<https://carpha.org/What-We-Do/Laboratory/Annex-2-GUIDELINES-FOR-PREPARATION-PACKING-AND-SHIPPING-SPECIMENS>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[6] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Laboratory Services - Specimen Collection Information".

[<https://carpha.org/What-We-Do/Laboratory/Specimen-Collection-Information>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[7] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 9 February 2021.

## 2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

### 2.2.2a

**Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. There is no evidence in the country's March 17, 2020 emergency preparedness plan for Covid-19, nor is there any on the website of the Ministry of Health or the government's main portal [1, 2, 3]. Furthermore, in June of 2020, the Head of the Ezra Long Laboratory announced that, through funding by the CIBC FirstCaribbean Bank, it would increase its testing capacity by 400%. However, there is no mention that this was part of a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak [4].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/cc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.



[3] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[4] St. Lucia Star. 17 June, 2020. "Covid-19 Testing Capability at Ezra Long Lab Soon to Increase by 400%".

[<https://stluciarstar.com/covid-19-testing-capability-at-ezra-long-lab-soon-to-increase-by-400/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

## 2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

### 2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

#### 2.3.1a

**Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?**

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis

= 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia conducts ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease. The Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) hosts a Tourism and Health Program (THP), a real-time system for hotel management and public health officials to identify events such as outbreaks early on [1]. CARPHA also has the Caribbean Vessel Surveillance System (CVSS) for rapid information flow and coordinated multi-sectoral response for public health events occurring among visitors from passenger ships [1]. However, there is no evidence that Saint Lucia participates in the CARPHA systems, and the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture make no mention of event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease on their websites [2, 3]. Furthermore, although Saint Lucia has a National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), there is no evidence on its website that it conducts ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease [4].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Tourism and Health Program - Surveillance and Response System".

[<https://carpha.org/THP/About-The-Program>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia.

[<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

[4] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO). [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

#### 2.3.1b

**Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), to the WHO within the last two years. No outbreaks or potential PHEIC's, including Covid-19, in Saint Lucia have been reported in the past two years, either on the World Health Organization's (WHO) Disease Outbreak News page, weekly bulletins on outbreaks, and other emergencies or by the media [1, 2, 3]. Furthermore there is no evidence that Saint Lucia reported a PHEIC to the WHO within the past two years on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the one for the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) [4, 5].

- [1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Emergencies preparedness, response - Disease Outbreak News (DONs)". [<http://www.who.int/csr/don/en/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.
- [2] World Health Organization (WHO). "Emergency Preparedness, Response - Saint Lucia". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/lca/en/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.
- [3] WHO Newsroom. [<https://www.who.int/news-room>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.
- [5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). [<http://carpha.org/>]. Accessed 09 February, 2021.

## 2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

### 2.3.2a

**Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national level. A 2016 presentation by the Ministry of Health available through the Severe Acute Respiratory Infections Network (SARInet), analyzes how Saint Lucia can improve its SARI surveillance. The report states that Saint Lucia uses PAHOFlu, an electronic sentinel surveillance system of Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI) and Influenza-like illness (ILI) which allows for data entry in real time and immediate lab updates. It recommends that Saint Lucia put in place the use of smart devices for data entry and publish more in-depth, SARI analyses in weekly Syndromic Report [1]. However, there is no evidence that these and other recommendations have been put in place nor that an electronic reporting surveillance system operates at both the national and the sub-national level on the Ministry of Health's website [2]. Furthermore, the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) hosts a Tourism and Health Program (THP) surveillance and response system, a real-time system for hotel management and public health officials to identify events such as outbreaks early on [3]. CARPHA also has the Caribbean Vessel Surveillance System (CVSS) for rapid information flow and coordinated multi-sectoral response for public health events occurring among visitors from passenger ships but there is no other indication of an electronic reporting surveillance system on its website [4].

- [1] Severe Acute Respiratory Infections Network (SARInet). 2016. "Improving SARI Surveillance in Saint Lucia - Presented by: Saint Lucia Ministry of Health Team". [<http://www.sarinet.org/?q=en/improving-sari-surveillance-saint-lucia>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.
- [3] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Tourism and Health Program - Surveillance and Response System". [<https://www.carpha.org/THP/Background>]. Accessed 10 February, 2021.
- [4] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). [<http://carpha.org/>]. Accessed 10 February, 2021.

### 2.3.2b

**Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia's surveillance system collects ongoing/real time data, as there is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia operates an electronic reporting surveillance system. A 2016 presentation by the Ministry of Health available through the Severe Acute Respiratory Infections Network (SARInet), analyzes how Saint Lucia can improve its SARI

surveillance. The report states that Saint Lucia uses PAHOFlu, an electronic sentinel surveillance system of Severe Acute Respiratory Infection (SARI) and Influenza-like illness (ILI). PAHOFlu allows for data entry in real time and immediate lab updates [1]. The Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) hosts a Tourism and Health Program (THP) surveillance system, a real-time system for hotel management and public health officials to identify events such as outbreaks early on [2]. CARPHA also has the Caribbean Vessel Surveillance System (CVSS) for rapid information flow and coordinated multi-sectoral response for public health events occurring among visitors from passenger ships[3]. However, there is no other indication of a surveillance system collecting ongoing/real time laboratory data on CARPHA's website nor on the one of the Ministry of Health [3, 4.]

[1] Severe Acute Respiratory Infections Network (SARINet). 2016. "Improving SARI Surveillance in Saint Lucia - Presented by: Saint Lucia Ministry of Health Team". [<http://www.sarinet.org/?q=en/improving-sari-surveillance-saint-lucia>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

[2] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Tourism and Health Program - Surveillance and Response System". [<https://www.carpha.org/THP/Background>]. Accessed 10 February, 2021.

[3] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). [<http://carpha.org>]. Accessed 10 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 10 February 2021.

## 2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

### 2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

#### 2.4.1a

##### Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

There is publicly available evidence that electronic health records are commonly in use in Saint Lucia. In June 2016, the Government Information System announced the Health Management Information System (HMIS) to be implemented "for health professionals to access patient records via a secure, encrypted online service" [1]. A June 2018 article in a local news outlet (St. Lucia News) reported that the HMIS recently began rolling out a centralized electronic patient records system and that HMIS connects 32 of the country's 35 Wellness Centers and was "tackling" the hospitals [2]. Furthermore, in a January, 2020 article from St. Lucia News, the Ministry of Health announced "the official implementation of the Computerized Health Information System which goes by the name 'CELLMA' at the Owen King European Union (OKEU) Hospital, the Turning Point Rehabilitation Centre and the National Mental Wellness Centre. According to the Ministry of Health, "CELMA is a modular software which supports the philosophy of "one patient, one record," and is a precursor to the establishment of the National Health Information program" [3]. In addition the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) profile on Saint Lucia last, last updated in 2017, states that the public health system consists of over 30 health centers, two district hospitals, one polyclinic in each of the eight health regions, and two acute care general hospitals, Victoria Hospital and St. Jude Hospital and one private hospital [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 13 June 2016. "Hospitals improve patient record management". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/hospitals-improve-patient-record-management>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[2] St. Lucia News Online. 6 June 2018. "One Patient, One Record goes 'live'". [<https://www.stlucianewsonline.com/one-patient-one-record-goes-live/>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[3] St. Lucia News Online. 28 January, 2020. "Department of Health and Wellness to commence CELLMA at health care

facilities". [<https://www.stlucianewsonline.com/department-of-health-and-wellness-to-commence-cellma-at-health-care-facilities/>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[4] Pan American Health Organization. 2017. "Saint Lucia". [<https://www.paho.org/salud-en-las-americanas-2017/?p=4211>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

### 2.4.1b

**Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia's national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in their country. In June 2016, the Government Information System announced the Health Management Information System (HMIS) to be implemented "for health professionals to access patient records via a secure, encrypted online service" and described the HMIS as "closed network that will share data between hospitals and the primary health care clinics in Saint Lucia" [1.] A June 2018 article in a local news outlet reported that the HMIS recently began rolling out a centralized electronic patient records system and that HMIS connects 32 of the country's 35 Wellness Centers and that it was "tackling" the hospitals soon [2]. Furthermore, in a January, 2020 article from St. Lucia News, the Ministry of Health announced "the official implementation of the Computerized Health Information System which goes by the name 'CELLMA' at the Owen King European Union (OKEU) Hospital, the Turning Point Rehabilitation Centre and the National Mental Wellness Centre. According to the Ministry of Health, "CELMA is a modular software which supports the philosophy of "one patient, one record," and is a precursor to the establishment of the National Health Information program" [3]. In addition the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) profile on Saint Lucia last updated in 2017, states that the public health system consists of over 30 health centers, two district hospitals, one polyclinic in each of the eight health regions, and two acute care general hospitals, Victoria Hospital and St. Jude Hospital and one private hospital [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 13 June 2016. "Hospitals improve patient record management". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/hospitals-improve-patient-record-management>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[2] St. Lucia News Online. 6 June 2018. "One Patient, One Record goes 'live'". [<https://www.stlucianewsonline.com/one-patient-one-record-goes-live/>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[3] St. Lucia News Online. 28 January, 2020. "Department of Health and Wellness to commence CELLMA at health care facilities". [<https://www.stlucianewsonline.com/department-of-health-and-wellness-to-commence-cellma-at-health-care-facilities/>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[4] Pan American Health Organization. 2017. "Saint Lucia". [<https://www.paho.org/salud-en-las-americanas-2017/?p=4211>]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

### 2.4.1c

**Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has data standards to ensure data is comparable. In June 2016, the Government Information System announced the Health Management Information System (HMIS) to be implemented "for health professionals to access patient records via a secure, encrypted online service" [1]. A June 2018 article in a local news outlet reported that the HMIS recently began rolling out a centralized electronic patient records system and that HMIS connects 32 of the country's 35 Wellness Centres and was "tackling" the hospitals soon [2]. Furthermore, in a January, 2020

article from St. Lucia News, the Ministry of Health announced "the official implementation of the Computerized Health Information System which goes by the name 'CELLMA' at the Owen King European Union (OKEU) Hospital, the Turning Point Rehabilitation Centre and the National Mental Wellness Centre. According to the Ministry of Health, "CELMA is a modular software which supports the philosophy of "one patient, one record," and is a precursor to the establishment of the National Health Information program" [3]. However, these sources provide no indication that there are data standards in place, nor is there any indication of this on the Ministry of Health's website [1, 2, 3, 4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 13 June 2016. "Hospitals improve patient record management". [http://health.govt.lc/news/hospitals-improve-patient-record-management]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[2] St. Lucia News Online. 6 June 2018. "One Patient, One Record goes 'live'". [https://www.stlucianewsonline.com/one-patient-one-record-goes-live/]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[3] St. Lucia News Online. 28 January, 2020. "Department of Health and Wellness to commence CELLMA at health care facilities". [https://www.stlucianewsonline.com/department-of-health-and-wellness-to-commence-cellma-at-health-care-facilities/]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 11 February 2021.

## 2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

### 2.4.2a

**Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has established mechanisms responsible for animal, human and wildlife surveillance to share data. One of the objectives of the "One Health, One Caribbean, One Love" project is to "entrench a One Health approach to zoonotic and food borne disease surveillance, diagnosis and response". However, no further details are available on activities regarding this objective [1]. In addition, there is no mention of established mechanisms for sharing data across ministries on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3].

[1] One Health One Caribbean One Love. 2014. "Technical Note - CARICOM One Health Policy".

[https://www.onehealthcommission.org/index.cfm/37526/83571/one\_health\_one\_caribbean\_one\_love]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 11 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 11 February, 2021.

## 2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

### 2.4.3a

**Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites. Both the government's main portal and the Ministry of Health publish bi-weekly reports on the number of new and confirmed Covid-19 cases but only regarding this disease [1, 2]. The Ministry of Health does have a section on its website regarding the Zika Virus but it is a one-time report (with no date) stating that the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) had discovered cases of Zika in various neighboring islands and what preventive steps should be taken to avoid contracting the disease [3]. Furthermore, the Pan American Health Organization published a profile on Zika in Saint Lucia, including de-identified health surveillance data. However, this document only covers Zika, and there is no evidence that the document is updated regularly [4]. In addition, there is no evidence that the Ministry of Agriculture makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports on its website [5].

[1] Saint Lucia government website: "Saint Lucia records cases #1557 to #1813 of COVID-19". 05 February, 2021.

[http://www.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-cases-1557-to-1813-of-covid-19]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia: "Saint Lucia records 278 new cases of COVID-19". 12 February, 2021.

[http://health.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-278-new-cases-of-covid-19]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. ND. "Zika Virus Disease". [http://health.govt.lc/zika]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[4] Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). September 2017. "Zika - Epidemiological Report Saint Lucia". [https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2017/2017-phe-zika-situation-report-stl.pdf]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia.

[http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

### 2.4.3b

**Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia makes de-identified Covid-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites. Although both the government and the Ministry of Health publish information regarding de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data on their websites, it is not done on a daily basis. For example, information is posted on their websites when the results of new tests have come in from the Ezra Long Laboratory. This includes the number of new cases confirmed, the total number of cases as well as the number of those recovered [1, 2]. The government and Ministry of Health also make Covid-19 surveillance data available when a Covid-19 related death is reported. Therefore, it is not necessarily done on a daily basis but on a bi-weekly or weekly basis [3, 4].

[1] Saint Lucia government website: "Saint Lucia records cases #1557 to #1813 of COVID-19". 05 February, 2021.

[http://www.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-cases-1557-to-1813-of-covid-19]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia: "Saint Lucia records 278 new cases of COVID-19". 12 February, 2021.

[http://health.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-278-new-cases-of-covid-19]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[3] Saint Lucia government website: "Saint Lucia records the 22nd COVID-19-related death". 10 February, 2021.

[http://www.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-the-22nd-covid-19-related-death]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia: "Saint Lucia records the 19th COVID-19-related death". 08 February, 2021.

[<http://health.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-the-19th-covid-19-related-death>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

## 2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

### 2.4.4a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia has legislation that safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. The Data Protection Act of 2011 (updated in 2015), covers regulating the collection, use, and processing of personal information, which is defined to include information relating to medical history [1, 2]. According to the Act, which is available in Bill form, a "data controller"—someone who processes data or determines how data is processed—must obtain express consent for collecting personal information [2]. Under Part 4, Obligation on Data Controllers, one of the exceptions of express consent is "for health and hospital care purposes, provided that the personal data is processed by a health care professional subject to the obligation for professional secrecy or professional confidentiality" [2]. There is no additional information regarding this legislation on the Ministry of Health's website [3].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Printing Corporation of Saint Lucia. Act No. 2 of 2015. "Data Protection (Amendment) Act, 2011". [[http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\\_for\\_sale/laws/3547/Act%20of%202015.pdf](http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document_for_sale/laws/3547/Act%20of%202015.pdf)]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. "Privacy & Data Protection Act". [<http://www.govt.lc/privacy-data-prot>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

### 2.4.4b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia's legislation which safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information includes mention of protections from cyber attacks. The Data Protection Act of 2011 (amended in 2015) and the 2009 Privacy and Data Protection Bill, cover regulating the collection, use, and processing of personal information, but there is no mention of protections from cyber attacks [1, 2]. According to a 2015 article by the Ministry of Public Service, posted by the Ministry of Health, Saint Lucia has "embarked on a number of initiatives and has taken several proactive measures to protect against cyber attacks, but no specific information on these initiatives is available [3]. In addition, there is no information on protection from cyber attacks on the Ministry of Health's website [4].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Printing Corporation of Saint Lucia. Act No. 2 of 2015. "Data Protection (Amendment) Act, 2011". [[http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\\_for\\_sale/laws/3547/Act%20of%202015.pdf](http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document_for_sale/laws/3547/Act%20of%202015.pdf)]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.



[2] Government of Saint Lucia. 2009. "Privacy and Data Protection Bill, 2009".

[<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/PrivacyAndDataProtectionBill.pdf>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[3] Julita Peter. Ministry of the Public Service of Saint Lucia. 6 May 2015. "Government of Saint Lucia guards against cyber attacks". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/government-of-saint-lucia-guards-against-cyber-attacks>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

## 2.4.5 International data sharing

### 2.4.5a

**Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?**

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the government of Saint Lucia has made a commitment to share surveillance data, for either one or more than one disease, during a public health emergency with other countries in the region. Saint Lucia is a Member State of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), which—according to Article 5 of the Agreement Establishing CARPHA—states that CARPHA's functions include provision of accurate, reliable, timely and relevant public health information to "various Caribbean and international audiences" [1]. A presentation at the 2014 Meeting of Caribbean National Epidemiologists and Laboratory Directors points out that, while the existing data sharing systems are functional, they are undocumented and there are no recorded agreements that govern CARPHA sharing of country-reported data to stakeholders and a CARPHA public health information sharing agreement between CARPHA and CARPHA Member States is proposed [2]. However, there is no evidence that such an information sharing agreement was created, and there is no evidence of such a commitment on the Ministry of Health's website [3]. In addition, CARPHA releases disease situation reports on its website. For example, it reports, on a bi-weekly basis on the Covid-19 pandemic situation in CARPHA Member States such as the number of new cases confirmed. However, this is done through CARPHA and there is no evidence that this is part of a government agreement among its Member States [4].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)". [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA\\_IGA.pdf](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA_IGA.pdf)]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[2] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). 12th Meeting of Caribbean National Epidemiologists and Laboratory Directors, 2014. "CARPHA Data and Information Sharing Agreement: A Proposal" [[http://carpha.org:8086/Portals/0/docs/MEETINGS/Epid\\_LabDir/Crooks\\_CARPHA\\_Data\\_and\\_Information\\_Sharing\\_Agreement.pdf](http://carpha.org:8086/Portals/0/docs/MEETINGS/Epid_LabDir/Crooks_CARPHA_Data_and_Information_Sharing_Agreement.pdf)]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[4] CARPHA: "Situation Reports for Covid-19". [<https://carpha.org/What-We-Do/Public-Health/Novel-Coronavirus/CARPHA-Situation-Reports-for-COVID-19>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

## 2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

### 2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

#### 2.5.1a

**Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level to conduct contact tracing either in preparation for future public health emergencies or for an active public health emergency. On March 17, 2020, Saint Lucia's government activated its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan. However, there is no mention in this plan of a strategy or system to provide support at the sub-national level to conduct contact tracing [1]. Furthermore, the full text of this plan could not be found online, nor on the website of the Ministry of Health or the government's main portal [2, 3]. In December, 2020, the government did announce that a new Covid-19 contact tracing application called the "58 Care Alert" would soon be available to the public. However there is no mention as to whether this was part of a system to provide support at the sub-national level in the event of a public health emergency [4].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/cc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. [http://www.govt.lc/]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[4] Government of Saint Lucia. 15 December, 2020. "Government explores COVID-19 contact tracing app".

[http://www.govt.lc/news/government-explores-covid-19-contact-tracing-app]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

#### 2.5.1b

**Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?**

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no available evidence that Saint Lucia provides wraparound services to enable cases and suspected cases to self-isolate as recommended, particularly economic support and medical attention. There is no mention of such services in the country's Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan of March 17, 2020 [1]. Furthermore, the full text of this plan could not be found online, nor on the website of the Ministry of Health or the government's main portal [2, 3]. In addition, in October of 2020 and updated in February 2021, Saint Lucia's government announced its "Quarantine Policy and Support Plan for Returning Nationals and Residents". The plan states that those returning will have to be put in quarantine for 14 days in a specified accommodation and that the cost will be at their expense. Some expectations would be made such as for returning students, people traveling for medical reasons or suffering financial hardship. Their expenses would be subsidized by the country. The updated plan did lower the cost of accommodations [4, 5].

- [1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020. [<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/ccc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.
- [3] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.
- [4]. St. Lucia News. Jonathan Stewart. 07 October, 2020. "New COVID-19 case recorded in St Lucia; Govt quarantine fees announced". [<https://www.loopslu.com/content/new-covid-19-case-recorded-st-lucia-govt-quarantine-fees-announced>]. Accessed 12 February, 2020.
- [5] Government of Saint Lucia. 12 February, 2021. "Saint Lucia Announces Cushion in Quarantine Fees for Returning Nationals". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-announces-cushion-in-quarantine-fees-for-returning-nationals>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

### 2.5.1c

**Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for Covid-19 available via daily reports, or other format, on government websites. Although both the government and the Ministry of Health publish information regarding de-identified Covid-19 surveillance data on their websites, this pertains more to the number of new cases confirmed, the total number of cases, the number of deaths as well as the number of those recovered. However, this does not include any data on contact tracing efforts, nor are these bulletins published on a daily basis [1, 2, 3]. Furthermore, the Ministry of Health sometimes makes announcements via its Facebook page when it has identified suspect Covid-19 cases and says that it is conducting contact tracing from these cases. However, there is no mention of the percentage of new cases from identified contacts [4].

- [1] Saint Lucia government website: "Saint Lucia records cases #1557 to #1813 of COVID-19". 05 February, 2021. [<http://www.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-cases-1557-to-1813-of-covid-19>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia: "Saint Lucia records 278 new cases of COVID-19". 12 February, 2021. [<http://health.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-278-new-cases-of-covid-19>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.
- [3] Saint Lucia government website: "Saint Lucia records the 22nd COVID-19-related death". 10 February, 2021. [<http://www.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-records-the-22nd-covid-19-related-death>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Health and Wellness Facebook page. 06 May, 2020. "Statement on the Contact Tracing Protocol". [<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=246718903345571>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

## 2.5.2 Point of entry management

### 2.5.2a

**Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts either in preparation for future public health emergencies nor in response to an active public health emergency. On March 17, 2020, the government of Saint Lucia activated its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan [1]. This was followed by the announcement of emergency measures which included the closing of all airports and sea ports [2]. However, there is no mention in either plan of a joint or cooperative agreement public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers. Furthermore, the government had announced, during the period of the coronavirus pandemic, that international travelers arriving will be tested for Covid-19 upon arrival and quarantined if they test positive. However, there is no mention of contact tracing nor is there any evidence that this is part of a cooperative plan between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency [3, 4]. In addition, there is no mention of such a joint plan on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the one for the Ministry of Home Affairs and National Security [5, 6].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/cc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia: "Emergency Powers (Disasters) (COVID 19) (Curfew)(No. 2) Order. 2020".

[<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/pressroom/news/attachments/s.i.---44-of-2020.pdf.pdf>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[3] Saint Lucia Tourism Organization. "Mandatory Entry Requirements". 10 February, 2021.

[<https://www.stlucia.org/en/covid-19/international-arrivals/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness Facebook page. 10 July, 2020. "Saint Lucia receives international flights".

[<https://www.facebook.com/MinistryOfHealthSaintLucia/posts/993603964393326/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[6] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

## 2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

### 2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

#### 2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia has applied epidemiology training programs but there is no available evidence that the government provides resources to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs.

As part of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), Saint Lucia has an applied epidemiology program. The Caribbean Regional Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (CR-FELTP) offers "a core curriculum of competency-based classroom learning and on-the-job training, to develop field epidemiology skills and tools to respond to public health issues in the Caribbean through surveillance, outbreak investigation, and operational research and analysis" [1]. However, there is no indication by CARPHA or the Ministry of Health that resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in the program [1, 2]. An April 2015 article by the Ministry of Health announced that nine public health professionals from Saint Lucia graduated as the first cohort to complete the CR-FELTP in Saint Lucia, and the Ministry reported six graduates from the program the following year [3, 4.] The CR-FELTP is funded by CARPHA and the Canadian Public Health Agency, and Level One of the program is conducted by local facilitators [4].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "What is a Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP)". [<http://carpha.org/What-We-Do/FELTP/Introduction>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 24 April 2015. "First cohort graduate from epidemiology and lab training program". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/first-cohort-graduate-from-epidemiology-and-lab-training-program>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 26 April 2016. "Six graduate from field training program". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/six-graduate-from-field-training-program>]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

### 2.6.1b

**Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Saint Lucia can participate in the Caribbean Regional Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (CR-FELTP) of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) which is inclusive of animal health professionals [1].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP) - Structure". [<http://carpha.org/what-we-do/feltp/structure>]. Accessed 12 February, 2021.

## 2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

### 2.6.2a

**Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

### 3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

#### 3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

##### 3.1.1a

**Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?**

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential but it does have disease-specific plans. On March 17, 2020, the government of Saint Lucia activated its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan, yet there is no mention that it addresses planning for communicable diseases other than Covid-19 [1]. Furthermore, Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), formerly the Office of Disaster Preparedness, plans for both natural and man-made disasters. [1] NEMO has a number of National Emergency Plans—such as the Hurricane Response Plan and Hazardous Materials Response Plan—as well as a National Influenza Plan, which is broken down into multiple volumes—including volumes for Communications Strategy and for the Ministry of Health—and Sectoral/Agency Plans—including the 2006 National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual. However, none of these are an overarching plan which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential [2, 3, 4.] The Hazardous Materials Response Plan classifies materials known or suspected to contain a pathogen as infectious substances and the Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual mentions outbreaks generally. [5, 6] There is no evidence that the National Influenza plan applies for other public health emergencies, and there is no evidence of a plan that addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. A January 2019 article posted by the Ministry of Health, titled the Department of Health Aims to Ensure Preparedness to Public Health Hazards, reports that work is underway to develop a multi-hazard disaster management plan aimed at building the health sector resilience to emergencies and disaster [7]. However, there is no evidence that such a plan has been put into place on the website of the Ministry of Health [8]. Saint Lucia is part of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) for disaster management in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Its mandate includes "coordinating the establishment, enhancement and maintenance of adequate emergency disaster response capabilities among the Participating States". However, there is limited information available on CDEMA's role in public health emergencies [9]. In addition, health emergency preparedness and response is one of the functions of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) [10].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/ccc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. "National Emergency Plans".

[<http://nemo.gov.lc/Disaster-Management/National-Emergency-Management-Plan/National-Plans>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. "Sectoral/Agency Plans - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan ". [<http://nemo.gov.lc/Disaster-Management/National-Emergency-Management->

Plan/Sector-Plans]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia. 1 October 2003. "Hazardous Materials Response Plan - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan ". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/HazMatPlan.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161122-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/HazMatPlan.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161122-000)]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[6] Government of Saint Lucia. 2006. "National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia". [[https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector\\_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf](https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf)]. Accessed 12 February 2021.

[7] Neptune, F. of the Ministry of Health of Saint Lucia. 25 January 2019. "Multi-hazard disaster management plan under review". [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/news/multi-hazard-disaster-management-plan-under-review>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[8] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[9] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). "What is CDEMA's Mandate?". [<https://www.cdema.org/about-us#what-is-cdema-s-mandate>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[10] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "The Role and Functions of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)". [<http://carpha.org/Who-We-Are/Role-and-Functions>]. Accessed 13 January, 2021.

### 3.1.1b

**If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no available evidence that Saint Lucia has an overarching plan in place and hence no evidence of a plan that was updated in the last 3 years. The country does have disease-specific plans such as its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan. However, this was only activated in March of 2020 and has not been updated in the past 3 years [1]. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), formerly the Office of Disaster Preparedness, plans for both natural and man-made disasters [1]. NEMO has a number of National Emergency Plans, some of which mention communicable diseases but they have not been updated in the last three years [2, 3]. Furthermore, a January 2019 article posted by the Ministry of Health, titled "The Department of Health Aims to Ensure Preparedness to Public Health Hazards", reports that work is underway to develop a multi-hazard disaster management plan aimed at building the health sector resilience to emergencies and disaster [4]. However, there is no evidence that such a plan has been put into place, nor that it is an overarching one, on the Ministry of Health's website [5].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/ccc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. "National Emergency Plans".

[<http://nemo.gov.lc/Disaster-Management/National-Emergency-Management-Plan/National-Plans>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Neptune, F. of the Ministry of Health of Saint Lucia. 25 January 2019. "Multi-hazard disaster management plan under review". [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/news/multi-hazard-disaster-management-plan-under-review>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

### 3.1.1c

**If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0



**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no available evidence that Saint Lucia has an overarching plan in place and hence no evidence of a plan that includes considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations. Saint Lucia does have disease-specific plans in place, such as its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan. However, there is no mention it includes considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations [1]. In addition, the full text of this plan is not available on line nor on the Ministry of Health's website or the government's main portal [2, 3]. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Office (NEMO), formerly the Office of Disaster Preparedness, which plans for both natural and man-made disasters, has a number of National Emergency Plans and National Influenza Plan. [4, 5] The National Influenza Plan mentions some special considerations for children but there is no evidence that the National Influenza Plan applies for other public health emergencies. [6] A January 2019 article posted by the Ministry of Health, titled the Department of Health Aims to Ensure Preparedness to Public Health Hazards, reports that work is underway to develop a multi-hazard disaster management plan aimed at building the health sector resilience to emergencies and disaster [7]. However, there is no available evidence that such a plan has been put into place, nor that it is an overarching one on the Ministry of Health's website [2]. Furthermore, Saint Lucia is part of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) for disaster management in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Its mandate includes "coordinating the establishment, enhancement and maintenance of adequate emergency disaster response capabilities among the Participating States". However, there is limited information available on CDEMA's role in public health emergencies and no evidence that Member States have an overarching plan in place [8].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/ccc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[4] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). "National Emergency Plans".

[<http://nemo.gov.lc/Disaster-Management/National-Emergency-Management-Plan/National-Plans>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[6] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). "National Influenza Plan - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan".

[[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_VoLO\\_Policy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_VoLO_Policy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[7] Neptune, F. of the Ministry of Health of Saint Lucia. 25 January 2019. "Multi-hazard disaster management plan under review". [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/news/multi-hazard-disaster-management-plan-under-review>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[8] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). "What is CDEMA's Mandate?".

[<https://www.cdema.org/about-us#what-is-cdema-s-mandate>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

**3.1.1d**

**Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

### 3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

#### 3.1.2a

**Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), formerly the Office of Disaster Preparedness, plans for both natural and man-made disasters, including influenza [1]. The Disaster Management Policy Framework, available through NEMO and applies to disasters that include epidemic outbreak, states the Government has a number of Memoranda of Understanding with the private sector for emergency and disaster circumstances [2]. The Policy Framework also includes a section on the role of the private sector, which outlines items such as capacity building options - for example, public-private sector partnerships and community building - and incentives that include duty free concessions of certain items [2]. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) mentions involvement of the private sector, but there is no evidence of a specific mechanism for engagement from either agency [3]. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) involves the private sector in assisting with outbreak emergency preparedness and response [4].

[1] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). 24 August 2004 (updated 2009). "Disaster Management Policy Framework for Saint Lucia - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan ". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/DMPolicyFramework.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161120-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/DMPolicyFramework.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161120-000)]. Accessed 8 February 2019.

[3] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). "CDEMA News". Vol. 3, Iss. 1.

[[https://www.cdema.org/CDEMANewsletter-iss1\\_2017.pdf](https://www.cdema.org/CDEMANewsletter-iss1_2017.pdf)]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[4] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). [<http://carpha.org/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

### 3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

#### 3.1.3a

**Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?**

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease= 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia has a plan and guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic but only for one disease. After the country activated its national its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan on March 17, 2021, a separate emergency document announced the implementation of NPIs to prevent the spread of the coronavirus pandemic. This included the closure of airports and seaports, a 7pm to 5am curfew, a ban on

social events of more than 10 people as well as instructions for social distancing [1, 2, 3].

[1] Castries Constituency Council: "CCC" activates preparedness plan amidst Covid-19". 17 March, 2020.

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/ccc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. "Emergency Powers (Disasters) (COVID 19) (Curfew)(No. 2)". 2020.

[<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/pressroom/news/attachments/s.i.---44-of-2020.pdf.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[3] WorldAware Alert. 27 April, 2020. Covid-19 Alert: Saint Lucia Extends Nationwide State of Emergency & Curfew Through May 31". [<https://www.worldaware.com/covid-19-alert-saint-lucia-extends-nationwide-state-emergency-curfew-through-may-31>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

## 3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

### 3.2.1 Activating response plans

#### 3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia has activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year yet there is insufficient evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. Saint Lucia activated its Covid-19 emergency preparedness plan on March 17, 2020 which was specifically in response to the coronavirus outbreak [1]. Regarding a biological threat-focused exercise, on December 17, 2020, the government announced that the Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA) in collaboration with the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), and other key response agencies had successfully conducted a Full-Scale Simulation exercise at the Hewanorra International Airport, on December 11, 2020. The aim of the exercise, among other goals was to "allow for the facility and related entities to coordinate and measure their preparedness and effectiveness in responding to possible threats or actions that could render facilities less than effective or operable". However, there is no specific mention that these "threats" were biological [2]. Furthermore, in October of 2019, SLASPA, in collaboration with the Royal Saint Lucia Police Force (RSLPF) conducted a mandatory seaport simulation exercise at the Castries Seaport. According to Saint Lucia's chief of police, "the goal of this exercise was to ensure that through practice, we are in the best state of preparedness to respond to an emergency should, and when, one occurs". Yet again, there is no mention that this was a simulation exercise for a biological threat [3]. In addition there is no evidence on the World Health Organization (WHO)'s Simulation Exercise website that Saint Lucia has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year [4]. There is also no evidence of such an exercise in the past year on the on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the government's main portal nor on the one of the National Emergency Management Organization [5, 6, 7].

[1] Saint Lucia Covid-19 Dashboard. 17 March, 2021. "Castries Constituency Council (CCC) activates its preparedness plan amid the COVID-19 pandemic". [<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/ccc-activates-preparedness-plan-amidst-covid-19>]. Accessed 28 February, 2021.

- [2] St. Lucia Times. 17 December, 2020. "Full Scale Simulation Exercise Ends At Hewanorra International Airport". [https://stluciatimes.com/full-scale-simulation-exercise-ends-at-hewanorra-international-airport/]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.
- [3] St. Lucia Times. 10 October, 2019. "SLASPA conducts simulation exercise at Castries seaport". [https://www.stlucianewsonline.com/slaspa-conducts-simulation-exercise-at-castries-seaport/]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.
- [4] World Health Organization (WHO) Simulation Exercises [https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise]. Accessed 28 February, 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.
- [6] Government of Saint Lucia. [http://www.govt.lc/]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.
- [7] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO). [http://nemo.gov.lc/]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

### 3.2.1b

**Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?**

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has, in the past year, identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. Saint Lucia does not appear on the World Health Organization's (WHO) list of after action reviews, and there is no indication of an after action review on the WHO country and regional page [1, 2, 3]. The Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA), in collaboration with the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), and other key response agencies, did conduct a Full-Scale Simulation exercise at the Hewanorra International Airport, on December 11, 2020. However, there is no evidence of an after-review of this exercise to identify a list of gaps and best practices [4]. Furthermore, there is no indication of an after action review or a biological threat-focused IHR on the website of the Ministry of Health nor one the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [5, 6].

- [1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH) - After Action Review". [https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [2] Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization (WHO) - Regional Office for the Americas. [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?lang=en]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [3] World Health Organization (WHO). "Saint Lucia". [https://www.who.int/countries/lca/en/]. Accessed 28 February 2021.
- [4] St. Lucia Times. 17 December, 2020. "Full Scale Simulation Exercise Ends At Hewanorra International Airport". [https://stluciatimes.com/full-scale-simulation-exercise-ends-at-hewanorra-international-airport/]. Accessed 13 February, 2021
- [5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 13 February 2021.
- [6] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

## 3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

### 3.2.2a

**Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has, in the past year, undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise and hence not one that has included private sector representatives. Saint Lucia does not appear on the World Health Organization's (WHO) list of after action reviews, and there is no indication of an after action review or of a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year on the WHO country and regional pages nor on its simulation exercise webpage [1, 2, 3, 4]. The Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA), in collaboration with the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), and other key response agencies, did conduct a Full-Scale Simulation exercise at the Hewanorra International Airport, on December 11, 2020. However, there is no evidence that this included private sector representatives [5]. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Saint Lucia, in the past year, has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives on the website of the Ministry of Health nor one the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [6, 7].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH) - After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[2] Pan American Health Organization / World Health Organization (WHO) - Regional Office for the Americas. [<https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?lang=en>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). "Saint Lucia". [<https://www.who.int/countries/lca/en/>]. Accessed 28 February 2021.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO) Simulation Exercise webpage. [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed 28 February, 2021.

[5] St. Lucia Times. 17 December, 2020. "Full Scale Simulation Exercise Ends At Hewanorra International Airport". [<https://stluciatimes.com/full-scale-simulation-exercise-ends-at-hewanorra-international-airport/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021

[6] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[7] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

## 3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

### 3.3.1 Emergency response operation

#### 3.3.1a

**Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Saint Lucia has in place an Emergency Operations Centre but it is only influenza specific. It is called the National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and is located at the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) headquarters. NEMO, which is formerly the Office of Disaster Preparedness, plans for both natural and man-made disasters, including influenza [1]. According to NEMO's Standard Operating Procedures document, the NEOC provides "centralized coordination

and control of emergency/disaster response and relief operations on a 24 hour-per-day basis if necessary" [1, 2] .The National Disaster Coordinator out of NEMO is responsible for maintaining the NEOC and ensuring the execution of policy decisions [2]. The Standard Operating Procedures do not specifically mention public health emergencies, however, the Ministry of Health is required for Level 2-"An emergency or disaster within the capabilities of government"—and Level 3—"A catastrophic event beyond the capabilities of government"—EOC activation [2].

[1] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). 7 August 2004. "Volume 2: Standard Operating Procedures For The National Emergency Operations Centre - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan ". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/SOPVol2EOC.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161126-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/SOPVol2EOC.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161126-000)]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

### 3.3.1b

**Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia's National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year nor is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once a year. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) annual report for 2009 (the most recent one available online) mentions that some simulation exercises took place such as the annual Saint Lucia Air and Seaports Authority Airport Exercise at the George Charles Airport [1]. However, there is no evidence in NEMO's Standard Operating Procedures document for the NEOC that yearly drills for a public health emergency scenario are required and there is no mention of drills or other exercises for the NEOC through NEMO [2, 3]. In addition, there has been evidence of recent public health emergency scenario drills in the past year. On December 11, 2020, the Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA) in collaboration with the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), and other key response agencies, announced it had successfully conducted a Full-Scale Simulation exercise at the Hewanorra International Airport. The aim of this exercise, among other objectives, was to test the preparedness of the NEOC. However, these drills are mandated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to take place every two years and not on a yearly basis [3]. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the Ministry of Health's website that the NEOC is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year nor that it has conducts a drill at least once a year [4].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia archives. "Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) annual report 2009". [<https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/general/NEMP-Executive.pdf>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO). 7 August 2004. "Volume 2: Standard Operating Procedures For The National Emergency Operations Centre - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan ". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/SOPVol2EOC.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161126-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/SOPVol2EOC.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161126-000)]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] St. Lucia Times. 17 December, 2020. "Full Scale Simulation Exercise Ends At Hewanorra International Airport". [<https://stluciatimes.com/full-scale-simulation-exercise-ends-at-hewanorra-international-airport/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

### 3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia's National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) has conducted, within the last year, a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. On July 1st, 2020, the Ministry of Health announced that it had been conducting, in collaboration with the National Emergency Management Organization, "a series of workshops with emergency shelters staff aimed at bringing awareness on dealing with the new COVID-19 environment in the shelters". However, there is no evidence that these exercises were activated within 120 minutes of identifying the public health emergency [1]. Furthermore, on December 11, 2020, the Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA), in collaboration with the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), and other key response agencies, announced it had successfully conducted a Full-Scale Simulation exercise at the Hewanorra International Airport. The aim of this exercise, among other objectives, was to test the preparedness of the NEOC and other agencies in response to the coronavirus pandemic and future potential emergencies. However, this exercise was conducted more than 120 minutes after the identification of the public health emergency [2]. In addition, there is no evidence of such an emergency response or exercise on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the one of NEMO [3, 4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia Facebook page. 01 July, 2020. "Health report - Emergency shelter training". [<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=974639396323314>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] St. Lucia Times. 17 December, 2020. "Full Scale Simulation Exercise Ends At Hewanorra International Airport". [<https://stluciatimes.com/full-scale-simulation-exercise-ends-at-hewanorra-international-airport/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[4] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

## 3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

### 3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

#### 3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia's public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event or that there are publicly available standard operating procedures,



guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. On December 11, 2020, the Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA), in collaboration with the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), and with both public health and national security authorities, conducted a Full-Scale Simulation exercise at the Hewanorra International Airport. One of the goals of this exercise was to these authorities "preparedness and effectiveness in responding to possible threats or actions that could render facilities less than effective or operable" However, although the word "threats" is used, there is no specific mention of whether these threats include a biological event or attack [1]. Further back, in March 2010, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago carried out a simulation exercise for a bio-terrorism incident; 'Exercise Bio-Shield', which attempted to identify gaps in the national response to biological attacks and determine ways to strengthen this mechanism [2]. Several other Caribbean countries, including Saint Lucia, joined the Exercise Bio-Shield training on the second day, but there is no evidence that public health and national security authorities of Saint Lucia participated [3]. In 2017, the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA), of which Saint Lucia is a Member State, participated in a training exercise aimed at improving regional responses during an emergency situation and coordination between relevant agencies, however, no information could be found on whether this included an exercise related to a potential deliberate biological event [4]. In addition, there is no publicly available evidence, on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one of NEMO, of standard operating procedures, guidelines, MOUs or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event [5, 6, 7].

[1] St. Lucia Times. 17 December, 2020. "Full Scale Simulation Exercise Ends At Hewanorra International Airport".

[<https://stluciatimes.com/full-scale-simulation-exercise-ends-at-hewanorra-international-airport/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[2] Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management, a Division of the Ministry of National Security of Trinidad and Tobago. "Biological Hazards". [<http://www.odpm.gov.tt/node/28>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[3] Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism. "Exercise Bio-Shield: Crisis Management Simulation Exercise in Response to a Bio-terrorist Attack". [<http://cicte.oas.org/rev/en/events/Bioterrorism/Bio-Trinidad-2010.asp>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

[4] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Caribbean Regional Security, Health and Disaster Agencies Face Comprehensive Readiness Test". [<https://carpha.org/More/Media/Articles/ArticleID/169/Caribbean-regional-security-health-and-disaster-agencies-face-comprehensive-readiness-test>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[6] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February, 2021.

[7] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 13 February 2021.

## 3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

### 3.5.1 Public communication

#### 3.5.1b

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the strategy document Saint Lucia uses to guide national public health emergency response outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communication needs. The Communications Strategy for the

2009 National Influenza Plan, from Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), includes a risk communication plan for influenza pandemics [1]. The Communications Strategy addresses ways to reach the general audience but also to address the "special needs of vulnerable and susceptible populations" such as "patients with asthma, chronic diseases, respiratory disorders; pregnant and lactating women; and the elderly". This includes a communication strategy on "how to best protect oneself and manage conditions or chronic diseases in an influenza crisis" and to communicate this through radio and television announcements and in spoken Creole when applicable [1]. Furthermore, there is evidence that this strategy also applies to Saint Lucia's emergency response to Covid-19 which is also coordinated by NEMO [2]. For example, on March 18, 2020, the director of NEMO appeared on the government's NTN (National Television Network) to inform the public about the country's preparedness plan in response to the coronavirus pandemic. The director as well as a government information service (GIS) officer explained the plan in Creole as well. The director also stated that NEMO's 2009 National Influenza Communications Strategy was being used in its Covid-19 emergency response plan [3].

[1] [Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). 18 May 2009. "National Influenza Plan - Volume 3: Communications Strategy - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan".

[[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_Vol3\\_Comms\\_Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_Vol3_Comms_Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[2] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia NTN. 18 March, 2020. "Saint Lucia's response to COVID-19 with the Director of the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO).

[[https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=1308087969391754&ref=watch\\_permalink](https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=1308087969391754&ref=watch_permalink)]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

### 3.5.1 Risk communication planning

#### 3.5.1a

**Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia has in place a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), which plans for both natural and man-made disasters, has a Communications Strategy as part of its 2009 National Influenza Plan [1, 2.] This strategy includes a section on how to communicate to the public regarding an infectious disease outbreak. For example, it calls for "instructing the public about measures they should take to protect themselves and their families, animals, and neighbors" and also to "inform the public and decision-makers about the nature of the pandemic and its effect on Saint Lucia, using technical expertise and guidance from involved ministries' as well as the use of mass media and messages through the Government Information Service (GIS) department [1]. Furthermore, there is evidence that this strategy also applies to Saint Lucia's emergency response to Covid-19 which is coordinated by NEMO as well [2]. For example, on March 18, 2020, the director of NEMO appeared on the government's NTN (National Television Network) to inform the public about the country's preparedness plan in response to the coronavirus pandemic. The director stated that NEMO's 2009 National Influenza Communications Strategy was being used in its Covid-19 emergency response plan [3].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). 18 May 2009. "National Influenza Plan - Volume 3: Communications Strategy - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan".

[[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_Vol3\\_Comms\\_Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_Vol3_Comms_Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)].

Accessed 15 February 2021.

[2] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia NTN. 18 March, 2020. "Saint Lucia's response to COVID-19 with the Director of the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO).

[[https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=1308087969391754&ref=watch\\_permalink](https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=1308087969391754&ref=watch_permalink)]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

### 3.5.1c

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia's risk communication plan designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. The Communications Strategy for the 2009 National Influenza Plan, from Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), which is also used for other public health emergencies such as the Covid-19 outbreak, states that "although only official spokespersons are authorized to speak with the media, we are all communicators". However, the plan does not designate a specific position to serve as the primary spokesperson [1]. Furthermore, throughout the coronavirus pandemic, the director of NEMO appeared frequently on the government's National Television Network (NTN) to update the public on the country's response to Covid-19. However, there is no mention that the director is the official spokesperson with the government to address the public during a public health emergency [2, 3]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a specific position on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one for NEMO [4, 5].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO). 18 May 2009. "National Influenza Plan - Volume 3: Communications Strategy - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan".

[[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_Vol3\\_Comms\\_Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_Vol3_Comms_Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia NTN. 9 April, 2020. "St. Lucia's Response to Covid-19.

[[https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=654046465396187&ref=watch\\_permalink](https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=654046465396187&ref=watch_permalink)]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia NTN. 18 March, 2020. "Saint Lucia's response to COVID-19 with the Director of the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO).

[[https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=1308087969391754&ref=watch\\_permalink](https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=1308087969391754&ref=watch_permalink)]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

[5] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

## 3.5.2 Public communication

### 3.5.2a

**In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?**

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia's public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation. When the government declared Covid-19 as a public health emergency, it set up a special Covid-19 dashboard website to keep the public informed about the pandemic [1]. Furthermore, the announcement of this special website was made via the Ministry of Health's Facebook page [2]. Both the government and the Ministry of Health have actively shared messages in the past year about ongoing public health concerns via their websites such as information on vaccination campaigns and information [3]. The government has also been active via its Facebook page and Twitter account [4]. For example, on May 18, 2021, the government broadcast live, on its National Television Network (NTN), which was then posted on their Facebook page, that the prime minister had tested negative for Covid-19 and dispelled the rumor that he had contracted it during a trip to Miami for medical reasons [5]. In addition, Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) has also actively shared messages via its website in the past year regarding public health concerns [6].

[1] Saint Lucia's Covid-19 Dashboard. [<https://covid19response.lc/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia Facebook page. 15 December, 2020. "Get all the information and updates on COVID-19 in Saint Lucia on covid19response.lc". [<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=203798918047322>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 16 February, 2021. "Pre-registration for the Covid-19 vaccine". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/pre-registration-for-the-covid-19-vaccine>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[4] Government of Saint Lucia Twitter account. [<https://twitter.com/saintluciagov?lang=en>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia Facebook page. 9 April, 2020. "St. Lucia's Response to Covid-19". [[https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=654046465396187&ref=watch\\_permalink](https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=654046465396187&ref=watch_permalink)]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[6] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

**3.5.2b**

**Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?**

No = 1, Yes = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia's senior leaders have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. There is no evidence in the country's following media outlets: St. Lucia Times, the St. Lucia Star, St., The Voice, St. Lucia Helen Television Systems (HTS) and Radio Caribbean International [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. There has been some criticism of the government not being "clear" about information regarding the Covid-19 pandemic. However, this criticism came from the opposition political party calling for unity in dealing with the pandemic [6].

[1] St. Lucia Times. [<https://stluciatimes.com/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[2] The St. Lucia Star. [<https://stluciastar.com/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[3] The Voice. [<http://q54.6bf.myftpupload.com/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[4] St. Lucia Helen Television Systems (HTS). [<https://www.htsstlucia.org/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[5] Radio Caribbean International. [<https://rcistlucia.com/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[6] The St. Lucia Star. 29 October, 2020. "Pierre Condemns COVID-19 Fake News!". [<https://stluciastar.com/pierre-says-the->

slp-is-concerned-over-recent-spike-in-covid-19-cases/]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

## 3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

### 3.6.1 Internet users

#### 3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 50.82

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

#### 3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 101.68

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

#### 3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 3.14

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

### 3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

#### 3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.24

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

## 3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

### 3.7.1 Trade restrictions

#### 3.7.1a

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that, in the past year, Saint Lucia issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export or import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. According to the International Trade Center (ITC) for Transparency in Trade which monitors temporary trade measures enacted by government authorities in relation to COVID-19, Saint Lucia has neither imposed restrictions on exports nor on imports of medical supplies in the past year [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a restriction on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of External Affairs and International Trade, nor on the government's main portal [2, 3, 4, 5].

[1] ICT Transparency in Trade: COVID-19 Temporary Trade Measures [<https://www.macmap.org/covid19>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021

[4]. Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation of Saint Lucia. [<http://externalaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

#### 3.7.1b

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that, in the past year, Saint Lucia issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. According to the International Trade Center (ITC) for Transparency in Trade which monitors temporary trade measures enacted by government authorities in relation to COVID-19, Saint Lucia has neither imposed restrictions on exports nor on imports of non-medical goods in the past year [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a restriction on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of External Affairs and International Trade, nor on the government's main portal [2, 3, 4, 5].

[1] ICT Transparency in Trade: COVID-19 Temporary Trade Measures [<https://www.macmap.org/covid19>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021

[4]. Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation of Saint Lucia. [<http://externalaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February, 2021.

## 3.7.2 Travel restrictions

### 3.7.2a

**In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia, in the past year, implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. On March 23, 2020, the Government of Saint Lucia declared a state of emergency due to the Covid-19 outbreak and announced the closure of the country's airports to incoming passengers until further notice. It also closed its seaports for two weeks [1]. On April 27, 2020, the state of emergency and ban on international travelers were extended until the end of May, 2020 [2].

[1] The Voice. 23 March, 2020. "Government Declares State of Emergency". [<https://thevoiceslu.com/2020/03/government-declares-state-of-emergency/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[2] World Aware. 27 April, 2021. "Covid-19 Alert: Saint Lucia Extends Nationwide State of Emergency & Curfew Through May 31". [<https://www.worldaware.com/covid-19-alert-saint-lucia-extends-nationwide-state-emergency-curfew-through-may-31/>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

## Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

### 4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

#### 4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

##### 4.1.1a

**Doctors per 100,000 people**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 64.09**



2017

WHO; national sources

#### 4.1.1b

##### Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

**Current Year Score: 315.47**

2017

WHO; national sources

#### 4.1.1c

##### Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no available evidence that Saint Lucia has a public health workforce strategy in place, updated within the last five years, to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. In 2008, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) health systems profile on Saint Lucia indicated that the country was experiencing a "dire shortage" of health care system personnel, including physicians and nurses [1]. A March 2018 article by PAHO (and posted on the Ministry of Health's website) announced the launch of a new study on health worker migration. PAHO stated that the results of the study would help address shortages of health care workers in the Caribbean. However, there is no reference to a public health workforce strategy for Saint Lucia [2]. Furthermore, a two-year project that began in 2014, led by The Commonwealth—a voluntary association that supports the 53 member governments—aimed to support the development of a health sector "Human Resource Development Policy" in Saint Lucia [3, 4]. The project refers to a Ministry of Health policy, "The National Human Resource for Health Policy", that was the result of this effort, but there is no evidence of this policy on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Infrastructure—which includes Labour, nor on the one of the Ministry of Education [5, 6, 7].

[1] Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization. (PAHO/WHO). "Health Systems Profile - Saint Lucia". [<https://docplayer.net/22480280-Health-systems-profile.html>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health of Saint Lucia. 6 March 2018. "PAHO launches new study on health worker migration". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/paho-launches-new-study-on-health-worker-migration>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[3] The Commonwealth. "About Us". [<http://thecommonwealth.org/about-us>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[4] The Commonwealth. "Strengthening health workforce planning in Saint Lucia". [<http://thecommonwealth.org/project/strengthening-health-workforce-planning-saint-lucia>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[6] Ministry of Infrastructure, Ports, Energy and Labour. [<http://infrastructure.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

[7] Ministry of Education, Innovation, Gender Relations and Sustainable Development. [<http://education.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 15 February 2021.

## 4.1.2 Facilities capacity

### 4.1.2a

#### Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

**Current Year Score: 130**

2017

WHO/World Bank; national sources

### 4.1.2b

#### Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases either in a biocontainment patient care unit or in a patient isolation facility located within the country. In Saint Lucia's 2009 National Influenza Plan, through the National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) which is the government entity that plans for both natural and man-made disasters, there are process diagrams for the flow of patients at Saint Jude and Victoria hospitals that include an isolation room [1]. A 2014 article, titled "Saint Lucia tightens monitoring, surveillance for Ebola", the Ministry of Health indicates that the country's three hospitals—Tapion, Victoria and Saint Jude—had identified isolation rooms in case of a potential Ebola threat, yet no specific information is available on whether these rooms were ever set up nor of their capacity to isolate patients [2]. Furthermore, during the Covid-19 pandemic in June of 2020, the Ministry of Health announced that the Victoria hospital was being converted into a respiratory hospital with isolation rooms. However, in November of 2020, the conditions of this hospital came under fire and the Ministry of Health issued a public apology for it not being properly prepared [3, 4]. In addition, there is no evidence of a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation facilities on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Tapion Hospital, nor on the one of the Saint Jude Hospital [5, 6, 7]. The Victoria Hospital does not have a website.

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). "National Influenza Plan - Volume 4: Ministry of Health Plan, Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan".

[[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_Vol4\\_MOH.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_Vol4_MOH.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[2] Government Information Systems, Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 2 October 2014. "Saint Lucia tightens monitoring, surveillance for Ebola". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-tightens-monitoring-surveillance-for-ebola>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[3] St. Lucia News. 8 June, 2020. "Isaac tours Victoria as it transitions to respiratory hospital".

[<https://www.loopslu.com/content/isaac-tours-victoria-it-transitions-respiratory-hospital>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[4] Saint Lucia's Covid-19 Dashboard. 10 November, 2020. "Conditions at the Respiratory Hospital".

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/conditions-at-the-respiratory-hospital>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 16 February 2019.

[6] Saint Jude Hospital, Saint Lucia. [<http://www.stjudehospitalslu.org/>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[5] Tapion Hospital, Saint Lucia. [<http://tapionhospital.com/>]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

### 4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years nor that it has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years.

In Saint Lucia's 2009 National Influenza Plan, through the National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) which is the government entity that plans for both natural and man-made disasters, there are process diagrams for the flow of patients at Saint Jude and Victoria hospitals that include an isolation room [1]. However, there is no evidence on the websites of NEMO, the Ministry of Health, nor on the one for Saint Jude Hospital that the number of isolation rooms or the capacity to isolate has increased in the past two years (the Victoria Hospital does not have a website) [2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, during the Covid-19 pandemic in June of 2020, the Ministry of Health announced that the Victoria hospital was being converted into a respiratory hospital with isolation rooms. However, in November of 2020, the conditions of this hospital came under review and the Ministry of Health issued a public apology for it not being properly prepared [5, 6].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). "National Influenza Plan - Volume 4: Ministry of Health Plan, Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_Vol4\\_MOH.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_Vol4_MOH.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[2] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) Official website. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[4] Saint Jude Hospital, Saint Lucia. [<http://www.stjudehospitalslu.org/>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[5] St. Lucia News. 8 June, 2020. "Isaac tours Victoria as it transitions to respiratory hospital".

[<https://www.loopslu.com/content/isaac-tours-victoria-it-transitions-respiratory-hospital>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[6] Saint Lucia's Covid-19 Dashboard. 10 November, 2020. "Conditions at the Respiratory Hospital.

[<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/conditions-at-the-respiratory-hospital>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

## 4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

### 4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

#### 4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies and medical supplies for routine needs.

The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act of 2015 was created to regulate and describe procedures for the public procurement of goods [1]. The 2014 Guidelines for Procurement provide information on general procedures for public procurement of goods and services in Saint Lucia [2]. There is no information on procurement processes specific to the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture—including access of the system by laboratories—but both the Act and Guidelines refer to ministries and other government departments as procuring entities [1, 2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, On November 11, 2020 the Prime Minister provided details on the data compiled on the procurement of goods and services for COVID-19 during the State of Emergency declared on March 23rd 2020. Among the expenditures were procurements for "the purchase of reagents for testing and surgical masks and bodysuits for physicians and healthcare workers" and "the supply of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)" [5]. In addition, Saint Lucia is a member of the Caribbean Health Agency (CARPHA), which is a partner of the Caribbean Med Labs Foundation (CMLF), a non-governmental organization dedicated to assisting governments around best practice in medical laboratory services in the Caribbean region [6]. CMLF has published the Regional Guidelines for Procurement and Inventory Management, which is intended to set out guidelines for laboratory acquisition and management of goods and services [7].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. No. 19 of 2015. "Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act." [http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\_for\_sale/laws/3625/Act19%20of%202015.pdf]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. 6 November 2014. "Guidelines for Procurement". [https://www.finance.gov.lc/resources/download/2024]. Accessed 16 February 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [http://health.govt.lc/]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [http://agriculture.govt.lc/]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia. 11 November, 2020. "Prime Minister provides details of expenditure on procurement under State of Emergency". [http://www.govt.lc/news/prime-minister-provides-details-of-expenditure-on-procurement-under-state-of-emergency]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[6] Caribbean Med Labs Foundation. "About Us". [http://cmedlabsfoundation.net/index.php/about-us/cmlf-objectives]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[7] Caribbean Med Labs Foundation. ND. "Regional Guidelines for Procurement and Inventory Management". [http://cmedlabsfoundation.net/images/pguide/introduction.html]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

## 4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

### 4.2.2a

**Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of such a stockpile on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Emergency Management Organization nor on

the one of the Pharmacy Council [1, 2, 3, 4]. A presentation by the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) on its website suggests that medical countermeasures are part of the response plan for regional health security, though no additional information is available [5]. Furthermore, this lack of a stockpile was highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic when the government announced, on May 12, 2020, that India had sent medical supplies which included MCMs and essential medicines plus a grant of US\$1 million under the India-UNDP Fund to St. Lucia [6, 7].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[4] Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Tourism and Health in the context of Regional Health Security". [<http://carpha.org/Portals/0/docs/THP/THPSecurity.pdf>]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

[6] Saint Lucia's Covid-19 Dashboard. 12 May, 2020. "India donates US\$1 million, medical supplies to Saint Lucia". [<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/india-donates-us-1-million-medical-supplies-to-saint-lucia>]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

[7] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia Facebook page. 14 August, 2020. "Donation of medical supplies from Government of India". [<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=625204838406582>]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

#### 4.2.2b

**Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of such a stockpile on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs nor on the one of the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) [1, 2, 3]. In addition, this lack of a stockpile was highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic. In January of 2021, Saint Lucia was among the Caribbean island nations that said increased PCR testing for Covid-19 is hampered by a lack of laboratory supplies such as reagents [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[4]. Travel Pulse News. Brian Major. 13 January, 2021. "Caribbean Destinations and Sellers Scramble To Adjust To CDC Changes". [<https://www.travelpulse.com/news/destinations/caribbean-destinations-and-sellers-scramble-to-adjust-to-cdc-changes.html>]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

#### 4.2.2c

**Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Saint Lucia the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency as there is no evidence that the country has a national stockpile to use during such an emergency. There is no evidence of such a requirement or stockpile on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Emergency Management Organization nor on the one of the Pharmacy Council [1, 2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, this lack of a stockpile was highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic when the government announced, on May 12, 2020, that India had sent medical supplies which included MCMs and essential medicines plus a grant of US\$1 million under the India-UNDP Fund to St. Lucia [5, 6].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[4] Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[5] Saint Lucia's Covid-19 Dashboard. 12 May, 2020. "India donates US\$1 million, medical supplies to Saint Lucia". [<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/india-donates-us-1-million-medical-supplies-to-saint-lucia>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

[6] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia Facebook page. 14 August, 2020. "Donation of medical supplies from Government of India". [<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=625204838406582>]. Accessed 01 May, 2021.

## 4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

### 4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that St. Lucia has a plan or agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency nor of a mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency.

The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act of 2015 was created to regulate and describe procedures for the public procurement of goods [1]. There is a specific section in this act for "emergency public procurement" that can be used when "the country is impacted by a disaster, war, Act of God, or national security is compromised" as well as when "life or the quality of life may be seriously compromised" (p.46) [1]. Furthermore, on July 24, 2020, the government announced that the Department of Finance was preparing for the implementation of the Procurement and Asset Disposal Act No. 19 of 2015 which included the section on "emergency public procurement" [2]. This emergency public procurement was used during the Covid-19 pandemic. On November 11, 2020, Saint Lucia's prime minister provided details of expenditure on procurement under the State of Emergency due to Covid-19. Among the expenditures were procurements for "the purchase of surgical masks and bodysuits for physicians and healthcare workers" and "the supply of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)" [3]. Regarding the leverage of domestic manufacturing to produce medical supplies, there is no evidence of such a plan on the on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one for the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) [4, 5, 6]. In addition, there are reports of local manufacturers producing face masks during the Covid-19

pandemic, however these masks were donated to frontline health workers and were not part of a national plan or agreement [7].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. No. 19 of 2015. "Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act.". [[http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\\_for\\_sale/laws/3625/Act19%20of%202015.pdf](http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document_for_sale/laws/3625/Act19%20of%202015.pdf)]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. 24 July, 2020. "Procurement and Asset Disposal Act No. 19 of 2015 Circulated for feedback". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/procurement-and-asset-disposal-act-no-19-of-2015-circulated-for-feedback>]. Accessed 28 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. 11 November, 2020. "Prime Minister provides details of expenditure on procurement under State of Emergency". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/prime-minister-provides-details-of-expenditure-on-procurement-under-state-of-emergency>]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[6] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[7] Saint Lucia's Covid-19 Dashboard. 22 May, 2020. "St. Lucia Distillers donation of masks to Front Line workers". [<https://www.covid19response.lc/blogs/st-lucia-distillers-donation-of-masks-to-front-line-workers>]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

### 4.2.3b

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that St Lucia has a mechanism to produce or procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency.

The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act of 2015 was created to regulate and describe procedures for the public procurement of goods [1]. There is a specific section in this act for "emergency public procurement" that can be used when "the country is impacted by a disaster, war, Act of God, or national security is compromised" as well as when "life or the quality of life may be seriously compromised" (p.46) [1]. Furthermore, on July 24, 2020, the government announced that the Department of Finance was preparing for the implementation of the Procurement and Asset Disposal Act No. 19 of 2015 which included the section on "emergency public procurement" [2]. This emergency public procurement was used during the Covid-19 pandemic. On November 11, 2020, Saint Lucia's prime minister provided details of expenditure on procurement under the State of Emergency due to Covid-19. Among the expenditures were procurements for the purchase of reagents for testing and other materials and equipment for testing [3]. Regarding the leverage of domestic manufacturing to produce laboratory supplies, there is no evidence of such a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, nor on the one for the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) [4, 5, 6].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. No. 19 of 2015. "Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act.". [[http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\\_for\\_sale/laws/3625/Act19%20of%202015.pdf](http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document_for_sale/laws/3625/Act19%20of%202015.pdf)]. Accessed 17 February,



2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. 24 July, 2020. "Procurement and Asset Disposal Act No. 19 of 2015 Circulated for feedback". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/procurement-and-asset-disposal-act-no-19-of-2015-circulated-for-feedback>]. Accessed 28 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. 11 November, 2020. "Prime Minister provides details of expenditure on procurement under State of Emergency". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/prime-minister-provides-details-of-expenditure-on-procurement-under-state-of-emergency>]. Accessed 17 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

[6] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 17 February 2021.

## 4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

### 4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

#### 4.3.1a

**Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no available evidence that Saint Lucia has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCMs) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of such a plan, guidelines or program on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), nor on the one of the Pharmacy Council [1, 2, 3, 4]. In addition, a 2012 report by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) on the pharmaceutical situation in Saint Lucia, states that the country does not have a National Medicines Policy nor does it have a formal medicines regulatory authority [5]. Furthermore, a recent presentation by the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) suggests that medical countermeasures are part of the response plan for regional health security, though no additional information is available [6].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[4] Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[5] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and Government of Saint Lucia. August 2012. "Pharmaceutical Situation in Saint Lucia: WHO Assessment of Level II - Health Facilities Survey". [<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2012/HSS-MT-PharmStLucia-2012.pdf>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[6] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). ND. "Tourism and Health in the context of Regional Health Security". [<http://carpha.org/Portals/0/docs/THP/THPSecurity.pdf>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

## 4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

### 4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. Article XXVII of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), which can be found as a section in the Disaster Management Policy Framework for Saint Lucia, indicates that a "requesting State" can receive assistance, including provision of personnel, from a "sending State". [1] The visiting personnel are accorded certain privileges, immunities and facilities, including facilitation of entry into, stay, and departure, yet there is no specific information as to how workers are processed and dispersed once they arrive [1]. For example, on March 31, 2020, the government announced that a team of one hundred and thirteen Cuban medical professionals had arrived in Saint Lucia to support the island's national response efforts for Covid-19. The government stated that lodging and accommodations for the Cuban Medical Brigade was paid for by Saint Lucia [2, 3], However, there is no available information as to whether this was part of a public plan to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Home Affairs, or the National Emergency Management Organization [4, 5, 6].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). 24 August 2004. "Disaster Management Policy Framework for Saint Lucia - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/DMPolicyFramework.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161120-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/DMPolicyFramework.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161120-000)]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. 31 March, 2020. Fernelle Neptune, GIS: "Cuban medical professionals to help fight coronavirus". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/cuban-medical-professionals-to-help-fight-coronavirus>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. 11 November, 2020. "Prime Minister provides details of expenditure on procurement under State of Emergency". [<http://www.govt.lc/news/prime-minister-provides-details-of-expenditure-on-procurement-under-state-of-emergency>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Home Affairs, Justice and National Security of Saint Lucia. [<http://homeaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[5] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

## 4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

### 4.4.1 Access to healthcare

#### 4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

#### 4.4.1b

**Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 98.7**

2012

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

#### 4.4.1c

**Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 296.41**

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 4.4.2 Paid medical leave

#### 4.4.2a

**Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?**

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

### 4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

#### 4.4.3a

**Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health

emergency. There is no such evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health nor on the one for the National Emergency Management Organization [1, 2]. The Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act of 1985 has provisions for securing the health of employees while at work, including care for "special risks to which they are exposed", but there is no specific mention of healthcare workers receiving prioritized health care services if they become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency [3]. Saint Lucia is part of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) for disaster management in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and health emergency preparedness and response is one of the functions of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) [4, 5]. However, there is no evidence from CDEMA or CARPHA of a policy prioritizing healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency [6, 7].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[2] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. Act No. 10 of 1985, revised 31 December 2005. "Employees (Occupational Health and Safety) Act". [<http://www.govt.lc/media.govt.lc/www/resources/legislation/EmployeesOccupationalHealthandSafetyAct.pdf>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[4] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). "About Us". [<https://www.cdema.org/about-us#what-is-cdema-s-mandate>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "The Role and Functions of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)". [<http://carpha.org/Who-We-Are/Role-and-Functions>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[6] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). [<https://www.cdema.org/>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[7] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). [<http://carpha.org/>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

## 4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

### 4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

#### 4.5.1a

**Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), which plans for both natural and man-made disasters, has in place a number of National Emergency Plans which includes its 2009 National Influenza Plan Communication Strategy [1, 2]. Although the plan mentions that "effective response communications require that all responding organizations be consistent and integrated", there is no mention of a specific system as to how public health officials and healthcare workers will communicate during a public health emergency [2]. In addition, there is no further evidence of such a system on NEMO's website nor on the one for the Ministry of Health [3, 4].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO). "National Emergency Plan2". [<http://nemo.gov.lc/Disaster-Management/National-Emergency-Management-Plan/National-Plans>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. 2009. "National Influenza Plan Volume 3: Communications Strategy". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_Vol1\\_Ops.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_Vol1_Ops.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

#### 4.5.1b

**Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency, hence there is no evidence of one which encompasses healthcare workers in both the public and private sector. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), which plans for both natural and man-made disasters, has in place a number of National Emergency Plans which includes its 2009 National Influenza Plan Communication Strategy [1, 2]. Although the plan mentions that "effective response communications require that all responding organizations be consistent and integrated", there is no mention of a specific system as to how public health officials and healthcare workers will communicate during a public health emergency [2]. In addition, there is no further evidence of such a system on NEMO's website nor on the one for the Ministry of Health [3, 4]. Furthermore, the Disaster Management Policy Framework, available through NEMO, states the Government has a number of Memoranda of Understanding with the private sector for emergency and disaster circumstances [5]. The Policy Framework also includes a section on the role of the private sector, which outlines items such as capacity building options and incentives, but does not cover communications during an emergency [5]. According to a 2017 article from the Government Information Service and posted by the Ministry of Health, a company called Tropical Shipping held a disaster management workshop, "Building Community Resiliency through Strategic Private-Public Partnerships", which covered enhancing disaster response in the region. However, the article makes no mention of health worker communications [6].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO). "National Emergency Plan2 ". [<http://nemo.gov.lc/Disaster-Management/National-Emergency-Management-Plan/National-Plans>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. 2009. "National Influenza Plan Volume 3: Communications Strategy". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/NIP\\_Vol1\\_Ops.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/NIP_Vol1_Ops.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161124-000)]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[3] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[5] Government of Saint Lucia, National Emergency Management Office (NEMO). 24 August 2004. "Disaster Management Policy Framework for Saint Lucia - Document of the Saint Lucia National Emergency Management Plan ". [[http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National\\_Plan/DMPolicyFramework.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161120-000](http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/National_Plan/DMPolicyFramework.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161120-000)]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

[6] Government Information Service, Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 5 May 2017. "Building Community Resiliency through Strategic Private-Public Partnerships". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/public-private-sectors-discuss-disaster-management>]. Accessed 18 February 2021.

## 4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

### 4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

#### 4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia's public health system monitors and tracks the number of health care associated infections (HCAIs) that take place in healthcare facilities. According to the Ministry of Health, in 2015 a team of consultants from the Pan American Health Organization visited Saint Lucia to assess and strengthen the surveillance system for health care associated infections, including providing support for the development of the Ministry's National Infection and Prevention Control Guidelines [1]. This was followed by a 2018 workshop on infection prevention and control which was hosted by Saint Lucia and included several members of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) [2]. However, there is no publicly available evidence on the Ministry of Health's website that these guidelines have been created [3]. In addition, the 2006 National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia indicates that the Ezra Long Laboratory at Victoria Hospital is the national laboratory, but there is no evidence the laboratory tracks health care associated infections, and there is no website and limited information for the Ezra Long Laboratory [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 17 September 2015. "PAHO assesses infection control practices". [<http://health.govt.lc/news/paho-assesses-infection-control-practices>]. Accessed 19 February 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 21 February 2021.

[3] Pan American Health Organization. "Sub-Regional Meeting on Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) and Health-Care Associated Infection Surveillance in Castries, St. Lucia on 15 to 17 October 2018".

[[https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=14756:sub-regional-meeting-on-infection-prevention-and-control-ipc-and-health-care-associated-infection-surveillance-in-castries-st-lucia-on-15-to-17-october-2018&Itemid=0&lang=en](https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14756:sub-regional-meeting-on-infection-prevention-and-control-ipc-and-health-care-associated-infection-surveillance-in-castries-st-lucia-on-15-to-17-october-2018&Itemid=0&lang=en)]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.

[4] Government of Saint Lucia. 2006. "National Communicable Disease Surveillance Manual of Saint Lucia".

[[https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector\\_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf](https://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/nemp/sector_plans/CommunicableDiseaseManual.pdf)]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.

## 4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

### 4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

#### 4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia has a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial. The Clinical Trials Act (April 2016), calls for an ethics committee to be appointed with the approval of the Cabinet [1]. Furthermore, in an article published just two months before this Act was approved, the Minister of Health stated that the ethics committee will "oversee the protection of the rights, safety, well being and confidentiality of subjects" and "will also be called upon to review applications of opinions and to conduct ethical assessments which will determine whether a clinical trial is warranted" [2]. In addition, according to the Minister of Health, this Act also "calls for the establishment of legislation to govern medical research on human subjects in Saint Lucia. The studies will help determine the strategies, treatment and devices needed to positively impact illness and disease" [2].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. 16 April, 2016. Clinical Trials Act. No. 10.

[[http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\\_for\\_sale/laws/3742/Act%2010%20of%202016.pdf](http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document_for_sale/laws/3742/Act%2010%20of%202016.pdf)]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. 5 February, 2016. "New bill regulates medical research".

[<http://health.govt.lc/news/new-bill-regulates-medical-research>]. Accessed 18 February, 2021.

**4.7.1b**

**Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics. There is no evidence of such a process in the country's Clinical Trials Act (April 2016), which regulates medical research and appoints an ethics committee [1]. In addition, there is no evidence of an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered MCMs on the website of the Ministry of Health, nor on the one for the National Printing Corporation, the government entity that posts legislation online and provides printing services [2, 3]. Furthermore, the Pharmacy Council has published a Standards of Conduct, Ethics and Performance For Pharmacists, but this does not include an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures [4]. Moreover, the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)'s Research Ethics Committee (REC) provides ethical oversight for research involving human participants conducted by staff or funded by CARPHA and its services are extended to CARPHA Member States upon request. However, there is no evidence that this includes services for an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered MCMs to treat ongoing epidemics [5].

[1] Government of Saint Lucia. 16 April, 2016. Clinical Trials Act. No. 10.

[[http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document\\_for\\_sale/laws/3742/Act%2010%20of%202016.pdf](http://slugovprintery.com/template/files/document_for_sale/laws/3742/Act%2010%20of%202016.pdf)]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 19 February 2021.

[3] National Printing Corporation of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.slugovprintery.com/>]. Accessed 19 February 2021.

[4] Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. 16 February 2013. "Standards of Conduct, Ethics and Performance For Pharmacists".

[<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/13feb/Standards%20of%20Conduct%20Ethics%20and%20Performance%20-%20Pharmacy%20Council.pdf>]. Accessed 19 February 2021.

[5] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). Research Training and Policy Development. [<http://carpha.org:8086/What-We-Do/Research-Training-and-Policy-Development/Research-Ethics>]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.



## 4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

### 4.7.2a

**Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures in humans. According to a 2012 report by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) on the pharmaceutical situation in Saint Lucia, the country does not have a formal medicines regulatory authority [1]. Saint Lucia's Pharmacy Council was established by the Pharmacy Act of 2003, for matters related to pharmacists, pharmacies, and distribution of drugs, but drug approval is not covered by the Act nor the Pharmacy Council [2, 3]. Some regulatory functions—licensing and inspection—are carried out by the Ministry of Health and the Pharmacy Council, according to a 2012 Pharmaceutical Country Profile by the Ministry of Health that was produced in conjunction with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) [4]. According to the profile, there are no legal provisions that require manufacturers to be licensed, and there are no additional details regarding approval of medical products, including countermeasures, provided by the Ministry of Health or the Pharmacy Council [3, 4, 5]. The Caribbean Regulatory System of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) oversees safety, quality, and efficacy of medicines and vaccines in the Caribbean, though there is no indication that this includes medical countermeasures [6]. CARPHA's Medicines Quality Control and Surveillance Department monitors medicinal quality and is the sole ISO/IEC 17025 accredited pharmaceutical quality control laboratory in the Caribbean [7]. Furthermore, the 2013 Caribbean Pharmaceutical Policy does not mention medical countermeasures [8].

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and Government of Saint Lucia. August 2012. "Pharmaceutical Situation in Saint Lucia: WHO Assessment of Level II - Health Facilities Survey". [<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2012/HSS-MT-PharmStLucia-2012.pdf>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. Chapter 11.21, 2008 Revised Edition of Act No. 8 of 2003. "Pharmacy Act". [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/17feb/Pharmacy%20Act%20-%20Cap.11.21.pdf>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[3] Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health, Wellness, Human Services and Gender Relations of Saint Lucia, in collaboration with the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). January 2012. "Saint Lucia Pharmaceutical Country Profile". [[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/pscp\\_santalucia\\_en.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/pscp_santalucia_en.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[6] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) "Caribbean Regulatory System". [<http://carpha.org/What-We-Do/Laboratory-Services-and-Networks/CRS>]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[7] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) "About Medicine Quality Control and Surveillance". [<http://carpha.org/What-We-Do/Medicines-Quality-Control-and-Surveillance/About-MQCSD>]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[8] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) / Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) / World Health Organization (WHO). 2013. "Caribbean Pharmaceutical Policy". [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/Caribbean\\_Pharmaceutical\\_Policy-2013.pdf](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/Caribbean_Pharmaceutical_Policy-2013.pdf)]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

### 4.7.2b

**Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Saint Lucia has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCMs) for human use during public health emergencies, as there is insufficient evidence that there is a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures in humans. According to a 2012 report by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) on the pharmaceutical situation in Saint Lucia, the country does not have a formal medicines regulatory authority [1]. Saint Lucia's Pharmacy Council was established by the Pharmacy Act of 2003, for matters related to pharmacists, pharmacies, and distribution of drugs, but drug approval is not covered by the Act nor the Pharmacy Council [2, 3]. Some regulatory functions—licensing and inspection—are carried out by the Ministry of Health and the Pharmacy Council, according to a 2012 Pharmaceutical Country Profile by the Ministry of Health that was produced in conjunction with PAHO, but there are no additional details regarding approval of medical products, including countermeasures, provided by the Ministry of Health or the Pharmacy Council [3, 4, 5]. The Caribbean Regulatory System of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) oversees safety, quality, and efficacy of medicines and vaccines in the Caribbean, though there is no indication that this includes MCMs or that there is an expedited approval process [6]. Furthermore, the 2013 Caribbean Pharmaceutical Policy does not mention medical countermeasures or expedited approval processes [7].

[1] Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and Government of Saint Lucia. August 2012. "Pharmaceutical Situation in Saint Lucia: WHO Assessment of Level II - Health Facilities Survey". [<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2012/HSS-MT-PharmStLucia-2012.pdf>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. Chapter 11.21, 2008 Revised Edition of Act No. 8 of 2003. "Pharmacy Act". [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/17feb/Pharmacy%20Act%20-%20Cap.11.21.pdf>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[3] Pharmacy Council of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.pharmacycouncilslu.org/>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health, Wellness, Human Services and Gender Relations of Saint Lucia, in collaboration with the Pan American Health Organization/World Health Organization (PAHO/WHO). January 2012. "Saint Lucia Pharmaceutical Country Profile". [[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/pscp\\_santalucia\\_en.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/pscp_santalucia_en.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[6] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) "Caribbean Regulatory System". [<http://carpha.org/What-We-Do/Laboratory-Services-and-Networks/CRS>]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[7] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) / Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) / World Health Organization (WHO). 2013. "Caribbean Pharmaceutical Policy". [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/Caribbean\\_Pharmaceutical\\_Policy-2013.pdf](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/Caribbean_Pharmaceutical_Policy-2013.pdf)]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

## Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

### 5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

#### 5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

##### 5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

## 5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

### 5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that pandemics are integrated into Saint Lucia's national risk reduction strategy. Saint Lucia's National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO), which plans for both natural and man-made disasters, has a draft risk reduction document from 2012 posted on its website [1, 2]. A final version published in 2014 of NEMO's Country Document for Disaster Risk Reduction is available through 'Programa de Preparación ante Desastres de la Comisión Europea' (Disaster Preparedness ECHO) [3, 4]. The Document defines epidemics and pandemics, such as avian flu, among health emergency hazards [4]. The Document provides an overview of the status of disaster risk reduction, and defines national priorities and strategies regarding hazards—such as improving knowledge, capacity, and preparedness—for Saint Lucia [4]. There is no evidence of a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics on the websites of the Ministry of Health nor on the one for NEMO [5, 6].

[1] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. "Reports & Documents".

[<http://nemo.gov.lc/Resources/Reports-Documents/ItemId/354>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[2] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. August 2012. "Disaster Risk Reduction Country Profile for Saint Lucia". [<http://nemo.gov.lc/Portals/0/Documents/Draft-DRR%20PROFILE-SLU.pdf?ver=2017-09-15-161110-000>].

Accessed 20 February 2021.

[3] Programa de Preparación ante Desastres de la Comisión Europea (Disaster Preparedness ECHO).

[<http://dipecholac.net/index-2.html>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

[4] National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. November 2014. "Saint Lucia: Country Document for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2014". [<http://dipecholac.net/docs/files/869-documento-pais-saint-lucia-para-la-web.pdf>].

Accessed 20 February 2021.

[5] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 20 February 2019.

[6] National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) of Saint Lucia. [<http://nemo.gov.lc/>]. Accessed 20 February 2021.

## 5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

### 5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

#### 5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia is part of a regional group with regards to public health emergencies. Article 4 of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)—signed by the Government of Saint Lucia—states that supporting the Caribbean Community in "preparing for and responding to public health emergencies" is one of CARPHA's objectives [1]. Health emergency preparedness and response is therefore one of the functions of the CARPHA [1, 2]. In addition, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) is a regional agency for disaster management in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Saint Lucia is a Member State [3]. CDEMA's mandate includes "coordinating the establishment, enhancement and maintenance of adequate emergency disaster response capabilities among the Participating States" [4].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)". [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA\\_IGA.pdf](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA_IGA.pdf)]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.

[2] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). "The Role and Functions of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)". [<http://carpha.org/Who-We-Are/Role-and-Functions>]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.

[3] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). "About Us". [<https://www.cdema.org/about-us#what-is-cdema-s-mandate>]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.

[4] Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA). "What is CDEMA's Mandate?". [<https://www.cdema.org/about-us#what-is-cdema-s-mandate>]. Accessed 19 February, 2021.

### 5.2.1b

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia is part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. The Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET), of which Saint Lucia is a member, is responsible for prevention and emergency preparedness plans for priority diseases [1]. Rabies, Salmonellosis, and Leptospirosis are identified by CaribVET as priority diseases [2]. The 2010 charter for CaribVET states that one of the roles of the Veterinary epidemiologist / para-epidemiologist (VEP) project is to support and operate a rapid national and regional emergency response task force [3]. Representatives from CaribVET have also been involved in the development of the Caribbean's Global Health Security Agenda (GHS) roadmap [4, 5] In June 2017, the Chief Veterinary Officer of Saint Lucia was welcomed as the new President of CaribVET [6].

[1] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "About the Network". [<https://www.caribvet.net/about-the-network>]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[2] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "Veterinary Public Health". [<https://www.caribvet.net/thematics/veterinary-public-health>]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[3] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "Caribbean Animal Health Network Charter". [[https://www.caribvet.net/content/download/4499/33474/version/1/file/CaribVET\\_CHARTER\\_FINAL\\_EN2011%28detailed%29.pdf](https://www.caribvet.net/content/download/4499/33474/version/1/file/CaribVET_CHARTER_FINAL_EN2011%28detailed%29.pdf)]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[4] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "The Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET) establishes high-level ties with Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)". [<https://www.caribvet.net/news/the-caribbean-animal-health-network-caribvet-establishes-high-level-ties-with-caribbean-disaster-emergency-management-agency-cdema>].

Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[5] Caribbean Community (CARICOM) "Working towards Regional Health Security in the Caribbean". 29 May, 2017. [https://caricom.org/working-towards-regional-health-security-in-the-caribbean/]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

[6] Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET). "Welcome to the New President of CaribVET, Dr. Auria King-Cenac, Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of St Lucia". [https://www.caribvet.net/meetings-conferences/caribvet-meetings/governance-and-coordination/12th-meeting-of-the-caribvet-steering-committee/gallery/welcome-to-the-new-president-of-caribvet-dr.-auria-king-cenac-chief-veterinary-officer-cvo-of-st-lucia]. Accessed 20 February, 2021.

## 5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

### 5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

#### 5.3.1a

**Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?**

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1b

**Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1c

**Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1d

**Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:**

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

## 5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

### 5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

## 5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

### 5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

#### 5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

#### 5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5 FINANCING

### 5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

#### 5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. There is no such evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of



Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance nor on the government's main portal [1, 2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, all funding to improve Saint Lucia's capacity to address the Covid-19 pandemic has come from international financing or donations from, for example, the IMF, or the World Bank [5, 6].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia. [<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Finance, Economic Growth, Job Creation, External Affairs and the Public Service of Saint Lucia. [<http://finance.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[4] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[5] International Monetary Fund (IMF). 28 April, 2020. "IMF Executive Board Approves US\$65.6 Million in Disbursements to Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia to Address COVID-19 Pandemic".

[<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/28/pr20192-dma-grd-lca-imf-executive-board-approves-us-million-disbursements-address-covid-19-pandemic>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[6] World Bank. 14 January, 2021. "World Bank Approves US\$30 Million Credit for Saint Lucia's COVID-19 Response, Recovery, and Resilience". Accessed 22 February, 2021.

## 5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

### 5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

### 5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Saint Lucia is eligible for support from the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group [1]. As an IDA eligible borrowing country, Saint Lucia can access the World Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF), which was introduced in 2017 to provide financial support to countries affected by a large-scale outbreak to prevent the outbreak from reaching pandemic proportions [2]. The pre-established group of diseases PEF covers includes: pandemic Influenza (new or novel influenza A virus), Coronaviruses (e.g. SARS, MERS), Filoviruses (e.g. Ebola, Marburg), Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever, Rift Valley fever, and Lassa fever [2]. Saint Lucia is considered a "blend" country—IDA-eligible based on per capita income but also creditworthy for some IBRD borrowing—and also eligible for borrowing on small economy terms [1]. As a Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) Member State, Saint Lucia is also eligible for support from the 'Stop Epidemics There and Here' (SETH) Fund [3]. Activities of the SETH Fund include immediate response interventions against vaccine-preventable diseases and deployment of rapid response personnel during outbreaks, public health emergencies, severe natural disasters, chemical and other events with health consequences [3].

[1] International Development Association (IDA) - World Bank Group. "Borrowing Countries".

[<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[2] World Bank. "World Bank Pandemic Financing Facility". [<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[3] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) Foundation. "Stop Epidemics There and Here (SETH) Fund". <http://carphafoundation.carpha.org/SETH-Fund>. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

## 5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

### 5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that, in the past three years, senior leaders in Saint Lucia have made a public commitment to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing and there is insufficient evidence that they have made a public commitment to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity. There is no evidence of such a public commitment on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the government's main portal nor on the one for the Ministry of

External Affairs [1, 2, 3]. Saint Lucia is not among the countries that contribute to the World Health Organization (WHO)'s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), and the WHO makes no other mention of this type of public commitment by Saint Lucia [4, 5]. Furthermore, although Saint Lucia received (April 2020) US\$ 29.2 million in disbursements from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a US\$30 Million Credit for Saint Lucia's COVID-19 Response, Recovery, and Resilience (January 2021), these announcements or commitments were made by these organizations and not by the country's senior leaders [6, 7].

[1] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[2] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[3] Government of Saint Lucia. "Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation". [<http://www.govt.lc/ministries/external-affairs-international-trade-and-civil-aviation>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO). ""Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE)". [<http://www.who.int/emergencies/funding/contingency-fund/en/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[5] World Health Organization (WHO). [<http://www.who.int/>]. Accessed 22 January 2021.

[6] International Monetary Fund (IMF). 28 April, 2020. "IMF Executive Board Approves US\$65.6 Million in Disbursements to Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia to Address COVID-19 Pandemic". [<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/28/pr20192-dma-grd-lca-imf-executive-board-approves-us-million-disbursements-address-covid-19-pandemic>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[7]. World Bank. 14 January, 2021. "World Bank Approves US\$30 Million Credit for Saint Lucia's COVID-19 Response, Recovery, and Resilience". Accessed 22 February, 2021.

### 5.5.4b

**Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:**

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Saint Lucia has invested finances from donors to improve its own domestic capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years, however there is no evidence that the country has invested resources to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. According to the Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking database, Saint Lucia has received technical and financial support to improve its domestic capacity to address epidemic threats in each of the past three years. The country received \$1.38 million in 2018, \$1.10 million in 2019 and and \$8 million in 2020 to improve its domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. Among the main donors were the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank Trust Funds, Canada and South Korea [1]. Furthermore, Saint Lucia received \$29.2 million in disbursements from the International Monetary Fund in April of 2020 and a \$30 million credit in January of 2021 from the World Bank for the Country's Covid-19 Response, Recovery and Resilience plan [2, 3]. However, there is no evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of External Affairs, nor on the government's main portal that Saint Lucia invested finances or provided technical support to help other countries combat epidemic threats [4, 5, 6].

[1] Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking database. [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/1036/recipient>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[2] International Monetary Fund (IMF). 28 April, 2020. "IMF Executive Board Approves US\$65.6 Million in Disbursements to Dominica, Grenada, and St. Lucia to Address COVID-19 Pandemic".

[<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/28/pr20192-dma-grd-lca-imf-executive-board-approves-us-million-disbursements-address-covid-19-pandemic>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[3] World Bank. 14 January, 2021. "World Bank Approves US\$30 Million Credit for Saint Lucia's Covid-19 Response, Recovery, and Resilience". Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation of Saint Lucia. [<http://externalaffairs.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[6] Government of Saint Lucia. [<http://www.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

### 5.5.4c

**Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## 5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

### 5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

#### 5.6.1a

**Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Saint Lucia has a publicly-available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, epidemiological data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. Saint Lucia has committed to sharing some infectious disease-related data with other countries in the region through its membership of the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA) [1, 2]. During the Covid-19 Pandemic, CARPHA, on its dashboard page, released the number of Covid-19 samples received, tested and reported as well as the number of members participating in this. However, it does not state the individual names of the countries participating nor is there evidence that this is part of a publicly available plan for sharing genetic data [3]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of commitments to share such data with international organizations or other countries on the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture's websites nor from a wider online search [4, 5].

[1] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). Official website. [<http://carpha.org/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[2] Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA). June 2011. "Agreement establishing the Caribbean Public Health Agency (CARPHA)." [[https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA\\_IGA.pdf](https://carpha.org/Portals/0/Documents/CARPHA_IGA.pdf)]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[3] CARPHA. Coronavirus. Caribbean region dashboard. 7th January to 13th February, 2021.

[<https://www.carpha.org/Portals/0/Images/LabDashboard.jpg>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[4] Ministry of Health and Wellness of Saint Lucia. [<http://health.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Physical Planning, Natural Resources and Co-operatives of Saint Lucia.

[<http://agriculture.govt.lc/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

### 5.6.1b

**Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years year [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the website and press release pages of the World Health Organization (WHO) nor are there any media reports by the WHO of any non-compliance by Saint Lucia in the past two years [2, 3].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Virus Sharing." [[http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus\\_sharing/en/](http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus_sharing/en/)]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). [<http://www.who.int>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO) newsroom. [<https://www.who.int/news-room>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

### 5.6.1c

**Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that Saint Lucia has not shared pandemic pathogen samples, including for Covid-19, during an outbreak in the past two years [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the website and press release pages of the World Health Organization (WHO) nor are there any media reports by the WHO of any non-compliance by Saint Lucia in the past two years [2, 3].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Virus Sharing." [[http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus\\_sharing/en/](http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus_sharing/en/)]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). [<http://www.who.int>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO) newsroom. [<https://www.who.int/news-room>]. Accessed 16 February, 2021.

## Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

### 6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

#### 6.1.1 Government effectiveness

##### 6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 56

2020

Transparency International

### 6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

### 6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence



### 6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

#### 6.1.3a

**What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?**

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

#### 6.1.4a

**How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?**

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

**Current Year Score: 4**

2021

Economist Intelligence

#### 6.1.4b

**What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?**

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

**Current Year Score: 3**

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

#### 6.1.4c

**How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?**

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.5 Armed conflict

### 6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.6 Government territorial control

### 6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.7 International tensions

### 6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

### 6.2.1 Literacy

#### 6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 93.7

2008-2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);  
The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.2 Gender equality

### 6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

**Current Year Score: 0.67**

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.3 Social inclusion

### 6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

**Current Year Score: 2.6**

2016

World Bank; Economist Impact

### 6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

According to Statista, a company specializing in market and consumer data, which gives statistics on a variety of issues, the share of employment in the informal sector for Saint Lucia was 31% in 2019 [1].

[1] Statista. Marina Pasquali. "Informal employment as percentage of total employment in selected countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2019". [<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1037216/informal-employment-share-latin-america-caribbean-country/>]. Accessed 22 February, 2021.

### 6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

**Current Year Score: 1**

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.2.4 Public confidence in government

### 6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.5 Local media and reporting

### 6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.6 Inequality

### 6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.51

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

### 6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

#### 6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

#### 6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

#### 6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

### 6.4.1 Urbanization

#### 6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 18.75

2019

World Bank

## 6.4.2 Land use

### 6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: -0.08

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

## 6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

### 6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

### 6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

#### 6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 76.06

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
World Factbook

#### 6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 515.7

2019

WHO

### **6.5.1c**

**Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)**

Input number

Current Year Score: 10.04

2019

World Bank

### **6.5.1d**

**Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)**

Input number

Current Year Score: 14.78

2018

World Bank

### **6.5.1e**

**Prevalence of obesity among adults**

Input number

Current Year Score: 19.7

2016

WHO

## **6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation**

### **6.5.2a**

**Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure**

Input number

Current Year Score: 98.16

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### **6.5.2b**

**Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities**

Input number

Current Year Score: 88.35



2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### 6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

#### 6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

**Current Year Score: 288.49**

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

#### 6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

#### 6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018