

Philippines

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Philippines. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Philippines.

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Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 2

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Philippines, conducted in 2018, confirms that the country has an existing national antimicrobial resistance plan called the "Philippine Action Plan to Combat AMR: One Health Approach". [1] The plan was published by the country's Inter-Agency Committee on Antimicrobial Resistance (ICAMR) in 2015. [2,3] According to the JEE, there were also plans to update it for the 2019-2023 period; however, there is currently no available evidence that a new plan has been formulated. [1] The current plan pinpoints surveillance as an important strategy for addressing AMR, and it does so by strengthening the Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Program (ARSP). It also states that there are 23 sentinel sites that monitor AMR across the country which are responsible for analysing test results and detecting any patterns. These sites submit monthly reports to the Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Reference Laboratory on (ARSRL), while the national Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Committee is responsible for policy actions based on the reports from the ARSRL. [3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippine Information Agency. "DOH, DA and UN agencies call for united fight against antimicrobial resistance". [<https://pia.gov.ph/press-releases/releases/1015308>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippines. 2015. "The Philippine Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance: One Health Approach". [http://apps.who.int/datacol/answer_upload.asp?survey_id=666&view_id=722&question_id=13163&answer_id=19958&respondent_id=197805]. Accessed August 2020.

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Philippines, conducted in 2018, there exists an Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Program (ARSP) that implements a sentinel surveillance system which tests for priority diseases. [1,2] The ARSP houses the Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Reference Laboratory (ARSRL) which tests for the pathogens *E. coli*, *K. pneumoniae*, *S. aureus*, *S. pneumoniae*, both typhoidal and non-typhoidal *Salmonella* species, *Shigella* species, and *N. gonorrhoeae*. All priority

pathogens are tested for excepting *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*, and the JEE mentions the need to include tuberculosis in the current surveillance system. [1,2,3] Transmission of data from 13 sentinel sites to the ARSRL is done on a daily basis. [3] Recently, the ASRP has also started to implement "local genomic sequencing of drug-resistant bacteria in the Philippines" to enhance infection control initiatives. [4] More recent reports from the ASRP are unavailable on their website, with the latest report being from 2018. [5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. 2015. "The Philippine Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance: One Health Approach". [http://apps.who.int/datacol/answer_upload.asp?survey_id=666&view_id=722&question_id=13163&answer_id=19958&respondent_id=197805]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Program of the Philippines. "2018 Annual Report". [<https://arsp.com.ph/download/1041/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Laboratory. "Genomic surveillance of antibiotic resistance in the Philippines established". [<https://arsp.com.ph/genomic-surveillance-of-antibiotic-resistance-in-the-philippines-established/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Laboratory. "Publications". [<https://arsp.com.ph/publications/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the government is conducting environmental surveillance. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Philippines, conducted in 2018, there is a need to expand AMR monitoring to the environment sector in order to identify broader AMR issues in the country. [1] The "Philippine Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance: One Health Approach" does not include a strategy for the detection or surveillance of AMR in the wild. Key activities mentioned in the plan in relation to animal health only refer to domesticated animals and cultured aquatic species, with particular focus on those raised for food production. Although Key Strategy 01 on animal health acknowledges that "AMR has long been present in both the soil and water microbiomes," the activities outlined there only relate to resource mobilization and agency coordination led by the Department of Agriculture. [2] There is no further evidence regarding this matter from the Department of Health and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. [3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. 2015. "The Philippine Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance: One Health Approach". [http://apps.who.int/datacol/answer_upload.asp?survey_id=666&view_id=722&question_id=13163&answer_id=19958&respondent_id=197805]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Environment and Natural Resources. [<https://www.denr.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

The Philippine Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an advisory in 2012 that prohibits the sale of antimicrobials without prescriptions. [1] In support of this regulation and the Antimicrobial Stewardship Programme, the Department of Health has also published National Antibiotic Guidelines for the use of healthcare facilities in prescribing and dispensing antibiotics. [2,3] There exists a government hotline which the public can call to report drugstores that sell antibiotics without prescriptions for immediate regulatory action. [1]

[1] Food and Drug Administration of the Philippines. DOH-FDA Advisory No. 2012-07 of 29 November 2012. "Antimicrobial Resistance". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/health_advisory/2012-017.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2017. "National Antibiotic Guidelines 2017".

[<https://drive.google.com/file/d/11yc2OggVkTAim3fNG7rgmyEloHanQKnR/view>] Accessed August 2020.

1.1.2b

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Philippine Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an advisory in 2013 on the use of antimicrobials in animals that states that "all antimicrobial products are prescription". The advisory specifically discusses the risk of spreading antimicrobial resistance in both animals and humans as a cause for concern, and consequently, all veterinary drug outlets are prohibited from dispensing veterinary antimicrobials without the written order of a licensed veterinarian." [1] However, according to the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, which was conducted in 2018, antimicrobial stewardship for animals still needs to be strengthened as it is currently absent from the national Antimicrobial Stewardship Program. It also cites a gap in monitoring antimicrobial use in the agricultural and primary production sectors.[2]

[1] Food and Drug Administration of the Philippines. FDA Advisory No. 2013-006 of 3 April 2013. "The Risks of Indiscriminate Use of Antimicrobials in animals". [<https://ww2.fda.gov.ph/attachments/article/38945/FA2013-006.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2 ZOOBOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a

Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

According to the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, which was conducted in 2018, the Philippine Inter-Agency Committee on Zoonotic Disease has issued plans in relation to five priority diseases: rabies, anthrax, leptospirosis, Japanese B Encephalitis and Ebola Reston. The most well-developed of these plans relate to rabies. [1] In 2007, the Anti-Rabies Act was passed by Congress which details the roles and responsibilities of different institutions in the country and establishes the National Rabies Prevention and Control Program. [2,3] The program is managed by the Department of Agriculture, Department of Health (DOH), Department of the Interior and Local Government, and the Department of Education while other government institutions and non-government organizations also help support it. [3] The DOH's Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Disease program has also issued several policies and guidelines in relation to MERS-CoV, Ebola, SARS, Meningococccemia, leptospirosis, and Zika. [4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Congress of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 9482. "Anti-Rabies Act of 2007". [https://rabies.doh.gov.ph/images/PDF/IRR-INSIDE-REV2_new.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2012. "National Rabies Prevention and Control Program - Manual of Operations". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/FINALMOP6.4.13WORDRADMay30.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2017. "Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases".

[<http://ro9.doh.gov.ph/index.php/health-programs/infectious-disease-program/emerging-and-re-emerging-infectious-diseases>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2.1b

Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Philippines has issued policy documents related to risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover.

There are disease-specific documents that are published on an ad hoc basis. For example, the Department of Health (DOH) has issued a manual of procedures as part of the National Rabies Prevention and Control Program. It explains how rabies is transmitted from an infected animal to a human: "Bites from infected animals are the most common mode of transmission of rabies to humans. Exposure to rabies may come from bites of infected dogs, cats, other domestic and wild animals including bats. However, bites from rats, rabbits, other rodents, reptiles and birds do not pose a risk for rabies infection. Non-bite exposures are less important and are infrequent modes of transmission. However, scratches, open wounds or mucous

membranes that are licked by an infected animal, can be points of entry of the rabies virus." To mitigate the spread of rabies, the Philippines has implemented mass dog vaccination campaigns and raised community awareness about the disease by working closely with the Department of Education. [1,2]

The DOH also manages the Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Disease Program in order to monitor and control the spread of diseases like leptospirosis, dengue, and avian flu which have zoonotic origins, but it has not issued a national strategy document in relation to zoonotic disease spillover. [3] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, which was conducted in 2018, does not note the presence of policy documents related to zoonotic transmission. [4] There is no further evidence from the Departments of Health and Agriculture regarding this topic. [5,6]

[1] National Rabies Prevention and Control Program. 2019. "Manual of Procedures".

[<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=648672>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Anti-Rabies Act and Other Issuances on Rabies Control and Prevention Program". [https://rabies.doh.gov.ph/images/PDF/IRR-INSIDE-REV2_new.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2017. "Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Disease Program".

[<https://www.doh.gov.ph/emerging-and-re-emerging-infectious-disease-program>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Agriculture. [<https://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2.1c

Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, which was conducted in 2018, notes the presence of existing legislation and policy documents that focus on the control of certain zoonotic diseases. It cites the Anti-Rabies Act of 2007 as well as the establishment of the Philippine Inter-Agency Committee on Zoonoses (PhilCZ) which focuses on five zoonotic diseases, namely, rabies, anthrax, leptospirosis, Japanese B Encephalitis and Ebola Reston. [1] The Anti-Rabies Act, which focuses on the control and elimination of rabies, created the National Rabies Prevention and Control Program. Through the law, the Department of Agriculture, Department of Health (DOH), and the Department of Education were designated roles on the management of rabies in animals, the monitoring and treatment of humans exposed to rabies, and raising awareness in the public and implementing vaccination campaigns, respectively. Several policies were also issued to promote implementation and adherence to the law. [2] Similarly, the DOH runs a Dengue Prevention and Control Program which has six program components: 1) Surveillance, 2) Case Management and Diagnosis, 3) Integrated Vector Management, 4) Outbreak Response, 5) Health Promotion and Advocacy, and 6) Research. [3] For the management of the COVID-19 situation in the Philippines, the Inter-Agency Taskforce for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases was convened. The taskforce has issued multiple policy guidelines and recommendations regarding disease control and mitigation. [4] The DOH also manages the Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Disease Program in order to monitor and control the spread of diseases with zoonotic origins, and it has issued national policy documents in relation to avian flu, Zika, MERS-CoV, and Meningococcal disease. [5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

eng.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Anti-Rabies Act and Other Issuances on Rabies Control and Prevention Program". [https://rabies.doh.gov.ph/images/PDF/IRR-INSIDE-REV2_new.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Dengue Prevention and Control Program". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/national-dengue-prevention-and-control-program>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. "COVID-19 Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases Resolutions". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/COVID-19/IATF-Resolutions>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2017. "Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Disease Program". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/emerging-and-re-emerging-infectious-disease-program>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a department, agency or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. The only body that is specifically responsible for zoonotic diseases is the Philippine Inter-Agency Committee on Zoonoses (PhilCZ). It is responsible for: "a) develop[ing] a national strategy on prevention, control and elimination of zoonoses; and b) establish[ing] a functional and sustainable mechanism to strengthen the animal-human interface for the effective prevention, control and elimination of zoonotic diseases." PhilCZ is composed of, but not limited to, the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Agriculture (DA), and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. [1] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, which was conducted in 2018, notes the need for dedicated funding for the PhilCZ and improved coordination between the three agencies. [2] Unlike other agencies which are created through laws, the PhilCZ is an ad hoc body formed through an administrative order from the executive branch. This means that it does not have dedicated staff that are responsible for implementation work. [1] In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the president has also convened the Inter-Agency Taskforce for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases; however, similar to the PhilCZ, this taskforce only works on an ad hoc basis. The Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Environment and Natural Resources do not have further evidence regarding this matter. [3,4,5]

[1] The President of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 10, s. 2011. "Creating the Philippine Inter-Agency Committee on Zoonoses, Defining Its Powers, Functions, Responsibilities, Other Related Matters and Providing Funds Thereof".

[<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2011/04/11/administrative-order-no-10-s-2011/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Agriculture. [<https://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Environment and Natural Resources. [<https://www.denr.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Philippine Animal Health Information System (Phil-AHIS) is a web portal where livestock owners and concerned citizens can voluntarily report incidences of animal disease. [1] The portal allows for reporting from individuals through its Animal Disease Incident Report option. [2] The Phil-AHIS is managed by the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) which is mandated "to investigate, study and report the cause of dangerous communicable diseases and the means of prevention, and in general, promote the development of the livestock industries." [3].

[1] Philippine Animal Health Information System. "Home". [<https://philahis.bai.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020

[2] Philippine Animal Health Information System. "Animal Disease Incident Report". [<https://philahis.bai.gov.ph/Pages/IERep>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Bureau of Animal Industry of the Philippines. "Mandates and Legal Bases".

[<http://www.bai.da.gov.ph/index.php/mandates-and-legal-bases>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that there are laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for owners of animals. The Philippines has an existing Data Privacy Act, but it does not explicitly safeguard the confidentiality of information gathered through animal surveillance, nor does it reference property protections. [1] With regards to data sharing, the act mandates that data sharing between government entities must be covered by a data sharing agreement. The act does prohibit the processing and transfer of sensitive personal information; however, names and animal disease status are not stated as being sensitive. [2] Neither the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Health had relevant information regarding the matter. [3,4]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act 10173 of 15 August 2012. "Data Privacy Act". [<https://www.privacy.gov.ph/data-privacy-act/#20>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] National Privacy Commission. 24 August 2016. "Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Data Privacy Act of 2012". [<https://www.privacy.gov.ph/implementing-rules-and-regulations-of-republic-act-no-10173-known-as-the-data-privacy-act-of-2012/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Agriculture. [<https://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes the need to improve wildlife health surveillance. [1] Although the Philippine Inter-Agency Committee on Zoonoses (PhilCZ) designates the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as being responsible for the control and prevention of zoonotic diseases from wild fauna, it is not clear if

the policy has been operationalized, and the JEE mentions implementation of objectives of the PhilCZ as a gap. [1,2] Although the JEE also specifically mentions the Department of Environment and Natural Resources' Biodiversity Management Bureau (BMB) as being responsible for zoonotic surveillance in the wild, disease monitoring is not explicitly stated as one of the unit's mandates. [1,3] While the Philippines has rather clear policies on the control of zoonotic diseases from livestock, this does not seem to be the case for wildlife. Even the spread of rabies, which is one of the main zoonotic diseases in the country, is not strictly monitored in the wild based on the country's Rabies Prevention and Control Program. [4] Neither the Department of Health nor the Department of Agriculture has further evidence regarding this matter. [5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] The President of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 10, s. 2011. "Creating the Philippine Inter-Agency Committee on Zoonoses, Defining Its Powers, Functions, Responsibilities, Other Related Matters and Providing Funds Thereof". [<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2011/04/11/administrative-order-no-10-s-2011/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Environment and Natural Resources - Biodiversity Management Bureau. "Mandates". [<https://bmb.gov.ph/index.php/about-us/mandates>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Rabies Prevention and Control Program". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/national-rabies-prevention-and-control-program>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Agriculture. [<https://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 6.79

2017

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 3.26

2017

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that there is a national law, plan, or equivalent strategy document, on zoonotic disease, and so, there are no broad-based mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, makes no mention of private sector involvement in the management of zoonotic diseases. [1] The Department of Health's Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response Framework, which "emphasizes a standardized proactive nationwide approach to outbreak detection, prevention and control", does establish the responsibility of private hospitals and clinics to report diseases and also allows for the formation of partnerships with the private sector to promote appropriate disease response and control; however, the Framework does not discuss zoonotic diseases specifically. [2] The Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Anti-Rabies Act also mentions the possible involvement of private dog impounding service providers and private animal shelters in the local government's management and control of rabies. [3] There is no further evidence from the Departments of Health and Agriculture as well as the National Institutes of Health. [4,5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Manual of Procedures for the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/PIDSRMOP3ED_VOL1_2014.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Anti-Rabies Act (RA 9482) and Other Issuances on Rabies Control and Prevention Program". [https://rabies.doh.gov.ph/images/PDF/IRR-INSIDE-REV2_new.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Agriculture. [<https://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that there is a record of the facilities which handle especially dangerous pathogens. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, indicates that the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine under the Department of Health has been compiling an inventory of dangerous pathogens; however, it does not mention whether there is an existing record of the facilities where these pathogens are stored. [1] In 2006, the Department of Health (DOH) designated a national task force to formulate a National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan; however, an inventory of facilities was not one of its responsibilities. [2] While the taskforce was mandated to develop an action plan/policy, there have been no updates regarding its formulation. [3] The DOH, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Science and Technology, and the National Institutes of Health do not have further evidence regarding this matter. [3,4,5,6,7] There is no legislation in the VERTIC database related to biosecurity. [8] Although there is an executive order creating the National Biosafety Network, it does not include biosecurity in its purview as it only focuses on biotechnology and the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol. [9] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [10]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Personnel Order No. 2006-2500 of 15 September 2006. "Creation of a Steering Committee and Task Force / Technical Working Group for Health Sector on National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan". [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwN14gABt_l_bGNNXzB2SVYybK0/view]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] The President of the Philippines. 2006. "Executive Order No. 514".

[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Philippines/PH_Biosafety_Framework_Order_514.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[10] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the country has regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, does not mention any policies related to containment, operation, and reporting regarding dangerous pathogens. [1] Guerrero and Serrano (2017) conducted an assessment of the biorisks in the natural science laboratories of a public university and found that "biosafety is lumped together with chemical safety and little to no mention of biosecurity." [1] While there exists a National Biosafety Framework, there does not seem to be an existing government policy or plan focused on biosecurity based on the VERTIC database. [3,4] The country has a "Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act", but the law does not mention toxins of a biological origin and only focuses on toxic chemical substances. [5] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, Science and Technology and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information on biosecurity policies in laboratories. [6,7,8,9,10] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [11]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Guerrero, Jonathan Jaime G., Serrano, Jocelyn. 2017. "Biorisk assessment of natural science laboratories of Bicol University College of Science, Philippines." *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An International Journal*, 24[1] , 57-71. doi:10.1080/10807039.2017.1362951. Accessed August 2020.

[3] The President of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 514, s. 2006 of 17 March 2006. "Establishing the National Biosafety Framework, Prescribing Guidelines for Its Implementation, Strengthening the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes". [<http://ncbp.dost.gov.ph/19-guidelines/25-executive-order-no-514-s-2006>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Philippines. Republic Act 6969 of 26 October 1990. "An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes". [https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Philippines/PH_Toxic_Substances_Act_6969.PDF]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[10] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[11] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.1c

Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of biosecurity legislation, and consequently, there is no public evidence that an agency has been established to enforce it. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, pinpoints the National Committee on Biosafety under the Department of Science and Technology as being responsible for coordinating biosafety and biosecurity policies in the country; however, based on its mandate, the committee focuses on biosafety measures, particularly in relation to biotechnology. [1,2] While there also exists a National Biosafety Framework, there does not seem to be an existing government policy or plan focused on biosecurity based on the VERTIC database. [3,4] The country has a "Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act", but the law does not mention toxins of a biological origin. [5] A task force was convened to develop a National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan, but there have been no updates regarding the latter's formulation. [6] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, Science and Technology and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [7,8,9,10,11] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [12]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Science and Technology of the Philippines. 3 December 2013. "The DOST Biosafety Committee". [<http://dost-bc.dost.gov.ph/transparency/overview>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] The President of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 514, s. 2006 of 17 March 2006. "Establishing the National Biosafety Framework, Prescribing Guidelines for Its Implementation, Strengthening the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes". [<http://ncbp.dost.gov.ph/19-guidelines/25-executive-order-no-514-s-2006>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Philippines. Republic Act 6969 of 26 October 1990. "An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes". [https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Philippines/PH_Toxic_Substances_Act_6969.PDF]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Personnel Order No. 2006-2500 of 15 September 2006. "Creation of a Steering Committee and Task Force / Technical Working Group for Health Sector on National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan". [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwN14gABt_l_bGNNXzB2SVYybK0/view]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[10] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[11] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[12] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.1d

Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of action taken to consolidate inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, indicates that the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine under the Department of Health has been compiling an inventory of dangerous pathogens; however, it does not mention whether there is a move to regulate the number of facilities where they are stored. [1] In 2006, the Department of Health (DOH) designated a national task force to formulate a National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan; however, an inventory of facilities was not one of its responsibilities, and documentary evidence is unavailable on whether the task force was able to formulate an action plan itself which might include provisions regarding consolidation. [2] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, Science and Technology and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [3,4,5,6,7] There is no legislation in the VERTIC database related to biosecurity. [8] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [9]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Personnel Order No. 2006-2500 of 15 September 2006. "Creation of a Steering Committee and Task Force / Technical Working Group for Health Sector on National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan". [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwN14gABt_l_bGNNXzB2SVYybK0/view]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Research Institute for Tropical Medicine currently uses two methods to detect Ebola: serological tests enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay and the Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). [1] The Institute also promotes the more widespread use of PCR detection through training workshops which it conducts yearly for clinicians, technologists,

researchers, and students. [2] Regarding anthrax, it is unclear what detection methods are being used by the Department of Health (DOH) for humans, but the Department of Agriculture already implements training programs on the use of PCR testing for anthrax. [3,4]

[1] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. July 2014. "RITM prepares for Ebola Virus Disease". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ritmupdate-v01iss02-jul-sep-2014.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Training Workshop on Molecular Diagnosis of Infectious Diseases by PCR". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/training/laboratory-training/training-workshop-on-molecular-diagnosis-of-infectious-diseases-by-pcr/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. 3 December 2019. "DA expands BSS project to enhance integrated animal disease diagnostic lab". [<https://www.da.gov.ph/da-expands-bss-project-to-enhance-integrated-animal-disease-diagnostic-lab/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines requires biosecurity training for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, mentions the presence of several institutions conducting biosecurity training and the establishment of training modules; however, training is not required in all sectors. [1] Although the National Institutes of Health house a National Training Centre for Biosafety and Biosecurity (NTCBB) which aims to train research, academic and healthcare institutions on principles of biosafety and biosecurity, there is no evidence that training under them is mandatory. [2] Based on the services listed on their website, the NTCBB is not yet offering biosecurity-focused training. [3] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, Science and Technology, the National Institutes of Health, and the VERTIC database do not have further evidence regarding this subject. [4,5,6,7,8,9] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [10]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] National Training Center for Biosafety and Biosecurity. "About Us". [<https://ntcbb.com.ph/index.php/about-us/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] National Training Center for Biosafety and Biosecurity. "Services". [<https://ntcbb.com.ph/index.php/services/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[10] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Philippines has existing employment requirements regarding drug testing that may apply to personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens and toxins, while there is also existing regulation requiring mental fitness checks for security personnel employed by private companies. The Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE) requires companies employing more than 10 people to submit all their employees to drug testing. [1] While there is no legislation requiring checks for general personnel with access to dangerous pathogens and toxins, all security personnel working in private firms are required by DOLE to pass the neuro-psychiatric examinations of the Philippine National Police before employment. [2] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, makes no mention of testing or checks for personnel working with dangerous biological materials. [3] The VERTIC database does not list any legislation related to regulations for personnel handling dangerous biological substances. [4] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [5]

[1] Department of Labor and Employment of the Philippines. Department Order No. 53-03 of 2003. "Guidelines for the Implementation of a Drug-Free Workplace Policies and Programs for the Private Sector". [<http://www.oshc.dole.gov.ph/11-local/59-department-order-no-53-03>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Labor and Employment of the Philippines. Department Order No. 150-16 of 2016. "Revised Guidelines Governing the Employment and Working Conditions of Security Guards and Other Private Security Personnel in the Private Security Industry". [<https://blr.dole.gov.ph/news/departament-order-no-150-series-of-2016-revised-guidelines-governing-the-employment-and-working-conditions-of-security-guards-and-other-private-security-personnel-in-the-private-security-industry/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (Categories A and B) from the Philippines, although, as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines agreed to Protocol 9 regarding the transit of dangerous goods. [1] In the agreement, members of ASEAN agreed to adopt the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods - Model Regulations which includes a provision on Category A and B substances, but there is no publicly available document about its actual adoption by the government. [1,2] Due to the COVID-19 situation in the country, the Department of Health issued a guideline regarding the transport of patient specimens, which are under Category B, and the document refers the reader to the "WHO Guidance on regulations for the transport of infectious substances 2019-2020". [3] The Philippines also follows the International Maritime Organization's rules regarding the transport of infectious substances. The Maritime Industry Authority (Marina) is responsible for enforcing safety rules and regulations of shipping vessels and assesses applications for shipping dangerous/hazardous cargo. [4,5] The VERTIC database does not list any legislation that outlines transportation regulations for Category A and Category B substances. [6] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [7]

[1] Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 17 October 2012. "Protocol Dangerous Goods".

[https://asean.org/?static_post=protocol-dangerous-goods-2]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] United Nations. 2011. "Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods - Model Regulations".

[https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev17/English/Rev17_Volume1.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Annex 5. Packaging and Shipment to Another Laboratory".

[<https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/basic-page/ANNEX%205.%20Packaging%20and%20shipment%20to%20another%20laboratory.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Almonte, Liza. 16 August 2015. "PH ports observe international rules on dangerous goods handling". PortCalls Asia.

[<https://www.portcalls.com/ph-ports-observe-international-rules-dangerous-goods-handlingppa/#>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Philippine Coast Guard. 2014. "Memorandum of Agreement - PCG and MARINA".

[<http://www.coastguard.gov.ph/index.php/memorandums/memorandum-of-agreement/pcg-and-marina>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence of national legislation in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and pathogens with pandemic potential. The Strategic Trade Management Act regulates the trade of toxins and pathogens based on their inclusion in the National Strategic Goods List. [1,2] The list specifically refers to "pathogens or toxins, selected or modified (such as altering purity, shelf life, virulence, dissemination characteristics, or resistance to UV radiation) to produce casualties in humans or animals, degrade equipment or damage crops or the environment." [2] Anyone who wishes to engage in the trading of strategic goods is required to first register with the Strategic Trade Management Office (STMO), under the Department of Trade and Industry, and to submit an Application for Authorization and Governmental End-Use Assurances. The STMO reviews the application based on "the sensitivity of the goods, end-use, end-user, and the reliability of each party to the transaction". [3] The trader is also required to document the origin and acquisition of the strategic goods. [3] End-users undergo a certification process which confirms that "(a) the end-user has undertaken to import the goods with specific value and amount; (b) the purpose of the use of the goods; and (c) that the end-user shall not re-export or re-assign the goods without prior written authorization." [1,3]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 10697 of 27 July 2015. "Strategic Trade Management Act".

[https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2015/ra_10697_2015.html]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. 17 July 2018. "National Strategic Goods List - Annex 2".

[<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170831-RA-IRR-10697-RRD-Annex-2-List-of-Dual-Use-Goods.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippines. 25 September 2018. "Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10697".

[<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170831-RA-IRR-10697-RRD.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a

Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Philippines has national biosafety legislation and/or regulations in place. Although the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, cites the existence of the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) as a sign of the country's commitment to biosafety, its mandate is more focused on "evaluating potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments or the introduction of new species and genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks". [1,2,3] The government has also established the National Biosafety Framework which aims to strengthen both biosafety policies with regards to biotechnology and bioengineering and the NCBP itself. [3,4] While both largely focus on agricultural/environmental biosafety, the Biosafety Guidelines published through the NCBP do outline some procedures and standards for personnel and facilities to ensure

biosafety at work; however, they also only focus on people and laboratories that work with biotechnology for genetic engineering. [5] A task force was convened to develop a National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan, but there have been no updates regarding the latter's formulation. [6] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, Science and Technology, the National Institutes of Health, and the VERTIC database do not have further evidence regarding this subject. [7,8,9,10,11] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [12]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [2] Department of Science and Technology of the Philippines. 3 December 2013. "The DOST Biosafety Committee". [<http://dost-bc.dost.gov.ph/transparency/overview>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [3] The President of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 430, s. 1990 on 15 October 1990. "Constituting the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) and for Other Purposes". [<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1990/10/15/executive-order-no-430-s-1990/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [4] The President of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 514, s. 2006 on 17 March 2006. "Establishing the National Biosafety Framework Prescribing Guidelines for Its Implementation, Strengthening the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes". [<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2006/03/17/executive-order-no-514-s-2006/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [5] Department of Science and Technology of the Philippines. September 2014. "The Philippines Biosafety Guidelines for Contained Use of Genetically Modified Organisms". [<https://www.ecolex.org/details/legislation/executive-order-no-514-establishing-the-national-biosafety-framework-lex-faoc076432/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [6] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Personnel Order No. 2006-2500 of 15 September 2006. "Creation of a Steering Committee and Task Force / Technical Working Group for Health Sector on National Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Action Plan". [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwN14gABt_I_bGNNXzB2SVYybK0/view]. Accessed August 2020.
- [7] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [8] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [9] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [10] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [11] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [12] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.4.1b

Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the Philippines has an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations, and there is no evidence of national biosafety legislation and/or regulations from the VERTIC database. [1] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, cites the existence of the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) as a sign of the country's commitment to biosafety and as the main coordinating body regarding biosafety policies in the country. [2] While its current focus is on agricultural/environmental

biosafety in relation to GMOs and biotechnology, the committee has also issued guidelines that include a section on laboratory containment procedures for "rDNAs, pests, and potentially harmful microorganisms" to reduce the possibility of exposure of workers, persons outside the laboratory, and the environment to the harmful organisms. [3,4] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, Science and Technology, and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [5,6,7,8] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [9]

- [1] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [3] Department of Science and Technology of the Philippines. 3 December 2013. "The DOST Biosafety Committee". [<http://dost-bc.dost.gov.ph/transparency/overview>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [4] National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. 28 November 2014. "Philippine Biosafety Guidelines". [<http://www.ncbp.dost.gov.ph/download/guidelines/category/13-philippine-biosafety-guidelines>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [5] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [6] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [7] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [8] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [9] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines requires biosafety training. Although the National Institutes of Health (NIH) launched the National Training Centre for Biosafety and Biosecurity (NTCBB) in 2018, there is no public evidence that training for those working in facilities handling especially dangerous pathogens and toxins is mandatory. [1] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, mentions the need to further develop biosafety training programs and to conduct training for all sectors. [2] The NTCBB's main service is an Advanced Biorisk Officer Training program which "capacitates institutions to designate a certified biorisk officer and facilitate the creation and implementation of Institutional Biosafety and Biosecurity Committee". [3] The Department of Health's Research Institute for Tropical Medicine, as a World Health Organisation Regional Training Centre, also conducts biosafety training. [4] The Departments of Science and Technology and Agriculture facilitated a biosafety training course in 2014, but this was focused on genetic engineering issues. [5] The VERTIC database does not have any relevant legislation on this topic, and the Departments of Health, Agriculture, Science and Technology, and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information either. [6,7,8,9,10] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being

submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [11]

- [1] University of the Philippines Manila. 24 May 2018. "Nat'l Training Center for Biosafety and Biosecurity launched". [https://www.upm.edu.ph/node/2432]. Accessed August 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.
- [3] National Training Center for Biosafety and Biosecurity of the Philippines. "Services". [https://ntcbb.com.ph/index.php/services/]. Accessed August 2020.
- [4] Department of Health - Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. 28 May 2019. "RTC conducts 1st International Training Course on Biosafety". [http://ritm.gov.ph/rtc-conducts-1st-international-training-course-on-biosafety/]. Accessed August 2020.
- [5] Department of Science and Technology - National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. 25 November 2014. "Philippines - Biosafety and the Law Training Course". [http://dost-bc.dost.gov.ph/articles/14-philippines-biosafety-and-the-law-training-course]. Accessed August 2020.
- [6] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/]. Accessed August 2020.
- [7] Department of Health of the Philippines. [http://www.doh.gov.ph/]. Accessed August 2020.
- [8] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [http://www.da.gov.ph/]. Accessed August 2020.
- [9] Department of Science and Technology. [http://www.dost.gov.ph/]. Accessed August 2020.
- [10] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [http://nih.upm.edu.ph/]. Accessed August 2020.
- [11] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines]. Accessed August 2020.

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens and toxins. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, indicates that the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine under the Department of Health has been compiling an inventory of dangerous pathogens; however, it does not mention whether it keeps track of all research work on substances with pandemic potential. [1] Although the Strategic Trade Management Office (STMO) currently regulates the trade and use of strategic goods, including dangerous toxins and pathogens, through its registration system of traders and brokers and its database of goods, there is no evidence that an assessment has been done regarding ongoing research. [2] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, Science and Technology, the National Institutes of Health, and the VERTIC database do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [3,4,5,6,7,8] Although the Philippines has submitted five

Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [9]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [2] Philippines. 25 September 2018. "Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10697". [<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170831-RA-IRR-10697-RRD.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [4] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [5] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [6] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [7] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [8] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [9] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of legislation/regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and other dual-use research. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, mentions that some tertiary institutions actively review research proposals before approval; however, this practice does not seem to be standardized or regulated. [1] While the Philippines currently regulates the trade of these dangerous goods through the Strategic Trade Management Act, its focus is on regulating their movement and trade. Although the Act does require compliance checks of users to ensure that the stated purpose for their sale is the same as the actual use, it does not explicitly discuss oversight of dual-use research. [2] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, Science and Technology, and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [3,4,5,6] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [7]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [2] Philippines. 25 September 2018. "Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10697". [<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170831-RA-IRR-10697-RRD.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [4] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [5] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [6] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [7] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

August 2020.

1.5.1c

Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of an agency responsible for the oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and/or pathogens with pandemic potential. Although the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, identifies the National Committee on Biosafety as the unit responsible for regulations regarding biosafety, its focus is more on management of biotechnology research. [1,2] While the Strategic Trade Management Office currently monitors the trade of these goods and manages a database of traders with information on the purpose of the goods' sale, oversight of dual-use research is not part of its mandate. The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, and Science and Technology are members of the National Security Council - Strategic Trade Management Committee; however, the Committee is focused on the movement of goods and does not oversee research done with them. [3] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, Science and Technology, and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [4,5,6,7,8,9] Although the Philippines has submitted five Confidence Building Measures Reports with the most recent report being submitted in 2020, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [10]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Science and Technology - National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. "Responsibilities of the IBC". [<http://dost-bc.dost.gov.ph/institutional-biosafety-committee/responsibilities-of-the-ibc>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippines. 25 September 2018. "Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10697". [<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170831-RA-IRR-10697-RRD.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[10] Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Philippines". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of national legislation, regulation, policy, or other guidance requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before selling. The Strategic Trade Management Act regulates the movement of strategic goods in the country; however, DNA is not in the list of strategic goods. [1,2] DNA is also not listed in the Philippine National Trade Repository. [3] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, makes no mention of DNA screening. [4] While the National Committee on Biosafety has released guidelines on the contained use of GMOs, it has not issued a similar document on screening of synthesized DNA against known pathogens. [5] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, National Defence, Science and Technology, the National Institutes of Health, and the VERTIC database do not have information on this subject. [6,7,8,9,10,11]

[1] Philippines. 25 September 2018. "Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10697".

[<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170831-RA-IRR-10697-RRD.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. 17 July 2018. "National Strategic Goods List - Annex 2".

[<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/08aug/20170831-RA-IRR-10697-RRD-Annex-2-List-of-Dual-Use-Goods.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippine National Trade Repository. "Commodity Search". [http://www.pntr.gov.ph/search-results-page/?frm_search=dna]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines. "Guidelines". [<http://dost-bc.dost.gov.ph/download/guidelines>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[10] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[11] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre. "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/p/>]. Accessed August 2020.

1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

World Health Organization

1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is publicly available evidence that the national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. According to the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, there are 32 priority diseases that the laboratory system tests for, including the five core tests identified by the WHO. [1] Based on a Department of Health (DOH) circular from 2013, all DOH-level labs and hospitals are able to test for all six diseases, but only four -- poliovirus (virus culture), HIV (serology), tuberculosis (microscopy), and typhoid (bacterial culture) -- follow the WHO-specified diagnostic tests. [2] Apart from the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM), which is a national reference laboratory, there are five sub-national/regional laboratories that conduct real-time PCR testing for the influenza virus. [3,4] The RITM's Department of Parasitology, as a WHO Collaborating Centre for Malaria Diagnosis, also conducts rapid diagnostic testing for malaria. [5] There is no evidence from the DOH or the National Institutes of Health that the four country-specific tests have been defined. [6,7]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Circular No. 2013-0435 of 14 October 2013. "Implementation of Service Capabilities of Laboratories at Various Levels". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=348512>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. "Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses".

[<http://ritm.gov.ph/reference-laboratories/national-reference-laboratories/influenza-and-other-respiratory-viruses/>].

Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2015-0036 of 17 August 2015. "Recognition and Terms of Reference of the Subnational Laboratories to Augment Laboratory Support for National Surveillance and Outbreak Investigations". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=337048>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. "WHO Collaborating Centre (WHOCC) for Malaria Diagnosis". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/reference-laboratories/who-recognized-laboratories/who-collaborating-centre-whocc-for-malaria-diagnosis/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence of a national plan/strategy for conducting testing during a public health emergency.

The Department of Health (DOH) issued guidelines on "Minimum Health System Capacity Standards for COVID-19". The document aimed to increase testing capacity to 30,000 per day by May 30th by augmenting the number of laboratories with PCR-testing capabilities to one per region, and at the provincial level, requiring at least 10 staff with training on "proper collection, packaging, and transportation of samples for COVID-19 testing" and "at least 30 days supply of testing swabs, reagents, and other commodities for testing in laboratories". [1]

There also exists an Inter-Agency Taskforce for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases (IATF-EID) which is mandated to "establish a system to identify, screen, and assist Filipinos suspected or confirmed to be infected with EID [emerging infectious disease]". This body was formed in 2014 and was tasked with formulating an EID Preparedness Manual that would form the basis for the government's response and protocol to a disease outbreak; however, there is no public evidence that the manual has been drafted. [2] Although a national health emergency plan exists, it does not discuss testing specifically and only mentions it in context of the responsibilities of government/health sector units. [3]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2020-0016 of 4 May 2020. "Minimum Health System Capacity Standards for COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Strategies".

[<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=653156>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] The President of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 168, s. 2014. "Creating the Inter-Agency Taskforce for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases in the Philippines". [<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2014/05/26/executive-order-no-168-s-2014/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11332 of 23 July 2018. "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act". [https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11332_2019.html]. Accessed August 2020.

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Only the Philippines' San Lazaro Hospital HIV/AIDS National Reference Laboratory has publicly indicated ISO 15189:2013 accreditation by the Philippine Accreditation Bureau. [1,2] The other four national reference laboratories only mention accreditation in ISO 9001 which is more focused on process quality management. [3,4,5,6,7,8] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, noted the need for accreditation of national and regional reference laboratories. [9]

[1] San Lazaro Hospital of the Philippines. "Accreditations". [<http://slh.doh.gov.ph/transparency/iso-9001-2008>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] San Lazaro Hospital of the Philippines. "Certificate of Accreditation". [http://slh.doh.gov.ph/images/pdf/accreditations/NRL_SACCL_dti_accreditation.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. "Philippine National Influenza Center". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/reference-laboratories/national-reference-laboratories/philippine-national-influenza-center/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. "Tuberculosis". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/reference-laboratories/national-reference-laboratories/tuberculosis/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. "National Poliovirus Laboratory". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/reference-laboratories/who-recognized-laboratories/national-poliovirus-laboratory/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. "WHO Collaborating Centre (WHOCC) for Malaria Diagnosis". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/reference-laboratories/who-recognized-laboratories/who-collaborating-centre-whocc-for-malaria-diagnosis/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Carmona, Chicco Emmanuel. 10 July 2017. "RITM is 9001:2015 certified". Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. [<http://ritm.gov.ph/ritm-is-iso-2015-certified/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] International Organization for Standardization. "ISO 9001 Quality Management". [<https://www.iso.org/iso-9001-quality-management.html>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Two of the five national reference laboratories have evidence of undergoing external quality assessment. The WHO Collaborating Centre for Malaria Diagnosis regularly undergoes external quality assessment (EQA) by the WHO. [1] The San Lazaro Hospital HIV/AIDS National Reference Laboratory, as part of the accreditation process for ISO 15189:2003, also underwent EQA review. [2,3] Although the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, mentions the Department of Health's requirement for all clinical laboratories to undergo EQA, it makes no mention of this requirement for

the national reference laboratories. [4]

[1] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. "WHO Collaborating Centre (WHOCC) for Malaria Diagnosis". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/reference-laboratories/who-recognized-laboratories/who-collaborating-centre-whocc-for-malaria-diagnosis/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] San Lazaro Hospital of the Philippines. "Accreditations". [<http://slh.doh.gov.ph/transparency/iso-9001-2008>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] San Lazaro Hospital of the Philippines. "Certificate of Accreditation". [http://slh.doh.gov.ph/images/pdf/accreditations/NRL_SACCL_dti_accreditation.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a

Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a nationwide specimen transport system in the Philippines. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes the need to improve the specimen transport and referral system. [1] The Research Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM) and the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) both have organizational guidelines concerning this matter, but they are disease-specific and focus more on proper packaging of specimens for transport. [The RITM has published guidelines with regards to tuberculosis and leptospirosis test specimens, while the BAI based its guidelines largely on the types of samples collected and only specifies one disease, rabies. [2,3,4] The RITM has also recently issued interim guidelines on the handling and transport of COVID-19 specimens. While the document cites the Department of Health's "Interim Guidelines on Transportation of Biological Specimens", there is no evidence of this document on the internet. [5] The Department of Health's National Standards for Infection Control in Healthcare Facilities only states that transportation procedures must be made available by facilities with a microbiology laboratory, but these procedures can be different for each laboratory. [6] The Departments of Health and Agriculture and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [7,8,9]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. 2017. "Manual on Collection, Storage & Transport of Specimens for TB Testing". [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_tFmvP7R8aVZ2g1dXdQVjdPaVU/view]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. 29 August 2012. "Guidelines for Collection and Transport of Specimen for Laboratory Diagnosis of Pathogenic *Leptospira* spp.". [https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_tFmvP7R8aVcHp2WFBCUDlhUkE/view]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Bureau of Animal Industry of the Philippines. "Laboratory Testing/Analysis for Animal Disease Diagnosis". [<https://www.bai.gov.ph/index.php/regulatory/item/371-laboratory-training-analysis-for-animal-disease-diagnosis>]. Accessed August 2020.

August 2020.

[5] Research Institute for Tropical Medicine of the Philippines. 15 March 2020. "Interim Biosafety Guidelines for Laboratories Handling SARS-COV-2 (COVID 19) Specimen". [<http://ritm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Interim-Biosafety-Guidelines-for-Laboratories-Handling-and-Testing-SARS-COV-2-Version-2.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2009. "National Standards in Infection Control for Healthcare Facilities". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/NATIONAL_STANDARDS_IN_INFECTION_CONTROL_FOR_HEALTH.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[9] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a

Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a plan to rapidly authorize/license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system during an outbreak. Due to the COVID-19 situation, the Department of Health issued national guidelines for securing a license to become a COVID-19 testing laboratory. This was done to increase the number of laboratories in the country amidst the pandemic. The guidelines are applicable to all laboratories, whether public or private. However, they only apply to COVID-19, and there is no evidence that there is an overall plan to rapidly authorize laboratories should another disease outbreak occur. [1] The Departments of Health, Agriculture, and the National Institutes of Health do not have any additional information regarding this matter. [2,3,4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2020-0014 of 7 April 2020. "Guidelines in Securing a License to Operate a COVID-19 Testing Laboratory in the Philippines".

[<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=652860>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<http://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis

= 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence of an event-based surveillance system. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines (JEE), conducted in 2018, notes the presence of the Event-Based Surveillance and Response system (ESR) managed by the Department of Health's Epidemiology Bureau. The ESR allows for all administrative levels as well as the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine and the Bureau of Quarantine to submit data on public health events. The system also allows for the participation of health actors at the field level. The ESR's online reporting tool gives real-time reports. [1,2] However, there are still gaps in data management and validation. [1] The JEE cited "major reporting delays for measles with suboptimal completeness and timeliness of the overall reporting system." [1]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2014. "Event-Based Surveillance and Response - Manual of Procedures". [<http://www.ncroffice.doh.gov.ph/HealthStatistics?p=Py9WRi6jnZC3yQIQWf4ZO0tj%2B6aZXQohKR4uUbaIXMiobaP9mbkCFn3LN1EN3DWWoZA8TCwCaJlAQ%2FZKR0ONFT1O9xiLBAE7VDk%2BpVOUso3NV53FTEsA9S1hdU0EKpsvxy8O%2FaK5tHRdHQFdGAGg44ANQ7ZPAijErTITUw6n%2Frka0E0sXolcKK%2FoUcf%2FzK%2BggBmqPo1X2SSETU2FpYOvefTyyJmO1ZgBatH57x6JBXeZCbW4nnU5pN7T2R14bLUPwpuZV%2FOQ5fx6aRVL6A9Xz5i0FCm1OgW2%2FzUfNrLM%3D>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years. Apart from the outbreak of COVID-19 in the Philippines in 2020, the first case of which was reported on 30 January 2020, the Philippines also reported two outbreaks of polio in 2019. [1,2]

[1] World Health Organization. 9 May 2020. "Coronavirus in the Philippines".

[<https://www.who.int/philippines/emergencies/covid-19-in-the-philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organization. 2019. "Emergencies preparedness, response".

[<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2019/en/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Philippines operates electronic surveillance systems at both the national and sub-national levels through the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (PIDSRS) and the Event-Based Surveillance and Response (ESR) system. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that the PIDSRS uses sentinel surveillance, while the ESR allows for reporting down to the local level. [1] The PIDSRS is a "process of coordinating, prioritizing, and streamlining of multiple disease surveillance systems into a unified national disease surveillance system that combines core surveillance activities and support functions into a single integrated activity for the purpose of making the system more efficient and

effective in providing timely, accurate and relevant information for action." [1] At the sub-national level, surveillance information is consolidated by Disease Surveillance Coordinators from physical forms submitted by Disease Reporting Units; both hard and electronic copies of the consolidated information are submitted to respective Provincial Epidemiology Surveillance Units and Disease Surveillance Officers (DSOs). [2] By contrast, while the ESR is managed by the Department of Health, it does not have structured reporting units as anyone with health information can make a report. [3] Both systems consolidate information electronically; however, there are issues with data management. [1]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. April 2014. "Manual of Procedures - Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/PIDSRMOP3ED_VOL1_2014.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2014. "Event-Based Surveillance and Response - Manual of Procedures". [<http://www.ncroffice.doh.gov.ph/HealthStatistics?p=Py9WRi6jnZC3yQIQWf4ZO0tj%2B6aZXQohKR4uUbalXMiobaP9mbkCFn3LN1IEN3DWWoZA8TCwCaJAQ%2FZKR0ONFT1O9xiLBAEe7VDk%2BpVOUso3NV53FTEsA9S1hdU0EKpsvxy8O%2FaK5tHRdHQFdGAGg44ANQ7ZPAijErTITUw6n%2Frka0E0sXolcKK%2FoUcf%2FzK%2BggBmqPo1X2SSETU2FpYOVefTyyJmO1ZgBatH57x6JBXeZCbcW4nnU5pN7T2R14bLUPwpuZV%2F0Q5fx6aRVL6A9Xz5i0FCm1OgW2%2FzUfNrLM%3D>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the Philippines, conducted in 2018 and published in 2019, notes that the Event-Based Surveillance and Response (ESR) system managed by the Department of Health provides real-time reporting of data. [1,2] According to the JEE, "the ESR uses an online electronic reporting tool or real-time reporting at all administrative levels within the health sector." The online ESR platform allows "data on health events [to be] accessed anytime and anywhere." [2] While the Philippines Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (PIDSR) system is also electronic, its data is entered offline and reports are analyzed on a weekly basis.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2014. "Event-Based Surveillance and Response - Manual of Procedures". [<http://www.ncroffice.doh.gov.ph/HealthStatistics?p=Py9WRi6jnZC3yQIQWf4ZO0tj%2B6aZXQohKR4uUbalXMiobaP9mbkCFn3LN1IEN3DWWoZA8TCwCaJAQ%2FZKR0ONFT1O9xiLBAEe7VDk%2BpVOUso3NV53FTEsA9S1hdU0EKpsvxy8O%2FaK5tHRdHQFdGAGg44ANQ7ZPAijErTITUw6n%2Frka0E0sXolcKK%2FoUcf%2FzK%2BggBmqPo1X2SSETU2FpYOVefTyyJmO1ZgBatH57x6JBXeZCbcW4nnU5pN7T2R14bLUPwpuZV%2F0Q5fx6aRVL6A9Xz5i0FCm1OgW2%2FzUfNrLM%3D>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Manual of Procedures for the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/PIDSRMOP3ED_VOL1_2014.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence that electronic health records are being used, but they are not yet widespread. The Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) has certified six electronic health record systems. [1] Of these, the most widely used is the Community Health Information Tracking System (CHITS), but it has only been adopted by 171 health units out of 2587 nationwide. [2,3,4] With the passage of the Universal Healthcare Law, the Department of Health (DOH) has been promoting the use of electronic health records more as part of the Philippine Health Information Exchange system which would store patient records to make them available to different healthcare facilities/workers. [5]

[1] Philippine Health Insurance Agency. Advisory No. 2016-0040 of 2016. "Electronic Medical Record System".

[<https://www.philhealth.gov.ph/advisories/2016/adv2016-0040.pdf>]

[2] Ongkeko, Arturo M., R. Fernandez, P. Sylim, et al. 2017. "Community Health Information and Tracking System (CHITS): Lessons from Eight Years Implementation of a Pioneer Electronic Medical Record System in the Philippines". Acta medica Philippina 50

[4] :1-16. [<https://www.researchgate.net/deref/http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.47895%2Famp.v50i4.769>]

[3] Philippine Council for Health Research and Development. 28 May 2020. "Community Health Information Tracking System (CHITS)". [<https://www.pchrd.dost.gov.ph/index.php/programs-and-services/create-article/6556-community-health-information-tracking-system-chits>]. Accessed March 2021.

[4] World Health Organization. 2018. "The Philippines Health System Review".

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/274579/9789290226734-eng.pdf>]. Accessed March 2021.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Philippine Health Information Exchange".

[<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/index.php/phie/overview#>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4.1b

Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippine public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in the country. While the Department of Health has been promoting the use of electronic systems for public health management, it is still currently at the testing phase of the Philippine Health Information Exchange (PHIE) system. [1] There have not been many updates regarding the status of the PHIE, and the most recent news from their website was from 2018. [2] Neither the Department of Health nor the National Institutes of Health has further information regarding this matter. [3,4]

[1] Miranda, Maristela. 20 September 2019. GMA News Online. "Health info exchanges: Promises and challenges".

[<https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/opinion/content/708730/health-info-exchanges-promises-and-possibilities/story/>].

Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines - eHealth. 12-14 September 2018. "Consultative Planning on the Electronic Health Record System (EHRS) Validation". [<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/index.php/100-consultative-planning-on-the-electronic-health-record-system-ehrs-validation?layout=blog>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4.1c

Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that there are data standards for electronic health records. Although some hospitals have begun to use electronic medical records and the Department of Health has set guidelines on telemedicine, data standards for electronic health records were not mentioned. [1] While the Philippine Health Information Exchange puts importance on setting health data standards to ensure interoperability between health facilities and a National Experts Group on Health Data Standards and Privacy has been formed, only a non-final draft of the National eHealth Information Interoperability Standards Catalogue has been uploaded to the Department of Health (DOH) website. [2,3,4] Neither the DOH and the National Institutes of Health have further documentary evidence regarding this subject. [5,6]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Memorandum Circular No. 2020-0034 of 14 July 2020. "Telemedicine Practice Guidelines". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=655607>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health, Department of Science and Technology, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Joint Administrative Order No. 2016-001 of 20 January 2016. "Implementation of the Philippine Health Information Exchange". [<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/images/HealthPrivacyCode.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "National EHealth Information Interoperability Standards Change Management Manual". [<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/images/StandardsChangeManagement-Re0108152016.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. "National EHealth Information Interoperability Standards Catalogue". [<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/images/eHealthPDF/StandardsCatalogue-R0108012016-B.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a

Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Department of Health (DOH) manages the National Rabies Information System (NaRIS) which allows data sharing between stakeholders working on rabies mitigation in the country. For health professionals, it serves as both an online bite and rabies registry and inventory card where patient-based data can be inputted and an informational dashboard and database that can guide decision-making regarding the country's rabies prevention program. [1,2] The Department of

Agriculture is the main agency partner of the DOH, but stakeholders also include local government units, non-governmental organisations, and the World Health Organization. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the agency responsible for environmental and wildlife affairs, however, is not a named stakeholder on the NaRIS website. [2] To promote an integrated approach to rabies surveillance and to capture data comprehensively, the government has linked NaRIS to the Bureau of Animal Industry's Philippine Animal Health Information System. [3] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, however, notes that sharing of surveillance data between the animal, human, and environment sectors is still lacking. [4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. "The NaRIS". [<https://rabies.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "National Rabies Information System". [<http://ro5.doh.gov.ph/index.php/links/info-systems/14-links/29-naris>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] World Health Organization. 2015. "Rationale for Investing in the Global Elimination of Dog-Mediated Human Rabies". [http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/185195/9789241509558_eng.pdf;jsessionid=5DC6E68C3487AF2C08295D0C1A72D6AE?sequence=1]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Department of Health (DOH) makes de-identified surveillance data on diseases available regularly. While there are reports on priority diseases on the DOH website, almost none of the documents uploaded are from 2020, and for the Weekly Disease Surveillance Reports, the latest come from 2018. Reports for HIV/AIDS are the only ones with updates for 2020. [1] The HIV/AIDS report covering the months from April to June of 2020 presents the total number of cases in the period, the geographic regions where the cases were reported, summary demographic information of the infected, and the modes of transmission of the disease. [2] Similarly, the most recent Influenza Surveillance Report, which was from 2019, reports total cases/deaths, geographic distribution, and demographic information. [3]

However, the DOH does have a COVID tracker which is updated daily with information on the number of cases (total, recovered, deaths), geographic distribution of the disease outbreak, and testing being done. [4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2020. "Statistics". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/statistics>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health - Epidemiology Bureau. April-June 2020. "HIV/AIDS & Art Registry of the Philippines". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/statistics/EB_HARP_Apr-Jun_AIDSreg2020.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health - Epidemiology Bureau. January 1-June 29, 2019. "Influenza/SARI Monthly Surveillance Report No. 6".

[<https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/statistics/2019%20Influenza%20%20SARI%20Monthly%20Surveillance%20Report%20No.%206.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. "COVID-19 Case Tracker". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/2019-nCov>]. Accessed

August 2020.

2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Department of Health has a COVID-19 case tracker which shows data on total cases, recoveries, and deaths. It also shows how many cases were added on that particular day. The data can be filtered by region and is presented in graphical format as well. [1] There also exists a map of the data to show the geographic spread of the outbreak. [2]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. "COVID-19 Case Tracker". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/2019-nCov>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "COVID-19". [<http://geoportal.gov.ph/gpapps/covidapp>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Data Privacy Act of 2012 helps ensure the confidentiality of individual health data processed through the Philippine Health Information Exchange (PHIE), which is "a platform for secure electronic access and efficient exchange of health data and/or information among health facilities, health care providers, health information organizations, and government agencies." [1,2] According to Joint Administrative Order 2016-0001 of the Department of Health, Department of Science and Technology, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, the PHIE is grounded by the principles of the "primacy of human and protection of health information privacy." [2] By default, patient information is de-identified in the PHIE Data Warehouse and only information necessary for statistical reference is stored. [3]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 10173 of 25 July 2011. "An Act Protecting Individual Personal Information in Information and Communications Systems in the Government and Private Sector, Creating for this Purpose a National Privacy Commission, and for Other Purposes". [<https://www.privacy.gov.ph/data-privacy-act/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health, Department of Science and Technology, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Joint Administrative Order No. 2016-0001 of 2016. "Implementation of the Philippine Health Information Exchange". [<http://www.pchrd.dost.gov.ph/index.php/downloads/category/110-joint-administrative-order?download=549:joint-administrative-order-no-2016-0001-implementation-of-the-philippine-health-information-exchange-phie-and-joint-administrative-order-no-2016-0002-privacy-guidelines-for-the-implementation-of-the-phie>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health, Department of Science and Technology, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. "Health Privacy Code Implementing the Joint Administrative Order No. 2016-0002, 'Privacy Guidelines for the Implementation of the Philippine Health Information Exchange'". [<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/images/HealthPrivacyCode.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4.4b

Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Privacy Guidelines for the Implementation of the Philippine Health Information Exchange follows standards set by the Data Privacy Act and the Cybercrime Prevention Act. [1] Chapter VII of the Data Privacy Act of 2012 discusses the Philippine government's responsibilities in securing personal information in government records. [2] Heads of government units are mandated to strictly adhere to security policies set by the National Privacy Commission and to follow the standards of the information and communications technology industry to prevent data breaches, which the law defines as "break[ing] in any way into any system where personal and sensitive personal information is stored." [2] The Cybercrime Prevention Act, while not explicitly mentioning cyber attacks, outlines measures against crimes focused on computer systems and the data stored in them. [3]

[1] Department of Health, Department of Science and Technology, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. "Health Privacy Code Implementing the Joint Administrative Order No. 2016-0002, 'Privacy Guidelines for the Implementation of the Philippine Health Information Exchange'". [<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/images/HealthPrivacyCode.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. Republic Act No. 10173 of 25 July 2011. "An Act Protecting Individual Personal Information in Information and Communications Systems in the Government and Private Sector, Creating for this Purpose a National Privacy Commission, and for Other Purposes". [<https://www.privacy.gov.ph/data-privacy-act/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippines. Republic Act No. 10175 of 25 July 2011. "Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012". [<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2012/09/12/republic-act-no-10175/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a

Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the Philippines has made a commitment via public statements, legislation, and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region but for one disease only (covid-19).

The foreign minister of the Philippines made a joint statement with ASEAN and the People's Republic of China on February 20, 2020 to increase cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic to share information in a timely manner which includes "exchanging available epidemiological information, technical guidelines and solution for epidemic prevention and control, diagnosis, treatment and surveillance." [1]

Although there exists a national policy for the implementation of International Health Regulations (IHR) and the Asia-Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED) which pinpoints the National Epidemiology Center (now the Epidemiology Bureau of

the Department of Health [DOH]) as the unit responsible for sharing public health event updates to the World Health Organization and other partners, it does not specifically discuss the sharing of surveillance data with other countries. [2]

The Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act only discusses sharing of surveillance data in the local context and does not indicate whether this will be made available to other countries in the region. [3] While the Philippines is part of the ASEAN Regional Animal Health Information System (ARAHIS), which encourages reporting of suspected outbreaks and information sharing, it is unclear whether it does so or would do so during a public health emergency. [4,5] Neither the Department of Health nor the National Institutes of Health have further evidence regarding this matter. [6,7] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, does not discuss surveillance data sharing in an international context. [8]

[1] Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). "Statement of the Special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting on the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)". [<https://asean.org/statement-special-asean-china-foreign-ministers-meeting-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/>]. Accessed 8 September 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2012-0022 of 15 October 2012. "National Policy For The Implementation of International Health Regulation (IHR) and Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases (APSED) in the Philippines". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336911>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11332 of 23 July 2018. "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act". [https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11332_2019.html]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] ASEAN Regional Animal Health Information System. [<http://www.arahis.oie.int/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] World Organisation for Animal Health. 2018. "Manual 6: Animal health information systems". [<https://rr-asia.oie.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/seacfm-manual-6.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a national system that provides support to conduct contact tracing at the sub-national level in the event of a public health emergency.

For the COVID-19 outbreak, the Department of the Interior and Local Government was designated as the agency responsible for contact tracing by the Inter-Agency Taskforce on Emerging Infectious Diseases. It has issued guidelines on the qualifications of contact tracers and the composition of contact trace teams; however, there are no details regarding their

training and funding. [1,2] Neither the Department of Health nor the National Institutes of Health have further information regarding this subject. [3,4]

[1] Department of the Interior and Local Government of the Philippines. 18 June 2020. "DILG: Over 80,000 contact tracers needed nationwide for expanded contact tracing efforts". [<https://www.dilg.gov.ph/news/DILG-Over-80000-contact-tracers-needed-nationwide-for-expanded-contact-tracing-efforts/NC-2020-1205>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of the Interior and Local Government of the Philippines. Memorandum Circular No. 2020-077 of 24 April 2020. [https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=https://dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/issuances/memo_circulars/dilg-memocircular-2020424_a6a4af4ba9.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence that the Philippines provides medical support to infected people.

In response to COVID-19, the Philippines passed the "Bayanihan to Heal as One Act" on March 24, 2020 which outlines welfare and medical support for sectors that are highly affected by the pandemic. It ensures medical coverage to anyone infected with COVID, and in particular, it provides more income support for health workers, whether public and private. [1] While it does not include provisions on job security/paycheck guarantees, it does call for a subsidy of PHP 5-8,000 to be given to 18 million low-income households per month for two months; it does not cover people from higher income classes who might be affected by isolation policies though. While the law mainly prioritized the low-income population, many city/municipal governments also provided financial assistance to households. According to a survey of the general population, about 70% of Filipino households received some sort of financial assistance. [2]

Neither the Department of Health nor the National Institutes of Health have further information regarding this topic. [3,4]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11469 of 23 March 2020. "Bayanihan to Heal as One Act".

[<https://www.senate.gov.ph/Bayanihan-to-Heal-as-One-Act-RA-11469.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Nazario, Dhel. 27 July 2020. Manila Bulletin. "70% of Filipinos received COVID-19 financial aid from gov't - survey".

[<https://mb.com.ph/2020/07/27/70-of-filipinos-received-covid-19-financial-aid-from-govt-survey/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

The Philippine government does not make available de-identified contact tracing information with regards to COVID-19. Neither the Department of Health's COVID case tracker nor the government's officially endorsed contact tracing portal/app provides information on community/"linked" cases. However, in the pandemic's early stages when there were fewer cases, news reports from the government still contained information on contact tracing. [3] This seems to have been discontinued.

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. "COVID-19 Case Tracker". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/2019-nCov>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Stay Safe Philippines. [<https://www.staysafe.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. 9 March 2020. "DOH Reports 10 New COVID-19 Patients; Cases Up to 20". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/doh-press-release/doh-reports-10-new-covid-19-patients-cases-up-to-20>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency but only during the active response to COVID-19.

As a unit of the Department of Health, the Bureau of Quarantine (BOQ) is responsible for "conduct[ing] health surveillance on the country's ports and airports of entry and sub-ports as well as the airports and ports of origin of international flights and vessels." [1] For the management of COVID-19, the DOH has issued guidelines on the assessment of cases, which details screening/quarantine processes for travelers. This directs the BOQ to use a decision tool to identify possible COVID patients at all ports of entry. Travelers that are identified as "persons under investigation" (PUI), or likely COVID carriers, are immediately reported to surveillance units, so that they can be isolated and their contacts can be traced. [2] These guidelines, though, only apply to COVID currently. Neither the Department of Health nor the Bureau of Immigration has further information regarding this subject. [3,4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 168 s. 2004 of 9 September 2004. "National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336597>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Circular No. 2020-0080 of 26 February 2020. [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=652081>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines. [<https://www.immigration.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

According to the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) is strongly embedded in the Department of Health. [1] The Philippines FETP is a two-year course which has been accredited by the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET). It is currently run and managed by the Epidemiology Bureau of the Department of Health. [1,2] There is no clear evidence that the Philippine government provides resources to send citizens to applied epidemiology training abroad according to the Department of Health or TEPHINET. [3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. "Philippines Field Epidemiology Training Program". [<https://www.tephinet.org/training-programs/philippines-field-epidemiology-training-program>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. [<https://www.tephinet.org/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

According to the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, the Philippines' FETP program includes two veterinarians among its graduates. [1] In its call for more field epidemiologists, the government also explicitly stated that veterinarians are welcome to the training course. [2] There also exists a Regional Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians that provides training to veterinarians from Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines. The program, however, is based in Thailand and there is no public evidence from the Department of Health and TEPHINET that the Philippine government provides resources for training abroad. [3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] MIMS Today. 22 January 2018. "DOH seeking public health professionals to become 'field epidemiologists'". [<https://today.mims.com/doh-seeking-public-health-professionals-to-become--field-epidemiologists->]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. "Regional Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians (Southeast Asia)". [<https://www.tephinet.org/training-programs/regional-field-epidemiology-training-program-for-veterinarians-southeast-asia>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. [<https://www.tephinet.org/>]. Accessed August 2020.

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a

Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

Current Year Score: 2

The Philippines currently has an overarching plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. The purpose of Republic Act 1132 is "to protect the people from public health threats through the efficient and effective disease surveillance of notifiable diseases including emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases,

diseases for elimination and eradication, epidemics, and health events including chemical, radio-nuclear and environmental agents of public health concern and provide an effective response system in compliance with the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO)." The law is focused on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases which it defines as diseases that "(1) have not occurred in humans before; (2) have occurred previously but affected only small numbers of people in isolated areas; (3) have occurred throughout human history but have only recently been recognized as a distant disease due to an infectious agent; (4) are caused by previously undetected or unknown infectious agents; (5) are due to mutant or resistant strains of a causative organism; and (6) once were major health problems in the country, and then declined dramatically, but are again becoming health problems for a significant proportion of the population." [1] The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the law outline the process for declaring a national public health emergency and define the responsibilities of different national government agencies and units of the Department of Health. It lists the country's disease surveillance and response systems and explains what role each system plays. It also explains the disease response responsibilities of the health sector, private companies, and the general public depending on the disease type. [2]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11332 of 23 July 2018. "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act". [https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11332_2019.html]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 28 August 2020. "The 2020 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 11332, or the Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act." [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/node/24268>]. Accessed September 2020.

3.1.1b

If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Philippines' overarching plan was enacted in 2018. The purpose of Republic Act 1132 is "to protect the people from public health threats through the efficient and effective disease surveillance of notifiable diseases including emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, diseases for elimination and eradication, epidemics, and health events including chemical, radio-nuclear and environmental agents of public health concern and provide an effective response system in compliance with the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO)." The law is focused on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases which it defines as diseases that "(1) have not occurred in humans before; (2) have occurred previously but affected only small numbers of people in isolated areas; (3) have occurred throughout human history but have only recently been recognized as a distant disease due to an infectious agent; (4) are caused by previously undetected or unknown infectious agents; (5) are due to mutant or resistant strains of a causative organism; and (6) once were major health problems in the country, and then declined dramatically, but are again becoming health problems for a significant proportion of the population." [1]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11332 of 23 July 2018. "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act". [https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11332_2019.html]. Accessed August 2020.

3.1.1c

If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippine public health emergency response plan includes considerations for paediatric and other vulnerable populations. In discussing the response activities for the general public, the RA 11332 does mention different populations/needs. [1] There also exists a Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response Framework which includes a chapter on epidemic response, but the document does not discuss vulnerable nor paediatric populations. [2] Neither the Department of Health nor the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council has documentary evidence regarding this matter. [3,4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. 28 August 2020. "The 2020 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 11332, or the Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act." [https://www.doh.gov.ph/node/24268]. Accessed September 2020.

[2] Department of Health - National Epidemiology Center. April 2014. "Manual of Procedures for the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response".

[https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/PIDSRMOP3ED_VOL1_2014.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [https://www.doh.gov.ph/]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/]. Accessed August 2020.

3.1.1d

Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a

Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

In the Philippines, there is insufficient public evidence that the government has specific mechanisms for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that a private sector leader is part of the National Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), which is responsible for managing all types of emergencies in the country. [1] The role and responsibilities of the private sector representative, however, are not defined. [2] Aside from the NDRRMC, the Manual of Operations on Health Emergency Disaster and Response Management mentions the need for the command centres in each region and the Department of Health's (DOH's) Central Office to have alternative communications facilities prior to an emergency, and included in the list of alternatives are arrangements with mobile phone companies in the area, private individuals and local establishments, and local media offices. Private hospitals are also considered important stakeholders as sources of information regarding disease incidence and patient condition, and the manual notes that the DOH Procurement

Division "should ensure the availability of list of qualified and responsible pharmaceutical companies and other suppliers for emergency procurement of drugs, medicines medical equipment, etc." although no further details are provided [3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. 27 September 2010. "Implementing Rules and Regulations for Republic Act No. 10121".

[http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/95/Implementing_Rules_and_Regulation_RA_10121.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Health Emergency Management Bureau of the Department of Health of the Philippines. 2015. "Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management".

[<https://hospitalsafetypromotionanddisasterpreparedness.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/complete-manual-20150129.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Philippines has issued guidelines on implementing non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) for managing the COVID-19 outbreak in the country.

The Department of Health issued preparedness and response strategies that include the use of NPIs like social distancing, frequent handwashing, and school closures; these guidelines are specific to COVID-19 and there is no mention that they should be applied to other disease outbreaks in the absence of medication/vaccines. [1] Although Chapter 8 of the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response framework discusses how to respond to an epidemic, it also makes no mention of NPIs. [2] Neither the Department of Health nor the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council has further information regarding this subject. [3,4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2020-0016 of 4 May 2020. "Minimum Health System Capacity Standards for COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Strategies".

[<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=653156>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health - National Epidemiology Center. April 2014. "Manual of Procedures for the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response".

[https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/PIDSRMOP3ED_VOL1_2014.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence that the Philippines has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious diseases outbreak in the past year, but there is no public evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year.

In response to the COVID outbreak, the president declared a "State of Public Health Emergency" on March 8, 2020 following the provisions of the Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act, which serves as the country's national health emergency response plan. [1] One of the main objectives of the Act is the "establishment and maintenance of relevant, efficient and effective disease surveillance and response system at the national and local levels." The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Act detail the different offices responsible in the health emergency response process. [2]

While the country has completed three simulation exercises with the World Health Organization, none were conducted in the past year. [3] Two of the simulation exercises were focused on "test[ing] the processes for [International Health Regulations] notification, verification and Event Information System (EIS) posting," and they were conducted in 2016 and 2018. [4,5] The third simulation exercise was done in 2018 and was conducted by the International Food Safety Authorities Network and focused on a food safety emergency. [6]

[1] President of the Philippines. Proclamation No. 922 of 8 March 2020. "Declaring a State of Public Health Emergency Throughout the Philippines". [<https://gcg.gov.ph/files/AX3ZGMr47s3jLjXOcUZr.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 28 August 2020. "The 2020 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 11332, or the Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act." [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/node/24268>]. Accessed September 2020.

[3] World Health Organization. "Simulation Exercise". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] World Health Organization. 8-9 December 2016. "IHR Exercise Crystal". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/333639/20161209-PHL-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed September 2020.

[5] World Health Organization. 14 December 2018. "Exercise Crystal: Ten years of strengthening communication between countries and WHO during emergencies". [<https://www.who.int/westernpacific/news/feature-stories/detail/exercise-crystal-ten-years-of-strengthening-communication-between-countries-and-who-during-emergencies>]. Accessed September 2020.

[6] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 9 October 2017. "Preventing Food Safety Emergencies: INFOSAN, FAO/WHO International Food Safety Authorities Network". [<http://www.fao.org/3/a-i8024e.pdf>]. Accessed

September 2020.

3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has developed an after action review to improve response capabilities. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines was conducted in 2018 and does not have information on this matter. [1] The Philippines participated in a workshop conducted by the World Health Organisation (WHO) on after action reviews and simulation exercises; however, there is no evidence of a plan/review that resulted from the workshop. [2] The Philippines also participated in a simulation exercise in 2018, but there is no evidence of a plan/report resulting from the exercise. [3] The Department of Health, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, and the WHO country page for the Philippines do not have further information regarding this subject. [4,5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] WHO. 21-24 January 2019. "Workshop on After Action Review and Simulation Exercises in the Western Pacific Region". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/333062/RS-2019-GE-01-PHL-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of National Defense - Office of Civil Defense. "1st Simulation Exercise for Top Government Officials in the Philippines and in ASEAN Region". [<https://ocd.gov.ph/news/568-1st-simulation-exercise-for-top-government-officials-in-the-philippines-and-in-asean-region.html>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] WHO. "Philippines". [<https://www.who.int/countries/ph/en/>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has undergone a biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. The most recent simulation exercise that the country was a part of was conducted in 2018, and only government officials participated in it. [1,2] The Department of Health, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, and the WHO country page for the Philippines do not have further information regarding this subject.

[3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organization. "Simulation Exercise". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of National Defense - Office of Civil Defense. "1st Simulation Exercise for Top Government Officials in the Philippines and in ASEAN Region". [<https://ocd.gov.ph/news/568-1st-simulation-exercise-for-top-government-officials-in-the-philippines-and-in-asean-region.html>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] WHO. "Philippines". [<https://www.who.int/countries/ph/en/>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Health Emergency Management Bureau (HEMB) under the Department of Health (DOH) serves as the country's emergency operations centre. It manages the DOH's activities "for all health emergencies and disasters, as well as incidents with the potential of becoming an emergency, and coordinate[s] the mobilization and sharing of resources". It also serves as the liaison between the DOH and other agencies and institutions during emergency events. [1] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that the HEMB "manages the risk assessment and resource mapping processes for health emergencies and disasters". [2]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Health Emergency Management Bureau". [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/orgchart-hemb>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organization. "Simulation Exercise". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Health Emergency Management Bureau (HEMB), as the Philippines' emergency operations centre requires that all health facilities conduct a drill at least once per year. [1,2] As the bureau responsible for the Department of Health's Health Emergency Preparedness Program, it monitors compliance of health facilities to the program guidelines which includes "allot[ing] a certain percentage of [the] annual budget for preparedness activities, training and drills, advocacy activities for health emergenc[ies]". [3,4] There is no public evidence from the Department of Health or the National Disaster Risk

Reduction and Management Council regarding the last drill conducted. [5,6]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Health Emergency Management Staff". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/node/555>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Circular No. 2019-0137 of 10 April 2019. [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=623976>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 168 s. 2004 of 9 September 2004. "National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336597>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Joson, Reynaldo O. January 2011. "DOH Requirements on Emergency Preparedness Program". Hospital Disaster Preparedness. [<https://sites.google.com/site/hospitaldisasterpreparedness/doh-requirements-on-disaster-preparedness>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[6] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Health Emergency Management Bureau, as the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) of the health sector, has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that the EOC personnel need to be trained and capacitated further to develop position-specific capacities and gave the Philippines a score of 3 on indicator R.2.2 - Emergency operations centre (EOC) capacities, procedures and plans. [1] Neither the Department of Health nor the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council has further information regarding this subject. [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a

potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no clear evidence that the national security and public health authorities in the Philippines have developed a coordinated plan to respond to biological threats or have conducted an exercise to respond to such events. Although the Philippines has stated that there exists a national Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) action plan, it is unclear if this has been finalized and no draft version of the document exists. It is also unclear whether this plan was formulated with the active participation of the Department of Health (DOH). Although the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that the DOH is the "Office of Primary Responsibility for disease outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics, including for biological incidents (such as terrorism or accidental release)", it does not discuss coordination/communication systems between the DOH and the Department of National Defense. [3] While the country hosts the CBRN Centre of Excellence for Southeast Asia and has a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations regarding its establishment, participation of the DOH in its activities is not documented. [4] The DOH, the DND, Department of Justice, and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council do not have documentary evidence on exercises to respond to a potential deliberate biological event or agreements between the public health and national security/defence authorities regarding a potential deliberate biological event. [5,6,7,8]

[1] Embang, Jose Jr. 7 November 2016. United Nations Office at Geneva. "Philippine Statement".

[[https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/8E4B30475D4FF14FC125806500376413/\\$file/Philippines.pdf](https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8E4B30475D4FF14FC125806500376413/$file/Philippines.pdf)]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Embang, Jose Jr. 22-24 November 2017. CBRN Centres of Excellence. "The Philippines CBRN National Action Plan".

[<http://www.amchamphilippines.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/02-Philippines-NAP-Rome-Italy.pptx>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 21-24 January 2019. "Workshop on After Action Review and Simulation Exercises in the Western Pacific Region". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/333062/RS-2019-GE-01-PHL-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Office of the President of the Philippines. Memorandum Order No. 54, s. 2013.

[<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2013/03/19/memorandum-order-no-54-s-2013/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[7] Department of Justice of the Philippines. [<https://www.doj.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[8] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Philippines has a risk communication plan that outlines how messages will reach different populations/sectors. According to the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, the Department of Health's (DOH's) Health Promotions and Communications Service (HPCS) is responsible for drafting a communication plan; however, there is no available risk communication plan from its website.[1,2] The Health Emergency Management Bureau of the Department of Health published a Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management in 2015 which includes a subsection on risk communication, but it does not outline steps for information dissemination to more out-of-reach populations or to those who have different language needs. [3] Republic Act 11332, which serves as the national health emergency response plan, does not discuss risk communication. [4] For the COVID-19 outbreak, the DOH issued guidelines for the health system that includes mention of risk communication steps/activities, but it does not mention messaging for different populations or languages. [5] The Department of Health and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council do not have more documentary evidence regarding this subject. [2,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 21-24 January 2019. "Workshop on After Action Review and Simulation Exercises in the Western Pacific Region". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/333062/RS-2019-GE-01-PHL-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2015. "Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management". [<https://hospitalsafetypromotionanddisasterpreparedness.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/complete-manual-20150129.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11332 of 23 July 2018. "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act". [https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11332_2019.html]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2020-0016 of 4 May 2020. "Minimum Health System Capacity Standards for COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Strategies".

[<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=653156>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Health Emergency Management Bureau of the Department of Health published a Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management in 2015. Included in the document is a subsection on risk communication which provided both general and specific guidelines to public health officials. It clarifies the importance of communicating to the public clearly and sets out risk assessment tasks that officials can do to mitigate communication issues. [1] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that available risk communication plans are agency-specific and there is a need to develop a robust risk communication plan that will be adopted across government agencies. [2]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2015. "Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management". [<https://hospitalsafetypromotionanddisasterpreparedness.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/complete-manual-20150129.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Philippines has a risk communication plan that designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, the Department of Health's (DOH's) Health Promotion Bureau is responsible for drafting a communication plan; however, there is no available risk communication plan from its website. [1,2] By law, the Department of Health is the primary agency responsible for responding to public health emergencies, while its Health Emergency Management Bureau is the unit responsible for disseminating information. [3,4] Republic Act 11332 also designates the Secretary of Health as the person responsible for declaring epidemics of national/international concern, but it does not make clear whether the Secretary would continue to be responsible for communicating with the public during the state of emergency. [3] The JEE notes that the DOH also has designated spokespersons and a communication team that communicates the government's messaging to the public. [1]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Health Promotion and Communication Service". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/orgchart-hpcs>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11332 of 23 July 2018. "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act". [https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11332_2019.html]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Health Emergency Management Bureau". [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/orgchart-hemb>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.5.2 Public communication

3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is public evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or to dispel rumors. The Department of Health (DOH) updates its dedicated COVID-19 page on a daily basis with the latest number of cases and disease news. [1] Its Facebook and Twitter accounts have been active in posting health infographics and have been engaging with the public even before the pandemic, while its website's press release page is regularly updated with news articles on news about different public health issues. [2,3,4] Currently, the DOH has been promoting its BIDA campaign which aims to provide the public with the facts about the disease. [5] In 2019, it also posted a video debunking vaccine myths as part of World Immunization Week. [6]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Updates on Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)".

[<https://www.doh.gov.ph/2019-nCoV>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Facebook". [<https://www.facebook.com/OfficialDOHgov/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Twitter".

[https://twitter.com/DOHgovph?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Press Releases". [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/press-releases>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. 16 September 2020.

[<https://www.facebook.com/BIDASolusyon/photos/a.112776700492666/159387925831543/?type=3&theater>]. Accessed September 2020.

[6] Department of Health of the Philippines. 29 April 2019. "Immunization".

[<https://www.facebook.com/OfficialDOHgov/videos/429911491129721/>]. Accessed September 2020.

3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is some public evidence that senior leaders shared misinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. The closest case of misinformation relates to the Dengvaxia controversy in the Philippines in which senators and the Chief Public Attorney blamed the vaccine for the deaths of children after Sanofi Pasteur revealed that "those inoculated were at risk of a more severe form of dengue". The Department of Health suspended its dengue vaccination program, and cases were filed against officials from the previous administration in 2018. [1,2] However, no deaths have so far been conclusively linked to Dengvaxia. The controversy is directly linked to a tremendous drop in confidence in vaccines in the country. [1] There is no further information on main international and national news outlets.

[1] Punongbayan, JC. 16 January 2019. Rappler. "Dengvaxia scare: How viral rumors caused outbreaks".

[<https://rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/analysis-dengvaxia-scare-how-rumors-caused-viral-outbreaks>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Arkin, Fatima. 24 April 2019. Science. "Dengue vaccine fiasco leads to criminal charges for researcher in the Philippines".

[<https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/04/dengue-vaccine-fiasco-leads-criminal-charges-researcher-philippines>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 43.03

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 154.76

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has issued restrictions on the export/import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. As part of the COVID-19 response, the government removed tariffs on medical supplies. [1] In 2019, the biggest outbreaks of concerned measles, dengue, and polio; however, there is no information on trade restrictions on medical supplies because of them from the Departments of Health, Agriculture, and Foreign Affairs. [2,3,4]

[1] Department of Finance of the Philippines. 4 February 2020. "DOF issues guidelines on tax-free imports of PPEs, test kits and medical supplies amid COVID pandemic". [<https://www.dof.gov.ph/dof-issues-guidelines-on-tax-free-imports-of-ppes-test-kits-and-medical-supplies-amid-covid-pandemic/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. [<https://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. [<https://dfa.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

3.7.1b

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

In 2020, the Department of Agriculture issued a temporary ban on poultry imports from Brazil due to reports of the presence of SARS-COV-2 agents on the surface of the meat. [1] However, according to the World Health Organization, there is "no evidence of coronavirus being spread by food or packaging and urged people not to be afraid of the virus entering the food chain." [2]

[1] Department of Agriculture of the Philippines. Memorandum Order No. 39 of 14 August 2020.

[https://www.da.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/mo39_s2020.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Dela Cruz, Enrico. 14 August 2020. Reuters. "Philippines bans chicken imports from Brazil on coronavirus scare".

[<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-philippines-brazil/philippines-bans-chicken-imports-from-brazil-on-coronavirus-scare-idUSKCN25A1D1>]. Accessed September 2020.

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is evidence that the Philippines implemented a travel ban without international/bilateral support in the past year. The Philippines restricted all inbound travel to the country of foreigners from all countries as part of its COVID response strategy [1] In 2019, other countries issued travel advisories for travelers to the Philippines due to the re-emergence of polio in the country, but the Philippines did not enact any bans on inbound travelers due to public health concerns. [2] There is no further evidence from the Department of Health, Department of Foreign Affairs, and Bureau of Immigration. [3,4,5]

[1] Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. 22 March 2020. "Travel Advisory: Inbound Travel Restrictions by the Philippine Government on Foreign Travelers". [<https://www.dfa.gov.ph/covid-19-advisories/26402-travel-advisory-inbound-travel-restrictions-by-the-philippine-government-on-foreign-travelers>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] US Embassy in the Philippines. 9 October 2019. "Health Alert - US Embassy Manila (October 9, 2019)". [<https://ph.usembassy.gov/health-alert-u-s-embassy-manila-october-9-2019/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[4] Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. [<https://dfa.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[5] Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines. [<https://www.immigration.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 60.04

2017

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 493.51

2018

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient public evidence that the country has a health workforce strategy that was updated in the past five years.

The Department of Health issued "Guidelines on the Deployment of Human Resources for Health under the National Health Workforce Support System" in 2020 whose objectives include:"1. To establish criteria for determining HRH requirements and priority areas for deployment; 2. To provide operational guidelines for overall management and implementation of deployment of HRH under NHWSS within province-wide and city-wide health systems; 3. To establish the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in the management and implementation of deployment of HRH." [1] However, these guidelines provide guidance for how to put together the plan itself, rather than constituting a workforce strategy in and off itself.

The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, cites the existence of the "Reformulation of the Human Resources for Health Master Plan (HRHMP) 2014-2030"; however, this document was published in 2013 and there is no evidence it was updated within the past five years. [2] The original version of the HRHMP was drafted by the Department of Health in conjunction with the World Health Organization and formulated a strategy for the period from 2005-2030. [3,4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. 20 August 2020. Administrative Order No. 2020-0038. "Guidelines on the Deployment of Human Resources for Health under the National Health Workforce Support System".

[<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=656754>]. Accessed September 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 21-24 January 2019. "Workshop on After Action Review and Simulation Exercises in the Western Pacific Region". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/333062/RS-2019-GE-01-PHL-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Human Resources for Health Network". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/Health-Program/human-resource-for-health-network>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Lorenzo, F. Marilyn. 5 March 2008. "The Philippine HRH Master Plan".

[https://www.who.int/workforcealliance/forum/presentations/Fely_Marilyn_Elegado.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 99

2014

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the country has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a patient isolation facility.

The Department of Health has issued a National Policy on Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Facilities which states: "Isolation rooms shall be provided for highly communicable or yet unknown new infections and for the severely immune-compromised. These shall be available in all hospital facilities. The Health Facility Development Bureau-Department of Health, in coordination with the National Council or inter-agency technical working group, shall periodically review the requirements for isolation room in various hospital facilities." [1]

In a research article reviewing infection control in a hospital in the Philippines, the authors mention that "[t]he facility has designated medical floors for those needing airborne isolation (e.g. pulmonary tuberculosis)." [2] The Department of Health has no further information regarding this subject. [3] However, there is insufficient evidence that any of the aforementioned isolation rooms is indeed a permanent biocontainment patient care unit and/or advanced patient isolation facility for patients with highly communicable diseases.

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2016-0002 of 8 January 2016. "National Policy on Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Facilities".

[<http://www.ncroffice.doh.gov.ph/HealthStatistics?p=Py9WRi6jnZC3yQIQWf4ZO0tjI%2B6aZXQohKR4uUbalXMiobaP9mbkCFn3LN1IEN3DWWoZA8TCwCaJaq%2FZKRoONFT1O9xiLbaEe7VDk%2BpVOUso3NV53FTEsA9S1hdU0EKpsvxy8O%2FaK5tHRdHQFdGAGg44ANQ7ZPAijErTITUw6n%2Frka0E0sXolcKK%2FoUcf%2Fzk%2BggBmqPo1X2SSETU2FpYOVefTjuJmO1ZgBatH57x6JCdrOZDF2Egteli3mrG%2FSC9oU21v896Hq9bpWe4S3zXKyapEoOd9wpEg7y3NhKXifdQ1A%2BlpHK4dXyBXQbypcakWklbWxD1KiljG1757nbPpeaG56K5AMbv0e0JPGAmLR%2FodTNTHTVp%2BRCYZk4lzlCqJltsdkOx8mjKcP7lQzKTrw%3D%3D>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Mitchell, Kaitlin, A. Barker, C. Abad, and N. Safdar. 2017. "Infection control at an urban hospital in Manila, Philippines: a systems engineering assessment of barriers and facilitators". *Antimicrobial Resistance & Infection Control* 6: 90.

[<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5581421/>]

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Philippines has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. There is no evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) issued guidelines on how local government units can convert existing government facilities to isolation facilities. [1] Reporting on the implementation of Republic Act 11494, which provides mechanisms and interventions for COVID-19 response, the Department of Public Works and Highways reported constructing 461 new COVID-related facilities, including quarantine and isolation facilities. [2] There is no evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years via the Ministry of Health. [3]

[1] Department of the Interior and Local Government of the Philippines. Memorandum Circular No. 2020-064 of 29 March 2020. [https://dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/issuances/memo_circulars/dilg-memocircular-2020329_1a459ece60.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Office of the President of the Philippines. 7 December 2020. "Report on the Implementation of Republic Act No. 11494 or the Bayanihan to Recover as One Act". [<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2020/12dec/20201207-Report-on-the-Implementation-of-Republic-Act-No-11494-or-the-Bayanihan-to-Recover-as-One-Act.pdf>]. Accessed March 2021.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

The Philippines' procurement policies are issued and implemented by the Government Procurement Policy Board which was formed through Republic Act No. 9184. [1] The Act defines procurement as "the acquisition of Goods, Consulting Services, and the contracting for Infrastructure Projects by the Procuring Entity." [1] There is also an electronic portal for government entities to post procurement opportunities for all goods and services, including laboratory needs and medical supply needs, called the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System. [2] Both the Department of Health and the Department of Agriculture, as procuring entities, post procurement opportunities in the portal, including laboratory and medical supply needs. [3] The Act also requires them to form internal Bids and Awards Committees that manage the public bidding process of procurement. [1, 2]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 9184 of 10 January 2003. "An Act Providing for the Modernization, Standardization and Regulation of the Procurement Activities of the Government and for Other Purposes".

[https://www.gppb.gov.ph/laws/laws/RA_9184.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. 29 August 2016. "The 2016 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9184, Otherwise Known as the Government Procurement Reform Act". [<http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/images/uploads/20160826-IRR-RA-9184-procurement-reform.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System. "Open Opportunities".

[<https://www.philgeps.gov.ph/GEPSNONPILOT/Tender/SplashOpenOpportunitiesUI.aspx?menuIndex=3&ClickFrom=OpenOpportunity&type=agency>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that the Philippines maintains a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency.

The Department of Health's (DOH's) policy on logistics management during emergencies states that the National Centre for Disease Prevention and Control is responsible for managing a reserve of "drugs relevant to disaster response (e.g., Vitamin A, vaccines, etc.)" solely for emergencies. [1] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that the national vaccine stockpile is stored and managed by the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine. There are, however, gaps in the supply for outbreak response. [2]

As a member of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines also contributes to a regional stockpile of vaccines against the flu which are stored in Singapore where they can be dispatched to any Southeast Asian country with signs of a pandemic strain of the disease [3,4] There is also currently a bill in the Senate to address the need for a national stockpile that includes emergency supplies and equipment. [5]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2012-0013 of 20 July 2012. "Policy Guidelines on Logistics Management in Emergencies and Disasters". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336901>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 21-24 January 2019. "Workshop on After Action Review and Simulation Exercises in the Western Pacific Region". [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/333062/RS-2019-GE-01-PHL-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Siripitayakunkit, Unchalee. 16 June 2017. "Procurement Policies - an example for ensuring vaccine security: the ASEAN vaccine security and self-reliance initiative".

[https://www.who.int/influenza_vaccines_plan/objectives/SLPIVPP_Session5.6_Siripitayakunkit.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Young-soo, Shin. 7 May 2009. "ASEAN + 3 Health Ministers' Special Meeting on Influenza A (H1N1)".

[[https://www.who.int/westernpacific/news/speeches/detail/asean-3-health-ministers-special-meeting-on-influenza-a-\(h1n1\)](https://www.who.int/westernpacific/news/speeches/detail/asean-3-health-ministers-special-meeting-on-influenza-a-(h1n1))]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Casayuran, Mario. 1 August 2020. Manila Bulletin. "National Emergency Stockpile bill filed".

[<https://mb.com.ph/2020/08/01/national-emergency-stockpile-bill-filed/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.2.2b

Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. Although the Department of Health has a policy on logistics management during emergencies, it does not specifically mention laboratory supplies in its stockpile requirements. [1] There is currently a bill in the Senate to address the need for a national stockpile that includes emergency supplies and equipment. [2] The Departments of Health and National Defense, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency have no further evidence regarding this subject. [3,4,5,6]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2012-0013 of 20 July 2012. "Policy Guidelines on Logistics Management in Emergencies and Disasters". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336901>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Casayuran, Mario. 1 August 2020. Manila Bulletin. "National Emergency Stockpile bill filed". [<https://mb.com.ph/2020/08/01/national-emergency-stockpile-bill-filed/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[4] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[5] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[6] Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. [<https://pdea.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

4.2.2c

Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines conducts an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure that the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency.

There is currently a bill in Congress which proposes to establish a Health Procurement and Stockpiling Bureau under the Department of Health which will be responsible for conducting analyses and studies of the medical supply needs of the country and its different regions. [1] There is no further evidence from the Departments of Health and National Defense and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. [2, 3, 4]

[1] House of Representatives of the Philippines. 12 June 2020. House Bill No. 6995.

[https://www.congress.gov.ph/legisdocs/basic_18/HB06995.pdf]. Accessed March 2021.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[3] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed September 2020.

[4] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed

September 2020.

4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Philippines has a plan or agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency nor of a mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency.

The Governmental Procurement Policy Board (GPBB) passed Resolution No. 03-2020 which approves the adoption of "expedient procurement procedures during a state of public health emergency". The resolution includes a list of medical supplies that can be procured during a public health emergency. The list includes: alcohol, sanitizers, tissue, thermometers, hand soap, detergent, sodium hydrochloride, cleaning materials, PPE for utility staff, povidone iodine, gloves, masks, common medicines, and testing kits. [1] Although there is no evidence of legislation or a plan to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity that would apply to all public health emergencies, the COVID-19-specific "Bayanihan to Heal as One Act" does include provisions to incentivize the manufacturing sector to produce needed medical supplies/equipment. [2,3]

[1] Governmental Procurement Policy Board of the Philippines. Resolution No. 03-2020 of 9 March 2020.

[https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=652945]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11469 of 23 March 2020. "Bayanihan to Heal as One Act".

[https://www.senate.gov.ph/Bayanihan-to-Heal-as-One-Act-RA-11469.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Trade and Industry of the Philippines. Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2020-02.

[https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=652901]. Accessed August 2020.

4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a mechanism to procure laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency.

While the Governmental Procurement Policy Board (GPBB) passed Resolution No. 03-2020, which approves the adoption of

"expedient procurement procedures during a state of public health emergency", it does not explicitly include laboratory supplies in its list of "common-use supplies and equipment" that can be procured during a public health emergency. The list includes: alcohol, sanitizers, tissue, thermometers, hand soap, detergent, sodium hydrochloride, cleaning materials, PPE for utility staff, povidone iodine, gloves, masks, common medicines, and testing kits. It may allow for their inclusion with the written request of the Department of Health however. [1,2]

While there is no evidence of legislation or a plan to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity that would apply to all public health emergencies, there is COVID-19-specific legislation that includes related provisions on the manufacturing and procurement of laboratory supplies. [3] The Department of Health, Department of National Defense, National Institutes of Health, and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council do not have further information regarding this topic. [4,5,6,7]

- [1] Governmental Procurement Policy Board of the Philippines. Resolution No. 03-2020 of 9 March 2020. [<https://www.gppb.gov.ph/issuances/Resolutions/GPPB%20Resolution%20No.%2003-2020.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [2] Governmental Procurement Policy Board of the Philippines. Circular No. 04-2016 of 20 December 2016. [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=610844>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [3] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11469 of 23 March 2020. "Bayanihan to Heal as One Act". [<https://www.senate.gov.ph/Bayanihan-to-Heal-as-One-Act-RA-11469.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [5] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [6] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.
- [7] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency. Although the Department of Health (DOH) has issued a policy on logistics management during emergencies, its focus is on distribution from the central office to health facilities and local government units, which are specified as the end-users in the distribution chain. [1] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that there is no integrated plan regarding the deployment of countermeasures. [2] The DOH, the Department of National Defence, and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council do not have further evidence regarding this matter. [3,4,5]

- [1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2012-0013 of 20 July 2012. "Policy Guidelines on Logistics Management in Emergencies and Disasters". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336901>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of National Defense of the Philippines. [<http://www.dnd.gov.ph/home.html>]. August 2020.

[5] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, states that "there is an accreditation system for receiving resources from foreign counterparts". [1] The Department of Health's (DOH's) National Policy on the Mobilization of Health Emergency Response Teams (HERTs) also includes discussion of international HERTs (IHERTs). A HERT is a team of health personnel that are "mobilized during events, emergencies, and disasters to provide health and health-related services by any health sector agency/organization, whether local or international," while an IHERT is a HERT team "from a foreign country assisting the Philippines." The Bureau of International Health Cooperation under the DOH is responsible for facilitating international mobilization, establishes a mechanism for approving travel visas, and helps develop reporting and monitoring mechanisms for IHERTs. The process for receiving IHERTs begins with an official offer of assistance from a foreign entity submitted to the DOH, with the Department of Foreign Affairs and/or embassy/consulate copied. DOH then evaluates the offer before allowing the admission of IHERTs into the country. [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2018-0018 of 19 July 2018. "National Policy on the Mobilization of Health Emergency Response Teams". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=611523>]. Accessed December 2018.

4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 84.4

2017

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 197.19

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has issued a policy/public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency.

In response to the COVID-19 situation, the Philippines passed the "Bayanihan to Heal as One Act" which includes provisions

that prioritize health workers. Specifically, it mandates that: "(e) [T]he Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) to shoulder all medical expenses of public and private health workers in case of exposure to COVID-19 or any work-related injury or disease during the duration of the emergency; (f) Provide compensation of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to public and private health workers who may contract severe COVID-19 infection while in the line of duty: Provide, further, That a compensation of One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be given to public and private health workers, who may die while fighting the COVID-19 pandemic: Provided, finally, That this shall have retroactive application from February 1, 2020." [1] The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers also states that public health workers employed by the government, when needing medical treatment and/or hospitalization, shall receive "the treatment and/or hospitalization including medicines [for] free either in a government or a private hospital by the government entity paying the salary of the public health worker." [2] However, this provision does not apply to health workers in the private sector. The Philippine Health Agenda 2016-2022 talks about developing human resources for health with one of the points being incentives for service in high-risk areas; however, there is no statement about giving healthcare workers prioritization if they fall ill in the line of duty. [3] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, makes no mention of priority provisions for healthcare workers. [4]

There is no further evidence regarding this subject from the Department of Health and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. [5,6]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 11469 of 23 March 2020. "Bayanihan to Heal as One Act".

[<https://www.senate.gov.ph/Bayanihan-to-Heal-as-One-Act-RA-11469.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. Republic Act No. 7305 of 26 March 1992. "The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers".

[https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra1992/ra_7305_1992.html]. Accessed September 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Philippine Health Agenda 2016-2022".

[https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/basic-page/Philippine%20Health%20Agenda_Dec1_1.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[6] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a

Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

While the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that the "DOH [Department of Health] coordinates risk communication plans, strategies and messages with other health players during emergencies", it does not make clear whether this system allows for two-way communication [1] The DOH requires all its facilities to define and set up communication lines for communicating both internally and externally with other DOH units, government agencies, and stakeholders, but these systems have not been specified. [2]

In general, the communications link between DOH units and DOH partners during an emergency is the Health Emergency Management Staff, which is a unit under DOH regional offices, according to the National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters. [3] The policy, however, does not specify the process behind the communications system. [3] There is no further evidence from the Department of Health or the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. [4,5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2015. "Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management". [<https://hospitalsafetypromotionanddisasterpreparedness.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/complete-manual-20150129.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 168 s. 2004 of 9 September 2004. "National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336597>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.5.1b

Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

While the Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, notes that the "DOH [Department of Health] coordinates risk communication plans, strategies and messages with other health players during emergencies", it does not make clear whether this system allows for two-way communication [1] The DOH requires all its facilities to define and set up communication lines for communicating both internally and externally with other DOH units, government agencies, and stakeholders, but these systems have not been specified. [2]

In general, the communications link between DOH units and DOH partners during an emergency is the Health Emergency Management Staff, which is a unit under DOH regional offices, according to the National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters. [3] The policy, however, does not specify the process behind the communications system. [3] There is no further evidence from the Department of Health or the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. [4,5]

1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2015. "Manual of Operations on Health Emergency and Disaster Response Management". [<https://hospitalsafetypromotionanddisasterpreparedness.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/complete-manual-20150129.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 168 s. 2004 of 9 September 2004. "National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters". [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=336597>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Department of Health requires all healthcare facilities to have an Infection Control Committee to develop and manage the facility's infection control programs, and the National Policy on Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Facilities requires the reporting of HAIs. [1,2] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, also notes that infection prevention and control is a requirement for hospital licensing. [2]

Based on the DOH's Budget Accountability Report from March 2018, which shows the hospital infection rate ($(\text{number of healthcare associated infections} / \text{number of discharges}) \times 100$), HCAs are still being consistently monitored by healthcare facilities. [2]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2009. "National Standards in Infection Control for Healthcare Facilities". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/NATIONAL_STANDARDS_IN_INFECTION_CONTROL_FOR_HEALTH.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2016. Administrative Order No. 2016-002 of 8 January 2016. "National Policy on Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Facilities". [<http://www.ncroffice.doh.gov.ph/HealthStatistics?p=Py9WRi6jnZC3yQIQWf4ZO0tjl%2B6aZXQohKR4uUbalXMiobaP9mbkCFn3LN1IEN3DWWoZA8TCwCaJAQ%2FZKRoONFT1O9xiLbaEe7VDk%2BpVOUso3NV53FTEsA9S1hdU0EKpsvxy8O%2FaK5tHRdHQFdGAGg44ANQ7ZPAijErTITUw6n%2Frka0E0sXolcKK%2FoUcf%2FzK%2BggBmqPo1X2SSETU2FpYOvefTyyJmO1ZgBatH57x6JCdrOZDF2Egteli3mrG%2FSC9oU21v896Hq9bpWe453zXKyapEoOd9wpEg7y3NhKXifdQ1A%2BHpHK4dXyBXQbypcakWkIbWxD1KiljG1757nbPpeaG56K5AMbv0e0JPGAmLR%2FodTNTHVp%2BRCYZk4lzlCqJltsdKOx8mjKcP7lQzKTrw%3D%3D>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2019. "Quarterly Physical Report of Operation: For the 3rd Quarter Ending September 2019". [https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/transparency%20seal/BAR1-2019-3rdQ_0.pdf]. August 2020.

4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Republic Act 10532 instituted the Philippine Health Research Ethics Board (PHREB) which issues guidelines on the ethical conduct of human health research, standardizes the research ethics review process, advises the Philippine National Health Research System with regards to ethical issues in human health research. [1] The guidelines issued by PHREB for the implementation of the law state that "all health research involving human subjects must undergo ethical review and clearance". [2]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 10532 of 23 July 2012. "An Act Institutionalizing the Philippine National Health Research System". [<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2013/05/07/republic-act-no-10532/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippine Health Research Ethics Board. 2017. "National Ethical Guidelines for Health and Health-Related Research". [<http://www.ethics.healthresearch.ph/index.php/phoca-downloads/category/4-neg?download=98:neghhr-2017>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.7.1b

Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to treat ongoing pandemics. According to the Philippine Health Research Ethics Board Standard Operating Procedures Workbook, an expedited review is only performed when there is only minimal risk to study participants and participants are not from a vulnerable group. The Workbook does not provide other instances when an expedited review may be done. [1] The Department of Health's regulations on clinical trials makes no mention of an expedited approval process in light of a health emergency/epidemic. [2] The Department of Science and Technology and the National Institutes of Health do not have documentary evidence regarding this subject. [3,4]

[1] Philippine Health Research Ethics Board. 2015. "Philippine Health Research Ethics Board Standard Operating Procedures Workbook". [<http://www.ethics.healthresearch.ph/index.php/2012-04-19-05-10-10/233-phreb-sop-workbook-2015>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2020-0010 of 6 March 2020. [<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=652399>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Institutes of Health of the Philippines. [<http://nih.upm.edu.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a

Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Republic Act No. 9711 establishes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and amends the previous Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and its related government issuances. [1,2,3] The FDA is responsible for regulating health products and authorizes their sale in the market. Health products are defined as "food, drugs, cosmetics, devices, biologicals, vaccines, in-vitro diagnostic reagents and household/urban hazardous substances and/or a combination of and/or a derivative thereof...[and] products that may have an effect on health, which require regulations as determined by the FDA". [4] The Agency also reviews research studies on these products in order to ensure their safety for human use and can issue recalls of products if they have been found to be unsafe for consumers. [1]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 9711 of 28 July 2008. "Food and Drug Administration Act of 2009".

[<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2009/08/18/republic-act-no-9711/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Philippines. Republic Act No. 3720 of 22 June 1963. "Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act".

[<https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/13583>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] President of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 175 of 22 May 1987. "Further Amending Republic Act No. 3720".

[<https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/13591>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health of the Philippines. Department Circular No. 2011-0101 of 22 March 2011. "The Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9711-The Food and Drug Administration Act of 2009".

[<https://ww2.fda.gov.ph/attachments/article/224763/IRR%20of%20RA%209711.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies. The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for regulating drugs and medical devices, among other products, and authorizes their sale in the market. [1] There is no information on its website and other online sources on guidelines for urgent approval of these products nor were there examples of incidents where the FDA has fast-tracked authorizations. According to its General Director, the use of vaccines would only be approved "if it has been tested on a large group of patients and it has proven to be safe and effective in building a patient's immunity against the virus." [2] Neither the Department of Health nor the Department of Science Technology has documentary evidence regarding this matter. [3,4]

[1] Philippines. Republic Act No. 9711 of 28 July 2008. "Food and Drug Administration Act of 2009".

[<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2009/08/18/republic-act-no-9711/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Tan, Lara. 12 August 2020. CNN Philippines. "Philippines reviews 'accelerated' approval of Russia's coronavirus vaccine".

[<https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/8/12/Philippines-FDA-Russia-coronavirus-vaccine-clinical-trial-COVID-19.html>].

Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Science and Technology. [<http://www.dost.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that pandemics are integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or that there is a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics. Although the Department of Health (DOH) has issued a National Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management in Health, it only provides a framework for managing disasters/emergencies. It does not delineate specific strategies/activities geared towards risk reduction for health emergencies. [1] It designates the Health Emergency Management Bureau as the lead unit in development the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan in Health (DRRM-H), but there is no publicly available version of this plan. [1,2] There is no further information available from the DOH and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. [3,4]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. Administrative Order No. 2019-0046 of 29 October 2019.

[<https://dmas.doh.gov.ph:8083/Rest/GetFile?id=648166>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Health Emergency Management Bureau". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/orgchart->

hemb]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

As a member of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines has cross-border agreements with other ASEAN member-states with regards to public health emergencies. One of the emergency response initiatives developed by the organization, with Japan, was a Strategic Regional Vaccine Stockpile for potential pandemics like the flu. The ASEAN countries purchase the vaccines through pooled procurement and store them as a regional stockpile in Singapore from which they can be dispatched to any Southeast Asian country with signs of a pandemic strain of the flu. [1,2] The ASEAN can also deploy emergency medical teams as part of its ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre through the coordination of the ASEAN Secretary-General upon the request of a member-country "in the event of a major disaster, whether it be a natural disaster or a pandemic". [3,4] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, mentions that there is effective multilateral communication with other countries but does not specify agreements or protocols regarding public health emergencies. [5]

[1] Siripitayakunkit, Unchalee. 16 June 2017. "Procurement Policies - an example for ensuring vaccine security: the ASEAN vaccine security and self-reliance initiative".

[https://www.who.int/influenza_vaccines_plan/objectives/SLPIVPPP_Session5.6_Siripitayakunkit.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Young-soo, Shin. 7 May 2009. "ASEAN + 3 Health Ministers' Special Meeting on Influenza A (H1N1)".

[[https://www.who.int/westernpacific/news/speeches/detail/asean-3-health-ministers-special-meeting-on-influenza-a-\(h1n1\)](https://www.who.int/westernpacific/news/speeches/detail/asean-3-health-ministers-special-meeting-on-influenza-a-(h1n1))]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Association of Southeast Asian Nations. September 2017. "ASEAN Joint Disaster Response Plan".

[<https://ahacentre.org/files/AJDRP.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management. March 2018. "Operationalising One ASEAN One Response". [<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AHA-GDE-One-ASEAN-One-Response-FINAL-1810318-1.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.2.1b

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has cross-border agreements, protocols or MOUs with neighbouring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. Although the Philippines, as a member of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), contributes to programs that aim to "[prevent], control, and [eradicate] trans-boundary animal diseases and zoonoses" with other ASEAN members through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Animal Health and Zoonoses, the program does not appear to have a health emergency response aspect. [1] ASEAN leaders also released a shared declaration on regional disaster health management; however, the document does not mention animal health emergencies specifically, so it is unclear whether these are covered by the declaration. [2] Neither the Department of Health nor the National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council has documentary evidence on this matter in their websites. [3,4] The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, makes no mention of international agreements pertaining to animal health emergencies. [5]

[1] Association for Southeast Asian Nations. 7 October 2016. "Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Animal Health and Zoonoses". [<http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20161108071810.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Association for Southeast Asian Nations. 13 November 2017. "ASEAN Leaders' Declaration on Disaster Health Management". [https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/4.-ADOPTION_2017_ALD-on-DHM_Endorsed-13th-AHMM.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of the Philippines. [<http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a

Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b

Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. There were also decreases in spending for other aspects of epidemic management. The Health Emergency Management Bureau (HEMB), which is the main unit in charge for handling health emergencies, had an 8% increase in its budget between 2019 to 2020. The HEMB serves as the Emergency Operations Center of the government for public health emergencies and is responsible for "monitor[ing] all health and health-related events on a 24/7 basis, including all national events, mass gatherings, and international events with potential impact to the Philippines." [2] Health Emergency Preparedness and Response at the regional level became a specific line item of the Department of Health's budget, while before it was lumped under Local Health Systems Development and Assistance. This was meant to support the development of local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management for Health systems. [2]

Although the HEMB received an increase in its budget, for the same period, the Surveillance and Epidemiology Program saw a 56% decrease in funding. [1]

[1] Department of Health of the Philippines. "DOH 2020 Budget Brochure". [<https://hpdpb.doh.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/DOH-Budget-Brochure-2020.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. "Health Emergency Management Bureau". [<http://www.doh.gov.ph/orgchart-hemb>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. 2018. "Budget Folio". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/FY%202018%20Budget%20Folio.pdf>]. Accessed September 2020.

5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Philippines has both national disaster funds and local disaster funds which it can use in the event of a public health emergency. [1] Financing from the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund can be sourced during "epidemics as declared by the [Department of Health]" to provide aid and other necessary services to areas affected by emergencies. [2] Local governments are also mandated to set aside 5 per cent of their revenue as a Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund, with 30 per cent of this amount automatically being allocated to a Quick Response Fund which is a standby fund for relief efforts. [1] Utilization of local funds are determined individually by the local government units but follows the framework of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund which allows for funding for epidemics. [2,3] The Philippines is not an IDA eligible borrowing country and does not have access to the World Bank's pandemic financing facility. [4,5]

[1] Senate of the Philippines. PB-17-01 of May 2017. "Examining the Philippines' Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System". [https://senate.gov.ph/publications/SEPO/PB_Examining%20PH%20DRRM%20System_05June2017.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Budget Management of the Philippines. 2016. "National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund". [<https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/GAA/GAA2016/VOLUME%20II-B/NDRR.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, Department of Budget Management, and the Department of the Interior and Local Government of the Philippines. Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2013-1 of 25 March 2013. "Allocation and Utilization of the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund".

[http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/2383/Joint_Memorandum_Circular_No_2013_1.pdf]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] International Development Association. 2018. "Borrowing Countries". [<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] World Bank. December 2017. "Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility". [<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence that senior leaders have made a public commitment to either support other countries in improving their capacity to address epidemic threats and to improve domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. The Joint Statement from Health Ministers of ASEAN and the United States on COVID-19 Cooperation (30 April 2020) addresses funding and capacity development for future disease outbreaks by stating that that the Ministers "[welcome] the announcement of the ASEAN Member States' plan to establish the COVID-19 Response Fund to address COVID-19 and future public health emergencies, and a Regional Reserve of Medical Supplies to enable rapid response to emergency medical supply needs, with the partnership of external partners." [1] Additionally, during an outbreak of dengue in 2019, the Secretary of Health issued a public statement to trigger the use of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council's Quick Response Fund to address spread of the disease, but he did not call for increases to the DOH's budget to address disease threats in the future. [2] There is no further evidence from the Department of Health, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the World Health Organization. [3,4,5]

[1] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 30 April 2020. "Joint Statement Special Video Conference of Health Ministers of ASEAN and the United States in Enhancing Cooperation on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Response". [https://asean.org/storage/2020/05/Adopted_ASEAN-US-Joint-Statement-on-COVID-19.pdf]. Accessed September 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. 6 August 2019. "DOH Declares National Dengue Epidemic". [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/press-release/DOH-DECLARES-NATIONAL-DENGUE-EPIDEMIC>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. [<https://dfa.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] World Health Organization. [<https://www.who.int/countries/ph/en/>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the Philippines has obtained financing from donors to improve the country's capacity to address epidemic threats. From 2018 to 2020, the Philippines received about USD 130 million as IHR capacity-building funding. From 2014-2020, almost 60 percent of funding has gone to improving reporting and surveillance systems [1]

There is no evidence that the Philippines has provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats from the Georgetown Infectious Disease Atlas, the Department of Health, and the Department of Foreign Affairs, and WHO. [1,2,3,4]

[1] Georgetown Infectious Disease Atlas Global Health Security Ranking. "Philippines".

[<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/180/recipient>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Department of Health of the Philippines. [<https://www.doh.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. [<https://dfa.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] World Health Organization. [<https://www.who.int/countries/phl/en/>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no clear evidence that there is a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, epidemiological data, clinical and/or isolated specimens with international organizations and countries, beyond influenza. The Joint External Evaluation of the Philippines, conducted in 2018, does not mention sharing of specimens with international partners. [1] Although the Philippines, as a member-state of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations, is part of the ASEAN Plus Three Partnership Laboratories initiative, this initiative seems more focused on the sharing of surveillance data rather than genetic and/or specimen data. [2,3] The Departments of Health and Science and Technology both manage the Philippine Health

Information Exchange; however, its focus is on sharing health data between local institutions. [4] The Department of Agriculture's website has no relevant information on this matter. [6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 10-14 September 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Republic of the Philippines". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/Philippines-10-14%20Sept%202019-eng.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[2] Association for Southeast Asian Nations. 13 August 2012. "Joint Statement of the 4th ASEAN+3 Health Ministers Meeting Singapore, 23 July 2010". [https://asean.org/?static_post=joint-statement-of-the-4th-asean3-health-ministers-meeting-singapore-23-july-2010]. Accessed August 2020.

[3] Varan, Aiden K., Robson Bruniera-Oliveira, Christopher R. Peter, Maureen Fonseca-Ford, and Stephen H. Waterman. "Multinational disease surveillance programs: promoting global information exchange for infectious diseases." *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 93, no. 3 (2015): 668-671.

[3] Liverani, Marco, Srey Teng, Minh Sat Le, and Richard Coker. "Sharing public health data and information across borders: lessons from Southeast Asia." *Globalization and Health* 14, no. 1 (2018): 94.

[<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6162912/>]. Accessed August 2020.

[4] Department of Health, Department of Science and Technology, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. 2016. "Health Privacy Code Implementing the Joint Administrative Order No. 2016-0002 'Privacy Guidelines for the Implementation of the Philippine Health Information Exchange'". [<http://ehealth.doh.gov.ph/images/HealthPrivacyCode.pdf>]. Accessed August 2020.

[5] Department of Agriculture. [<https://www.da.gov.ph/>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no publicly available evidence that the Philippines has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the last two years. The World Health Organization has not reported any non-compliance during the same time period as well. [1]

[1] World Health Organization. "Influenza Virus Traceability Mechanism". [<https://extranet.who.int/ivtm2>]. Accessed August 2020.

5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that the Philippines has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. Neither the World Health Organization nor media sources have documented non-sharing from the Philippines during such an event. [1]

[1] World Health Organization. "News and releases and feature stories".
[<http://www.wpro.who.int/philippines/mediacentre/en/>]. Accessed August 2020.

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 34

2020

Transparency International

6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a

What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b

What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 4

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 98.18

2015

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.57

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1.2

2015

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that the share of the informal sector of the Philippines is 38%. [1] The Philippine Statistics Authority does not give information on the size of informal sector. [2]

[1] International Labour Organisation. "Decent Work Country Diagnostics: Philippines 2017". October 2017. [<https://openstat.psa.gov.ph/portals/0/downloads/Decent%20Work%20Diagnostics%20-%20Philippines%202017.pdf>]. Accessed March 2021.

[2] Philippine Statistics Authority. 10 August 2020. "2019 Annual Estimates Tables". [<https://psa.gov.ph/content/2019-annual-estimates-tables>]. Accessed August 2020.

6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

Current Year Score: 1

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government

6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting

6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality

6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.42

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 47.15

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.62

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 71.09

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook

6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 713.6

2019

WHO

6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 5.31

2019

World Bank

6.5.1d

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 24.3

2018

World Bank

6.5.1e

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 6.4

2016

WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 93.57

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.2b

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 76.53

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 128.62

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018