

Nauru

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Nauru. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Nauru.

CATEGORY 1: PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OR RELEASE OF PATHOGENS WITH POTENTIAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCERN	4
1.1 Antimicrobial resistance (AMR)	4
1.2 Zoonotic disease	6
1.3 Biosecurity	11
1.4 Biosafety	16
1.5 Dual-use research and culture of responsible science	18
1.6 Immunization	21
CATEGORY 2: EARLY DETECTION AND REPORTING FOR EPIDEMICS OF POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL CONCERN	22
2.1 Laboratory systems strength and quality	22
2.2 Laboratory supply chains	24
2.3 Real-time surveillance and reporting	25
2.4 Surveillance data accessibility and transparency	27
2.5 Case-based investigation	33
2.6 Epidemiology workforce	36
CATEGORY 3: RAPID RESPONSE TO AND MITIGATION OF THE SPREAD OF AN EPIDEMIC	38
3.1 Emergency preparedness and response planning	38
3.2 Exercising response plans	41
3.3 Emergency response operation	43
3.4 Linking public health and security authorities	45
3.5 Risk communications	46
3.6 Access to communications infrastructure	49

3.7 Trade and travel restrictions	50
-----------------------------------	----

CATEGORY 4: SUFFICIENT AND ROBUST HEALTH SECTOR TO TREAT THE SICK AND PROTECT HEALTH WORKERS 52

4.1 Health capacity in clinics, hospitals, and community care centers	52
---	----

4.2 Supply chain for health system and healthcare workers	55
---	----

4.3 Medical countermeasures and personnel deployment	59
--	----

4.4 Healthcare access	60
-----------------------	----

4.5 Communications with healthcare workers during a public health emergency	62
---	----

4.6 Infection control practices and availability of equipment	63
---	----

4.7 Capacity to test and approve new medical countermeasures	64
--	----

CATEGORY 5: COMMITMENTS TO IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY, FINANCING PLANS TO ADDRESS GAPS, AND ADHERING TO GLOBAL NORMS 66

5.1 International Health Regulations (IHR) reporting compliance and disaster risk reduction	66
---	----

5.2 Cross-border agreements on public health and animal health emergency response	67
---	----

5.3 International commitments	68
-------------------------------	----

5.4 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway (PVS)	69
--	----

5.5 Financing	70
---------------	----

5.6 Commitment to sharing of genetic and biological data and specimens	74
--	----

CATEGORY 6: OVERALL RISK ENVIRONMENT AND VULNERABILITY TO BIOLOGICAL THREATS 75

6.1 Political and security risk	75
---------------------------------	----

6.2 Socio-economic resilience	79
-------------------------------	----

6.3 Infrastructure adequacy	81
-----------------------------	----

6.4 Environmental risks	82
-------------------------	----

6.5 Public health vulnerabilities	83
-----------------------------------	----

Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national AMR plan for surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. The website of the government of Nauru does not mention any plan [1]. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture do not seem to have their individual websites. Nauru is not enlisted at the World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment [2]. There is no entry of Nauru in the Library of National Action Plans of WHO [3]. Nauru has not completed the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the International Health Regulations Core Capacities [4].

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment". [<https://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring and Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national laboratory or laboratory system which tests for priority antimicrobial resistant (AMR) pathogens. The Republic of Nauru (RON) Hospital houses the country's only national laboratory which can conduct basic tests, such as preliminary diagnosis of hepatitis B and HIV infection using rapid diagnostic test kits and diagnosis of tuberculosis by microscopy. [1] However, according to a 2016 report by the Ministry of Health, the RON Hospital laboratory "lacks the facilities for bacterial culture or infectious disease serology that are necessary to support laboratory confirmation of a broader range of diseases of public health significance." [2] Nauru is not enlisted at the World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment [3]. There is no entry of Nauru in the Library of National Action Plans of WHO [4]. Nauru has not completed the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the International Health Regulations Core Capacities [5]. There is no information available on the Nauru government website

regarding laboratories or testing for priority AMR pathogens. [6] The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture do not appear to have their own websites.

- [1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 07 December 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health of Nauru. March 2016. "Nauru Global AIDS Progress Report". [http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/country/documents/NRU_narrative_report_2016.pdf]. Accessed 07 December 2020.
- [3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment". [<https://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.
- [4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.
- [5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring and Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.
- [6] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence to suggest Nauru conducts environmental detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial organisms. There is no information available on the Nauru government website regarding detection or surveillance activities of the Department of Commerce, Industry and Environment (CIE). [1] The Department of CIE does not appear to have its own website. CIE Environment, a division of the Department of CIE, does have a website, but it has not been updated since 2012. [2] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Country Self Assessments has no reports on Nauru. [3] As per the government report, "water- borne illnesses are also a major issue" in Nauru. It adds that "priority actions in other sectors can also contribute in reducing water borne- illnesses for instance the provision of better drainage infrastructure to reduce the occurrence of flooding around settlements, and improved sanitation systems to reduce contamination of water." [4]

- [1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.
- [2] Department of Commerce, Industry and Environment (CIE) of the Republic of Nauru, CIE Environment. [<http://nauruenv.appspot.com/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.
- [3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments" [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Environment. December 2014. "Republic of Nauru: Second National Communication". [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Final_Nauru_SNC_Report_revised.pdf]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation or regulation in place in Nauru requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans. Nauru has an essential medicines list which categorises antibiotics for use in secondary and tertiary healthcare levels, rather than primary healthcare levels, but the document states that these categorisations are not meant as prescription guidelines. [1] There is no information available on the Nauru government website regarding prescription practices for antibiotics, and the Ministry of Health does not appear to have its own website. [2] The WHO Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Country Self Assessments states that Nauru has no national AMR action plan. [3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2010. "Nauru: National Medicines List/Formulary/Standard Treatment Guidelines".

[https://www.who.int/selection_medicines/country_lists/nru_2010.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments".

[<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.1.2b

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence available of national legislation or regulation in place in Nauru requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals. The Animals Act 1982 focusses on measures used to control Nauru's dog population and does not reference prescription medicines for animals. [1] There is no information available on the Nauru government website regarding antibiotic use in animals, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not appear to have their own websites. [2] The WHO Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Country Self Assessments states that Nauru has no national AMR action plan. [3]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Animals Act 1982".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/files/acts/01693e58c9331911a1eaf586a762e431.pdf]. Accessed 09 January 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments".

[<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.2 ZOO NOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a

Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a national law, plan, or equivalent strategy document, on zoonotic disease in Nauru. There is no relevant information available on the Nauru government website, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not appear to have their own websites. [1] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not list a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) evaluation report for Nauru. [2] Nauru has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities. [3]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "OIE PVS Evaluation Reports". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/pvs-evaluation-reports/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring & Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.2.1b

Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans in Nauru. The website of the Government of Republic of Nauru does not mention any plans for reduction of zoonotic diseases [1]. The Ministry of Health and Agriculture do not have their own websites. The Ministry of Health had drafted an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in consultation with World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2005 to "provide an overview of the activities and responses that will be required from the Nauru government, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to an influenza pandemic". However there is no evidence of further follow up by the Ministry of Health and WHO. [2]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.2.1c

Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of national plans, guidelines, or laws that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. In 2005, the Ministry of Health published an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza to "provide an overview of the activities and responses that will be required from the Nauru government, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to an influenza pandemic".

However there is no evidence of further follow up by the Ministry of Health and WHO. [1] There is no further information available on the Nauru government website, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not appear to have their own websites. [2] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not list a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) evaluation report for Nauru. [3] Nauru has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "OIE PVS Evaluation Reports". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/pvs-evaluation-reports/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring & Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that there is a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated zoonotic disease that functions across ministries in Nauru. Zoonotic disease is not mentioned on the Nauru government website. [1] The Department of Agriculture under the Department of Commerce, Industry & Environment and the Department of Health and Medical Services do not appear to have their own websites that deal with human and animal health respectively. [1] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not list a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) evaluation report for Nauru. [2] Nauru has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities. [3]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020..

[2] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "OIE PVS Evaluation Reports". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/pvs-evaluation-reports/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring & Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Nauru has a national mechanism for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. There is no mention of such a mechanism on the website of the government of Nauru. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not have their own websites. [1] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not list a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) evaluation report for Nauru. [2] Nauru has not

completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities. [3]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "OIE PVS Evaluation Reports". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/pvs-evaluation-reports/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring & Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals. The government of Nauru shares no relevant information on its website. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not appear to have their own websites. [1] The right to privacy is expressed in the Constitution of Nauru. Section 3 of the Constitution guarantees the rights to "life, liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property and the protection of the law" and "respect for his private and family life". However, there is no domestic law related to privacy and data protection. [2]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/gazette/view/496]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. The government of Nauru does not provide any relevant information on its website, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not appear to have their own websites. [1] In 2019, Nauru's National Environment Management Strategy identified pest and disease infestations as one of the major challenges faced by Nauru and highlighted "the need for the strengthening of quarantine procedures to ensure that serious new pests and diseases are not introduced into Nauru." [2] However there is no evidence available on the further follow up on these recommendations.

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[2] Department of Commerce, Industries and Environment. October 2019. "Convention on Biological Diversity: Sixth National Report of Nauru". [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/nr/nr-06/nr-nr-06-en.pdf>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: -

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: -

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national law, plan, or equivalent strategy document, on zoonotic diseases in general, let alone provisions for coordinating with the private sector. The government of Nauru does not provide any relevant information on its website, and the Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not appear to have their own websites. [1] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) does not list a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) evaluation report for Nauru. [3] Nauru has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations

Core Capacities. [4] There is no other evidence of studies or articles that provide relevant information.

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[2] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "OIE PVS Evaluation Reports". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/pvs-evaluation-reports/>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring & Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has in place a record of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [1] There is no mention of such a record on the website of the government of Nauru. The Biosecurity Bill 2004 (under development) states "to protect the health, environment and agriculture of Nauru and to facilitate trade in its animal and plant products". However, it doesn't explicitly specify the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. [2]The Ministries of Health and Agriculture, and the Department of Justice and Border Control, do not have their own websites. [3,4] There are no national laboratory or national public health institute websites. Although Nauru had become a member nation to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in March,2013, yet there is no public evidence that it submitted Confidence-Building Measures(CBMs) reports. [5]

[1] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). January 2018. "Nauru: Review of National Resources and Environment Related Legislation". [<https://www.sprep.org/attachments/Publications/EMG/sprep-legislative-review-nauru.pdf>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Justice and Border Control".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control.aspx>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has in place legislation or regulations related to biosecurity, including any that address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. Nauru's online legal database RONLAW, does not list any relevant information. [1] The government of Nauru has formed the Cyber Security Awareness Team (CSAT) to provide safety to the government departments. But there is no mention of cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. [2] There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [3] There is no relevant information available on the main website of The Government of Nauru. [4] The Ministries of Health and Agriculture also do not have their own websites. There is no evidence of any other biosecurity policies or laws, or other relevant articles or studies on the topic. Although Nauru is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) reports. [5]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "The Department of Telecommunications".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-telecommunications.aspx>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[3] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.3.1c

Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has in place legislation or regulations related to biosecurity, or that it has designated an agency responsible for biosecurity. The government of Nauru's website has a page on quarantine practices of the Department of Justice and Border Control, but information on this page is very limited. The Department of Justice and Border Control does not appear to have its own website. [1] The Ministries of Health and Agriculture also do not have their own websites. There is no evidence of other relevant articles or studies on the topic. There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [2] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [3]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Justice and Border Control".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control.aspx>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[3] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

1.3.1d

Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that shows that Nauru has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. The country does not possess such inventories. The government of Nauru's website has a page on quarantine practices of the Department of Justice and Border Control, but information on this page is very limited. The Department of Justice and Border Control does not appear to have its own website. [1] The Ministries of Health and Agriculture also do not have their own websites. There is no evidence of any other biosecurity policies or laws, or other relevant articles or studies on the topic. There is no mention of any laws in the VERTIC database. [2] Although Nauru is a member to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) reports. [3]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Justice and Border Control".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control.aspx>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[2] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[3] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola. The Republic of Nauru (RON) Hospital houses the country's only national laboratory which can conduct preliminary diagnosis of hepatitis B and HIV infection using rapid diagnostic test (RDT) kits and of tuberculosis by microscopy. However, according to the report by the Ministry of Health and Medical Services, the RON Hospital laboratory "lacks the facilities for bacterial culture or infectious diseases serology that are necessary to support laboratory confirmation of a broader range of diseases of public health significance." [1] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) has a network of shared laboratory services which Nauru participates in. According to the PPHSN, tests for influenza, dengue, HIV and several other diseases in Nauru are performed by laboratories in either Australia or Fiji. [2] However no information is available about the accreditation if the laboratory on the main website of the government of Nauru. [3] The Ministry of Health as well as the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Agriculture also do not appear to have public facing websites.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Laboratories".

[<http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/Ref-Laboratories-maps.pdf>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru requires biosecurity training, using a standardised, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer programme, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. In 2006, a refresher training for Nauru Quarantine officers by SPC Land Resources Division (LRD) including the review of all their quarantine border operations [1]. However, there is no evidence of further training sessions. There is no mention of any relevant laws in the VERTIC database. [2] There is no information available in the main website of The Government of Nauru. [3] The Ministries of Health, Defence and Agriculture also do not have their own websites. Nauru is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention yet there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) reports. [4]

[1] SPC Land Resource Division (LRD). "Pacific Fruit Fly Project: Nauru". [<https://lrd.spc.int/country-profiles/nauru>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[2] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[4] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel in Nauru with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. There is no relevant information on the government of Nauru website. The Department of Justice and Border Control does not appear to have its own website. [1] There is no mention of any relevant laws in the VERTIC database. [2] There is no evidence of any other biosecurity policies or laws, or other relevant articles or studies describing whether biosecurity personnel are subject to drug testing, background checks or psychological/mental fitness checks. The Ministry of Health as well as the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of

Agriculture do not have public facing websites. Although Nauru is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) reports. [3]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Justice and Border Control".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control.aspx>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[2] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[3] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has publicly available information on the safe and secure transport of Category A and Category B infectious substances. The official website of Nauru Maritime and Port Authority does not mention any such information. [1] The website of the government of Nauru has very limited information on the practices of the Department of Justice and Border Control. The department does not have its own webpage, and neither does the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [2] The Port Authority Act 2006 requires that dangerous goods be transported or stored in accordance with the International Maritime Dangerous Goods code, but the act makes no specific mention of infectious substances. [3] The full text of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) code does not appear to be publicly available, so it is not possible to check whether it includes specific reference to the safe transport of Category A and Category B infectious substances. [4] Also, there is no specific mention to the infectious substances in the amendments to the 2018 edition of IMDG Code. [5] There is no evidence of any relevant laws in the VERTIC database. [6] There is no evidence of any other biosecurity policies or laws, or other relevant articles or studies on this issue. Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [7]

[1] Nauru Maritime and Port Authority. "Services". [<https://www.pan.com.nr/services/nauru-port-information/>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Justice and Border Control".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control.aspx>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Port Authority Act 2006".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_ljms/files/acts/871c2d97a88dc65581be6e8d25ae2365.pdf]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[4] International Maritime Organization. 2018. "International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code: 2018 Edition."

[<http://www.imo.org/en/Publications/Documents/IMDG%20Code/IMDG%20Code,%202018%20Edition/IL200E.PDF>]. Accessed 12 November 2020

[5] IMDG Code. "What's new in the 2018 Edition".

[<https://www.wcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/Publications/Documents/IMDG%20Code/IMDG%20Code,%202018%20Edition/Changes%2039-18.pdf>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[6] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[7] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation, regulation, or other guidance in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and pathogens with pandemic potential in Nauru. The official website of Nauru Maritime and Port Authority does not mention any such information. [1] The website of the government of Nauru has very limited information on the practices of the Department of Justice and Border Control. The department does not have its own webpage, and neither does the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [2] The Port Authority Act 2006 requires that dangerous goods be transported or stored in accordance with the International Maritime Dangerous Goods code, but the act makes no specific mention of dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential. [3] The Biosecurity Bill 2004 (under development) has no mention about the cross border transfer of pathogens and toxins. [4] There is no mention of any relevant laws in the VERTIC database. [5] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [6]

[1] Nauru Maritime and Port Authority. "Services". [<https://www.pan.com.nr/services/nauru-port-information/>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Justice and Border Control". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control.aspx>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Port Authority Act 2006". [http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/files/acts/871c2d97a88dc65581be6e8d25ae2365.pdf]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[4] Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). January 2018. "Nauru: Review of National Resources and Environment Related Legislation". [<https://www.sprep.org/attachments/Publications/EMG/sprep-legislative-review-nauru.pdf>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[5] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a

Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national biosafety legislation and/or regulations in Nauru. Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor a national laboratory, appear to have public-facing websites, and there is no relevant information on the main website of the government of Nauru. [1] There is no evidence of biosafety legislation in Nauru's online legal database RONLAW. [2] There is no mention of any relevant laws in the VERTIC database. [3] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [4]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/gazette/view/496]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[3] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[4] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

1.4.1b

Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national biosafety legislation and/or regulations in Nauru, nor of any specific established agency responsible for enforcing such measures. Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor a national laboratory, appear to have public-facing websites, and there is no relevant information on the main website of the government of Nauru. [1] There is no evidence of biosafety legislation in Nauru's online legal database RONLAW. [2] Nauru is a party to the the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity which governs the movements of the living modified organisms (LMO) resulting from modern biotechnology from one country to another. However, there is no publicly available evidence of its biosafety regulations. [3] There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [4] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [5]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/gazette/view/496]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Biosafety Clearing House. "Country Profile: Nauru". [<https://bch.cbd.int/about/countryprofile.shtml?country=nr>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru requires biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor a national laboratory, have public-facing websites. [1] There is no evidence of biosafety legislation in Nauru's online legal database RONLAW. [2] Nauru is a party to the the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity which governs the movements of the living modified organisms (LMO) resulting from modern biotechnology from one country to another. However, there is no publicly available evidence on the requirement of biosafety trainings. [3] There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [4] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [5]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/gazette/view/496]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Biosafety Clearing House. "Country Profile: Nauru". [<https://bch.cbd.int/about/countryprofile.shtml?country=nr>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research. Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor a national laboratory, have public-facing websites. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence, and there is no relevant information on the main government of Nauru website. [1] Nauru has very limited research capability. Naoero Public Health Centre, run by the Department of Public Health delivers essential public health services including "Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems". [2,3]. It proposed to "support institutional structures for health research capability" in its National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020.

[3] There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [4] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [5]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru RON Hospital".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service.aspx>]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 12 November 2020.

[4] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>] Accessed 12 November 2020.

1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a national policy requiring oversight of dual use research, such as research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or pathogens with pandemic potential. Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor a national laboratory, have public-facing websites. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence, and there is no relevant information on the main government of Nauru website. [1] Nauru has very limited research capability. Naoero Public Health Centre, run by the Department of Public Health delivers essential public health services including "Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems". [2,3]. It proposed to "support institutional structures for health research capability" in its National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020. [3] There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [4] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [5]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru RON Hospital".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service.aspx>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.5.1c

Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an agency specifically responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, pathogens with pandemic potential, or other dual-use research in Nauru. Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor a national laboratory, have public-facing websites. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence, and there is no relevant information on the main government of Nauru website. [1] Nauru has very limited research capability. Naoero Public Health Centre, run by the Department of Public Health delivers essential public health services including "Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems". [2,3]. It proposed to "support institutional structures for health research capability" in its National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020. [3] There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [4] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [5]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru RON Hospital".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service.aspx>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation, regulation, policy, or other guidance, requiring the screening of synthesised DNA before it is sold. Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor a national laboratory, have public-facing websites. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence, and there is no relevant information on the main government of Nauru website [1]. There is no evidence of relevant legislation in Nauru's online legal database RONLAW [2]. Nauru has very limited research capability. Naoero Public Health Centre, run by the Department of Public Health delivers essential public health services including "Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health problems" [3,4]. It proposed to "support institutional structures for health research capability" in its National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 [4]. There is no mention of any laws in VERTIC database. [5] Although Nauru is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [6].

- [1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database". [http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/gazette/view/496]. Accessed 17 January 2020.
- [3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru RON Hospital". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service.aspx>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [5] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/n/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.
- [6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Nauru." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/nauru>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2019

World Health Organization

1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence to confirm that Nauru's national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 core tests defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The Republic of Nauru (RON) Hospital houses the country's only national laboratory which can conduct preliminary diagnosis of hepatitis B and HIV infection using rapid diagnostic test (RDT) kits and of tuberculosis by microscopy. However, according to the report by the Ministry of Health and Medical Services, the RON Hospital laboratory "lacks the facilities for bacterial culture or infectious diseases serology that are necessary to support laboratory confirmation of a broader range of diseases of public health significance." [1] Nauru has not completed the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the International Health Regulations Core Capacities. [2] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) has a network of shared laboratory services which Nauru participates in. According to the PPHSN, tests for influenza, dengue, HIV and several other diseases in Nauru are performed by laboratories in either Australia or Fiji. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health of Nauru. "Strategic Plan".

[https://www.who.int/goe/policies/nauru_health_sector_strategic2010_2015.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): IHR Monitoring and Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Laboratories".

[<http://phts.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/Ref-Laboratories-maps.pdf>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. There is no such information available on the main website of the Government of Nauru.[1] The

Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Naoero Public Health Center and the national laboratory do not have public-facing websites. The Ministry of Health had drafted an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in consultation with World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2005 to "provide an overview of the activities and responses that will be required from the Nauru government, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to an influenza pandemic". However there is no mention about the testing capacities of the country. There is no evidence of further follow up by the Ministry of Health and WHO. [2]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence regarding a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited in Nauru. The Republic of Nauru (RON) Hospital houses the country's only national laboratory which can conduct preliminary diagnosis of hepatitis B and HIV infection using rapid diagnostic test (RDT) kits and of tuberculosis by microscopy. [1] However no information is available about the accreditation of the laboratory on the main website of the government of Nauru. [2] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture also do not appear to have public facing websites.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence available on the national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review. The Republic of Nauru (RON) Hospital houses the country's only national laboratory which can conduct preliminary diagnosis of hepatitis B and HIV infection using rapid diagnostic test (RDT) kits and of tuberculosis by microscopy. [1] However no information on the external quality assurance review of the national laboratory on the main website of the government of Nauru. [2] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture also do not appear to have public facing websites. Nauru is part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN), but it is not clear that the PPHSN performs

quality assurance reviews on the laboratories which are part of its LabNet network. [3]

- [1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [3] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Laboratories". [<http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/Ref-Laboratories-maps.pdf>] Accessed 07 December 2020.

2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a

Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is limited publicly available evidence that Nauru has a nationwide specimen transport system. Nauru is part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN), which has a network of laboratories which share resources called LabNet. LabNet has guidelines for shipping specimens between laboratories. [1] Nauru regularly sends samples to laboratories in Fiji and Australia for testing. [2] According to a 2015 report by the PPHSN, Nauru uses Air Nauru to ship laboratory specimens. Air Nauru is certified by the International Air Transport Association. [3] There is, however, no evidence of a formal agreement between the government and Air Nauru to transport specimens. The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the national laboratory do not have public-facing websites. There is no relevant information on the main government of Nauru website. [4]

- [1] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). September 2013. "Referral of Biological Samples in the Pacific PPHSN LabNet Reference Laboratories". [<https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/WD-4-Referral-of-biological-samples-in-the-PacificC-PPHSN-LABNET-Reference-laboratory.pdf>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [2] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Laboratories". [<https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/Ref-Laboratories-maps.pdf>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [3] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). 2015. "PPHSN LabNet Catalog - 2015 Edition". [https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/PPHSN_LabNet_catalogL1L2L3_July2015-.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.
- [4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a

Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. The Republic

of Nauru (RON) Hospital houses the country's only national laboratory which can conduct preliminary diagnosis of hepatitis B and HIV infection using rapid diagnostic test (RDT) kits and of tuberculosis by microscopy. [1] However no information on the licensing the other laboratories for scaling up the testing on the main website of the government of Nauru. [2] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture also do not appear to have public facing websites.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis

= 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease. The Nauru National Disaster Risk Management Plan, published in 2008, does not mention the existence of event-based surveillance (EBS). [1] According to the government report, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis." [2] However there is no mention about the EBS in the report. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. There is no reference to an EBS or ongoing surveillance and analysis activities on the main Nauru government website. [3] Nauru is a part of The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which is dedicated to promote public health surveillance and appropriate response to the health challenges of Pacific countries and territories. [4] However there is insufficient evidence regarding the surveillance or analysis for infectious disease conducted by the Nauru government.

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020

[2] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020

[4] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network. [<https://www.pphsn.net/index.htm>]. Accessed 17 November 2020

2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru reported a potential public health emergency of international concern to the World Health Organisation (WHO) within the last two years including for Covid-19. The WHO Disease Outbreak News site reports no recent outbreaks of reportable diseases. [1] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website. There is no relevant information on the main Nauru government website, nor any recent media reports. [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News: Nauru".

[<http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/nru/en/>]. Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that Nauru has a surveillance system operational at a national level. But there is no information about the surveillance system operational at the sub-national level. According to the Strategic Plan 2010-2015, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis. The Public Health Unit produces a monthly surveillance bulletin, which summarises reporting trends from the previous month." [1] However, there is no mention about the system being an electronic reporting surveillance system. There is no mention about any surveillance system in the latest Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020. [2] Nauru is a part of The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which is dedicated to promote public health surveillance and appropriate response to the health challenges of Pacific countries and territories. [3] However there is no information about surveillance systems operating in Nauru. Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "Strategic Plan 2010-2015".

[https://www.who.int/goe/policies/nauru_health_sector_strategic2010_2015.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[<https://extranet.who.int/nutrition/gina/sites/default/filesstore/NRU-2016-2020-National%20health%20Plan.pdf>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[3] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network. [<https://www.pphsn.net/index.htm>]. Accessed 18 November 2020

2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient public evidence to confirm that the electronic reporting surveillance system collects ongoing or real-time laboratory data in Nauru. According to the Strategic Plan 2010-2015, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis." [1] However there is no mention about the collection of real-time laboratory data in the report. There is no mention about any surveillance system in the latest Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020. [2] There is no mention about the data collection neither in the National Disaster Risk Management Plan nor on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [3,4] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "Strategic Plan 2010-2015".

[https://www.who.int/goe/policies/nauru_health_sector_strategic2010_2015.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that electronic health records are commonly in use in Nauru. According to a government report, "The RON Hospital Medical Records Department has a Microsoft Excel database into which patient registration data and International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) discharge diagnoses can be entered." [1] There are no programmed analytic functions and the staff are only able to perform limited manual collation of data and generate line listings. Although the report mentions the need for a Health Information System yet there is no information regarding this system in the main website of the Government of Nauru. [2] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

2.4.1b

Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the public health system has access to the electronic health records of the individuals in the country. The public health services in Nauru are provided by two facilities; Republic of Nauru Hospital (RONH) and Naoero Public Health Centre. RONH provides general outpatient and inpatient services. Departments and services include acute ward areas for adult, paediatric and maternity patients; Out-Patient Department; Dressing Clinic; Operating Theatre; Emergency Room; High-Dependency Unit; Isolation Ward; Radiology; Dental; Laboratory; Pharmacy; Medical Stores; Physiotherapy; Medical Records and an Ambulance service. The Naoero Public Health Centre conducts regular community and school outreach visits for both primary and preventive health purposes. It has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. [1] According to a government report, "The RON Hospital Medical Records Department has a Microsoft Excel database into which patient registration data and International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) discharge diagnoses can be entered." However there is no mention of the access of electronic health records of individuals neither in the report nor on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [2] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

2.4.1c

Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence on the data standards to ensure that the records are comparable. According to a government report, "The RON Hospital Medical Records Department has a Microsoft Excel database into which patient registration data and International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) discharge diagnoses can be entered." [1] There are no programmed analytic functions and the staff are only able to perform limited manual collation of data and generate line listings. However there is no mention about the data standards for these records neither in the report nor on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [2] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a

Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has an established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance). Although there is biosafety legislation like The Quarantine Act 1908 , which "regulates measures for the inspection, exclusion, detention, observation, segregation, isolation, protection, treatment, sanitary regulation, and disinfection of vessels, persons, goods, things, animals, or plants", and the Agricultural Quarantine Act 1999, which covers exportation and other aspects of animal and plant quarantine, are in place in the country, they do not address data sharing. The Department of Health and Medical Services and the Department of Justice and Border Control is responsible for enforcing the Quarantine Act 1908 and the Agricultural Quarantine Act 1999 respectively. [1,2] However there is no mention about the animal, human and the wildlife surveillance in the documents. There is no relevant information on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [3] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture also do not appear to have public facing websites. The Department of Commerce, Industry and Environment (CIE) Environment, a division of the Department of CIE, does have a website, but it has not been updated since 2012.

[1] RONLAW: Nauru's Online Legal Database. [http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/act/view/556]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] RONLAW: Nauru's Online Legal Database. [http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/act/view/609]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[4] Department of Commerce, Industry and Environment (CIE) of the Republic of Nauru, CIE Environment. [<http://nauruenv.appspot.com/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases available via reports (or other format) on government websites in Nauru. The Public Health Centre has an operational surveillance system; according to a government report, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis. The Public Health Unit produces a monthly surveillance bulletin, which summarises reporting trends from the

previous month." [1] However, the data is neither available on the main website of the Government of Nauru nor on any other online portals. [2,3] The Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[3] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network. [<https://www.pphsn.net/index.htm>]. Accessed 18 November 2020

2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is limited publicly available evidence that Nauru has made de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites. The main website of The Government of Nauru publishes weekly updates on the COVID-19 including testing and quarantining of people. However, there is no information of the daily case count and mortality rate on the website. [1] The main website of the Government of Nauru has a separate page dedicated to COVID-19 but it does not contain any reports or surveillance data. [2] According to the government report, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis. The Public Health Unit produces a monthly surveillance bulletin, which summarises reporting trends from the previous month." [3] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Coronavirus Update". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government-information-office/gio-notices/friday,-11-september-2020.aspx>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Prevention of Covid-19".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service/covid-19.aspx>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020

2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. The right to privacy is expressed in the Constitution of Nauru. Section 3 of the Constitution guarantees the rights to "life, liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property and the protection of the law" and " respect for his private and family life". [1] However there is no legislation specifically safeguarding the personal information. There is also no evidence on the main government of Nauru website. [2] According to the government report, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis. The Public Health Unit produces a monthly surveillance bulletin, which summarises reporting trends from the previous month." However there is no specific information about safeguarding the confidentiality of health information for individuals that is generated through health surveillance activities. [3] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/gazette/view/496]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020

2.4.4b

Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, and no mention of cyber attack protections. The right to privacy is expressed in the Constitution of Nauru. Section 3 of the Constitution guarantees the rights to "life, liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property and the protection of the law" and " respect for his private and family life". [1] However there is no legislation specifically safeguarding the personal information including cyber attacks. There is also no evidence on the main government of Nauru website. [2] According to the government report, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis. The Public Health Unit produces a monthly surveillance bulletin, which summarises reporting trends from the previous month." However there is no specific information about safeguarding the confidentiality of health information for individuals that is generated through health surveillance activities. [3] The government of Nauru has formed the Cyber Security Awareness Team (CSAT) to provide safety to the government departments. But there is no mention of services to safeguard the confidentiality of health information for individuals. [4] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The

Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru, "RONLAW: Nauru's online legal database".

[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/index.php/gazette/view/496]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 18 November 2020

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "The Department of Telecommunications".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-telecommunications.aspx>]. Accessed 18 November 2020.

2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a

Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease = 2, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the government of Nauru has made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data of any number of diseases during a public health emergency with other countries in the region. According to the government report, "The Public Health Unit has introduced a weekly system of syndromic surveillance of communicable diseases, with urgent reporting of suspected outbreaks (for which there are guidelines for reporting thresholds) and specific conditions of possible international public health concern. The syndromes currently subject to surveillance include: diarrhoea, influenza-like illness, severe acute respiratory infection or pneumonia, acute fever with rash, and acute flaccid paralysis. The Public Health Unit produces a monthly surveillance bulletin, which summarises reporting trends from the previous month." [1] However the report does not mention the commitment of the government to share the data. There is no reference to collecting or sharing surveillance data on the main Nauru government website. [2] There is also no mention of any specific commitments to share surveillance data with other countries in the National Disaster Risk Management Plan. [3] Nauru is, however, part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which shares information between countries in the region in the event of public health emergencies through a platform called PacNet. [4] The Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[3] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[4] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PacNet". [<https://www.pphsn.net/Services/PacNet/intro.htm>].

Accessed 19 November 2020

2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing neither to prepare for future public health emergencies nor for an active public health emergency. The main website of the Government of Nauru has a separate page dedicated for COVID-19 but it does not mention any steps taken by the Government to conduct contact tracing. [1] There is no relevant information on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [2] There is also no mention of any national system to provide training to conduct contact tracing in either the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 nor in the National Disaster Risk Management Plan. [3,4] Nauru is a part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which has shared the guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island countries and territories.[5] However, there is no information of follow-up by the government either during SARS or COVID-19. Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have public facing website.

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Prevention of Covid-19".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service/covid-19.aspx>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020

[5] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). 2003. "PPHSN Guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island Countries And Territories.

[https://www.pphsn.net/Outbreak/SARS/Guidelines_last_update/ManagementOfContacts.htm]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention. The main website of the Government of Nauru has a separate page dedicated for COVID-19 but it does not mention any such services. [1] There is no relevant information on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [2] There is also no mention of self isolation and provision of economic support in either the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 nor in the National Disaster Risk Management Plan. [3,4] Nauru is a part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which has shared the guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island countries and territories. [5] However, there is no information of follow-up by the government. Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory have individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

- [1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Prevention of Covid-19". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service/covid-19.aspx>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020
- [4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [5] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). 2003. "PPHSN Guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island Countries And Territories". [https://www.pphsn.net/Outbreak/SARS/Guidelines_last_update/ManagementOfContacts.htm]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar). The Government of Nauru publishes weekly updates on COVID-19 and the contact tracing efforts was indicated during the initial phase of the outbreak. [1] However, there is no information about the similar efforts in the subsequent periods. The main website of the Government of Nauru has a separate page dedicated for COVID-19 but it does not contain any reports on contact tracing. [2] There is no information about the reports on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [3] There is also no mention of the contact tracing efforts and the subsequent availability of daily reports in either the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 nor in the National Disaster Risk Management Plan. [4,5] Nauru is a part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which has shared the guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island countries and territories. But it does not mention submission of daily reports.[6] There is no evidence that the government has made any

follow-up actions either for SARS or COVID-19. Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] The Government of Republic of Nauru. "GIO Notices". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government-information-office/gio-notices/tuesday,-28-april,-2020.aspx>]. Accessed 07 December 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Prevention of Covid-19". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service/covid-19.aspx>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[5] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[6] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). 2003. "PPHSN Guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island Countries And Territories". [https://www.pphsn.net/Outbreak/SARS/Guidelines_last_update/ManagementOfContacts.htm]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts neither in the event of a active public health emergency nor for future public health emergencies. The main website of the Government of Nauru has a separate page dedicated for COVID-19 but it does not mention any agreement between the public health system and border control authorities. [1] There is no relevant information on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [2] Neither the Department of Justice and Border Control section of the government website mentions such information nor the Quarantine section of the website. [3,4] The Port Authority Act 2006 does not have any information about such agreement. There is also no mention of any such plan/agreement in either the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 nor in the National Disaster Risk Management Plan. [6,7] Nauru is a part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which has shared the guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island countries and territories.[8] However, there is no information of follow-up by the government. Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Justice and Border Control also do not appear to have public facing websites.

- [1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Prevention of Covid-19".
[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service/covid-19.aspx>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Justice and Border Control".
[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control.aspx>] Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Quarantine Section".
[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-justice-and-border-control/quarantine-section.aspx>] Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [5] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Port Authority Act 2006".
[http://ronlaw.gov.nr/nauru_lpms/files/acts/28dca1ca9d887375dae6fc543f6a1bec.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".
[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [7] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".
[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [8] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN Guidelines for the preparedness, surveillance and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Pacific Island Countries And Territories".
[https://www.pphsn.net/Outbreak/SARS/Guidelines_last_update/ManagementOfContacts.htm]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of any applied epidemiology training programs in Nauru, nor is there evidence that there are resources available to send citizens overseas for training. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 does not reference epidemiology training programs. [1] Nauru is part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network, but it is not clear whether this organisation provides applied epidemiology training programs. [2] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website. The TEPHINET website does not mention any training programs with Nauru. [3]

- [1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".
[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-

2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[2] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). [<http://www.pphsn.net/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[3] TEPHINET. "Training Programs". [<https://www.tephinet.org/training-programs>]. Accessed 19 November 2020

2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of any applied epidemiology training programs in Nauru, let alone one inclusive of animal health professionals. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 does not reference epidemiology training programs. [1] Nauru is part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network, but it is not clear whether this organisation provides applied epidemiology training programs. [2] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website. The TEPHINET website does not mention any training programs with Nauru. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[2] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). [<http://www.pphsn.net/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[3] TEPHINET. "Training Programs". [<https://www.tephinet.org/training-programs>]. Accessed 19 November 2020

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a

Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Nauru has a disease specific plan in place but it does not have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. The Ministry of Health had drafted an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in consultation with World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2005 to "provide an overview of the activities and responses that will be required from the Nauru government, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to an influenza pandemic". But this is not designed to be used in the event of other disease outbreaks. [1] Additionally, neither the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 nor the Disaster Risk Management Plan include provisions for response for multiple types of communicable diseases. [2,3] No further information is publicly available. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. There is no reference to electronic health records on the main Nauru government website. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[2] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[3] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

3.1.1b

If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?

Yes = 1, No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. The Ministry of Health had drafted an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in consultation with World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2005 to

"provide an overview of the activities and responses that will be required from the Nauru government, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to an influenza pandemic". But this neither covers other diseases nor it has been updated since. [1] Additionally, neither the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 nor the Disaster Risk Management Plan include provisions for response for multiple types of communicable diseases. [2,3] No further information is publicly available. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. There is no reference to electronic health records on the main Nauru government website. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[3] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

3.1.1c

If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential or a plan which addresses considerations for paediatric and other vulnerable populations. The Ministry of Health had drafted an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in consultation with World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2005 to "provide an overview of the activities and responses that will be required from the Nauru government, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to an influenza pandemic". However it does not cover multiple diseases and does not explicitly outline how paediatric and vulnerable populations should be treated in the event of a public health emergency. [1] Neither the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 nor the Disaster Risk Management Plan mention these populations. [2,3] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website, and there is no other relevant information on the main website of the government of Nauru. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[3] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

3.1.1d

Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a

Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient public evidence to confirm that Nauru has a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. According to the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020, "There are no private or non-government health service providers on Nauru. Over-the-counter medications (but not prescription drugs) are available in the supermarket and in many stores. The proposed Pharmacy Act will govern the procurement, sale and use of medicinal drugs outside of health facilities." [1] The Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza says that "identification of public and private sector partners needed for effective planning and response" is the primary responsibility of the Nauru government. The plan does not specify any more details about how the government should engage with the private sector. [2] The Disaster Risk Management Plan says that effective partnerships between the government, non-governmental organisations and the private sector are required for successful management of disasters, but does not give details of a specific mechanism to engage with the private sector in the event of an emergency. [3] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[2] Ministry of Health of Nauru. August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[3] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020

3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic for any number of diseases. The Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza although mentions about informing the public about the disease, animal surveillance and staying at home. [1] However, the plan is in the draft and hasn't yet been implemented. The Disaster Risk Management Plan mentions "developing prevention activities and raising awareness" but the plan doesn't specify the exact activities and guidelines. [2] The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 does not mention any such guidelines. [3] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health of Nauru. August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [http://www.naurugov.nr/]. Accessed 19 November 2020

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has either activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year or has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year. There is no evidence of biological threat focussed exercises on the WHO IHR Strategic Partnership Portal, or in the WHO Nauru country profile. [1,2] Although the Ministry of Health had drafted an Emergency

Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in consultation with World Health Organisation (WHO) in 2005 to "provide an overview of the activities and responses that will be required from the Nauru government, corporations, and non-governmental organizations to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to an influenza pandemic", this plan is neither extended to other diseases nor it has been activated in the past year. [3] The Ministry of Health does not have its own websites and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. [4]

[1] World Health Organisation. "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation. "Nauru". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/country-status/nauru#naphs>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza". [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru in the past year has undergone an exercise to identify a list of gaps and best practices through a biological threat-focused international health regulations (IHR) exercise with the World Health Organisation (WHO). There is no evidence of an after-action review on the WHO IHR Strategic Partnership Portal, or in the WHO Nauru country profile. [1,2] The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture do not have their own websites and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. [3]

[1] World Health Organisation. "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation. "Nauru". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/country-status/nauru#naphs>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. There is no evidence of an after-action review on the WHO IHR

Strategic Partnership Portal, or in the WHO Nauru country profile. [1,2] According to the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020, "There are no private or non-government health service providers on Nauru". [3] Additionally, The Disaster Risk Management Plan says that effective partnerships between the government, non-governmental organisations and the private sector are required for successful management of disasters, but does not give details of a specific mechanism about the inclusion of the private sector. [4] The Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza says that "identification of public and private sector partners needed for effective planning and response" is the primary responsibility of the Nauru government. The plan does not specify any more details about how the government should engage with the private sector. [5] The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture do not have their own websites and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. [6] There is no further evidence on the WHO Simulation Exercise page. [7]

- [1] World Health Organisation. "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation. "Nauru". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/country-status/nauru#naphs>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 19 November 2020
- [4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020
- [5] Ministry of Health of Nauru. August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza". [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020
- [6] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.
- [7] World Health Organization (WHO). Simulation Exercise. [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed 19 November 2020.

3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence Nauru has an Emergency Operations Center in place. The Nauru National Disaster Risk Management Plan, published in 2008, states that Nauru's National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) is located in the Nauru Police Headquarters. Its major function is to "act as the central control and coordination centre during an emergency situation." The plan does not indicate which specific types of emergencies the NEOC is responsible for, but does include an accounting of the main hazards for Nauru. These risks include public health crises and animal disease (both of which are listed as a high risk). [1] The Ministries of Health and Agriculture and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. There is no reference to an NEOC on the main Nauru government website. [2]

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that Nauru's National Emergency Operations Center is required to conduct a drill at least once per year or that it actually conducts a drill once a year. The Nauru National Disaster Risk Management Plan, published in 2008, states that Nauru's National Emergency Operations Centre is located in the Nauru Police Headquarters. Its major function is to "act as the central control and coordination centre during an emergency situation." There is no additional information about conducting drills in the plan. [1] In 2012, National Disaster Risk Management Office (NDRMO) organised Emergency Operation Centres training "targeting key stakeholder personnel from the Nauru Police Force, Fire and Rescue Service, Department of Health, the Utilities Corporation, Civil Aviation, Department of Marine and Fisheries, Department of Commerce, Environment and Industry and the Phosphate Corporation (RonPhos). The Emergency Operations Centres training, held from the 25th of April to the 1st of May was requested by the NDRMO and the National Disaster Risk Management Council as part of the process towards the development of Nauru's National DRM Action Plan." [2] But there is no evidence regarding the source and date of publishing of this document. There is no evidence about the further training of EOC in subsequent years. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. There is no reference to the NEOC on the main Nauru government website. [3]

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020

[2] SPC Geoscience Division."Nauru: Emergency Operations Centres Training".

[<http://gsd.spc.int/sopac/snapshot/Snapshot76/files/assets/downloads/page0007.pdf>]. Accessed 20 November 2020

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 20 November 2020

3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence to show that Nauru's National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) can conduct, or has conducted within the last year, a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. The Nauru National Disaster Risk Management Plan, published in 2008, states that Nauru's National Emergency Operations Centre is located in the Nauru Police Headquarters. Its major function is to "act as the central control and coordination centre during an emergency situation." There is no additional information about conducting drills in the plan. [1] In 2012, National Disaster Risk Management Office (NDRMO) organised

Emergency Operation Centres training "targeting key stakeholder personnel from the Nauru Police Force, Fire and Rescue Service, Department of Health, the Utilities Corporation, Civil Aviation, Department of Marine and Fisheries, Department of Commerce, Environment and Industry and the Phosphate Corporation (RonPhos). The Emergency Operations Centres training, held from the 25th of April to the 1st of May was requested by the NDRMO and the National Disaster Risk Management Council as part of the process towards the development of Nauru's National DRM Action Plan." [2] However there is no evidence about the further training of EOC in subsequent years. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture and the national laboratory do not have their own websites. There is no reference to the NEOC on the main Nauru government website. [3]

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020

[2] "Nauru: Emergency Operations Centres Training".

[http://gsd.spc.int/sopac/snapshot/Snapshot76/files/assets/downloads/page0007.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [http://www.naurugov.nr/]. Accessed 20 November 2020

3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?
- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru's public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event, nor are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, or agreements between those entities regarding such events. Neither the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza nor the Disaster Risk Management Plan indicates that such exercises have taken place. The Disaster Risk Management Plan says that "a programme of exercises and practices" should be developed to test disaster response systems, but there is no evidence that this has occurred. [1,2] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. The Nauru police force, which is in charge of operating the National Emergency Operations Center, does not appear to have its own website. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that Nauru has in place a risk communication plan, however it neither explicitly mentions the populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach) nor does it mention if it is used for public health emergencies, not just natural disasters like floods. According to the National Disaster Risk Management Plan, "regular assessment of available communications and back-up communication resources for use in major emergencies and disasters and testing of these resources on a regular basis." The plan has assigned Police/ National Controller as a lead agency for coordinating the issuance of public information, providing information to the public for local and international enquiries and to ensure that there are effective communication links between all the responding agencies. [1] The Ministry of Health published an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in 2005. This plan outlines a communications strategy, which identifies who is responsible for informing the government, the public, and organisations such as the World Health Organisation, and at what stage of the outbreak this activity is necessary. For example, the Director of Public Health is responsible for exchanging information with WHO and other relevant organisations and countries. However, it is not clear that this plan is intended for use in other public health emergencies. [2] As per the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020, "Health communication capabilities need to be developed along with strategies for sustained health awareness and health communication." But there is no information regarding the follow up of this strategy. [3]

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that Nauru has a communication plan specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. According to the National Disaster Risk Management Plan, "regular assessment of available communications and back-up communication resources for use in major emergencies and disasters and testing of these resources on a regular basis." The plan has assigned Police/ National Controller as a lead agency for coordinating the issuance of public information, providing information to the public for local and international enquiries and to ensure that there are effective communication links between all the responding agencies. [1] However there is no mention whether this plan can be used for public health emergencies. The Ministry of Health published an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in 2005. This plan outlines a communications strategy, which identifies who is responsible for informing the government, the public, and organisations such as the World Health Organisation, and at what stage of the outbreak this activity is necessary. For example, the Director of Public Health is responsible for exchanging information with WHO and other relevant organisations and countries. However, it is not clear that this plan is intended for use in other public health emergencies. [2] As per the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020, "Health communication capabilities need to be developed along with strategies for sustained health awareness and health communication." But there is no information regarding the follow up of this strategy. [3]

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020

3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is limited publicly available evidence that Nauru has a risk communication plan that designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. According to the National Disaster Risk Management Plan, "regular assessment of available communications and back-up communication resources for use in major emergencies and disasters and testing of these resources on a regular basis." The plan has assigned Police/ National Controller as a lead agency for coordinating the issuance of public information, providing information to the public for local and international enquiries and to ensure that there are effective communication links between all the responding agencies. [1] However there is no mention whether this plan can be used for public health emergencies. The Ministry of Health published an Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza in 2005. This plan outlines a communications strategy, which identifies who is responsible for informing the government, the public, and organisations such as the World Health Organisation, and at what stage of the outbreak this activity is necessary. For example, the Director of Public Health is responsible for exchanging information with WHO and other relevant organisations and countries. However, it is not clear that this plan is intended for use in other public health emergencies. [2] As per the

National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020, "Health communication capabilities need to be developed along with strategies for sustained health awareness and health communication." But there is no information regarding the follow up of this strategy. [3]

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020

3.5.2 Public communication

3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that the public health system of Nauru has actively shared messages via online media platforms to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation, during active emergencies. The Government of Nauru only has a Twitter account which has been actively used to provide information about the Coronavirus disease pandemic (COVID-19). This included the timely information about the travel restrictions and Coronavirus updates by the President. [1] However, the link to the document is not routed to the official website of the Government of Nauru where it publishes its fortnightly bulletin. [2] Nevertheless, there is no information if the same platform has been used for other public health concerns in the past year. There are no separate accounts for ministries and individual departments. The Ministry of Health does not appear to have a public facing website.

[1] Twitter. "@Republic_Nauru." [https://twitter.com/republic_auru?lang=en]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru Bulletin". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government-information-office/nauru-bulletin.aspx>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no publicly available evidence that senior leaders of Nauru have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter. Deputy Minister for Nauru Port Authority and Finance and Sustainable Development, Hon. Russ Kun has both Twitter and Facebook accounts. [1,2] However, there is no evidence of misinformation or disinformation on his account. Minister for Climate Change , Commerce, Industry & Environment (CIE) and Infrastructure Development, Hon. Rennie Gadabu has a facebook account. [3] But there is no sign of misinformation or disinformation from his account. Minister for Justice & Border Control and Sports, Hon. Maverick EOE has a facebook account but he hasn't shared any misinformation or disinformation through his account. [4] Deputy Minister for Public Service, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Multicultural Affairs and Nauru Air Corporation, Hon. Asterio Appi has both Twitter and Facebook accounts. [5,6] There is no proof that he has shared any misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years on his social media accounts

[1] Twitter. "@russjkun". [<https://twitter.com/russjkun?lang=en>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Facebook. "Hon. Russ J. Kun MP". [<https://www.facebook.com/russjkunmp>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Facebook. "Rennie Stanislaus Gadabu". [<https://www.facebook.com/rennier.gadabu>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] Facebook. "Maverick Eoe (Mav)". [<https://www.facebook.com/maverick.eoe>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[5] Twitter. "@AsterioAppi". [<https://twitter.com/asterioappi?lang=en>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[6] Facebook. "Hon. Asterio Appi Member for Boe". [<https://m.facebook.com/Hon-Asterio-Appi-Member-for-Boe-407455310030950/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 57

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 94.58

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.87

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.44

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak. The main website of the Government of Nauru does not provide any relevant information.[1] The Nauru Bulletin which the government publishes fortnightly does not contain the news releases of past year.[2] There is no mention about such restrictions in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade section of the government website. [3] The Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not have public facing websites. However, the government received Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) medical supplies by the World Health Organisation (WHO) on 27 February.[4]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>] Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru Bulletin". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/nauru-bulletin.aspx>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade".

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade.aspx>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. 24 March 2020. "Nauru Bulletin".
[http://www.naurugov.nr/media/121885/nauru_bulletin__04_24mar2020__208_.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

3.7.1b

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. The main website of the Government of Nauru does not provide any relevant information.[1] The Nauru Bulletin which the government publishes fortnightly does not contain the news releases of past year.[2] There is no mention about such restrictions in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade section of the government website. [3] The Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not have public facing websites. On the contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has committed to ensure supply chain connectivity during the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic. Countries like Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Chile, Laos, Myanmar, New Zealand, Singapore and Uruguay along with Nauru have affirmed "the importance of refraining from the imposition of the export controls or tariffs and non- tariff barriers and of removing any existing trade restrictive measures on essential goods, especially medical supplies, all this time." [4]

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru Bulletin". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/nauru-bulletin.aspx>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade". [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade.aspx>]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. 6 May 2020. "Nauru Bulletin".
[http://www.naurugov.nr/media/123629/nauru_bulletin__07_06may2020__211_.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is publicly available evidence that Nauru has implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. Nauru has implemented the travel ban only at the advent of coronavirus disease (Covid-19). It restricted the entry to China, Macao, Hong Kong, Korea, Iran, Europe, USA, Asia (except Taiwan), Majuro, Kiribati and Fiji. [1] The main website of the Government of Nauru does not provide any relevant information. [2] The Nauru Bulletin which the government publishes fortnightly does not contain the news releases regarding the travel ban prior to COVID-19. [3] Neither the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade nor the department of Justice and Border Control sections of the government website have any mention about such restrictions. [4] The Ministries

of Health and Agriculture do not have public facing websites.

- [1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. 24 March 2020. "Nauru Bulletin". [http://www.naurugov.nr/media/121885/nauru_bulletin__04_24mar2020__208_.pdf]. Accessed 20 November 2020.
- [2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [http://www.naurugov.nr/]. Accessed 20 November 2020.
- [3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Nauru Bulletin". [http://www.naurugov.nr/government/nauru-bulletin.aspx]. Accessed 20 November 2020.
- [4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. "Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade". [http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade.aspx]. Accessed 20 November 2020.

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 134.62

2015

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 766.36

2018

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Nauru has a public workforce strategy in place to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. There is no standalone strategy, but the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-20 identifies fields where there are insufficient workers and strategies to address these shortcomings. Notably, Nauru has proposed to create a nursing school to train more nurses. [1] The plan include the objectives to continue its engagement with local health workers, Enable internal institutional (MOH) capacities for local staff recruitment and support creation of positions and engagement of expatriate staff for specialised positions. It also aims to strengthen training and education of nurses and local health workers. The plan gives details about the gaps in the health workforce and the strategies to overcome the same. The plan includes the aim to create and adopt a Health Workforce Plan and a Staff Succession and Training Plan for health professions by the end of 2016, however it is not clear whether these plans have been published. The Ministry of Health and the Department of Education do not have public-facing websites and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. [2].

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 23 November 2020

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 23 November 2020.

4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 500

2010

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence to show that Nauru has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a patient isolation facility located within the country. Nauru has one hospital, the Republic of Nauru (RON) Hospital, which does not have its own website. The RON Hospital was upgraded in 2017 with new paediatric, medical and surgical wings and enhanced capacity for pathology and radiology, however, it is not clear whether the hospital has the capacity to isolate patients. [1] In 2018 there was a provision of wellness centres around the country to improve the

community's access to medical care. Médecins Sans Frontières completed a mental health project on Nauru in 2018, which noted that there were insufficient beds available in the hospital for patients needing psychiatric treatment -- suggesting the hospital has limited capacity. [3] According to the Nauru Bulletin, the Government ordered certain establishments to be designated residences to quarantine the coronavirus disease (Covid-19) patients. [4] However, there is no evidence of a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit that is permanently dedicated towards patient's isolation. The Ministry of Health does not have its own website.

[1] Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. September 2017. "Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017: Nauru". [<https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/nauru-appr-2016-17.pdf>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. September 2017. "Aid Program Performance Report 2016-2017: Nauru". [<https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/nauru-appr-2017-18.pdf>]. Accessed 23 November 2020.

[3] Médecins Sans Frontières. December 2018. "Indefinite Despair: The Tragic Consequences of Offshore Processing in Nauru". [https://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/2018-12/Indefinite_despair_nauru_report_Dec_2018.pdf] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. 24 March 2020. "Nauru Bulletin".

[http://www.naurugov.nr/media/121885/nauru_bulletin__04_24mar2020__208_.pdf]. Accessed 23 November 2020.

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that Nauru has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak nor developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. There is only one government website for information related to Covid-19 and it has no mention of isolation capacity or the expansion of it. [1] Nauru does not have a separate Ministry of health or disaster management website; there is only one government website that deals with everything. The Nauru Ministry of Health Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza 2005 also does not mention anything related to expansion of isolation capacity to deal with an ongoing or future infectious disease outbreak. [2]

[1] The government of the republic of Nauru, prevention of covid-19.

[<http://www.naurugov.nr/government/departments/department-of-health-and-medicinal-service/covid-19.aspx>]. Accessed 4 May, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza".

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 4 May, 2021.

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies and medical supplies for routine needs. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 mentions establishing "a baseline minimum equipment requirement in all sections and units of the hospital to ensure that basic service can be maintained in the phase of severe resource constraints," and "equipment management of identification, procurement, servicing and disposal medical equipment requirements." [1] However there is no mention about the provision of specific equipment and there is no evidence of follow up strategy in place by the Ministry of Health in the official website of the Government. [2] The draft of the Emergency Operations Plan for Influenza Pandemic does mention that the Director of Public Health is responsible for procurement of gowns, masks and other infection control supplies. [3] However there is no evidence of follow up on this draft by the concerned departments. The National Disaster Risk Management Plan does not mention the provision of any medical and laboratory supplies. [4] Both the Naoero Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have individual websites. The Ministry of Health and Agriculture also does not appear to have public facing websites.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza"[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 mentions establishing "a baseline minimum equipment requirement in all sections and units of the hospital to ensure that basic service can be maintained in the phase of severe resource constraints," and "equipment management of identification, procurement, servicing and disposal medical equipment requirements." [1] Also, there is no mention about the provision of specific equipment and there is no evidence of follow up strategy in place by the Ministry of Health in the official website of the Government. [2] However there is no evidence of follow up on this draft by the concerned departments. The National Disaster Risk Management Plan does not mention the provision of any medical supplies. The Ministry of Health however received coronavirus disease(Covid-19) medical supplies from the World Health Organisation (WHO) which included personal protective equipment (PPE). Both the Naoru Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have individual websites. The Ministry of Health and Agriculture also does not appear to have public facing websites. The draft of the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza does however highlight that the Director of Public Health and the Pandemic Influenza Task Force are responsible for stockpiling vaccines and other drugs, gowns, masks, and other infection control supplies to prepare for an outbreak. However, there is no indication that this has been done. [3] The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 says that for many years "the medical supply chain was plagued by shortages and stock-outs, which necessitated frequent short-term, emergency procurements through Australian suppliers." Currently, around 60 percent of items on the Essential Medicines List are procured through the International Drug Association, a non-governmental organisation based in the Netherlands. The rest is obtained through private providers in Australia and the region. This has "virtually eliminated stock-outs of core essential drugs," the report says. It also mentions that vaccines are managed by the PH Department with their set up of the cold chain and with vaccines procured through UNICEF channel. Nauru does not appear to have a Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Health does not have its own website and there is no other relevant information on the central government website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 3 May, 2021.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 3 May, 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza"[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 3 May, 2021.

[4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 3 May, 2021.

[5] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. 24 March 2020. "Nauru Bulletin".

[http://www.naurugov.nr/media/121885/nauru_bulletin__04_24mar2020__208_.pdf]. Accessed 3 May, 2021.

4.2.2b

Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 mentions establishing "a baseline minimum equipment requirement in all sections and units of the hospital to ensure that basic service can be maintained in the phase of severe resource constraints," and "equipment management of identification, procurement, servicing and disposal medical

equipment requirements." [1] However there is no mention about the provision of specific equipment and there is no evidence of follow up strategy in place by the Ministry of Health in the official website of the Government. [2] Neither the Emergency Operations Plan for Influenza Pandemic nor the National Disaster Risk Management Plan mention the provision of any laboratory supplies. [3,4] Both the Naoero Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have individual websites. The Ministry of Health and Agriculture also does not appear to have public facing websites.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza"[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnaadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.2.2c

Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that Nauru conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. There is only one government website for all departments/ministries of the government and there is no law/public order available to indicate that there exists a need for annual review of stockpile to ensure sufficient supply. [1] The Government Information Office which gives out periodical information regarding issues pertaining to the island has no information/government order regarding audit of stockpile. [2] Nauru does not have a separate website for ministry of health or defence.

[1] The government of the republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 4 May, 2021.

[2] The government of the republic of Nauru, Government Information Office. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/government-information-office.aspx>]. Accessed 4 May, 2021.

4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) nor is there any evidence to suggest that Nauru has capacity to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 mentions establishing "a baseline minimum equipment requirement in all sections and units of the hospital to ensure that basic service can be maintained in the phase of severe resource constraints," and "equipment management of identification, procurement, servicing and disposal medical equipment requirements." [1] However there is no mention about the manufacturing and provision of specific equipment and there is no evidence of follow up strategy in place by the Ministry of Health in the official website of the Government. [2] The draft of the Emergency Operations Plan for Influenza Pandemic does mention that the Director of Public Health is responsible for procurement of gowns, masks and other infection control supplies. [3] However there is no evidence of follow up on this draft by the concerned departments. The National Disaster Risk Management Plan does not mention the provision of any medical supplies. [4] Both the Nauru Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have individual websites. The Ministry of Health and Agriculture also does not appear to have public facing websites. The Ministry of Health however received coronavirus disease(Covid-19) medical supplies from the World Health Organisation (WHO) which included personal protective equipment (PPE). [5] Both the Nauru Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have individual websites. The Ministry of Health and Defense also does not appear to have public facing websites.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 3 May 2021.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 3 May 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza"[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 3 May 2021.

[4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 3 May 2021.

[5] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. 24 March 2020. "Nauru Bulletin".

[http://www.naurugov.nr/media/121885/nauru_bulletin__04_24mar2020__208_.pdf]. Accessed 3 May 2021.

4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies and a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 mentions establishing "a baseline minimum equipment requirement in all sections and units of the hospital to ensure that basic service can be maintained in the phase of severe resource constraints," and "equipment management of identification, procurement, servicing and disposal medical equipment requirements." [1] However there is no mention about the production and provision of specific equipment and there is no evidence of follow up strategy in place by the Ministry of Health in the official website of the Government. [2] Neither the Emergency Operations Plan for Influenza

Pandemic nor the National Disaster Risk Management Plan mention the provision of any laboratory supplies. [3,4] Both the Naoero Public Health Centre and the national laboratory do not have individual websites. The Ministry of Health and Defense also does not appear to have public facing websites.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza" [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency. Although the draft of the Emergency Operations Plan for Influenza Pandemic does outline the guidelines for dispensing vaccines and other medical supplies. The Director of Public Health is responsible for procuring vaccines, gowns, masks, and other infection control supplies and the Pandemic Influenza Task Force is responsible for prioritization of persons to receive Tamiflu or vaccine and stockpiling of drugs. [1] However it is not clear whether this plan is extended for other public emergencies. There is no evidence of implementation of this plan by the government. There is also no mention of a dispensing plan in the Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008. [2] The Ministry of Health does not have a public-facing website and there does not appear to be a Ministry of Defense. There is no other relevant information on the central government website. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic

Influenza" [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries in response to a public health emergency in Nauru. According to the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 14.8% of the health staff positions are assigned to expatriate staff. The expatriate staff are nationals from various countries in the Pacific such as Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga and PNG and outside of the region from Philippines, Cuban and Burma. The Plan also mentions that "Nauru health service will continue to depend on expatriate specialised doctors for some years to come." [1] However there is no mention of receiving health personnel from other countries during a public health emergency in the plan. The Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza says that in the event of an outbreak, the Director of Medical Services should "plan to call up retired nursing staff and paramedics to work as nurse aides; request foreign support if required." There are no further details of how this foreign support might be procured. [2] There is also no mention of a plan to receive health personnel from other countries in the Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008. [3] The Ministry of Health does not have a public-facing website.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza"[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 97.4

2007

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 12.11

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is limited publicly available evidence that Nauru has a policy in place prioritizing health care services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. The Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza says that in the event of an outbreak, Nauru will prioritize giving vaccines to doctors, nurses and medical laboratory staff. High-risk patients will be second priority, followed by government workers. The plan does not, however, address what happens if healthcare workers get sick while working. [1] No other information on prioritization of services is available. The Ministry of Health does not have its own website and there is no other relevant information on the main government website of Nauru. [2]

[1] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza" [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_inf]

luenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a

Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a system in place for public health officials and public health workers to communicate during a public health emergency in Nauru. The Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008 outlines the need for inter-agency communications but does not specifically mention any system for health officials and healthcare workers to communicate. [1] There is no detailed communications system outlined in the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza. [2] There is no relevant information found in the main website of the Government of Nauru. [3] The Ministry of Health does not appear to have its own website.

[1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic

Influenza" [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.5.1b

Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a system in place for public health officials and public health workers to communicate during a public health emergency in Nauru, let alone a system for communication between public and private sector workers. The Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008 outlines the need for inter-agency communications but does not specifically mention any system for health officials and healthcare workers to communicate. [1] There is no detailed communications system outlined in the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza. [2] There is no relevant information found in the main website of the Government of Nauru. [3] The Ministry of Health does not appear to have its own website.

- [1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza"[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.
- [3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [http://www.naurugov.nr/]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the national public health system in Nauru is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare-associated infections that take place in healthcare facilities. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 does not mention such activity. According to the Plan, "The 56-bed Republic of Nauru (RON) Hospital is the principal curative health facility, and provides general outpatient and inpatient services. A ward section of the hospital has been renovated to accommodate inpatient requirements of the RPC. RON clinic departments and services include acute ward areas for adult, paediatric and maternity patients; Out-Patient Department; Dressing Clinic; Operating Theatre; Emergency Room; High-Dependency Unit; Isolation Ward; Radiology; Dental; Laboratory; Pharmacy; Medical Stores; Physiotherapy; Medical Records and an Ambulance service." However, there is no mention about any system in RON that monitors and tracks the number of healthcare associated infections. [1] The hospital does not have its individual website. The WHO Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Country Self Assessments states that Nauru has no national AMR action plan, which might address monitoring of infections in healthcare facilities. [2] There is no relevant information on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [3] Neither the Naoero Public Health Centre nor the national laboratory has its individual websites. The Ministry of Health also does not appear to have a public facing website.

- [1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020
- [2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment". [https://amrcountryprogress.org/]. Accessed 24 November 2020.
- [3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [http://www.naurugov.nr/]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial in Nauru. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 suggests that research capability in Nauru is very limited. A key strategic area of the plan is to strengthen capacity for health research and establish a Health Research Unit. There is no mention of clinical trials or the need for ethical review in this plan. [1] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website, and there is no other relevant information on the main government of Nauru website. [2]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.7.1b

Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to treat ongoing pandemics in Nauru. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 suggests that research capability in Nauru is very limited. A key strategic area of the plan is to strengthen capacity for health research and establish a Health Research Unit. There is no mention of clinical trials or the need for ethical review in this plan. [1] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website, and there is no other relevant information on the main government of Nauru website. [2] There is no mention of clinical trials or approval of unregistered medical countermeasures in the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza" [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a

Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans in Nauru. The Ministry of Health maintains an Essential Drug List (EDL) which forms the basis for supplies and requisition of medicine. Vaccines are managed by the Public Health Department. It is not clear how new drugs, vaccines or devices are approved. The Ministry of Health is developing a new National Medicine Policy, which is expected to form the basis of a new Pharmacy Bill. [1] The Ministry of Health does not have its own public-facing website, nor are there any other relevant documents on the government of Nauru website. [2]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies. It is not clear how new drugs, vaccines or devices are approved in Nauru. The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 does not address any such processes. [1] The Ministry of Health does not have its own website, and there is no other relevant information on the main government of Nauru website. [2] There is also no mention of approval of medical countermeasures in the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza" [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Health Organization

5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence of a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics in Nauru. According to The Republic of Nauru Framework for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (RONAdapt) represents the Government of Nauru's response to the risks to sustainable development posed by climate change and disasters. It identifies immediate priorities relating to climate change adaptation (CAA) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and provides a general framework for longer term planning and programming of CCA and DRR activities. It aims to undertake an epidemiological study of the expected changes in climate sensitive diseases of Nauru (e.g dengue fever etc.) strengthening the health information system and increasing capacities in biostatistics and epidemiology. The document also mentions establishing a vector-borne disease control unit. [1] However, there is no evidence regarding the implementation of these objectives on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [2] Neither the National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) nor RONAdapt maps directly to the Sendai Framework. The Sendai Framework, generically, seeks to work along three synergic tracks: preventing the creation of new risk exposures, reducing existing related vulnerability, and strengthening resilience.[3] Sendai Framework data readiness report has reviewed the availability of data in Nauru to report against the indicators recommended to measure the global targets of the Sendai Framework and find the gaps. [4] The Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza mainly addresses disaster response but does include some limited risk reduction strategies. It is not clear whether the plan could be applied to other pandemic disease emergencies, and it does not appear to have been updated since 2005. [5] Pandemics are not integrated into the Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008, although public health crises and animal disease are listed as a potential risk. [6]

- [1] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2015. "Framework for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (RONAdapt)". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/NRU_2015_ROMAdapt_Framework.pdf]. Accessed 25 November 2020.
- [2] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 25 November 2020.
- [3] Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2020. "Special Report: Pacific Disaster Prevention Review". [<https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2020-06/A%20Pacific%20disaster%20prevention%20review.pdf?nzbJH8w3zKA5nQYLLGPwEiCOWDsFmCW>]. Accessed 25 November 2020
- [4] United Nations Office for Risk Reduction. 2017. "Sendai Framework Data Readiness Review - Report - Nauru". [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/54294_aurunru.pdf]. Accessed 25 November 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza". [https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 25 November 2020.
- [6] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008". [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf]. Accessed 25 November 2020

5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that Nauru has cross-border agreements as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies.

Nauru is a member of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN), which, among other functions, coordinates responses to public health crises in the Pacific. [1] Nauru is also a member of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), which facilitates collaboration between Pacific community members in areas such as public health, education and climate change. [2] Nauru also has close ties with the Australian Government, which funds close to 50 percent of Nauru's health budget. [3] There is no evidence of gaps in implementation of any of the agreements.

- [1] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). [<http://www.pphsn.net/>]. Accessed 25 November 2020.
- [2] Secretariat of the Pacific Community. SPC. [<https://www.spc.int/about-us/divisions>]. Accessed 25 November 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020". [http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 25 November 2020.

5.2.1b

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is not sufficient publicly available evidence to confirm that Nauru has cross-border agreements as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. Nauru is a member of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN), which, among other functions, coordinates responses to public health crises in the Pacific. [1] Nauru is also a member of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), which facilitates collaboration between Pacific community members in areas such as public health, education and climate change. [2] Neither organisation specifically addresses animal health.

[1] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). [<http://www.pphsn.net/>]. Accessed 25 November 2020.

[2] Secretariat of the Pacific Community. SPC. [<https://www.spc.int/about-us/divisions>]. Accessed 25 November 2020.

5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a

Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b

Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. The official website of the Government of Nauru does not mention any such information.

[1] Neither the draft of the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza nor the National Disaster Risk Management plan provides any information regarding the allocation of national funds. [2,3] The National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020 does not have any information regarding the allocation of funds to address the epidemic. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture do not have their own websites.

[1] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 26 November 2020

[3] Government of the Republic of Nauru. 2008. "Nauru Disaster Risk Management Plan 2008".

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/www.pacificdisaster.net_pdnadmin_data_original_NRU_2008_DM_Plan.pdf] Accessed 26 November 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 26 November 2020

5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which Nauru can access in the face of a public health emergency. Nauru is not eligible to borrow from the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA). [1] Nauru cannot access funds from the World Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF). [2] There is no other publicly available evidence that Nauru has a dedicated national reserve fund. The Ministry of Health does not have a public-facing website, and there is no other relevant information on the central government website. [3]

[1] International Development Association. "Borrowing Countries". [<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

[2] Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility. December 2017. "Operational Brief for Eligible Countries". [<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that senior leaders have made a public commitment to improve Nauru's own domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity in the past three years, nor committed to providing financing or support to other countries for such purposes in the past three years. There is no mention of such a commitment or request in the Ministry of Health's National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020. [1] There is no evidence in international news media or from United Nations or WHO press releases that Nauru has made a request for such funding in the last three years. The Global Health Security Tracking Dashboard does not report any grants specifically geared toward improving Nauru's capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. [2] There are no press releases or other relevant information on the central government website. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 26 November 2020

[2] Global Health Security Tracking Dashboard. "Nauru". [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/#analysis/NR/r>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

[3] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Nauru has neither provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats, nor it has requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. There is no mention of such a commitment or request in the Ministry of Health's National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020. [1] There is no evidence in international news media or from United Nations or WHO press releases that Nauru has made a request for such funding in the last three years. The Global Health Security Tracking Dashboard does not report any grants specifically geared toward improving Nauru's capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. During that time period, the tracker highlights funding for efforts such as NCDs, family planning and COVID-19 response. [2] Evidence shows that recent funding has focused on response efforts to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the European Union's ongoing support to increase response capabilities for this emergency. [3] There is no other relevant information on the central government of Nauru website. [4]

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 26 November 2020

[2] Global Health Security Tracking Dashboard. "Nauru". [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/#analysis/NR/r>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organization. February 2021. "Strengthening vital partnerships in the Pacific to support health sector responses to COVID-19." [<https://www.who.int/westernpacific/about/how-we-work/pacific-support/news/detail/25-01-2021-strengthening-vital-partnerships-in-the-pacific-to-support-health-sector-responses-to-covid-19>]. Accessed 24 June 2021.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, epidemiological data, clinical specimens, or isolated specimens (biological materials) with international organisations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. There is no mention of such a plan in the National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020, or the Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza. [1,2] Neither the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor the national laboratory, have public-facing websites. There is no evidence of such a plan in media, academic studies, or other external documentation.

[1] Ministry of Health & Medical Services. "National Health Strategic Plan 2016-2020".

[http://staging.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/planning_cycle_repository/nauru/nauru_nhsp_2016-2020_final.pdf]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. 20 August 2005. "Emergency Operations Plan for Pandemic Influenza.

[https://www.apaci.asia/images/Resources/Pandemic_planning/nauru_emergency_operations_plan_pandemic_influenza_2005_draft.pdf]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that Nauru has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past year. There have not been any reports of Nauru not sharing samples in either national and international media. The latest External Evaluation of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Partnership Contribution, published in 2016, does not refer to Nauru not sharing samples. [1]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2016. "External Evaluation of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Partnership Contribution—High-Level Implementation Plan 2013-2016".

[https://www.who.int/about/evaluation/pip_evaluation_report.pdf]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that Nauru has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. There have not been any reports of Nauru not sharing samples in either national and international media. There are also no reports in international media of pandemic pathogen outbreaks in Nauru in the last two years. The World Health Organisation Disease Outbreak News site reports no recent outbreaks of reportable diseases for Nauru. [1] As per the COVID-19 Joint Incident Management Team Health Sector Preparedness & Response document prepared by the World Health Organisation (WHO), Nauru has zero reported cases and there is no mention about sharing the Covid-19 samples. [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News: Nauru".

[<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/nru/en/>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "COVID-19 Joint external situation report for Pacific Islands #30".

[<https://www.who.int/westernpacific/internal-publications-detail/covid-19-joint-external-situation-report-for-pacific-islands-30>]. Accessed 26 November 2020.

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 43

2020

Transparency International

6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a

What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b

What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 0

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 88.1

2008-2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.55

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.13

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is limited publicly available evidence on the share of employment in the informal sector in Nauru. According to a report by United Nations, "Employment is dominated by the public service, the RPC and the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the public service, the focus is on improved labour utilisation through training and management development, and in health and education the need to develop local skills capacity." According to the 2011 Census, most people are engaged in waged employment and the informal sector is very small. As per the 2010 estimates, "42% of all people in employment worked for the government and 40% for state-owned enterprises." [1] The International Labour Organization database (ILOSTAT) does not provide any such information. [2] The World Bank data also does not contain any data regarding employment in the informal sector. [3] There is no evidence available on the main website of the Government of Nauru. [4]

[1] United Nations ESCAP. 1 June 2015. "Situational Analysis of Employment in Nauru".

[<https://www.unescap.org/resources/situational-analysis-employment-nauru>]. Accessed 08 December 2020.

[2] International Labour Organization (ILOSTAT). "Country profiles". [<https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/>]. Accessed 27 November 2020.

[3] The World Bank. "Informal employment (% of total non-agricultural employment)".

[<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.ISV.IFRM.ZS>]. Accessed 27 November 2020.

[4] The Government of the Republic of Nauru. [<http://www.naurugov.nr/>]. Accessed 27 November 2020.

6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

Current Year Score: 0

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government

6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting

6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality

6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.35

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 100

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 67.8

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook

6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 666.23

2019

WHO

6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1.8

2019

World Bank

6.5.1d

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 52.1

2018

World Bank

6.5.1e

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 61

2016

WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 99

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.2b

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 65.6

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 971.99

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018