

Micronesia

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Micronesia. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Micronesia.

CATEGORY 1: PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OR RELEASE OF PATHOGENS WITH POTENTIAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCERN	4
1.1 Antimicrobial resistance (AMR)	4
1.2 Zoonotic disease	7
1.3 Biosecurity	12
1.4 Biosafety	18
1.5 Dual-use research and culture of responsible science	21
1.6 Immunization	23
CATEGORY 2: EARLY DETECTION AND REPORTING FOR EPIDEMICS OF POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL CONCERN	24
2.1 Laboratory systems strength and quality	24
2.2 Laboratory supply chains	26
2.3 Real-time surveillance and reporting	27
2.4 Surveillance data accessibility and transparency	29
2.5 Case-based investigation	33
2.6 Epidemiology workforce	36
CATEGORY 3: RAPID RESPONSE TO AND MITIGATION OF THE SPREAD OF AN EPIDEMIC	38
3.1 Emergency preparedness and response planning	38
3.2 Exercising response plans	41
3.3 Emergency response operation	43
3.4 Linking public health and security authorities	45
3.5 Risk communications	46
3.6 Access to communications infrastructure	49

3.7 Trade and travel restrictions	50
-----------------------------------	----

CATEGORY 4: SUFFICIENT AND ROBUST HEALTH SECTOR TO TREAT THE SICK AND PROTECT HEALTH WORKERS 52

4.1 Health capacity in clinics, hospitals, and community care centers	52
---	----

4.2 Supply chain for health system and healthcare workers	54
---	----

4.3 Medical countermeasures and personnel deployment	58
--	----

4.4 Healthcare access	60
-----------------------	----

4.5 Communications with healthcare workers during a public health emergency	61
---	----

4.6 Infection control practices and availability of equipment	63
---	----

4.7 Capacity to test and approve new medical countermeasures	63
--	----

CATEGORY 5: COMMITMENTS TO IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY, FINANCING PLANS TO ADDRESS GAPS, AND ADHERING TO GLOBAL NORMS 65

5.1 International Health Regulations (IHR) reporting compliance and disaster risk reduction	65
---	----

5.2 Cross-border agreements on public health and animal health emergency response	66
---	----

5.3 International commitments	67
-------------------------------	----

5.4 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway (PVS)	69
--	----

5.5 Financing	70
---------------	----

5.6 Commitment to sharing of genetic and biological data and specimens	73
--	----

CATEGORY 6: OVERALL RISK ENVIRONMENT AND VULNERABILITY TO BIOLOGICAL THREATS 74

6.1 Political and security risk	74
---------------------------------	----

6.2 Socio-economic resilience	78
-------------------------------	----

6.3 Infrastructure adequacy	80
-----------------------------	----

6.4 Environmental risks	81
-------------------------	----

6.5 Public health vulnerabilities	82
-----------------------------------	----

Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of a nationally formulated AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens in Micronesia. The World Health Organization (WHO) Global Action Plan database on AMR shows that Micronesia has a developed national AMR plan but the plan is not publicly available. [1] The WHO Library of National Action Plans does not show that Micronesia has a national AMR plan. [2,3] The websites of Micronesia's National Government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture) has no information about a national AMR plan. [4,5] The Ministry of Health does not have an official website to check for the availability of an AMR plan. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) done on Micronesia in 2018 also does not mention a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. [6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for the Tripartite Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments. [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans, [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2015. "Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance". [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/193736/9789241509763_eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, FSM National Government [<https://www.fsmgov.org/ngovt.html>] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[5] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[6] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 08 December 2020.

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of a national laboratory/laboratory system that tests for priority AMR pathogens in Micronesia. The World Health Organization (WHO) Library of National Action Plans shows that Micronesia does not have a national AMR action plan or a working laboratory system. [1] The WHO Global Action Plan database on AMR also has no information

showing a national lab system in Micronesia. [2,3] There is no evidence of a lab system on the website of the National Government or the Department of Resources (which covers agriculture). [4,5] The Ministry of Health does not have an official website to check for an AMR plan or a national laboratory. Finally, there is no evidence of a separate public health institute in Micronesia. The Joint Evaluation Report (JEE) report assessment on Micronesia informs of all the four state hospital laboratories conducting antimicrobials resistance detection for bacterial pathogens from all specimens submitted. In addition, "Results are reported in the Laboratory Information System, with the data published in an annual report. The private laboratory also conducts antimicrobial resistance detection for bacterial pathogens." [6] However, there is no mention of a national laboratory system in place in Micronesia.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans, [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments. [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2015. "Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance". [http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/193736/9789241509763_eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed 09 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[5] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 09 November 2020.

[6] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 08 December 2020.

1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia conducts any environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g. in soil, waterways, etc.) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. According to the Joint Evaluation (JEE) Report assessment conducted on Micronesia in 2018, "There is also no environmental monitoring (water, air, soil, sediment) or monitoring of consumer products (e.g. food and goods) for chemical hazards and no procedures for risk assessment to activate a response." [1] The World Health Organization (WHO) Library of National Action Plans shows that Micronesia does not have a national action plan or a national laboratory. [2] The WHO Global Action Plan database on AMR also has no information showing such surveillance activities in Micronesia. [3,4] There is no evidence of this on the website of the National Government or the Department of Resources and Development. [5,6] Finally, there is no website for the Department of Environment and Climate Change, Emergency Management or the Department of Health and Social Affairs, and no public evidence after searching on these activities.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans, [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments. [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 11 November 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2015. "Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance".
[http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/193736/9789241509763_eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed 11 November 2020.

[5] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[6] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Micronesia does not have a national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans. The World Health Organization (WHO) database for Global Action Plan on AMR records that Micronesia does not have any laws in place for prescriptions and the sale of antimicrobials for human use.[1] However, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in 2018 on Micronesia notes that "in general, a prescription is required from a doctor for antibiotic use in humans. However, health care assistants who work in remote dispensaries can prescribe certain first-line antibiotics, based on specific clinical criteria consistent with bacterial infections." [2] The World Health Organization (WHO) Library of National Action Plans shows that Micronesia does not have a national AMR action plan. [3] There is no evidence of such regulations or legislation on the website of the National Government or the Department of Resources and Development.[4,5] The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website. Finally, there is no website or publicly available evidence of a pharmaceutical regulatory or any legislation repository/academic studies detailing such laws.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for the Tripartite Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment Survey." [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 11 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans, [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[5] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

1.1.2b

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals in Micronesia. The World Health Organization (WHO) database for Global Action on AMR shows that Micronesia has no such law in place. [1] The WHO Library of National Action Plans does not have any information on an AMR plan in Micronesia. [2] There is no such evidence available on the websites of the National Government of Micronesia or the Department of Resources and Development. [3,4];The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment report on Micronesia states that in Micronesia "Antibiotic use in animals is not regulated and a prescription is not required for antibiotics." [5].

Finally, there is no website or publicly available evidence of a pharmaceutical regulatory or any legislation repository/academic studies detailing such laws.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for the Tripartite Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment Survey." [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 11 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans, [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

1.2 ZOO NOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a

Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic diseases in Micronesia. There is no information on such legislation, plan, or strategy available on the websites of the National Government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [1,2] The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment report on Micronesia does not record any such information on a legislation or a plan.[3] Finally, there is no publicly available evidence of such legislation in academic studies or other articles.

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 11 November 2020.

1.2.1b

Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national plan or an equivalent strategy that includes measures for risk identification and reduction of zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans.

The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia reports that a zoonotic outbreak in humans would likely be detected through an existing event-based surveillance system led by a team called EpiNet, which is responsible for routine reporting

on the status of zoonotic outbreaks to the national EpiNet team. Outbreaks in animals would most likely be detected through regular farm inspections and necessary measures are charted to control the outbreak at the state and national levels.[1] However, there is no mechanism for risk identification or efforts to reduce zoonotic disease spillover events.

There is no information about such a plan or a strategy on the websites of the National Government of Micronesia or the Department of Resources and Development which covers agriculture. [2,3] Finally, there is no publicly available document of academic study or journal which informs about such a plan existing in Micronesia.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 03 May 2021.

1.2.1c

Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of national legislation, regulations, or strategies that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such regulations or legislation on the websites of the National Government of Micronesia or the Department of Resources and Development. [1,2] The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website to access information. Finally, there is no publicly available evidence of such legislation in academic studies or other articles. There is no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment Report on Micronesia [3] The report informs that "The one priority zoonoses in humans is leptospirosis, which is notifiable and laboratory tests are conducted on-island. There are mechanisms for reporting animal health issues through the relevant livestock authorities. For large scale outbreaks, the State Disaster Response Plan can be activated with a multi-sectorial response ensuing." However, the report also identified areas that need improvement and notes that, "There is minimal animal health workforce in the Federated States of Micronesia, and no animal health workers in Yap. The level of training of animal health workers is limited to short paravet courses. Outbreaks in animals may not be detected or reported, and there are limited response mechanisms in animal health. There are no joint human and animal health response plans for zoonotic diseases."

[1] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 11 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 11 November 2020.

1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of a national strategy on zoonotic disease and therefore there is also no evidence of a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such regulations or legislation on the websites of the national government of Micronesia or the Department of Resources and Development [1,2]. Micronesia's 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment report informs that "Although there is no formal surveillance system for animal populations, backyard farmers can call the relevant animal health agency in each state for assistance in animal husbandry and report sick animals. The agency sends a team member to visit the farm, survey the location, provide advice for treatment, and administer antibiotics if appropriate. Each visit is recorded and reported in monthly reports used for internal monitoring. If there is any concern, or impact on human health, the Department of Health and Social Affairs (DHS) would be notified by phone. There are some informal relationships between human and animal health at the local level, and both Departments are members of the relevant State Disaster Response Plan." [3] Finally, there is no publicly available evidence of such a department/agency in academic studies or other articles.

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2018. "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is public evidence that Micronesia has a national mechanism for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) states that "Although there is no formal surveillance system for animal populations, backyard farmers can call the relevant animal health agency in each state for assistance in animal husbandry and to report sick animals. The agency sends a team member to visit the farm, survey the location, provide advice for treatment and administer antibiotics if appropriate. Each visit is recorded and reported in monthly reports used for internal monitoring. If there is any concern, or impact on human health, the DHS would be notified by phone. There are some informal relationships between human and animal health at the local level, and both Departments are members of the relevant State Disaster Response Plan." [1] This indicates a voluntary mechanism for owners of livestock to conduct or report on disease surveillance. There is no additional evidence of on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development [2,3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that there are laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners) in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such legislation or policies on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development [1, 2]. Finally, there is no publicly available evidence of such legislation in academic studies or other articles. There is no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation Assessment(JEE) report conducted on Micronesia. [3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation Assessment(JEE) on IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g. wild animals, insects, other disease vectors, etc). There is no evidence of such activities on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development [1, 2]. Lastly, there is no publicly available evidence of such legislation in academic studies or other articles. There is no evidence of this in the 2018 JEE Assessment report. [3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.88

2017

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 6.15

2017

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of national legislation, regulation, or strategy in place on zoonotic disease in Micronesia. Hence, there is no evidence of a plan or a strategy that includes collaboration with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonotic diseases. There is no evidence of such a mechanism on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture) [1, 2]. Finally, there is no publicly available evidence of a national laboratory system or separate public health institute and there is no evidence of such legislation in academic studies or other articles. However, it is worth noting that the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia notes as a recommended priority action to: " Formalize and document mechanisms for coordinated communication. These should include hospital and healthcare sectors, civil society organizations, private sector and general public." [3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has in place a record, updated within the past 5 years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities. There is a "biosecurity plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but upon review, this plan focuses primarily on protection from biological marine invasion risks as opposed to regulations for facilities handling dangerous pathogens. [1] There is no evidence of such a record on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Development of Resources and Development [2, 3]. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with in free association with the United States of America through the Compact of Free Association which came into law in 1986, and there is no evidence of this updated record for Micronesia. [4] There is no Ministry of Research, a separate national laboratory system or national public health institute in place, and no available information through academic studies. There is also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity. [5] Micronesia is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject via Confidence Building Measures reports. [6] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report assessment conducted on Micronesia states "There is also no whole-of-government biosafety and biosecurity system in place for human, animal and agriculture facilities in the Federated States of Micronesia." [7]

[1] The University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2014 "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii,"

[https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government Website [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia"

[<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[5] Vertic. "National Implementation Measures - Biosecurity," [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[6] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[7] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity that address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. There is a "biosecurity plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but upon review, this plan focuses primarily on protection from biological marine invasion risks to Micronesia as opposed to regulations for facilities handling dangerous pathogens. [1] There is no evidence of such legislation on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development [2, 3]. There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity. [4] While there is no evidence of current legislation or regulations, it is worth noting that in Micronesia's Agricultural Policy document (2012-2016) identified biosecurity as one area of priority to: "support a well functioning bio security service to ensure adequate protection of FSM's plant and animal health status from introduced exotic pests and diseases. Priority actions include: Enact harmonized bio security legislation and regulations. Develop a national bio security strategic plan." [5] However, this also appears to focus on biosafety, and not biosecurity related legislation. Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject through Confidence Building Measures reports. [6] There is no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment conducted on Micronesia. [7]

[1] University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," [https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database" https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[5] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development. "Federated States of Micronesia Agriculture Policy, 2012-2016." [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/sap/docs/FSM%20Agriculture%20Policy%20DraftSR2Sept2011.pdf]

[6] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[7] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.3.1c

Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. There is a "biosecurity plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but upon review, this plan focuses primarily on protection from biological marine invasion risks to Micronesia as opposed to regulations for facilities handling dangerous pathogens. [1] There is no evidence of such legislation on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development [2, 3]. There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is

also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity. [4] Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject through Confidence Building Measures reports. [5] There is no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment report on Micronesia. [6]

[1] University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," [https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database" [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[5] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[6] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.3.1d

Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. There is a "biosecurity plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but upon review, this plan focuses primarily on protection from biological marine invasion risks to Micronesia as opposed to regulations for facilities handling dangerous pathogens. [1] There is no evidence of such legislation on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development [2, 3]. There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity. [4] Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject through Confidence Building Measures reports. [5] There is no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment report. [6]

[1] University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," [https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database" [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[5] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[6] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17

November 2020.

1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen. There is no evidence of such a capacity with the government of Micronesia on its website or on the official website of the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [1,2] Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with in collaboration with the United States through its Compact of Free Association treaty signed in 1986, and there is no mention of a PCR- based diagnostic testing capacity for anthrax or Ebola in it. [3] There is no national laboratory system or a national public health institute in place in Micronesia; there are no academic studies or articles informing of such capacity. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working online website to access information. Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject through the Convention's Confidence Building Measures reports. [4] Finally, there is no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment report on Micronesia. [5]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia" [<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) IHR Core Capacities," [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia requires biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. There is a regional "bio-security plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but after further examination, this plan focuses on bio-safety issues and not bio-security as defined above. [1] There is no evidence of such training on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development [2,3]. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with through its Compact of Free Association with

the United States, and there is no evidence of such training for Micronesia. [4] There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place, and no available information through academic studies. There is also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity. [5] There is some evidence of ad-hoc training. In 2013, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community hosted and trained participants from Micronesia on biosecurity. According to the SPC report, "the training is meant to strengthen the skills of those at the front line of the inspection process - the quarantine and biosecurity officers who carry out inspections and make decisions regarding the entrance of products and goods. " [6] Micronesia is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject via Confidence Building Measures reports. [7] There is no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment report. [8]

[1] University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," [https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmdr.fm/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia" [https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[5] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database," [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[6] Secretariat for the Pacific Community. "SPC conducts biosecurity training for Micronesian countries" [http://lrd.spc.int/focus-areas/biosecurity-and-trade/26/spc-conducts-biosecurity-training-for-micronesian-countries] Accessed 17 November 2020

[7] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[8] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE Report, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has regulations or licensing conditions that specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. There is a regional "bio-security plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but after further review, this plan focuses on bio-safety issues and not bio-security as defined above. [1] There is no evidence of such regulations on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development [2,3]. The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working online website. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with through its Compact of Free Association with the United States, and there is no evidence of such regulations for Micronesia. [4] There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory

system, or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity. [5] Micronesia is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject via Confidence Building Measures reports. [6]

[1] University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," [https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[4] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database" [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/] Accessed 17 November 2020.

[5] VERTIC, "BWC Legislation Database," https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/] Accessed 17 November 2020

[6] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse] Accessed 17 November 2020.

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (Categories A and B). There is no evidence of such a record on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development, or the Department of Transportation, Communications and Infrastructure [1, 2,3]. The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website to access information. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with through its Compact of Free Association with the United States, but there is no evidence of the US establishing a biosecurity agency in the country. [3] No evidence was found in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Micronesia, conducted in 2018. [4] No evidence was found via the VERTIC BWC legislation database. [5] Micronesia is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject via Confidence Building Measures reports. [6]

[1] Micronesia, National Government Website [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Transportation, Communications and Infrastructure [https://tci.gov.fm/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 08 December 2020.

[5] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database" [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[6] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse] Accessed 18 November 2020.

1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has national legislation, regulation, or other guidance in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential. There is no evidence of such legislation on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers both agriculture and trade and industry portfolios) [1, 2]. The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working online website to access information. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with through its Compact of Free Association with the United States, but there is no evidence of the US establishing such legislation in the country. [3] There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity. [4] Micronesia is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject via Confidence Building Measures reports. [5]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia" [<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm>] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[4] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database" [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/>] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[5] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 18 November 2020.

1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a

Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has in place a national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. However, there is a regional "biosecurity plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii formulated by the United States to assess marine biological risks but does not include the protection of laboratory workers working with dangerous pathogens.[1] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia done in 2018 informs about a Biosafety Laboratory Manual that provides guidelines of biosafety for hospitals and public health institutes within the country. It states that, " The manual includes guidelines for high consequence pathogens, e.g. Ebola virus. The guidelines were implemented with a one-week competency-based training conducted by the National Laboratory Biosafety Officer in each State hospital. Annual biosafety audits are conducted of government health laboratories." [2] However, there is no evidence of whether these guidelines are part of the legal mandate of Micronesia. There is no information about such laws or regulations on the official websites of the national government of Micronesia or

the Department of Resources and Development.[3,4] The Ministry of Health does not have a working online website to access information. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with in collaboration with the United States through the Compact of Free Association pact, and no such law as a requisite is mentioned in the treaty.[5] Finally, there are no academic articles or journals which provide information about such laws. Micronesia is yet to become a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and hence, there is no information regarding its biosafety or biosecurity regulations mentioned on the BWC Legislation Database.[6]

[1] University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," [https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO), "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Federated States of Micronesia," 2018 [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, National Government Website [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[5] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia" [https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[6] VERTIC. "BWC Legislation Database," [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

1.4.1b

Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations in Micronesia. There is a "biosafety" plan for Micronesia and Hawaii but upon review, this plan emphasizes potential risks from biological marine invasions as opposed to protective measures for laboratories working with dangerous pathogens. [1] There is evidence of such information available on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development.[2,3] The Department of Health and Social affairs do not have a working online website. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with in collaboration with the United States through the Compact of Free Association treaty signed in 1986, but it does not mention the establishment of any such agency. [4] There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. The VERTIC database on biosecurity legislation does not show any record of Micronesia.[5] Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and hence there is no information about Micronesia's biosecurity rules and regulations in the Convention's reports.[6] Finally, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia does not record any evidence of such an agency.[7]

[1] The University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, " Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," [https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government Website [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia" [https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[5] Vertic. "BWC Legislation Database," [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-

legislation-database/m/] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[7] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[8] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 19 November 2020.

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a trainee-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no concrete evidence available showing that Micronesia requires biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a trainee-trainer program for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. However, there is some evidence of informal training practices. In 2013, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community hosted and trained participants from Micronesia on "biosecurity" but this mostly catered to biosafety training as defined by the study. According to the SPC report, "the training is meant to strengthen the skills of those at the front line of the inspection process - the quarantine and biosecurity officers who carry out inspections and make decisions regarding the entrance of products and goods." [1] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia done in 2018 informs about a Biosafety Laboratory Manual that provides guidelines of biosafety for hospitals and public health institutes within the country. It states that, "The manual includes guidelines for high consequence pathogens, e.g. Ebola virus. The guidelines were implemented with a one-week competency-based training conducted by the National Laboratory Biosafety Officer in each State hospital. Annual biosafety audits are conducted on government health laboratories." [2] However, this does not suggest a standardized approach such as a common curriculum or a trainee trainer program. There is no available information of such a training program on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development. [3,4] Micronesia does not have a Ministry of Research and the Department of Health and social affairs does not have a working website. Micronesia does not have in place a national laboratory system or a public health institute. There is also no evidence available on VERTIC's database on biosecurity legislation. [5] Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject through Confidence Building Measures reports. [6]

[1] The University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii," 2014.

[https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, National Government Website [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[5] VERTIC "BWC Database Legislation," [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/] Accessed 18 November 2020.

[6] BWC Confidence Building Measures [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/>] Accessed 08 December 2020.

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual-use research in Micronesia. There is a regional "bio-security plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but after further examination, this plan focuses on bio-safety issues and not bio-security as defined above.[1] The plan states no evidence of such an assessment. There is no evidence of such an assessment on the websites of the national government or the Department of Research and Development.[2,3] Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with through its Compact of Free Association with the United States, and there is no evidence of such an assessment for Micronesia. [4] There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is also no evidence of this through VERTIC's database on legislation related to biosecurity.[5] Micronesia is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject via Confidence Building Measures reports. [6]

[1] The University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii,"

[https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf]
] Accessed 19 November 2020

[2] Micronesia, National Government Website [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia"

[<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[5] Vertic. "BWC Biosecurity Legislation," [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[6] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has a legislation or a regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual-use research. There is a "biosafety" plan for Micronesia and Hawaii, but the plan states no evidence of such a legislation or regulation. [1] There is no evidence of such a legislation available on the websites of Micronesia's national government or the Department of Resources and Development.[2,3] the Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working online website to access information. There are no academic documents or articles that inform about the existence of such regulations requiring oversight over research on dangerous pathogens. Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system or a public health institute. Finally, the VERTIC database on BWC legislation does not show any record of such a legislation in Micronesia. [4] Lastly, Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject through the Confidence Building Measures Reports. [5]

[1] The University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii,"[https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government Website[<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development[<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] VERTIC, "BWC legislation database,"[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[5] United Nations, Confidence Building Measures" "[<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 09 December 2020.

1.5.1c

Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual-use research in Micronesia. There is a regional "bio-security plan" for Micronesia and Hawaii, but after further examination, this plan focuses on bio-safety issues and not bio-security as defined above.[1]There is no evidence of such an agency on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development. [2,3] The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website to access information. Micronesia does not have a Ministry of Research or a national public health research institute. The VERTIC database on biosecurity legislation also does not record any information about such an agency.[4] Finally, Micronesia is not a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject through Confidence Building Measures reports.[5]

[1] The University of Guam and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, "Regional Biosecurity Plan for Micronesia and Hawaii,"[https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/pac_regional_biosecurity_plan_for_micronesia_and_hawaii_volume_iii.pdf] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government[<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development[<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] VERTIC, "BWC Legislation database,"[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/m/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[5] United Nations, "Confidence Building Measures." "[<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>]

1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Micronesia has national legislation, regulation, policy, or other guidance, requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before it is sold. There is no evidence of such a policy framework on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development and the Department of Transportation, Communications and Infrastructure [1, 2, 3]. The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website to access information. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with through its Compact of Free Association with the United States, and there is no evidence of this assessment. [4] There is also no information available on whether such legislation may be in development. There is no Ministry of Research, separate national laboratory system, or national public health institute in place, and no available information through academic studies. Micronesia is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention and therefore does not share information on this subject via Confidence Building Measures reports. [5]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Transportation, Communications, and Infrastructure [<https://tci.gov.fm/>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

[4] U.S Department of State, "ÜS Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia." [<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-federated-states-of-micronesia/>] Accessed 09 December 2020.

[5] United Nations, "Biological Weapons Convention States Parties," [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/browse>] Accessed 19 November 2020.

1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

World Health Organization

1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of a national laboratory system that has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests in Micronesia, but the tests are not named. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report for Micronesia notes, " Five of the ten core tests, as well as tests for Dengue, can be conducted at the State Hospital Laboratories or can be sent to regional laboratories for testing. All tests, shipping and results are recorded in the Laboratory Information System (LIS), including for those specimens referred off-island. Monthly and quarterly reports of testing are generated in the LIS. The LIS can be accessed at national level by the National Laboratory Coordinator and by all clinicians in the health network. Clinicians who do not have access to LIS are sent hard copies of reports. The Laboratory Handbook provides information on type of test, specimen required and storage and transport requirements for specimens. The Federated States of Micronesia laboratories are also described in the PPHSN LabNet Catalogue. Local capacity is available for: influenza polymerase chain reaction (Pohnpei only), HIV serology, tuberculosis microscopy, culture for Salmonella (however typing sera often not available). Dengue Duo rapid test and blood culture testing available in all state laboratories. All other testing with exception of malaria rapid tests are available from the Hawaii Public Health Laboratory (HPHL). There are specific algorithms for testing HIV and tuberculosis. Malaria is rarely seen (in imported cases only), therefore it is not viable to maintain stocks of test kits. All health services laboratories have microscopes and GeneXpert analyzers for tuberculosis. Point of care equipment is available at community health centers." [1] Evidence for the fifth test, in this case for malaria, needs more clarity. There is no additional information available on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development about any testing capacity for malaria.[2,3]] The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website. Micronesia does not have a national public health institute.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018",
[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a publicly available national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing in Micronesia.

In response to Covid-19, Micronesia introduced a "Covid-19 Response Framework". It mentions the need for testing but does not provide any details about roles and responsibilities or a plan on expanding testing. [1]

The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report assessment on Micronesia does not mention a strategy or a plan to conduct testing during an emergency. There is no additional information available on this subject on the Ministry of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture).[2,3] The Ministry of Health does not have a working website. Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system or a public health institute.

[1] Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020 [https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO), 2018. "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018" [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, Ministry of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence available of an accredited national laboratory system that serves as a reference facility in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such a facility on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development.[1,2] According to the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment on Micronesia, there is a national laboratory system but it does not have a reference facility.[3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national laboratory system in Micronesia that serves as a reference facility that is subject to external quality assurance review. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report assessment on Micronesia does inform about a national laboratory system but not one which is subject to an external quality assurance review.[1] The websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development do not have any evidence of such a capacity.[2,3]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report, 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a

Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publicly available evidence that Micronesia has a nationwide specimen transport system. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report Assessment on Micronesia conducted in 2018 scored Micronesia's Specimen referral and transport system a 4 out of 5, which indicates 80% coverage of the specimen transport and referral system in the country. According to the JEE, "Each state has certified IATA shippers and medical technicians and can routinely transport specimens from the state level laboratories to regional laboratories. Across the Federated States of Micronesia there are 13 International Air Transport Association (IATA) shippers with four also being IATA trainers across the four states. The PIHOA revolving fund simplifies the shipping and payment process. The document Specimens Referred to Hawaii Public Health Laboratory: 2017 provides evidence that there is a functioning referral system available. There is train the trainer programs for IATA certified shippers in each state." [1]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core

Capacities." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 09 December 2020.

2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a

Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no documented evidence available to show for a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak in Micronesia. The Ministry of Health does not have a working online website to access information. The website of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development does not have any information of such a capacity.[1,2] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report on Micronesia does not record any plan in to rapidly authorize laboratories to increase capacity.[3] Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system in place.

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Ministry of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmdr.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organization, 2018. "Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Federated States of Micronesia, 2018" [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Micronesia conducts ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis of infectious diseases and pathogens, but no evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation conducted on Micronesia reports that "The national public health early warning function largely relies on information generated by any type of information source and is captured through both formal and informal channels." The report scored the country's event-based surveillance system a top grade--4 and informs that the surveillance system includes unusual health systems as well. At the state level, Micronesia conducts regular and frequent interactions between public health and remote communities in the outer islands, as well as between public health and clinical staff. However, the report also lists out areas that need strengthening in the surveillance system - "A national communicable diseases surveillance protocol that clarifies how the system operates at the national and state levels. Review of the following in the national surveillance protocol: (i) mechanisms to adapt the surveillance system under specific circumstances (e.g. outbreak investigation and response, post-disaster context, mass gathering events); (ii) mechanisms for adding new and novel diseases; (iii) management of national and international contact tracing operations; and (iv) identification of imported cases of the disease. Revision of the number of sites and conditions reported in the syndromic surveillance system and clarification of the case definitions of the notifiable disease systems which are currently a mix of both clinical and laboratory criteria." [1] No further information is available via

the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development. [2,3] Micronesia does have a functioning Emergencies Operations Center but it does not have any information on event-based surveillance.[4]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities Report, 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia. National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development[http://www.fsrmr.fm/] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fsmnationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 21 November 2020.

2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the past two years. According to the WHO Disease Outbreak News page, Micronesia did not report any disease last year. [1] There is no evidence of this on the website of the national government. The Department of Health does not have a working website to access information. There is no evidence available to suggest that Covid-19 was declared as a PHEIC to the WHO by Micronesia.[2] However, the government has executed a contingency plan in order to avoid the entry of the Covid-19 virus into the country.[3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News," [https://www.who.int/csr/don/en/] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO), "WHO Coronavirus Disease (Covid19) Dashboard." [https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/fm] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Covid19 Policy Tracker." [https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M] Accessed 03 May 2021.

2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Micronesia operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level. There is no information on this on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development. [1,2] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working online website. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report for Micronesia recommends "A national communicable diseases surveillance protocol that clarifies how the system operates at the national and state levels" and that "although the paper-based system works well, a simple electronic tool (e.g. MS Excel) for the collation and analysis of aggregated communicable diseases-related surveillance

data may strengthen surveillance collation and report at national and state levels." [3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018.", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national levels in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such a system on the website of the national government. [1]. The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have an online website. There is no separate national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report for Micronesia recommends "A national communicable diseases surveillance protocol that clarifies how the system operates at the national and state levels" and that "although the paper-based system works well, a simple electronic tool (e.g. MS Excel) for the collation and analysis of aggregated communicable diseases-related surveillance data may strengthen surveillance collation and report at national and state levels." [2]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018," [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that electronic health records are commonly in use in Micronesia. There is no evidence of electronic health records on the website of the national government [1]. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website. There is no separate national laboratory system or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is no evidence of this in the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in 2018. [2]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018",

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 21 November 2020.

2.4.1b

Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national public health system that has access to electronic health records of individuals in Micronesia. There is no information on EHRs on the websites of the national government and the Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website. One of the six goals of the strategic framework set out by the Framework for Sustainable Health Development in the Federated States of Micronesia is to improve availability, accessibility, quality, and use of health information for evidence-based decision-making.[1] Despite this, there is no information on EHRs on the websites of the national government and the Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website.[2] Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system or a functioning public health institute. There is no evidence of such access to EHRs mentioned in any academic journals or studies in Micronesia.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "WHO Country Cooperation Strategy,"

[https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/136945/ccsbrief_fsm_en.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

2.4.1c

Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of EHRs in the country, nor of any standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g. ISO standards) in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such regulations or legislation on the website of the national government and the Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website[1]. There is no separate national laboratory system or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. There is no mention of building data standards in Micronesia in academic documents or journals.

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a

Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for the animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance, etc.) in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such a mechanism available on the websites of the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture) or on the website of the Ministry of Environment, Climate change and Emergency Management. [1,2] There is no national laboratory system or a public health institute in Micronesia. Finally, the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia does not record any such information. [3]

[1] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsrmrd.fm/>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Environment, Climate change and Emergency Management [<https://fsm-data.sprep.org/group/department-environment-climate-change-emergency-management-decem-fsm>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 2018. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of the Federated States of Micronesia 2018," [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Micronesia makes de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks publicly available via reports (or another format) on government websites such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). In fact, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a functioning online website. There is no national public health institute or a national laboratory system in Micronesia. The 2018 WHO Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report for Micronesia does not mention any mechanism through which Micronesia makes de-identified health surveillance data available. [2]

[1] Micronesia, Ministry of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsrmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Micronesia makes de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar). The Ministry of Health does not have a working online website to access information. There is no information available regarding Covid19 cases on Micronesia's national government website, and there is no national public

health institute or laboratory system in place in Micronesia.[1] However, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that Micronesia has zero confirmed cases, last updated on 29th November 2020.[2]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO) "Micronesia (Federated States of) Coronavirus situation" [<https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/fm>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of existing legislation or regulation that safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such regulations on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development. [1,2] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working online website to access such information. Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system or a public health institute. There is no evidence of such laws or regulations in the works mentioned in academic journals or articles. Finally, the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report assessment on Micronesia does not record any such information. [3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018," [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

2.4.4b

Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of laws, regulations, or guidelines safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware) in Micronesia. There is no evidence of such regulations on the websites of the national government.[1] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website. There is no separate national laboratory system or national public health institute in place and no available information through academic studies. The World Health Organization (WHO) 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report or the Country Cooperation Strategy does not record any such legislations or regulations in place in Micronesia.[2,3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018," [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[3] WHO, "Country cooperation Strategy

[https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/136945/ccsbrief_fsm_en.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 23 November 2020.

2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a

Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease = 2, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence available showing that Micronesia has made commitments via public statements, legislation, and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region for one or more diseases.

There is no information about such statements available on the websites of Micronesia's national government. [1] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a functioning website to access information. Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system or a national public health institute. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report on Micronesia does not record any such commitments from Micronesia. [2] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) is a regional public health network but it does not provide any such information.[3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). 2018. "Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities of the Federated States of Micronesia 2018," [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "SPC Public Health Division" [<https://phd.spc.int/programmes/surveillance/pphsn>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no documented evidence available of a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization, and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of an active or future public health emergency in Micronesia.

The Covid-19 Response Framework by federal government of Micronesia mentions the need to conduct contact tracing in case of confirmed cases, however there are no details about a system to provide support at the sub-national level. [1]

The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Micronesia informs of a national disaster response plan that outlines the procedures of the EOC (Emergency Operation Center), required roles, and responses of EOCs which have been routinely tested through functional exercises. [2] However, there is no mention of training, metrics standardization, and provision of financial resources to expand contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency.

The websites of the national government of Micronesia and the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture) do not have any information of such a capacity. [3,4] Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system or a public health institute in place.

[1] Government of the Federal State of Micronesia, "Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020"

[https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO), 2018. "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to support that Micronesia provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention.

There is no relevant information in the Covid-19 Response Framework, the contingency Plan for the Federal State of Micronesia [1]. The country has only 1 reported case of Covid-19 as of May 2021. [2] The websites of the national government or the Ministry of Resources and Development do not have any information about such services being provided. [3,4] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website to access information. The Joint External Evaluation (2018) Report Assessment on Micronesia does not inform about the availability of such services to citizens of Micronesia. [5] Micronesia does not have a national public health institute or a laboratory system in place.

[1] Government of the Federal State of Micronesia, "Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020"

[https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] "Micronesia COVID: 1 Cases And 0 Deaths - Worldometer". 2021. [Worldometers.Info.

<https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/micronesia/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[5] World Health Organization (WHO), 2018. "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar). There is no information available on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [1,2] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning online website to avail information. However, the World Health Organization (WHO) reports that there are zero confirmed Covid19 cases in Micronesia, which explains the lack of data on contact tracing efforts in the country.[3] Micronesia does not have a national public health institute or a national laboratory system in place.

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia (Federated States of) Coronavirus situation," [<https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/fm>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of an active or future public health emergency in Micronesia.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report identifies that "There are nine designated points of entry (PoE) according to Federated States of Micronesia Code Title 18 Section 2. All vessels and aircraft entering and departing a port of entry are subject to immigration, quarantine, customs, agricultural, and other administrative inspections authorized by law. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARF) HAZMAT teams, located at each airport, are trained and equipped to respond to ill travelers. International airports have either an isolation unit or can separate cases into separate rooms while they wait for transport to the hospital by ambulance. Portable surge capacity shelters are available in all states and can be utilized at the PoEs. PPE is

provided, and the staff is trained in donning and doffing. If there are ill passengers reported on a boat, the passengers remain on the boat until the routine inspection is conducted and a doctor has cleared the ill travelers. If required, passengers can be transported to the hospital. The state airport and seaport regulations broadly describe these procedures." However, the JEE also notes that the mechanisms for managing ill passengers are not well documented, and that there are no full time personnel at the POEs to identify and isolate suspected cases. Plans and exercises focus mostly on disasters, not public health issues. [1]

There is no relevant information in the Covid-19 Response Framework for the country. [2] There is no additional information available on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [3,4] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning online website in place to avail information. Micronesia does not have a national public health institute or a laboratory in place.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018" [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Government of the Federal State of Micronesia, "Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020" [https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Micronesia provides an applied epidemiology training program or that resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP). The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report assessment records that, "1) The Data for Decision Making (DDM) applied epidemiology course has provided training in applied epidemiology for state and national level public health staff members. 2) Several DDM graduates are using the skills acquired in the course in existing or new positions and have provided valuable contributions to public health emergencies," as part of Micronesia's best practices. The report also informs areas that need strengthening- "1) The DDM course is not routinely delivered and the number of participants is limited. Plans to institutionalize and sustain the course through partnership with an academic institution in Pohnpei is encouraged. 2) There is limited secondary education available, and no tertiary level institutions in the Federated States of Micronesia for training in public health or as epidemiologists. However, several suitable on-line training and education courses to further build capacity of the workforce are available. 3) Access to other countries in the region that have Field Epidemiology Training Programmes

which may provide an option for additional workforce training." [1] There is no additional evidence on such training programs or collaborations on the websites of the national government.[2] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website to access information. According to the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) website there is no program for Micronesia.[3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[3] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. [https://www.tephinet.org/] Accessed 23 November 2020.

2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that has available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV). There is no evidence of such training programs on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [1,2] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website. The Center for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) does not provide any evidence of Micronesia meeting the criteria through a FETPV. [3] According to the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) website, there is no program for Micronesia. [4] There is also no evidence of this in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report. [5]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[3] Center for Disease Control, "Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP)," [https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fetp/index.htm] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[4] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. [https://www.tephinet.org/] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018"[https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 23 November 2020.

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a

Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is publicly available evidence that Micronesia has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia conducted in 2018 notes that the Federated States of Micronesia National Disaster Response Plan (2016), prepared under the Disaster Relief Assistance Act of 1989, is an all-hazard plan. "These hazards comprise a wide range of natural and man-made disasters including natural hazards (typhoons, tropical storms); chemical events (environmental pollution, oil, and chemical spills); disease outbreaks, epidemics, and pandemic influenza; agricultural pests; and plane and boat incidents". [1] This plan assigns responsibility to the National Disaster Committee (NDC) for oversight of arrangements for all hazards through six lead agencies, including the "OEEM Div for EM - all hazards (excluding those listed below) Dept of Health and Social Affairs - pandemics and health incident". [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] The Federal States of Micronesia Environment Data Portal. "FSM National Disaster Response Plan 2016". [<https://fsm-data.sprep.org/dataset/fsm-national-disaster-response-plan-2016/resource/ca503524-4c50-4800-9f4a-ecb8cd05a15e>]. Accessed 23 November 2020.

3.1.1b

If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?

Yes = 1, No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is evidence that Micronesia has a national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential, but has not been updated within the last three years. The plan

was formulated and implemented in 2016 has not been updated since. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) notes that the Federated States of Micronesia National Disaster Response Plan (2016), prepared under the Disaster Relief Assistance Act of 1989, is an all-hazard plan. "These hazards comprise a wide range of natural and man-made disasters including natural hazards (typhoons, tropical storms); chemical events (environmental pollution, oil and chemical spills); disease outbreaks, epidemics and pandemic influenza; agricultural pests; and plane and boat incidents". [1] This plan assigns responsibility to the National Disaster Committee (NDC) for oversight of arrangements for all hazards through six lead agencies, including the "OEEM Div for EM - all hazards (excluding those listed below) Dept of Health and Social Affairs - pandemics and health incident". [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Federal States of Micronesia Environment Data Portal. "FSM National Disaster Response Plan 2016". [https://fsm-data.sprep.org/dataset/fsm-national-disaster-response-plan-2016/resource/ca503524-4c50-4800-9f4a-ecb8cd05a15e]. Accessed 23 November 2020.

3.1.1c

If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to support that Micronesia has a national public health emergency response plan in place which includes considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations. The plan was formulated and implemented in 2016 has not been updated since. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) notes that the Federated States of Micronesia National Disaster Response Plan (2016), prepared under the Disaster Relief Assistance Act of 1989, is an all-hazard plan. "These hazards comprise a wide range of natural and man-made disasters including natural hazards (typhoons, tropical storms); chemical events (environmental pollution, oil and chemical spills); disease outbreaks, epidemics and pandemic influenza; agricultural pests; and plane and boat incidents". [1] However, the JEE does not mention any separate plan or strategy in place to protect vulnerable populations in case of an emergency. This plan assigns responsibility to the National Disaster Committee (NDC) for oversight of arrangements for all hazards through six lead agencies, including the "OEEM Div for EM - all hazards (excluding those listed below) Dept of Health and Social Affairs - pandemics and health incident". [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 23 November 2020.

[2] Federal States of Micronesia Environment Data Portal. "FSM National Disaster Response Plan 2016". [https://fsm-data.sprep.org/dataset/fsm-national-disaster-response-plan-2016/resource/ca503524-4c50-4800-9f4a-ecb8cd05a15e]. Accessed 23 November 2020.

3.1.1d

Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a

Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Micronesia has a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response in the National Disaster Response Plan (2016). "The plan calls for strong horizontal and vertical coordination between sectors, national, state and community levels using an 'all-of-government', 'all-of-country' coordinated approach that emphasizes partnerships between the public sector, private sector, and civil society." More importantly, the plan informs that the "private sector is an important component and resource in disaster management and disaster risk reduction. The private sector is expected to address their own DM issues, including working within and contributing to the Plan framework where appropriate for disaster planning and response. This includes insurance coverage and avoiding or mitigating activities that may contribute to community risk. In addition, "Critical infrastructure agencies in the private sector are required to work and participate within the Plan framework, and Section 40 in particular." The plan includes all types of disasters including pandemics and endemics. [1] There is no additional evidence of such a private sector collaboration to assist with emergency response mentioned on the websites of the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management. [2] The Ministry of Health does not have an official working website to access information.

[1] Federal States of Micronesia Environment Data Portal. "FSM National Disaster Response Plan 2016". [<https://fsm-data.sprep.org/dataset/fsm-national-disaster-response-plan-2016/resource/ca503524-4c50-4800-9f4a-ecb8cd05a15e>]. Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Response [<https://fsm-data.sprep.org/group/department-environment-climate-change-emergency-management-decem-fsm>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease= 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence available that Micronesia has a policy, plan, or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic for one or more diseases.

According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) Covid19 Policy Response Tracker "To address the emergency caused by

COVID-19, the national government has prepared a US\$20 million (5 percent of GDP) COVID-19 Response Framework, in order to develop quarantine and isolation facilities across the nation, provide mandatory infection control training for all first responders, and increase testing capacity and ventilators for each island state in the FSM." [1]

There is no additional evidence available of such a capacity on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [2,3] The Ministry of Health does not have an active online website to access information. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report on Micronesia done in 2018 does not report of any such policy, plan, or guideline in place in Micronesia. [4]

[1] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Covid19 Policy Response Tracker," [https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO), 2018. "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 03 May 2021.

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence available to suggest that Micronesia has activated its national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. However, there is no public evidence that Micronesia has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year.

Micronesia does have a national public health emergency response plan called "The Covid-19 Response Framework", which is a contingency plan. It looks into ways to mitigate the impact excepted from COVID-19. In addition, this Plan is to assist members of the country's President's COVID-19 Task Force and members of the Department of Health and Social Affairs Incident Command System in supporting the states to have the capacities and resources in responding to the pandemic. [1]

However, there is no public evidence that Micronesia has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. There is no information on such a collaborative exercise on the WHO extranet. [2] The websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development do not provide any information on such an exercise conducted in the past year. It also does not have any information on the activation of a national emergency response plan for any infectious disease outbreak. [3,4] The website of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which is the official public health surveillance organization in the Western Pacific Region does not have any relevant information. [5] The

Ministry of Health does not have a functioning online website.

[1] Government of the Federal State of Micronesia, "Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020"

[https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] WHO, "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH)."[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[5] Pacific Community, "EpiNet, the Pacific Community," [<https://www.spc.int/taxonomy/term/1823>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to support that Micronesia has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat-focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities in the past year. The World Health Organization (WHO) extranet which maintains a list of after-action reviews has no record of such a plan being developed in Micronesia in the past year. [1] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) however, informs of Micronesia's policy response to the Coronavirus pandemic. It states that "To address the emergency caused by COVID-19, the national government has prepared a US\$20 million (5 percent of GDP) COVID-19 Response Framework, in order to develop quarantine and isolation facilities across the nation, provide mandatory infection control training for all first responders, and increase testing capacity and ventilators for each island state in the FSM." [2] There is no additional information available on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [3,4] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website to access information. The WHO portal for International Health Regulations (IHR) also does not provide any information on this subject.[5]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "After Action Review, Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (IHR) and Health Security (SPH),"[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Covid19 Policy Response Tracker," [<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development, [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[5] WHO, "International Health Regulations," [https://www.who.int/health-topics/international-health-regulations#tab=tab_1] Accessed 30 November 2020.

3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence Micronesia has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives in the past year. The World Health Organization (WHO)'s extranet which maintains a list of after-action reviews by countries has no mention of a national-level biological threat focussed exercise conducted in Micronesia. [1] There is no information available of such an exercise on the WHO International Health Regulation (IHR) website or WHO's Micronesia (Federated States of) country page.[2,3] The websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture) do not mention any such collaborative exercise involving the private sector.[4,5] The Ministry of Health does not have a working online website to access information. The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which is dedicated to the promotion of public health surveillance in the region has no information on this subject.[6]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Simulation Exercises." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] WHO, "International Health Regulations." [https://www.who.int/health-topics/international-health-regulations#tab=tab_1] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[3] WHO, "Micronesia(Federated States of)." [<https://www.who.int/countries/fsm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[5] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[6] The Pacific Community, "Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN), EpiNet." [<https://www.spc.int/fr/a-l-agenda/pacific-public-health-surveillance-network-regional-meeting-linking-up-the-initiatives>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of a functioning Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Micronesia. According to Micronesia's Emergencies and Disasters Operations Manual, the National Emergency Operations Center, NEOC, "is the designated administrative hub of national emergency and disaster response mechanisms." The NEOC is, therefore, the "nerve center" of disaster response and recovery operations." [1] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website. There is no additional information on this subject on the websites of the national government or the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management. [2,3]

[1] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fsmnationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management [<https://decem.gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the National Emergency Operations Center, NEOC is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year, or is that it conducts a drill at least once per year.

There is no evidence of such a requirement on the websites of the national government or the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Response. [1,2] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website to access information. Micronesia's Emergencies and Disasters management policy operations manual informs that the NEOC in Micronesia is, "nerve center" of disaster response and recovery operations," and is the "designated administrative hub of national emergency and disaster response mechanisms." [3] However, the manual does not inform about any requirement of an annual drill. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia reports that, "The hospital, state and national disaster plans outline the procedures of the EOC, the required roles and the required response. These have been routinely tested through tabletop and functional exercises." In addition, "The national Public Health and Healthcare Emergency Preparedness Program (PHHEP) unit manages a program of exercises and drills for all states." [4] However, the frequency of drills is not mentioned.

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management [<https://decem.gov.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes, and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fmationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. The IMF Policy Responses to Covid19 tracker reports, "To date, there are no confirmed COVID-19 cases in the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), but the country's health system has limited capacity for handling an outbreak. The public health emergency is effective from January 31, 2020 to November 30, 2020. The national and state governments have introduced travel restrictions, including restricting residents from traveling abroad and banning or requiring 14-day self-quarantine in a COVID-19-free area prior to entry into the FSM." [1] However, there is no additional information available on the role of the NEOC and whether the emergency response exercise was activated within 120 minutes of identifying the public health emergency. There is no additional information of such an emergency response action on the websites of the national government of the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management.

[2,3] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia does inform that "The hospital, state, and national EOCs can be operational within two hours." [4]

[1] International Monetary Fund (IMF). "Policy responses to Covi19" [<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Natural Disaster [<https://decem.gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO) "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 09 December 2020.

3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e. bioterrorism attack) within the last 5 years, though Micronesia has guidelines and agreements between public health and other security officials, and holds exercises to respond to bioterrorism and has regulations on preventing bioterrorism. According to the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report for Micronesia, "The Department of Health Services and Department of Public Security (DPS) jointly participate in the exercises and drills managed by the PHHEP program. The Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARF) and hospital HAZMAT teams complete annual training together as first responders. DPS were also included in The Federated States of Micronesia RSS and POD Operations Full-Scale Exercises by providing security for the delivery of prophylaxis and vaccines." Additionally, "Both the DHS and DPS are part of the State Disaster Management Plan with representatives on the State Disaster Coordination Team and State EOC. The Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARF) HAZMAT team are DPS staff and are first responders under the State Disaster Management Plan." [1] There is no information available on this subject on the websites of the national government or the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management. [2,3] The Ministry of Health does not have a working website. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with in collaboration with the United States through the Compact of Free Association treaty signed in 1986, but this agreement does not have any information of any procedures in case of a bioterrorism attack.[4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018",

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Environment, Climate Change, and Disaster Management. [<https://decem.gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] US State Department. "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia" [<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation, or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach) in Micronesia. There is, however, a record of an emergency communication plan in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia which states that, "During an emergency response, the State Disaster Coordination Team and the National Disaster Coordination Teamwork from the relevant state or national EOC and therefore communication between the sectors occurs constantly throughout the response. Daily radio surveillance to the outer islands from in Chuuk and Yap can be also used to share information." But, there is no information on whether there is a documented strategy in communicating with diverse populations in times of crisis.[1] Micronesia has a National Emergency Operations Center but there is no available information on a strategy of this type according to official documents.[2] There is no information available on this subject on the websites of the national government or the Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management. [3,4] The Ministry of Health does not have a working website to access information.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018", [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fsmnationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] Micronesia, Department of Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management [<https://decem.gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence suggesting that Micronesia has in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. As recorded in the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report assessment on Micronesia, "In most of the states, risk communication for public health is the responsibility of the EpiNet team with the Director of Department of Health Services (DHS) approving the risk communications strategies and messages. When the NEOC(National Emergency Operations Center) is activated, public/media communications are coordinated through the President's Public Information Officer (PIO), and during a national emergency with public health implications, the Department of Health and Social Affairs (DHSA) is responsible for coordinating health-related communication activities. When the State Disaster Plan is activated, the PIO in the Governor's Office is responsible for all risk communications, with the Governor approving all communications. " [1] However, the JEE also notes, "Although the mechanisms are in place, and the players know their roles, there is no formal arrangements or documentation regarding the risk communication process." There is no additional evidence on this subject on the websites of the national government.[2] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a functioning website to access information. Micronesia's Emergency and Disaster Policy Manual does not mention any such information of such legislation or regulation.[3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018", [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fsmnationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 24 November 2020.

3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is sufficient evidence that in Micronesia, the risk communication plan(or other legislation, regulation, or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency). The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report assessment on Micronesia informs that in times of a national public health emergency, the President's Public Information Office (PIO) is responsible for communicating a risk strategy. The JEE found that "when the State Disaster Plan is activated, the President's PIO in the Governor's Office is responsible for all risk PIO communications, with the Governor approving all communications. If DHS is the Lead Agency, then the EpiNet team, under the guidance of the Director of the Department of Health Services (DHS) will continue with risk communication efforts. " [1] The website of the national government has a separate portal to the Public Information Office which gives out information on the latest developments and rule changes in the country. [2] The Ministry of Health does not have a working online website.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 30

November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government. "Office of the President." [<https://gov.fm/index.php/fsmpio>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

3.5.2 Public communication

3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is sufficient public evidence to suggest that Micronesia's public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation, or disinformation. The website of the national government has separate portal access to the Office of the President which updates information on all the latest laws, rules, and developments in the country including public health concerns such as on the Covid19 pandemic.[1] Micronesia has an official Facebook page and a Twitter handle which gives out information to the public during emergencies. [2,3] For instance, the Office of the President's Official Facebook page regularly gives out information regarding new public health initiatives taken by the government, appointments, travel restriction updates (mindful of Covid19 pandemic). The country's official public information page on Twitter also regularly gives out information on new developments related to public health. The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website to access information.

[1] Micronesia, National Government, "Office of the President." [<https://gov.fm/index.php/fsmpio>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] Facebook, "Office of the President, Federated States of Micronesia." [<https://www.facebook.com/piofsm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[3] Twitter, "Federated States of Micronesia Public Information." [<https://twitter.com/fsmpio?lang=en>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no available public evidence suggesting that Micronesia's senior political leaders such as the President or the ministers have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases over the past two years. The Office of the President's Information Office portal on the national government's website does not have any evidence of such misinformation or disinformation spread by the Office of the President during the last two years.[1] Kaselehlie Press, which is a prominent newspaper in Micronesia does not inform of any such misinformation or disinformation from senior political

leaders in Micronesia.[2]

[1] Micronesia, National Government, "Office of the President." [<https://gov.fm/index.php/fsmpio>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] Kaselehlie Press, "The FSM's Newspaper For Today and Tomorrow." [<http://www.kpress.info/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 35.3

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 20.74

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.87

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.44

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that in the past year Micronesia issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak. There is no information about such a restriction on the websites of the national government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [1,2,3] Kasalehlie Press, which is a prominent newspaper in Micronesia does not report any such restriction imposed by Micronesia. [4]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php/residents/2015-08-10-10-11-21/joomla-search?searchword=ban&searchphrase=all>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Foreign Affairs [<https://www.fsmgov.org/ovmis.html>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Agriculture [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[4] Kasalehlie Press, "The FSM's Newspaper."

[http://www.kpress.info/index.php?searchword=medical&searchphrase=all&Itemid=101&option=com_search] Accessed 30 November 2020.

3.7.1b

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that in the past year Micronesia issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. There is no information about such a restriction on the websites of the national government or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [1,2,3] Kasalehlie Press, which is a prominent newspaper in

Micronesia does not report any such restriction imposed by Micronesia. [4]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php/residents/2015-08-10-10-11-21/joomla-search?searchword=ban&searchphrase=all>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Foreign Affairs [<https://www.fsmgov.org/ovmis.html>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Agriculture [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 30 November 2020.

[4] Kaselehlie Press, "The FSM's Newspaper."

[http://www.kpress.info/index.php?searchword=medical&searchphrase=all&Itemid=101&option=com_search] Accessed 30 November 2020.

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is sufficient evidence that in the past year, Micronesia implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak in Micronesia. The Office of the President portal on the website of the national government informs that Micronesia banned international arrivals into Chuuk State (one of the four states of Micronesia) when the World Health Organization declared Covid19 as a global health pandemic and when the US state of Hawaii and Guam recorded positive cases. Micronesia advised travelers to the country to stay at home and made a 14-day quarantine for all foreign travelers.[1] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Transportation and Communication do not have any additional information on this subject. [2,3]The Ministry of Health does not have an online website to access information. Kaselehlie Press which is a prominent newspaper in Micronesia has also reported on the ban to Chuuk State and foreign travelers being subject to mandatory quarantine. [4]

[1] Micronesia, National Government, "Office of the President." [<https://gov.fm/index.php/component/content/article/35-pio-articles/news-and-updates/287-travelers-encouraged-to-stay-home-if-travel-to-the-fsm-is-necessary-you-will-be-subject-to-quarantine-isolation-requirements-travel-to-chuuk-banned-until-march-29th-2020?Itemid=177>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Foreign Affairs [<https://www.fsmgov.org/ovmis.html>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Transportation, Communication, and Infrastructure, [<https://tci.gov.fm/communications.html>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[4] Kaselehlie Press, "The FSM's official newspaper."

[http://www.kpress.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1397:travelers-encouraged-to-stay-home-if-travel-to-the-fsm-is-necessary-you-will-be-subject-to-quarantine-isolation-requirements-travel-to-chuuk-banned-until-march-29th-2020&catid=8&Itemid=103] Accessed 01 December 2020.

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 17.7

2010

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 204.26

2018

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has a public workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. There is no evidence of such a strategy on the websites of the national government or on the Department of Resources and Development, or the Department of Education [1, 2,3]. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs does not have a working website to access information. Further, a core recommendation of the JEE assessment (2018) is to "Develop and implement a comprehensive national workforce plan to recruit, retain and develop staff to implement, sustain and advance activities to comply with IHR provisions." [4]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Education [<http://national.doe.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018",

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 320

2009

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation facility located within the country. However, with the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, Micronesia has been able to build the necessary facilities to isolate patients or incoming travelers. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Policy Response tracker on Micronesia, "To address the emergency caused by COVID-19, the national government has prepared a US\$20 million (5 percent of GDP) COVID-19 Response Framework, in order to develop quarantine and isolation facilities across the nation, provide mandatory infection control training for all first responders, and increase testing capacity and ventilators for each island state in the FSM." [1] Evidence of actual, on-ground capacities is not available. There is no evidence of such a capacity on the websites of the National Government [2]. The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website to access information. Micronesia has four hospitals in the federation but none have websites or information on such a capacity. [3]

[1] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Covid19 Policy Response Tracker." [<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Embassy of the FSM in USA, "Hospitals," [<http://www.fsmembassydc.org/page/hospitals>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Micronesia has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. There is also no evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years.

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Micronesia has been able to create the necessary facilities in hospitals to isolate patients or incoming travelers. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Policy Response tracker on Micronesia, "To address the emergency caused by COVID-19, the national government has prepared a US\$20 million (5 percent of GDP) COVID-19 Response Framework, in order to develop quarantine and isolation facilities across the nation, provide mandatory infection control training for all first responders, and increase testing capacity and ventilators for each island state in the FSM." However, the plan is not specific to isolation capacities. [1] The country has only recorded 1 case of as of May 2021 and, there is no evidence of actual, on-ground expansion of capacities. [2]

There is no evidence of such a capacity on the websites of the National Government [3]. The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website to access information. Micronesia has four hospitals in the federation but none have websites or information on such a capacity. [4]

[1] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Covid19 Policy Response Tracker." [<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M>] Accessed 04 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia COVID: 1 Cases And 0 Deaths - Worldometer [<https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/micronesia/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/>] Accessed 04 May 2021.

[4] Embassy of the FSM in USA, "Hospitals," [<http://www.fsmembassydc.org/page/hospitals>] Accessed 04 May 2021.

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that Micronesia has a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents, and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs.

There is no information on such a protocol on the websites of the national government, the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [1,2] Micronesia does not have a national level laboratory system or a public health institute in place. Micronesia has four major hospitals that operate on the regional level but does not have a national hospital system. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment on Micronesia does not have any information of such a

national-level protocol.[3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia JEE Report."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence available to suggest that Micronesia has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency, but there is no information on what the stockpile contains.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment on Micronesia in 2018 reports that "In the Federated States of Micronesia, in-country readiness arrangements focus on supporting the first 72 hours of a response to a sudden onset event. This is due to the geo-demographic characteristics of the country and the Compact of Free Association Agreement with the US. Although the country has a small stockpile of medical countermeasures on Pohnpei Island, which can be deployed to other islands, the Federated States of Micronesia primarily relies on accessing medical countermeasures through the Strategic National Stockpile of the United States of America (US SNS). Following the declaration of emergency by the President, the Secretary of the DHSA has the authority to request the deployment of medical countermeasures from the US." However, the JEE also informs of areas to improve and suggests to "Accelerate arrangements with US Strategic National Stockpile to send supplies directly to the affected location, and not exclusively to Pohnpei Island." [1]

There is no additional available on this subject on the website of the Department of Resources and Development.[2] The Ministry of Health does not have an online website to access information. Micronesia does not have a national laboratory system or a drug regulatory agency which can monitor such a stockpile.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

4.2.2b

Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Micronesia has a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report informs that Micronesia does have an arrangement with the United States Strategic National stockpile to send medical countermeasures directly to affected areas in case of a public health emergency, but it is not clear if this includes laboratory supply. [1] There is no additional information on this subject on the websites of the national government, or the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture). [2,3] The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense do not have functioning online websites to access information. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with in collaboration with the United States through the Compact of Free Association Treaty, but the official website of the US Department of State does not have any information on the availability of laboratory stockpiles in Micronesia. [4]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmdr.fm/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[4] US Department of State, "US Relations with Federated States of Micronesia." [<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-federated-states-of-micronesia/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

4.2.2c

Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency

The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Assessment report on Micronesia does not have any information on such a review of the national stockpile.[1] The websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development do not have any information on this subject.[2,3] The Ministries of Health and Defense do not have an online website to access information. Micronesia's defense issues are handled in collaboration with the United States as part of the Compact of Free Association Treaty. However, the US Department of State page on Micronesia does not mention any such protocol.[4]

[1] World Health Organization, "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018,"

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 04 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 04 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmdr.fm/>] Accessed 04 May 2021.

[4] United States Department of State, "US Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia." [<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-federated-states-of-micronesia/>] Accessed 04 May 2021.

4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Micronesia has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia in 2018 reports that "In the Federated States of Micronesia, in-country readiness arrangements focus on supporting the first 72 hours of a response to a sudden onset event. This is due to the geo-demographic characteristics of the country and the Compact of Free Association Agreement with the US. Although the country has a small stockpile of medical countermeasures on Pohnpei Island, which can be deployed to other islands, the Federated States of Micronesia primarily relies on accessing medical countermeasures through the Strategic National Stockpile of the United States of America (US SNS)."[1]

To deal with Covid-19, Micronesia received ventilators & medical supplies from the State of Israel, the United States of America and China. [2,3] As of May 2021, Micronesia has only 1 reported case of Covid-19 and has no active case. [4]

There is no additional information regarding a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce MCMs on the websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development. [5,6] The Ministry of Health does not have an online website to access information. Micronesia does not have a national drug agency or a laboratory system to monitor such a situation.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Reliefweb, "Through Donations Of Ventilators & Medical Supplies From The State Of Israel & The United States Of America, Governor Oliver, Secretary Taulung, & Ambassador Cantor Strengthen The FSM COVID-19 Response Framework & The FSM-U.S. Enduring Partnership - Micronesia" [https://reliefweb.int/report/micronesia-federated-states/through-donations-ventilators-medical-supplies-state-israel.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Reliefweb, "People'S Republic Of China Donates Medical Supplies & \$100,000 To The FSM; "Thank You, China, For Your Great Friendship," President Panuelo Says" [https://reliefweb.int/report/micronesia-federated-states/people-s-republic-china-donates-medical-supplies-100000-fsm-thank.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[4] Micronesia COVID: 1 Cases And 0 Deaths - Worldometer [https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/micronesia/] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[5] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/index.php] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[6] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [http://www.fsmrd.fm/] Accessed 03 May 2021.

4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that Micronesia has a plan to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. There is also no evidence of a plan or a mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report for Micronesia informs of a legal provision called the Micronesia Pharmaceutical Act of 2018 which can be enacted during a public health emergency. "The fast-tracked importation, registration and waiving the registration of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, needed to support response efforts, are included in the provisions of the Pharmaceutical Act of 2018 that is being enacted." [1] However, it is unclear if this protocol includes the capacity to procure laboratory supplies. The Ministry of Health does not have a working website to access information. The website of the National Government does not have any information on this subject. [2] Micronesia does not have a national public health institute or a drug agency to monitor such a situation.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Jthe 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/index.php] Accessed 01 December 2020.

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Micronesia has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency (i.e. antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics). As part of the 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report for Micronesia, one of the priority recommendation to, "Accelerate arrangements with US Strategic National Stockpile to send supplies directly to the affected location, and not exclusively to Pohnpei Island." [1] According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), through its Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program, Micronesia has been provided: "vital resources to ensure communities can effectively respond to infectious disease outbreaks, natural disasters, and chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event". The CDC also lists, as a key strength, Micronesia's "strong relationship with a healthcare and medical countermeasures distributor." However, the same report also notes that Micronesia is challenged by a "lack of site-specific plans for all points of dispensing across the islands hampered by the lack in infrastructure in responding to remote communities". [2] There is no information of such a plan on

the websites of the national government.[3] The Ministry of Health does not have an official website to access information.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Micronesia JEE Report, 2018",
[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Center for Disease Control (CDC). "Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (PHEP) Program Fed States of Micronesia." [<https://www.cdc.gov/cpr/pubs-links/2018/documents/MICRONESIA2018.pdf>] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia, National Government

[[https://gov.fm/#:~:text=STATE%20GOVERNMENT&text=The%20Federated%20States%20of%20Micronesia%20\(FSM\)%20is%20an%20independent%2C,includes%20seven%20major%20island%20groups.](https://gov.fm/#:~:text=STATE%20GOVERNMENT&text=The%20Federated%20States%20of%20Micronesia%20(FSM)%20is%20an%20independent%2C,includes%20seven%20major%20island%20groups.)] Accessed 09 December 2020.

4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Although there is evidence to support that Micronesia has a plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency, such a document is not publicly available. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment on Micronesia in 2018 informs that "The Federated States of Micronesia primarily relies on personnel from the US when national capacity is exceeded. The All Hazards Response and Recovery - Public Health Base Plan 2017 includes orientation materials for incoming health care professionals. Although there are no written protocols or regulations for the expedited registration and licensing of international healthcare professionals by the Medical Licensing Board and by the Nursing Licensing Board, the process to request and receive international health care professionals, especially from the US CDC, has been successful, for example, during measles and mumps outbreaks in 2014 and 2017 respectively." [1] There is no additional information available on this subject on the websites of the national government.[2] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning online website. Micronesia's defense issues are dealt with in collaboration with the United States of America as part of the Compact of Free Association Treaty. However, the US Department of State website's official country page on Micronesia does not provide any details of such a shared plan/agreement with Micronesia, but there is an overarching mention of health and medical support provided to Micronesia without further details.[3]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018,"
[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] United States Department of State, "US Relations with Micronesia (Federated States of)." [<https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-federated-states-of-micronesia/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 100

2009

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 11.85

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the government of Micronesia has a legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment on Micronesia reports that, "The Federated States of Micronesia Infection Control Guidelines, updated in 2017, provide healthcare administrators and healthcare workers with a framework to prevent and control the transmission of infectious pathogens within, from or to the healthcare setting, to patients, healthcare workers and the community alike. The guidelines provide information on protection of healthcare workers," in a section related Health-care associated infection (HCAI) activities. However, the report also mentions that, "Although there are some HCAI prevention activities, there is no national plan for HCAI programs." [1] The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning website to access information. There is no additional information available in national planning and emergency documents.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia JEE Report 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a

Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a system in place in Micronesia for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency.

The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment for Micronesia informs that "In most of the states, risk communication for public health is the responsibility of the EpiNet team with the Director of DHS approving the risk communications strategies and messages. The EpiNet team will discuss the risk communication strategy, designate a team member to develop the materials, and distribute them." [1] However, the JEE information refers to a general risk communication protocol in place but does not entail any information on a system for government health officials to communicate in times of an emergency.

There is no relevant information in the Covid-19 Response Framework. [2] There is no additional information available on the websites of the national government. [3]

The Ministry of Health does not have a functioning online website to access information. Micronesia does not have an official website for an emergency management agency. Micronesia's Disaster Management Reference Book reports the need for the establishment of an efficient risk communication strategy with the "capacity to manage public, internal, and partner communication for all phases of public health emergencies." [4]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Government of the Federal State of Micronesia, "Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020" [https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/index.] Accessed 03 May 2021

[4] Micronesia, "Disaster Management Reference Book, 2019." [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/disaster-mgmt-ref-hdbk-FSM.pdf] Accessed 03 May 2021.

4.5.1b

Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompasses healthcare workers in both the public and private sector.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report on Micronesia done in 2018 reports the need to, "Formalize and document mechanisms for coordinated communication. These should include hospital and healthcare sectors, civil society organizations, private sector and the general public." [1]

There is no additional information available on this subject on the website of the national government or the Covid-19 Response Framework. [2,3] Micronesia's Health Ministry and the National Emergency Operations Center does not have an official website to access information.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/index.php] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Government of the Federal State of Micronesia, "Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020" [https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Micronesia's national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report on Micronesia scores HCAI activities 1 out of 4 and informs that, "Although there are some HCAI prevention activities, there is no national plan for HCAI programs. The availability of PPE in laboratories and hospitals is not sufficient to manage patients for more than one or two days. There is no surveillance for high-risk groups (e.g. diabetic, surgical patients)."[1] However, there is no mention of monitoring and tracking of HCAI in Micronesia.

There is no additional information available on this subject on the website of the national government or in the Covid-19 Response Framework [2,3] Micronesia's Health Ministry and the National Emergency Operations Center does not have an official website to access information.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO) "Micronesia JEE Report 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Government of the Federal State of Micronesia, "Covid-19 Response Framework April 2020" [https://gov.fm/files/FSM_COVID-19_Response_Framework.pdf.] Accessed 03 May 2021.

4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that there is a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial in Micronesia. The websites of the national government

or the Department of Resources and Development do not have any information on this subject. [1,2] The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a website. Micronesia does not have a Ministry of Research. There is no information regarding this subject in academic journals or studies. Finally, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment on Micronesia in 2018 does not provide any information on this subject. [3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] World Health Organization(WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

4.7.1b

Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that there is an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics in Micronesia. The websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development do not have any information on this subject. [1,2] The Department of Health and Social Affairs does not have a website. Micronesia does not have a Ministry of Research. There is no information regarding this subject in academic journals or studies. Finally, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report Assessment on Micronesia in 2018 does not provide any information on this subject. [3]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] World Health Organization(WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a

Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no sufficient evidence to suggest that Micronesia has a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report on Micronesia reports that "Following the declaration of emergency by the President, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Social Affairs (DHSA) has the authority to request the deployment of medical countermeasures from the US." [1] However, there is no evidence if DHSA or any other government agency is responsible for approving new medical countermeasures in Micronesia. There is no additional information available on the websites of the national government. [2] The Ministry of Health does not have an online website to access information. There is no Ministry of Research in Micronesia and there is no evidence available of

such an agency in academic journals or documents.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/index.php] Accessed 01 December 2020.

4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies in Micronesia. However, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) reports that, "The fast-tracked importation, registration and waiving the registration of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, needed to support response efforts, are included in the provisions of the Pharmaceutical Act of 2018 that is being enacted." [1] Although there is no information on an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies. Micronesia does not have a Ministry of Research and the Ministry of Health does not have an online website.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 01 December 2020.

Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or that there is a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics in Micronesia. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) 2018 on Micronesia does not record any integrated national risk strategy or a standalone strategy for epidemics and pandemics. [1] There is no information about such strategies on the websites of the national government. [2] The Ministry of Health does not have a working website to access information. Micronesia has a National Emergency Operations Center but there is no available information on such a strategy according to official documents. [3]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), 2018. "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities 2018." [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [https://gov.fm/] Accessed 24 November 2020.

[3] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fsmnationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 24 November 2020.

5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has cross-border agreements, protocols or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies. There is no evidence of such agreements on the website of the national government [1]. Micronesia has a National Emergency Operations Center but there is no available information on such agreements according to official documents. [2] There were no agreements found in studies or external documents. Micronesia is also a member of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). While the PPHSN provides a mechanism for communication regarding public health emergencies, including those of international concern (PacNet), this is for communicating the emergency to the WHO. [3] Micronesia heavily relies on the United States when it comes to defense issues and procures much of its medical countermeasures in times of a public health emergency through the Strategic National Stockpile of the United States of America (US SNS). However, there is no formal agreement to follow

such a protocol with the US.[4]

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2]

[2] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fsmnationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation. "Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN)"

[http://www.wpro.who.int/southpacific/programmes/pacific_initiatives/pphsn/en/] Accessed 01 December 2020.

5.2.1b

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Micronesia has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. There is no evidence of such agreements on the website of the national government [1]. Micronesia has a National Emergency Operations Center but there is no available information on such agreements according to official documents. [2] There were no agreements found in studies or external documents. Micronesia is also a member of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). While the PPHSN is responsible for communication regarding public health emergencies, this is primarily for communicating the emergency to the WHO. [3] There were no agreements found in academic studies or external documents.

[1] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia. "FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA Emergencies and Disasters Policy, Plans, Programmes and Projects OPERATIONS MANUAL." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27083_fsmnationaleocplan.pdf] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation. "Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN)"

[http://www.wpro.who.int/southpacific/programmes/pacific_initiatives/pphsn/en/] Accessed 01 December 2020.

5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a

Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b

Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence to show that Micronesia has allocated national funds to improve the capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. In light of the coronavirus global pandemic, Micronesia has taken steps to prevent the entry of the virus into the country. But, there is no information available on whether Micronesia has allocated funds to expand current capacity in preparation of future threats. The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia conducted in 2018 has no information regarding such a fund established up until 2018.[1] There is no additional information on this subject on the websites of the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture) or on the portal of the Office of the President. [2,3] The Ministry of Health does not have an official website to access information. Micronesia's national budget is not available online and cannot be accessed through the national government's website.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities,2018.)

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>]

[2] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] Micronesia, National Government, "Office of the President" [<https://gov.fm/index.php/fsmpio>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence available to show that there is a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency. Micronesia is eligible for support from the International Development Association (IDA) and can avail of Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) in case of a public health emergency.[1,2] Micronesia heavily relies on the United States for economic support. The 2018 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) on Micronesia reports that "The Compact of Free Association between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States of America (US) provide for US economic assistance (including eligibility for certain US federal programs) defense and security, and other benefits in exchange for US defense and certain other operating rights in the Federated States of Micronesia, denial of access to the Federated States of Micronesia territory to other nations, and other agreements. The current Compact will expire in 2023." [3] However, there is no mention of a separate emergency financing mechanism. The Ministry of Health does not have an online website to access information. There is no additional information on this subject on academic journals or documents.

[1] International Development Association, "Borrowing Countries" [<https://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] World Bank, "Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility." [<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence to support that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support or improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity. There is no information about such a statement made by the President available on the website of the national government with the portal to the President's Office.[1] The websites of the Department of Foreign Affairs does not have any information on this subject.[2] The Ministry of Health does not have an online website to access information.

[1] Micronesia, National Government, "Office of the President." [<https://gov.fm/index.php/fsmpio>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Foreign Affairs [<https://www.fsmgov.org/ovmis.html>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence to support that Micronesia has requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats but has not extended any form of financial or technical support to other countries. According to the Global Health Security Funding Tracking Dashboard, Micronesia has received 4.90 million USD from 2014-2020. This funding has come from the WHO, Japan, Australia and the United States (donors in order of financial commitment). These funds have been disbursed for capacities such as health workforce development, national legislation, policy and financing, and improving response to zoonotic diseases. [1] There is no additional information available on this subject on the websites of the Office of the President or the Department of Foreign Affairs. [2,3]

[1] International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Covid19 Policy Tracker." [<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#M>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[2] Micronesia, Department of Foreign Affairs [<https://www.fsmgov.org/ovmis.html>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

[3] Georgetown Global Health Security Tracker, "Federated States of Micronesia." [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/80/recipient>] Accessed 03 May 2021.

5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that Micronesia has a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that go beyond influenza. The website of the Department of Resources and Development (which covers agriculture) does not have any such information. [1] The Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Report assessing Micronesia in 2018 does not provide any information on this subject.[2] The Ministry of Health does not maintain an official website. Micronesia does not have a Ministry of Research.

[1] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO), "Micronesia Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of IHR Core Capacities, 2018."

[<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/279896/WHO-WHE-CPI-2018.34-eng.pdf?sequence=1>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that Micronesia has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years. There is no evidence of such news on the websites of WHO, or the country page of

Micronesia.[1] News outlets in Micronesia have also no information about such an event.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Federated States of Micronesia."

[[https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/countries/country-details/GHO/micronesia-\(federated-states-of\)?countryProfileId=111e3ddf-e673-411a-a588-770633f41478](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/countries/country-details/GHO/micronesia-(federated-states-of)?countryProfileId=111e3ddf-e673-411a-a588-770633f41478)] Accessed 01 December 2020.

5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that Micronesia has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. Micronesia has not recorded a single case of Covid19 disease and hence has not had to share any samples. There is no evidence of such news on the WHO's country page for Micronesia. [1] Local and international news outlets also provide no such evidence.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO), "Federated States of Micronesia."

[[https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/countries/country-details/GHO/micronesia-\(federated-states-of\)?countryProfileId=111e3ddf-e673-411a-a588-770633f41478](https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/countries/country-details/GHO/micronesia-(federated-states-of)?countryProfileId=111e3ddf-e673-411a-a588-770633f41478)] Accessed 01 December 2020.

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 35.94

2020

Transparency International

6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a

What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b

What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 0

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 70.3

2008-2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.5

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 5.5

2013

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no clear evidence of data on the percentage of the workforce involved in the informal sector in Micronesia. Micronesia has 34.6% of the workforce involved in agriculture according to ILOSTAT. [1] The websites of the national government or the Department of Resources and Development do not have any such data. [2,3] There is no such data available through academic studies or journals.

[1] International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT, "Federated States of Micronesia." [<https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[2] Micronesia, National Government [<https://gov.fm/index.php>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

[3] Micronesia, Department of Resources and Development [<http://www.fsmrd.fm/>] Accessed 01 December 2020.

6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

Current Year Score: 1

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government

6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting

6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality

6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.4

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 22.81

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.41

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 67.75

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook

6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1171.4

2019

WHO

6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.19

2019

World Bank

6.5.1d

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 28.94

2018

World Bank

6.5.1e

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 45.8

2016

WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 78.57

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.2b

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 88.31

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 108.99

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018