

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Guinea. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Guinea.

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Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Republic of Guinea has in place a national plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority antimicrobial resistant (AMR) pathogens. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that the country does not have in place a national plan to address the issue of AMR. [1] There is no new or updated information from the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture to suggest such a plan has been set up since the JEE was conducted. [2,3] Guinea has not conducted a World Health Organisation (WHO) national action plan (NAP), and the national laboratory, the National Laboratory of Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique or LNSP) does not have a website. [4,5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation. 2018. "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] REMENTA. "National Institute of Public Health of Guinea/National Public Health Laboratory (Institut National de Santé Publique de Guinée/ Laboratoire National de Santé Publique)". [<http://www.rementa.net/index.php/fr/presentation/equip-partenaires/25-institut-national-de-sante-publique-de-guinee-laboratoire-national-de-sante-publique>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has in place a national laboratory system, which tests for some antimicrobial resistant (AMR) pathogens. The National Laboratory of Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique or LNSP) is the national reference laboratory for the

tests for pathogens defined as World Health Organisation (WHO) priority pathogens, and it coordinates medical biology sentinel sites across the country. While Guinea does not test for all 7+1 WHO priority pathogens, the LNSP can test for 6 of the WHO priority pathogens: E. coli, K. pneumonia, S. aureus, S. pneumoniae, Salmonella species, and Shigella species. In addition, the LNSP can test for Neisseria meningitidis, even though this is not on the WHO 7+1 list. [1] There is no further information about the LNSP's capacity for testing for pathogens from the LNSP itself, nor from the Ministry of Health. [2, 3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] REMENTA. "National Institute of Public Health of Guinea/National Public Health Laboratory (Institut National de Santé Publique de Guinée/ Laboratoire National de Santé Publique)". [<http://www.rementa.net/index.php/fr/presentation/equipement-partenaires/25-institut-national-de-sante-publique-de-guinee-laboratoire-national-de-sante-publique>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Guinean government conducts detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial resistant (AMR) organisms. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that Guinea only conducts surveillance activities for antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in the human sector. [1] Guinea has not conducted a World Health Organisation (WHO) national action plan (NAP). [2] There is no evidence from the Guinean Ministry of Health, nor from the Guinean Ministry of Environment, Water, and Forestry or any other government entity of any surveillance activities for AMR organisms in the environment. [3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation. "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[4] Official Portal of the Guinean Government (Portail Officiel du Gouvernement Guinéen). "The Government (Le gouvernement)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/le-gouvernement>]; Accessed 31 August 2020;

[5] Ministry of the Environment, Water, and Forestry (Ministere de l'Environnement, des Eaux et Foret). [<http://meef-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Guinea has in place regulations requiring prescriptions for human use of antibiotics, but there is also evidence of gaps in enforcement. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, Guinea has established regulations on the prescriptions for all use of antibiotics, although no further information is available on these regulations. [1] A study conducted in 2018, which evaluated prescription of antimicrobial drug use and resistance among 13 hospitals in Guinea, concluded that "the study showed excessive use of antimicrobials in hospitals in Guinea" and recommended that an "action plan needs to be developed to define a set of workable targets of appropriate antibiotic use". [2] No further evidence was found about enforcement of the legislations or whether the Guinean population can buy antibiotics without prescriptions. There is no information about these regulations from the Ministry of Health, and Guinea has not developed a World Health Organisation (WHO) national action plan (NAP). [3,4] According to a study published in January 2020, prescribing antibiotics at the Internal Medicine Department of Donka National Hospital, the location where the study took place, was discussed as being a common practice, where "results showed that fever was the factor independently associated with the antibiotic prescription". However, it goes on to state that "where malaria is the main cause of fever, the results suggest the need for training health care workers in antibiotic prescribing" suggesting that the practice of prescribing antibiotics may not always be properly executed since patients may not have always needed a prescription if their only symptom was a fever. [5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Infection Control Africa Network. July 2018. "The Global Point Prevalence Survey of Antimicrobial Consumption and Resistance (Global-PPS) Results of antimicrobial prescribing in Guinea". [https://www.global-pps.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/7-Global-PPS_Guinea_experience_Ican-congress.pdf]. Accessed 20 March 2021.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation. "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] Bangoura, Salifou & Touré, Abdoulaye & Sidibé, Sidikiba & Camara, Alioune & Sylla, Djibril & KEITA, Alpha & Sow, Mamadou & Camara, Alimou & Diallo, Mamadou Saliou Kalifa & Cisse, Mohamed. (2020). "Frequency and Determinants of Prescribing Antibiotics for Internal Medicine at Donka National Hospital (Guinea)". Central African Journal of Public Health. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342893166_Frequency_and_Determinants_of_Prescribing_Antibiotics_for_Internal_Medicine_at_Donka_National_Hospital_Guinea]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.1.2b

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Guinea has in place regulations requiring prescriptions for all use of antibiotics, but no specific mention is made of antibiotics for animal use and there is no mention of animal antibiotic regulations being enforced. No new or updated evidence was found since last year's research. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, regulations exist in Guinea that require prescriptions for the use of all antibiotics, although no specific mention is made of antibiotics for animal use. However, the JEE also states that the rules around the need for prescriptions for antibiotics need to be enforced, and Guinea needs to develop a national plan for the management and appropriate use of antibiotics, although again, no specific mention is made of antibiotics for animals. [1] There is no more information available as to the regulations around prescriptions for antibiotics from the Ministries of Health or Agriculture, and Guinea has not developed a World Health Organisation (WHO) national action plan (NAP). [2,3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation. "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.2 ZOO NOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a

Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has in place a national plan, laws, or guidelines on zoonoses. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the country did not have a plan for addressing zoonoses-related issues, and neither was there a "One Health" policy integrating human and animal health. Surveillance for zoonoses occurred throughout the country, but this did not happen in accordance with any formalised plan. [1] In November 2016, commitments to develop a joint plan were made between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, who acknowledged having weak health systems, as evidenced by their ability to respond to the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak. In order to strengthen their resilience to health threats, the three nations established a "Regional Strategic Roadmap to institutionalize the One Health approach". However, there is no evidence that the approach has influenced the development of a national plan or guidelines. [2] There is evidence that the worldwide network of laboratories of the Pasteur Institute, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the French International Cooperation for Agronomic Research for Development (Coopération Internationale de Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement or CIRAD), and the Institute for Development Research (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement or IRD) are involved in the surveillance for zoonoses, but not that a plan or laws exist per se. [3] There is no information as to a plan for zoonoses or animal disease available from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [4,5]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [2] One Health Outlook. November 2019. "Establishing National Multisectoral Coordination and Collaboration mechanisms to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 2016-2018". [<https://onehealthoutlook.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s42522-019-0004-z>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [3] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "EBO-SURSY". [http://www.rr-africa.oie.int/projects/EBOSURSY/fr_index.html]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.2.1b

Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a national legislation, plan or equivalent strategy document which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, Guinea did not yet have a policy or official "One Health" plan, which is a "collaborative, mutlisectoral, and transdisciplinary approach - working at the local, regional, and global levels - with the goal of achieving optimal health outcomes recognizing the interconnection between people, animals, plants and their shared environment". [1,2] In November 2016, however commitments to develop a joint plan were made between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, who acknowledged having weak health systems, as evidenced by their ability to respond to the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak. In order to strengthen their resilience to health threats, the three nations established a "Regional Strategic Roadmap to institutionalize the One Health approach". However, there is no evidence that the approach has influenced the development of a national plan or guidelines. [3] No other evidence was found on the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture websites and Guinea has not developed a World Health Organisation (WHO) national action plan (NAP). [4,5,6]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [2] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "One Health" [<https://www.cdc.gov/onehealth/index.html>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [3] One Health Outlook. November 2019. "Establishing National Multisectoral Coordination and Collaboration mechanisms to prevent, detect, and respond to public health threats in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 2016-2018". [<https://onehealthoutlook.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s42522-019-0004-z>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[6] World Health Organisation. "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.2.1c

Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Guinea has in place a national plan for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, Guinea has identified the zoonoses that pose the greatest public health risk for the country (including anthrax, rabies, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), Ebola virus disease (EVD), Rift Valley fever, and brucellosis), and conducts separate surveillance activities for these diseases, although only HPAI and EVD have official ministerial committees dedicated to dealing with surveillance and potential outbreaks. However, none of these surveillance activities are formalised into a national plan. [1] No additional information is available about a national plan for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [2,3] A study conducted in June 2019 assessed the One Health approach and looked specifically at existing systems and structures for zoonotic disease detection and control. One of the challenges found was the "lack of data management expertise particularly for animal health and environmental officials at lower levels of the health system" - the subsequent recommendation was to "include animal health and environment officials in ongoing data management training in order to improve surveillance and reporting for zoonotic diseases" further suggesting that the current surveillance system is not strong enough. The report also makes no mention of a formal surveillance and/or control plan in Guinea. [4] Another study conducted in 2018 looked at ways to improve integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR) capacity in Guinea in order to implement the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), and found that Guinea had a weak existing disease surveillance system, where there existed a lack of public health workers trained in IDSR which contributed to "underreporting of cases and problems with data completeness, accuracy, and reliability". They also found that "Guinea's IDSR strengthening activities are an important step towards achieving the GHSA objective of establishing a functional public health surveillance system capable of detecting events of significance for public health, animal health, and health security". [5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlementation Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Science Direct. June 2019. "Assessing health systems in Guinea for prevention and control of priority zoonotic diseases: a One Health approach". [<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352771418300466>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] Reynolds, E. M., Hemingway-Foday, J. J., Souare, O., Diallo, B. I., Bah, M., Kaba, A. K., Kone, M., Diallo, T., Camara, N., Kante, M., Guilavogui, S., Kante, M., & MacDonald, P. (2019). "Improving integrated disease surveillance and response capacity in Guinea, 2015-2018". *Online Journal of Public Health Informatics*, 11[1].

[<https://www.rti.org/publication/improving-integrated-disease-surveillance-and-response-capacity-guinea-2015-2018>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a department dedicated to zoonoses that functions across ministries. Guinea has two inter-ministerial committees dedicated to two specific zoonotic disease, which functions across ministries, but there is no evidence of a department dealing with such diseases. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, Guinea has a committee functioning across ministries dedicated to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), and another inter-ministerial committee dedicated to Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). However, for all other zoonoses, the different departments of the healthcare system in Guinea collaborate, but is no department responsible for coordinating the collaboration, no plan in place to guide this collaboration, nor is the extent of the collaboration clear. [1] There is no evidence either from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture of any department dedicated to zoonotic diseases in Guinea and Guinea has not developed a World Health Organisation (WHO) national action plan (NAP). [2,3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlementation Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation. "Library of National Action Plans". [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a national mechanism for owners of livestock to conduct or report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. There is no such evidence from the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, not from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [1, 2, 3] According to the JEE for Guinea, routine surveillance for zoonoses is conducted by the government, but there is no mention of any mechanism for self-reporting of animal disease. [1] As well, a study conducted in June 2019 assessed the One Health approach and looked specifically at existing systems and structures for zoonotic disease detection and control. One of the challenges found was the "lack of data management expertise particularly for animal health and environmental officials at lower levels of the health system" - the subsequent recommendation was to "include animal health and environment officials in ongoing data management training in order to improve surveillance and reporting for zoonotic diseases" further suggesting that the current surveillance system is not strong enough. There was no mention of a

reporting system available for livestock owners. [4]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] Science Direct. June 2019. "Assessing health systems in Guinea for prevention and control of priority zoonotic diseases: a One Health approach". [<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352771418300466>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] Global Legal Group. June 2020. "Guinea: Data Protection Laws and Regulations 2020". [<https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place any legislation to safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, makes no mention of any provisions for confidentiality, and neither does the last World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) report that Guinea published in 2007. [1,2] Guinea published an OIE PVS Gap Analysis report in September 2012, but this makes no mention of confidentiality provisions either. [3] The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) states that Guinea does not as of 2018 have any legislation to safeguard privacy and data protection. [4] There is no evidence of any such legislation from the Ministry of Health. [5] On the Global Legal Group website, which compiles a country's data protection laws and regulations, no laws for Guinea have been recorded and shared. [6]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). May 2007. "Performance, vision, and strategy: a tool for the governance of veterinary services". [http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Support_to_OIE_Members/docs/pdf/FinalReport-Guinea.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). September 2012. "PVS Gap Analysis report (Analyse des Ecartés PVS - Rapport)". [http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Support_to_OIE_Members/docs/pdf/PVS_GapAnalysisReport-Guinea.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 1 April 2018. "Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide". [https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-Data-Protection-Laws.aspx]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/fr/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] Global Legal Group. June 2020. "Guinea: Data Protection Laws and Regulations 2020". [<https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea conducts regular passive surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the National System for Epidemiological Surveillance (Système National de Surveillance épidémiologique or SNSE) within the Ministry of Agriculture has created a network, the Network for the Surveillance of Animal Diseases (réseau de surveillance des maladies animales or REMAGUI), whose responsibility it is to conduct regularly passive surveillance in livestock and wildlife for diseases for which notification is mandatory, although the list of these diseases is not publicly available, nor is there any explicit mention of which animals are the subject of the surveillance. [1] There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture as to wildlife surveillance activities. [2, 3] A study conducted in June 2019 assessed the One Health approach and looked specifically at existing systems and structures for zoonotic disease detection and control, including wildlife/ecosystem health. When discussing rabies as one of six priority diseases assessed, it was reported that rabies "bite data are not routinely shared at higher levels of each sector's administration, and the Ministry of Health (MOE), despite being responsible for wildlife issues, including surveillance for rabid wildlife, is not involved in the processes". Additionally, one of the challenges found with regards to training and personnel was "limited veterinary oversight of wildlife health" and that there isn't always veterinary coverage of the four major parks. The recommendation provided was "coverage of the parks could be added as a duty to a prefectural or regional veterinarians in areas with supplemental training provided. In either case, this would be an opportunity for joint Ministry of Health and Ministry of Livestock trainings on wildlife disease surveillance". [4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Science Direct. June 2019. "Assessing health systems in Guinea for prevention and control of priority zoonotic diseases: a One Health approach". [<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352771418300466>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.66

2018

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: -

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has a national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans that include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, found that there is a mechanism in place for the government to involve private veterinarians in the eventuality of an outbreak of a zoonotic disease, upon request from the surveillance technical group (groupe technique de surveillance or GTT), which comprises surveillance specialists from all areas of health surveillance including surveillance for zoonoses. [1] However, no evidence was found to suggest that this is a formal and established plan. No additional information was found from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, from the Weekly Epidemiological Bulletins published by the GTT, or from a broader online search. [2,3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales

capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [http://sante.gov.gn/]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin of Guinea (Bulletin épidémiologique hebdomadaire de la Guinée)". [https://anss-guinee.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Bulletin_Epi_SIMR_Guin%C3%A9_S20-2018.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a record of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens are kept or processed, however a study was conducted in April 2019 to find ways to strengthen the national specimen referral system, where referral laboratory facilities were listed through a laboratory network map and details on inventory management was provided. The study specifically focuses on building sustainable capacity since it found that "Guinea's laboratory system was severely under-resourced prior to the [Ebola] outbreak. During the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) crisis, donor assistance was not always provided in line with the national health pyramidal structure, meaning that post-Ebola, there is a wide discrepancy between the infrastructure, personnel, and capabilities across laboratories", which is evidence that a coordinated system among laboratories led by the Guinean government has so far not existed, although there is an awareness that this will be needed in the long term. The study further explains that eventually there will be a transition to move the "management and implementation of the specimen referral system fully to the Ministry of Health, a critical step for future sustainability". [1] According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, Guinea had not yet in 2017 kept a record of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens were kept, however, the country had just initiated a procedure to draw up such a record, with the support of the United States' Centers for Disease Control (CDC). [2] There was also no evidence that such a record has been created, neither from the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [3,4,5] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [6] There is no evidence of such a record on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [7]

[1] Standley, C. J., Muhayangabo, R., Bah, M. S., Barry, A. M., Bile, E., Fischer, J. E., Heegaard, W., Koivogui, L., Lakiss, S. K., Sorrell, E. M., VanSteelandt, A., Dahourou, A. G., & Martel, L. D. (2019). "Creating a National Specimen Referral System in Guinea: Lessons From Initial Development and Implementation". *Frontiers in public health*, 7, 83.

[https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6499205/]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [http://sante.gov.gn/]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire. "ANSS". [https://anss-guinee.org/]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[6] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. 2018. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database 2018. "BWC Legislation Database". [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place legislation or regulations relating to biosecurity. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing the issue of biosecurity. [1] There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, that any such legislation has been developed, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [2,3,4,5] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) BWC legislation database compiling national legislation does not cite any biosecurity legislation for Guinea. [6] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [7]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [http://sante.gov.gn/]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [https://anss-guinee.org/]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). 2018. "BWC Legislation Database".

[https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[7] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. 2018. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports".

[<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.3.1c

Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place any laws relating to biosecurity, and as such does not have a body responsible for implementing such laws. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing the issue of biosecurity. [1] There is no evidence from the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, or Research, that any such legislation has been developed, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [2, 3, 4, 5] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and there is no evidence of a biosecurity law on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [6,7]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Évaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[6] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports".

[<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). 2018. "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.3.1d

Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. There is no evidence of such action from the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, nor from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [1, 2, 3, 4] The national laboratory, the National Laboratory of Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique or LNSP) does not

have a website. [5] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and there is no evidence of action taken to consolidate inventories on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [6,7]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [4] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire. "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [5] REMENTA. "National Institute of Public Health of Guinea/National Public Health Laboratory (Institut National de Santé Publique de Guinée/ Laboratoire National de Santé Publique)". [<http://www.rementa.net/index.php/fr/presentation/equipes-partenaires/25-institut-national-de-sante-publique-de-guinee-laboratoire-national-de-sante-publique>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [6] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). 2018. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Republic of Guinea has the in-country capacity to perform polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for Ebola, which precludes culturing the live virus. As of 2015-2016, given the epidemic of Ebola flaring in Guinea, multiple Ebola centres were set up, which have the in-house capacity to perform PCR testing for Ebola. [1,2] There is no evidence that Guinea has the in-country capacity to perform PCR testing for anthrax, neither from the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, from Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [3,4,5,6,7]

- [1] Granier H, Carmoi T, Savini H, Sagui E, Aletti M, Cordier PY, Cotte J, Maugey N, Rousseau C, Janvier F, Fois-Saud V, Dampierre H. 2015. "Epidemic of Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea. Set up of a treatment centre for healthcare professionals in Conakry (Épidémie ` virus Ebola en Guinée. Mise en &oeil;uvre SSA d'un Centre de traitement des soignants ` Conakry)". [<http://www.academie-medecine.fr/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1015-1016.pdf>]. Bulletin Académie Nationale de Médecine, 199
- [6] : 1015-1016; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] Gaüzère BA, Ouellet I, Nottebrock D, Nied JC, Beya-Kadiebwe B, Camara AK, Camara D, Camara MLM, Camara M, Soumah A, Tounkara MK, Monteil V, Camara A, Bauffe F, Camara A, Camara IB, Sissoko D, Simon B, Jaspard M, Tran-Minh T, L'Hériteau F. 2016. "Activity results of the Ebola treatment centre in Forécariah (Guinea) from the 23rd of April to the 5th of

June 2015: analysis and reflections (Bilan d'activité du centre de traitement Ebola de Forécariah (Guinée) du 23 avril au 5 juin 2015 : analyse et réflexions)". [<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13149-016-0504-3>]. Bulletin de la Société de pathologie exotique 109

[4] : 272-280; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Research Structures (Structures de recherche)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/structures-de-recherches/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[7] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). 2018. "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a requirement for biosecurity training, using a standardised, required approach, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens or materials with pandemic potential. There is evidence, however, according to a study conducted in 2016/2017 that meant to build capacity of 120 laboratory professionals in bio risk, that efforts have been made to train healthcare workers and there are significant benefits to the training since healthcare workers report that with the new skills they have improved their biosecurity procedure and biomedical sample management. [1] Guinea through its Biosecurity and Biosafety Association (Association Guineene de Biosurete et de Biosecurite), joined the International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) in December 2018, where they are promoting good biological and clinical practices, strengthening technical expertise in biosafety and biosafety in laboratories and research institutions, supporting the network of laboratories and research institutions to strengthen the surveillance and early detection of risk systems, among others, which is further evidence that efforts are being made to strengthen capacity, however not yet is there a standardized, required approach. [2,3] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing the issue of biosecurity, and that one of the highest priority recommendations by the WHO on that topic is to instate as soon as possible a standardised biosecurity training for laboratory personnel. Biosecurity training of the "necessary laboratory personnel" (although what personnel is defined as requiring this training is not specified) is offered by the National Institute of Public Health, but there is no evidence of a legal or regulatory requirement for this training for all personnel dealing with dangerous pathogens. [4] There is no evidence from the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, or Research, that any such legislation has been developed, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [5,6,7,8] Guinea has not submitted any

Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and there is no evidence that Guinea has in place a requirement for biosecurity training on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [9,10]

- [1] Barry, Alpha Mahmoud, Natasha G., Fares K., Lamine K., Aboubacar S. October 2018. "Capacity building through training of 120 laboratory professionals in Bio risk (biosecurity and biosafety) and bio threat risk reduction in Guinea Conakry 2016-2017". University of Gamma. [<https://www.imedpub.com/proceedings/capacity-building-through-training-of-120-laboratory-professionals-in-bio-risk-biosecurity-and-biosafety-and-bio-threat--5081.html>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [2] International Federation of Biosafety Associations. December 2018. "IFBA Welcomes new Members from Greece, Guinea, and Mongolia". [<https://internationalbiosafety.org/ifba-welcomes-new-members-from-greece-guinea-and-mongolia/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [3] Consuloan. "Nos Objectifs". [<http://www.aguibios.org/main.php?Objectifs/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [8] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [9] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [10] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). 2018. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of any regulations or licensing conditions in Guinea specifying that personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens or biological materials with pandemic potential must be subjected to any drug testing, background checks, or psychological or mental fitness checks. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing any issue around biosecurity. [1] There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, that any such legislation, regulations, or licensing conditions, have been developed, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [2,3,4,5] The Verification

Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) BWC legislation database compiling national legislation does not cite any biosecurity legislation or licensing conditions for Guinea. [6] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [7] There is evidence that laboratories provide internally safe and secure environments but no broader regulations seem to be in place. [8]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [6] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [7] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [8] Pasteur Institute of Guinea (Institut Pasteur de Guinée). October 2018. "The inauguration of the first Pasteur Institute of Guinea laboratory in Conakry" (L'institut Pasteur de Guinée inaugure son premier laboratoire à Conakry). [<https://www.pasteur.fr/fr/institut-pasteur/institut-pasteur-monde/actualites/institut-pasteur-guinee-inaugure-son-premier-laboratoire-conakry>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances of Category A or Category B. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing the issue of biosecurity or biosafety. However, there are trainings and certificates available for healthcare professionals who are required to send biological samples securely. [1] There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, that any such legislation or regulations have been developed, including for the secure transport of infectious materials of any categories, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [2,3,4,5] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) BWC legislation database compiling national legislation does not cite any biosecurity legislation for Guinea. [6] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [7]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [6] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [7] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place national regulations to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens. No new or updated evidence was found since last year's research. There is no evidence according to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, that any such legislation or regulations have been developed, including for the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [1,2,3,4,5] The Ministry of Defence does not appear to have a website. [6] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) BWC legislation database compiling national legislation does not cite any biosecurity legislation for Guinea. [7] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [8]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] GoAfricaOnline. "Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense)". [<https://www.goafricaonline.com/gn/78756-ministere-presidence-charge-defense-conakry-guinee>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). 2018. "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[8] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. 2018. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a

Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place legislation or regulations relating to biosafety. There is evidence, however, according to a study conducted in 2016/2017 that meant to build capacity of 120 laboratory professionals in bio risk, that efforts have been made to increase Guinea's capacity to prevent accidents that involve harmful biological substances. The study trained healthcare workers in biosecurity procedure and biomedical sample management and it was found that further training had a significant advantages in their ability to manage these substances, however there was no mention of a law or regulation in place. [1] Guinea through its Biosecurity and Biosafety Association (Association Guineene de Biosurete et de Biosecurite), joined the International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) in December 2018, where they are promoting good biological and clinical practices, strengthening technical expertise in biosafety and biosafety in laboratories and research institutions, supporting the network of laboratories and research institutions to strengthen the surveillance and early detection of risk systems, among others, which is further evidence that efforts are being made to strengthen capacity, however there is also no mention of a law or regulation in place to prevent accidents having to do with harmful biological substances. [2,3] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing the issue of biosafety. [4] There is no evidence from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, that any such legislation has been developed, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [5,6,7,8] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) BWC legislation database compiling national legislation does not cite any biosafety legislation for Guinea. [9] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [10]

[1] Barry, Alpha Mahmoud, Natasha G., Fares K., Lamine K., Aboubacar S. October 2018. "Capacity building through training of 120 laboratory professionals in Bio risk (biosecurity and biosafety) and bio threat risk reduction in Guinea Conakry 2016-2017". University of Gamma. [<https://www.imedpub.com/proceedings/capacity-building-through-training-of-120-laboratory-professionals-in-bio-risk-biosecurity-and-biosafety-and-bio-threat--5081.html>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] International Federation of Biosafety Associations. December 2018. "IFBA Welcomes new Members from Greece, Guinea, and Mongolia". [<https://internationalbiosafety.org/ifba-welcomes-new-members-from-greece-guinea-and-mongolia/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Consuloan. "Nos Objectifs". [<http://www.aguibios.org/main.php?Objectifs/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

- [4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [8] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [9] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [10] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.4.1b

Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has laws relating to biosafety, and as such does not have a body responsible for implementing such laws. Guinea does have a Biosecurity and Biosafety Association (Association Guineene de Biosurete et de Biosecure) and joined the International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) in December 2018, where they are promoting good biological and clinical practices, strengthening technical expertise in biosafety and biosafety in laboratories and research institutions, supporting the network of laboratories and research institutions to strengthen the surveillance and early detection of risk systems, among others. However, neither association show evidence of enforcing a national level law relating to biosafety. [1,2] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing the issue of biosafety. [3] There is no evidence as of December 2018 from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, that any such legislation has been developed, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [4,5,6,7] The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) BWC legislation database compiling national legislation does not cite any biosafety legislation for Guinea. [8] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [9]

- [1] International Federation of Biosafety Associations. December 2018. "IFBA Welcomes new Members from Greece, Guinea, and Mongolia". [<https://internationalbiosafety.org/ifba-welcomes-new-members-from-greece-guinea-and-mongolia/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] Consulao. "Nos Objectifs". [<http://www.aguibios.org/main.php?Objectifs/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August

2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[7] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[9] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports".

[<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a requirement for biosafety training, using a standardised, required approach, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens or materials with pandemic potential. There is evidence, however, according to a study conducted in 2016/2017 that meant to build capacity of 120 laboratory professionals in bio risk, that efforts have been made to train healthcare workers. Results showed that there were significant benefits to the training since healthcare workers reported that with the new skills they improved their biosecurity procedure and biomedical sample management. [1] Guinea also through its Biosecurity and Biosafety Association (Association Guineene de Biosurete et de Biosecurete), joined the International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) in December 2018, where they are promoting good biological and clinical practices, strengthening technical expertise in biosafety and biosafety in laboratories and research institutions, supporting the network of laboratories and research institutions to strengthen the surveillance and early detection of risk systems, among others, which is further evidence that efforts are being made to strengthen biosafety capacity, however there is no mention of standardized approaches or train-the-training practices. [2,3] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, specifically states that as of April 2017, Guinea had no legislative or regulatory framework addressing the issue of biosafety, and that one of the highest priority recommendations by the WHO on that topic is to instate as soon as possible a standardised training for laboratory personnel. Biosafety training of the "necessary laboratory personnel" (although what personnel is defined as requiring this training is not specified) is offered by the National Institute of Public Health, but there is no evidence of a legal or regulatory requirement for this training for all personnel dealing with dangerous pathogens. [4] There is no evidence as of December 2018 from the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, or Research, that any such legislation has been developed, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [5,6,7,8] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and there is no evidence that Guinea has in place a requirement for biosafety training on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [9,10]

- [1] Barry, Alpha Mahmoud, Natasha G., Fares K., Lamine K., Aboubacar S. October 2018. "Capacity building through training of 120 laboratory professionals in Bio risk (biosecurity and biosafety) and bio threat risk reduction in Guinea Conakry 2016-2017". University of Gamma. [<https://www.imedpub.com/proceedings/capacity-building-through-training-of-120-laboratory-professionals-in-bio-risk-biosecurity-and-biosafety-and-bio-threat--5081.html>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] International Federation of Biosafety Associations. December 2018. "IFBA Welcomes new Members from Greece, Guinea, and Mongolia". [<https://internationalbiosafety.org/ifba-welcomes-new-members-from-greece-guinea-and-mongolia/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] Consuloan. "Nos Objectifs". [<http://www.aguibios.org/main.php?Objectifs/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [8] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [9] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020;
- [10] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is taking place involving especially dangerous pathogens. There is no information concerning this in the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, nor from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research. [1,2,3,4] The Ministry of Defence does not appear to have a website. [5] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and there is no evidence that Guinea has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is taking place involving especially dangerous pathogens on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [6,7]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [5] GoAfricaOnline. "Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense)". [<https://www.goafricaonline.com/gn/78756-ministere-presidence-charge-defense-conakry-guinee>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [6] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a national policy establishing that oversight of dual use research or research with especially dangerous pathogens is required. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture make no mention of such a policy, and neither does the Ministry of Research. [1,2,3] The Ministry of Defence does not appear to have a website. [4] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [5] There is also no evidence of a policy according to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017. [6] And there is no evidence that Guinea has in place a national policy establishing that oversight of dual use research or research with especially dangerous pathogens is required on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [7]

- [1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Research Structures (Structures de recherche)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/structures-de-recherches/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [4] GoAfricaOnline. "Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense)". [<https://www.goafricaonline.com/gn/78756-ministere-presidence-charge-defense-conakry-guinee>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [5] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [6] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales

capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[7] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database".

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.5.1c

Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a national policy requiring oversight of dual use research or research with especially dangerous pathogens, and there is no evidence of an agency responsible for oversight of such research. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture make no mention of such a policy or an agency responsible for enforcing it. [1,2] When searching on the Ministry of Research page, it indicates that no accessibility rights to documents with regards to pathogens. [3] The Ministry of Defence does not appear to have a website. [4] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and there is no evidence that Guinea has in place a national policy requiring oversight of dual use research or research with especially dangerous pathogens on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [5,6]

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Research Structures (Structures de recherche)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/structures-de-recherches/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[4] GoAfricaOnline. "Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense)". [<https://www.goafricaonline.com/gn/78756-ministere-presidence-charge-defense-conakry-guinee>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[5] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[6] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place any national legislations, regulations, or provisions that require the screening of synthesised DNA before it is sold. No new or updated evidence is available since last year's research. Neither the Guinean Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research make any mention of such legislation or any provisions imposing the screening of synthesised DNA prior to selling. [1,2,3] The Guinean Ministry of Defence website is not accessible as of December 2018. [4] The National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS) also makes no mention of rules or regulations on screening synthesised DNA. [5] The Ministry of Transport does not appear to have a website. [6] Guinea has not submitted any Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention and there is no evidence that Guinea has in place a national legislations, regulations, or provisions that require screening of synthesised DNA before it is sold on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [7,8]

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Research Structures (Structures de recherche)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/structures-de-recherches/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense). "Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense)". [<http://www.defense.gov.gn/>];18; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[6] GoAfricaOnline. "State Ministry of Transport (Ministère d'Etat des Transports)". [<https://www.goafricaonline.com/gn/28305-ministere-etat-transports-conakry-guinee>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[7] BWC Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Guinea - Available Confidence Building Measures Reports". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/guinea>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). "BWC Legislation Database". [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/g/>]; Accessed 31 August 2020.

1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

World Health Organization

1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Guinea's national laboratory system does not have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, explains that the public health system is organized in three levels in Guinea: peripheral (health center laboratories), regional (prefectural and municipal hospitals and hospitals regional) and central (national reference laboratories). It goes on to say that "at the peripheral level, laboratories are able to conduct diagnostic tests for HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, cholera, and Ebola. At the prefectural and municipal level, laboratories are able to perform molecular biology techniques to detect the Ebola virus in addition to the tests carried out at the peripheral level. At the regional level, laboratories are able to carry out molecular biology techniques for HIV and Ebola virus disease. At the central level, the National Reference Laboratories are able to carry out the techniques to detect measles / rubella, Ebola, yellow fever, Lassa, dengue, Crimea Congo, cholera, meningitis, shigellosis and tuberculosis". This shows that Guinea's laboratory system has the capacity to perform essential tests for important diseases, but the tests do not cover at least five of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. [1] The WHO's JEE Tool for International Health Regulations (IHR) states that Guinea only scores a 3 on the question of laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases (Question D.1.1), which corresponds to the country being able to test for 3-4 core diseases defined by the WHO. [2] More recently, and following the Ebola crisis, which has scarred the nation, quite a few studies have been conducted for rapid diagnostic testing on Ebola to detect new Ebola cases. [3,4] The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirms that Guinean laboratories "have the capacity to test for most priority diseases" suggesting that they do not have the capacity to test for all. They also do not give any details as to which diseases the laboratories have the capacity to test. [5] There is no additional or updated information from the Ministries of Health or Research, and Guinea has not completed or published a World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last 5 years: the last published OIE PVS was published in 2007. Guinea last published an OIE PVS Gap Analysis report in September 2012, and has not published one since. [6,7,8,9,10,11]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] WHO. 2005. "Joint External Evaluation (International Health Regulations)". [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204368/9789241510172_eng.pdf?sequence=1]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] Jean Louis, F., Huang, J. Y., Nebie, Y. K., Koivogui, L., Jayaraman, G., Abiola, N., Vansteelandt, A., Worrel, M. C., Shang, J., Murphy, L. B., Fitter, D. L., Marston, B. J., & Martel, L. (2017). "Implementation of broad screening with Ebola rapid diagnostic tests in Forécariah, Guinea". *African journal of laboratory medicine*, 6[1] , 484. [<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5523918/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. August 2018. "Expanding the Ebola Control Tool Box: A New Rapid Diagnostic Test in Guinea". [<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/stories/test-guinea.html>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "Global Health - Guinea". [<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/countries/guinea/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Research Structures (Structures de recherche)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/structures-de-recherches/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [8] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). May 2007. "Performance, vision, and strategy: a tool for the governance of veterinary services". [http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Support_to_OIE_Members/docs/pdf/FinalReport-Guinea.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [9] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "PVS Evaluation missions". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/status-of-missions/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [10] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). September 2012. "PVS Gap Analysis report (Analyse des Ecart PVS - Rapport)". [http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Support_to_OIE_Members/docs/pdf/PVS_GapAnalysisReport-Guinea.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [11] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "PVS Gap Analysis missions". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-gap-analysis/status-of-missions/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

This is no evidence of a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. According to the Ministry of Health website, the first international forum for sustainable financing of Guineane Health Security took place in January 2020. The Minister of Health shared his expectations of his department with regard to the establishment of the alliance for health security in Guinea. He continued by saying "that it is essential to set up a lasting system of mobilization of resources, especially endogenous, to ensure and maintain an optimal level of preparation and responses to future epidemics". He also shared his action plan, which will be structured around three priority areas: advocacy, mobilization of

resources and sharing values. He asked that various actors also put in place strategies and financing mechanisms in favor of the alliance for health security in Guinea. Although this shows Guinea's commitment to wanting to improve its health system capacity, no action plan is yet available to the public and no mention of testing during a public health emergency was made.

[1] No other plan or strategy is available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Guinea's Public Health Institute. [2,3,4]

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministere de la Sante). January 2020. "The first international forum for sustainable financing of Guinea's health security (Le 1er forum international pour le financement durable de la securite sanitaire en Guinee)". [<https://sante.gov.gn/le-1er-forum-international-pour-le-financement-durable-de-la-securite-sanitaire-en-guinee/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] National Public Health Institute (Insitut National de Sante Publique). [<http://www.insp-guinee.org/home/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea's national laboratory system is accredited. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, notes that Guinea has three national laboratories that serve as reference facilities for the country (although these laboratories were not specifically named in the report), and all three of these are accredited according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) standards, with ISO 1189 accreditation. [1] In November 2019, the Merieux Foundation (Fondation Merieux) further confirmed that through the support from one of their projects called Quality Initiative (Initiative Qualite), three Guinean laboratories were able to get accredited. [2] There is no further information about these accreditations from the Ministries of Health or Research, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Merieux Foundation (Fondation Merieux). November 2019. "New training course on laboratory quality management in Guinea as part of the LABOGUI project" (Nouvelle formation sur le management de la qualite des laboratoires en Guinee dans le cadre du projet LABOGUI). [<https://www.fondation-merieux.org/actualites/nouvelle-formation-sur-le-management-de-la-qualite-des-laboratoires-en-guinee-dans-le-cadre-du-projet-labogui/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Research Structures (Structures de recherche)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/structures-de-recherches/>];

Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has a national laboratory system that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance reviews. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, states that the National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique or LNSP) is the national reference centre for all public health tests, and is since 2002 subject to external quality assurance tests. The quality assurance tests to which the LNSP is submitted are regulated and standardised by the National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) based in Johannesburg, and aim to increase laboratory quality and performance for enteric and meningial disease laboratories. [1]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a

Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a nationwide specimen transport system. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, Guinea has in place a good transport system for biological samples obtained during surveillance activities from the districts to the national reference centres, and all stakeholders involved in the transport mechanism have demonstrated a good understanding of the system. However, this system is not yet functional throughout the country: it is rather a network of transport systems, that the WHO recommend Guinea should harmonise. [1] The WHO's JEE Tool for International Health Regulations (IHR) states that Guinea only scores a 3 on the question of specimen referral and transport system (Question D.1.2), which corresponds to a system being in place to transport specimens to national laboratories from 50-80% of districts within the country for advanced diagnostics. [2] A study conducted in January 2020 designed and piloted a specimen transport system in Burkina Faso, and makes reference to Guinea working on "establishing a specimen referral and transport system following the West Africa Ebola virus disease outbreak, and they have documented the importance of collaborating closely with the Ministry of Health and conducting a baseline assessment to inform system design". [3] There is no information from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research, about the specimen transport system, nor from the National Agency

for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [4,5,6,7]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] WHO. 2005. "Joint External Evaluation (International Health Regulations)". [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204368/9789241510172_eng.pdf?sequence=1]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] Dama, Emilie, Abdoulaye N., Kameko N., Brice Wilfried B., Souleymane P., Rebecca Greco K., Zekiba T., Assana C., Irene N., Aime A., Isaie M., Flavien A., and Sara A. M. January 2020. "Designing and Piloting a Speciment Transport System in Burkina Faso". Health Security. [<https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/hs.2019.0068>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Texts and Laws (Textes et lois)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [7] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a

Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. A study conducted in April 2019 uses Ebola as an example to describe how important "rapid and reliable laboratory testing for diagnosis of suspected Ebola cases or of EBOV-infected persons is central to controlling the disease and serves multiple purposes, including differential diagnosis of cases and triage of patients into care, initiation of contact tracing and safe discharge of EBOV-negative patients to their home communities". The study continue to explain that the World Health Organization "initially organized laboratory response activities" to support Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone due to weak health system infrastructure. There were a number of challenges with the activities, such as "the lack of approved diagnostic tools adapted to such a large-scale outbreak; a shortage of skilled personnel; limited biosafety knowledge by local staff, inadequate supply chain management to provide for universal use of personal protective equipment; and weak national laboratory systems that could not support the rollout of standardized methods and mechanisms for safe collection, transport, and testing of specimens from persons suspected to have Ebola". [1] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, explains that Guinea has a multi-risk contingency plan, which was updated in 2016 and that since the Ebola crisis, there are contingency plans that have been developed but they are not updated regularly. In preparation of a public health emergency, the report also states that health personnel are trained in all levels of the health system and that logistics equipment is positioned in response centers and in prefectural hospitals. During the beginning of the year as well, a platform for coordinating simulation exercises has been developed for multidisciplinary national and regional rapid response

organizations, which occur every three months. There is also a multisectoral health emergency response management committee that includes the Ministries of Interior, Livestock, Agriculture and the Environment. The report also states that Guinea plans to develop a national multi-risk emergency preparedness and response public health plan in collaboration with other sectors. [2] Although, much has been organized to be better prepared for a public health emergency, no evidence of a recent plan - the last one available to the public which was developed by the Humanitarian Coordination Team (HCT) seems to be one that was developed in 2012. [3] No other plan or strategy is available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Guinea's Public Health Institute. [4,5,6]

[1] Sealy TK, Erickson BR, Taboy CH, et al. April 2016. "Laboratory Response to Ebola — West Africa and United States". MMWR Suppl 2016;65(Suppl-3):44-49. [<https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/su/su6503a7.htm>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Humanitarian Coordination Team (HCT) (La Communauté Humanitaire). 2012. "Multirisk Contingency Plan (Plan de Contingence Multirisque de la Guinée)".

[https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Guinea/files/Guinee_CP_Plan_de_Contingence_2012_FR.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] National Public Health Institute (Insitut National de Sante Publique). [<http://www.insp-guinee.org/home/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea performs event-based surveillance (EBS) for infectious diseases, or that the country has an EBS unit. There is no evidence from the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, nor from the Ministries of Health or Agriculture, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS) that an EBS unit exists or that the country performs EBS. [1,2,3,4] There is evidence that international organizations have implemented event-based surveillance activities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and International Organization for Migration, however no evidence suggest that these activities were initiated or led by the Guinean government. [5]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/fr/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [4] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.
- [5] International Organization for Migration. July 2016. "IOM Guinea Launches Community Event-Based Surveillance Activities in Forest Region". [<https://www.iom.int/news/iom-guinea-launches-community-event-based-surveillance-activities-forest-region>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Guinea has reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the World Health Organisation (WHO) within the last two years.

On 14 February 2021, the Ministry of Health (MoH) of Guinea informed WHO of a cluster of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) cases in the sub-prefecture of Gouécké, Nzérékoré Region, Guinea between 18 January and 13 February 2021. The cases showed symptoms of diarrhea, vomiting and bleeding after attending the burial of another relative (a 51 year-old nurse) on 1 February 2021. [1]

- [1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Ebola virus disease – Guinea". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/17-february-2021-ebola-gin/en/>]; Accessed 3 June 2021.

2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has in place an electronic reporting surveillance system at the national and sub-national levels. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the electronic reporting system, Digital Health Information System 2 (DHIS2), was being implemented at the national and sub-national levels when the JEE was conducted. [1] The trial phase for DHIS2 in Guinea ended in October 2017, and was thereafter rolled out to all health centres. [2, 3] The Disease Surveillance System in DHIS 2 includes reporting facilities for aggregated reports of cases of cholera, meningitis, yellow fever, measles, tetanus, polio, malaria, shigellosis, influenza, maternal/neonatal deaths, and viral haemorrhagic fevers. In addition, the platform enabled Guinean health centres to report

maternal deaths, and individual case notification and laboratory results to DHIS2 users, including government health officials and the WHO. [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] RTI International. 4-6 December 2017. "Implementing DHIS 2 as the National Disease Surveillance Database in Guinea: Results and Lessons Learned from the Pilot Phase (June-October 2017)".

[https://www.globaldigitalhealthnetwork.org/sites/mhealthwg.org/files/eileen_reynolds_-_11336_guinea_gdhf_reynoldse_poster_v3_resized.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "Ministry of Health: Towards the extension of DHIS1 (Ministère de la Santé : vers l'extension du DHIS2)". [<https://anss-guinee.org/?p=1777>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

The electronic reporting system in Guinea does not yet collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the Digital Health Information System 2 (DHIS2) rolled out in Guinea since 2015 can collect laboratory data, but cannot collect real-time laboratory data. [1] While the capacity to collect laboratory data is confirmed, there is no evidence from RTI International, the implementing partner for DHIS2 in Guinea, nor from the Guinean Ministry of Health or the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS), that the DHIS2 system implemented in Guinea can collect real-time laboratory data. [2,3]

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Guinean healthcare system has in place electronic health records. No new or updated evidence was found since last year's research. There is no mention of the existence of such a system from the Ministry of Health, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [1, 2] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, also makes no mention of electronic health records in place. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.1b

Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Guinean healthcare system has in place electronic health records. There is no mention of the existence of such a system from the Ministry of Health, nor from the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [1,2] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, also makes no mention of electronic health records in place. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.1c

Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has implemented data standards to ensure that health data are comparable. There is no mention of such standards in the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, nor by the Ministry of Health or the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [1, 2, 3] The National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement

Sanitaire 2015-2024) developed by the Ministry of Health for the period covering 2015-2024 makes no mention of current data standards in place, nor of any intention to implement data standards within the defined period. [4] And the Global Legal Group website, which compiles a country's data protection laws and regulations, there are no data standards or regulations listed for Guinea. [5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. "Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide".

[https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-Data-Protection-Laws.aspx]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)".

[http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/country_docs/Guinea/plan_national_developpement_sanitaire_2015-2024_guinee_fin.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] Global Legal Group. June 2020. "Guinea: Data Protection Laws and Regulations 2020". [<https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/guinea>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a

Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has in place a mechanism to share data across relevant ministries responsible for human, animal, and wildlife surveillance data. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the country's Technical Surveillance Group (Groupe Technique de Surveillance or GTT), including members of the animal and human health governmental departments (though which departments specifically is not specified), meets weekly to discuss and interpret all surveillance data from human, animal, and wildlife disease surveillance. The Guinean Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) is responsible for defining if the data collated by the GTT requires a response as for a potential epidemic, and for coordinating that response if necessary. [1] There is no information from the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [2,3] No new or updated evidence could be found since last year's research.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Guinea does not make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available on a weekly basis, at minimum, via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar). Since the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in Guinea, there have been periodic updates on the Ministry of Health Facebook page. These updates have been provided as frequently as weekly but have also had spans of over a month with no information. [1] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, states that Guinea has in place a surveillance technical group (groupe technique de surveillance or GTT), which comprises surveillance specialists from all areas of health surveillance including surveillance for zoonoses, which meets weekly to validate and interpret surveillance and laboratory data, although no further details are available as to what kinds of data, gathered by all groups in the previous week. [2] The GTT then publishes a weekly epidemiological bulletin with a summary of all de-identified disease information, and makes these reports available to all health partners in the country (including NGOs and private healthcare providers), and international partners. [3] Recent evidence of the GTT bulletin was not found, however. No further information is available on the Ministry of Health or Agriculture websites. [4,5]

[1] Facebook. Ministry of Health - Facebook (Ministere de la Sante - Facebook). [<https://www.facebook.com/SanteGN/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Évaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin of Guinea (Bulletin épidémiologique hebdomadaire de la Guinée)". [https://anss-guinee.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Bulletin_Epi_SIMR_Guin%C3%A9_S20-2018.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

No evidence was found in Guinea of de-identified health surveillance data on COVID-19 made publicly available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar). Since the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in Guinea, there have been periodic updates on the Ministry of Health Facebook page but they are not shared at a regular frequency and are not daily reports. [1] No daily reports with regards to COVID-19 were found on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Guinea's Public Health Institute. [2,3,4]

[1] Facebook. Ministry of Health - Facebook (Ministere de la Sante - Facebook). [<https://www.facebook.com/SanteGN/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/fr/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] National Public Health Institute (Insitut National de Sante Publique). [<http://www.insp-guinee.org/home/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place any legislation to safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for health data. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, makes no mention of any provisions for confidentiality. [1] The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) states that Guinea does not as of 2018 have any legislation to safeguard privacy and data protection. [2] The Ministry of Health makes no mention of such a strategy, and neither does the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS). [3,4] No new or updated evidence was found since last year's research.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. "Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide".

[https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-Data-Protection-Laws.aspx]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire). "ANSS". [<https://anss-guinee.org/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.4b

Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place any legislation to safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for health data, or any legislation providing safeguards against cyberattacks. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, makes no mention of any provisions for confidentiality. [1] The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) states that Guinea does not as of 2018 have any legislation to safeguard privacy and data protection, nor any cybersecurity laws. [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 1 April 2018. "Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide". [https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-Legislation/eCom-Data-Protection-Laws.aspx]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a

Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Guinean government has made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, makes no mention of any such commitment. [1] There is no evidence of such a commitment from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Research either. [2,3,4] Guinea has not completed or published a World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last 5 years: the last published OIE PVS was published in 2007. Guinea last published an OIE PVS Gap Analysis report in September 2012, and has not published one since. [5,6,7,8]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle :

agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique). "Research Structures (Structures de recherche)". [<http://www.mesrs.gov.gn/structures-de-recherches/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). May 2007. "Performance, vision, and strategy: a tool for the governance of veterinary services". [http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Support_to_OIE_Members/docs/pdf/FinalReport-Guinea.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "PVS Evaluation missions". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/status-of-missions/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[7] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). September 2012. "PVS Gap Analysis report (Analyse des Ecarts PVS - Rapport)". [http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Support_to_OIE_Members/docs/pdf/PVS_GapAnalysisReport-Guinea.pdf]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[8] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "PVS Gap Analysis missions". [<http://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-gap-analysis/status-of-missions/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency. Most recently, in response to a current Ebola outbreak, contract tracing efforts have been made to track down people who may have been in contact with Ebola patients, but it is not clear how the national government supports sub-national systems. [1] Previous to this, a study was conducted to test whether mobile technology used for contact tracing could allow for rapid health data collection and analysis. Findings concluded that a digital health information system could indeed support efforts such as contact tracing, however Guinea does not have a well established system in place to provide such opportunities, despite there being interest in such a system. The article also mentions that contract tracing efforts were made in response to the Ebola outbreak of 2014, although without a proper system in place, they were insufficient. [2] There is also evidence that contract tracing was initiated in response to COVID-19 spread, however, no evidence exists that the contact tracing efforts are made to prepare for future public health emergencies in any of the cases mentioned here. [3] No further mention of a national contact tracing system that could provide support at the sub-national level is available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Guinea's Public Health Institute. [4,5,6]

[1] Aljazeera. February 2021. "Guinea races to trace contacts with Ebola deaths".

[<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/15/guinea-says-tracking-down-contacts-of-ebola-victims>]. Accessed 20 March 2021.

[2] Sacks JA, Zehe E, Redick C, Bah A, Cowger K, Camara M, et al. December 2015. "Introduction of mobile health tools to support Ebola surveillance and contact tracing in Guinea". [<https://www.ghspjournal.org/content/3/4/646>]. Accessed 20

March 2021.

[3] Nature. July 2020. "Ebola prepared these countries for coronavirus - but now even they are floundering".

[https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02173-z]. Accessed 20 March 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [http://sante.gov.gn/fr/#]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[6] National Public Health Institute (Insitut National de Sante Publique). [http://www.insp-guinee.org/home/]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

No evidence was found that Guinea provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention. No mention of wraparound services is mentioned on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Guinea's Public Health Institute. [1,2,3] No other evidence of any wraparound services was available through a general media search.

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [http://sante.gov.gn/fr/#]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] National Public Health Institute (Insitut National de Sante Publique). [http://www.insp-guinee.org/home/]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

No evidence was found in Guinea of de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar). Since the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in Guinea, there have been periodic updates on the Ministry of Health Facebook page but they are not shared at a regular frequency and do not include data on contract tracing.

[1] No other daily reports on COVID-19 contract tracing data were found on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Guinea's Public Health Institute. [2,3,4]

[1] Facebook. Ministry of Health - Facebook (Ministere de la Sante - Facebook). [https://www.facebook.com/SanteGN/]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). "Health Policy (Politique Santé)". [<http://sante.gov.gn/fr/#>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l'Agriculture). "Sector presentation: Agriculture (Présentation sectorielle : agriculture)". [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/agriculture>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

[4] National Public Health Institute (Insitut National de Sante Publique). [<http://www.insp-guinee.org/home/>]; Accessed 30 August 2020.

2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency. Although Guinea airport authorities are actively monitoring arrivals and suspected cases in collaboration with the public health system during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is no evidence that there is a join plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities or that land borders are also being monitored. [1] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, or the facebook pages of the Ministry of the Interior or Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2,3,4,5] The Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs do not have websites.

[1] Diarra, Atouma. 17 March 2020 "Coronavirus: Guinea capitalizes on its experience of the Ebola epidemic." ("Coronavirus : la Guinée capitalise sur son expérience de l'épidémie d'Ebola.") Le Monde Afrique.

[https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/03/17/coronavirus-la-guinee-capitalise-sur-son-experience-de-l-epidemie-d-ebola_6033432_3212.html] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of the Interior Facebook Page. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Foreign Affairs Facebook page. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/MAEGEGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country

- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) available in country, but there is no evidence that resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP). In 2017, the first FETP training was held in Guinea for 25 health professionals. [1] In 2019, Guinea began the first FETP-intermediate cohort in Africa to be taught in French. [2] The FETP training is overseen by the National Health Security Agency (ANSS). [3] There is no evidence that the government provides resources to send its citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs.

[1] U.S. Embassy in Guinea. 2020. "Success of the first FETP field epidemiology cohort in Guinea."

[<https://gn.usembassy.gov/fr/succes-de-la-premiere-cohorte-depidemiologie-de-terrain-fetp-en-guinee/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] US Center for Disease Control. 2019. "Global Health-Guinea."

[<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/countries/guinea/default.htm>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is publically available evidence of available field epidemiology training programs(FETP) explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV) in Guinea. In 2018, the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations) and the Institute for Infectious Animal Diseases (IIAD) at Texas A&M AgriLife Research launched the In-Service Applied Veterinary Epidemiology (ISAVET) program in 14 countries, including Guinea. [1,2] The program is a four-month frontline field epidemiology program to train veterinary field epidemiologists, and training occurred in Guinea under this program in 2019. [3,4] There is no additional information on the websites of the Guinea National Health Security Agency, Ministry of Health, or Ministry of Animal Resources. [5,6,7]. The Africa FETP network (AFENET), the international network (TEPHINET (Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network)), and CDC (Centre for Disease Control and Prevention) have no further information. [8,9,10]

[1] Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations. October 2018. "New training for veterinarians in 14 African countries to help combat infectious diseases." [<http://www.fao.org/emergencies/fao-in-action/stories/stories-detail/en/c/1161401>]. Accessed 2 September 2020.

[2] Institute for Infectious Animal Diseases. "Frontline ISAVET." [<https://iiad.tamu.edu/frontline-isavet/>]. Accessed 2 September 2020.

[3] Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations. October 2019. "First FAO In-Service Applied Veterinary Epidemiology (ISAVET) training programme held in Uganda." [<http://www.fao.org/resilience/news-events/detail/en/c/1171750>]. Accessed 2 September 2020.

[4] Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations: Animal Production and Health. 15 March 2019. "An

assessment of the veterinary epidemiology capacity and training needs in Guinea."

[http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/news_150319.html] Accessed 2 September 2020.

[5] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Guinea Ministry of Livestock and Animal Productions. [<https://www.facebook.com/Minist%C3%A8re-de-lElevage-et-des-Productions-Animales-Guin%C3%A9e-1533480233581451/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] AFENET (Africa FETP network). 2020. [<http://afenet.net/index.php/countries/guinea-conakry>]

[9] TEPHINET (Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network). 2020. [<https://www.tephinet.org/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[10] US Center for Disease Control (CDC). 2019. "Global Health-Guinea."

[<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/countries/guinea/default.htm>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a

Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted in 2017, Guinea has a multi-risk contingency plan which

only incorporates avian influenza that was updated in 2016. [1] This plan is not publicly available. The JEE report indicates that Guinea has in place a plan to address several infectious diseases with pandemic potential, including Ebola and measles, as well as certain zoonoses (which are not explicitly listed), although there is no evidence that this plan is part of an overarching national public health emergency response plan. To the contrary, the JEE report recommends that Guinea create a national multi-risk plan as well as develop and test a national contingency plan for preparing and responding to emergencies in public health. [1] There is no publically available evidence that Guinea has already developed this plan. Guinea does have a multirisk contingency plan from 2012, which covers cholera, diarrheal diseases, measles, yellow fever, and meningitis, but it is not an overarching national public health emergency response plan. [2] There is no additional information on the websites of the Guinea National Health Security Agency or Ministry of Health. [3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Humanitarian Community (HCT). 2012. "Guinea Multirisk Contingency Plan." ("PLAN DE CONTINGENCE MULTIRISQUE DE LA GUINEE")

[https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Guinea/files/Guinee_CP_Plan_de_Contingence_2012_FR.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.1.1b

If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has an overarching national public health emergency response plan or that it has been updated within the past three years. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted in 2017, Guinea has an old contingency plan for epidemics, but it is not updated regularly. [1] This plan is not publically available. The JEE report indicates that Guinea has in place a plan to address several infectious diseases with pandemic potential, including Ebola and measles, as well as certain zoonoses (which are not explicitly listed), although there is no evidence that this plan is part of an overarching national public health emergency response plan. To the contrary, the JEE report recommends that Guinea create a national multi-risk plan for preparing and responding to public health emergencies. There is no publically available evidence that Guinea has already developed this plan. Guinea does have a multirisk contingency plan from 2012, which covers cholera, diarrheal diseases, measles, yellow fever, and meningitis, but it is not an overarching national public health emergency response plan. [2] There is no additional information on the websites of the Guinea National Health Security Agency or Ministry of Health. [3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Humanitarian Community (HCT). 2012. "Guinea Multirisk Contingency Plan." ("PLAN DE CONTINGENCE MULTIRISQUE DE LA GUINEE")

[https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Guinea/files/Guinee_CP_Plan_de_Contingence_2012_FR.pdf]

nce_2012_FR.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of Health. [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.1.1c

If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has an overarching national public health emergency response plan or that it includes considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted in 2017, Guinea has an old contingency plan for epidemics, but it is not updated regularly. [1] This plan is not publically available. The JEE report recommends that Guinea create a national multi-risk plan for preparing and responding to public health emergencies. There is no publically available evidence that Guinea has already developed this plan. Guinea does have a multirisk contingency plan from 2012, which covers cholera, diarrheal diseases, measles, yellow fever, and meningitis, but it is not an overarching national public health emergency response plan. [2] There is no additional information on the websites of the Guinea National Health Security Agency or Ministry of Health. [3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Humanitarian Community (HCT). 2012. "Guinea Multirisk Contingency Plan." ("PLAN DE CONTINGENCE MULTIRISQUE DE LA GUINEE")

[https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Guinea/files/Guinee_CP_Plan_de_Contingence_2012_FR.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of Health. [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.1.1d

Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a

Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. There is no evidence of such a mechanism from the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, the Guinea National Health Security Agency, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Higher-level Teaching and Scientific Research. [1, 2, 3, 4,5] The National Health Development Plan (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire) developed by the Ministry of Health for the period spanning 2015-2024, also makes no mention of such a mechanism. [6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of the Agriculture Facebook page. 2020. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Higher-level Teach and Scientific Research. 2019. [<https://www.mesrs.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)".

[http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/country_docs/Guinea/plan_national_developpement_sanitaire_2015-2024_guinee_fin.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease= 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic, with specific criteria outlined for when NPIs are implemented. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted in 2017, Guinea has a National Preparation and Action Plan for Public Health Emergencies, but it does not provide details of what it contains. [1] The plan is not publically available. Guinea also has a Guide for the Establishment And Operation Of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (Cou-Sp) In Health Districts. [2] However, this does not have information about NPIs during an epidemic

or pandemic. There is no additional information on the websites of the Guinea National Health Security Agency or Ministry of Health. [3,4] The National Health Development Plan developed by the Ministry of Health for the period spanning 2015-2024, also does not include information about such a plan. [5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Health Security Agency. 2017. "Guide for the Establishment And Operation Of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (Cou-Sp) In Health Districts" ("GUIDE DE MISE EN PLACE ET DU FONCTIONNEMENT DES CENTRES D'OPERATIONS D'URGENCE EN SANTE PUBLIQUE (COU-SP) DANS LES DISTRICTS SANITAIRES") [https://anss-guinee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GUIDE-TECHNIQUE-DU-COU-_VF.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)".

[http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/country_docs/Guinea/plan_national_developpement_sanitaire_2015-2024_guinee_fin.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year but there is evidence that it has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year. Guinea created a national emergency response plan in April 2020 for the COVID-19 pandemic, but this is focused on the financing of the emergency response, as opposed to outlining outbreak response measures. [1] There is no evidence that Guinea activated an already existing national emergency response plan. According to the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted in 2017, Guinea has a National Preparation and Action Plan for Public Health Emergencies, but it does not provide details of what it contains. [2] The plan is not publically available. According to the World Health Organization, Guinea last implement national-level biological threat-focused exercises in 2019. The goal of the exercise was to assess the readiness of PHEOCs in the WHO African Region to respond to a public health emergency, in this case Ebola. [3] There is no additional information on webpages for Guinea of the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Guinea National Health Security Agency, the official portal

of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Health, or Ministry of Agriculture. [4,5,6,7,8]

[1] Guinea Prime Minister's Office. April 2020. "Economic response plan to the COVID-19 health crisis." ("Plan de riposte économique à la crise sanitaire COVID-19") [http://mef.gov.gn/images/DOCS/Plan-de-riposte-economique-GN_exe.pdf.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] WHO. 2020. "Simulation Exercise." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organization Africa Region. 2020. "Guinea." [<https://www.afro.who.int/fr/countries/guinea>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Guinea Ministry of the Agriculture Facebook page. 2020. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has, in the past year, undergone an exercise to identify a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response of a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO) After Action Review calendar, Guinea has not completed an After Action Review. [1] There is no evidence that Guinea conducted such an exercise on the webpages for Guinea of the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Guinea National Health Security Agency, the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or Ministry of Higher-level Teaching and Scientific Research. [2,3,4,5,6,7]

[1] World Health Organization. 2020. "After Action Review." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organization Africa Region. 2020. "Guinea." [<https://www.afro.who.int/fr/countries/guinea>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea Ministry of the Agriculture Facebook page. 2020. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Guinea Ministry of Higher-level Teach and Scientific Research. 2019. [<https://www.mesrs.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August

2020.

3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year that has included private sector representatives. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Guinea last implement national-level biological threat-focused exercises in 2016. [1] There is no additional information on webpages for Guinea of the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Guinea National Health Security Agency, the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Health, or Ministry of Agriculture. [2,3,4,5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2020. "Simulation Exercise." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organization Africa Region. 2020. "Guinea." [<https://www.afro.who.int/fr/countries/guinea>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea Ministry of the Agriculture Facebook page. 2020. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, the Emergency Operations Center (or COU for its French acronym) was created in 2016 and was mandated by the same law that created the National Health Security Agency (ANSS), the Presidential Decree D/2016/205/PRG/SGG of the 4th of July 2016. [1] Both the EOC and the ANSS are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. This JEE found that the EOC has a solid capacity for mounting a rapid response to a public health crisis, which has been tested and found operational and satisfactory during the measles epidemic in Guinea in 2016-2017. Guinea also has established sub-national Emergency Operation Centers. [2, 3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales

capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Health Security Agency. 2017. "Guide for the Establishment And Operation Of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (Cou-Sp) In Health Districts" ("GUIDE DE MISE EN PLACE ET DU FONCTIONNEMENT DES CENTRES D'OPERATIONS D'URGENCE EN SANTE PUBLIQUE (COU-SP) DANS LES DISTRICTS SANITAIRES") [https://anss-guinee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GUIDE-TECHNIQUE-DU-COU-_VF.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Regional Epidemic Alert and Response Teams." [https://anss-guinee.org/welcome/erare] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or that they conduct a drill at least once per year. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 states that Guinea has initiated a policy of training and simulation exercises for its EOC (called the Centre Opérationnel d'Urgence or COU) and that a theoretical drill was conducted. In addition, the JEE also states that Guinea's EOC has been activated repeatedly in response to the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) and measles outbreaks. [1] However, there is no evidence of drill frequency, EOC activation frequency or that a drill is required at least once per year. Guinea's guide for its sub-national EOCs indicates that simulations should happen, but no frequency recommendation is included. [2] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Guinea National Health Security Agency, under whose umbrella the EOC is placed. [3, 4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Health Security Agency. 2017. "Guide for the Establishment And Operation Of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (Cou-Sp) In Health Districts" ("GUIDE DE MISE EN PLACE ET DU FONCTIONNEMENT DES CENTRES D'OPERATIONS D'URGENCE EN SANTE PUBLIQUE (COU-SP) DANS LES DISTRICTS SANITAIRES") [https://anss-guinee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/GUIDE-TECHNIQUE-DU-COU-_VF.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Guinea's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 states that Guinea has initiated a policy of training and simulation exercises for its EOC (called the Centre Opérationnel d'Urgence or COU) and that a theoretical drill was conducted. [1] However, there is no evidence of drill frequency or that emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes. There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Guinea National Health Security Agency, under whose umbrella the EOC is placed. [2,3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?
- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack) or that Guinea has publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack). The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 states that Guinea's public health and national security authorities cooperate closely in the case of suspected or confirmed biological events, and are well practiced at such collaborations given the recent epidemics of measles and Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). [1] However, the JEE does not mention either exercises for potential deliberate biological events or bioterrorist attacks or guidelines between the public health and security authorities to respond to such events. There is no information about such exercises or collaborations in case of deliberate biological events from the Guinea National Health Security Agency, the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, or Ministry of Security. [2, 3, 4,5,6] The Ministry of Security only has a Facebook page not a website.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales

capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of Health. [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Justice. [http://justiceguinee.gov.gn/en/home/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Security. [https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Guinea has in place a risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outlining how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach). According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, Guinea developed a communications and risk communications plan for the epidemics of Ebola and measles, but there is no general or generic risk communications plan for public health emergencies. [1] There is no evidence that this plan could be used for other diseases. In April 2020, Guinea created a national emergency response plan for the COVID-19 pandemic, but it only mentions communication once. [2] There is no additional information about a risk communications plan from the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, or the Ministry of Information and Communication. [3,4,5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea Prime Minister's Office. April 2020. "Economic response plan to the COVID-19 health crisis." ("Plan de riposte économique à la crise sanitaire COVID-19") [http://mef.gov.gn/images/DOCS/Plan-de-riposte-economique-GN_exe.pdf.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Information and Communication. [https://infocommunication.gov.gn/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Guinea has in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, Guinea developed a communications and risk communications plan for the epidemics of Ebola and measles, but there is no general or generic risk communications plan for public health emergencies. [1] There is no evidence that this plan could be used for other diseases or in general as a risk communication plan. In April 2020, Guinea created a national emergency response plan for the COVID-19 pandemic, but it only mentions communication once. [2] In July 2019, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection held a workshop to prepare for future epidemics including a communication risk plan for the security sector. [3] There is no evidence this plan was developed, finalized, or adapted or that it could be used for all sectors during a public health emergency. There is no additional information about a risk communications plan from the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Information and Communication, or the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. [4,5,6,7,8]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea Prime Minister's Office. April 2020. "Economic response plan to the COVID-19 health crisis." ("Plan de riposte économique à la crise sanitaire COVID-19") [http://mef.gov.gn/images/DOCS/Plan-de-riposte-economique-GN_exe.pdf.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Condé, Mohamed M'bemba. 1 July 2019. "Kindia: 23 school security actors in the development of the epidemic risk communication plan." ("Kindia : 23 acteurs de la sécurité à l'école de l'élaboration du plan de communication sur les risques épidémiques.") Guinee Matin. [<https://guineematin.com/2019/07/01/kindia-23-acteurs-de-la-securite-a-lecole-de-lelaboration-du-plan-de-communication-sur-les-risques-epidemiques/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Guinea has in place a risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) that designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. During the COVID-19 pandemic, government agency spokespersons continued speaking for their particular agency. [1,2] According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, Guinea developed a communications and risk communications plan for the epidemics of Ebola and measles, but there is no general or generic risk communications plan for public health emergencies. [3] There is no evidence that this plan could be used for other diseases. In April 2020, Guinea created a national emergency response plan for the COVID-19 pandemic, but it only mentions communication once. [4] There is no additional information about a risk communications plan that designates a spokesperson to the public from the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, or the Ministry of Information and Communication. [5,6,7,8]

[1] Le Monde / AFP. 27 April 2020. "Guinea counts more than 1,000 cases of Covid-19." ("La Guinée dénombre plus de 1 000 cas de Covid-19") [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/04/27/la-guinee-franchit-la-barre-des-1-000-cas-de-coronavirus_6037877_3212.html] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[2] Voice of America. 8 May 2020. "The Guinean government denies repression under cover of Covid-19." ("Le gouvernement guinéen se défend de réprimer sous couvert de Covid-19.") [<https://www.voafrique.com/a/le-gouvernement-guin%C3%A9en-se-d%C3%A9fend-de-r%C3%A9primer-sous-couvert-de-covid-19/5412304.html>] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea Prime Minister's Office. April 2020. "Economic response plan to the COVID-19 health crisis." ("Plan de riposte économique à la crise sanitaire COVID-19") [http://mef.gov.gn/images/DOCS/Plan-de-riposte-economique-GN_exe.pdf.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.5.2 Public communication

3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

Current Year Score: 2

Guinea's public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (eg social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation in the past year.

Guinea's Ministries, for example the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, frequently use facebook to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns as some ministries do not have official websites [1]. Agencies with websites like the Ministry of Health, the National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, and the Ministry of Information and Communication frequently update their "news" section of their websites as well as their Facebook pages with official government announcements or orders and COVID-19 updates in the past year [2,3,4,5]. This practice has been ongoing prior to the COVID-19 pandemic as Facebook and news sections on official websites are frequently used to communicate with the public about public health concerns.

[1] Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5

[2] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Senior leaders (president or ministers) in Guinea have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases (in the past two years). The President of Guinea, Alpha Condé, advocated to his citizens to put mentholated gel in their nostrils and to drink hot water to prevent Covid-19 in April 2020, neither idea has scientific basis for preventing COVID-19. [1,2] There is no documented evidence of misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the three years prior to 2020 on news sites or the websites of Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Information and Communication, or the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection . [3,4,5,6,7]

[1] RFI. 24 April 2020. "Two African leaders under fire for touting unproven Covid-19 'preventatives.'"

[<https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20200424-two-african-leaders-under-fire-for-touting-unproven-coronavirus-preventatives-madagascar-guinea-covid-organics-artemisia>] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[2] Panapress. 10 April 2020. "Coronavirus: Guinean President Alpha Condé says mentholatum, hot water can kill COVID-19"

[https://www.panapress.com/Coronavirus-Guinean-President-Al-a_630636864-lang2.html] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 18

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 100.8

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 21.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 13.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

In the past year, there is no evidence that Guinea has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (eg: medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak. To the contrary, the International Monetary Fund indicates that Guinea created measures to allow banks to provide more credit to importers of food and pharmaceutical products during the COVID-19 pandemic. [1] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Disease Outbreak News makes no mention of any restrictions by Guinea or imposed on Guinea due to infectious disease risk in 2018, 2019 or 2020. [2] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Weekly Disease Information mentions one outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Guinea in 2018 that resulted in within-country control of animal movement, but no other restrictions are mentioned. [3,4] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [5,6,7,8,9,10]

[1] International Monetary Fund. 2020. "Policy Responses to COVID-19." [<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation. 2020. "Emergencies preparedness, response: Guinea". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/gin/en/>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] World Organisation for Animal Health. 2018. "Foot and mouth disease, Guinea". [https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Reviewreport/Review?page_refer=MapFullEventReport&reportid=27626]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] World Organisation for Animal Health. 2018. "Weekly Disease Information". [https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/WI]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[9] Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Accessed 5 August 2020.] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.7.1b

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

In the past year, there is no evidence that Guinea has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (eg: food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. To the contrary, the International Monetary Fund indicates that Guinea created measures to allow banks to provide more credit to importers of food and pharmaceutical products during the COVID-19 pandemic. [1] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Disease Outbreak News makes no mention of any restrictions by Guinea or imposed on Guinea due to infectious disease risk in 2018, 2019 or 2020. [2] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Weekly Disease Information mentions one outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Guinea in 2018 that resulted in within-country control of animal movement, but no other restrictions are mentioned. [3,4] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [5,6,7,8,9,10]

[1] International Monetary Fund. 2020. "Policy Responses to COVID-19." [<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation. 2020. "Emergencies preparedness, response: Guinea". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/gin/en/>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] World Organisation for Animal Health. 2018. "Foot and mouth disease, Guinea". [https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Reviewreport/Review?page_refer=MapFullEventReport&reportid=27626]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] World Organisation for Animal Health. 2018. "Weekly Disease Information". [https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/WI]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[9] Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[10] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Accessed 5 August 2020.] Accessed 5 August 2020.

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

In the past year, there is evidence that Guinea has implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. Guinea closed its land borders to all travels in March 2020 and later closed its airport to international travels due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] The airport reopened to some travelers who follow additional restrictions in May 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. [2] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Disease Outbreak News makes no mention of any travel bans by Guinea on travelers arriving from specific countries due to disease outbreak in 2018 or 2019. [3] The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Weekly Disease Information mentions one outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Guinea in 2018 that resulted in within-country control of animal movement, but no other restrictions are mentioned. [4,5] There is no additional information on the

websites of the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Information and Communication, the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [6,7,8,9,10,11]

- [1] U.S. Overseas Security Advisory Council. 2020. "Health Alert: Guinea, Government Declares Health State of Emergency Through April 10." [<https://www.osac.gov/Country/Guinea/Content/Detail/Report/40a1108c-10f1-4b57-a6ca-1854d9b519f2>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] U.S. Embassy in Guinea. 3 August 2020. "Covid-19 Information." [<https://gn.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/covid-19-information/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] World Health Organisation. 2020. "Emergencies preparedness, response: Guinea". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/gin/en/>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] World Organisation for Animal Health. 2018. "Foot and mouth disease, Guinea". [https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Reviewreport/Review?page_refer=MapFullEventReport&reportid=27626]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] World Organisation for Animal Health. 2018. "Weekly Disease Information". [https://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/WI]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [9] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [10] Ministry of Security and Civil Protection. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Accessed 5 August 2020.] Accessed 5 August 2020.

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 8.32

2016

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 12.38

2016

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Guinea currently has a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, Guinea was planning to develop such a strategy when the JEE was conducted. [1] According to the National Health Development Plan (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire or PNDS) developed by the Ministry of Health for the period spanning 2015-2024, one of the priorities for Guinea within that period is to develop a workforce strategy and identify priorities with regards to the public health workforce, although there is no further detail as to what this will involve. [2] There is no additional information from the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Information and Communication, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research that such a strategy has been developed as of August 2020. [3, 4,5,6,7] The Ministry of Labor does not have an official website. [8]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)".

[http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/country_docs/Guinea/plan_national_developpement_sanitaire_2015-2024_guinee_fin.pdf]. Accessed 6 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. [<https://www.mesrs.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Guinean Government Portal (Portail du gouvernement guinéen). "Websites of the Ministries (Sites web du Ministère)". [<http://www.gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/le-gouvernement>]. Accessed 6 August 2020.

4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 30

2011

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit or patient isolation facility within the country. The non-profit Doctors Without Borders (MSF) rehabilitated an isolation and care center to international standards in May 2020 in Conakry to treat COVID-19 patients that they had established in 2015 as part of their Ebola response. [1] The center was handed over to national authorities after the Ebola crisis ended, and it has space for up to 75 patients. However, this center called the Nongo treatment center is currently only treating mild cases of COVID-19 requiring hospitalization, although it might expand to more severe cases as the pandemic develops. There is no evidence that this center has expanded and developed to treat serious COVID-19 cases requiring isolation as of August 2020. The Donka hospital was the only health facility designated to receive COVID-19 patients in the first weeks of the crisis, but there is no evidence that it currently has an isolation center to treat patients with highly communicable diseases. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, makes no mention of this isolation facility and there is no evidence that national health authorities kept it active during this time. [2] There is no additional information from the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, or the Ministry of Information and Communication. [3,4,5,6]

[1] Doctors Without Borders. 12 May 2020. "MSF supports the COVID-19 pandemic response in Guinea."

[<https://www.msf.org/msf-supports-covid-19-pandemic-response-guinea>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Guinea has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years or that Guinea has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. The non-profit Doctors Without Borders (MSF) rehabilitated an isolation and care center to international standards in May 2020 in Conakry to treat COVID-19 patients that they had established in 2015 as part of their Ebola response. [1] The center was handed over to national authorities after the Ebola crisis ended, and it has space for up to 75 patients. This center called the Nongo treatment center is currently only treating mild cases of COVID-19 requiring hospitalization, although it might expand to more severe cases as the pandemic develops. There is no evidence that this center has expanded and developed to treat serious COVID-19 cases requiring isolation as of August 2020. The Donka hospital was the only health facility designated to receive COVID-19 patients in the first weeks of the crisis, but there is no evidence that it has expanded isolation capacity. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, makes no mention of this isolation facility and there is no evidence that national health authorities kept it active during this time. [2] There is no additional information from the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, or the Ministry of Information and Communication. [3,4,5,6]

[1] Doctors Without Borders. 12 May 2020. "MSF supports the COVID-19 pandemic response in Guinea."

[<https://www.msf.org/msf-supports-covid-19-pandemic-response-guinea>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Information and Communication. [<https://infocommunication.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that a national procurement protocol is in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (such as equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (equipment, PPE) for routine needs. The National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 indicates that the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (Pharmacie Centrale de Guinée) is charged with providing quality health supplies including laboratory reagents to all government-authorized establishments. [1] It also indicated that a logistics manual was created to optimize purchases and distributions and that it would soon be utilized. There is no publicly available evidence that this logistics manual has been finalized and is be utilized. There is no further information on the websites of the Central Pharmacy of Guinea, the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, or the Ministry of Agriculture. [2,3,4,5,6]

[1] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Central Pharmacy of Guinea. 2020. [<http://pcg.org.gn/index.php>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Agriculture. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea maintains a stockpile of medical supplies including MCMs (i.e. vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics) for national use during a public health emergency, which includes essential medicines. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) makes no mention of such a stockpile. [1] Neither the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 nor the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) mention a policy to stockpile medical countermeasures for a health emergency. [2,3] There is no further information on the websites of the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (the procurement and regulatory center for medical supplies), the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Security, or the Ministry of Defense. [4,5,6,7,8, 9, 10] (The Ministries of Agriculture, Security and Defense only have Facebook pages and do not have official websites.)

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

- [3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Central Pharmacy of Guinea. 2020. [<http://pcg.org.gn/index.php>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] Ministry of Agriculture. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [9] Ministry of Security. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [10] Ministry of Defense. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/DefenseNationaleGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.2.2b

Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. To the contrary, the Guinea Scientific Council suggests that Guinea has an insufficient amount of laboratory supplies. [1] Additionally, the World Bank in June 2020 provided an emergency support project to Guinea to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included financing laboratory supplies. [2] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) makes no mention of such a stockpile. [3] There is no further information on the websites of the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (the procurement and regulatory center for medical supplies), the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Security, or the Ministry of Defense. [4,5,6,7,8, 9] (The Ministries of Security and Defense only have Facebook pages and do not have official websites.)

- [1] Camara, Dansa. 1 May 2020. "Response to Covid-19 in Guinea: the Scientific Council releases its first opinion on the community propagation chain" ("Riposte au Covid-19 en Guinée: le Conseil scientifique sort son premier avis sur la chaîne de propagation communautaire") Guinee 360. [<https://www.guinee360.com/01/05/2020/riposte-au-covid-19-en-guinee-le-conseil-scientifique-sort-son-premier-avis-sur-la-chaine-de-propagation-communautaire/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] The World Bank. 18 June 2020. "Guinea: Additional funding of \$ 10.9 million for the fight against the coronavirus." ("Guinée : un financement additionnel de 10,9 millions de dollars pour la lutte contre le coronavirus") [<https://www.banquemonde.org/fr/news/press-release/2020/06/18/guinee-un-financement-additionnel-de-109-millions-de-dollars-pour-la-lutte-contre-le-coronavirus>] Accessed 2 September 2020.
- [3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Central Pharmacy of Guinea. 2020. [<http://pcg.org.gn/index.php>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Security. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[9] Ministry of Defense. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/DefenseNationaleGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.2.2c

Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) makes no mention of a national stockpile nor an annual review of a national stockpile. [1] Neither the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 nor the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) mention a policy to stockpile medical countermeasures for a health emergency or to review the national stockpile. [2,3] There is no further information on the websites of the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (the procurement and regulatory center for medical supplies), the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Security, or the Ministry of Defense. [4,5,6,7,8,9,10] (The Ministries of Agriculture, Security and Defense only have Facebook pages and do not have official websites.)

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Central Pharmacy of Guinea. 2020. [<http://pcg.org.gn/index.php>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Agriculture. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[9] Ministry of Security. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[10] Ministry of Defense. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/DefenseNationaleGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency or has a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) makes no mention of such plans/agreements. [1] Neither the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 nor the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) mention plans to produce or procure medical supplies during a public health emergency. [2,3] There is no further information on the websites of the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (the procurement and regulatory center for medical supplies), the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Security, or the Ministry of Defense. [4,5,6,7,8, 9, 10] (The Ministries of Agriculture, Security and Defense only have Facebook pages and do not have official websites.)

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Évaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Central Pharmacy of Guinea. 2020. [http://pcg.org.gn/index.php] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Agriculture. [https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[9] Ministry of Security. [https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[10] Ministry of Defense. [https://fr-fr.facebook.com/DefenseNationaleGN/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) or a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. Rather, the World Bank in June 2020 provided an emergency support project to Guinea to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, which included financing laboratory supplies. [1]The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) does not mention such plans/agreements. [2] Neither the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014

nor the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) mention plans to produce or procure laboratory supplies during a public health emergency. [3,4] There is no further information on the websites of the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (the procurement and regulatory center for medical supplies), the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Security, or the Ministry of Defense. [5,6,7,8, 9, 10,11] (The Ministries of Agriculture, Security and Defense only have Facebook pages and do not have official websites.)

- [1] The World Bank. 18 June 2020. "Guinea: Additional funding of \$ 10.9 million for the fight against the coronavirus." ("Guinée : un financement additionnel de 10,9 millions de dollars pour la lutte contre le coronavirus") [<https://www.banquemonde.org/fr/news/press-release/2020/06/18/guinee-un-financement-additionnel-de-109-millions-de-dollars-pour-la-lutte-contre-le-coronavirus>] Accessed 2 September 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Central Pharmacy of Guinea. 2020. [<http://pcg.org.gn/index.php>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [9] Ministry of Agriculture. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/AgricultureGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [10] Ministry of Security. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [11] Ministry of Defense. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/DefenseNationaleGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics). The World Health Organisation's (WHO) 2017 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) makes no mention of such a plan. [1] The National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 indicates that the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (Pharmacie Centrale de Guinée) is charged with providing and distributing quality health supplies to all government-authorized establishments. [2] It also indicated that a logistics manual was created to optimize purchases and distributions and that it would soon be utilized. There is no publically available

evidence that this logistics manual has been finalized and is to be utilized. The National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) also does not mention a plan for dispensing MCM during a public health emergency. [3] There is no further information on the websites of the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (the procurement and regulatory center for medical supplies), the Ministry of Health, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the official portal of the Guinean government, the Ministry of Security, or the Ministry of Defense. [4, 5,6,7,8, 9] (The Ministries of Security and Defense only have Facebook pages and do not have official websites.)

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Évaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Central Pharmacy of Guinea. 2020. [<http://pcg.org.gn/index.php>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Guinea Ministry of Health. [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] Ministry of Security. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [9] Ministry of Defense. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/DefenseNationaleGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has in place a public plan to receive healthcare personnel from other countries in order to respond to a public health emergency. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017, Guinea has a plan to receive additional healthcare personnel from both national partners (such as NGOs or private hospitals) and international partners (international NGOs or other countries), in the event of a public health emergency, although the countries with which this is in place are not explicitly mentioned, and there is no evidence of a plan to receive the health workers once they arrive in the country. [1] This plan is not publicly available. Neither the National Health Development Plan (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire or PNDS) nor the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 make mention of such provisions or of any additional memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Guinea and other countries. [2,3] The plan is not available from the Ministries of Health, Security or Defence, or the official portal of the Guinean government from the National Agency for Health Security (ANSS). [4, 5,6,7,8]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Évaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

- [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Security. [<https://www.facebook.com/MSPCGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Defense. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/DefenseNationaleGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 55.3

2018

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 50.54

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has committed to providing prioritised healthcare to health workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 does not provide any information on prioritized healthcare to health workers in a public health emergency. [1] Neither the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 nor the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) mention such a commitment to health workers. [2,3] There is no further information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, or National Agency for Health Security (ANSS). [4,5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a

Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a system in place in Guinea for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 does not provide any information on such a system. [1] In fact, it reports that Guinea has not established official governmental services for public communication and also that a national communication plan does not exist. Neither the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 nor the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) mention such a commitment to health workers. [2,3] There is no further information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, or National Agency for Health Security (ANSS). [4,5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.5.1b

Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a system in Guinea for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 does not provide any information on such a system. [1] In fact, it reports that Guinea has not established official governmental services for public communication and also that a national communication plan does not exist. Neither the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 nor the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (PNDS) mention such a commitment to health workers. [2,3] There is no further information on the websites

of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, or National Agency for Health Security (ANSS). [4,5,6]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea's public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities. The National Health Development Plan (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire) developed by the Ministry of Health for the period spanning 2015-2024 mentions that the Ministry of Health intends to make monitoring HCAs a priority in that period, but there is no evidence that the measures outlined to fight HCAs have been put in place. [1] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 mentions that a Committee for the Fight Against HAIs (Comité de Lutte contre les Infections Nosocomiales) exists, and that Guinea should make surveillance of HCAs a priority. [2] A 2016 research study on HCAI in Conakry suggests that HCAI are high in public hospitals but provides no evidence that Guinea's public health system is monitoring or tracking them. [3] There is no evidence that tracking or monitoring strategy of HCAI has been developed from the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) or the Ministry of Research. [4,5,6,7]

[1] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Keita, Alpha Kabinet, Naman Doumbouya, Mamadou Saliou Sow, Bintou Konaté, Yacouba Dabo, Daniel Agbo Panzo,

- Mamady Keita. March 2016. "Prevalence of nosocomial infections in two hospitals in Conakry (Guinea)" ("Prévalence des infections nosocomiales dans deux hôpitaux de Conakry (Guinée)") *Sante Publique*. 28:2. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301202125_Prevalence_des_infections_nosocomiales_dans_deux_hopitaux_de_Conakry_Guinee] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Higher Education and Research. [https://www.mesrs.gov.gn/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial. According to U.S Department of Health and Human Service's National Institute of Health's extensive clinic regulations database (ClinRegs), the Guinea Ministry of Health's National Ethics Committee for Research in Health (Comité National d'Ethique pour la Recherche en Santé (CNERS)) must approve the clinical trial application prior to beginning a clinical trial based on Guinea's Decree No D/218/PRG/SGG creating the CNERS in 1998 and based on Guinea's Public Health Code [1,2,3]. Although the World Health Organisation mediated the ethical approval of certain clinical trials of relevance to addressing the public health emergency posed by Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Guinea and in certain cases expedited the ethical approval process, there is no evidence that the WHO did this due to a lack of national ethical review requirements. [4] Rather, the WHO wanted to expediate the ethical approval processes and needed its own internal ethical review based on its own legal obligations.

- [1] U.S Department of Health and Human Service's National Institute of Health. 17 July 2020. "ClinRegs: Guinea." [https://clinregs.niaid.nih.gov/country/guinea#_top] Accessed 5 August 2020
- [2] Guinea President of the Republic. 29 October 1998. "Decree No D/218/PRG/SGG" [http://cners-guinee.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/De%CC%81cret-.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020
- [3] Republic of Guinea Assembly National. 19 June 1997. "Public Health Code." [http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Guinea/GN_Code_Sante_Publique.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020
- [4] Alirol E, Kuesel AC, Guraiib MM, dela Fuente-Núñez V, Saxena A, Gomes MF. 2017. "Ethics review of studies during public health emergencies - the experience of the WHO ethics review committee during the Ebola virus disease epidemic". *BMC Med Ethics*, 18:43. [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5485606/]. Accessed 5 August 2020

4.7.1b

Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

An expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics exists in Guinea. The Guinea Public Health Code and the U.S Department of Health and Human Service's National Institute of Health's extensive clinic regulations database (ClinRegs) indicate that in emergencies (e.g., epidemics or disasters), an accelerated procedure is adopted without prejudice to the requirements of submitting the protocol and including reduction of the minimum and maximum periods of review and decision to 48 hours and one (1) week respectively. [1,2, 3] During the public health emergency posed by Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Guinea, the World Health Organisation mediated the ethical approval of certain clinical trials of relevance and also expedited the ethical approval process in certain cases. [3]

[1] U.S Department of Health and Human Service's National Institute of Health. 17 July 2020. "ClinRegs: Guinea."

[https://clinregs.niaid.nih.gov/country/guinea#_top] Accessed 5 August 2020

[2] Guinea President of the Republic. 29 October 1998. "Decree No D/218/PRG/SGG" [<http://cners-guinee.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/De%CC%81cret-.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020

[3] Republic of Guinea Assembly National. 19 June 1997. "Public Health Code."

[http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Guinea/GN_Code_Sante_Publique.pdf] Accessed 5 August 2020

[4] Alirol E, Kuesel AC, Guraiib MM, dela Fuente-Núñez V, Saxena A, Gomes MF. 2017. "Ethics review of studies during public health emergencies - the experience of the WHO ethics review committee during the Ebola virus disease epidemic". BMC Med Ethics, 18:43. [<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5485606/>]. Accessed 5 August 2020

4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a

Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Guinea has in place a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans. A new law passed in July 2018 assigns the National Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicine (DNPM) the responsibility for assuring quality medicine and surveying the market including registration for market authorization and importation of medicine. [1] However, there is no evidence that they approve new medical countermeasures for humans beyond medicines. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS) is designated by the Ministry of Health as responsible for managing the distribution of medical countermeasures for humans, but there is no evidence that this includes approving new medical countermeasures. [2] The National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 indicates that the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (Pharmacie Centrale de Guinée) is charged with providing and distributing quality health supplies to all government-authorized establishments. [3] However, there is no evidence that this includes approving new medical countermeasures. There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) or the Ministry of Research. [4,5,6,7]

- [1] Promoting the Quality of Medicines. 2020. "Guinea Updates its Pharmaceutical Regulatory Law." [<https://www.usp-pqm.org/results/guinea-success-story>] Accessed 7 August 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Higher Education and Research. [<https://www.mesrs.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies. A new law passed in July 2018 assigns the National Directorate of Pharmacy and Medicine (DNPM) the responsibility for assuring quality medicine and surveying the market. [1] However, there is no evidence that they approve new medical countermeasures for humans beyond medicines or that they could expediate approval of MCM in health emergencies.. According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Guinea, conducted in April 2017, the National Agency for Health Security (Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire or ANSS) is designated by the Ministry of Health as responsible for managing the distribution of medical countermeasures for humans, but there is no evidence that this includes approving new medical countermeasures or expediting their approval. [2] The National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 indicates that the Central Pharmacy of Guinea (Pharmacie Centrale de Guinée) is charged with providing and distributing quality health supplies to all government-authorized establishments. [3] However, there is no evidence that this includes approving or expediting approval of new medical countermeasures. There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) or the Ministry of Research. [4,5,6,7]

- [1] Promoting the Quality of Medicines. 2020. "Guinea Updates its Pharmaceutical Regulatory Law." [<https://www.usp-pqm.org/results/guinea-success-story>] Accessed 7 August 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Ministry of Higher Education and Research. [<https://www.mesrs.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that epidemics and pandemics are integrated in Guinea's national disaster risk reduction strategy or that there is a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics. Guinea published a National Disaster Management Plan that includes epidemics in 1996, but it does not contain measures for disaster risk reduction (DRR). [1] The 2012 Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategy does not include epidemics or pandemics. [2] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) or the Ministry of Research. [3,4,5,6]

[1] Republic of Guinea (République de Guinée). January 1996. "National Disaster Management Plan (Plan national de gestion des catastrophes)". [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/30443_guineepnannationalgestioncatastroph.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Republic of Guinea. December 2012. "Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategy." ("Stratégie nationale de réduction des

risques de catastrophe")

[https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKewiViebr_ojAhU00uAKHf67A4UQFjABegQIAxAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ifrc.org%2Fdocs%2FIDRL%2FStratu00E9gie_Catastrophes-GN-Volume%25202.docx&usg=AOvVaw2RDXleEg1JVvgVwkQpKQVa] Accessed 7 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Ministry of Higher Education and Research. [https://www.mesrs.gov.gn/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies. The United States Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) drafted in 2014, given the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, a formal public health emergencies-related partnership between 10 countries (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo), all of which either shared a border with Guinea or were geographically close enough that infectious disease spread was a public health concern. [1] This partnership was to involve sharing of health information and data for all notifiable infectious diseases, and open cooperation for issues such as contact tracing. However, there is no evidence that the protocol was ever finalized or signed by these countries. In addition, Guinea and Sierra Leone developed an agreement involving the border region between the two countries in August 2015, which ensured that any information as to potential or confirmed Ebola cases was immediately shared between the two countries. [2] However, there is no evidence that this agreement is applicable for other diseases or that it is still active today. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 does not provide any information on such an agreement. [3] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [4,5,6,7]

[1] Merrill RD, Rogers K, Ward S, Ojo O, Glele Kaka? C, Tsiadi Agbeko T, Garba H, MacGurn A, Oppert M, Kone I, Bamsa O, Schneider D, Brown C. December 2017. "Responding to Communicable Diseases in Internationally Mobile Populations at Points of Entry and along Porous Borders, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo". [https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/23/13/17-0520_article]. Emerging Infectious Diseases 23 Suppl DOI: 10.3201. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Jalloh MF, Bunnell R, Robinson S, Jalloh MB, Barry AM, Corker J, Sengeh P, VanSteeleand A, Li W, Dafaie F, Diallo AA, Martel LD, Hersey S, Marston B, Morgan O, Redd J. 10 April 2017. "Assessments of Ebola knowledge, attitudes and practices in Forécariah, Guinea and Kambia, Sierra Leone, July-August 2015". [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5394642/]. Philosophical Transactions B Royal Society London 372(1721): 20160304. Accessed 23 December 2018 Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health

Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [https://fr-fr.facebook.com/MAEGEGN/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.2.1b

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that Guinea has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards for animal health emergencies. The United States Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) drafted in 2014, given the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, a formal public health emergencies-related partnership between 10 countries (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo). [1] This partnership was to involve sharing of health information and data for all notifiable infectious diseases, and open cooperation for issues such as contact tracing. However, there is no evidence that the protocol was ever finalized or signed by these countries or that it could be utilized for animal health emergencies. In addition, Guinea and Sierra Leone developed an agreement involving the border region between the two countries in August 2015, which ensured that any information as to potential or confirmed Ebola cases was immediately shared between the two countries. [2] However, there is no evidence that this agreement is applicable for other diseases, that it is still active today, or that it could be utilized for animal health emergencies. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 does not provide any information on such an agreement. [3] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Livestock and Animal Products. [4,5,6,7,8]

[1] Merrill RD, Rogers K, Ward S, Ojo O, Glele Kaka? C, Tsidi Agbeko T, Garba H, MacGurn A, Oppert M, Kone I, Bamsa O, Schneider D, Brown C. December 2017. "Responding to Communicable Diseases in Internationally Mobile Populations at Points of Entry and along Porous Borders, Nigeria, Benin, and Togo". [https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/23/13/17-0520_article]. Emerging Infectious Diseases 23 Suppl DOI: 10.3201. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Jalloh MF, Bunnell R, Robinson S, Jalloh MB, Barry AM, Corker J, Sengeh P, VanSteeleand A, Li W, Dafaé F, Diallo AA, Martel LD, Hersey S, Marston B, Morgan O, Redd J. 10 April 2017. "Assessments of Ebola knowledge, attitudes and practices in Forécariah, Guinea and Kambia, Sierra Leone, July-August 2015".

[https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5394642/]. Philosophical Transactions B Royal Society London 372(1721): 20160304. Accessed 23 December 2018 Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".

[https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health [https://sante.gov.gn/#] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435]

Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/MAEGEGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Livestock and Animal Products. [<https://www.facebook.com/Minist%C3%A8re-de-lElevage-et-des-Productions-Animales-Guin%C3%A9-1533480233581451/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a

Does the country have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b

Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence evidence that Guinea has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 recommended creating a national budgetary line to finance the preparation for dealing with epidemic threats. [1] Even news articles praising Guinea's quick response to the COVID-19 pandemic acknowledge that the biggest issue is funding. [2] Specifically, only 1.45 million masks are available in a country of 12.8 million and the government plans to depend on its partners to find the funding necessary to purchase this equipment. [2] Additionally, Guinea has also received separate PPE donations from UNICEF and WHO to help its shortage of PPE during the COVID-19 pandemic. [3,4] There is no additional information on national funds for epidemic threats on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the

Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the Ministry of Livestock and Animal Products, or the Ministry of Finance. [5,6,7,8,9]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)".
[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] Diarra, Atouma. 17 March 2020 "Coronavirus: Guinea capitalizes on its experience of the Ebola epidemic." ("Coronavirus : la Guinée capitalise sur son expérience de l'épidémie d'Ebola.") Le Monde Afrique.
[https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/03/17/coronavirus-la-guinee-capitalise-sur-son-experience-de-l-epidemie-d-ebola_6033432_3212.html] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Diallo, Aboubacar Sidiki. 4 August 2020. "COVID-19, UNICEF provides the ANSS with personal protective equipment." ("COVID-19, l'UNICEF met à disposition de l'ANSS des équipements de protection individuelle.") UNICEF.
[<https://www.unicef.org/guinea/recits/covid-19-lunicef-met-%C3%A0-la-disposition-de-lanss-des-%C3%A9quipements-de-protection-individuelle>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] WHO. 3 March 2020. "Shortage of personal protective equipment endangering health workers worldwide."
[<https://www.who.int/fr/news-room/detail/03-03-2020-shortage-of-personal-protective-equipment-endangering-health-workers-worldwide>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] Ministry of Livestock and Animal Products. [<https://www.facebook.com/Minist%C3%A8re-de-lElevage-et-des-Productions-Animales-Guin%C3%A9e-1533480233581451/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [9] Ministry of Finance. [<https://mef.gov.gn/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

In Guinea, there is a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act). As an International Development Association (IDA) eligible borrower from the World Bank, Guinea is eligible for the World Bank pandemic financing facility. [1,2]. There is no evidence that Guinea has a dedicated national reserve fund for public health emergencies.

[1] International Development Group. 2020. "Borrowing Countries." World Bank.

[<https://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>] Accessed 7 August 2020.

[2] Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility. December 2017. "Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility(PEF)." World Bank.

[<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>] Accessed 7 August 2020.

5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Guinea's senior leaders have made a public commitment either to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats or to improve its own domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity in the past three years. To the contrary, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that even though Guinea had systems and practices in place from the Ebola epidemic, Guinea was financially unprepared and lacked basic health materials for a new epidemic threat. [1,2,3] The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 recommended created a national budgetary line

to finance the preparation for dealing with epidemic threats. [4] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Livestock and Animal Products. [5,6,7,8,9]

[1] Camara, Dansa. 1 May 2020. "Response to Covid-19 in Guinea: the Scientific Council releases its first opinion on the community propagation chain" ("Riposte au Covid-19 en Guinée: le Conseil scientifique sort son premier avis sur la chaîne de propagation communautaire") Guinee 360. [<https://www.guinee360.com/01/05/2020/riposte-au-covid-19-en-guinee-le-conseil-scientifique-sort-son-premier-avis-sur-la-chaîne-de-propagation-communautaire/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Diallo, Aboubacar Sidiki. 4 August 2020. "COVID-19, UNICEF provides the ANSS with personal protective equipment." ("COVID-19, l'UNICEF met à la disposition de l'ANSS des équipements de protection individuelle.") UNICEF. [<https://www.unicef.org/guinea/recits/covid-19-lunicef-met-%C3%A0-la-disposition-de-lanss-des-%C3%A9quipements-de-protection-individuelle>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] WHO. 3 March 2020. "Shortage of personal protective equipment endangering health workers worldwide." [<https://www.who.int/fr/news-room/detail/03-03-2020-shortage-of-personal-protective-equipment-endangering-health-workers-worldwide>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Livestock and Animal Products. [<https://www.facebook.com/Minist%C3%A8re-de-lElevage-et-des-Productions-Animales-Guin%C3%A9-1533480233581451/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

Guinea has, in the past three years, invested finances (from donors or national budget) to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats, but there is no evidence that Guinea provided technical or financial support to support other countries to improve their capacity to address epidemic threats. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Guinea requested the World Bank support its capacity to address the threat, including through access to better medical equipment and supplies. [1] The Global Health Security Funding Tracker indicates that Guinea has received donor funding to improve capacity in the past three years prior to 2020. For example, the World Health Organisation contributed approximately US\$150,000 for technical assistance to improve control strategies, plans and capacities developed for diseases such as cholera, viral haemorrhagic fever, meningitis and influenza and those due to vector-borne, emerging and re-emerging pathogens. [2] In 2016, during the Ebola epidemic, Guinea requested both finances and technical support from its partners to address this epidemic threat. [3,4] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry

of Livestock and Animal Products. [5,6,7,8,9]

[1] World Bank Group. 28 April 2020. "The World Bank Group supports the COVID-19 Response in Guinea." ("Le Groupe de la Banque mondiale supporte la riposte COVID-19 en Guinée")

[<https://www.banquemonde.org/fr/news/statement/2020/04/28/le-groupe-de-la-banque-mondiale-supporte-la-riposte-covid-19-en-guinee>] Accessed 7 August 2020.

[2] Global Health Security Funding Tracker. [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/#/data>]. Accessed 7 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organization. 30 March 2016. "Ebola Virus Disease situation report." ("RAPPORT DE SITUATION SUR LA FLAMBÉE DE MALADIE À VIRUS EBOLA")

[https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/205012/ebolasitrep_30Mar2016_fre.pdf?sequence=1] Accessed 7 August 2020.

[4] French Red Cross. 15 May 2017. "French Red Cross in Guinea." ("LA CROIX-ROUGE FRANÇAISE EN GUINÉE")

[<https://www.croix-rouge.fr/Nos-actions/Action-internationale/Rechercher-un-programme/LA-CROIX-ROUGE-FRANCAISE-EN-GUINEE>] Accessed 7 August 2020.

[5] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/MAEGEGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[9] Ministry of Livestock and Animal Products. [<https://www.facebook.com/Minist%C3%A8re-de-l%E9levage-et-des-Productions-Animales-Guin%C3%A9-1533480233581451/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and non-emergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that Guinea has in place a plan or policy for sharing genetic data, epidemiological data, clinical specimens, or isolated specimens with international organisations or other countries. The World Health Organisation's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) conducted in April 2017 indicates that Guinea participates in regional and international veterinarian networks for external quality control (REGULAB, RESAOLAB, RESAULAB). [1] However, there is no evidence of a plan or policy for sharing this type of data with international organization or other countries. Neither the National Health Development Plan (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire or PNDS) drawn up for 2015-2024 nor the National Pharmaceutical Policy of 2014 make mention of a plan or policy for data or specimen sharing with organizations or other countries. [2,3] There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Research. [4,5,6,7,8]

- [1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 23-28 April 2017. "Joint External Evaluation of the principle International Health Regulations (IHRs) capacities of the Republic of Guinea: Mission Report (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités Règlement Sanitaire International (RSI) de la République de Guinée : Rapport de mission)". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/sites/default/files/jeeta/WHO-WHE-CPI-REP-2017.40-fre.pdf>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] Guinea National Directorate of Pharmacy and Laboratory. "National Pharmaceutical Policy." ("Politique Pharmaceutique Nationale") [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/politique-pharmaceutique-nationale>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health (Ministère de la Santé). 2014. "National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire 2015-2024)". [<https://www.invest.gov.gn/document/plan-national-developpement-sanitaire-2015-2024-guinee>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/MAEGEGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that Guinea has withheld samples in contravention of the World Health Organisation's (WHO) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework within the past 2 years. On the contrary, there is evidence from the WHO's Influenza Updates for 2017 and 2018 that Guinea has regularly shared influenza samples. [1, 2] The WHO Influenza Update for 2019 Southern Hemisphere is not yet available.

- [1] World Health Organisation. 2018. "Influenza Virological Surveillance in the WHO African Region, Epidemiological bulletins". [<https://afro.who.int/health-topics/influenza/influenza-epidemiological-bulletin>]. Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation. 2018. "Percentage of respiratory specimens that tested positive for influenza by influenza transmission zone - status as of 7 December 2018". [https://www.who.int/influenza/surveillance_monitoring/updates/latest_update_GIP_surveillance/en/]. Accessed 5 August 2020.

5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that Guinea has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. During the COVID-19 pandemic, there is no evidence that Guinea has refused to share pandemic pathogen samples. To the contrary, Guinea is collaborating with a number of international partners to establish international standard laboratories in-country for the COVID-19 pandemic. [1] Guinea has also established a partnership with the French Pasteur Institute, which resulted in a new laboratory in Guinea. [2] All these facilities will facilitate the sharing of COVID-19 pathogen samples. There is no additional information on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the official portal of the Guinean government, National Agency for Health Security (ANSS) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Research. [4,5,6,7,8]

[1] John Libby Eurotext. 20 April 2020. "April 20, 2020 - Covid-19: after Ebola, towards a new emergence of SARS-CoV-2 in Africa?" ("20 avril 2020 - Covid-19 : après Ebola, vers une nouvelle émergence du SARS-CoV-2 en Afrique ?")

[<https://www.jle.com/fr/covid19-apres-ebola-nouvelle-emergence-sars-cov2-afrique>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Sekou, Berthe Cheick Sekou. 4 May 2020. "Covid19: Towards the establishment of a sample analysis laboratory in Kankan" ("Covid19: Vers la mise en place d'un laboratoire d'analyse des échantillons des prélèvements à Kankan.") Guinee News.org. [<https://www.guineenews.org/covid19-vers-la-mise-en-place-dun-laboratoire-danalyse-des-echantillons-des-prelevements-a-kankan/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Pasteur Institute. "The Institut Pasteur inaugurates its first laboratory in Conakry." ("L'Institut Pasteur de Guinée inaugure son premier laboratoire à Conakry.") [<https://www.pasteur.fr/fr/institut-pasteur/institut-pasteur-monde/actualites/institut-pasteur-guinee-inaugure-son-premier-laboratoire-conakry>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health [<https://sante.gov.gn/#>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Official Portal of the Guinean Government. [<http://gouvernement.gov.gn/index.php/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Guinea National Health Security Agency (ANSS). 2020. "Article Detail." [<https://anss-guinee.org/Article/singlePost/435>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [<https://fr-fr.facebook.com/MAEGEGN/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 28

2020

Transparency International

6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a

What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b

What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 4

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 32.0

2014

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.41

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 10.6

2012

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 2

A 2016 World Bank study estimates that Guinea's share of employment in the informal sector was 88% in 2010 and will be 85% in 2020. [1] The International Labor Organization Department of Statistics (ILOSTAT) did not have data on Guinea's informal sector. [2] A 2017 academic study on Guinea's informal sector estimated its size was at least two-thirds of the workforce. [3] The ranking for 2019 should also be 2.

[1] Loayza, Norman V. October 2016. "Informality in the Process of Development and Growth." Policy Research Working Paper 7858. World Bank Group, Washington, DC.

[<http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/998481476291165295/pdf/WPS7858.pdf>] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[2] International Labor Organization Department of Statistics. 2020. "Informal employment and informal sector as a percent of employment by sex."

[https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer37/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=IFL_4IEM_SEX_ECO_IFL_RT_A] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[3] Diallo, Aissata Diallo, Zhonghua Yin, Mukete Beckline. 16 January 2017. "Assessing the Socioeconomic Impacts of the Informal Sector in Guinea, West Africa." Open Access Library Journal.

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312477765_Assessing_the_Socioeconomic_Impacts_of_the_Informal_Sector_in_Guinea_West_Africa] Accessed 6 August 2020.

6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

Current Year Score: 0

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government

6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting

6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality

6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.34

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 36.5

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: -1.51

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 61.19

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook

6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 660.2

2019

WHO

6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.94

2019

World Bank

6.5.1d

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 14.04

2018

World Bank

6.5.1e

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 7.7

2016

WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 61.9

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.2b

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 22.72

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 17.96

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018