

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Fiji. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Fiji.

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## Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

### 1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

#### 1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

##### 1.1.1a

**Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?**

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Fiji does have a national AMR plan but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. According to the WHO Library of National Action Plans, Fiji has a plan as of 2018 and the document details their efforts. According to the report, "Fiji has identified antimicrobial resistance as a priority agenda, with support from senior management. An informal National Committee was formed in 2015, however dedicated resources and planning is needed to address the critical issues to contain antimicrobial resistance. Awareness of the policy makers is high on antimicrobial resistance; however the awareness in the general public is low." [1,2] According to the WHO, Fiji is the first country in the Western Pacific to launch an AMR plan. The plan includes five key strategies to combat, or minimize the impact of AMR: improve awareness and understanding of AMR through effective communication, education and training; strengthen nationally coordinated surveillance systems; reduce the incidence of antimicrobial resistance events through improved infection prevention and control, sanitation and hygiene, and wellness measures; optimize the use of antimicrobial medicines in human and animal health; establish and ensure governance, sustainable investment and actions to combat AMR. [3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation, "Library of National Action Plans - Fiji National AMR Action Plan," [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation. "Fiji Launches National Antimicrobial Resistance Action Plan," [<https://www.who.int/westernpacific/news/releases/news-from-the-country/-fiji-launches-national-antimicrobial-resistance-action-plan>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

##### 1.1.1b

**Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?**

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that there is a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens in Fiji. Fiji does have a national AMR plan, and according to the plan: "Fiji does not have a national surveillance system on antimicrobial resistance or antimicrobial consumption. In addition there is a lack of an electronic laboratory information management system." The document further states as one of its strategic objectives in its AMR plan to: "Establish a One Health antimicrobial resistance surveillance system that integrates and shares data from human, environment and agricultural

sectors and establish a surveillance technical group with an endorsed TOR to develop the One Health surveillance system to include routine, sentinel and surveys." [1] There is no additional context on this through academic studies or the website of the Ministry of Health. Fiji does have a national laboratory within its Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it tests for AMR pathogens. [2] There is also no evidence of such activities from the Ministry of Agriculture. [3]

- [1] World Health Organisation, "Library of National Action Plans - Fiji National AMR Action Plan," [https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/] Accessed 15 September 2020.  
[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [https://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 15 September 2020.  
[3] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [https://www.agriculture.gov.fj/] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.1.1c

**Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji conducts detection or surveillance activities (e.g. in soil, waterways, etc.) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. There is no evidence of this on the website of the Department of Environment. [1] Fiji does have a national AMR plan, but according to the plan: "Fiji does not have a national surveillance system on antimicrobial resistance or antimicrobial consumption." There is no specific reference to surveillance/detection related to antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. And there is no reference to when this might be overcome. [2] Fiji does have a national laboratory within its Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that conducts detection or surveillance activities of this kind. [3] There is also no evidence of such activities from the Ministry of Agriculture. [4]

- [1] Fiji, Department of Environment. [https://doefiji.wordpress.com/] Accessed 15 September 2020.  
[2] World Health Organisation, "Library of National Action Plans - Fiji National AMR Action Plan," [https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/] Accessed 15 September 2020.  
[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [https://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 15 September 2020.  
[4] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [https://www.agriculture.gov.fj/] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

### 1.1.2a

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans in Fiji. Despite this there is some information of steps in this direction. According to a report published by the Ministry of Health and the WHO on the pharmaceutical profile of Fiji, "In Fiji, legal provisions to control the promotion and/or advertising of prescription medicines exist. The Pharmacy and Poisons Board has been responsible for regulating promotion and/or advertising of medicines. Legal provisions prohibit direct advertising of prescription medicines to the public and pre-approval for medicines advertisements and promotional materials is required. Guidelines and Regulations for advertising and promotion of non-prescription medicines exist. Control of advertising and promotion of medicines by marketing authorization holders is covered in the National Medicinal Products Policy 2012." [1,2] There are some issues where

enforcement continues to be challenged. According the AMR plan, published in 2015, there remains: "inappropriate prescribing of third or last resort antibiotics (high prescription rates of ceftriaxone and meropenem reported). The monitoring of antibiotic consumption and promotion of rational use in private pharmacies also does not exist, however prescription only is promoted." [3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<https://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and WHO, "Pharmaceutical Profile - Fiji,"

[[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji\\_PSCP\\_NarrativeFeb18.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji_PSCP_NarrativeFeb18.pdf?ua=1)] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation, "Library of National Action Plans - Fiji National AMR Action Plan,"

[<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.1.2b

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence of national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals in Fiji. There is no such evidence of requirements for animals after searching the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2] There is also no evidence of this in the National AMR plan or the country's pharmaceutical profile. [3,4] There is no independent pharmaceutical regulatory outside of the Ministry of Health and no information found in academic studies.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation, "Library of National Action Plans - Fiji National AMR Action Plan,"

[<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Ministry of Health and WHO, "Pharmaceutical Profile - Fiji,"

[[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji\\_PSCP\\_NarrativeFeb18.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji_PSCP_NarrativeFeb18.pdf?ua=1)] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.2 ZOOONOTIC DISEASE

### 1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

#### 1.2.1a

**Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence of national legislation, regulation or strategy in place on zoonotic disease in Fiji. Fiji's Ministry of Health has released Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines in 2016. These guidelines reference names of: anthrax, brucellosis, leptospirosis, tuberculosis, zika, etc. The guidelines reference in detail elements of Fiji's surveillance and control of diseases, including roles of laboratories, external partners (World Health Organization), etc. According to the report, some roles include: "Receive urgent notifications within 24 hours of suspected or confirmed cases of urgent notifiable diseases (National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System-NNDSS); Provide monthly reports on urgent notifications and outbreaks to the Fiji MHMS (Medical Health Management System), including epidemiological analyses such as case numbers

by (by age, sex, and Division), disease incidence, epidemic curves, and outbreak thresholds; Provide technical advice and assistance as requested by Divisions and medical officers; Conduct risk assessment of diseases of public health importance, determine seriousness of public health events and the likelihood of international spread; Notify WHO of potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) under IHR 2005; Report syndromic surveillance data to PPHSN; Liaise with external partners as required, including WHO, SPC, PPHSN, US CDC, NGOs, and researchers.; Manage the Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS) including oversight of data collection, collation and feedback on indicator-based syndromic surveillance and event-based surveillance of communicable disease threats and their verification, risk assessment and investigation/response as required." [1,2] It is also worth noting that the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN, has noted on its website in 2018 that: "the Biosecurity Authority of Fiji (BAF) is implementing information technologies in the effort to predict potential occurrence of diseases which could pose harm to animals and humans (zoonotic diseases). Detection of zoonotic diseases outbreaks is crucial to BAF, as it is the task of the Authority to implement measures for the prevention of animal diseases." [3] The FAO has also been helping to build capacity in Fiji on detection of zoonotic disease and conducted a project, in collaboration with Fijian authorities and help from Belgium, to " minimise the spread of zoonotic diseases such as Leptospirosis, Brucellosis and Bovine Tuberculosis among livestock farmers and households." [4] There is a website for the Biosecurity Authority of Fiji (BAF) which provides all necessary and relevant information, notifications and guidelines. [5]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, "Using technology to track zoonotic diseases in Fiji," [http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail-events/en/c/1106470/] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, "Reducing the spread of Zoonotic diseases in Fiji," [http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail-events/en/c/447291/] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [http://www.baf.com.fj/] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.2.1b

**Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence of a national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. There is no evidence of this on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2] However, there is some mention of it in the Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines 2016, released by Fiji's Ministry of Health. These guidelines reference names of multiple viruses including a category for Influenza-Like Illnesses under which SARS (Severe acute respiratory syndrome) is noted as one of the sources of infection. The guidelines provided include varied reporting depending on the type of the influenza: SARS to be reported to the Divisional and Subdivisional Medical Officers (DMO, SDMO); a new type of influenza is to be reported to the WHO (World Health Organization) under the IHR (International Health Regulations). The guidelines also contain directions for management, investigation & prevention control. [3] It is also worth noting that the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the UN, has noted on its website in 2018 that: "the Biosecurity Authority of Fiji (BAF) is implementing information technologies in the effort to predict potential occurrence of diseases which could pose harm to animals and humans (zoonotic diseases). Detection of zoonotic diseases outbreaks is crucial to BAF, as it is the task of the Authority to implement measures for the prevention of animal diseases." [4] The FAO

has also been helping to build capacity in Fiji on detection of zoonotic disease and conducted a project, in collaboration with Fijian authorities and help from Belgium, to " minimise the spread of zoonotic diseases such as Leptospirosis, Brucellosis and Bovine Tuberculosis among livestock farmers and households." [5] There is a website for the Biosecurity Authority of Fiji (BAF) which provides all necessary and relevant information, notifications and guidelines. There is no evidence of a plan, strategy, or guidelines that identifies pathways for transmission of zoonotic diseases from animals to humans on the website of the BAF. [6]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<https://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Agriculture. [<https://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines." [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 28 October 2020.

[4] Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN. "Using technology to track zoonotic diseases in Fiji." [<http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail-events/en/c/1106470/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN. "Reducing the spread of Zoonotic diseases in Fiji." [<http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail-events/en/c/447291/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Fiji. Biosecurity Authority of Fiji. [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 28 October 2020.

### 1.2.1c

**Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There are national guidelines that account for the surveillance of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern and plans to control such pathogens. Fiji's Ministry of Health has released Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines in 2016. These guidelines reference names of: anthrax, brucellosis, leptospirosis, tuberculosis, zika, etc. The guidelines reference in detail elements of Fiji's surveillance and control of diseases, including roles of laboratories, external partners (World Health Organization), etc. According to the report, some roles include: "Receive urgent notifications within 24 hours of suspected or confirmed cases of urgent notifiable diseases (National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System-NNDSS); Provide monthly reports on urgent notifications and outbreaks to the Fiji MHMS (Medical Health Management System), including epidemiological analyses such as case numbers by (by age, sex, and Division), disease incidence, epidemic curves, and outbreak thresholds; Provide technical advice and assistance as requested by Divisions and medical officers; Conduct risk assessment of diseases of public health importance, determine seriousness of public health events and the likelihood of international spread; Notify WHO of potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) under IHR 2005; Report syndromic surveillance data to PPHSN (Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network); Liaise with external partners as required, including WHO, SPC, PPHSN, US CDC, NGOs, and researchers.; Manage the Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS) including oversight of data collection, collation and feedback on indicator-based syndromic surveillance and event-based surveillance of communicable disease threats and their verification, risk assessment and investigation/response as required." [1]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.2.1d

**Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of a national strategy on zoonotic disease and therefore there is also no evidence of a department, agency or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries in Fiji. The Biosecurity Authority of Fiji is close to this definition, but there is no evidence that it functions across multiple ministries and deals with both human and animal health. According to its website, "The Biosecurity Authority of Fiji (BAF) was established under the Biosecurity Promulgation in December 2008. BAF is mandated to protect Fiji's agricultural sector from the introduction and spread of animal and plant pests and diseases, facilitate access to viable agro-export markets and ensure compliance of Fiji's agro-exports to overseas market requirements. BAF manages quarantine controls at our borders to minimise the risk of exotic pests and diseases entering the country. It also provides import and export inspection and certification to help retain Fiji's favourable animal, plant and human health status and wide access to overseas export markets." [1] It is to be noted that the FAO has also been helping to build capacity in Fiji on detection of zoonotic disease and conducted a project, in collaboration with Fijian authorities and help from Belgium, to " minimise the spread of zoonotic diseases such as Leptospirosis, Brucellosis and Bovine Tuberculosis among livestock farmers and households." [2] There is also no evidence of such a unit through the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. [3,4] There is a unit, within the Ministry of Health, named the Fiji Centre for Communicable Disease Control (FCCDC) but there is no evidence that it functions across national ministries, although it does liaise with the WHO and other international partners. [5]

[1] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN, "Reducing the spread of Zoonotic diseases in Fiji," [<http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail-events/en/c/447291/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

### 1.2.2a

**Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. There is no evidence of such a mechanism on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2]. This could not be confirmed through any national sources and there are no newer reports available. There is one academic study from 2016 that notes that Fiji, amongst other countries in the region, has a "lack of funds, lack of technical capacity, shortage of veterinarians, high turnover of in-country officials and lack of awareness on the impacts of animal diseases on public health that were constraining active disease surveillance. During the development and implementation of the surveys, constraints highlighted were outdated census data on farm numbers and cattle population, lack of funds for mobilisation of officials to carry out the surveys, lack of equipment



for collecting and processing samples, lack of staff knowledge on blood sampling, geographical difficulties and security in accessing farms." [3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Andrew Tukana, Robert Hedlef, and Bruce Gummow. "Brucella abortus surveillance of cattle in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and a case for active disease surveillance as a training tool," *Tropical Animal Health and Production*, October 2016. [<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11250-016-1120-8> ] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.2.2b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has a national mechanism for animal disease surveillance and therefore there is also no evidence of laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners). There is no evidence of such regulations on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2]. This could not be confirmed through any national sources and there are no newer reports available. There is one academic study from 2016 that notes that Fiji, amongst other countries in the region, has a "lack of funds, lack of technical capacity, shortage of veterinarians, high turnover of in-country officials and lack of awareness on the impacts of animal diseases on public health that were constraining active disease surveillance. During the development and implementation of the surveys, constraints highlighted were outdated census data on farm numbers and cattle population, lack of funds for mobilisation of officials to carry out the surveys, lack of equipment for collecting and processing samples, lack of staff knowledge on blood sampling, geographical difficulties and security in accessing farms." [3] There was no specific reference on legislation.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Andrew Tukana, Robert Hedlef, and Bruce Gummow. "Brucella abortus surveillance of cattle in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and a case for active disease surveillance as a training tool," *Tropical Animal Health and Production*, October 2016. [<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11250-016-1120-8> ] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.2.2c

**Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g. wild animals, insects, other disease vectors, etc.) There is no evidence of such surveillance activities on the websites of Fiji's Biosecurity Authority, the Ministry of Health, or the Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2,3]. There is no mention of this in the Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines. [4] There was also no evidence found through any national sources and there are no newer reports available. There is one academic study from 2016 that notes that Fiji, amongst other countries in the region, has a "lack of funds, lack of technical capacity, shortage of veterinarians, high turnover of in-country officials and lack of awareness on the impacts of animal diseases on public health that were constraining active disease surveillance.

During the development and implementation of the surveys, constraints highlighted were outdated census data on farm numbers and cattle population, lack of funds for mobilisation of officials to carry out the surveys, lack of equipment for collecting and processing samples, lack of staff knowledge on blood sampling, geographical difficulties and security in accessing farms." [5]

[1] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Andrew Tukana, Robert Hedlef, and Bruce Gummow. "Brucella abortus surveillance of cattle in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and a case for active disease surveillance as a training tool," Tropical Animal Health and Production, October 2016. [<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11250-016-1120-8> ] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

### 1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

## 1.2.4 Animal health workforce

### 1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.05

2018

OIE WAHIS database

### 1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 26.41

2018

OIE WAHIS database

## 1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

### 1.2.5a

**Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has a national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulation or plan that includes mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. There is no evidence of such a mechanism on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture [1,2]. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a mechanism and there is no public health institute or national laboratory system separate from the Ministry of Health. Despite this, Fiji's Ministry of Health has released Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines in 2016 - but there is no specific evidence of such mechanisms in the plan. [3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.3 BIOSECURITY

### 1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

#### 1.3.1a

**Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has in place a record, updated within the past 5 years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities. There is no evidence of such records on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3]. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a mechanism and there exists no separate national public health institute, or separate laboratory system, or Ministry of Research. There is a regional biosecurity plan, that includes Fiji, run by the Pacific Community but it focuses only on biosafety areas and there is no evidence of specific record-taking. [4] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [5] According to VERTIC's database on biosecurity legislation, Fiji passed a legislation on Biological and Toxic Weapons in 2011 but there is no evidence of any records, or plans for records/inventories.

[6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Pacific Community (SPC) "The Regional Biosecurity Operating Procedures," [<http://bif.lrd.spc.int/alien-invasive-species-2/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Vertic. "National Implementation Measures - Biosecurity," [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

### 1.3.1b

**Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. There is no evidence of such legislation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3]. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a mechanism and there exists no Ministry of Research. Fiji does have a national laboratory within its Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it addresses these matters. [1] There is a regional biosecurity plan, that includes Fiji, run by the Pacific Community but it focuses only on biosafety areas, such as plant inspection and not dual-use or intentional misuse, and there is no evidence of specific regulations. [4] According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosecurity in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Pacific Community (SPC) "The Regional Biosecurity Operating Procedures," [<http://bif.lrd.spc.int/alien-invasive-species-2/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.3.1c

**Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. There is also no evidence of biosecurity legislation. There is no evidence of such an agency on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence.[1,2,3]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a specific agency and there exists no Ministry of Research. Fiji does have a national laboratory within its Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence of such responsibility for such regulations. [1] According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons conventions legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosecurity in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available . [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Pacific Community (SPC) "The Regional Biosecurity Operating Procedures," [<http://bif.lrd.spc.int/alien-invasive-species-2/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.3.1d

**Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. There is also no evidence of biosecurity legislation. There is no evidence of such an action on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence.[1,2,3]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such action and there exists no Ministry of Research. Fiji does have a national laboratory within its Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has taken such actions [1]. According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosecurity in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Pacific Community (SPC) "The Regional Biosecurity Operating Procedures," [<http://bif.lrd.spc.int/alien-invasive-species-2/>]

Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.3.1e

**Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has an in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen. There is no evidence of such an capacity on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a capacity and there exists no separate national public health institute and there is no Ministry of Research. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a capacity. [1]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

### 1.3.2a

**Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji requires biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. There is no evidence of biosecurity legislation in Fiji. There is no evidence of such training or approach on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such requirements of training and there exists no separate national public health institute, or Ministry of Research. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. [1] According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosecurity in the terms above. [5] Fiji

has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Pacific Community (SPC) "The Regional Biosecurity Operating Procedures," [<http://bif.lrd.spc.int/alien-invasive-species-2/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

#### 1.3.3a

**Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?**

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. There is no evidence of such regulations on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such action and there exists no separate national public health institute, or Ministry of Research. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosecurity in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed

15 September 2020.

### 1.3.4 Transportation security

#### 1.3.4a

**Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (Categories A and B) in Fiji. There is no evidence of such regulations on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defence, or the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. [1,2,3,4] There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [5] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such action and there exists no separate national public health institute, or separate laboratory system and no Ministry of Research. According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements on biosecurity in the terms above. [6] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [7]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport [<http://www.moit.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[7] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

#### 1.3.5a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation, regulation, or other guidance in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and pathogens with pandemic potential in Fiji. There is no evidence of such an legislation on these matters on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defence, or the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism.[1,2,3,4]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [5] After subsequent attempts to



search national sources, there was no public evidence of such legislation and there exists no separate national public health institute, or separate laboratory system and no Ministry of Research. According to VERTIC's database on biosecurity legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosecurity in the terms above. [6] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [7]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport [<http://www.moit.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[7] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.4 BIOSAFETY

### 1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

#### 1.4.1a

**Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Fiji does have some legislation in place on biosafety, but no public evidence it covers the prevention of accidents that involve the release of harmful biological substances. There is a Biological Promulgation Act of 2008, but it focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues and there is no information on preventing accidental and unintentional misuse and release. The Act notes: "it has adopted strategic and integrated approach which prevents the entry of animal and plant pests and diseases into the Fiji Islands, controls their establishment and spread in the Fiji Islands, regulates the movement of animal and plant pests and diseases and of animals and plants and their products, facilitates international cooperation in respect of animal and plant diseases and for related matters." There is also no evidence about safety when working dangerous pathogens. [1] There is no evidence of such an legislation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence.[2,3,4]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [5] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such laws and there exists no separate national public health institute or Ministry of Research. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. [1] According to VERTIC's database on biosecurity legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosafety in the terms above. [6] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available . [7]

[1] Biological Promulgation Act 2008, Fiji, [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC099041/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

- [2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [3] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [4] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [5] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [6] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [7] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.4.1b

#### Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Fiji has an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. Fiji has Biosecurity Authority Fiji which manages quarantine controls at the borders to minimise the risk of exotic pests and diseases entering the country. It also provides import and export inspection and certification to help retain Fiji's favorable animal, plant and human health status and wide access to overseas export markets. However, there is no evidence that this authority is not about preventing accidental infection, exposure when handling pathogens of high consequences in a medical or laboratory setting.[1] There is a Biological Promulgation Act of 2008, but it focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues and there is no information on preventing accidental and unintentional misuse and release. The Act notes: "it has adopted strategic and integrated approach which prevents the entry of animal and plant pests and diseases into the Fiji Islands, controls their establishment and spread in the Fiji Islands, regulates the movement of animal and plant pests and diseases and of animals and plants and their products, facilitates international cooperation in respect of animal and plant diseases and for related matters." [2] There is also no evidence about safety when working dangerous pathogens. There is no evidence of such an legislation on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture [3,4]. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such laws and there exists no separate national public health institute or Ministry of Research. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. [3] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997. [5] According to VERTIC's database on biosecurity legislation, Fiji passed a legislation on Biological and Toxic Weapons in 2011 but there is no evidence of an established agency for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulation. [6]

- [1] Fiji. Biosecurity Authority of Fiji. [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [2] Biological Promulgation Act 2008. Fiji. [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC099041/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [4] Fiji. Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [5] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [6] Vertic. "National Implementation Measures - Biosecurity." [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

## 1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

### 1.4.2a

**Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji requires biosafety training. Despite this, Fiji has signed and ratified the Cartagena Protocol - or Convention on Biological Diversity - which requires "Parties to have appropriate institutional mechanisms and infrastructure, well-trained human resources, adequate funding, access to relevant information and other types of capacities." But there is no evidence that the protocol has been adopted or implemented by Fiji. [1] There is no additional evidence of this requirement however on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture.[2,3]. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of additional legislation and there exists no Ministry of Research or separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. According to VERTIC's database on biosecurity legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements for biosafety in the terms above. [4] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [5]

[1] The Convention on Biological Diversity, "The Cartagena Protocol," [[https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb\\_art22.shtml](https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb_art22.shtml)] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

### 1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

#### 1.5.1a

**Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual use research. There is no evidence of such an assessment on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3] There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and

quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such an assessment and there exists no separate national public health institute, or separate laboratory system and no Ministry of Research. According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any assessment in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.5.1b

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has a national policy requiring oversight of dual use research, such as research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and/or pathogens with pandemic potential. There is no evidence of such a policy on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a policy and there exists no separate national public health institute, or separate laboratory system and no Ministry of Research. According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any policy in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

### 1.5.1c

**Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or other dual use research. There is no evidence of such an agency on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3]. There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such an agency and there exists no separate national public health institute, or separate laboratory system and no Ministry of Research. According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any agent in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[5] Vertic. "National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

[6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

### 1.5.2a

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has national legislation, regulation, policy, or other guidance, requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before it is sold. There is no evidence of such an legislation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Defence. [1,2,3] There is evidence of a Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, but its mandate focusses on biosafety and quarantine issues. [4] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such legislation and there exists no separate national public health institute, or separate laboratory system and no Ministry of Research. According to VERTIC's database on biological weapons convention legislation, Fiji has legislation - the Biological and Toxin Weapons Decree of 2011, but this law does not detail any regulations or requirements biosecurity in the terms above. [5] Fiji has submitted Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention, with its last report in 1997, but there is no additional information on what is contained in the report as it is not publicly available. [6]

- [1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [3] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [4] Fiji, Biosecurity Authority of Fiji, [<http://www.baf.com.fj/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [5] Vertic."National Implementation Measures - Biological Weapons Convention [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/f/>] Accessed 15 September 2020.
- [6] Confidence Building Measures under the Biological Weapons Convention. [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/fiji>] Accessed 15 September 2020.

## 1.6 IMMUNIZATION

### 1.6.1 Vaccination rates

#### 1.6.1a

##### Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2019

World Health Organization

#### 1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2020

OIE WAHIS database

## Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

### 2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

#### 2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

##### 2.1.1a

**Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?**

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient public evidence that Fiji has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. Fiji has a 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' released in 2016, on the website of the Ministry of Health which confirms the tests conducted by the Fiji Centre for Communicable Disease Control (FCCDC) National Public Health Laboratory (NHPL) for PCR testing for Influenza. There other tests performed include Chikungunya ELISA, Clamydia NAAT, Dengue ELISA, HIV confirmation ELISA, HIV Viral load, Leptospirosis ELISA, Measles ELISA, Rubella Elisa, Rotavirus ELISA, Water samples and other communicable diseases (not mentioned in the document). [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a specific capacity and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a capacity. [2] There is also no evidence of these capacities through the latest WHO Country Cooperation Strategy, released in 2017. [3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

[3] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022' [<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

##### 2.1.1b

**Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?**

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Fiji has a national plan for conducting testing during a public health emergency which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing. Fiji has a "Fiji Coronavirus (COVID-19) Preparedness and Response Plan 2020" under the Ministry of Health and Medical Services. It has been designed to provide an overview of the activities and responses to be undertaken in order to prepare for, and respond

to, an outbreak (either single or multiple cases) of COVID-19 in Fiji. Under this plan, there is mention about laboratory testing being one of the seven components of the framework of action. [1]. Further, the website of Ministry of Health and Medical Services has all information on COVID-19 swab test requirements, cost of testing, criteria for testing of COVID-19 in Fiji etc. [2]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. 'Fiji Coronavirus (COVID-19) Preparedness and Response Plan' [http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/COVID-19-Fiji-Preparedness-and-Response-Plan-2020.pdf] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[2] COVID-19. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [http://www.health.gov.fj/covid-19/] Accessed 20 September 2020.

[4] The Fijian Government. [https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Home] Accessed 20 September 2020.

## 2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

### 2.1.2a

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Fiji has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA]). While Fiji does have a National Public Health Laboratory, there is no mention of any certification for this as per the website of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture or the FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022. [1,2,3] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such an accredited facility and there exists no separate national public health institute.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[3] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022' [https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942] Accessed 21 September 2020.

### 2.1.2b

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Fiji has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance (EQA) review. While Fiji does have a National Public Health Laboratory, there is no mention of it being subject to an EQA as per the website of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or in the FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022. [1,2,3] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such an accredited facility and there exists no separate national public health institute.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[3] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'



[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

## 2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

### 2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

#### 2.2.1a

**Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that there is a nationwide system for transporting specimens from the site of collection to a laboratory for testing. There is no evidence of such a system on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. [1,2,3]. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a system and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a system. [1]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport [<http://www.moit.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

### 2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

#### 2.2.2a

**Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence of a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. Fiji has a 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines 2016' on the website of the Ministry of Health that lists the teams and personnel responsible for scaling up and scaling down the response to an outbreak. According to these guidelines, the scale of response would be assessed on a case-by-case basis. While it mentions relying on external sources and partners such as the World Health Organization (WHO), NGOs for assistance, there is no consideration for private laboratories, academic laboratories or public health laboratories. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such an accredited facility and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is no further evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. [2,3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

## 2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

### 2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

#### 2.3.1a

**Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?**

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,  
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis  
= 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that Fiji is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease, but it is not clear if this is analysed on a daily basis. According to the Ministry of Health's 2016 report on Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines, there is a system and "the event-based surveillance system is intended to monitor unusual events, not only in humans, but also in birds, animals, and the environment. Events of interest include diseases in humans, clusters of diseases, unusual patterns in diseases (e.g. more severe cases), unexpected deaths, high work/school absenteeism, die offs in birds or animals, contaminated food or water, and environmental hazards (e.g. chemical spills)." [1,2] There is no additional information on how often the information is collected, etc. There is no information on the website of the Ministry of Agriculture. [3] Despite this, there is no evidence from any of the above sources that this data is being analysed on a daily basis.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

#### 2.3.1b

**Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential PHEIC to the WHO within the last two years. According the WHO Disease Outbreak News page, Fiji did not report a potential PHIEC within the last two years. [1] There is some evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health of COVID-19 laboratory samples being shared with the the WHO collaborating center reference laboratory - the Victorian Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory (VIDRL) at the Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity in Melbourne, Australia. [2] There is no evidence evidence that COVID-19 was reported as a PHEIC to the WHO on the websites of the Ministry of Health & Medical Services, and the Fijian Government. [3,4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/en/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. 'COVID-19 Updates'. [[www.health.gov.fj/covid-19-updates/](http://www.health.gov.fj/covid-19-updates/)] Accessed 9

October 2020.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 29 September 2020.

[4] The Fijian Government. [<https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Home>] Accessed 29 September 2020.

## 2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

### 2.3.2a

**Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji's government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national level. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a system and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a system. [1] According to the Ministry of Health 2016 report on Communicable Disease Surveillance, it is a longterm strategic goal to have this "conducted electronically, using standard case investigation forms that are accessible using smart phones or tablets. Electronic data collection will allow completed forms to be submitted immediately to a central database, and for data to be collated rapidly. Smart phones can also collect GPS coordinates during case investigations, and allow mapping of cases and detection of clusters." [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

### 2.3.2b

**Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji's government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national level. There is likewise no publicly available evidence of any real time data collection. After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a system and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a system. [1] According to the Ministry of Health 2016 report on Communicable Disease Surveillance, it is a longterm strategic goal to have this "conducted electronically, using standard case investigation forms that are accessible using smart phones or tablets. Electronic data collection will allow completed forms to be submitted immediately to a central database, and for data to be collated rapidly. Smart phones can also collect GPS coordinates during case investigations, and allow mapping of cases and detection of clusters." [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

## 2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

### 2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

#### 2.4.1a

##### Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji commonly uses electronic health records. When searching national sources, there is no publicly available evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a policy and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such use. [1] There is one academic study from 2016 on electronic medical records in Fiji: "an assessment of the status of health informatics in Fiji through interviews and surveys conducted in Fiji with the patients, medical practitioners and staff of Ministry of Health. Our results show that a fully integrated web based EMR system is needed to fulfil the computational and technological requirements of public hospitals in Fiji. The obstacle in place has been the lack of computers in Fijian government hospitals. Additional security measures may need to be implemented for web based EMRs. Patient confidentiality, organizational ICT policies and the country's legislation need to have such concerns addressed at their respective levels to support the technical measures." [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Swaran S. Ravindra, Rohitash Chandra and Virallikattur S. Dhenesh. "A Study of the Management of Electronic Medical Records in Fijian Hospitals," [<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.03659.pdf>] Accessed September 21 2020.

#### 2.4.1b

##### Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in their country. When searching national sources there is no publicly available evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a policy and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. [1] There was one academic study from 2016 on electronic medical records in Fiji: "an assessment of the status of health informatics in Fiji through interviews and surveys conducted in Fiji with the patients, medical practitioners and staff of Ministry of Health. Our results show that a fully integrated web based EMR system is needed to fulfil the computational and technological requirements of public hospitals in Fiji. The obstacle in place has been the lack of computers in Fijian government hospitals. Additional security measures may need to be implemented for web based EMRs. Patient confidentiality, organizational ICT policies and the country's legislation need to have such concerns addressed at their respective levels to support the technical measures." [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Swaran S. Ravindra, Rohitash Chandra and Virallikattur S. Dhenesh. "A Study of the Management of Electronic Medical

Records in Fijian Hospitals," [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.03659.pdf] Accessed 21 September 2020.

### 2.4.1c

**Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji commonly uses electronic health records and therefore there are no data standards to ensure data is comparable. When searching national sources there is no publicly available evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a policy and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. There was one academic study from 2016 on electronic medical records in Fiji: "an assessment of the status of health informatics in Fiji through interviews and surveys conducted in Fiji with the patients, medical practitioners and staff of Ministry of Health. Our results show that a fully integrated web based EMR system is needed to fulfil the computational and technological requirements of public hospitals in Fiji. The obstacle in place has been the lack of computers in Fijian government hospitals. Additional security measures may need to be implemented for web based EMRs. Patient confidentiality, organizational ICT policies and the country's legislation need to have such concerns addressed at their respective levels to support the technical measures." [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Swaran S. Ravindra, Rohitash Chandra and Virallikattur S. Dhenesh. "A Study of the Management of Electronic Medical Records in Fijian Hospitals," [https://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.03659.pdf] Accessed 21 September 2020.

## 2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

### 2.4.2a

**Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human and wildlife surveillance to share data in Fiji. There is no evidence of such an assessment on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture or the Department of Environment. [1,2,3] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a mechanism and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. According to Fiji's AMR plan, one of its strategic objectives is to: "Establish a One Health antimicrobial resistance surveillance system that integrates and shares data from human, environment and agricultural sectors and establish a surveillance technical group with an endorsed TOR to develop the One Health surveillance system to include routine, sentinel and surveys." [4]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [https://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [https://www.agriculture.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Department of Environment. [https://doefiji.wordpress.com/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation, "Library of National Action Plans - Fiji National AMR Action Plan," [https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

## 2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

### 2.4.3a

**Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji makes de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks publicly available via reports. When searching national sources, there is no supporting evidence of such data on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a system and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a system. [1] There is no evidence of any reports on the website of the Ministry of Agriculture either. [2]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [https://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Agriculture. [http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

### 2.4.3b

**Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is some evidence that the Fijian Government makes de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available, but not via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites. There are updates available on the website of the Ministry of Health, but they are updated sporadically varying between a day and a week. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such an accredited facility and there exists no separate national public health institute.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health & Medical Services, 'COVID-19 Updates', [http://www.health.gov.fj/covid-19-updates/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

## 2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

### 2.4.4a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has laws, regulations, or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. When searching national sources there is no supporting evidence of such regulations on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such regulations and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national public health laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such regulations.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<https://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

#### 2.4.4b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has laws, regulations, or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals. There is likewise no evidence of protection from cyber attacks. When searching national sources there is no supporting evidence of such regulations on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such regulations and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national public health laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such regulations. [1]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<https://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

### 2.4.5 International data sharing

#### 2.4.5a

**Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?**

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has made a commitment via public statements, legislation, and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region for more than one disease or only for one disease. When searching national sources there is no supporting evidence of such a commitment on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a commitment and there exists no separate national public health institute. There is national public health laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a commitment. [1] There is evidence of a regional laboratory network involving Fiji called LabNet run by the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). The PPHSN is a voluntary network of countries and organisations dedicated to the promotion of public health surveillance and appropriate response to the health challenges of 22 island countries in the Western Pacific - including Fiji. But there is no evidence on their website of such an arrangement of sharing. [2] According to the 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines', the responsibilities of the Fiji Centre for Communicable Diseases

(FCCDC) includes to "Report syndromic surveillance data to PPHSN". But there is no evidence of this being carried out, or of such a commitment through any sources to share data during a public health emergency. [3]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<https://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[2] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "LabNet" [<https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/intro.htm>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

## 2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

### 2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

#### 2.5.1a

**Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to conduct contact tracing in the event of an active or future public health emergency. The FIJI COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Plan present on the website of the Ministry of Health provides information on the surveillance, risk assessment and response-"Upon detection of a COVID-19 event, a rapid response team (RRT) must be mobilised to undertake an investigation and conduct control measures including contact tracing and contact management" although no further detail is provided.[1] According to the 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' released in 2016, there is a section under each disease that accounts for the 'Mangement of Contact(s)'. [2] There is no other evidence available on the website of the Ministry of Health & Medical Services. [3]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. 'Fiji Coronavirus (COVID-19) Preparedness and Response Plan' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/COVID-19-Fiji-Preparedness-and-Response-Plan-2020.pdf>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<https://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 9 October 2020.

#### 2.5.1b

**Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?**

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0



**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that Fiji provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention.

As per the "Entry Requirements for Repatriating Fiji Citizens", all the citizens on their arrival to Fiji will enter a mandatory 14-day quarantine in a government designated border quarantine facility. The Fijian Government will cover the accommodation and meals. Further, all testing costs are covered by the Fijian Government. If at any point a citizen tests COVID-19 positive then the government will cover all costs. [1]

As per the 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' released in 2016, in certain cases of diseases, isolation is advised, but there is no apparent provision of any wraparound services provided. [2]

There is no further evidence available on the websites of the Ministry of Health, and there exists no separate national public health institute. [3]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Commerce. Trade. Tourism & Transport. 'Entry Requirements for Repatriating Fiji Citizens' [https://www.mcttt.gov.fj/covid-19-guidelines/covid-19-important-guidelines/] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. 'Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines' [http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [https://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

### 2.5.1c

**Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that Fiji makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites. The website of the Ministry of Health provides regular updates but it does not contain any information related to contact tracing. [1] The website of the Fijian Government does not provide any such information either. [2]

[1] COVID-19, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/covid-19/] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] The Fijian Government, [https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Home] Accessed 21 September 2020.

## 2.5.2 Point of entry management

### 2.5.2a

**Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of an active or future public health emergency. There is no evidence of this on the websites of the Ministry of Health, or the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, and there exists no separate national public health institute [1,2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport [<http://www.moit.gov.fj/>] Accessed 21 September 2020.

## 2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

### 2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

#### 2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in Fiji. According to the US National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health, Fiji participated in a three-year pilot which started in 2016 and was delivered in country by epidemiologists working for Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network partners. The programme consisted of five courses: four one-week classroom-based courses and one field epidemiology project. Sessions were structured so that theoretical understanding was achieved through interaction and reinforced through practical hands-on group activities, case studies and other interactive practical learning methods. There is no evidence that this has been held in Fiji before and also no evidence that it will be renewed. [1] When searching national sources however, there is no publicly available evidence that resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP) according to the Ministry of Health. [2]. There is also no evidence of this on CDC or TEPHINET websites. [3,4]

[1] US National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health. "Lessons learnt from a three-year pilot field epidemiology training programme," [<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5635332/>]

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 24 September 2020.

[3] Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. "Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP)," [<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fetp/index.htm>] Accessed 24 September 2020.

[4] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. [<https://www.tephinet.org/>] Accessed 24 September 2020.

### 2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence Fiji's available field epidemiology training programs are explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV. ) According to the US National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health, Fiji participated in a three-year pilot which started in 2016 and was delivered in country by epidemiologists working for Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network partners. The programme consisted of five courses: four one-week classroom-based courses and one field epidemiology project. Sessions were structured so that theoretical understanding was achieved through interaction and reinforced through practical hands-on group activities, case studies and other interactive practical learning methods. But there was no specific mention of FETPV or animal health professionals taking part. [1] When searching national sources however, there is no publicly available evidence of this according to the Ministry of Health. [2] There is also no evidence of this on CDC or TEPHINET websites. [3,4]

[1] US National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health. "Lessons learnt from a three-year pilot field epidemiology training programme," [<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5635332/>]

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 24 September 2020.

[3] Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. "Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP)," [<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fetp/index.htm>] Accessed 24 September 2020.

[4] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. [<https://www.tephinet.org/>] Accessed 24 September 2020.

## 2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

### 2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

### 3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

#### 3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

##### 3.1.1a

**Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?**

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

There is some evidence that Fiji has an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential. The National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan (HEADMAP), updated in 2013 and available on the website of the Ministry of Health & Medical Services, provides specifics on the Ministry of Health's response and outlines its specific roles in epidemics/pandemic or other crises: "At Level 3 (out of four levels of crisis), particularly if it involves a health emergency such as pandemic influenza or a natural disaster that produces mass casualties, one or more of the regional health authorities and the associated health infrastructure may be overwhelmed. In these circumstances, the role of the ministry must adapt and expand. It is for this reason that a physical EOC is established at Level 3. The ministry must be prepared to exercise a surge response and, in extreme circumstances, to assume a direct command and control function over the health emergency response." In addition to the activation of a Ministry of Health-specific emergency operations center, there is information on the roles and responsibilities of all personnel involved, and laboratories in response to a public health outbreak for each disease. [1]

[1] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

##### 3.1.1b

**If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?**

Yes = 1, No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Fiji's overarching national public health emergency response plan, which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, has been updated in the last 3 years. The National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan (HEADMAP) available on the website of the Ministry of Health & Medical Services, provides specifics on the Ministry of Health's response and outlines its specific roles in epidemics/pandemic or other crises. This was last updated in 2013.

[1] Fiji. National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25

September 2020.

### 3.1.1c

**If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence of the plan having an overarching plan is in place which includes considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations. The Ministry of Health's National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan does include considerations for paediatric and other vulnerable population. Specifically, it notes that it is a core task of the Ministry of Health's Operation Centre as well as the National Emergency Operations Centre to: "identify vulnerable groups, i.e. lactating mothers, children under five (preschool children), the elderly, diabetics etc, and alert emergency teams to their presence." There is no specific mention of procedures beyond that. [1,2]

[1] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

### 3.1.1d

**Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

## 3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

### 3.1.2a

**Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has mechanism to engage with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. According to Fiji's National Emergency Plan, released in 1995: "Government involvement in disaster rehabilitation is not limited to the rehabilitation of government assets. It also includes support to communities and the private sector in their rehabilitation efforts. This support is given to compliment the efforts of communities and the private sector, and should not replace those efforts." But there is no information on a specific engagement mechanism or other private sector engagement during an emergency outbreak. There is also no evidence if the plan is still in effect or has

been updated. Similarly, in the Ministry of Health's response through its National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, there is reference to the private sector role, but it falls short of a specific mechanism. [1,2] There is no mention of any such mechanisms in the plans present in the Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines. [3]

[1] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

### 3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

#### 3.1.3a

**Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?**

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Fiji has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) for one disease, COVID-19.

The FIJI COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Plan present on the website of the Ministry of Health provides instructions for implementing non-pharmaceutical interventions under three scenarios. In the first case scenario, during the first cases when the imported source and exposure groups are known, NPIs such as restrictions on border control, mass gatherings and social distancing have been stipulated. The second case calls for measures including greater isolation capacity, when there are small clusters of cases with a known source. In the third case scenario, when there are large clusters with no confirmed source, "public health measure involves broader measures to enforce social distancing such as travel restrictions, school closures, and minimising social and cultural activities." [1]

[1] FIJI COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Plan [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/COVID-19-Fiji-Preparedness-and-Response-Plan-2020.pdf>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

## 3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

### 3.2.1 Activating response plans

#### 3.2.1a

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

**- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?**

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is some evidence that the Fiji has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Health has released a COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Plan on their website. The plan mentions drawing from several other existing plans, policies and guidelines, such as the National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan (updated in 2013), the Fiji National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan, 2006 and the Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines, 2016. [1]

There is no evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year. There is no evidence that Fiji has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year according to the Simulation Exercise page of the World Health Organisation (WHO). [2] There is no such evidence from the websites of the Ministry of Health or Fiji's National Disaster Management Office. [3,4]

[1] Fiji COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Plan [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/COVID-19-Fiji-Preparedness-and-Response-Plan-2020.pdf>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): Simulation Exercise" [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>] Accessed 13 October 2020.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 13 October 2020.

[4] Fiji. The National Disaster Management Office. [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 13 October 2020.

### 3.2.1b

**Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?**

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that Fiji has, in the past year, undergone an exercise to identify a list of gaps and best practices through either an after action review (post emergency response) or a biological threat-focused International Health Regulations (IHR) exercise with the WHO. There is evidence that an after action review was conducted in Fiji in July-September 2020. However, there is no evidence of an associated report from this review. [1] There is no additional evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health or Fiji's National Disaster Management Office. [2,3] There is also no information on this in the WHO country strategy for Fiji [4].

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO) "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations and Health Security (SPH)," [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>] Accessed 28 September 2020..

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 28 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 28 September 2020.

[4] World Health Organization, 'Fiji-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022' [<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 28 September 2020.

## 3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

### 3.2.2a

**Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. There is no evidence that Fiji has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year according to the Simulation Exercise page of the World Health Organisation (WHO). [1] There is no such evidence from the websites of the Ministry of Health or Fiji's National Disaster Management Office. [2,3]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security (SPH): Simulation Exercise" [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>] Accessed 28 September 2020..

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 28 September 2020..

[3] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 28 September 2020.

## 3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

### 3.3.1 Emergency response operation

#### 3.3.1a

**Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Fiji does have in place an Emergency Operations Center. There is a National Disaster Management Office that is tasked with dealing with major emergencies, including coordinating health emergencies. It has a National Emergency Operations Centre within it and also works with the Ministry of Health. According to National Emergency Plan, from 1997, its aim is: "to outline arrangements for control and coordination of all disaster related activities in Fiji. This will serve to: "reduce (or avoid, if possible) the potential losses and other adverse effects of known hazards; assure prompt and appropriate disaster assistance to disaster survivors, when necessary; achieve rapid and durable recovery following any occurrence." [1,2] Additionally, there is more specifics on the Ministry of Health's response through its National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan which outlines its specific roles in pandemic or other crises: "At Level 3 (out of four levels of crisis), particularly if it involves a health emergency such as pandemic influenza or a natural disaster that produces mass casualties, one or more of the regional health authorities and the associated health infrastructure may be overwhelmed. In these circumstances, the role of the ministry must adapt and expand. It is for this reason that a physical EOC is established at Level 3. The ministry must be prepared to exercise a surge response and, in extreme circumstances, to assume a direct command and control function over the health emergency response." However, there is no evidence that this plan from 1997 is still in place or has been updated. In addition to the activation of a Ministry of Health-specific emergency operations center, there is more information on the response plan through this document. [3]

[1] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.



[3] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

### 3.3.1b

**Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji's National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) is required to conduct a drill at least once per year. The National Disaster Management Plan, 1995 does not detail these measures. [1] There is also no evidence of such measures website of the Ministry of Health or its National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, 2013-2017 [2,3].

[1] Fiji. National Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji. National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

### 3.3.1c

**Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji's National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) can conduct, or has conducted within the last year, a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. The National Disaster Management Plan, 1995 does not detail these measures. [1] There is also no evidence of such measures website of the Ministry of Health or its National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, 2013-2017. [2,3]

[1] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

## 3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

### 3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

#### 3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?
- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack) or that there are publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack). The National Disaster Management Plan, 1995 on the website of the National Disaster Management Office does not detail these measures or anything related to a deliberate biological event. [1,2] There is also no evidence of this on websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Defence. [3,4]

[1] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Ministry of Defence and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

## 3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

### 3.5.1 Public communication

#### 3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has in place this strategy and therefore also no evidence of how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs during a public health emergency. Fiji does have a national public health emergency response plan and has a National Emergency Operations Centre within it and also works with the Ministry of Health. According to National Emergency Plan, from 1997, its aim is: "to outline arrangements for control and coordination of all disaster related activities in Fiji. This will serve to: "reduce (or avoid, if possible) the potential losses and other adverse effects of known hazards; assure prompt and appropriate disaster assistance to disaster survivors, when

necessary; achieve rapid and durable recovery following any occurrence." [1,2] But there is no reference on a specific communications plan or strategy. There is also no evidence that this plan from 1995 is still in place or has been updated. According to the plan, "Promptness, timeliness and the appropriate form of communication within the organization, and with the outside environment, must be given due emphasis and attention for information to be useful, decisions and control to be effective, and processes to be efficient. Both the vertical and horizontal channels of communication within the organization must be followed. Each level of the organization (National, Divisional and District) must have in place appropriate timeframes and formats for reports which must be adhered to by the organizations. The National Disaster Management Office will provide guidance in the preparation of these. Attention is drawn to the importance of situation reports upwards between Emergency Operation Centres, prompt conveyance of decisions and instructions, and prompt acquisition, receipt, recording and conveyance of information at the Emergency Operation Centres. It is the responsibility of the authorities at the various organizational levels to ensure that adequate emphasis is given to the need for timely and orderly communication." [2] Additionally, there is no specific reference on the Ministry of Health's response through its National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan which outlines its specific roles in pandemic or other crises. There is reference to the importance of communications, etc., but no detailed outlining of the process [3]

[1] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

### 3.5.1 Risk communication planning

#### 3.5.1a

**Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of a national public health emergency response plan according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Disaster Management Office that is tasked with dealing with major emergencies, including coordinating health emergencies - done in consultation with the Ministry of Health. It has a National Emergency Operations Centre within it and also works with the Ministry of Health, but there is no information on a specific risk communication plan. [2,3] There is no evidence that this National Disaster plan from 1995 is still in place or has been updated. Additionally, there is no specific information on such a plan in the Ministry of Health's response through its National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan. According to the plan, " Promptness, timeliness and the appropriate form of communication within the organization, and with the outside environment, must be given due emphasis and attention for information to be useful, decisions and control to be effective, and processes to be efficient. Both the vertical and horizontal channels of communication within the organization must be followed. Each level of the organization (National, Divisional and District) must have in place appropriate timeframes and formats for reports which must be adhered to by the organizations. The National Disaster Management Office will provide guidance in the preparation of these. Attention is drawn to the importance of situation reports upwards between Emergency Operation Centres, prompt conveyance of decisions and

instructions, and prompt acquisition, receipt, recording and conveyance of information at the Emergency Operation Centres. It is the responsibility of the authorities at the various organizational levels to ensure that adequate emphasis is given to the need for timely and orderly communication." [4,5]

[1] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

### 3.5.1c

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has in place a risk communication plan and therefore none that designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. There is no evidence in the National Disaster Management Plan,1995 or the National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan,2013. [1,2] As per the Communicable Diseases Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines 2016, the Risk Communication Plan should be available on the Ministry of Health website's repository as a part of the appendix, but there is no evidence of it. [3,4]

[1] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

## 3.5.2 Public communication

### 3.5.2a

**In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?**

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is some evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation. The website as well as the Facebook pages of the Ministry of Health have regularly shared updates on the possible misinformation or disinformation during COVID19. [1,2,3,4] There is insufficient evidence that suggests that these are active well beyond active emergencies.

[1] Facebook, Ministry of Health & Medical Services- Fiji [<https://www.facebook.com/MHMSFiji/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Facebook, The Fijian Government [<https://www.facebook.com/FijianGovernment>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] The Fijian Government, [<https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Home>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 3.5.2b

**Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?**

No = 1, Yes = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. There is no evidence of this on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] There is no evidence of this on national or international news outlets such as the Fiji Times, the Fijian Broadcasting Commission (FBC), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), or the Cable News Network (CNN). [2,3,4,5]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 13 October 2020.

[2] Fiji Times, [<https://www.fijitimes.com/>] Accessed 29 October 2020.

[3] Fijian Broadcasting Commission (FBC) [<https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/>] Accessed 29 October 2020.

[4] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) [<https://www.bbc.com/>] Accessed 29 October 2020.

[5] Cable News Network (CNN) [<https://edition.cnn.com/>] Accessed 29 October 2020.

## 3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

### 3.6.1 Internet users

#### 3.6.1a

**Percentage of households with Internet**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 49.97**

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

#### 3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 117.83

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

#### 3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.87

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

### 3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

#### 3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.44

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

## 3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

### 3.7.1 Trade restrictions

#### 3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence that Fiji has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak. There is no evidence of this on the website of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism and Transport. [1,2,3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism and Transport, [<https://www.mcttt.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 3.7.1b

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence that Fiji has issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. There is no evidence of this on the website of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism and Transport. [1,2,3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Commerce, Trade, Tourism and Transport, [<https://www.mcttt.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 3.7.2 Travel restrictions

### 3.7.2a

**In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is evidence that the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. In response to the COVID-19 case in Fiji, travel restrictions were imposed on a few countries including China, Italy, Iran Spain and South Korea, which was then extended to all foreign nationals who have been in the United States of America, Europe and UK within 14 days of their travel to Fiji. [1] Currently, as per the website of Department of Immigration, travel to Fiji is severely restricted, with a host safety measures and entry through boats is considered only a case-by-case basis. [2]

[1] The Fijian Government, 'PM Bainimarama's Statement on the first COVID-19 Case in Fiji' [<https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Centre/Speeches/PM-BAINIMARAMA%E2%80%99S-STATEMENT-ON-THE-FIRST-COVID-19-C>] Accessed 13 October 2020.

[2] Department of Immigration, [<http://www.immigration.gov.fj/>] Accessed 13 October 2020.

## Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

### 4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

#### 4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

##### 4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 86

2015

WHO; national sources

##### 4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 337.52

2018

WHO; national sources

##### 4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that Fiji has a public workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. There is no evidence of this on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Education. [1,2]. The website for the the Ministry of Employment, Productivity and Industrial Relations is currently unavailable and down for maintenance. [3]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Education, [<http://www.education.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Employment, Productivity and Industrial Relations, [<http://www.employment.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.



## 4.1.2 Facilities capacity

### 4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 200

2016

WHO/World Bank; national sources

### 4.1.2b

**Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient public evidence that Fiji has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation facility located within the country. However, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Health & Medical Services shared an updated list of COVID-19 isolation facilities in Fiji which are present in 5 hospitals and 3 community isolation facilities across Fiji. [1] There is no further evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health or its National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, 2013-2017 [2,3].

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, 'Updated List of COVID-19 Isolation Facilities'

[<http://www.health.gov.fj/media-release-updated-list-of-covid-19-isolation-facilities/>] Accessed 13 October 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 25 September 2020.

[3] Fiji. National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 25 September 2020.

### 4.1.2c

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years or there is no evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. There is no supporting evidence on the website of Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [1]

There is no such information available on the Fiji National Disaster Management Plan [2]. There is no evidence available on

the Fiji National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan (HEADMAP). [3] There is no evidence available on the Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines [4]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 7 April 2021.

[2] Fiji. The National Disaster Management Office. [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 7 April 2021

[3] Fiji. National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 7 April 2021

[4] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines." [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 7 April 2021

## 4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

### 4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

#### 4.2.1a

**Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?**

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence of a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs. Fiji does have a national procurement protocol in place and has its own sub-agency called the Fiji Procurement Office and it is housed in the Ministry of Economy. This protocol services all departments, including the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. There is no specific reference that it can be used to acquire medical or laboratory supplies, but the protocol caters to all agencies of the government. [1] According to the Ministry of Health, the WHO also helps with: "assisting with procurement of supplies of laboratory diagnostic tests and medicines". This same report notes that, "Fiji's Pharmaceutical and Biomedical Services (FPBS) Centre is responsible for coordinating procurement, warehousing and distribution of supplies required for outbreak responses. Supplies include "medicines, medical consumables and medical laboratory reagents and consumables." [2,3] There is no evidence of any plan, strategy or guidelines, on the website of the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Agriculture. [2,4]

[1] Fiji Procurement Office. [<http://www.fpo.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines." [<http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji. Ministry of Agriculture. [<https://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 29 October 2020.

## 4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

### 4.2.2a

**Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji maintains a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of these capacities according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Disaster Management Plan but there is no mention of stockpiles in the plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such supplies on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Disaster Management Office, or the Ministry of Defense and National Security. [3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organization. 'Fiji-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[2] Fiji. National Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[4] Fiji. The National Disaster Management Office. [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[5] Fiji. Ministry of Defense and National Security. [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

### 4.2.2b

**Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has in place a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of these capacities according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Disaster Management Plan but there is no mention of stockpiles in the plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such stockpiles on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Disaster Management Office, or the Ministry of Defense and National Security. [3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organization, 'Fiji-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

#### 4.2.2c

**Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency.

There is no evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile according to the WHO.

[1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Disaster Management Plan but there is no mention of annual review of the national stockpiles to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency in the plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such annual review of the national supplies on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Disaster Management Office, or the Ministry of Defense and National Security. [3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organization. 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[2] Fiji. National Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[4] Fiji. The National Disaster Management Office. [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[5] Fiji. Ministry of Defense and National Security. [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 5 April 2021.

### 4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

#### 4.2.3a

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of this in the National Disaster Management Plan, or the Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines 2016. [1,2]

There is no evidence a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of this on the website of Ministry of Health, the National Disaster Management Office, or the Ministry of Defense and National Security. [3,4,5]

[1] Fiji. National Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response

Guidelines." [http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[4] Fiji. The National Disaster Management Office. [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php] Accessed 5 April 2021.

[5] Fiji. Ministry of Defense and National Security. [https://www.defence.gov.fj/] Accessed 5 April 2021

#### 4.2.3b

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of this in the National Disaster Management Plan, or the Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines 2016. [1,2]

There is no evidence a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of this on the website of Ministry of Health, the National Disaster Management Office, or the Ministry of Defense and National Security. [3,4,5]

[1] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\_PLAN.pdf] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response Guidelines," [http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Fiji-Communicable-Disease-Surveillance-and-Outbreak-Response-Guidelines-2016-1.pdf] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [https://www.defence.gov.fj/] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

### 4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

#### 4.3.1a

**Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has in place a plan, program, or guidelines for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of a these capacities according to

the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Emergency Plan but there is no mention of countermeasures in the plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such countermeasures on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Disaster Management Office, or the Ministry of Defense and National Security. [3,4,5]

[1] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

#### 4.3.2a

**Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has in place a plan to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. There is no evidence of such a plan according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Emergency Plan but there is no mention of such a plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Disaster Management Office, or the Ministry of Defense and National Security. [3,4,5] There is evidence of a regional laboratory network involving Fiji called LabNet run by the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN), but no evidence of a plan in place to respond to such emergencies. [6]

[1] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [<https://www.defence.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[6] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "LabNet" [<https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/intro.htm>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

### 4.4.1 Access to healthcare

#### 4.4.1a

**Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?**

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

#### 4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 99.9

2015

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

#### 4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 50.33

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 4.4.2 Paid medical leave

#### 4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

### 4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

#### 4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has issued legislation, a policy or a public statement committing to provide prioritized health care services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. There is no evidence of such legislation according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Emergency Plan but there is no mention of such legislation in the plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such legislation on the website of the Ministry of Health or the National Disaster Management Office. [3,4]

[1] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'  
[https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\_PLAN.pdf] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Defense and National Security, [https://www.defence.gov.fj/] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

### 4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

#### 4.5.1a

**Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. There is no evidence of such a system according to the WHO. [1] There is no evidence of such a system on the website of the Ministry of Health or the National Disaster Management Office [2,3]. Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Disaster Management Plan, 1995 but there is no specific mention of this in the Plan. [4] There is also no specific mention of this in the Ministry of Health's National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, 2013. [5]

[1] World Health Organization. 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'  
[https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. National Disaster Management Plan. [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\_PLAN.pdf] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji. The National Disaster Management Office. [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Fiji. National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan. [http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\_HEADMAP\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\_2013-2017.pdf] Accessed 27 September 2020.



#### 4.5.1b

**Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency in both the public and private sector. There is no evidence of such a system on the website of the Ministry of Health or the National Disaster Management Office [1,2]. Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Disaster Management Plan, 1995 but there is no specific mention of this in the Plan. [3] There is also no specific mention of this in the Ministry of Health's National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan, 2013. [4]

[1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. National Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji. The National Disaster Management Office. [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji. National Health Emergencies and Disaster Management Plan. [[http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5\\_HEADMAP\\_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan\\_2013-2017.pdf](http://www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/5_HEADMAP_Health-Emergencies-and-Disaster-Management-Plan_2013-2017.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

### 4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

#### 4.6.1a

**Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has a national public health system monitoring for and tracking the number of health care associated infections that take place in healthcare facilities. There is no evidence of this according to the WHO. [1] There is no evidence of such a system on the website of the Ministry of Health. [2] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a mechanism and there exists no separate national public health institute outside of the Ministry of Health. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a monitoring system.

[1] World Health Organization. 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

### 4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

#### 4.7.1a

**Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has a national requirement for ethical review (e.g. from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial. There is no evidence of such a requirement on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such requirement and there exists no separate national public health institute outside of the Ministry of Health. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. [1] There is also no evidence of this in Fiji's Pharmaceutical Profile. [2] There was no evidence of this in articles or other non-governmental sources.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and WHO, "Pharmaceutical Profile - Fiji," [[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji\\_PSCP\\_NarrativeFeb18.pdf](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji_PSCP_NarrativeFeb18.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

#### 4.7.1b

**Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to treat ongoing pandemics. There is no evidence of such a process on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a process and there exists no separate national public health institute outside of the Ministry of Health. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a process. There is also no evidence of this in Fiji's Pharmaceutical Profile. [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and WHO, "Pharmaceutical Profile - Fiji," [[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji\\_PSCP\\_NarrativeFeb18.pdf](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji_PSCP_NarrativeFeb18.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

### 4.7.2a

**Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has a government agency for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans. There is no evidence of such a requirement on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a process. [1] There is also no evidence of this in Fiji's Pharmaceutical Profile. [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and WHO, "Pharmaceutical Profile - Fiji,"

[[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji\\_PSCP\\_NarrativeFeb18.pdf](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji_PSCP_NarrativeFeb18.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 4.7.2b

**Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies. There is no evidence of such a requirement on the website of the Ministry of Health. [1] After subsequent attempts to search national sources, there was no public evidence of such a mechanism and there exists no Ministry of Research. There is national laboratory housed within the Ministry of Health, but there is no evidence that it has such a requirement. [1] There is also no evidence of this in Fiji's Pharmaceutical Profile. [2]

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and WHO, "Pharmaceutical Profile - Fiji,"

[[https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji\\_PSCP\\_NarrativeFeb18.pdf](https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/coordination/Fiji_PSCP_NarrativeFeb18.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

### 5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

#### 5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

##### 5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Health Organization

#### 5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

##### 5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that pandemics are integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or that there is a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics in Fiji. There is no evidence of this according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Emergency Plan. According to the Plan, the Ministry of Health is an agency tasked with response-leads in the NEOC. The Ministry of Health is responsible for epidemiology/disease surveillance. But there is no specific mention of anything resembling a risk reduction plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such a plan with on the website of the Ministry of Health or the National Disaster Management Office. [3,4] It is worth noting that, according to a 2018 article from the UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction, Fiji is planning a disaster risk reduction strategy that would be aligned with the Sendai Framework on risk reduction. [5]

[1] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] UN Office of Disaster Risk Reduction, "Fiji to Adopt new DRR Policy," [<https://www.unisdr.org/archive/57134>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

### 5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

#### 5.2.1a

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has cross-border agreements, protocols or MOUs with neighbouring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies. There is no evidence of this according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Emergency Plan but there is no specific mention of this in the Plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such a plan on the website of the Ministry of Health or the National Disaster Management Office [3,4]. Fiji is also a member of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). While the PPHSN provides a mechanism for communication regarding public health emergencies, including those of international concern (PacNet), this is for communicating the emergency to the WHO. [5] There is no evidence that Fiji has any bilateral or multilateral treaties with states in the regions on these matters.

[1] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "LabNet" [<https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/intro.htm>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

#### 5.2.1b

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that Fiji has cross-border agreements, protocols or MOUs with neighbouring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. There is no evidence of this according to the WHO. [1] Fiji does have a National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) and also has a National Emergency Plan but there is no specific mention of this in the Plan. [2] There is also no evidence of such a plan on the website of the Ministry of Health or the National Disaster Management Office [3,4]. Fiji is also a member of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). While the PPHSN provides a mechanism for communication regarding public health emergencies, including those of international concern (PacNet), this is for communicating the emergency to the WHO. [5] There is no evidence that Fiji has any bilateral or multilateral treaties with states in the region on these matters.

[1] World Health Organization, 'FIJI-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy: 2018-2022'

[https://iris.wpro.who.int/handle/10665.1/13942] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\_PLAN.pdf] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [http://www.health.gov.fj/] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[4] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "LabNet" [https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/intro.htm] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

### 5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

#### 5.3.1a

**Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?**

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1b

**Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1c

**Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

### 5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

## 5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

### 5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

## 5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

### 5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

#### 5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

#### 5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5 FINANCING

### 5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

#### 5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. According to the Fiji Budget Estimates 2020-21, there has been an increase in the allocation of



funds to the Ministry of Health & Medical Services in lieu of the COVID-19 pandemic with measures to prevent future threats of the Pandemic but there no allocation that is specific to address epidemic threads. [1] There is no such information on the website of the Ministry of Health & Medical Services, or the Fijian Government. [2]

[1] Parliament of Fiji, "Fiji Budget Estimates 2020-21" [[http://www.parliament.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Budget-Estimates-2020-2021\\_1.pdf](http://www.parliament.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Budget-Estimates-2020-2021_1.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

### 5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

### 5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is some evidence of a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency. Fiji is an International Development Association (IDA) eligible borrower,

according to the World Bank and therefore is eligible for a World Bank pandemic financing facility. [1,2] It should be noted that Fiji was eligible to access IDA WB funding for the first time in 2019. [3] After checking national sources, there is no additional evidence of government-reserved funds for this. Fiji does have a National Emergency Plan but there is no specific mention of this in the Plan. [3] There is also no evidence of such a plan on the website of the Ministry of Health or National Disaster Management Office [4,5].

[1] International Development Association (IDA), World Bank. "Borrowing Countries"

[<https://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] World Bank, "Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) Operational Brief for Eligible Countries December 2017,"

[<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[3] World Bank, 'Major Boost for Fiji with Additional World Bank Support', [<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/26/major-boost-for-fiji-with-additional-world-bank-support>] Accessed 29 October 2020.

[4] Fiji, National Disaster Management Plan, [[http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO\\_PLAN.pdf](http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/images/Legislature/NDMO_PLAN.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[5] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[6] Fiji, The National Disaster Management Office, [<http://www.ndmo.gov.fj/index.php>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

## 5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

### 5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available information that Fijian leaders have made public commitments either to support other countries or to improve its own capacity to address epidemic threats. Despite this, Fiji has improved its own domestic capacity to address zoonotic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity in the past three years. According to the Global Health Security Funding Tracking Dashboard, Fiji has 22.62 million USD committed from foreign donors from 2014-2020; out of this total 34.63 million USD has been dispersed. This funding has come from New Zealand, the World Health Organization, the International Development Association, The European Union and Australia. This funding has been spent on a range of capacities including: the development of national legislation, workforce development, national laboratory, zoonotic disease, etc. But there is no clear evidence that this capacity building addresses epidemics. [1] Additionally, there is no supporting evidence of such commitments via the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [2,3]

[1] Georgetown University. "Georgetown Health Security Tracking Dashboard" [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/#analysis/FJ/r>] Accessed 27 September 2020. [1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that Fiji has, in the past 3 years, requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. There is evidence via the Global Health Security Funding Tracker that Fiji has invested donor finances to improve domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. The tracker notes that Fiji has received funding from multiple donors to enhance their capacity on global security preparedness, including just over USD 1.75 million from New Zealand towards preparedness. [1] However, there is no evidence that Fiji has provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats. [2,3]

[1] Georgetown University. "Georgetown Health Security Tracking Dashboard" [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/#analysis/FJ/r>] Accessed 27 September 2020. [1] Fiji. Ministry of Health and Medical Services. [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji. Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## 5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

### 5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

#### 5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. There is no evidence of this on the website of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2] After subsequent attempts to search national sources and external documentation, there was no public evidence of such a plan and there exists no Ministry of Research.

[1] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, [<http://www.health.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Agriculture, [<http://www.agriculture.gov.fj/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 5.6.1b

**Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has not shared samples in accordance with the PIP framework in the past two years. There is no evidence of this via local media or via the WHO reports on the PIP framework. [1]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework" [<https://www.who.int/influenza/pip/en/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 5.6.1c

**Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no public evidence that Fiji has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. There is no such evidence via the local media or through the WHO reports. [1] There is some evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health of COVID-19 laboratory samples being shared with the the WHO collaborating center reference laboratory - the Victorian Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory (VIDRL) at the Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity in Melbourne, Australia. [2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework" [<https://www.who.int/influenza/pip/en/>] Accessed 27 September 2020.

[2] Fiji, Ministry of Health and Medical Services, 'COVID-19 Updates', [[www.health.gov.fj/covid-19-updates/](http://www.health.gov.fj/covid-19-updates/)] Accessed 13 October 2020

## Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

### 6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

#### 6.1.1 Government effectiveness

##### 6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 43

2020

Transparency International

### 6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

### 6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

#### 6.1.3a

**What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?**

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

#### 6.1.4a

**How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?**

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

**Current Year Score: 4**

2021

Economist Intelligence

#### 6.1.4b

**What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?**

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

**Current Year Score: 4**

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

#### 6.1.4c

**How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?**

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.5 Armed conflict

### 6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.6 Government territorial control

### 6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.7 International tensions

### 6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

### 6.2.1 Literacy

#### 6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 99.08

2017



United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);  
The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.2 Gender equality

### 6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

**Current Year Score: 0.64**

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.3 Social inclusion

### 6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

**Current Year Score: 0.1**

2013

World Bank; Economist Impact

### 6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

The share of employment in the informal sector in Fiji is 60% according to the Fiji Labour Market Update, 2016 by the International Labour Organization.

[1] International Labour Organization, "Fiji Labour Market Update, 2016" [[https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-suva/documents/publication/wcms\\_465248.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-suva/documents/publication/wcms_465248.pdf)] Accessed 27 September 2020.

### 6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

**Current Year Score: 1**

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.2.4 Public confidence in government

### 6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.5 Local media and reporting

### 6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.6 Inequality

### 6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.37

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

### 6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

#### 6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

#### 6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

#### 6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

### 6.4.1 Urbanization

#### 6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 56.75

2019

World Bank

### 6.4.2 Land use

#### 6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: 3.65

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

### 6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

#### 6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

### 6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

#### 6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 67.34

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
World Factbook

#### 6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 923.4

2019

WHO

#### 6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 5.62

2019

World Bank

### **6.5.1d**

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 26.7

2018

World Bank

### **6.5.1e**

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 30.2

2016

WHO

## **6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation**

### **6.5.2a**

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 93.79

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### **6.5.2b**

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 95.07

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### 6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

#### 6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 254.43

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

#### 6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

#### 6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018