

Dominican Republic

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Dominican Republic. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Dominican Republic.

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Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

1.1.1a

Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Dominican Republic has a national plan for the surveillance, detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. The Dominican Republic does not appear in the World Health Organisation (WHO) library of national action plans, nor is the country part of the Global Database of Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment. [1,2] There are no mentions of an AMR plan on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Publica), the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) or the national laboratory system. [3,4, 5]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of national action plans". 2020. [<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment". 2020. [<https://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[4] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Laboratorio Nacional Dr Defillo. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/.sec-laboratorio-nacional>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.1.1b

Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2 , Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of testing for some, if not all, of the priority AMR pathogens in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic is a member of the Latin American Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network (ReLAVRA), an international network supported by the Pan American Health Organization that collects reliable, timely and reproducible microbiological data. [1,2] A 2014 ReLAVRA report (most recent available online), confirms that the laboratory system in the Dominican Republic conducts tests for drug resistant Salmonella, Shigella, S.aureus, N.gonorrhoea, E.coli and K.pneumonia. [3] There is insufficient evidence of testing for other priority AMR pathogens via other sources. The National Laboratory of Microbiology, the National Public Health Laboratory Dr. Defillo (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Publica Dr. Defillo), is among the participants of the Latin-American programme for quality control in bacteriology and resistance to antimicrobials [4,5]. However, there is no mention of testing or other specifics in the website of the laboratory or in that of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (MISPAS, Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura).

[6,7,8].

[1] Pan American Health Organization. "ReLAVRA - Países miembros".

[https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6251:2017-relavra-paises-participantes&Itemid=42428&lang=es] Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Pan American Health Organization. "Red Latinoamericana de Vigilancia de la Resistencia a los Antimicrobianos - ReLAVRA". [https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13682:relavra-home&Itemid=42427&lang=es] Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Pan American Health Organization. "ReLAVRA - Documentos técnicos".

[https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6246:2017-relavra-documentos-tecnicos&Itemid=42431&lang=en] Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Organizacion Panamericana de la Salud OPS/OMS y INEI - ANILS, 2018, "Programa Latinoamericano de Control de Calidad en Bacteriología y Resistencia a los antimicrobianos" <http://antimicrobianos.com.ar/programa-latinoamericano-de-control-de-calidad-en-bacteriologia-y-resistencia-a-los-antimicrobianos/>. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Revista Panamericana de Salud Publica, 2008, "Control de calidad en bacteriología y resistencia a los antimicrobianos: siete años de experiencia en America Latina

[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Maria_De_La_Paz_Ade/publication/277665431_Control_de_calidad_en_bacteriologia_y_resistencia_a_los_antimicrobianos_siete_anos_de_experiencia_en_America_Latina/links/556f5bde08aefcb861dda064/Control-de-calidad-en-bacteriologia-y-resistencia-a-los-antimicrobianos-siete-anos-de-experiencia-en-America-Latina.pdf]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, "Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Publica Dr. Defillo".

[<http://www.msp.gob.do/sec-laboratorio-nacional>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[7] Ministerio de Salud y Tecnologia, Informacion publica, [<http://www.msp.gob.do/front>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[8] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed on December 26, 2020.

1.1.1c

Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that shows that the government conducts surveillance for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. The websites of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) and the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales) do not have any public information about testing soil and waterways for AMR pathogens. [1,2] The Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) conducted a (one-off) testing on AMR related to poultry in 2016, with the co-operation of the Interamerican Agricultural Co-operation Institute (IICA) and Ohio University in the US. [3] No evidence of a plan could be found on the WHO library of national plans, either [4].

[1] Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. [<http://ambiente.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2017. "Ministry of Health affirms that it has not identified antimicrobial resistance in chicken in the country (Ministerio de Salud afirma no se ha identificado resistencia antimicrobiana en pollo en el país)". [<http://sespas.gov.do/Ministerio-Salud-afirma-no-se-ha-identificado-resistencia>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of national action plans". 2020. [<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial->

resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

1.1.2a

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no clear evidence that national legislation requires prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans in the Dominican Republic. Law No. 50-88 of 1988 on Drugs and Controlled Substances requires the use of prescriptions for all medications that fall within the categories I, II and III of controlled substances, which include drugs with the potential of abuse, lack of safety conditions for use under medical supervision, medication with severe restrictions and those that can result in physical or psychological dependence. None of the categories mention antibiotics specifically. [1] A regulation under this law, the Rule No. 246-06 on Medication of 2006, which regulates the fabrication, elaboration, quality control, circulation, distribution, commercialisation, publicity and import of medication, also requires prescriptions for controlled substances. Antibiotics are defined in this norm as "biological medications". There is however no statement that antibiotics require prescription for human use. [2] In practice, antibiotics are commonly bought over the counter. [3] As a result, in 2017 the Patronage of the General Hospital Plaza de la Salud, a large public hospital in the capital city, advised the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (MISPAS, Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) on the need to control the use of antibiotics. The Patronage's representative, Dr Julio Cesar Castanos Guzman, indicated that recent measures taken by the MISPAS to control the sale of certain pharmaceuticals, such as sexual stimulants and energy drinks, have been favourable, and should be replicated for antibiotics. [3] There is no further information provided on the website of the health ministry, nor on the WHO library of national plans. [4, 5]

[1] Republica Dominicana. Law 50-88 of 1988. "On Drugs and Controlled Substances (Sobre Drogas y Sustancias Controladas de la Republica Dominicana)". [http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/legislations/pdf/do/ley_50-88.pdf]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Republica Dominicana. 2006. "Medicines Regulation (Reglamento sobre Medicamentos)". [http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/text.jsp?file_id=467730]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Listin Diario. 2017. "Controls proposed on sale of antibiotics (Plantea aplicar control en venta de antibioticos)". [<https://listindiario.com/la-republica/2017/08/19/478874/plantea-aplicar-control-en-venta-de-antibioticos>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of national action plans". 2020. [<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.1.2b

Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that national legislation requires prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals in the Dominican Republic. Both the Law No. 50-88 on Drugs and Controlled Substances (1988), which regulates all aspects of drugs and controlled substances in the Dominican Republic, and the Rule No. 246-06 of 2006, which underlies Law No. 50-88, include veterinarians

among the list of professionals that are authorised to prescribe medication (for animals). However, antibiotics are not included in the categories that require the use of a prescription. [1,2] There is no further information provided on the website of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura), nor on the WHO library of national plans. [3, 4,5]

[1] Republica Dominicana. Law 50-88 of 1988. "On Drugs and Controlled Substances (Sobre Drogas y Sustancias Controladas de la Repu?blica Dominicana)". [http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/legislations/pdf/do/ley_50-88.pdf]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Republica Dominicana. 2006. "Medicines Regulation (Reglamento sobre Medicamentos)". [http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/text.jsp?file_id=467730]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of national action plans". 2020. [<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.2 ZOO NOTIC DISEASE

1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.1a

Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease in the Dominican Republic. In 2015, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), in conjunction with the Pan American Health Organisation/World Health Organisation (PAHO/WHO) launched the Action Plan on prevention and control of diseases transferred by *Aedes aegypti* (dengue, chikungunya and zika virus) (Plan de acciones de prevención y control de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes aegypti* (dengue, chikungunya y zika virus)). [1,2] The plan comprises a campaign to be launched in schools, with the objective of reducing the risks that waste represents by eliminating vector hatcheries, and promoting the application of larvicides and educational actions for the collection and final management of solid waste as a result of the elimination of mosquito breeding sites in homes, among others. These initiatives only apply to *Aedes aegypti*. [1] The Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo, the country's largest public university, has an institute for the study of zoonotic disease. The centre is tasked with study and research in the field of public health and zoonoses, focusing on the epidemiological and ecological studies related to zoonotic disease. It currently has two projects of Leptospirosis and another related to Leishmaniosis. [3] The health ministry conducts informative information and issues health warnings and an early alert module on leptospirosis, dengue and H1N1 on its website. [4] The ministry also conducts regular surveillance of leptospirosis through a special vigilance and early alert module. There is no evidence of this being part of a wider strategy. [5]

[1] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO)/World Health Organisation (WHO). 2015. "Ministry of Health and PAHO/WHO launch action plan for prevention and control of illnesses transmitted by *Aedes aegypti* (Ministerio de Salud y OPM/OMS lanzan Plan de acciones de prevencion y control de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes aegypti*)".

[https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1917:plan-acciones-prevencion-enfermedades&Itemid=213]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] De la Cruz, Santiago. 2015 "Health ministry defines strategies against dengue, chikungunya and zika (Salud define

estrategias contra el dengue, chikungunya y zika)". [<https://listindiario.com/la-republica/2015/11/12/395892/salud-definir-estrategias-contra-el-dengue-chikungunya-y-zika>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo. [<https://uasd.edu.do/index.php/requisitos-de-ingreso-a-las-carreras2>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Leptospirosis". [<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/handle/123456789/953>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.2.1b

Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans, although there is evidence of individual plans for specific diseases. No evidence of an overarching document is available on the Ministry of Health and Agriculture websites [1,2]. There is evidence of an agency, named Center for Prevention and Control of Zoonotic Diseases (Centro de Prevención y Control de Enfermedades Transmitidas por Vectores y Zoonosis, CECOVEZ), which should supervise the vigilance and control over zoonotic diseases. Nevertheless, CECOVEZ does not have a website to confirm this. [1] There is evidence of specific plans addressing individual zoonotic diseases, such as dengue and leptospirosis [3, 4]. Additionally, according to the press, the recently-appointed director of CECOVEZ pledged to implement a plan against malaria and rabies [5]. The documentation available on the Action Plan on prevention and control of diseases transmitted by *Aedes aegypti* (dengue, chikungunya and zika virus) (Plan de acciones de prevención y control de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes aegypti* (dengue, chikungunya y zika virus)) mentions measures for risk identification and reduction such as the promotion of larvicides and educational actions for the collection and management of solid waste related which pose risk to the diffusion of mentioned diseases, but the plan itself is not accessible [6]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud publica. 2010. PROTOCOLO DE ATENCION PARA EL DIAGNÓSTICO Y TRATAMIENTO DE LA LEPTOSPIROSIS.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/953/ProtocoloAtencionDiagnostico%20yTratamientoLeptospirosis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] PAHO. 2005. Estrategia Ajustada de Gestión Integrada de Prevención y Control del Dengue en Centroamérica y República Dominicana. [<https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2010/EGI-CA-DOR%20AJUSTADO%20RevGV.pdf>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Resumen de Salud. September 2020. Cecovez se compromete a iniciar plan contra enfermedades transmitidas por vectores. [<https://www.resumendesalud.net/60-infectologia/23915-cecovez-se-compromete-a-iniciar-plan-contra-enfermedades-transmitidas-por-vectores>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[6] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO)/World Health Organisation (WHO). 2015. "Ministry of Health and PAHO/WHO launch action plan for prevention and control of illnesses transmitted by *Aedes aegypti* (Ministerio de Salud y OPM/OMS lanzan Plan de acciones de prevención y control de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes aegypti*)".

[https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1917:plan-acciones-prevencion-enfermedades&Itemid=213]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.2.1c

Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. Dominican Republic has a strategy to prevent and control diseases transmitted by the *Aedes aegypti* mosquito (dengue, chikungunya and zika). The strategy was developed by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) with the assistance of the Pan American Health Organisation/World Health Organisation (PAHO/WHO) in 2015. [1,2,3] The plan comprises a campaign to be launched in schools, with the objective of reducing the risks that waste represents by eliminating vector hatcheries, and promoting the application of larvicides and educational actions for the collection and final management of solid waste as a result of the elimination of mosquito breeding sites in homes, among others. [1] Prior to this, in 2004, the Dominican Republic had a joint strategy with Central American countries to prevent and control dengue. [4] The joint strategy integrated the main components for the control and prevention of the disease, including environmental sanitation, epidemiological surveillance, entomology, health promotion and social communication, and patient care and laboratories. [4] The health ministry also provides information and issues health warnings and an early alert module on leptospirosis, dengue and H1N1 on its website. [5,6] The ministry conducts regular surveillance of leptospirosis through a special vigilance and early alert module. [5] There is no evidence of this being part of a wider strategy. [7]

[1] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO)/World Health Organisation (WHO). 2015. "Ministry of Health and PAHO/WHO launch action plan for prevention and control of illnesses transmitted by *Aedes aegypti* (Ministerio de Salud y OPM/OMS lanzan Plan de acciones de prevencion y control de enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes aegypti*)".

[https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1917:plan-acciones-prevencion-enfermedades&Itemid=213]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] De la Cruz, Santiago. 2015 "Health ministry defines strategies against dengue, chikungunya and zika (Salud define estrategias contra el dengue, chikungunya y zika)". [<https://listindiario.com/la-republica/2015/11/12/395892/salud-define-estrategias-contra-el-dengue-chikungunya-y-zika>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Action plan for prevention and control of illnesses transmitted by *Aedes aegypti* (Plan de acciones prevencion y control enfermedades transmitidas por *Aedes Aegypti*, Dengue, Chikungunya and Zika Virus)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/oai/documentos/PLAN-DENGUE-CHIK-ZIKA-2015.pdf>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Ministerios de Salud de Centroamerica y Republica Dominicana. 2005. "Adjusted Strategy for Integrated Management of Dengue Prevention and Control in Central America and the Dominican Republic (Estrategia Ajustada de Gestio?n Integrada de Prevencio?n y Control del Dengue en Centroame?rica y Repu?blica Dominicana)".

[<http://www1.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2010/EGI-CA-DOR%20AJUSTADO%20RevGV.pdf>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Leptospirosis". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/leptospirosis>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[6] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2019. "Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin (Boletin Epidemiologico Semanal)". [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/docs/Boletines%20epidemiologicos/Boletines%20semanales/2019/Boletin%20Semanal%2052-2019.pdf>] Accessed December 26, 2020

[7] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.2.1d

Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (MISPAS, Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) and the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) follow up on specific zoonotic diseases. The health ministry has two relevant modules: the Early Detection Module, which monitors the endemic behaviour of emerging diseases, and the Module on Special Cases and Non-Transmittable Diseases, which conducts individual notification, clinical-epidemiological investigation, and control of communicable diseases and other events of importance. [1,2] Both modules include Leptospirosis among the monitored diseases. [3] The MISPAS Centre for the Control of Tropical Illnesses leads actions for the prevention and control of malaria, dengue and Schistosomiasis. [4] There is evidence of an organisation named Center for Prevention and Control for Zoonotic Diseases (Centro de Prevención y Control de Enfermedades Transmitidas por Vectores y Zoonosis, CECOVEZ), but its functions are unclear and there is no accessible website [5].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica, Direccion General de Epidemiologia. "Early Alert Module (Modulo de Alerta Temprana)". [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/modulo-de-alerta-temprana-sat/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica, Direccion General de Epidemiologia. "Special Vigilance Module (Modulo de Vigilancia Especial)". [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/modulo-de-vigilancia-especial-de-casos-y-no-transmisibles/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, Direccion General de Epidemiologia. "Epidemiological Bulletin (Boletin Epidemiologico)". [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/docs/Boletines%20epidemiologicos/Boletines%20semanales/2019/Boletin%20Semanal%2052-2019.pdf>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Centro Nacional para el control de enfermedades tropicales. [<http://msp.gob.do/sec-cencet>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica. 2020. Nuevo director del CECOVEZ implementerà plan para disminuir enfermedades transmitidas por vectores y zoonosis. [<https://www.msp.gob.do/web/?p=8518>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

1.2.2a

Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is sufficient evidence of a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. The Directorate of General Livestock (Direccion General de Ganaderia, DIGEGA) that is under the Ministry of Agriculture runs the "National Livestock Traceability Programme" (Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Animal, SINAT) to guarantee sanitary standards in the sector [1,2,3]. The SINAT is based on Resolution no. 82-2013 of the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) [4]. The SINAT includes a "National Pecuary Registry" (Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Pecuaria, SINARP), which registers animals and their owners, as well as veterinary facilities [1,2,3,4]. The DIGEGA aims to control brucellosis, tuberculosis, rabies, boophilus spp tick, classical swine fever, avian influenza and Newcastle disease in local bovine herds. [5] In order to register, livestock owners must contact the nearest DIGEGA office (by email or phone), deposit the cost of the livestock ear tags at the DIGEGA's bank account, and coordinate with a veterinary doctor a date for the application of the tags. In the event of the suspicion of disease, owners must contact

the DIGEGA via phone, or alternately fill out a form on the website. [4]

[1] Ministerio de Agricultura. "Agricultura implementa el Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Animal" <http://www.agricultura.gob.do/index.php/noticias/item/354-agricultura-implementa-el-sistema-nacional-de-trazabilidad-animal>. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Direccion General de Ganaderia. 2018. "La trazabilidad y la sanidad animal: modernizacion de la sanidad bovina en Republica Dominicana" <http://www.ganaderia.gob.do/index.php/component/k2/item/271-la-trazabilidad-y-la-sanidad-animal-modernizacion-de-la-sanidad-bovina-en-republica-dominicana>. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Direccion General de Ganaderia. Registro en el Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Pecuaria. <http://www.ganaderia.gob.do/index.php/servicios/item/262-registro-en-el-sistema-nacional-de-trazabilidad-pecuaria>. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Republica Dominicana. Regulation No.82-2013 of 25 April on the National Livestock Traceability System in the Dominican Republic. https://members.wto.org/crnattachments/2014/sps/DOM/14_3528_00_s.pdf. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Direccion General de Ganaderia. Servicios Direccion Sanidad Animal. <http://www.ganaderia.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/dir-sanidad-animal>. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.2.2b

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners). The Dominican Republic has a national traceability and registration system of livestock, but it is not focused on disease reporting. The National Livestock Traceability Programme (Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Animal) of the Directorate of General Livestock (Direccion General de Ganaderia) guarantees the confidentiality of the information provided in the National Livestock Registry (Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Pecuaria). [1] This is included in the Resolution No. 82-2013 of 2013 of the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura). [2] No further evidence is available on the Ministry of Health or Agriculture websites [3, 4].

[1] Ministerio de Agricultura. "Agriculture ministry implements National System of Animal Traceability (Agricultura implementa el Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Animal)". [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/index.php/noticias/item/354-agricultura-implementa-el-sistema-nacional-de-trazabilidad-animal>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Republica Dominicana. Regulation No. 82-2013 of 25 April 2013. "On the National Livestock Traceability System in the Dominican Republic". [https://members.wto.org/crnattachments/2014/sps/DOM/14_3528_00_s.pdf]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[4] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.2.2c

Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the country conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, MISPAS) has an "Entomology Programme" (Programa de Entomología) with the mission to monitor, prevent and control outbreaks of vector-borne diseases. The Programme measures the risk indices of the disease, provides technical support to health providers (both for prevention and upon the spread of the diseases), and watches out for the compliance of the norms regarding entomologic vigilance in the Dominican Republic. [1] Additionally, the MISPAS has several other programmes in place aimed at controlling diseases transmittable by vectors. These include a surveillance programme, the "Red de vigilancia entomologica de la Republica Dominicana" (entomologic vigilance network of the Dominican Republic), a network of vector control units at a local and provincial level, a vigilance system for the susceptibility of vectors to pesticides, a system of biological evaluation of pesticides of use and alternatives, and an entomology lab. [1] One programme, the "Entomology and Vector Control Programme" (Programa de Entomología y Control de Vectores) within the Ministry is tasked with coordinating and overseeing these tasks. [2] Besides the entomology programmes, the MISPAS has a filaria programme, an epidemiology programme, and a parasitology programme. The epidemiology programme covers surveillance and control of mosquito vectors for malaria, dengue and lymphatic filariasis." [1] In September 2018, the Minister of Health participated in the 56th Directing Council's 70th Session of the Regional Committee of the World Health Organisation for the Americas, where he ratified the country's commitment to vector control and increase vigilance and control. [3,4] There is no further information available on the Ministry of Health and Agriculture websites [5, 6].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Centro Nacional para el control de enfermedades tropicales, Informacion publica. <http://msp.gov.do/sec-cencet>. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Entomología y Control de Vectores" <http://www.msp.gov.do/cencet-web/documentos/ENTOMOLOGIA/DESCRIPCION%20ENTOMOLOGA%20Y%20CONTROL%20DE%20VECTORES.pdf>. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Organizacion Mundial de la Salud, Organizacion Panamericana de la Salud. 2018. "Plan de accion sobre entomologia y control de vectores 2018-2023" https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&category_slug=56-directing-council-spanish-9965&alias=45777-cd56-11-s-pda-entomologia-777&Itemid=270&lang=en. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Listin Diario, 2018. "Ministro de salud acuerda arreciar lucha contra vectores con directivos de OPS/OMS en Washington" <https://listindiario.com/la-republica/2018/09/26/534809/ministro-de-salud-acuerda-arreciar-lucha-contra-vectores-con-directivos-de-opsoms-en-washington>. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gov.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[6] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gov.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4 Animal health workforce

1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 7.81

2018

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 3.41

2018

OIE WAHIS database

1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no documented national plan or strategy document that includes private sector engagement for controlling or responding to zoonoses, but there are certain instances of collaboration. The National Livestock Traceability Programme (Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Pecuaria; SINARP) under the National System of Animal Traceability (Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Animal; SINAT) of the Directorate of General Livestock (Direccion General de Ganaderia) allows owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance. [1,2] SINAT also provides technical assistance to producers through the Unit of Animal Health. [3] Within the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) ,the National Centre for the Control of Tropical Illnesses (Centro Nacional para el Control de las Enfermedades Tropicales) conducts prevention activities in collaboration with private-sector entities. [4] There is no further information available on the Ministry of Health and Agriculture websites [5, 6].

[1] Ministerio de Agricultura. "Agriculture ministry implements National System of Animal Traceability (Agricultura implementa el Sistema Nacional de Trazabilidad Animal)". [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/index.php/noticias/item/354-agricultura-implementa-el-sistema-nacional-de-trazabilidad-animal>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Dominican Republic. Regulation No.82-2013 of 25 April 2013. "On the National Livestock Traceability System in the Dominican Republic". [https://members.wto.org/crnattachments/2014/sps/DOM/14_3528_00_s.pdf]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Direccion General de Ganaderia. "Animal Health Directorate (Direccion Sanidad Animal)".

[<http://www.ganaderia.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/dir-sanidad-animar>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] PAHO. Ministerio de Salud y OPS/OMS lanzan "Plan de acciones de prevención y control de enfermedades transmitidas por Aedes aegypti. [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1917:plan-acciones-prevencion-enfermedades&Itemid=213]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[6] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

1.3 BIOSECURITY

1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

1.3.1a

Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country has in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities. No such evidence could be found via the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales), the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the Law No. 64 of 2000 on the Environment and Natural resources, which enshrines environmental policies that the Dominican Republic has in place a record of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored/processed. [1,2,3] Law 219-15 on Biosecurity in Biotechnology (Ley de Seguridad de la Biotecnología) mandates that the Ministry Environments establish and maintain a registry of physical and juridical persons, public or private, which perform activities with live modified organisms, as well as on these. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that such registry exists [4]. Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [5] No further evidence could be found on the Ministry of Defense nor Agriculture websites, as well as on the VERTIC database [6, 7, 8].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales. [<https://ambiente.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Dominican Republic. Law 64-00 of 2000. "On the Environment and Natural Resources". [<http://ambiente.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Ley-No-64-00.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] FAO. Ley No. 219-15 sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología. G. O. No. 10815 del 30 de octubre de 2015. [<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/dom163723.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020

[5] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[7] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[8] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.3.1b

Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the Dominican Republic has in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. There is no evidence of such a law in the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database or on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, MISPAS), Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa), or Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura). [1,2,3,4] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [5]

[1] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.3.1c

Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations in the Dominican Republic. There is no publicly available evidence that the Dominican Republic has in place legislation related to biosecurity that applies to laboratories broadly. There is no evidence of such a law in the VERTIC database or on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, MISPAS), Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa), or Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura). [1,2,3,4] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [5] According to law 219 of 2015 on Biosecurity in Biotechnology (Ley No. 219-15 sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología), the Ministry of Environment is the national authority responsible for organizing, leading and controlling the activities related to modern biotechnology and biosecurity on the national territory. In performing such task, the Ministry is informed by the National Commission of Biosecurity (Comisión Nacional de Bioseguridad, CONABIO), which provides guidance on decision making and plan developing. [6] It is however unclear whether the law is applied to biosecurity beyond the field of biotechnology, and no additional information is available on this point in the law nor on the Ministry of Environment's website [7]

- [1] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020..
- [2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020
- [3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [4] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [5] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [6] FAO. Ley No. 219-15 sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología. G. O. No. 10815 del 30 de octubre de 2015. [<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/dom163723.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020
- [7] Ministry of Environment. [<https://ambiente.gob.do/>]. Accessed April 19, 2021.

1.3.1d

Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

Although there is evidence that the Dominican Republic has passed regulation aimed at controlling the entire chain of disposal of dangerous substances, there is no evidence of concrete actions taken to consolidate inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. No such evidence is found in the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) or the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa). [1,2,3,4,5,6] According to press statements using data from the National Statistics Office, only 10.72% of dangerous substances generated in the country in 2016 were properly treated. [7] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [8] No further evidence is available on the VERTIC database, either [9]

- [1] El Nacional. 2013. "Environment ministry publishes five regulations to regulate solid waste management (Medioambiente publica cinco normas regularan manejo desechos solidos)". [<https://elnacional.com.do/medio-ambiente-publica-cinco-normas-regularan-manejo-desechos-solidos/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [2] Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. "Regulation for the management of dangerous substances and chemical waste in the Dominican Republic (Reglamento para la gestion de sustancias y desechos quimicos peligrosos en la Republica Dominicana)". [<http://www.cne.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Reglamento-para-la-Gestion-de-Sustancias-y-Desechos-Quimicos-Peligrosos-en-RD.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [3] Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. "Norms for the environmental management of radioactive waste (Norma para la gestion ambiental de desechos radioactivos)". [<http://www.cne.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Norma-para-la-Gestion-Ambiental-de-Desechos-Radioactivos.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [5] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [6] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [7] Mariela Mejia. 2018. "Eighty-nine percent of dangerous waste generated in the Dominican Republic is untreated (El 89% de desechos peligrosos generados en Dominicana van al medioambiente sin tratarse)". [<https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/medioambiente/el-89-desechos-peligrosos-va-al-ambiente-sin-tratarse-GO10876189>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.
- [8] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[9] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.3.1e

Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen. No such evidence could be found on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) or the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa). [1,2,3,4] In September 2015 the Pan American Health Organisation/World Health Organisation (PAHO/WHO) Dominican Republic office granted the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance health ministry one emergency kit for Ebola. There is no evidence in the publication that the country was given capabilities to test (rather than treat) Ebola. [1,5] The health ministry has a "Protocol of Vigilance and Assistance for Ebola in the Dominican Republic", which lays the groundwork to prevent an Ebola outbreak and reinforce the health services in the event of an outbreak. The protocol does not mention testing. [5]

[1] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). "Ebola Preparation and Response Plan (Plan de preparacion y respuesta para el ebola)". [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1924:preparacion-ebola&Itemid=213]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Protocol of Vigilance and Assistance for Ebola in the Dominican Republic (Protocolo de Vigilancia y Asistencia de Ebola en Republica Dominicana)".

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Ebola/Internacional/Protocolos%20de%20vigilancia%20y%20respuesta%202014.pdf>] Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

1.3.2a

Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. No evidence could be found in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) that the country requires biosecurity training using a standardised curriculum in the Dominican Republic. [1,2,3] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN

Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [4] No such evidence is available on the VERTIC database, either. [5]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

1.3.3a

Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. The "Regulation for the Management of Dangerous Substances and Chemicals", which lays out the legal responsibilities, technical requirements and administrative procedures of all stages of the waste management of chemical substances that present a threat to human health or the environment, does not mention a requirement for drug testing or any other non-technical medical background test. The norms for "Management of Infectious Waste" and "Management of Radioactive Waste" do not mention drug testing either. [1,2,3] The Ministry of Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) has also issued a manual for biosafety in laboratories, which relates more specifically to guidelines to promote the safety of personnel in healthcare and laboratory facilities. This manual requires that all personnel submit to a clinical health check upon entry into the job but does not mention drug testing, background checks or mental fitness checks. [4] There is no additional publicly available evidence via the health ministry, the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura). [5,6,7] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [8] No evidence is available on the VERTIC database either. [9]

[1] Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. "Regulation for the management of dangerous substances and chemical waste in the Dominican Republic (Reglamento para la gestion de sustancias y desechos quimicos peligrosos en la Republica Dominicana)". [<http://www.cne.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Reglamento-para-la-Gestion-de-Sustancias-y-Desechos-Quimicos-Peligrosos-en-RD.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. "Norm for the management of radioactive waste (Norma para la gestion ambiental de desechos radioactivos)". [<http://www.cne.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Norma-para-la-Gestion-Ambiental-de-Desechos-Radioactivos.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. "Norm for the management of infectious waste (Norma para la

gestion integral de desechos infecciosos)". [http://ficem.org/normas/Republica_Dominicana/na_06.pdf]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Dominican Republic. Norm No. 39 of 2003 on National Biosecurity for Laboratories Guidelines and General Requirements. [http://saludysociedadcivil.org.do/index.php/documentos/47/Nacional/131/Normas_Nacionales_de_Bioseguridad_para_Laboratorios_Directrices_y_Requisitos_Generalespara_la_Bioseguridad.pdf]. Accessed November 2018.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[7] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[8] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[9] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.3.4 Transportation security

1.3.4a

Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country has publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances, including Categories A and B. No such evidence could be found on the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, MISPAS), the Ministry of Defense (Ministerio de Defensa), or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) websites. [1,2,3] Although the Dominican Republic has submitted Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [4] No evidence is found on the VERTIC database, either. [5]. In 2004, the Ministry of Environment published the Regulation for Integral Management of infectious waste, which includes provisions regulating transportation of substances belonging to categories A and B. Nevertheless, this regulation only applies to waste disposal and no language suggests it could find application beyond that [6]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales. 2004. Norma para la Gestión Integral de Desechos Infecciosos (Manejo, Segregación, Almacenamiento Transitorio, Transportación, Tratamiento y Depósito Final).

[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Dominican_Republic/DO_Norma_Desechos_Infecciosos.pdf]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

1.3.5a

Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of national legislation, regulation, or other guidance in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins and pathogens with pandemic potential . No such evidence could be found in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, MISPAS), the Ministry of Defense (Ministerio de Defensa), or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) websites. [1,2,3] Although the Dominican Republic has submitted Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [4] No evidence is found on the VERTIC database, either. [5]. In 2004, the Ministry of Environment published the Regulation for Integral Management of infectious waste, which includes provisions regulating transportation of infectious substances, but it does not include language on cross-border transfer. Additionally, this regulation only applies to waste disposal and no language suggests it could find application beyond that [6]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales. 2004. Norma para la Gestión Integral de Desechos Infecciosos (Manejo, Segregación, Almacenamiento Transitorio, Transportación, Tratamiento y Depósito Final).

[https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Dominican_Republic/DO_Norma_Desechos_Infecciosos.pdf]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.4 BIOSAFETY

1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

1.4.1a

Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is some evidence of at least one set of national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. In this context, the term "bioseguridad" corresponds to the English word "biosafety", as it relates to a set of guidelines to ensure operative security and the protection of personnel in laboratories in the country. In 2003 the Secretariat of Public Health and Social Assistance, a forerunner to the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, issued "National Norms, Guidelines, and General Requirements for Biosafety in Laboratories". The manuals are national, obligatory, and enforced by the health ministry. [1] In 2006 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance released "Technical Guidelines for Biosafety in Clinical Laboratories",

with the objective of granting healthcare facilities a guide for the protection of laboratory personnel and users of laboratory services, and the preservation of the environment. [2] The guidelines are not available in the website of the health ministry, neither is there evidence to indicate whether these guidelines replaced the "National Norms, Guidelines, and General Requirements for Biosecurity in Laboratories". [2,3] The 2006 guidelines are national and obligatory for all healthcare facilities. [4] There is no evidence regarding this in the UN Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Legislation Database. [5] Although the Dominican Republic submitted BWC Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6] No further evidence could be found on the VERTIC database [7].

[1] Scribd. Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Direccion General de Salud Ambiental. "Preliminary draft: Biosecurity technical regulation for health interventions (Borrador: Reglamento tecnico de bioseguridad para las intervenciones sanitarias)". [<https://www.scribd.com/document/378450080/Reglamento-Bioseguridad-Vs-Consulta-Publica-1>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Diario Salud. 2016. "Biosecurity of clinical laboratory (Bioseguridad de laboratorio clinico)". [<http://diariosalud.do/do/categoria-laboratorios/15160-ponen-a-circular-guia-tecnica-de-bioseguridad-de-laboratorio-clinico.html>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Resolution No. 000030 of 2015. "Enforces Technical Guide of Biosecurity in Clinical Laboratory (Que Pone en Vigencia Guia Tecnica de Bioseguridad en Laboratorio Clinico)". [<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/handle/123456789/1002?show=full>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] United Nations. "Biological Weapons Convention Legislation Database". [<http://www.vertic.org/pages/homepage/programmes/national-implementation-measures/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/introduction.php>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[7] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.4.1b

Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is some evidence of an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. The "Manual of Norms for Biosafety in Laboratories" does not explicitly establish a responsible agency for its enforcement, but is issued by the Directorate of Laboratories within the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, and it is aimed at all laboratories operating in the Dominican healthcare system. The "Technical Biosecurity Guide for Clinical Laboratories", also issued by the health ministry, explicitly designates the National Directorate of Clinical Laboratories for its enforcement. Both sets of guidelines are national and mandatory. [1,2] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [3] No further evidence is available on the VERTIC database [4]. According to law 219 of 2015 on Biosecurity/Biosafety in Biotechnology (Ley No. 219-15 sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología), the Ministry of Environment is the national authority responsible for organizing, leading and controlling the activities related to modern biotechnology and biosecurity/biosafety on the national territory. In performing such task, the Ministry is informed by the National Commission of Biosecurity/Biosafety (Comisión Nacional de Bioseguridad, CONABIO), which provides guidance on decision making and plan developing. [6] It is however unclear whether the law is applied to

biosecurity/biosafety beyond the field of biotechnology. [5]

[1] Secretaria de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2003. "Manual of Norms for Biosafety in Laboratories (Manual de Normas de Bioseguridad para Laboratorios)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/145/Normas%20Nacionales%20de%20Bioseguridad%20para%20Laboratorios%20Directrices%20y%20Requisitos%20Generalespara%20la%20Bio.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Resolution No. 000030 of 2015. "Enforces Technical Guide of Biosecurity in Clinical Laboratory (Que Pone en Vigencia Guia Tecnica de Bioseguridad en Laboratorio Clinico)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/handle/123456789/1002?show=full>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] FAO. Ley No. 219-15 sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología. G. O. No. 10815 del 30 de octubre de 2015.

[<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/dom163723.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020

1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

1.4.2a

Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. No evidence could be found in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) that biosafety training is required using a standardised approach. [1,2,3] There are two technical guidelines that address technical norms and procedures for biosafety, but these do not address biosafety training using a standardised, required approach. The "National Norms, Guidelines and General Requirements for Biosecurity in Laboratories", issued by the health ministry, which in 2003 was the Secretariat of Public Health and Social Assistance, explicitly indicates that individual laboratories are responsible for the training of personnel. [4] The "Technical Guidelines for Biosecurity in Clinical Laboratories", issued by the health ministry as a guide for the protection of laboratory personnel, users of laboratory services and the preservation of the environment, is unavailable from the health ministry's website. [5] No evidence is available on the VERTIC database, either [6] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [7]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Scribd. Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Direccion General de Salud Ambiental. "Preliminary draft: Biosecurity technical regulation for health interventions (Borrador: Reglamento tecnico de bioseguridad para las

intervenciones sanitarias)". [<https://www.scribd.com/document/378450080/Reglamento-Bioseguridad-Vs-Consulta-Publica-1>]. Accessed December 27, 2020. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[7] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. No evidence is available on the National Directorate of Healthcare Investigations (Direccion Nacional de Investigacion en Salud), the Ministry of Economy and Development (Ministerio de Economia y Desarrollo), Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) or the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa) of an assessment to determine whether dual-use research is occurring. [1,2,3,4] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [5] No such evidence is available on the VERTIC database, either. [6]

[1] Direccion Nacional de Investigacion en Salud. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/sec-dinisa>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Economia y Desarrollo. [<http://economia.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.5.1b

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. The Dominican Republic has a "National

Healthcare Research Policy" (2012) aimed at promoting health-related research in health in the country, which is overseen by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) through the National Directorate of Healthcare Investigations (Direccion Nacional de Investigacion en Salud). However, it does not mention dual research. [1] There is no mention of dual research via the health ministry, the Ministry of Economy and Development (Ministerio de Economia y Desarrollo), Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) or the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa). [2,3,4,5] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6] No such evidence is available on the VERTIC database, either. [7]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2012. "National Healthcare Research Policy (Politica nacional de investigacion para la salud)". [<https://www.intec.edu.do/downloads/documents/institucionales/politicas/politica-nacional-investigacion-salud-2012-meescyt.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Defensa, Informacion publica, [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Economia y Desarrollo. [<http://economia.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[7] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.5.1c

Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) is tasked with monitoring health-related research, not dual-use research. [1] There is no information regarding dual-use research on the websites of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales) or the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa). [2,3] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [4] No such evidence is available on the VERTIC database, either. [5] The law 219-15 on the Biosafety/Biosecurity of Biotechnology (Ley No. 219-15 sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología. G. O. No. 10815 del 30 de octubre de 2015) mentions that research on living modified organisms should be authorized by the Ministry of Environment, and that such ministry is also mandated with evaluating the security conditions of research on living modified organisms [6]. However, there is no explicit mention of dual-use research, and there is no language suggesting that law 219-15 could be applied beyond the realm of biotechnology.

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2012. "National Health Research Policy (Politica nacional de investigacion para la salud)". [<https://www.intec.edu.do/downloads/documents/institucionales/politicas/politica-nacional-investigacion-salud-2012-meescyt.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales. [<http://ambiente.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[4] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed

December 27, 2020.

[5] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] FAO. Ley No. 219-15 sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología. G. O. No. 10815 del 30 de octubre de 2015.

[<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/dom163723.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020

1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

1.5.2a

Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation, regulation, policy or other guidance, requiring the screening of synthesised DNA before it is sold. There is no evidence in Law No. 219-15 of 2015 on Security of Biotechnology, which regulates the introduction, research, development, handling and storage of living modified organisms, of requirements to screen synthesised DNA before it is commercialised. [1] There is also no evidence via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) and the National Institute of Transit and Terrestrial Transport. [2,3,4, 5] Although the Dominican Republic submitted UN Biological Weapons Convention Confidence Building Measures for both 2018 and 2017, access to the reports is restricted to the public, and it is unknown if they contain information on this matter. [6] No further evidence could be found on the VERTIC database [7].

[1] Republica Dominicana. 2015. Law No. 219-15 of 2015 "On Security of Biotechnology (Sobre Seguridad de la Biotecnología)". [<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/dom163723.pdf>]. Accessed December 27, 2020

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020

[4] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[5] Instituto Nacional de Transito y Transporte Terrestre. [<https://www.intrant.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[6] United Nations. "Confidence Building Measures". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/dominican-republic>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[7] VERTIC. BWC Legislation Database. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/d/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

1.6 IMMUNIZATION

1.6.1 Vaccination rates

1.6.1a

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

World Health Organization

1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

OIE WAHIS database

Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

2.1.1a

Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence on its website that the National Health Laboratory Dr. Defillo (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Publica Dr. Defillo), which is the national laboratory, can conduct five or more of the ten WHO-defined core tests. [1] The webpages for the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) and the Department of Epidemiology do not mention such testing capacities. [2,3]

[1] Laboratorio Nacional. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/sec-laboratorio-nacional>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

[3] Direccion General de Epidemiologia. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

2.1.1b

Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence of a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing, although there is a plan for COVID-19. There is no evidence of an overarching plan for conducting testing during a public health emergency on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites [1, 2]. The Dominican Republic drafted a Covid-19 Emergency Plan (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) which also includes scaling testing capacity and defining testing goals. [3]. There is no language suggesting that such document could be applied beyond Covid-19. The Ministry of Health website published in 2013 a manual on elaborating hospital plans to respond to emergencies and disasters (Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres) [4]. Such plan does not include information on testing, and there is no evidence suggesting that an overall plan was ever drafted. . Additionally, the national laboratory, Dr. Defillo, does not have a website.

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/141/guia%209789945436754.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

2.1.2a

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that there is a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA]). No evidence was found on the website of the National Public Health Laboratory Dr Defillo (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Publica Dr. Defillo; LNSPDD), the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerial de Agricultura) or the Ministry of Public Health and Social Services (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) of accreditations such as ISO or CLIA. [1,2,3] Press coverage indicates that the lab has been granted recognition by the World Health Organisation (WHO), Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the providers Cobas and Ampliprep/TaqMan, for its use of Cobas equipment, as well as the "excellent performance" of the lab. [4] There is no further public evidence regarding such recognitions in the website of the health ministry or the LNSPDD. [1,2]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "National Laboratory of Public Health Dr. Defillo (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Pública Dr. Defillo)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/sec-laboratorio-nacional>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Pública. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[4] 7 Días. 2017. "Laboratory Dr. Defillo receives certifications for excellence in use of equipment and tests (Laboratorio Dr.

Defilló recibe certificaciones por excelencia en uso de equipos y pruebas)".

[http://www.7dias.com.do/portada/2017/03/01/i225551_laboratorio-defillo-recibe-certificaciones-por-excelencia-uso-equipos-pruebas.html#.W-yxK-hKgxt]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.1.2b

Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that there is a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review. No evidence was found that the National Public Health Laboratory Dr Defillo (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Pública Dr. Defillo; LNSPDD) or the Ministry of Public Health and Social Services (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) are subject to external quality assurance review. There is no such evidence via the websites of the LNSPDD, the health ministry or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura). [1,2,3]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. "National Laboratory of Public Health Dr. Defillo (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Pública Dr. Defillo)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/sec-laboratorio-nacional>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

2.2.1a

Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a nationwide specimen transport system in the Dominican Republic, but there are specimen transport services in private laboratories. Private laboratories such as Amadita Laboratorio Clínico and Referencia Laboratorio Clínico offer (private) systems to transport specimens from the site of the collection to the facilities. [1,2] Referencia Laboratorio Clínico also works with laboratories in the US, and uses courier services as transporters. [2] However, there is no public evidence available in the National Public Health Laboratory Dr Defillo (Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Pública Dr. Defillo), the national laboratory, of the existence of a system for transporting specimens from the site of collection to a lab for testing. [3] There is no public evidence in the Central Veterinary Laboratory (Laboratorio Veterinario Central), which conducts testing on humans. [4] No further information is available on the Ministry of Health's website [5]

[1] Amadita Laboratorio Clínico, Información Pública, [<https://amadita.com/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Referencia Laboratorio Clínico, Información Pública, [<https://www.labreferencia.com/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Pública. Laboratorio Nacional de Salud Pública Dr. Defillo. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/sec-laboratorio-nacional>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture. "Laboratorio Veterinario Central". [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/dependencias/item/629-laboratorio-veterinario-central-lavecen>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

2.2.2a

Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. There is no evidence of an overarching plan to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites [1, 2]. The Ministry of Health website published in 2013 a manual on elaborating hospital plans to respond to emergencies and disasters (Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres) [3]. Such plan does not include information on testing, and there is no evidence suggesting that an overall plan was ever drafted. The Dominican Republic drafted a Covid-19 Emergency Plan (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) pledges to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak via the authorization of 7 private laboratories for testing during the emergency. [4]. There is no language suggesting that such document could be applied beyond Covid-19. The national laboratory, Dr. Defillo, does not have a website.

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/141/guia%209789945436754.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[4] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaemergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

2.3.1a

Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data is being analysed on a daily basis. The General Directorate of Epidemiology (Dirección General de Epidemiología), a unit within the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance has a module for surveillance and special and non-transmittable cases, the Modulo de Vigilancia Especial de

Casos y No Transmisibles, which consists of individual clinical notification of suspected or proven cases. These are notified on an ongoing basis by the health centres of the national healthcare system and by citizens in general. There is also a module of vigilance in entry points into the country, such as ports and land borders, the Vigilancia en Puntos de Entrada. [1] There is also a protocol to identify case and contacts in the case of events of public health of international relevance (ESP II) in the entry points (Identificación de casos y contactos de eventos de salud pública de importancia internacional (ESP II) en puntos de entrada), drafted in 2014 and that is applied during the Covid-19 emergency. [2]

[1] Dirección General de Epidemiología. [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Pública. Identificación de casos y contactos de eventos de salud pública de importancia internacional (ESP II) en puntos de entrada.

[<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Coronavirus/Nacional/Identificaci%20de%20casos%20y%20contactos%20de%20eventos%20de%20salud%20pública%20de%20importancia%20internacional%20%28ESP%29%20en%20puntos%20de%20entrada.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.3.1b

Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Dominican Republic has reported a potential public health emergency of international concern to the World Health Organisation (WHO) within the past two years including for Covid-19. There is no evidence that the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) or Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) notified the WHO about any infectious diseases within the past two years. [1,2] There is no evidence on the WHO's Disease Outbreak News page of the Dominican Republic reporting a disease to the WHO. COVID-19 was not reported as a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) in the Dominican Republic according to the WHO [3]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, Información Pública, [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Dominican Republic". [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/dom/en/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

2.3.2a

Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient publicly available evidence that the government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and sub-national level. The National Epidemiologic Surveillance System (SINAVE) is a system of mandatory notification aimed at collecting timely information on diseases and health events for the purposes of decision making related to healthcare. The SINAVE has an early-detection alert module, a special vigilance module on cases and non-transmittables,

and surveillance on entry points. Data is collected nationally from monitoring cases of endemic episodes reported by healthcare providers (or "notifying agents") within the national healthcare system, or upon notification. In all cases, the modules generate quarterly and weekly epidemiological bulletins. [1,2] The notifying agents include public, private and military healthcare providers, as well as non-governmental organisations that offer healthcare services in every province. [2] Notifications are either immediate (within 24 hours) or deferred. However, it is unclear if the system is electronic. The SINAVE's regulatory guideline, Decree no. 309-07 of 2007, indicates that the General Directorate of Epidemiology (Direccion General de Epidemiologia; DIGEPI) and healthcare providers must develop the technological tools required to carry out the surveillance. [3] No specification regarding this available via the DIGEPI. [1] There is no evidence available via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura). [4,5,6]. No additional evidence of such electronic reporting surveillance system could be found in the Procedures for surveillance of the Covid-19 disease (Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19), either. [7]

[1] Direccion Nacional de Epidemiologia. [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2018. "Performance monitoring report (Informe de monitoreo de desempeño)".

[http://digeprisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Sistema%20de%20Informacion/SINAVE%202017%20Ene-Dic_Version%20final%2018_Jun_2018.pdf]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Dominican Republic. Decree No. 309-07 of 2007. "On the Regulation of the National Epidemiological Surveillance System".

[<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2007%20-%20309%20Reglamento%20del%20Sistema%20Nacional%20de%20Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica%20SINAVE.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020

[5] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[7] Ministerio de Salud. Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)'

[<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Coronavirus/Nacional/Procedimientos%20Vigilancia%20COVID-19%20Rev-02%20noviembre.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.3.2b

Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence available that the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data. No evidence is available via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) indicating that the National Epidemiologic Surveillance System (SINAVE), a system of mandatory notification aimed at collecting timely information on diseases and health events for the purposes of decision making related to healthcare, collects ongoing or real-time laboratory data. [1,2,3] The SINAVE's regulatory guideline, Decree no. 309-07 of 2007, includes the Network of Public Healthcare Laboratories (Red Nacional de Laboratorios de Salud Publica) among its "ascribed" entities. The Network is organised by the decree according to "sub-networks" of environmental vigilance, sanitary regulation and medical assistance of high complexity. [4] The SINAVE has immediate notifications (within 24 hours), as well as non-immediate or deferred notifications by part of participating healthcare providers. Immediate notifications apply to diseases that require rapid intervention or elimination (cholera, dengue, diphtheria). Deferred notifications apply to illnesses that can wait between 24 hours and seven days for reporting (for example, tuberculosis and HIV). [5] However, there is no evidence via the General

Directorate of Epidemiology (Dirección General de Epidemiología) that real-time laboratory data is produced. [6] No evidence of an electronic reporting surveillance system collecting ongoing or real-time laboratory data could be found in the Procedures for surveillance of the Covid-19 disease (Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19), either. [7]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[4] Dominican Republic. Decree No. 309-07 of 2007. On the Regulation of the National Epidemiological Surveillance System. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2007%20-%20309%20Reglamento%20del%20Sistema%20Nacional%20de%20Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica%20SINAVE.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2018. "Performance Monitoring Report (Informe de monitoreo de desempeño)".

[http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Sistema%20de%20Informacion/SINAVE%202017%20Ene-Dic_Version%20final%2018_Jun_2018.pdf]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[6] Dirección Nacional de Epidemiología. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[7] Ministerio de Salud. Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Coronavirus/Nacional/Procedimientos%20Vigilancia%20COVID-19%20Rev-02%20noviembre.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

2.4.1a

Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of the prevalence of a national electronic health record (EHR) system commonly in use. No evidence is found in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social). [1] In September 2015 the Patronate of the Hospital General Plaza de la Salud, a public hospital in the capital city, Santo Domingo, proposed the creation of a single digital medical record, replacing the hospital's current manual medical records. [2, 3] In September 2018 the director of the Regional Metropolitan Healthcare Service (Servicio Regional de Salud Metropolitano) also recommended that the health records of patients in healthcare facilities in the provinces of Santo Domingo and Monte Plata should be kept in a single electronic record. [4] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Atlas of eHealth country profiles from 2015 indicates that there was no national EHR system in the Dominican Republic at that time. [5]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Batista, Lisania. 2015. "Plan to create a unique medical record for patient records (Plantean crear récord médico único para expedientes pacientes)". [<https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/plantean-crear-rcord-mdico-nico-para-expedientes-pacientes-IEDL959551>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Acosta, Dayana. 2015. "Medical records are the "backbone" of hospitals (Los expedientes médicos son la "columna vertebral" de hospital)". [<http://eldia.com.do/los-expedientes-medicos-son-la-columna-vertebral-hospital/>]. Accessed

December 28, 2020.

[4] El Caribe. 2018. "Font-Frías highlights the importance of the electronic medical record (Font-Frías destaca importancia del récord médico electrónico)". [<https://www.elcaribe.com.do/2018/09/19/destacado/font-frias-destaca-importancia-del-record-medico-electronico/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2016. "Atlas of eHealth country profiles: The use of eHealth in support of universal health coverage".

[http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204523/9789241565219_eng.pdf;jsessionid=E3E412C20FFB75072419AAEAA0D19578?sequence=1]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.1b

Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in their country, nor that such a system is in place. No such information is available on the Ministry of Health website [1]. In September 2015 the Patronate of the Hospital General Plaza de la Salud, a public hospital in the capital city, Santo Domingo, proposed the creation of a single digital medical record, replacing the hospital's current manual medical records. [2, 3] In September 2018 the director of the Regional Metropolitan Healthcare Service (Servicio Regional de Salud Metropolitano) also recommended that the health records of patients in healthcare facilities in the provinces of Santo Domingo and Monte Plata should be kept in a single electronic record. [4] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Atlas of eHealth country profiles from 2015 indicates that there was no national EHR system in the Dominican Republic at that time. [5]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Batista, Lisania. 2015. "Plan to create a unique medical record for patient records (Plantean crear récord médico único para expedientes pacientes)". [<https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/plantean-crear-rcord-mdico-nico-para-expedientes-pacientes-IEDL959551>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Acosta, Dayana. 2015. "Medical records are the "backbone" of hospitals (Los expedientes médicos son la "columna vertebral" de hospital)". [<http://eldia.com.do/los-expedientes-medicos-son-la-columna-vertebral-hospital/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[4] El Caribe. 2018. "Font-Frías highlights the importance of the electronic medical record (Font-Frías destaca importancia del récord médico electrónico)". [<https://www.elcaribe.com.do/2018/09/19/destacado/font-frias-destaca-importancia-del-record-medico-electronico/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2016. "Atlas of eHealth country profiles: The use of eHealth in support of universal health coverage".

[http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204523/9789241565219_eng.pdf;jsessionid=E3E412C20FFB75072419AAEAA0D19578?sequence=1]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.1c

Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards). There is no evidence of a national electronic health record (EHR) system in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud

Publica y Asistencia Social). [1] In September 2015 the Patronate of the Hospital General Plaza de la Salud, a public hospital in the capital city, Santo Domingo, proposed the creation of a single digital medical record, replacing the hospital's current manual medical records. [2,3] In September 2018 the director of the Regional Metropolitan Healthcare Service (Servicio Regional de Salud Metropolitano) also recommended that the health records of patients in healthcare facilities in the provinces of Santo Domingo and Monte Plata should be kept in a single electronic record. [4] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Atlas of eHealth country profiles from 2015 indicates that there was no national EHR system in the Dominican Republic at that time. [5]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Batista, Lisania. 2015. "Plan to create a unique medical record for patient records (Plantean crear récord médico único para expedientes pacientes)". [<https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/plantean-crear-rcord-mdico-nico-para-expedientes-pacientes-IEDL959551>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Acosta, Dayana. 2015. "Medical records are the "backbone" of hospitals (Los expedientes médicos son la "columna vertebral" de hospital)". [<http://eldia.com.do/los-expedientes-medicos-son-la-columna-vertebral-hospital/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[4] El Caribe. 2018. "Font-Frías highlights the importance of the electronic medical record (Font-Frías destaca importancia del récord médico electrónico)". [<https://www.elcaribe.com.do/2018/09/19/destacado/font-frias-destaca-importancia-del-record-medico-electronico/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2016. "Atlas of eHealth country profiles: The use of eHealth in support of universal health coverage".

[http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204523/9789241565219_eng.pdf;jsessionid=E3E412C20FFB75072419AAEAA0D19578?sequence=1]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

2.4.2a

Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance). No evidence could be found on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human and wildlife surveillance in the Dominican Republic. [1,2] The national response plans for chikungunya, zika and H1N1, which are spearheaded by the health ministry, do not include evidence of mechanisms for communication or data sharing with other ministries, although they do include communication with the National Emergency Commission (Comision Nacional de Emergencia), and the Emergency Operations Centre (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia), which are the two emergency committees in the country. [3,4,5] No further evidence could be found on the Ministry of Environment website, and no agencies or working group in the Dominican Republic are on One Health [6,7]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2014. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of Chikungunya

Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya)".

[<https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/chikungunya/plan-de-contingencia-chikungunya-version-27-01-2014.pdf?ua=1>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2015. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of zika virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/194/Planzikavirus2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Vigilance Protocol for Influenza Virus A (H1N1) (Protocolo de Vigilancia de Nuevo Virus Influenza A (H1N1)).

[https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/Protocolo_VigilanciaInfluenza.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales. [<http://ambiente.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[7] WHO. One Health Commission.

[https://www.onehealthcommission.org/en/resources__services/whos_who_in_one_health/]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

2.4.3a

Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the country makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar). The National Epidemiologic Surveillance System (SINAVE) is a system of mandatory notification aimed at collecting timely information on diseases and health events, for the purposes of decision making related to healthcare, publishes bulletins on the website of the General Epidemiology Directorate (DIGEPI). The "Epidemiologic Bulletins" (Boletines Epidemiologicos) are weekly and quarterly and are stored in the website. The bulletins inform on the status of diseases transmitted by vectors, diseases transmitted by water and food, zoonotic diseases, diseases that are preventable with inoculation, and acute respiratory febrile disease. [1] During the Covid-19 outbreak, a special bulletin including de-identified health surveillance data was issued on a daily basis [2]

[1] Direccion Nacional de Epidemiologia. "Documents (Documentos)".

[<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/documentos/?drawer=Boletines%20epidemiologicos>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Direccion Nacional de Epidemiologia. Boletin Especial COVID-19.

[http://www.digepisalud.gob.do/documentos/?drawer=Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica*Alertas%20epidemiologicas*Coronavirus*Nacional*Boletin%20Especial%20COVID-19]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.3b

Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the country makes de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar). Daily reports are available in the form of Covid-19 special bulletins, which are issued daily on the Ministry of Health website [1].

[1] Direccion Nacional de Epidemiologia. Boletin Especial COVID-19.

[http://www.digepisalud.gob.do/documentos/?drawer=Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica*Alertas%20epidemiologicas*Coronavirus*Nacional*Boletin%20Especial%20COVID-19]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

2.4.4a

Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There are legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. Law No. 173-13 of 2013 on the Protection of Personal Data classifies health information as "data especially protected", and puts in place safeguards for health information of individuals, "whether stored in archives, public registries, data bases, or other private or public registry". The law establishes an exception for the requirement of consent of divulgence of health data in the event of a national health emergency and epidemiologic studies, in so far as the identity of the individual is protected. The law does not make other specific mentions of protection of health related data. [1]

[1] Dominican Republic. Law No. 172-13 of 15 December 2013. "On Integral Protection of personal data stored in archives, public registers, data banks". [https://indotel.gob.do/media/6200/ley_172_13.pdf]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.4b

Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no available public evidence of legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware). Law no. 172-13 of 2013 on the Protection of Personal Data does not include such information, and neither does via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social). [1,2] The country launched a cyber-attack strategy in 2018, but legislation is still pending. [3]

[1] Dominican Republic. Law No.172-13 of 15 December 2013. "On integral protection of personal data stored in archives, public registers, data banks". [https://indotel.gob.do/media/6200/ley_172_13.pdf]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Agencia EFE. 2018. "Dominican Republic with Cybersecurity strategy (República Dominicana con una estrategia de

Ciberseguridad)". [<https://www.diariohispaniola.com/noticia/41639/economia/republica-dominicana-con-una-estrategia-de-ciberseguridad.html>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.4.5 International data sharing

2.4.5a

Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region for one or more diseases. No data is available via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the General Directorate of Epidemiology (Direccion General de Epidemiologia) indicating that the government has committed to sharing surveillance data with other countries in the region during a public health emergency. [1,2].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[2] Direccion Nacional de Epidemiologia. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

2.5.1a

Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of an active or future public health emergency. There is no evidence of an overarching plan to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites [1, 2]. The Ministry of Health website published in 2013 a manual on elaborating hospital plans to repond to emergencies and disasters (Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres) [3]. Such plan does not include information on contact tracing, and there is no evidence suggesting that an overall plan was ever drafted. The Dominican Republic drafted a Covid-19 Emergency Plan (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) which includes a strategy for contact tracing, but there is no evidence of support at the sub-national level to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing, nor there is any language suggesting that such document could be applied beyond Covid-19 [4].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/141/guia%209789945436754.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[4] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

2.5.1b

Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention. There is no evidence of an overarching plan to provide wraparound services on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites [1, 2]. The Ministry of Health website published in 2013 a manual on elaborating hospital plans to respond to emergencies and disasters (Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres) [3] Such plan does not include information on wraparound services, and there is no evidence suggesting that an overall plan was ever drafted. During the Covid-19 outbreak, various measures have been implemented to provide economic support, namely: the coverage of part of the salary in companies with economic difficulties, the provision of income stability to independent workers, the adoption measures to support the economic sector, as a way to protect employment and the income of workers, paid vacations to all workers who qualify for them, and other measures. Such initiatives do not apply exclusively to cases and suspected cases of Covid-19, but are applied nationwide to all qualifying individuals. [4] Additionally, in the case of Covid-19, the government committed to provide free testing to all people who need it, as well as a communication channel with doctors to provide treatment indications, and free medical care in both public and private institutions [5]. There is no evidence that such measures, which have been implemented in the context of Covid-19, could find application beyond it.

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Guía para la elaboración del Plan Hospitalario para Respuesta a Emergencias y Desastres.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/141/guia%209789945436754.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[4] KPMG. Dominican Republic. [<https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/dominican-republic-government-and-institution-measures-in-response-to-covid.html>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[5] Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic before the ASO. MEDIDAS TOMADAS POR EL GOBIERNO DOMINICANO PARA ENFRENTAR LA PANDEMIA DEL COVID-19. [<http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2020/CP42300TMEDIDASRD.pdf>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

2.5.1c

Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar). The daily bulletins provided by the Ministry of Health do not include data on contact tracing, nor does the webpage dedicated to coronavirus tracking hosted by the Presidency of the Dominican Republic [1] [2]

[1] Direccion Nacional de Epidemiologia. Boletin Especial COVID-19.

[http://www.digepisalud.gob.do/documentos/?drawer=Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica*Alertas%20epidemiologicas*Coronavirus*Nacional*Boletin%20Especial%20COVID-19]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Presidencia de la Republica Dominicana. Coronavirus. [<https://coronavirusrd.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

2.5.2 Point of entry management

2.5.2a

Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of an active or future public health emergency.

The General Directorate of Epidemiology (Direccion General de Epidemiologia), a unit within the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance has a module for surveillance and special and non-transmittable cases, the Modulo de Vigilancia Especial de Casos y No Transmisibles, which consists of individual clinical notification of suspected or proven cases. These are notified on an ongoing basis by the health centres of the national healthcare system and by citizens in general. There is also a module of vigilance in entry points into the country, such as ports and land borders, the Vigilancia en Puntos de Entrada. [1] The Dominican Republic Government also implements a protocol to identify cases and tracing contacts in the case of events of public health of international relevance (ESPII) at the entry points (Identificación de casos y contactos de eventos de salud pública de importancia internacional (ESPII) en puntos de entrada), drafted in 2014. [2] The Plan for Covid-19 Surveillance (Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) drafted by the General Directorate of Epidemiology ensures that the aforementioned protocol is applied during the Covid-19 emergency. Additionally, it mandates contract tracing for 14 days and mandates quarantine in case of a positive or suspected positive case of Covid-19 [3] No additional information is available on the Ministry of Health website. [4]

[1] Direccion General de Epidemiologia. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica. Identificación de casos y contactos de eventos de salud pública de importancia internacional

(ESPII) en puntos de entrada.

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Coronavirus/Nacional/Identificaci%20de%20casos%20y%20contactos%20de%20eventos%20de%20salud%20publica%20de%20importancia%20internacional%20%28ESPII%29%20en%20puntos%20de%20entrada.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Direccion General de Epidemiologia. November 2020. Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19).

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Coronavirus/Nacional/Procedimie%20ntos%20Vigilancia%20COVID-19%20Rev-02%20noviembre.pdf>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country, and/or resources provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP). The country has a National Field Epidemiology Training Plan (FETP; Plan Nacional de Entrenamiento Epidemiologia de Campo) as part of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance. The training programme is national in scope and has been executed by the health ministry in conjunction with the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Faculty of Science of the Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo, since 2000. [1,4] According to the CDC, the Dominican Republic has implemented the three-tiered training strategy at the basic and intermediate levels. In 2013 163 persons at the basic level and 39 at the intermediate level were trained. Through resources from CDC's Division of Global HIV and Tuberculosis and the US President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, the work of both the FETP programme supported by CDC-Central American Region and the basic and intermediate-level training supported by CDC-Dominican Republic have yielded a critical mass of Dominican epidemiologists. The first Dominican National Epidemiology Conference was held on February 2014 in Santo Domingo, the capital city. [2] There is no evidence in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance's website or the National Epidemiology Plan of instances of citizens being sent to other countries to participate in similar training programmes. [1,3,4]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2018. "National Field Epidemiology Training Plan (Programa Nacional de Entrenamiento de Epidemiología de Campo)". [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/event/programa-nacional-de-entrenamiento-de-epidemiologia-de-campo/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] Caceres, Victor. 2014. "Improving Disease Surveillance and Outbreak Response in the Latin American and Caribbean Region through the Field Epidemiology Training Program". [<https://blogs.cdc.gov/global/2014/02/05/improving-disease-surveillance-and-outbreak-response-in-the-latin-america-and-caribbean-region-through-the-field-epidemiology-training>]

program/]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] Training Programmes in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network. [<https://www.tephinet.org/training-programs/dominican-republic-national-epidemiology-program>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly evidence of available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV). No evidence could be found on the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) of field epidemiology training programmes explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals. [1,2] The National Field Epidemiology Plan (Plan Nacional de Epidemiologia de Campo) of the health ministry, does not have a website. There is some evidence from the US Centres of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of a collaboration between the CDC, the health ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture to develop a strategy to integrate veterinary medicine into existing field epidemiology training programmes. However, there is no mention of a target date, and it is unclear if this has been accomplished. [3] There is no evidence of results or follow-up from the CDC, or the health or agriculture ministries. [1,2,3]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2018. "National Field Epidemiology Training Programme (Programa Nacional de Entrenamiento de Epidemiología de Campo)". [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/event/programa-nacional-de-entrenamiento-de-epidemiologia-de-campo/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed January 2019.

[3] Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Dominican Republic Country Profile.

[<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhivtb/where-we-work/dominicanrepublic/dominicanrepublic.html>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

2.6.2a

Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

3.1.1a

Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

Current Year Score: 1

In the Dominican Republic, there is no evidence of an overarching public health emergency response plan in place addressing planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. No evidence could be found in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) or the Emergency Operations Centre (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia, COE). [1,2] There are, however, plans in place for individual diseases. The MISPAS has issued the following plans: Preparedness and Response Plan for spurs of Chikungunya Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya) and Preparedness and Reponses Plan for spurs of Zika Virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus). These plans present activities for prevention of the diseases and preparedness for the event of their occurrence and include multisectorial coordination massive communications, virus detection and monitoring, community involvement, and integrated response. The emergency response plan for Chikungunya dates back to 2014. The emergency response plan for zika dates back to 2015. [3,4] Additionally, there is a Plan for Facing Covid-19 Emergency (Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Emergencia Covid-19), but no language suggests it can find application beyond the specific disease. [5] There is also a communications plan for general emergencies, the National Strategy for Risks Communications and Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicación de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres), developed by the MISPAS, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAO). The plan lays out the main strategies for emergency preparedness, institutional coordination, and an action plan during a risk event. The plan dates to 2016. [6] The country has a risk management law, Law no. 147-02 on Risk Management (Ley No. 147-02 Sobre Gestión de Riesgos), which creates the fundamentals of the risk management capabilities around protection, prevention, coordination, of emergencies, in order to reduce the potential damages. There is also a National Risk Management Plan (Plan Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos), created under the Law no. 147-02 by presidential decree No. 275-13. The Plan orient activities toward the prevention and mitigation of risks. There is no evidence on either the law or the plan of a national public health emergency response plan. [7, 8]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. <http://www.msp.gob.do/> Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia (COE). <https://www.coe.gob.do/>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2014. "Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya". <https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/chikungunya/plan-de-contingencia-chikungunya-version-27-01-2014.pdf?ua=1>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2015. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of zika virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/194/Planzikavirus2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAlloWed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2016. Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana. [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/31104?locale-attribute=es>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[7] Republica Dominicana. 2002. Ley No. 147-02 Sobre Gestion de Riesgos.

<http://www.oas.org/dsd/EnvironmentLaw/CaribbeanLegislationProject/Disaster%26StateEmergency/DomRepublic/Ley%20147%2002.pdf>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[8] Republica Dominicana. Decreto No. 275-13. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/35861_decreto27513pngirdpnrrs1.pdf. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.1.1b

If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of an overarching public health emergency response plan in place addressing planning for multiple communicative diseases with pandemic potential that has been updated during the last 3 years. No evidence could be found in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the Emergency Operations Centre (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia, COE). [1,2] There are, however, plans in place for individual diseases. The MISPAS has issued the following plans: Preparedness and Response Plan for spurs of Chikungunya Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya) and Preparedness and Reponses Plan for spurs of Zika Virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus). These plans present activities for prevention of the diseases and preparedness for the event of their occurrence and include multisectorial coordination massive communications, virus detection and monitoring, community involvement, and integrated response. The emergency response plan for Chikungunya dates back to 2014. The emergency response plan for zika dates back to 2015. [3,4] Additionally, there is a Plan for Facing Covid-19 Emergency (Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Emergencia Covid-19), but no language suggests it can find application beyond the specific disease. [5] There is also a communications plan for general emergencies, the National Strategy for Risks Communications and Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres), developed by the MISPAS, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAO). The plan lays out the main strategies for emergency preparedness, institutional coordination, and an action plan for the event of a risk event. The plan dates to 2016. [6] The country has a risk management law, Law no. 147-02 on Risk Management (Ley No. 147-02 147-02 Sobre Gestión de Riesgos), which creates the fundamentals of the risk magement capabilities around protection, prevention, coordination, of emergencies, in order to reduce the potential damages. There is also a National Risk Management Plan (Plan Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos), created under the Law no. 147-02 by presidential decree No. 275-13. The Plan orient activities toward the prevention and mitigation of risks. There is no evidence on either the law or the plan of a national public health emergency response plan. [7, 8]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. <http://www.msp.gob.do/> Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia (COE). <https://www.coe.gob.do/>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2014. "Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya". <https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/chikungunya/plan-de-contingencia-chikungunya-version-27-01-2014.pdf?ua=1>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2015. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of zika virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/194/Planzikavirus2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2016. Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana. [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/31104?locale-attribute=es>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[7] Republica Dominicana. 2002. Ley No. 147-02 Sobre Gestion de Riesgos.

<http://www.oas.org/dsd/EnvironmentLaw/CaribbeanLegislationProject/Disaster%26StateEmergency/DomRepublic/Ley%20147%2002.pdf>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[8] Republica Dominicana. Decreto No. 275-13. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/35861_decreto27513pngirdpnrrs1.pdf. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.1.1c

If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of an overarching public health emergency response plan in place addressing planning for multiple communicative diseases with pandemic potential that includes considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations. No evidence could be found in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the Emergency Operations Centre (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia, COE). [1,2] There are, however, plans in place for individual diseases. The MISPAS has issued the following plans: Preparedness and Response Plan for spurs of Chikungunya Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya) and Preparedness and Reponses Plan for spurs of Zika Virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus). These plans present activities for prevention of the diseases and preparedness for the event of their occurrence and include multisectorial coordination massive communications, virus detection and monitoring, community involvement, and integrated response. The emergency response plan for Chikungunya dates back to 2014. The emergency response plan for zika dates back to 2015. [3,4] Additionally, there is a Plan for Facing Covid-19 Emergency (Plan de Enfrentamiento a la Emergencia Covid-19), but no language suggests it can find application beyond the specific disease. [5] There is also a communications plan for general emergencies, the National Strategy for Risks Communications and Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres), developed by the MISPAS, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAO). The plan lays out the main strategies for emergency preparedness, institutional coordination, and an action plan for the event of a risk event. The plan dates to 2016. [6] The country has a risk management law, Law no. 147-02 on Risk Management (Ley No. 147-02 147-02 Sobre Gestión de Riesgos), which creates the fundamentals of the risk magement capabilities around protection, prevention, coordination, of emergencies, in order to reduce the potential damages. There is also a National Risk Management Plan (Plan Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos), created under the Law no. 147-02 by presidential decree No. 275-13. The Plan orient activities toward the prevention and mitigation of risks. There is no evidence on either the law or the plan of a national public health emergency response plan. [7, 8]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. <http://www.msp.gob.do/> Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia (COE). <https://www.coe.gob.do/>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2014. "Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya". <https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/chikungunya/plan-de-contingencia-chikungunya-version->

27-01-2014.pdf?ua=1. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2015. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of zika virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/194/Planzikavirus2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>].

Accessed December 28, 2020.

[5] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2016. Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana. [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/31104?locale-attribute=es>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[7] Republica Dominicana. 2002. Ley No. 147-02 Sobre Gestion de Riesgos.

<http://www.oas.org/dsd/EnvironmentLaw/CaribbeanLegislationProject/Disaster%26StateEmergency/DomRepublic/Ley%20147%2002.pdf>. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[8] Republica Dominicana. Decreto No. 275-13. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/35861_decreto27513pngirdpnrrs1.pdf.

Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.1.1d

Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

3.1.2a

Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no clear evidence of specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. There are plans in place for various diseases which include specific mechanisms for engaging with the private sector to assist with emergencies: the Preparedness and Response Plan for spurs of Chikungunya Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya) and Preparedness and the Response Plan for spurs of Zika Virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus). These indicate that the Emergency Operations Centre (COE) and the National Emergency Commission (Comision Nacional de Emergencias the entity that co-ordinates the actions of the COE) will co-ordinate local governments, national associations, professional associations, producers associations, and telecommunications bodies. Nevertheless, no clear mention of direct private sector involvement is made. [1,2] The communications plan for emergencies, the National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres), developed by the

Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) does not include engagement with the private sector. [3] There is no evidence in the National Risk Management Plan (Plan Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos), created under Law No. 147-02 of 2002 by Presidential Decree No. 275-13 of 2013, of specific mechanisms for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. [4] There is no explicit mention of a specific mechanism for engaging with the private sector within the Covid-19 Emergency Plan (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) [5] No further evidence is available on the Emergency Operations Centre (COE) and the National Emergency Commission (Comision Nacional de Emergencias the entity that coordinates the actions of the COE) websites. [6, 7] No further information is available on the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) [8].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2014. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of Chikungunya Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya)".

[<https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/chikungunya/plan-de-contingencia-chikungunya-version-27-01-2014.pdf?ua=1>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2015. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of zika virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/194/Planzikavirus2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2016. "National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana)". Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Republica Dominicana. Decree No. 275-13 of 2013. "That the National Risk Management Plan and the National Plan for Seismic Risk Reduction are the instruments that define the strategic objectives, programs and subprograms through which the institutional activities for the prevention and mitigation of risks are oriented".

[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/35861_decreto27513pngirdpnrrs1.pdf]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[5] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[6] Ministry of Defence. COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE EMERGENCIAS. [<http://www.defensacivil.gob.do/comision-nacional-de-emergencias-cne>]. Accessed January 11 2021.

[7] Centro de operaciones de emergencia. [<https://www.coe.gob.do/>]. Accessed January 11, 2021.

[8] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. <http://www.msp.gob.do/> Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

3.1.3a

Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that the country has a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic for more than one disease. The Preparedness and Response Plan for spurs of Chikungunya Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya) and Preparedness and the Response Plan for spurs of Zika Virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus) include

specific NPIs to be implemented for surveillance and vectorial control, such as: improved cleaning for water storage, improved management of solid waste, expanded cleaning (including the use of larvicide) in high-risk areas, and others [1, 2]. Additionally, the Plan for Facing the Covid-19 Emergency (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) mandates measures such as mandatory mask-wearing in public places, expanded cleaning for of institutions and public places, social distancing and others [3]. None of these plans include language suggesting it can be used for other diseases. [3] No additional information is available on the Ministry of Health website [4].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2014. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of Chikungunya Fever (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de Fiebre Chikungunya)".

[<https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/chikungunya/plan-de-contingencia-chikungunya-version-27-01-2014.pdf?ua=1>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2015. "Plan for preparation and response to outbreaks of zika virus (Plan de preparación y respuesta frente a brotes de infección por zikavirus)".

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/194/Planzikavirus2015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[3] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. <http://www.msp.gob.do/> Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

3.2.1 Activating response plans

3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year, and there is no evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year. There is no publicly available information on a national emergency response plan for the Dominican Republic. There is a mention that the country activated a national emergency response plan following the Covid-19 emergency but it is not accessible in its entirety. [1, 2] The WHO has not published information about conducting biological threat-focused exercise in the country. [3, 4] No further information is available on the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) . [2]

[1] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. <http://www.msp.gob.do/> Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Simulation Exercise". [<https://extranet.who.int/spp/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Dominican Republic." [<https://www.who.int/countries/dom/en/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. The WHO has not published information about conducting IHR exercises in the country. [1, 2] The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) has not published any information about identifying a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. [3] The WHO Strategic Partnership Portal does not have any details on completed or planned after action reviews for the Dominican Republic. [4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Simulation Exercise". [<https://extranet.who.int/spp/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Dominican Republic." [<https://www.who.int/countries/dom/en/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, "Información Pública", [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. The WHO has not published information about conducting biological threat-focused exercise in the country. [1, 2, 3] The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) does not have information on such exercises either. [4]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Simulation Exercise". [<https://extranet.who.int/spp/simulation-exercise>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Dominican Republic." [<https://www.who.int/countries/dom/en/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "After Action Review". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, "Información Pública", [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

3.3.1 Emergency response operation

3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the country has in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The Dominican Republic has an Emergency Operations Centre (COE), as well as two additional emergency centres under the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social). The health ministry has two Centres for the Coordination of Response to Emergencies and Disasters, respectively located in the Eastern and Northern parts of the country. [1,2] Their objective is to guarantee access to healthcare and quick medical attention to populations affected by a health emergency or a disaster. [1,2] In terms of general emergencies, the COE is tasked with emergency preparedness and response in the country. The COE, a stand-alone agency and not dependent on any given ministry, also co-ordinates all the institutions within the National Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response System. [3]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Directorate of Emergencies and Disasters (Dirección de Emergencia y Desastres)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/direccion-de-emergencias-y-desastres>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[2] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). "Ministry of Health puts in place Co-ordinated Emergency and Disaster Centres for the South and East Regions (El Ministerio de Salud Pública pone en funcionamiento Centros Coordinadores de Emergencias y Desastres para las regiones Sur y Este)".

[https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1137:el-ministerio-salud-publica-pone-funcionamiento-centros-coordinadores-emergencias-desastres-regiones-sur-este&Itemid=213]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/quienes-somos.html>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC/COE) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year. The website of the Directorate of Emergencies and Disasters does not mention drills. [1] The COE conducts regular drills. However, there is

no evidence available via the COE of a requirement to conduct a drill at least once per year, nor there is evidence that it conducts drills on a yearly basis. [2,3] Law no. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which defines the national emergency system guidelines, does not mandate annual simulations by the COE. [4] There is no further information on the Ministry of Health website. [5]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Directorate of Emergencies and Disasters (Dirección de Emergencia y Desastres)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>].direccion-de-emergencias-y-desastres. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia. "The Emergence Operations Centre and the World Food Programme conduct emergency simulation (El Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias y el Programa Mundial de Alimentos realizan simulación de emergencia)". [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/noticias/item/295-el-centro-de-operaciones-de-emergencias-y-el-programa-mundial-de-alimentos-realizan-simulaci%C3%B3n-de-emergencia.html>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia. "COE and PMA conduct simulation of hydrometeorological emergency (COE y el PMA realizan simulación de emergencia por evento hidrometeorológico)".

[<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/noticias/item/296-coe-y-el-pma-realizan-simulaci%C3%B3n-de-emergencia-por-evento-hidrometeorol%C3%B3gico.html>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management".

[<https://www.preventionweb.net/english/polices/v.php?id=21017&cid=52>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020

3.3.1c

Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. No evidence is available via the in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) or the Emergency Operations Centre . [1,2]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Directorate of Emergencies and Disasters (Dirección de Emergencias y Desastres)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/direccion-de-emergencias-y-desastres>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. "Who we are (Quienes somos)". [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/quienes-somos.html>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack), nor these is publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack). No such evidence could be found via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Services (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Servicios Sociales) or the Emergency Operations Centre (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia) [1,2] There is, however, some evidence of training of security forces: in August 2017 the Civil Defence Force (Defensa Civil de la Republica Dominicana) trained some of its members in first response to incidents with chemical, radiological, biological and nuclear materials. However, the training did not include members of the health ministry. [3]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/documentos-descargas/category/10-manuales.html>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Defensa Civil Republica Dominicana. 2017. "Civil Defence Force volunteers trained in handling of dangerous substances and materials (Entrenan voluntarios de la defensa civil en manejo de sustancias y materiales peligrosos)".

[<http://www.defensacivil.gob.do/noticias/item/entrenan-voluntarios-de-la-defensa-civil-en-manejo-de-sustancias-y-materiales-peligrosos>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

3.5.1 Public communication

3.5.1b

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach). The National Strategy for Communication of Risks for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters, developed by the Ministry of Health, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), does not explicitly outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs. Regarding this, the plan only indicates that the assigned spokesperson in the event of an emergency must frame messages "in a language according to the target audience to which they will be directed. They should be written in a short, clear, and simple manner, and emphasise the risk and the actions that people can take to control or mitigate the effects on their health". [1,2] The Covid-19 Contingency Plan (Plan de contingencia ante enfermedad por Coronavirus - Covid-19) includes general provisions for risk communications, such as: identifying strategies to address vulnerable populations, reproducing and disseminating audiovisuals. defining and

activating a communication protocol for sharing official data, and others.[3] Nevertheless, no language suggests that such plan could be applied beyond Covid-19. No further evidence is available on the Ministry of Health or in the Emergency Operation Center websites. [4, 5]

[1] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). 2016. "Ministry of Health presents Strategy for Communication of Risks for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Ministerio de Salud presenta Estrategia de Comunicación de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres)". [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2223:lanzamiento-estrategia-de-comunicacion-de-riesgos&Itemid=216]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud. 2016. "Strategy for Communication of Risks for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters in the Dominican Republic (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana)". [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/31104?locale-attribute=es>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud. 2020. PLAN DE CONTINGENCIA ANTE ENFERMEDAD POR CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19). [<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/1720/PlancontingenciaCOVID-19.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[5] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/quienes-somos.html>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.5.1 Risk communication planning

3.5.1a

Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the country has in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. The 2016 National Risk Communication Plan for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters provides a detailed communications plan for health-related emergencies, including protocols regarding the other emergency system entities, the National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres), developed by the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). The plan lays out the main strategies for emergency preparedness and institutional co-ordination, and an action plan for the event of a risk event. [1,2]

[1] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). 2016. "Ministry of Health presents Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Ministerio de Salud presenta Estrategia de Comunicación de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres)". [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2223:lanzamiento-estrategia-de-comunicacion-de-riesgos&Itemid=216]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud. 2016. National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana). [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/31104?locale-attribute=es>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

3.5.1c

Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. The Strategy for Communication of Risks for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia de Comunicación de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres) indicates that the Risk Communication Committee will identify spokespersons, either political, technical or community for risk communication. During an emergency, the spokespersons will be the only authorized channels of communications with media in order to limit the amount of authorized information and the risk mitigation measures. The assigned spokesperson in the event of an emergency must frame messages "in a language according to the target audience to which they will be directed. They should be written in a short, clear, and simple manner, and emphasise the risk and the actions that people can take to control or mitigate the effects on their health". [1,2] The Covid-19 contingency plan (Plan de contingencia ante enfermedad por Coronavirus - Covid-19) instructs to define a protocol to disseminate official declarations related to Covid-19, as well as to authorize spokespersons for each target [3]. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) does not have any further information. [4].

[1] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). 2016. "Ministry of Health presents Strategy for Communication of Risks for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Ministerio de Salud presenta Estrategia de Comunicación de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres)". [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2223:lanzamiento-estrategia-de-comunicacion-de-riesgos&Itemid=216]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud. 2016. "Strategy for Communication of Risks for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters in the Dominican Republic (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicación de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la República Dominicana)". [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/31104?locale-attribute=es>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud. 2020. PLAN DE CONTINGENCIA ANTE ENFERMEDAD POR CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19). [<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/1720/PlancontingenciaCOVID-19.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 30, 2020

[4] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, "Información Pública", [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

3.5.2 Public communication

3.5.2a

In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation in the past year. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) notifies of all epidemics through regular bulletins on the website of the General Directorate of Epidemiology. [1] The Emergency Operations Centre also publishes regular bulletins on its website. [2] Both agencies have social media accounts (Facebook and Twitter) that are regularly updated. [3,4] Online platforms are used to updated the public about ongoing health emergencies to actively share messages, as most recently testified by the information shared during the Covid-19 outbreak [1, 2, 3, 4] Recent examples of communications about ongoing emergencies are, among others: the dispel of the rumor whereby the drug ivermectine was approved for treating COVID-19 in the country; and the news of the approval of the import of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine [6, 7]. As for examples of information shared outside an ongoing emergency (and therefore before the COVID-19) pandemic, in 2018 the online channels were used to publish the list of the Basic Framework of Essential Medications (Cuadro Basico de Medicaciones Esenciales) . [7]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social, [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. "Bulletins (Boletines)". [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/boletines.html>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Facebook. "COE Republica Dominicana". [<https://www.facebook.com/COEREPUBLICADOMINICANA/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Facebook. "Ministerio de Salud Publica". [https://www.facebook.com/pg/SaludPublicaRD/posts/?ref=page_internal]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Facebook. "Ministerio de Salud Publica".

[[https://www.facebook.com/SaludPublicaRD/posts/3589236734523136?__cft__\[0\]=AZXigWiYfAHKc8yUOcUmrSEUwo3_Ftq1HglMmJFO9a9mU-JKMfX1IRL9VDIO9yONTtuZdJQwMBMYIEfQ2Sat3EraKEZZTNJEWawLI4ICdXcqZFeXpgQrhE_EFX0FOEEyvW6B_AoK267m7Z_aMjYjoq9M6aa5TREZ7SgZDsLVh45FjgbwC4eqa78kUROA_3omBWU&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/SaludPublicaRD/posts/3589236734523136?__cft__[0]=AZXigWiYfAHKc8yUOcUmrSEUwo3_Ftq1HglMmJFO9a9mU-JKMfX1IRL9VDIO9yONTtuZdJQwMBMYIEfQ2Sat3EraKEZZTNJEWawLI4ICdXcqZFeXpgQrhE_EFX0FOEEyvW6B_AoK267m7Z_aMjYjoq9M6aa5TREZ7SgZDsLVh45FjgbwC4eqa78kUROA_3omBWU&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R)]. Accessed January 11, 2021.

[6] Facebook. "Ministerio de Salud Publica". [[https://www.facebook.com/SaludPublicaRD/posts/3568804126566397?__cft__\[0\]=AZXtrxK59HkDQvc-b0lXrQcDxaC8CeYm-LIVfvYYSakTM_-memq6sv2B_QH7IBEUnevF9a3vcmAv_zgzzLTuSgNfZrgMBla5eJWgZBOHzl8_ka8hyw9AZBbiE2iL68HflicMISgHBXZvVvTzFE2kOKOW3VUV4pXQyOO1ZdANY_VcXhhyURooLrc3uSTAFtBk14Og&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/SaludPublicaRD/posts/3568804126566397?__cft__[0]=AZXtrxK59HkDQvc-b0lXrQcDxaC8CeYm-LIVfvYYSakTM_-memq6sv2B_QH7IBEUnevF9a3vcmAv_zgzzLTuSgNfZrgMBla5eJWgZBOHzl8_ka8hyw9AZBbiE2iL68HflicMISgHBXZvVvTzFE2kOKOW3VUV4pXQyOO1ZdANY_VcXhhyURooLrc3uSTAFtBk14Og&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R)]. Accessed January 11, 2021.

[7] Facebook. "Ministerio de Salud Publica". [[https://www.facebook.com/SaludPublicaRD/posts/1654408664672629?__cft__\[0\]=AZW34VkwPQMjGnim_SKqJGD-IPhHO_HDUYWrSRypdMQZxkSCDvtvJs8nmQ7wj6RKJpRLoVfKyXZt7X1zrliY41RuZfxB81g__qs-vBXb9sJvyQB6_ILCVStJkrzrbYVXZBfHjf9_yyUzy6Tqe5rnnWK3oZ0vJw1agSbIOzul3U2YGkeKjZDsIX4uz0q4SXGqk&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R](https://www.facebook.com/SaludPublicaRD/posts/1654408664672629?__cft__[0]=AZW34VkwPQMjGnim_SKqJGD-IPhHO_HDUYWrSRypdMQZxkSCDvtvJs8nmQ7wj6RKJpRLoVfKyXZt7X1zrliY41RuZfxB81g__qs-vBXb9sJvyQB6_ILCVStJkrzrbYVXZBfHjf9_yyUzy6Tqe5rnnWK3oZ0vJw1agSbIOzul3U2YGkeKjZDsIX4uz0q4SXGqk&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R)]. Accessed January 11, 2021.

3.5.2b

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?

No = 1, Yes = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. On the contrary , the Ministry of Health had to actively fight misinformation and the diffusion of fake news, which spread more easily due to lack of trust in government sources as well as absence of streamlined

practices for Covid-19 treatments [1]. No other news could be found on relevant media outlets [2, 3, 4].

[1] Tapia, L. COVID-19 and Fake News in the Dominican Republic. Instituto de Medicina Tropical & Salud Global, Universidad Iberoamericana, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

[http://www.ajtmh.org/docserver/fulltext/14761645/102/6/tpmd200234.pdf?expires=1609342633&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=E24DA2E2B73831296BCFB1813781B103]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Diario Libre [https://www.diariolibre.com/usa]. Accessed December 30, 2020

[3] Listin Diario. [https://listindiario.com/]. Accessed December 30, 2020

[4] El Nacional. [https://elnacional.com.do/]. Accessed December 30, 2020

3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

3.6.1 Internet users

3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 74.82

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 83.32

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 3.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

3.7.1 Trade restrictions

3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no available public evidence that, in the past year, the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak. No such evidence could be found via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the two main news outlets, Diario Libre and Periodico Hoy [1,2,3,4, 5]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Diariolibre. [<https://www.diariolibre.com/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Periodico Hoy. [<http://hoy.com.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. [<https://www.mirex.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

3.7.1b

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that, in the past year, the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak. No such evidence could be found via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance, the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the two main news outlets, Diario Libre and Periodico Hoy [1,2,3,4, 5]

- [1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [2] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [3] Diariolibre. [<https://www.diariolibre.com/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [4] Periodico Hoy. [<http://hoy.com.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [5] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. [<https://www.mirex.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

3.7.2 Travel restrictions

3.7.2a

In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 0

There is evidence, in the past year, that the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. In March 2020, Dominican Republic implemented a one-month suspension for incoming flights from Europe, China, South Korea and Iran. [1] Additionally, on December 21st 2020, the Dominican Republic suspended flights with the United Kingdom following an outbreak of a new strain of Covid-19 until January 10, 2021 [2].

- [1] Ministerio de Salud Publica. Ante coronavirus, Danilo Medina afirma Gobierno continua adoptando medidas adicionales para proteger aparato productivo y empleos de la República Dominicana. [<https://www.msp.gob.do/web/?p=6570>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [2] Diario Libre, December 21, 2020. República Dominicana suspende desde hoy vuelos con Reino Unido. [<https://www.diariolibre.com/economia/república-dominicana-suspende-desde-hoy-vuelos-con-reino-unido-JE23412803/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 156

2017

WHO; national sources

4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 138.02

2018

WHO; national sources

4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country has a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. There is no evidence of a public workforce strategy in place according to the Ministry of Labour (Ministerio de Trabajo) and Law No. 1-12 of 2012 on the National Development Strategy 2030, a 20-year strategy plan published in 2012 that guides policymaking. There is also no evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance. [1,2,3]

[1] Ministerio de Trabajo. [<http://mt.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Republica Dominicana. Law No. 1-12 "National Development Strategy 2030 (Estrategia Nacional de Desarrollo 2030)". [<http://economia.gob.do/mepyd/wp-content/uploads/archivos/end/marco-legal/ley-estrategia-nacional-de-desarrollo.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.1.2 Facilities capacity

4.1.2a

Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 156

2017

WHO/World Bank; national sources

4.1.2b

Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Dominican Republic has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation facility located within the country. In 2013 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) published a guide, "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments" (Normas para la Prevención y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud) that includes specifications and requirements of isolation units. [1] The main private and public clinics and hospitals in the country, the Centro de Medicina Avanzada Dr. Abel González (which does not have a website), Clínica Abreu, Cedimat, Hospital General Plaza de la Salud and Hospital Infantil Robert Reid Cabral, do not mention isolation units. [2,3,4,5] Both the contingency plan for the Covid-19 Emergency (Plan de contingencia ante enfermedad por Coronavirus-19) and the Vigilance procedure for surveillance of Covid-19 (Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)) prescribe hospital isolation for positive or suspected positive cases that require monitoring or medical assistance. However, they do not provide further information on this topic. [6, 7]. Additionally, the the Plan for Facing the Covid-19 Emergency (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) mentions efforts to provide alternative isolation centers for people who could not quarantine in their houses. At the moment of the draft of the plan, such isolation centers can host 2050 beds in 9 locations. It is however unclear if mentioned centers can be utilized beyond Covid-19. [8]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments" (Normas para la Prevención y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud)".

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Clínica Abreu. [<http://clinicaabreu.com.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] CEDIMAT. [<http://www.cedimat.net>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Hospital General de la Plaza de la Salud. [<https://www.hgps.org.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Hospital Infantil Dr. Robert Reid Cabral. [<https://www.hirrc.org/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Salud. Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)'

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Coronavirus/Nacional/Procedimientos%20Vigilancia%20COVID-19%20Rev-02%20noviembre.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[7] Ministerio de Salud. 2020. PLAN DE CONTINGENCIA ANTE ENFERMEDAD POR CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19).

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/1720/PlancontingenciaCOVID-19.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[8] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Dominican Republic has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. There is no evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. Both the contingency plan for the Covid-19 Emergency (Plan de contingencia ante enfermedad por Coronavirus-19) and the Vigilance procedure for surveillance of Covid-19 (Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)) prescribe hospital isolation for positive or suspected positive cases that require monitoring or medical assistance. [1, 2]. More specifically, the Plan for Facing the Covid-19 Emergency (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) outlines efforts to provide alternative isolation centers for people who could not quarantine in their houses. At the moment of the draft of the plan, such isolation centers can host 2050 beds in 9 locations. It is however unclear if mentioned centers can be utilized beyond Covid-19, and what are the specifics of such isolation wards. [3] In 2013 the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) published a guide, "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments" (Normas para la Prevención y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud) that includes specifications and requirements of isolation units. [2] The main private and public clinics and hospitals in the country, the Centro de Medicina Avanzada Dr. Abel González (which does not have a website), Clínica Abreu, Cedimat, Hospital General Plaza de la Salud and Hospital Infantil Robert Reid Cabral, do not mention isolation units. [4,5,6, 7, 8] .

[1] Ministerio de Salud. Procedimientos para la vigilancia de la enfermedad por coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19)' [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Alertas%20epidemiologicas/Coronavirus/Nacional/Procedimientos%20Vigilancia%20COVID-19%20Rev-02%20noviembre.pdf>]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud. 2020. PLAN DE CONTINGENCIA ANTE ENFERMEDAD POR CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19). [<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/1720/PlancontingenciaCOVID-19.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19. [<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

[4] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments" (Normas para la Prevención y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud)". [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Clínica Abreu. [<http://clinicaabreu.com.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[6] CEDIMAT. [<http://www.cedimat.net>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[7] Hospital General de la Plaza de la Salud. [<https://www.hgps.org.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[8] Hospital Infantil Dr. Robert Reid Cabral. [<https://www.hirrc.org/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

4.2.1a

Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs. A national procurement protocol is established by the Law No. 340-06 of 2006 on Procurement of Goods, Services, and Works and Concessions. [1] The law applies to all centralised and non-centralised government institutions, including the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) and the Ministry of Agriculture. However, there is no specific mention of laboratory supplies and medical supplies in the law. [1,2] The procurement system, Compras Dominicana, is centralised and available online. [3] Providers can register online through Compras Dominicanas, and the health ministry publishes all relevant information on national and international bidding processes, restricted bids, price comparisons, emergency cases and cases of national security. [2] Additionally, law 543-12, Law on Purchase and Contracting good, services, works and concessions (Reglamento de la Ley sobre Compras y Contrataciones de Bienes, Servicios, Obras y Concesiones), further defines the public contracting legal framework for public entities. In this case, too, the law makes no mention of laboratory and medical supplies. [4] No further information is available on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites [5, 6]

[1] Dominican Republic. Law No. 340-06 of 18 August 2006. "On Purchases and Contracting of Goods, Services, Works and Concessions". [<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/do/do049es.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica. "Purchases and Contracts (Compras y Contrataciones)".

[<https://msp.gob.do/web/Transparencia/compras-menores/#>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Compras Dominicana. [<http://www.comprasdominicana.gov.do/web/guest/portada>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Dominican Republic. Dec. No. 543-12 que establece el Reglamento de la Ley sobre Compras y Contrataciones de Bienes, Servicios, Obras y Concesiones, y deroga el Reglamento No. 490-07 del 30 de agosto de 2007. G. O. No. 10694 del 15 de septiembre de 2012. [<http://www.consultoria.gov.do/Documents/GetDocument?reference=7d5fe2c9-9c20-4b6c-91f5-89a9291a8220>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. <http://www.msp.gob.do/> Accessed December 29, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 27, 2020.

4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

4.2.2a

Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Dominican Republic maintains a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) does not mention medical supplies or medical countermeasures. [1] Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which establishes the risk management policies of the country and orients the actions of national and local entities in the event of an emergency, does not mention medical supply or medical countermeasures, nor does "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments". [2,3] The Centre for Emergency Operations and the General Epidemiology Directorate do not refer to medical supply or medical countermeasures. [4,5] There is no evidence via the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa), nor on the Ministry of Interior and National Directory of Drug Control (Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas), the drug regulatory agency. [6, 7, 8] Nevertheless, the Plan for Facing the Covid-19 Emergency (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) mentions that the Ministry of Health is making efforts to overcome shortages in medical supply and medical countermeasures with the goal of providing continuous availability as well as a 3-month stockpile [9].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management".

[<https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=21017&cid=52>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. Normas para la Prevención y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud.

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias (COE). [<https://www.coe.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Dirección General de Epidemiología. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[6] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[7] Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas. [<https://www.dncd.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[8] Ministry of Interior and Police. [<https://www.mip.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[9] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo wed=y>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.2.2b

Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the Dominican Republic maintains a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) does not mention laboratory supplies. [1] Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which establishes the risk management policies of the country and orients the actions of national and local entities in the event of an emergency, does not mention laboratory supplies, nor does "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments". [2,3] The Centre for Emergency Operations and the General Epidemiology Directorate do not refer to laboratory supplies. [4,5] There is no evidence via the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa), nor on the Ministry of Interior and National Directory of Drug Control (Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas), the drug regulatory

agency. [6, 7, 8]

- [1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [2] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management". [<https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=21017&cid=52>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [4] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias (COE). [<https://www.coe.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [5] Dirección General de Epidemiología. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [6] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [7] Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas. [<https://www.dncd.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [8] Ministry of Interior and Police. [<https://www.mip.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.2.2c

Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) does not mention stockpiles of medical supplies or medical countermeasures, nor requirements for annual reviews. [1] Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which establishes the risk management policies of the country and orients the actions of national and local entities in the event of an emergency, does not mention stockpiles medical supply or medical countermeasures, nor does "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments". [2,3] The Centre for Emergency Operations and the General Epidemiology Directorate do not refer to stockpiles medical supply or medical countermeasures. [4,5] There is no evidence via the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa), nor on the Ministry of Interior and National Directory of Drug Control (Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas), the drug regulatory agency. [6, 7, 8] Nevertheless, the Plan for Facing the Covid-19 Emergency (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) mentions that the Ministry of Health is making efforts to overcome shortages in medical supply and medical countermeasures with the goal of providing continuous availability as well as a 3-month stockpile [9].

- [1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [2] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management". [<https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=21017&cid=52>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [4] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias (COE). [<https://www.coe.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [5] Dirección General de Epidemiología. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [6] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [7] Direccion Nacional de Control de Drogas. [<https://www.dncd.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [8] Ministry of Interior and Police. [<https://www.mip.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[9] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19.

[<https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAlloWed=y>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency, and insufficient evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. Law 543-12, Law on Purchase and Contracting good, services, works and concessions (Reglamento de la Ley sobre Compras y Contrataciones de Bienes, Servicios, Obras y Concesiones), defines the public contracting legal framework for public entities. [1] Mentioned Law includes regulations for exceptional procurement processes to be used in several occasions, including: cases of urgency, situations of national emergency, or national security. The law details the procurement procedure for such cases but provides no definition for them and makes no explicit mention of a public health emergency. Likewise, such law does not explicitly mention PPE or other medical supplies or medical countermeasures. [1] In addition to mentioned law, there is a national procurement protocol is established by the Law No. 340-06 of 2006 on Procurement of Goods, Services, and Works and Concessions, but it makes no explicit mention of medical supplies or medical countermeasures. [2] The law applies to all centralised and non-centralised government institutions, including the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social). [2,3] The procurement system, Compras Dominicana, is centralised and available online. [4] Providers can register online through Compras Dominicanas, and the health ministry publishes all relevant information on national and international bidding processes, restricted bids, price comparisons, emergency cases and cases of national security. [5]. Mentioned law does not include provisions on public health emergency, nor on medical supplies or medical countermeasures. Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which establishes the risk management policies of the country and orients the actions of national and local entities in the event of an emergency, does not mention address this issue either, nor does "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments". [6,3] The Centre for Emergency Operations and the General Epidemiology Directorate do not address the issue, at least in the context of the Dominican Republic. [7, 8] There is no evidence via the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa), nor on the Ministry of Health's website. [9, 10]

[1] Dominican Republic. Dec. No. 543-12 que establece el Reglamento de la Ley sobre Compras y Contrataciones de Bienes, Servicios, Obras y Concesiones, y deroga el Reglamento No. 490-07 del 30 de agosto de 2007. G. O. No. 10694 del 15 de septiembre de 2012. [<http://www.consultoria.gov.do/Documents/GetDocument?reference=7d5fe2c9-9c20-4b6c-91f5-89a9291a8220>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Dominican Republic. Law No. 340-06 of 18 August 2006. "On Purchases and Contracting of Goods, Services, Works and Concessions". [<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/do/do049es.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud.

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Compras Dominicana. [<http://www.comprasdominicana.gov.do/web/guest/portada>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Pública. "Purchases and Contracts (Compras y Contrataciones)".

[<https://msp.gob.do/web/Transparencia/compras-menores/#>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[6] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management".

[<https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=21017&cid=52>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[7] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias (COE). [<https://www.coe.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[8] Dirección General de Epidemiología. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[9] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[10] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency, and there is insufficient evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. Law 543-12, Law on Purchase and Contracting good, services, works and concessions (Reglamento de la Ley sobre Compras y Contrataciones de Bienes, Servicios, Obras y Concesiones), defines the public contracting legal framework for public entities. [1] Mentioned Law includes regulations for exceptional procurement processes to be used in several occasions, including: cases of urgency, situations of national emergency, or national security. The law details the procurement procedure for such cases but provides no definition for them and makes no mention of a public health emergency,. Likewise, such law does not explicitly mention laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) [1] In addition to mentioned law, there is a national procurement protocol is established by the Law No. 340-06 of 2006 on Procurement of Goods, Services, and Works and Concessions, but it makes no explicit mention of medical supplies. [2] The law applies to all centralised and non-centralised government institutions, including the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social). [2,3] The procurement system, Compras Dominicana, is centralised and available online. [4] Providers can register online through Compras Dominicanas, and the health ministry publishes all relevant information on national and international bidding processes, restricted bids, price comparisons, emergency cases and cases of national security. [5]. As above, the law makes no mention of public health emergencies nor of laboratory supplies. Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which establishes the risk management policies of the country and orients the actions of national and local entities in the event of an emergency, does not mention address this issue either, nor does "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments". [6,3] The Centre for Emergency Operations and the General Epidemiology Directorate do not address the issue, at least in the context of the Dominican Republic. [7, 8] There is no evidence via the Ministry of Defence (Ministerio de Defensa), nor on the Ministry of Health's website. [9, 10]

[1] Dominican Republic. Dec. No. 543-12 que establece el Reglamento de la Ley sobre Compras y Contrataciones de Bienes, Servicios, Obras y Concesiones, y deroga el Reglamento No. 490-07 del 30 de agosto de 2007. G. O. No. 10694 del 15 de septiembre de 2012. [<http://www.consultoria.gov.do/Documents/GetDocument?reference=7d5fe2c9-9c20-4b6c-91f5->

89a9291a8220]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Dominican Republic. Law No. 340-06 of 18 August 2006. "On Purchases and Contracting of Goods, Services, Works and Concessions". [<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/do/do049es.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud.

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Compras Dominicana. [<http://www.comprasdominicana.gov.do/web/guest/portada>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Publica. "Purchases and Contracts (Compras y Contrataciones)".

[<https://msp.gob.do/web/Transparencia/compras-menores/#>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[6] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management".

[<https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=21017&cid=52>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[7] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias (COE). [<https://www.coe.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[8] Dirección General de Epidemiología. [<http://digepisalud.gob.do>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[9] Ministerio de Defensa. [<https://www.mide.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[10] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

4.3.1a

Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics). No such evidence is available via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social). [1] There is also no evidence in Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which establishes the risk management policies of the country and orients the actions of national and local entities in the event of an emergency, the "National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters", or the "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments", issued by the health ministry. [2,3,4] Neither is there evidence in Decree No. 309-07 of 2007, which establishes the Regulation for the National System of Epidemiological Vigilance, which itself regulates the epidemiologic management of diseases and events of national importance. [5] The Emergency Operations Centre (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia) and the General Directorate of Epidemiology (Direccion General de Epidemiologia) do not refer to countermeasures, at least in the context of the Dominican Republic. [6,7] No evidence could be found on the websites of the Ministries of Defence and of Interior and Police [8, 9]. The Covid-19 Emergency Plan (Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19) refers to plans for the diffusion of tests, medications and vaccines through global and regional mechanisms, but it does not provide any additional information and there is no evidence that such regulations could be applied beyond Covid-19 [10].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management".

- [https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=21017&cid=52]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 28 June 2016. "National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicación de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana)". [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2223:lanzamiento-estrategia-de-comunicacion-de-riesgos&Itemid=216]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2013. "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments (Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud)". [http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [5] Republica Dominicana. Decreto No. 309-07 of 2007. "Regulation of the National System of Epidemiological Vigilance." [http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2007%20-%20309%20Reglamento%20del%20Sistema%20Nacional%20de%20Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica%20SINAVE.pdf]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [6] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. [https://www.coe.gob.do]. Accessed December 30, 2020
- [7] Dirección General de Epidemiología. [http://digepisalud.gob.do]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [8] Ministerio de Defensa. [https://www.mide.gob.do/]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [9] Ministry of Interior and Police. [https://www.mip.gob.do/]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [10] Plan para enfrentar la emergencia Covid-19. [https://repositorio.msp.gob.do/bitstream/handle/123456789/2106/planenfrentaremergenciacovid.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo wed=y]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is evidence of international co-operation as part of the public plans for emergencies in the Dominican Republic, but there is no mention specifically of a public plan to receive medical personnel. The 2016 National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres) includes "technical assistance and international co-operation" among the stakeholders in the event of a national health emergency, but does not specify further as to the details of this co-operation. [1] The Emergency Operations Centre (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia; COE) website refers to "maintaining contact and co-ordination with the international institutions of aid and assistance, throughout the response period" among its main objectives, but there is no further evidence of specification. [2] There is no evidence of international co-operation provisions in Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management, which establishes the risk management policies of the country and orients the actions of national and local entities in the event of an emergency. [3] There is no evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Defense and Interior and Police, too [4, 5].

- 1] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2016. "National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana)". [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2223:lanzamiento-estrategia-de-comunicacion-de-riesgos&Itemid=216]. Accessed December 30, 2020.
- [2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias (COE). [https://www.coe.gob.do]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management".

[https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?]. December 30, 2020

[4] Ministerio de Defensa. [https://www.mide.gob.do/]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Interior and Police. [https://www.mip.gob.do/]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

4.4.1 Access to healthcare

4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 99.6

2015

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

4.4.1c

Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 441.0

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

4.4.2 Paid medical leave

4.4.2a

Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

4.4.3a

Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that the government has issued legislation, policy or a public statement committing to provide prioritised healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Services (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Servicios Sociales) does not mention this, nor does Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management or Decree No. 309-07 of 2007, which establishes the Regulation for the National System of Epidemiological Vigilance. There is no evidence in the 2013 "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments", issued by the health ministry. [4] Health-related injuries are covered under the Dominican Republic's Social Security System, but the Regulation on the Insurance of Labour Risks of the Dominican Social Security System (Reglamento Sobre el Seguro de Riesgos Laborales del Sistema Dominicano de Seguridad Social) does not make special provisions for healthcare workers. [5]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Dominican Republic. Law No. 147-02 of September 2002. "On Risk Management".

[<https://www.preventionweb.net/english/policies/v.php?id=21017&cid=52>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Dominican Republic. Decree No. 309-07 of 2007. "On the Regulation of the National Epidemiological Surveillance System". [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2007%20-%20309%20Reglamento%20del%20Sistema%20Nacional%20de%20Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica%20SINAVE.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments (Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud)". [<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social (CNSS). "Regulation on the Insurance of Labour Risks of the Dominican Social Security System (Reglamento Sobre el Seguro de Riesgos Laborales del Sistema Dominicano de Seguridad Social)". [http://www.sisalril.gov.do/pdf/reglamentos/reglamento_seguro_de_riesgos_laborales.pdf]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

4.5.1a

Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. The 2016 National Strategy for Risks Communications and Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres) creates a risks communication team or committee tasked with planning and implementing the protocols of risks communications established by the strategy, as well as the operative plans to be followed in the event of an emergency. The team/committee is responsible for the creation of a working plan for the internal and external coordination of the committee's activities, as well as the follow-up to the plan. The committee includes public and private sector members like the 911 emergency system, the presidency of the Republic, fire department, civil defense, Red Cross, alongside international aid organizations like the FAO and UNICEF. The committee is coordinated by the Department of Health and Promotion and Disease Prevention (Departamento de Promoción de la Salud y Prevención de la Enfermedad) and the General Directorate of Strategic Communication (Dirección General de Comunicación Estratégica, DGCE), both under the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud y Asistencia Social, MISPAS). [1] No additional information is available on the Ministry of Health's or on the Emergency Operation Center's websites [2, 3].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2016. "Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana".

https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2223:lanzamiento-estrategia-de-comunicacion-de-riesgos&Itemid=216. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/quienes-somos.html>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

4.5.1b

Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence of a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency in both the public and private sector. The 2016 National Strategy for Risks Communications and Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres) creates a risks communication team or committee tasked with planning and implementing the protocols of risks communications established by the strategy, as well as the operative plans to be followed in the event of an emergency. The team/committee is responsible for the creation of a working plan for the internal and external coordination of the committee's activities, as well as the follow-up to the plan. The committee includes public and private sector members like the 911 emergency system, the presidency of the Republic, fire department, civil defense, Red Cross, alongside international aid organizations like the FAO and UNICEF. The committee is coordinated by the Department of Health and Promotion and Disease Prevention (Departamento de Promoción de la Salud y Prevención de la Enfermedad) and the General Directorate of Strategic Communication (Dirección General de Comunicación Estratégica, DGCE), both under the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud y Asistencia Social, MISPAS). Despite this, there is no clear evidence of a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. [1] No additional information is available on the Ministry of Health's or on the Emergency Operation Center's websites [2, 3].

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2016. "Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana".

https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2223:lanzamiento-estrategia-de-comunicacion-de-riesgos&Itemid=216. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. [<https://www.coe.gob.do/index.php/sobre-nosotros/quienes-somos.html>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of active tracking of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) in the Dominican Republic. In August 2018 the Ministry of Public Health (Ministerio de Salud Publica) alongside the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO)/World Health Organisation (WHO) held a conference on neonatology and research on outbreaks, which sought to strengthen surveillance for HCAI, specifically in the area of neonatology. Experts mentioned that the country needs to establish national criteria for HCAI, in order to create a more uniform collection of data. [1] The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) launched an awareness campaign in 2014 to reduce the incidence of HCAI, but there is no evidence of monitoring. [2,3] There is no mention of HCAI or HAI in the 2013 "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments (Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud)". [4] There is no evidence of HCAI being reported during the Covid-19 outbreak, neither in the Official Bulletins of the Ministry of Health, nor on the Covid-19-dedicated website hosted by the Presidency of the Dominican Republic [5, 6].

[1] Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO). 2018. "Authorities seek to reduce neonatal deaths due to infections (Autoridades buscan reducir las muertes neonatales a causa de infecciones)".

[https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2809:autoridades-buscan-reducir-las-muertes-neonatales-a-causa-de-infecciones&Itemid=362]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] PAHO. 2018. "RD launches campaign "Save Lives: Wash Hands" (RD se suma a campaña "Salve vidas: Límpiense las Manos)". [https://www.paho.org/dor/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2720:republica-dominicana-se-adhiere-a-la-campana-salve-vidas-limpiense-las-manos&Itemid=362]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2013. "Norms for the Prevention and Control of Infections in Healthcare Establishments (Normas para la Prevencion y Control de Infecciones en los Establecimientos de Salud)".

[<http://digepisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2013%20-%20Normas%20control%20infeccion.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[5] Direccion Nacional de Epidemiologia. Boletin Especial COVID-19.

[http://www.digepisalud.gob.do/documentos/?drawer=Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica*Alertas%20epidemiologicas*Coronavirus*Nacional*Boletin%20Especial%20COVID-19]. Accessed December 28, 2020.

[6] Presidencia de la Republica Dominicana. Coronavirus. [<https://coronavirusrd.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 29, 2020.

4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial. There is a national requirement for ethical review by an approval board, the National Council of Health Bioethics (Consejo Nacional de Bioetica en Salud; CONABIOS). CONABIOS, an agency of the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud y Asistencia Social), is ordained by Resolution No. 12 of 2008 of the Secretariat of Public Health and Social Assistance, the forerunner of the current health ministry, to "review, approve, deny, supervise, evaluate, and temporarily or definitely suspend any research or study that is performed with human beings, in order to guarantee that [the studies] meet scientific, methodological, and bioethical principles approved nationally and internationally." [1,2]

[1] Consejo Nacional de Bioética en Salud. [<http://conabios.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[2] Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Resolucion No. 12 of 2008. "That incorporates all the previous dispositions in matter of bioethics and establishes the structure, organisation and functions of the National Council of Health Bioethics as a decentralised organ of the SESPAS (que incorpora todas las disposiciones anteriores en materia de bioetica y establece la estructura, organizacion, y funciones del Consejo Nacional de Bioetica en salud como organio desconcentradode la SESPAS)". 2008. [<http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Montevideo/pdf/CNB-RD-ResAdm012Conabios.pdf>]. Accessed December 30, 2020

4.7.1b

Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Dominican Republic has an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to treat ongoing pandemics. The National Council of Health Bioethics, which is an agency of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance publishes the requirements for submitting a research protocol, and there is no information about being able to request an expedited process. [1] There is no evidence available in the health ministry's "National Health Research Policy (Politica Nacional de Investigacion para la Salud)", which aims to promote research in health. [2] There is no evidence available in the Resolution No. 12 of 2008 of the Secretariat of Public Health and Social Assistance (Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, a precursor to the current health ministry). [3] No

further evidence is available on the Ministry of Health website [4].

[1] Consejo Nacional de Bioética en Salud. [<http://conabios.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Pública. November 2014. "National Health Research Policy (Política Nacional de Investigación para la Salud)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/dinisa/documentos/Pol-dinisa.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Resolucion No. 12 of 2008. "That incorporates all previous dispositions in matter of bioethics and establishes the structure, organisation, and functions of the National Council of Bioethics in health as a decentralised organ of the SESPAS (Que incorpora todas las disposiciones anteriores en materia de bioetica y establece la estructura, organizacion, y funciones del Consejo Nacional de Bioetica en salud como organio desconcentradode la SESPAS)". 2008. [<http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Montevideo/pdf/CNB-RD-ResAdm012Conabios.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

4.7.2a

Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans. The General Directorate of Medicines, Foods and Sanitary Products is tasked with authorising sanitary regulations and approving medication in general, and conducting pharmaceutical surveillance. [1] There is no evidence available in Resolution No. 12 of 2008 on bioethics and the structure, organisation and functions of the National Council of Health Bioethics, or in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance's National Health Research Policy (Política Nacional de Investigación para la Salud), which aims to promote research in health. [3]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2016. "Technical Regulation of the National Pharmacovigilance System (Reglamento Técnico del Sistema Nacional de Farmacovigilancia)".

[<http://www.msp.gob.do/oai/documentos/Convocatorias/2016/Julio/ReglamentoFarmacovigilancia/RT%20Farmacovigilancia%20v.%20Consulta%20Publica%20.%20junio%202016.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Secretaria de Estado de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. Resolucion No. 12 of 2008. "That incorporates all the previous dispositions in matter of bioethics and establishes the structure, organisation and functions of the National Council of Health Bioethics as a decentralised organ of the SESPAS (que incorpora todas las disposiciones anteriores en materia de bioetica y establece la estructura, organizacion, y funciones del Consejo Nacional de Bioetica en salud como organio desconcentradode la SESPAS)". 2008. [<http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Montevideo/pdf/CNB-RD-ResAdm012Conabios.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica. 2014. "National Health Research Policy (Política Nacional de Investigación para la Salud)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/dinisa/documentos/Pol-dinisa.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Dominican Republic has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during health emergencies. The National Council of Health Bioethics publishes the requirements for submitting a research protocol, and there is no information about being able to request an expedited process, nor references to countermeasures. [1] There is no evidence via the General Directorate of Medicines, Foods and Sanitary Products, which authorises sanitary regulation and approves medication in general. [2] No is evidence available via the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social), either. [3]

[1] Consejo Nacional de Bioética en Salud. [<http://conabios.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Dirección General de Medicamentos, Alimentos y Productos Sanitarios. [<https://digemaps.msp.gob.do/menu/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020

Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

5.1.2a

Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence that pandemics are integrated into the national risk reduction strategy, nor that there is a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics. The "National Disaster Risk Management Plan" created by Presidential Decree No. 275-13 of 2013, a national plan orienting national and local entities in terms of risk management, does not include any mention of epidemics or pandemics. [1] There is no evidence of a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics via the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud y Asistencia Social) or Decree No. 309-07 that establishes the General Directorate of Epidemiology (Dirección General de Epidemiología). [2,3] The National Epidemiologic Surveillance System, which is part of the wider General Health Information System, foresees the creation of a "rapid response group for epidemiological emergencies", which is tasked with designing and implementing an action plan in the event of mobilisation. The response group can only be convened upon the occurrence of the threat of pandemic diseases, epidemics that surpass the geographic limits of a province and other relevant health emergencies. [4]

[1] República Dominicana. Decree No. 275-13 of 2013. "That the National Risk Management Plan and the National Plan for Seismic Risk Reduction are the instruments that define the strategic objectives, programs and subprograms through which the institutional activities for the prevention and mitigation of risks are oriented".

[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/35861_decreto27513pngirdpnrrs1.pdf]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Dominican Republic. Decree No. 309-07 of 2007. "On the Regulation of the National Epidemiological Surveillance System". [<http://digeprisalud.gob.do/docs/Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica/Reglamentos%20y%20Normas/2007%20-%20309%20Reglamento%20del%20Sistema%20Nacional%20de%20Vigilancia%20Epidemiologica%20SINAVE.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[4] Secretaría de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2009. "National System of Epidemiological Vigilance Early Warning System (Sistema Nacional de Vigilancia Epidemiológica Subsistema de Vigilancia de alerta temprana)".

[https://www.paho.org/dor/images/stories/archivos/Protocolo_VigilanciaInfluenza.pdf?ua=1]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

5.2.1a

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no public evidence of formal cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies. The Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social) does not mention such an agreement. [1] The 2016 National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicación de Riesgos para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres) includes "technical assistance and international co-operation" among the stakeholders in the event of a national health emergency, but does not provide specific detail. According to a strategy from the health ministry, "international organisations" are part of a risk communications team tasked with planning and implementing the communications strategy in the event of an emergency. The organisations include The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and "others". [2] The Centre for Emergency Operations includes "international co-operation"

among the things that it co-ordinates in the event of an emergency, but does not specify further. [3] The Dominican Republic is not a member of the Caribbean Public Health Agency. [4]

[1] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. 2016. "National Risk Communication Strategy for Sanitary Emergencies and Disasters (Estrategia Nacional de Comunicacion de Riesgos Para Emergencias Sanitarias y Desastres en la Republica Dominicana)". [<http://iris.paho.org/xmlui/handle/123456789/31104?locale-attribute=es>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Centro de Operaciones de Emergencias. [<https://www.coe.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[4] Caribbean Public Health Agency. [<http://carpha.org/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

5.2.1b

Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is evidence that the country has cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. The Dominican Republic is part of the US Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services, which includes emergency response preparedness, and there is no evidence of gaps in implementation. [1] In addition, Dominican Republic is a member of the CaribVET Caribbean animal health network. CaribVET's objectives include to "assist in implementation of early warning, early detection and quick response mechanisms for animal and zoonotic diseases" and to "improve and harmonize the surveillance and control of animal and zoonotic diseases". [2] There is no other available public evidence via the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura) or the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social) of cross-border agreements, protocols or MOUs with neighbouring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. [3,4]

[1] United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. "International Services".

[https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/internationalservices/Program_Overview. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] CaribVET Caribbean animal health network. 2020. "About the network". [<https://www.caribvet.net/about-the-network>]. Accessed 31 January 2021.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

5.3.1a

Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1b

Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5 FINANCING

5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. There is evidence of funding commitment to improve capacity to address epidemic threats in the national budget. The national budget laws for 2020 and 2019 include a budget item for Epidemic Surveillance within the Ministry of Health budget, as well as other items related to addressing epidemic threats in the field of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2]

[1] Ministerio de Hacienda. PROYECTO DE LEY DE PRESUPUESTO GENERAL DEL ESTADO.

[<http://www.digepres.gob.do/pubs/2020/Libros/Tomo-I/Proyecto-de-ley-de-presupuesto-General-del-Estado-2020-Tomo-I.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Hacienda. LEY DE PRESUPUESTO GENERAL DEL ESTADO 2019. [<http://www.digepres.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Libro-Ley-PGE-Tomo-I-2019.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence of publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act). Although the Dominican Republic is not an IDA borrowing country nor part of the WB Pandemic Financing facility, it has access to the Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option, or Cat DDO, from the World Bank, a contingency line of credit to secure US\$150m immediate financing in the aftermath of a disaster. The programme includes health emergencies. [1] Another such programme is the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund. Law No. 147-02 of 2002 on risk management creates a National Prevention, Mitigation and Disaster Response Fund, which is funded with resources from the national budget and tapped in the event of emergencies. There is evidence that this fund covers health emergencies such as dengue in the aftermath of hurricanes, and that it is in effect. [2,3,4,5]

[1] World Bank. 2017. "World Bank Supports the Dominican Republic to Better Prepare for Hurricanes and other Natural Disasters". [<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/09/28/world-bank-supports-the-dominican-republic-to-better-prepare-for-hurricanes-and-other-natural-disasters>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent. 2012. "Disaster relief emergency fund (DREF) Dominican Republic: Hurricane Sandy". [<http://www.ifrc.org/docs/Appeals/12/MDRDO006do.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Republica Dominicana. Law No. 147-02 of 2002. "On Risk Management (Sobre Gestion de Riesgos)". [<http://www.oas.org/dsd/EnvironmentLaw/CaribbeanLegislationProject/Disaster%26StateEmergency/DomRepublic/Ley%20147%2002.pdf>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[4] Defensa Civil República Dominicana. 2017. "RD develops actions for the reduction of disasters (RD desarrolla acciones para la reducción de desastres)". [<http://www.defensacivil.gob.do/noticias/item/rd-desarrolla-acciones-para-la-reduccion->

de-desastres]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[5] Oficina Técnica de Cooperación. 2013. "Accord signed on fund for prevention, mitigation and response in the face of disasters (Firman acuerdo para ejecutar fondo de Prevención, Mitigación y Respuestas ante Desastres)".

[<http://aacid.org.do/noticias/item/firman-acuerdo-para-ejecutar-fondo-de-prevencion-mitigacion-y-respuestas-ante-desastres>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support or improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity. The ministries of health of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, respectively, have ongoing collaboration and plans to support each other in combatting malaria, TB, and HIV. [1,2] There is evidence of specific projects where the government has earmarked funds to improve vigilance, such as the project "Malaria Zero" (2014) to improve vigilance in 5 provinces along the Dominican border area. [3, 4] However, there is insufficient evidence of public commitments from senior leaders of the country. [5, 6, 7]

[1] Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). "Global Health - Dominican Republic".

[<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/countries/dr/default.htm>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Diario Libre. 2018. "Dominican Republic and Haiti have managed to reduce tuberculosis (República Dominicana y Haití han logrado reducir la tuberculosis)." [<https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/salud/rd-y-haiti-han-logrado-disminuir-la-tuberculosis-MD11127964>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Ureña, Keyla. 2018. "Dominican Republic Malaria Situation (Situación Malaria República Dominicana)". [http://www.mcr-comisca.org/sites/all/modules/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/9_%20Reunion%20MCR%20Mayo%202018%20-%20Dra_%20Keyla%20Ure%C3%B1a.pdf]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[4] MesoAmerica Malaria. "Initiative announced to eradicate malaria in Central America and the Dominican Republic (Anuncian Iniciativa para Erradicar la Malaria en Centroamérica y República Dominicana)."

[<https://www.saludmesoamerica.org/es/noticias/ma/anuncian-iniciativa-para-erradicar-la-malaria-en-centroamerica-y-republica-dominicana>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[5] Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020

[6] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. [<https://www.mirex.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 30, 2020.

[7] WHO. [<https://www.who.int/>]. December 31, 2020.

5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is no evidence that the Dominican Republic provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats, but there is evidence that it has requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. The Global Health Security Funding Tracker indicates that the Dominican Republic has received funding from the World Health Organisation and others in the past three years to support epidemic preparedness, including for developing the national laboratory system, real-time surveillance, and the development of strategies, plans and capacities for diseases such as cholera, viral haemorrhagic fever, meningitis and influenza and those due to vector-borne, emerging and re-emerging pathogens. [1] Additionally, the Dominican Republic earmarked funds under the "Malaria Zero" program to improve vigilance in 5 provinces along the Dominican - Haitian border area, was put into effect in 2014. Along with six others, the country also received financial support from the Interamerican Development Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Carlos Slim Foundation, to eliminate malaria. [2,3,4,5] The ministries of health of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, respectively, have ongoing collaboration and plans to support each other in combatting malaria, TB, and HIV, but there is no evidence that the support is aimed at improving capacity to address epidemic threats [6] There is no evidence of financial support from donors and/or to other countries in the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture. [7,8]

[1] Global Health Security Funding Tracker. [<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/#/data>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Ureña, Keyla. 2018. "Situación Malaria República Dominicana". http://www.mcr-comisca.org/sites/all/modules/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/9_%20Reunion%20MCR%20Mayo%202018%20-%20Dra_%20Keyla%20Ure%C3%B1a.pdf. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Malaria Zero. "Hispaniola: The Last Stronghold of Malaria in the Caribbean." <https://www.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2015/2015-cha-malaria-zero-cdc-factsheet.pdf>. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[4] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2018. "Situacion Malaria en Republica Dominicana". http://www.mcr-comisca.org/sites/all/modules/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/9_%20Reunion%20MCR%20Mayo%202018%20-%20Dra_%20Keyla%20Ure%C3%B1a.pdf. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[5] MesoAmerica Malaria. "Anuncian Iniciativa para Erradicar la Malaria en Centroamérica y República Dominicana." <https://www.saludmesoamerica.org/es/noticias/ma/anuncian-iniciativa-para-erradicar-la-malaria-en-centroamerica-y-republica-dominicana>. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[6] Diario Libre. 2018. "Dominican Republic and Haiti have managed to reduce tuberculosis (República Dominicana y Haití han logrado reducir la tuberculosis)." [<https://www.diariolibre.com/actualidad/salud/rd-y-haiti-han-logrado-disminuir-la-tuberculosis-MD11127964>]

[7] Ministerio de Salud Publica. <https://www2.msp.gob.do/web/>. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[8] Ministerio de Agricultura. <http://agricultura.gob.do/>. Accessed December 31, 2020.

5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. The country has a formal collaboration with the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to conduct research and prevention activities throughout Central America and provide ongoing disease surveillance, especially around the detection and response to disease outbreaks such as cholera, chikungunya, histoplasmosis and Zika. However, there is no evidence that there is an agreement to share genetic or epidemiological data or specimens. [1] There is no available public evidence via the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance nor via the Ministry of Agriculture. [2]

[1] Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). "Global Health - Dominican Republic". [<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/countries/dr/default.htm>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[3] Ministerio de Agricultura. [<http://www.agricultura.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 26, 2020.

5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that the Dominican Republic has not shared samples in accordance with the PIP framework in the past two years. The World Health Organisation (WHO) evaluation on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Partnership Contribution mentions the Dominican Republic and indicates that the country shared influenza virus samples with WHO collaborating centres, H5 reference laboratories and essential regulatory authorities at least once in the two years prior to the report, which covered November 2016 to February 2017. [1] The biennial progress report mentions Dominican Republic as a funding recipient, but provides no additional information on sharing samples [2]. No further information is available on

WHO websites or media outlets.

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2016. "External evaluation of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Partnership Contribution - High-Level Implementation Plan 2013- 2017".

[http://www.who.int/about/evaluation/pip_evaluation_report.pdf]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] WHO. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework. [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/332171/WHO-WHE-GIH-PIP-2020.1-eng.pdf?ua=1>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

5.6.1c

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 0, No = 1

Current Year Score: 1

There is no public evidence that the Dominican Republic has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. Additionally, no evidence could be found that Dominican Republic has not shared Covid-19 samples. No evidence is available according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance (Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social, as well as other media outlets. [1,2]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). [<https://www.who.int/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

[2] Ministerio de Salud Publica y Asistencia Social. 2018. "Malaria Situation in the Dominican Republic (Situacion Malaria en Republica Dominicana)". [<http://www.msp.gob.do/>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

6.1.1 Government effectiveness

6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 3

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 28

2020

Transparency International

6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2020

Economist Intelligence

6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

6.1.3a

What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

6.1.4a

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.4b

What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

Current Year Score: 1

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

6.1.4c

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.5 Armed conflict

6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.6 Government territorial control

6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.1.7 International tensions

6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

6.2.1 Literacy

6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 93.8

2016

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.2 Gender equality

6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.55

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

6.2.3 Social inclusion

6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0.1

2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

Current Year Score: 2

According to the World Bank/ILOSTAT, the informal employment in the non-agricultural sector amounted to 51% in 2019. [1]

[1] World Bank/ILOSTAT. Informal employment (% of total non-agricultural employment) - Dominican Republic. [<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.ISV.IFRM.ZS?locations=DO>]. Accessed December 31, 2020.

6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

Current Year Score: 1

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.2.4 Public confidence in government

6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.5 Local media and reporting

6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

6.2.6 Inequality

6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.42

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

6.4.1 Urbanization

6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 81.83

2019

World Bank

6.4.2 Land use

6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: 1.55

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 73.89

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook

6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 506.5

2019

WHO

6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 7.3

2019

World Bank

6.5.1d

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 9.4

2018

World Bank

6.5.1e

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 27.6

2016

WHO

6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation

6.5.2a

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 96.69

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.2b

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 83.89

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 450.83

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018