

# Cook Islands

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Cook Islands. For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Cook Islands.

<b>CATEGORY 1: PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OR RELEASE OF PATHOGENS WITH POTENTIAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCERN</b>	<b>4</b>
1.1 Antimicrobial resistance (AMR)	4
1.2 Zoonotic disease	7
1.3 Biosecurity	12
1.4 Biosafety	18
1.5 Dual-use research and culture of responsible science	20
1.6 Immunization	23
<b>CATEGORY 2: EARLY DETECTION AND REPORTING FOR EPIDEMICS OF POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL CONCERN</b>	<b>24</b>
2.1 Laboratory systems strength and quality	24
2.2 Laboratory supply chains	26
2.3 Real-time surveillance and reporting	27
2.4 Surveillance data accessibility and transparency	29
2.5 Case-based investigation	33
2.6 Epidemiology workforce	35
<b>CATEGORY 3: RAPID RESPONSE TO AND MITIGATION OF THE SPREAD OF AN EPIDEMIC</b>	<b>37</b>
3.1 Emergency preparedness and response planning	37
3.2 Exercising response plans	40
3.3 Emergency response operation	41
3.4 Linking public health and security authorities	42
3.5 Risk communications	43
3.6 Access to communications infrastructure	45

3.7 Trade and travel restrictions	46
-----------------------------------	----

**CATEGORY 4: SUFFICIENT AND ROBUST HEALTH SECTOR TO TREAT THE SICK AND PROTECT HEALTH WORKERS 48**

4.1 Health capacity in clinics, hospitals, and community care centers	48
---	----

4.2 Supply chain for health system and healthcare workers	50
---	----

4.3 Medical countermeasures and personnel deployment	54
--	----

4.4 Healthcare access	55
-----------------------	----

4.5 Communications with healthcare workers during a public health emergency	57
---	----

4.6 Infection control practices and availability of equipment	58
---	----

4.7 Capacity to test and approve new medical countermeasures	58
--	----

**CATEGORY 5: COMMITMENTS TO IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY, FINANCING PLANS TO ADDRESS GAPS, AND ADHERING TO GLOBAL NORMS 60**

5.1 International Health Regulations (IHR) reporting compliance and disaster risk reduction	60
---	----

5.2 Cross-border agreements on public health and animal health emergency response	61
---	----

5.3 International commitments	62
-------------------------------	----

5.4 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway (PVS)	64
--	----

5.5 Financing	65
---------------	----

5.6 Commitment to sharing of genetic and biological data and specimens	68
--	----

**CATEGORY 6: OVERALL RISK ENVIRONMENT AND VULNERABILITY TO BIOLOGICAL THREATS 70**

6.1 Political and security risk	70
---------------------------------	----

6.2 Socio-economic resilience	73
-------------------------------	----

6.3 Infrastructure adequacy	76
-----------------------------	----

6.4 Environmental risks	76
-------------------------	----

6.5 Public health vulnerabilities	77
-----------------------------------	----

## Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

### 1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

#### 1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

##### 1.1.1a

**Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?**

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence to say whether the Government of the Cook Islands has developed and approved a national antimicrobial resistance (AMR) plan for the surveillance, detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. Several sources refer to the existence of such a plan, but it is not publicly available. The World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Database for AMR Country Self Assessments indicates that the Cook Islands developed a national AMR plan "that reflects Global Action Plan objectives, with an operational plan and monitoring arrangements" in 2016, approved by Government of the Cook Islands in 2017. [1] Global Action Plan objectives include surveillance, detection and reporting of AMR pathogens. [2] Health Action International Asia-Pacific, an informal network of non-governmental organisations and individuals, reports that an Antimicrobial Resistance Action Plan was launched on November 19, 2016. [3] The Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 states that a National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance is "in existence" [4]. Additionally, the Pacific Island Countries and Areas WHO Cooperation Strategy 2018-2022 lists implementing the National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance as a national strategic priority for the Cook Islands. [10] The Cook Islands-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2018-2022 mentions the National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance that includes "carrying out the annual Antibiotic Awareness Week, and advancing antimicrobial stewardship and infection prevention and control" but there is no publically available evidence to verify the same [5]. World Health Organisation (WHO) Library of National Action Plans does not have an entry for the Cook Islands. [6] There is no information on the development, approval, or publication of a national AMR plan on the Ministry of Health public website or the Ministry of Agriculture public website[7,8]. The Cook Islands has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities. [9]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments". [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2015. "Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance." [<https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/193736>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "The Pacific Island Countries and Areas WHO Cooperation Strategy 2018-2022." [<http://iris.wpro.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665.1/14097/WPRO-2017-DPM-027-pic-eng.pdf>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Library of National Action Plans." [<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[6] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[7] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[8] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations (2005) and Health Security

(SPH): IHR Monitoring & Evaluation". [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/ihr-monitoring-evaluation>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[9] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strengthening Health Security by Implementing the International Health Regulations (2005), WHO Western Pacific Region: Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Mission Reports."

[<https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/mission-reports-western-pacific/en/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[10] World Health Organisation (WHO). "COOK ISLANDS-WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2018-2022."

[<https://iris.wpro.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665.1/13941/WPRO-2017-DPM-007-cok-eng.pdf>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

### 1.1.1b

#### Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2 , Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

The Cook Islands has a national laboratory which can test for some priority antimicrobial resistant (AMR) pathogens. The Ministry of Health Antibiotic Guidelines 2018 states that "the laboratory at Rarotonga Hospital in Avarua is the only microbiology laboratory for Cook Islands." The guidelines say that "samples sent to the laboratory in Rarotonga are mainly collected at the Hospital or from General Practitioners on Rarotonga, but may be collected from other islands." [1] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Database for AMR Country Self Assessments 2017 indicates the Cook Islands has national AMR surveillance activities in place for "common bacterial pathogens" but "capacity (including laboratory) for surveillance and reporting of data on AMR is lacking." [2] The Antibiotic Guidelines 2018 suggest that *E. coli*, *K. pneumoniae*, *S. aureus*, *S. pneumoniae*, *Salmonella* spp., *Shigella* spp, and *N. gonorrhoeae* can be tested for in Cook Islands. It is noted in the guidelines that clinical samples were collected from a minority of patients and "especially those patients who may be failing antibiotic treatment." [1] But the Ministry of Health website indicates confirmation and culture of *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* must be done overseas. [3]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Antibiotic Guidelines 2018." [[http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands\\_Handbook\\_1\\_Mar\\_18-DIGITAL.pdf](http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands_Handbook_1_Mar_18-DIGITAL.pdf)] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments". [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Hospital Laboratory Services." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital/hospital-laboratory-services/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

### 1.1.1c

#### Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that the Cook Islands government is conducting environmental surveillance for antimicrobial resistant (AMR) organisms or antimicrobial residues. The Cook Islands' National Environment Services website does not mention any particular policy to do such surveillance. [1] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Database for AMR Country Self Assessments reports that Cook Islands has a national AMR action plan, but the plan is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Health. [2,3,4] In the World Health Organisation Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessment, no data is available for Cooks Island on whether there is a national surveillance system for AMR in animals, plants, foods and environment. [5] Sustainable Integrated Water Resources and Wastewater Management in Pacific Island Countries (SOPAC) reported in 2007 that the Ministry of Health "periodically

carries out water monitoring for microbiological content (coliform) in the water supplies" in the Cook Islands. The report said that these water supplies are "neither properly filtered nor disinfected" and are "vulnerable to any form of disaster, such as contamination from agriculture chemicals, sanitation contamination and saltwater intrusion." [6]

- [1] Cook Islands National Environment Service. [<http://environment.gov.ck/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments". [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments". [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [6] Sustainable Integrated Water Resources and Wastewater Management in Pacific Island Countries. November 2007. "National Integrated Water Resource Management Diagnostic Report: Cook Islands." [<http://www.pacificwater.org/userfiles/file/GEF%20IWRM%20Final%20Docs/MR0635CI.pdf>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

## 1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

### 1.1.2a

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of national legislation or regulation in place in the Cook Islands requiring prescriptions for antibiotics for humans. The Ministry of Health published a Pharmaceutical Country Profile in 2013 which states that "sometimes antibiotics are sold over-the-counter without a prescription." [1] The Ministry of Health (Pharmacy and Therapeutic Products) Regulations 2013 make no specific mention of antibiotics as a prescription-only medication. [2] There are however detailed guidelines for prescribers on the appropriate use of antibiotics in both the Cook Islands Essentials Medicines List and the Cook Islands 2018 Antibiotic Guidelines. However, the document does not mention any legal action if these guidelines are not followed [3,4]. The National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 outlines that Essential Medicine list should be reviewed every two years and aligned to Anti-Microbial Resistance Action Plan and Antibiotic guidelines but no evidence is available for such a review [6]. In the World Health Organisation Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self-Assessment, the Cook Islands reported that there are guidelines to "enable appropriate use" of antimicrobials in human health [5].

- [1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health and World Health Organisation (WHO). "Cook Islands Pharmaceutical Country Profile." June 2013. [<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21358en/s21358en.pdf>] Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. October 2013. "Ministry of Health (Pharmacy and Therapeutic Products) Regulations 2013." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/MOH-Pharmacy-and-Therapeutic-Products-Regulation-2013.pdf>] Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. November 2017. "Cook Islands Essential Medicines List." [<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s23518en/s23518en.pdf>] Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Antibiotic Guidelines 2018." [[http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands\\_Handbook\\_1\\_Mar\\_18-DIGITAL.pdf](http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands_Handbook_1_Mar_18-DIGITAL.pdf)] Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [5] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments". [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.
- [6] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. The National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021.

[[https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai\\_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf](https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf)]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

### 1.1.2b

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Government of the Cook Islands has passed a legislation or regulation requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use in animals. Both the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture make no mention of antibiotic use in animals on their websites. [1,2] The World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Database for Anti Microbial Resistance Country Self Assessments reports that Cook Islands has a national AMR action plan, but the plan is not available on the websites of the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2,3] There is no entry for the Cook Islands in the WHO library of national Anti Microbial Resistance action plans. [4] There is no evidence available of relevant legislation on the Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute website. [5]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self Assessments". [<http://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 31 July 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation. "Library of National Action Plans." [<http://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[5] The University of the South Pacific, Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute. [<http://www.pacii.org/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

## 1.2 ZOOBOTIC DISEASE

### 1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

#### 1.2.1a

**Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has a national law, plan or strategic document on zoonotic disease. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture address zoonotic disease in detail on their websites [1,2]. The Cook Islands National Agricultural Policy 2017-2021 lists strengthening national and regional "surveillance monitoring systems for pests and diseases, invasive species and zoonotic outbreaks" as a policy objective [3]. However, no government plan has been found to achieve the same. The Ministry of Agriculture states that the country is free of zoonotic diseases as outlined in List A and List B of the OIE World Organisation for Animal Health disease database [4,5]. But the Cook Islands has not publicly published an OIE Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Evaluation Report [5].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. April 2017. "Cook Islands National Agricultural Policy 2017-2021."

[<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/contents/pdf-download/national-docs&acts/National%20Agricultural%20Policy%202017-2021%20FINAL%20DRAFT.pdf>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[4] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "Old Classification of Diseases Notifiable to the OIE, List A."

[<http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/the-world-animal-health-information-system/old-classification-of-diseases-notifiable-to-the-oie-list-a/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

[5] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "Old Classification of Diseases Notifiable to the OIE, List B."

[<http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/the-world-animal-health-information-system/old-classification-of-diseases-notifiable-to-the-oie-list-b/>] Accessed 31 July 2020.

### 1.2.1b

**Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence of an official policy document, which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans in Cook Islands. An overarching agricultural policy includes some measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events - policy goal 6 of the National Agricultural Policy 2017-2021 deals with implementation of measures (Pests Surveillance Strategies) that minimises any further risk of pests and diseases entering the Cook Islands and strengthening of national, regional surveillance monitoring systems for pests and diseases, invasive species and zoonotic outbreaks. However, there is no further mention of specific measures to be taken. [1] The Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture mention any other policy or further evidence on this on their websites [2,3].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. April 2017. "Cook Islands National Agricultural Policy 2017-2021."

[<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/cok170722.pdf>] Accessed 15 March 2021.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 6 April 2021.

### 1.2.1c

**Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that Cook Islands government has any national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. The Ministry of Health website, the Ministry of Agriculture website and the Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 do not mention any guidelines in place for such a surveillance and control [1,2,3].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021"

[[https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai\\_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf](https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf)]

Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.2.1d

**Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of existence of a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries in the government of Cook Islands. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture mention any such department in detail on their websites [1,2]. The National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 document also lacks reference to any such department [3]. The Cook Islands has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities [4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021" [[https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai\\_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf](https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf)] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strengthening Health Security by Implementing the International Health Regulations (2005), WHO Western Pacific Region: Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Mission Reports." [<https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/mission-reports-western-pacific/en/>]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

## 1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

### 1.2.2a

**Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Cook Islands does not appear to have a national mechanism for owners of livestock to report on disease surveillance, though the Ministry of Agriculture does encourage the public "to help with the identification [of] any unusual events concerning our livestock." [1] The Ministry of Agriculture website also says the Cook Islands "rely heavily on outside agencies like; New Zealand and SPC (South Pacific Committees), in Fiji for the usage of their laboratories, diagnostic services and expert advice" in relation to livestock disease surveillance. [1] There is no relevant information on the Ministry of Health website. [2]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Livestock Division." [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/livestock/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.2.2b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?**



Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Cook Islands has laws or guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture share relevant information on their websites. [1,2] The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 does however state that it is an offence for a biosecurity officer to disclose information "of a confidential or commercial nature which has come into the officer's possession." [3]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008"

[<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/contents/2015/bio-security/register%20and%20forms/Cook%20Islands%20Biosecurity%20Act%202008.pdf>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.2.2c

**Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publically available evidence to suggest that the Government of the Cook Islands conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. The Biosecurity Act, 2008 mentions "surveillance and monitoring of pests and diseases in the Cook Islands and assess the status of regulated pests and diseases" but there is no evidence that surveys or surveillance are taking place. It says that pest and disease surveys can be carried out on any area of the Cook Islands at the direction of the secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture. The legislation says that "wild or feral animals suspected of carrying a regulated pest or disease" can be destroyed with the approval of the secretary, but it is not clear how these animals might be identified. [1] The Cook Islands has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities nor has it made any reports to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) on the performance of its veterinary services (PVS) public. [2,3] There is no further information on the Ministry of Health website. [4]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strengthening Health Security by Implementing the International Health Regulations (2005), WHO Western Pacific Region: Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Mission Reports." [<https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/mission-reports-western-pacific/en/>]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "OIE Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Evaluation Reports." [<http://oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/pvs-evaluation-reports/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

## 1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

### 1.2.3a

**Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2019

OIE WAHIS database

## 1.2.4 Animal health workforce

### 1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: -

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

### 1.2.4b

Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: -

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

## 1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

### 1.2.5a

Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of a national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulation or plans including mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 does not describe such a mechanism, but does say improving coordination with the private sector to improve disaster risk management is a priority. [1] Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture cover zoonotic disease surveillance on their websites. [2,3] The Cook Islands has not completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) of International Health Regulations Core Capacities nor has it made any reports to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) on the performance of its veterinary services (PVS) public. [4,5]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008"  
[<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/contents/2015/bio->

security/register%20and%20forms/Cook%20Islands%20Biosecurity%20Act%202008.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Strengthening Health Security by Implementing the International Health Regulations (2005), WHO Western Pacific Region: Joint External Evaluation (JEE) Mission Reports."

[<https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/mission-reports-western-pacific/en/>]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

[5] World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). "OIE Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Evaluation Reports."

[<http://oie.int/solidarity/pvs-evaluations/pvs-evaluation-reports/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

## 1.3 BIOSECURITY

### 1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

#### 1.3.1a

**Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has a record of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored. There is no relevant evidence on the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture website of a requirement to maintain a record of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored. There is no Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Research. The country has one clinical laboratory in the Cook Islands based at Rarotonga Hospital [1]. No evidence of a national laboratory system could be found [2,3,4]. Although the Cook Islands has laws on biosecurity, this primarily refers to the control of animal and plant diseases and pests, rather than the control of dangerous pathogens and toxins for human health. The Ministry of Agriculture says the country "operates very strict biosecurity procedures at airports and ports to prevent the introduction of unwanted pests and diseases of plants and animals," but does not refer to the control of high-consequence biological agents and/or toxins. [5] Biosecurity is defined in the Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 as "the control by legal and administrative means of pests and diseases affecting animals, plants and their products, in order to avoid adverse effects from such pests and diseases on the economy and health of the Cook Islands." [6] Although the Cook Islands is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [7]. No reference to any such law regarding the same was found in the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [8].

[1] Cooks Island Ministry of Health Clinical Support [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital-health/clinical-support/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Biosecurity." [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[6] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008"

[<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/contents/2015/bio->

security/register%20and%20forms/Cook%20Islands%20Biosecurity%20Act%202008.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[7] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.3.1b

**Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has legislation in place which addresses biosecurity requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems and/or cyber-security of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. Although the Cook Islands has "biosecurity" legislation in place, it does not address high-consequence biological agents or toxins, but rather the control of ecological threats. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 largely focuses on border control and describes quarantine procedures at ports, airports or post offices. It does not address cyber-security of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins may be stored. Biosecurity is defined in the Biosecurity Act 2008 as "the control by legal and administrative means of pests and diseases affecting animals, plants and their products, in order to avoid adverse effects from such pests and diseases on the economy and health of the Cook Islands." [1] There is no evidence of relevant biosecurity legislation on the VERTIC (the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre) database. [2] There is no other relevant information on the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture website. There is no national laboratory system [3,4,5] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [6]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.3.1c

**Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has either an agency or legislation in place which addresses biosecurity requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems and/or cyber-security of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. Although the Cook Islands has "biosecurity" legislation and an enforcement agency in place, it does not address high-consequence biological agents or toxins, but rather the control of ecological threats. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 established the Cook Islands Biosecurity Service, which is responsible for preventing "the establishment and spread of regulated pests and diseases and the release of organisms that might adversely affect animals, plants, human beings and the environment," among other duties. The Ministry of Agriculture

is responsible for the enforcement of this legislation [1,2]. A permit to import is required from the Director for Biosecurity Service for live animal importation into the Cook Islands [3]. There is no other evidence on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence or a Ministry of Research. The national laboratory does not have its own website. [4,5,6] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [7]. No reference to any law regarding this was found in the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [8].

- [1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Biosecurity." [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Biosecurity-Importing" [https://agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/importing/] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [5] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [6] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [http://www.ck/govt2.htm] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [7] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/] Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.3.1d

**Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 talks about the creation of biosecurity holding areas for inspection of incoming or outgoing articles and consignments, but not does mention consolidating inventories of dangerous pathogens into a minimum number of facilities. [1] The Ministry of Health published an Influenza Pandemic Action Plan in 2007 which also does not address consolidating inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. [2] The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that there was "no scientific research or development program being undertaken in the Cook Islands directly related to biosafety." [3] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [4]. No evidence of this was was found in the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture of Agriculture websites [5,6,7].

- [1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [3] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [4] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands] Accessed 4 August 2020.  
 [5] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-

weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

[6] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

[7] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.3.1e

**Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)–based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 makes no mention of PCR-based diagnostic testing. [1] The Ministry of Health website does not mention PCR-based diagnostic testing. [2] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network reports that PCR testing for Dengue and Influenza are referred to labs in other countries. [3]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020

[3] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN).

"[https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/PPHSN\\_LabNet\\_catalogL1L2L3\\_July2015-.pdf](https://www.pphsn.net/Services/LabNet/PPHSN_LabNet_catalogL1L2L3_July2015-.pdf)" Accessed 4 August 2020.

## 1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

### 1.3.2a

**Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is limited public evidence that the Cook Islands requires biosecurity training, using a standardised, required approach for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 requires that any person designated as a biosecurity officer "shall be given adequate training in biosecurity control measures." [1] However, there are no details of this training on either the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Health websites, so it is not clear whether there is a standardised approach [2,3]. The Cook Islands Health Workforce Plan 2016-2025 makes no mention of biosecurity training, but does say that a National Training Needs Assessment for the healthcare workforce is being commissioned by the Ministry of Education [4]. There is no relevant biosecurity legislation on the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [5] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [6].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Biosecurity." [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

- [4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 30 November 2016. "Cook Islands Workforce Plan 2016-2025." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Cook-Islands-Health-Workforce-Plan-2016-2025.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [5] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [http://vertic.org/pages/homepage/programmes/national-implementation-measures/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands] Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

#### 1.3.3a

**Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?**

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 does not specify whether biosecurity officers must undergo drug, background, psychological or mental fitness checks. The legislation does, however, state that biosecurity officers should be in "compliance with the laws of the Cook Islands generally." [1] The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture do not mention any checks for personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins or biological materials. [2,3] The Ministry of Health published a workforce plan in 2016 which says there is a strong need for more laboratory staff. It does not mention the need for any background checks. [4] However, the Ministry of Health Act 2013 makes clear that any health professional or allied health professional "breaches the standards of professional conduct" if he or she commits a criminal offence which is in any way associated with his or her work duties. [5] There is no other relevant legislation on the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [6] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [7]

- [1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Biosecurity". [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands Workforce Plan 2016-2025." [http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Cook-Islands-Health-Workforce-Plan-2016-2025.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [5] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Ministry of Health Act 2013" [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ministry-of-Health-Act-2013.pdf] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [6] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [http://vertic.org/pages/homepage/programmes/national-implementation-measures/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c.php] Accessed 4 August 2020.
- [7] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands] Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.3.4 Transportation security

#### 1.3.4a

**Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of national regulation on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 outlines the procedure for quarantining vessels or areas that may pose a biosecurity risk, but does not detail how infectious substances might be transported. [1] The Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites make no mention on the safe and secure transportation of infectious substances. [2,3] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) indicates that many infectious disease tests are referred to labs overseas, particularly to labs in New Zealand and Australia. The PPHSN says the Cook Islands uses International Air Transport Association (IATA) certified shippers to transport these substances, and the samples are flown by Air New Zealand. [4] Neither the New Zealand Defence Force nor the New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade department share any detailed information on regulations for the transport of infectious substances to or from the Cook Islands. [5,6] There is also no relevant biosecurity legislation on the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [7] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [8]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 4 August 2020

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Biosecurity." [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[4] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Catalog: 2015 Edition." July 2015. [[http://pht.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN\\_LabNet\\_catalogL1L2L3\\_July2015-.pdf](http://pht.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN_LabNet_catalogL1L2L3_July2015-.pdf)] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[5] New Zealand Defence Force. [<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[6] New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. "Cook Islands." [<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/pacific/cook-islands/#Trade>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[7] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).

[<http://vertic.org/pages/homepage/programmes/national-implementation-measures/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

[8] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 4 August 2020.

### 1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

#### 1.3.5a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There does not appear to be national legislation, regulation or guidance in place in the Cook Islands to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens or toxins. The Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008 outlines procedures for obtaining biosecurity export clearance but does not specify whether this covers especially dangerous



pathogens, toxins or pathogens with pandemic potential. The legislation says that in order to approve the export clearance of animal or plant products, a biosecurity officer must ensure that "the biosecurity certification requirements of the receiving country have been complied with." [1] The National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015 describes developing a "policy and protocol for importation, use and disposal of hazardous substances" as a key objective. [2] There is no further information on the Ministry of Health website. The website for Emergency Management Cook Islands (EMCI) which is the designated governmental division charged with ensuring the maintenance of the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) plan and all necessary sub-plans for the Cook Islands could not be accessed [3,4]. There is also no relevant legislation on the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [5]. Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [6].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Cook Islands Biosecurity Act 2008" [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Biosecurity-Act-2008.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Government of the Cook Islands. August 2010 "National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015." [[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869\\_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf)] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Emergency Management Cook Islands (EMCI) [<http://www.emci.gov.ck/>] Attempted access 5 August 2020.

[5] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

## 1.4 BIOSAFETY

### 1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

#### 1.4.1a

**Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has any national biosafety legislation or regulations in place. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture websites make any specific mention of biosafety. [1,2] Additionally the Biosafety Clearing House, a mechanism set up by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to facilitate exchange of information on Living Modified Organisms, indicates that no laws, regulations or guidelines have been published by the Cook Islands to address biosafety. [3] The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that it was planning to create a biosafety framework and that "biosafety and biosecurity in the Cook Islands is limited by resources, technical capacity and inadequate monitoring and enforcement measures." The report continues; "There are no specific policies, procedures or legislation in place to accommodate biosafety, including the trans-movement and safe handling of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). Such organisms are not currently covered under the Cook Islands Biosecurity Act." Additionally the National Environment Service states that a "Biosafety Policy Framework has been drafted but needs further development before it can be finalised." [4] The National Environment Service's website mentions that the country is a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on the Convention on Biological Diversity but has not ratified it yet (signed in 2001) [5]. The Strategic roadmap document proposes "improve biosecurity" but no steps or guidelines have been mentioned [6]. There is no relevant legislation in the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [7]. Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has

submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [8]

- [1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Biosafety Clearing House, Convention on Biological Diversity. "Country Profile: Cook Islands" [<https://bch.cbd.int/about/countryprofile.shtml?country=ck>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [5] Cook Islands National Environment Service. [<https://environment.gov.ck/island-futures-division/>] Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [6] Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018 - 2023 [<https://bsrp.gsd.spc.int/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [7] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

#### 1.4.1b

**Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Cook Islands has established an agency that is responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture websites make any specific mention of biosafety on their websites. [1,2] The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that it planned to create a biosafety framework, but no such framework can be found on their website as of September 2020. [3,4] The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reported in 2015 that a Biosafety Policy Framework "has been drafted but needs further development before it can be finalised." [5]. The National Environment Service's website mentions that the country is a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on the Convention on Biological Diversity, but has not ratified it yet (signed in 2001) [6]. There is no relevant legislation in the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database. [7] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [8]

- [1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020
- [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [3] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [4] Cook Islands National Environment Service. [<http://environment.gov.ck/>] Accessed 17 September 2020.
- [5] Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. 2014. "Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015. Country Report: Cook Islands." [<http://www.fao.org/3/a-az190e.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [6] Cook Islands National Environment Service. [<https://environment.gov.ck/island-futures-division/>] Accessed 31 August 2020.
- [7] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.
- [8] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook

Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

## 1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

### 1.4.2a

**Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Cook Islands requires biosafety training for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins or biological materials with pandemic potential. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture websites make any specific mention of biosafety or biosafety training. [1,2] The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that it planned to create a biosafety framework, but no such framework can be found on their website as of September 2020 [3,4]. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reported in 2015 that a Biosafety Policy Framework "has been drafted but needs further development before it can be finalised." [5] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports. [6]. The National Environment Service's website mentions that the country is a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on the Convention on Biological Diversity, but has not ratified it yet (signed in 2001) [7]. There is no relevant legislation in the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [8].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands National Environment Service. [<http://environment.gov.ck/>] Accessed 17 September 2020.

[5] Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. 2014. "Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015. Country Report: Cook Islands." [<http://www.fao.org/3/a-az190e.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Cook Islands National Environment Service. [<https://environment.gov.ck/island-futures-division/>] Accessed 31 August 2020.

[8] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

## 1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

### 1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

#### 1.5.1a

**Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Cook Islands has conducted an assessment to determine whether on-going research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential, and/or dual use research. The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that there was "no scientific research or development program being undertaken in the Cook Islands directly related to biosafety." [1] Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture make reference to any assessments of research into dangerous pathogens or toxins on their websites. [2,3] There are no ministries of science or research in the Cook Islands. [4] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [5]. There is no relevant legislation in the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [6].

[1] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Government. "Cook Islands Government - Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

**1.5.1b**

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has any policy requiring oversight of dual use research. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture make reference to such a policy on their websites. [1,2] The Cook Islands' national laboratory is located at Rarotonga Hospital and offers limited clinical/medical diagnostic services. It does not appear to conduct any scientific research. [3] The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that there was "no scientific research or development program being undertaken in the Cook Islands directly related to biosafety." [4] There are no ministries of science or research in the Cook Islands. [5] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [6]. There is no relevant legislation in the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [7].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Hospital Laboratory Services." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital/hospital-laboratory-services/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. "Cook Islands Government - Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological->

weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/] Accessed 5 August 2020.

### 1.5.1c

**Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has an agency responsible for the oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture make reference to any such agency on their websites. [1,2] The Cook Islands' national laboratory is located at Rarotonga Hospital and offers limited clinical/medical diagnostic services. It does not appear to conduct any scientific research. [3] The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that there was "no scientific research or development program being undertaken in the Cook Islands directly related to biosafety." [4] There are no ministries of research or science in the Cook Islands. [5] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [6]. There is no relevant legislation in the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [7].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Hospital Laboratory Services." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital/hospital-laboratory-services/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. "Cook Islands Government - Structure." [<http://www.ck.govt2.htm>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[7] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

## 1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

### 1.5.2a

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Cook Islands has no national legislation, regulation, policy or guidance requiring the screening of synthesized DNA before it is sold. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture make reference to synthesized DNA on their websites. [1,2] The Cook Islands' national laboratory offers limited clinical/medical diagnostic services and does not undertake cytology, genetic studies or virology. [3] The Cook Islands National Environment Service reported in 2011 that it was planning to create a biosafety framework and that "biosafety and biosecurity in the Cook Islands is limited by resources, technical capacity and inadequate monitoring and enforcement measures." The report continues; "There are no specific policies, procedures or legislation in place to accommodate biosafety, including the trans-movement and safe handling of Living Modified Organisms

(LMOs) and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). Such organisms are not currently covered under the Cook Islands Biosecurity Act." [4] Although the Cook Islands is party to the Biological Weapons Convention, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence-Building Measures reports [5]. There is no relevant legislation in the Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) database [6].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Hospital Laboratory Services." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital/hospital-laboratory-services/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands National Environment Service. 2011. "Cook Islands 4th National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity." [<https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/ck/ck-nr-04-en.pdf>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[5] United Nations Office at Geneva, Biological Weapons Convention Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Cook Islands." [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/cook-islands>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

[6] Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>] Accessed 5 August 2020.

## 1.6 IMMUNIZATION

### 1.6.1 Vaccination rates

#### 1.6.1a

##### Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2019

World Health Organization

#### 1.6.1b

##### Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

OIE WAHIS database

## Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

### 2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

#### 2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

##### 2.1.1a

**Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?**

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Cook Islands' national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. The Rarotonga Hospital laboratory is limited in which clinical diagnostic tests it can perform. According to the Ministry of Health, the laboratory has five key service areas: haematology, clinical biochemistry, microbiology, immuno-haematology and phlebotomy services. Histology, cytology, genetic studies, virology and TB confirmation, culture and antimicrobial sensitivity tests are referred overseas. [1] The Cook Islands Antibiotic Guidelines 2019 suggest that the laboratory can test for common bacteria such as *E. coli*, *K. pneumoniae*, and *N. gonorrhoeae*. [2] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) reported in 2015 that the Rarotonga Hospital Laboratory can perform tests for Chlamydia, Cholera, Dengue, Gonorrhoea, HIV and fluorescent stains for Influenza. The Rarotonga Hospital Laboratory does not appear to conduct serotyping or Polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Tests for Leptospirosis, Measles, Rubella, Syphilis, Tuberculosis and Typhoid are referred to LabPlus in Auckland, New Zealand. [3]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Hospital Laboratory Services." [https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital-health/clinical-support/] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Antibiotic Guidelines 2018." [http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands\_Handbook\_1\_Mar\_18-DIGITAL.pdf] Accessed 6 August 2020.

[3] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Catalog: 2015 Edition." July 2015. [http://psh.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN\_LabNet\_catalogL1L2L3\_July2015-.pdf] Accessed 6 August 2020.

##### 2.1.1b

**Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?**

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is some evidence of a national plan for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for scaling capacity and defining goals for testing in the context of Covid-19. The Ministry of Health has published a comprehensive testing and surveillance plan of action for Covid-19 in December 2020 detailing the process it aims to implement in terms of containing the spread of Covid-19. The plan includes details of goals for testing, such as that

testing strategies should be flexible and rapidly adapt to change, depending on local epidemiology, transmission, population dynamics and resources. It also includes strategies for testing under limited resources, surveillance systems and contact tracing. [1] Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture mention any other policy or further evidence on this on their websites [2,3].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/surveillance-and-testing-plan-for-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/>] Accessed 15 March 2021.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 6 April 2021.

## 2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

### 2.1.2a

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited. The country has one clinical laboratory in the Cook Islands based at Rarotonga Hospital [1]. No evidence of a national laboratory system could be found at the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites [2,3,4]. A 2014 review of Drinking Water Laboratory Capacity in the Cook Islands said it is "unlikely that any of the existing laboratory [sic] (except for the hospital clinical laboratory) will have enough resources to gain ISO 17025 laboratory accreditation as the initial costs to achieve this, as well as the on-going costs of maintaining is significant." [5] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) lists the Rarotonga Hospital Laboratory as a Level 1 (L1) laboratory. L1 laboratories collect samples from suspect patients and can perform limited diagnostic tests. Level 2 (L2) labs are regional labs that perform confirmation tests for L1 labs -- they require more training and equipment than L1 labs. Level 3 (L3) labs are reference laboratories and perform more sophisticated tests. PPHSN suggests that Cook Islands often refers tests to the LabPlus lab in Auckland, New Zealand, or other labs in Australia. The LabPlus lab is accredited by International Accreditation New Zealand and meets ISO15189:2012 standards [6,7].

[1] Cooks Island Ministry of Health Clinical Support [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital-health/clinical-support/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[5] Nico van Loon, prepared for the World Health Organisation and the Cook Islands Government. 21-24 January 2014. "Drinking Water Laboratory Capacity Review: Cook Islands."

[[http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/MFEM\\_Documents/DCD\\_Docs/National\\_Programmes/WHO\\_Cook\\_Islands\\_Drinking\\_Water\\_Laboratory\\_Capacity\\_Review\\_january\\_2014\\_Final.pdf](http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/MFEM_Documents/DCD_Docs/National_Programmes/WHO_Cook_Islands_Drinking_Water_Laboratory_Capacity_Review_january_2014_Final.pdf)] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[6] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Catalog: 2015 Edition." July 2015.

[[http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN\\_LabNet\\_catalogL1L2L3\\_July2015-.pdf](http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN_LabNet_catalogL1L2L3_July2015-.pdf)] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[7] LabPlus. "Accreditation" [<http://www.labplus.co.nz/about-us/accreditation/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.1.2b

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?**



Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence of a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review. The country has one clinical laboratory in the Cook Islands based at Rarotonga Hospital [1]. No evidence of a national laboratory system could be found at the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites [2,3,4]. The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) lists the Rarotonga Hospital Laboratory as a Level 1 (L1) laboratory. L1 laboratories collect samples from suspect patients and can perform limited diagnostic tests. Level 2 (L2) labs are regional labs that perform confirmation tests for L1 labs -- they require more training and equipment than L1 labs. Level 3 (L3) labs are reference laboratories and perform more sophisticated tests. [5] The Ministry of Health Antibiotic Guidelines 2018 state that "the laboratory at Rarotonga Hospital in Avarua is the only microbiology laboratory for Cook Islands." [6] The PPHSN suggests that Cook Islands often refers tests to the LabPlus lab in Auckland, New Zealand, or other labs in Australia. The LabPlus lab is accredited by International Accreditation New Zealand and meets ISO15189:2012 standards. [6,7]

[1] Cooks Island Ministry of Health Clinical Support [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital-health/clinical-support/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[5] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Catalog: 2015 Edition." July 2015.

[[http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN\\_LabNet\\_catalogL1L2L3\\_July2015-.pdf](http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN_LabNet_catalogL1L2L3_July2015-.pdf)] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[6] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Antibiotic Guidelines 2018." [[http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands\\_Handbook\\_1\\_Mar\\_18-DIGITAL.pdf](http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands_Handbook_1_Mar_18-DIGITAL.pdf)] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[7] LabPlus. "Accreditation" [<http://www.labplus.co.nz/about-us/accreditation/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

## 2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

### 2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

#### 2.2.1a

**Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient publicly available evidence to conclude that Cook Islands has a nationwide specimen transport system for all steps between sample collection and overseas transport. The Ministry of Health's Antibiotic Guidelines 2018 state that "samples sent to the laboratory in Rarotonga are mainly collected at the Hospital or from General Practitioners on Rarotonga, but may be collected from other islands." [1] It is not clear how the samples are transported. The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) indicates that many infectious disease tests are referred to labs overseas, particularly to labs in New Zealand and Australia. The PPHSN says the Cook Islands uses International Air Transport Association (IATA) certified shippers to transport these substances, and that samples are flown by Air New Zealand. [2]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Antibiotic Guidelines 2018." [[http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands\\_Handbook\\_1\\_Mar\\_18-DIGITAL.pdf](http://3884f72zkn1312o3ar1xn03r.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Cook-Islands_Handbook_1_Mar_18-DIGITAL.pdf)] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] The Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "PPHSN LabNet Catalog: 2015 Edition." July 2015.

[[http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN\\_LabNet\\_catalogL1L2L3\\_July2015-.pdf](http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Services/LabNet/PPHSN_LabNet_catalogL1L2L3_July2015-.pdf)] Accessed 10 August 2020.

## 2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

### 2.2.2a

**Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence to suggest a plan is in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. The Pharmacy Board, enacted through the Ministry of Health (Pharmacy and Therapeutic Products) Regulations 2013, is responsible for the registration and licensing of pharmacy assistants, technicians and pharmacists, including the establishment and regulation of pharmacies [1]. The Pharmacy and Therapeutic Products Regulations 2013 do not mention any provision for rapid authorisation or licensing [2]. The Ministry of Health website mentions that they have "submitted proposals to obtain a PCR laboratory in country which will be more cost-effective and enable us to conduct up to 1000 tests per day. As part of this work, we are working towards accreditation for our laboratory that involves investing in quality infrastructure and up-skilling our workforce" to build their testing capability [1]. No relevant information regarding this could be found on the Ministry of Agriculture website [3]. No further information was available in any news articles or press releases [4,5].

[1] Cooks Island Ministry of Health Clinical Support [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital-health/clinical-support/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. October 2013. "Ministry of Health (Pharmacy and Therapeutic Products) Regulations 2013." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/MOH-Pharmacy-and-Therapeutic-Products-Regulation-2013.pdf>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[4] CITV News [<http://www.citv.co.ck/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

[5] Ministry of Finance and Economic Management [<http://www.mfem.gov.ck/finsec-office-press-releases>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

## 2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

### 2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

#### 2.3.1a

**Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?**

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,  
Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Cook Islands is conducting on-going event-based surveillance or analysing this data on a daily basis. The Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan, which was published in 2007, states that regular surveillance of influenza-like illnesses should occur even of times of no threat of a pandemic, however, there is no evidence that this activity is taking place. [1] There is no mention of an event-based surveillance unit in the Cook Islands National Action Plan for

Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015, nor any evidence of on-going event-based surveillance and data analysis. [2] There is no evidence on the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Agriculture websites [3,4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Government of the Cook Islands. August 2010 "National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015."

[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869\_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.3.1b

**Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the World Health Organisation (WHO) within the last two years. The WHO Disease Outbreak News has no reports from the Cook Islands for 2019, 2018, 2017 or 2016. [1] A WHO weekly epidemiological record published in February 2016 said however that the Cook Islands is among countries that have reported instances of Zika virus since 2013. [2] The Ministry of Health website does not share any relevant evidence [3]. There have been no cases of COVID-19 in the country as of August 31 2020 [4].

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News." [https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2019/en/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 19 February 2016. "Weekly Epidemiological Record."

[https://www.who.int/wer/2016/wer9107.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/]. Accessed 31 August 2020.

## 2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

### 2.3.2a

**Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands operates an electronic reporting surveillance system. The Cook Islands National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015 and the Influenza Pandemic Action Plan do not describe whether there is an electronic reporting surveillance system at either the national or sub-national level. [1,2] The National Health Information Strategy 2015-2019 describes a "reliance on traditional paper records" when it comes to health information which "limits the extent to which health workers can share information in a useful, timely and seamless way." [3] There is no relevant information on the Ministry of Health website. [4]

- [1] Government of the Cook Islands. August 2010 "National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869\_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.
- [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.
- [3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "National Health Information Strategy, Cook Islands: 2015-2019." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Cook-Islands-Health-Information-Systems-Strategy-2015-2019.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.
- [4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.3.2b

**Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no clear evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at either the national or sub-national level nor whether it collects on-going laboratory data. The Cook Islands National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015 and the Influenza Pandemic Action Plan do not describe whether laboratory data is collected on an on-going basis. [1,2] There is no other relevant information on the Ministry of Health website. [3]

- [1] Government of the Cook Islands. August 2010 "National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869\_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.
- [2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.
- [3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

## 2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

### 2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

#### 2.4.1a

**Are electronic health records commonly in use?**

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence to say whether electronic health records are commonly in use. The Cook Islands has an electronic health management information system called MedTech32 that is used in the main hospital in Rarotonga. According to the National Health Information Strategy 2015-2019, this platform is "relatively user-friendly" and allows health workers from all islands to enter and access health information via the internet, providing an "important information 'bridge' back to the central Ministry of Health on Rarotonga." However, it is not clear how much the system is used by smaller health facilities. This system covers "basic information for many hospital activities including in-patient admission, transfer and discharge; out-patient case registration; surgery details; special clinical services, oral health; laboratory services; prescription records; radiology reports; discharge planning; pregnancy and birth records; postnatal follow-ups; immunization records and death registration." All of the remaining information systems are paper-based. This includes data from the "communicable disease programme and community health nursing." Additionally, "information from recent surveys and on-field services is

also paper-based and not integrated into MedTech32." The strategy states that a "reliance on traditional paper records limits the extent to which health workers share information in a useful, timely and seamless way" [1]. The National Health Road Map 2017-2036 in its Vision of Cook Islands Health Service in 2036 states as one of its priority areas "Patient medical records are well kept and accessible to health providers locally and abroad through their electronic health record numbering. Such electronic record also maintains information on drugs and medicine prescription for improved efficiency and safety "[2] No evidence is available of any progress in this area. There is no other evidence on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites. The national laboratory does not have its own website [3,4,5]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "National Health Information Strategy, Cook Islands: 2015-2019." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Cook-Islands-Health-Information-Systems-Strategy-2015-2019.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Island National Health Road Map 2017-2036 [https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/health-roap-map-2017.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [http://www.ck/govt2.htm] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.4.1b

**Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the national public health system of the Cook Islands has access to electronic health records of individuals in their country. The Cook Islands has a national public health system that is managed by the Ministry of Health. This system is managed by the Ministry of Health and allows health workers from all islands to access and enter information on individuals. The National Health Information Strategy 2015-2019 states that currently health information is shared "on an ad-hoc basis." The strategy says that "All data collected by the health sector partner entities will be freely available within the health sector and also available to the public when relevant." It adds; " Data that includes personally identifiable information will be protected from disclosure. Personal data will be stripped of identifiers and aggregated to a point where it is not possible to identify individuals." [1] The Ministry of Health Act 2013 indicates that medical records can be disclosed if "necessary to prevent or lessen a serious threat to public health or public safety." [2]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "National Health Information Strategy, Cook Islands: 2015-2019." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Cook-Islands-Health-Information-Systems-Strategy-2015-2019.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Ministry of Health Act 2013" [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ministry-of-Health-Act-2013.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.4.1c

**Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Cook Islands does not appear to have data standards to ensure data is comparable. In the National Health Information Strategy 2015-2019, developing "national minimum core indicators" for collection and reporting on key aspects of health

system delivery is listed as a strategic priority. It is noted that failure to develop such core indicators would mean "data cannot be compared due to the lack of common definitions and measurement." Additionally, the strategy notes, "there are several indicator sets in use in the Cook Islands, and many are not completely comparable due to differences in indicator definitions." Developing a core indicator set that will "ideally consist of around 20 indicators" will give "a broad picture of health and the operation of Ministry of Health activities." [1] There does not appear to be an updated version of the strategy for 2020 and beyond at the Ministry of Health website [2].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "National Health Information Strategy, Cook Islands: 2015-2019." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Cook-Islands-Health-Information-Systems-Strategy-2015-2019.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/]. Accessed 31 August 2020.

## 2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

### 2.4.2a

**Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of established mechanisms to share data between ministries responsible for animal, human and wildlife surveillance in the Cook Islands. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture have any information about sharing surveillance data on their websites. [1,2] The Cook Islands National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015 talks about the need to improve partnership among agencies for disaster risk management and openly share data and information, but there do not appear to be established mechanisms to do this. [3] There is a more recent Disaster Risk Management plan for 2016-2020, but this focuses on climate change and does not contain any evidence of an established mechanism to share animal, health and wildlife surveillance data between ministries. [4]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[3] Government of the Cook Islands. August 2010 "National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869\_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[4] The Cook Islands Government. "The Cook Islands 2nd Joint National Action Plan: A Sectoral Approach to Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management." [https://pacificclimatechange.net/sites/default/files/documents/cok170758.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

## 2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

### 2.4.3a

**Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands makes de-identified health surveillance data on disease outbreaks publicly available. There are no such reports on either the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture websites. [1,2]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.4.3b

**Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

As of August 10 2020, there have been no reported cases of COVID-19 in the Cook Islands. The Ministry of Health website keeps updating COVID-19 related plans, border restrictions and data. The website states that "this information is taken daily from a live database and is likely to change as more details are provided" [1].

[1] Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

## 2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

### 2.4.4a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

The Cook Islands has guidelines that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals. The Cook Islands National Health Information Strategy 2015-2019 states; "data that includes personally identifiable information will be protected from disclosure." Additionally the strategy says "personal data will be stripped of identifiers and aggregated to a point where it is not possible to identify individuals." Ensuring the protection and security of health information is listed as a "key founding principle" of the Ministry of Health's culture of information. [1]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "National Health Information Strategy, Cook Islands: 2015-2019."

[<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Cook-Islands-Health-Information-Systems-Strategy-2015-2019.pdf>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.4.4b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Cook Islands National Health Information Strategy 2015-2019 talks about ensuring the security and confidentiality of health information as a strategic priority, but makes no mention of protecting this information from cyber-attack. [1]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "National Health Information Strategy, Cook Islands: 2015-2019." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Cook-Islands-Health-Information-Systems-Strategy-2015-2019.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.

## 2.4.5 International data sharing

### 2.4.5a

**Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?**

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence of a commitment to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region for more than one disease.

Cook Islands has made a commitment to make disaster risk management data available to the public and "openly shared among agencies that collect data and information." [1] The Cook Islands Pandemic Action Plan says the country may close its borders if there is evidence of a human to human transmission of influenza pandemic strains overseas. In the event of a pandemic strain exhibiting in the Cook Islands, the country says it will inform the World Health Organisation (WHO) under the International Health Regulations (IHR). [2] The Cook Islands is part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN) which publishes outbreak reports. [3] However, neither of these agreements explicitly mention a commitment to share surveillance data during public health emergencies.

[1] Government of the Cook Islands. August 2010 "National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869\_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.  
[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 10 August 2020.  
[3] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "Outbreak Reports." [http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Outbreak/Reports/Intro.htm] Accessed 10 August 2020.

## 2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

### 2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

#### 2.5.1a

**Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**



There is no evidence to suggest that a national system is in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency. No such evidence is found via the websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. [1,2]. There is no evidence of online presence of a national laboratory system or a national public health institute. The "Surveillance and Testing Plan Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)" does mention a community based tracing and testing strategy; but there is no evidence of the provision of sub-national support. [3]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/>] Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/arrival-passengers/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/surveillance-and-testing-plan-for-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/>] Accessed 15 March 2021.

### 2.5.1b

**Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?**

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence to suggest that the Government of Cook Islands provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention. No relevant information could be found on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture websites [1,2].

[1] Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 10 August 2020.

### 2.5.1c

**Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence to suggest that The Government of Cook Islands has de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19. Although updates related to COVID-19 are available via the Ministry of Health website, as of 31 August 2020, the country has not had any cases of COVID-19 [1]. No further evidence is available via the broader Ministry of Health website. [2]

[1] Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/>] Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 17 September 2020.

## 2.5.2 Point of entry management

### 2.5.2a

**Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of an active or future public health emergency. No evidence was found via the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Customs webpage of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Management. [1,2]. There is mention of increased surveillance at the borders to restrict the spread of Covid-19 virus from foreigners and/or incoming residents and monitoring of their health status. However, there is no evidence that this is being undertaken via a joint plan. [3]

[1] Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/>] Accessed 31 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Finance and Economic Management [<http://www.mfem.gov.ck/customs>] Accessed 31 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/surveillance-and-testing-plan-for-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/>] Accessed 15 March 2021.

## 2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

### 2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

#### 2.6.1a

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of epidemiology training programs such as FETP (Field Epidemiology Training Program) in the Cook Islands, and it is not clear the government provides resources to send citizens to another country to receive training. A 2011 study of epidemiological capacity in the WHO (World Health Organisation) Western Pacific region said Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs) "rely on outside agencies (e.g WHO, universities) for provision of training." The Fiji School of Medicine provides training to many PICTs, but students also go to Australia or New Zealand for training and "may not return." [1] There is no mention of the Cook Islands on either the TEPHNET or SAFETYNET websites. [2,3] The Ministry of Health Website has no information on epidemiology training programs or resources to send citizens abroad for training. [4]

[1] Blakely et al. International Journal of Epidemiology, volume 40, Issue 4, 1 August 2011, pages 1109-1121. 22 February 2011. "Health Status and Epidemiological Capacity and Prospects: WHO Western Pacific Region.

[<https://academic.oup.com/ije/article/40/4/1109/680337>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHNET). [<https://www.tephinet.org/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] South Asia Field Epidemiology and Technology Network (SAFETYNET) [<https://www.safetynet-web.org/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

### 2.6.1b

**Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that there are field epidemiology training programs (FETPs) in the Cook Islands that are inclusive of animal health professionals. A 2011 study of epidemiological capacity in the WHO Western Pacific region said Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs) "rely on outside agencies (e.g WHO, universities) for provision of training." The Fiji School of Medicine provides training to many PICTs, but students also go to Australia or New Zealand. The study does not refer to animal health. [1] Te Are Manu, a Cook Islands based charitable organisation operates the only veterinary clinic in the country. The clinic is run by animal health professionals from other countries on a voluntary basis. [2] The Cook Islands National Agriculture Policy 2017-2021 aims to "build the capacity of government and the community to implement national and community climate change and disaster risk strategies and initiatives linked to the agriculture sector" but does not explicitly address the need for animal health professionals with epidemiology training. [3] There is no relevant information on the Ministry of Health website. [4]

[1] Blakely et al. International Journal of Epidemiology, volume 40, Issue 4, 1 August 2011, pages 1109-1121. 22 February 2011. "Health Status and Epidemiological Capacity and Prospects: WHO Western Pacific Region.

[<https://academic.oup.com/ije/article/40/4/1109/680337>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Te Are Manu Veterinary Clinic. [<https://www.tearemanu.com/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. April 2017. "National Agriculture Policy 2017-2021."

[<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/contents/pdf-download/national-docs&acts/National%20Agricultural%20Policy%202017-2021%20FINAL%20DRAFT.pdf>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

## 2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

### 2.6.2a

**Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

### 3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

#### 3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

##### 3.1.1a

**Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?**

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential, but there is evidence of a disease specific plan. The Ministry of Health published the Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan in 2007 which aims to “put in place a plan to reduce the health, social and economic impact of an influenza pandemic in the Cook Islands,” as well as reduce the likelihood of an influenza pandemic through strict border control. The plan also outlines different pandemic management scenarios in the event of a pandemic outbreak in the Cook Islands or overseas. However, this plan does not address other diseases with pandemic potential, nor has it been recently updated. [1] There is no other evidence on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites [2,3,]. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence or a Ministry of Research [4] Furthermore, the Ministry of Health is currently drafting a bill for public health reform that will take into considerations the flaws in the current overall public health law and the system that has been highlighted by the Covid-19 pandemic. The draft policy/bill will be tabled in the legislature in March 2021 which will go into effect later in the year. The draft policy paper explains the rationale for the reforms and outlines the proposed measures to be included in the new Act. [5]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. “Influenza Pandemic Action Plan.”

[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[4] Cook Islands Government. ""Structure."" [http://www.ck/govt2.htm] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[5] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/public-health-law-reform/] Accessed 16 March 2021.

##### 3.1.1b

**If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Cook Islands does not have a national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. The Ministry of Health published the Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan in 2007 which aims to “put in place a plan to reduce the health, social and economic impact of an influenza pandemic in the Cook Islands.” However, this plan does not address other diseases with pandemic potential, nor has it been recently updated [1]. The National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015 does not cover pandemics. There is a Disaster Risk Management plan for 2016-2020, which mentions pandemics as a risk to the Cook Islands, but this plan largely focusses on climate change [2,3].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. “Influenza Pandemic Action Plan.”

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Government of the Cook Islands. August 2010 “National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management 2009-2015.”

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869\\_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/21869_17857finalnapdocument200920155b15d1.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Government of the Cook Islands. "The Cook Islands 2nd Joint National Action Plan: A Sectoral Approach to Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management." [<https://pacificclimatechange.net/sites/default/files/documents/cok170758.pdf>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

### 3.1.1c

**If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Cook Islands does not have a national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential, therefore, there is no plan with considerations for paediatric and other vulnerable populations. Although there is a disease-specific plan in place for influenza, the Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan in 2007, it does not make mention of considerations for vulnerable populations [1]. There is no other evidence on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence or a Ministry of Research [2,3,4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. “Influenza Pandemic Action Plan.”

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

### 3.1.1d

**Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)

### 3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

#### 3.1.2a

**Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence the Cook Islands has mechanisms for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. Although there is evidence of some considerations for communicating with the private sector during a health emergency, there is no evidence of a specific mechanism for engagement. The Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan says that a Health Emergency Task Force (formed following the declaration of a national emergency) is responsible for notifying private practitioners of clinical advice and control measures, as well as working with private pharmacies to ensure they have sufficient stock of medicines such as Tamiflu. [1] There is no other evidence on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites of an additional plan for response to a public health emergency, nor is there evidence of a mechanism to engage with the private sector as part of response. There does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence or a Ministry of Research [2,3,4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

### 3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

#### 3.1.3a

**Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?**

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease= 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

The Cook Islands does have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic, for one disease. It is mentioned in great detail in the "Surveillance and Testing Plan Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)" report. There are specific NPI guidelines, such as educating the population on outbreak control measures, including contact tracing, quarantine, physical distancing that are to be followed by the community. [1]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/surveillance-and-testing-plan-for-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/>] Accessed 15 March 2021.

## 3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

### 3.2.1 Activating response plans

#### 3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

Although the Cook Islands does not have an overarching national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak that it has activated in the past year, it developed and activated a COVID-19-specific emergency response plan. The country issued Cook Islands Emergency Response Plan in March 2020 to "mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on the health, social and economic status of the Cook Islands population" [1,2]. There is no evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year [3,4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. COVID Emergency Response Plan. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/cook-islands-emergency-response-plan-to-covid-19/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. COVID Emergency Response Plan. [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CookIslandsEmergencyResponsePlanCOVID19\\_Mar2020.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CookIslandsEmergencyResponsePlanCOVID19_Mar2020.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Simulation Exercise" [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

#### 3.2.1b

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Cook Islands has undergone an exercise to identify a list of gaps and best practices through either an after action review or a biological threat focussed International Health Regulations (IHR) exercise with the World Health Organisation (WHO). There is no entry for the Cook Islands in the WHO extranet list of after-action reviews. [1] There are also no recent entries for the Cook Islands on the WHO Disease Outbreak News list. [2].

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). "After Action Review." [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/after-action-review>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News." [<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2018/en/>]

Accessed 11 August 2020.

## 3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

### 3.2.2a

Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year. There is no instance of participation of private sector in such an exercise either. There is no entry for the Cook Islands in the World Health Organisation Strategic Partnership for International Health Regulations and Health Security (SPH) website on any such exercise [1]. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture mention such an exercise [2, 3].

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO) Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security

[<https://extranet.who.int/sph/country/cook-islands?page=1>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

## 3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

### 3.3.1 Emergency response operation

#### 3.3.1a

Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

The Cook Islands is in the process of creating an emergency operations centre, but does not currently have one. In the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023, formalising a permanent National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC) is listed as a "national focus for emergency management activities." An Emergency Management facility with space for an NEOC facility is in the design phase, with a target completion date of June 2020 [1]. As of August 2020, there is no evidence of it being operational.

[1] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

#### 3.3.1b

Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0



There is insufficient evidence of a requirement for public health drills at least once a year to increase inter-institutional cooperation in the face of any public health disaster. Furthermore, there is clear evidence of a National Emergency Response Centre being setup for this purpose. The policy document, "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023", clearly states that a permanent National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) as a national focus for emergency management activities will be formalised and also, mentions conducting annual drills in the near future. [1] There is no evidence of any drills being operational, and no further evidence was found in the website of Ministry of Health [2].

[1] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 16 March 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

### 3.3.1c

**Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence to show that the emergency operations center can conduct or has conducted a coordinated emergency response exercise. The Cook Islands is in the process of creating an emergency operations center and does not yet conduct drills. In the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023 the Cook Islands says it plans to introduce "annual inter-agency exercise planning and drills for emergency management" by March 2020 [1]. As of August 2020, no evidence of conducting such emergency response exercises is available, and no information is available on any emergency operations to counter Covid-19. [1,2,3].

[1] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

## 3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

### 3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

#### 3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence to show that the Cook Islands has carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event such as a bioterrorism attack nor are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, MOUs or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. The Cook Islands is in the process of creating an emergency operations center and does not yet conduct drills. In the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023 it is planned that “annual inter-agency planning and drills for emergency management” will be introduced by March 2020. There is no specific mention in the roadmap of how to respond to deliberate biological events such as bioterrorism attack. [1] There is no other information on the Ministry of Health website and the website of the Cook Islands Emergency Management Office does not appear to be active [2,3].

- [1] Cook Islands Government. “Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023.” [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf] Accessed 11 August 2020.  
[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 11 August 2020.  
[3] Cook Islands Emergency Management Office. [http://emci.gov.ck/] Attempted access 11 August 2020.

## 3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

### 3.5.1 Public communication

#### 3.5.1b

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is limited evidence the Cook Islands has considered how messages will reach populations with different communication needs in the event of a health emergency. In the 2007 Influenza Pandemic Action Plan, the Ministry of Health pledges to share information about pandemic outbreaks on multiple media platforms. It also says it will disseminate information in both Maori and English. However, the plan has not been recently updated and there is no evidence that it is currently operational [1]. No new update was found on the Ministry of Health website [2].

- [1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. “Influenza Pandemic Action Plan.” [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 11 August 2020.  
[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 11 August 2020.

### 3.5.1 Risk communication planning

#### 3.5.1a

**Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence of a risk communication plan specifically intended for use during a public health emergency in the Cook Islands. The 2008 Influenza Pandemic Action Plan report has guidelines that are to be followed in case of a public

health emergency. Although this report is specific to Influenza pandemic, it is in all likelihood being used as the basic premise for handling the Covid-19 pandemic. The 2008 report specifies measures such as 'Produce and disseminate information on influenza outbreaks via media' as one of the key measure. [1] There is no further evidence in the plan that can attest to any details on a risk communication.

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 17 March 2021.

### 3.5.1c

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence to suggest that the Government of Cook Islands has designated a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. The Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan, published in 2007, includes some instructions on which parts of the government are responsible, but there is no specific person designated to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency [1]. The Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands mentions creation of a Civil Defence Management Authority/Structure (CDEMA) to "clarify roles and responsibilities in emergency management and allocate appropriate resources needed in order to be more responsive to the needs of our communities" [2]. There is no designated person assigned for the purpose. The Cook Islands has a National Disaster Risk Management Plan published in 2018, which mentions that "the coordination of communications for disasters is handled through the newly established Communications Cluster", but the leading authority for the Communications Cluster has not been determined yet [3].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Emergency Management Cook Islands. March 2018,

[[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNDP%20\\_%20Cook%20Islands%20Country%20Preparedness%20Package%20Booklet%20HRv1%20%28web%29.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNDP%20_%20Cook%20Islands%20Country%20Preparedness%20Package%20Booklet%20HRv1%20%28web%29.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

## 3.5.2 Public communication

### 3.5.2a

**In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?**

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

The evidence suggests that the Government of Cook Islands uses media platforms to inform the public about public health emergencies. The Ministry of Health has an active Facebook group which is used to share information about health initiatives and could be used to disseminate information about public health emergencies [1]. For instance, the Facebook page contains posts with information on handwashing and physical distancing in both regional and english languages [1]. Similarly, information on testing and cross-border restrictions are also updated on the page frequently [1]. The Ministry of Health's Twitter account is also active in sharing relevant information [2]. The tweets range from information about tobacco health warnings, vaccination for kids to the research happening in the current context of COVID-19 [2]. The Influenza Pandemic Action Plan states that in the event of a pandemic, the government will "produce and disseminate information" on multimedia platforms, including TV. It does not specifically mention social media or ministry websites [3].

[1] Facebook. "Ministry of Health, Cook Islands." [<https://www.facebook.com/CookIslandsHealth/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

[2] Twitter. "Health Cook Islands." [<https://twitter.com/minhealthci?lang=en>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

### 3.5.2b

**Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?**

No = 1, Yes = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence which suggests that senior leaders (president or ministers) of the Government of Cook Islands have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. Various sources like Ministry websites, the World Health Organisation (WHO) or United Nations (UN) websites do not indicate any such sharing of misinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years [1,2,3,4,5].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Cook Islands." [<https://www.unocha.org/office-pacific-islands/cook-islands>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation. "Cook Islands." [<https://www.who.int/cookislands/our-work>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Immigration [<https://www.facebook.com/mfaicookislands/>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

## 3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

### 3.6.1 Internet users

#### 3.6.1a

**Percentage of households with Internet**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 54**

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

#### 3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 83.05

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

#### 3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.87

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

### 3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

#### 3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.44

2018-2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

## 3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

### 3.7.1 Trade restrictions

#### 3.7.1a

In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence to suggest the Cook Islands has recently issued a restriction on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) from another country because of the risk posed by an infectious disease outbreak. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Management has not published any recent customs notices. [1] There are also no recent notices on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites [2,3].

[1] Ministry of Finance and Economic Management. "Customs: Important Notices."

[<http://www.mfem.gov.ck/customs/important-notice>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. "Biosecurity." [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. Biosecurity. [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/importing/>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

### 3.7.1b

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no evidence to suggest that the Government of Cook islands has issued a restriction on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak [1]. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture websites mention any such restrictions [2,3]. The Cook Islands is self-governing in 'free association' with New Zealand, and as such, does not have its own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[1] Ministry of Finance and Economic Management [<http://www.mfem.gov.ck/customs/covid-19/2-for-businesses/243-movement-of-essential-and-non-essential-goods>]

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. Biosecurity. [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/biosecurity/importing/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

## 3.7.2 Travel restrictions

### 3.7.2a

**In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

Evidence suggests the Cook Islands has issued a temporary restriction on movement of people from another country because of the risk posed by an infectious disease outbreak. But the ban was not without international/bilateral support. These restrictions are in place due to the current COVID-19 pandemic and most of the countries have placed such restrictions due to the global spread of the disease. The country has zero confirmed cases of the disease as on 1 September 2020 [1,2].

[1] Ministry of Finance and Economic Management. "Customs: Important Notices."

[<http://www.mfem.gov.ck/customs/important-notice>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health. "Travel to the Cook Islands during COVID-19". [<https://www.health.gov.ck/travel-to-the-cook-islands-during-covid-19/>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

## Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

### 4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

#### 4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

##### 4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 141

2015

WHO; national sources

##### 4.1.1b

Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people

Input number

Current Year Score: 575.7

2009

WHO; national sources

##### 4.1.1c

Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

The Cook Islands has a public workforce strategy in place which identifies fields where there is insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. The Cook Islands Workforce Plan 2016-2025 outlines where there are health sector

staffing shortages and how much money is needed to train or recruit staff to fill these shortages by 2025. Increasing the number of general practitioners, nurses and other allied health professionals will be achieved through “significant, but staged investment.” Funding will come from tax revenue, the World Health Organisation (WHO), New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Colleges and other funders. [1]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. “Cook Islands Health Workforce Plan 2016-2025.”

[<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiSo7ql5rbvAhUG4nMBHaHPDjYQFjAAegQIAhAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.health.gov.ck%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2017%2F12%2FCook-Islands-Health-Workforce-Plan-2016-2025.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2usK-YQUYbT5viq4JCTyzk>] Accessed 6 April 2021

## 4.1.2 Facilities capacity

### 4.1.2a

**Hospital beds per 100,000 people**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 317.5**

2010-2015

WHO/World Bank; national sources

### 4.1.2b

**Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence the Cook Islands has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation facility. The Rarotonga is the principle health facility in the Cook Islands with 70 beds. The Aitutaki Hospital is the second largest facility with 28 beds. There is no evidence on the Ministry of Health website or in the Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 that either facility has a patient isolation facility. [1,2]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. “Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021.” [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 13 August 2020.

### 4.1.2c

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?
- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?



Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity or developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years. The "Surveillance and Testing Plan Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)" report published in December 2020 gives specific measures to deal with the covid-19 public health emergency and includes Isolation as one of the key measures; it also mentions a 'New Zealand managed isolation' facility but there is no evidence of expanding country's own isolation capacity. Furthermore, the "Surveillance and Testing Plan Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)" report does not explicitly mention any intention of expanding/developing isolation facilities in the country. [1]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/surveillance-and-testing-plan-for-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/>] Accessed 15 March 2021.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/>] Accessed 15 March 2021.

## 4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

### 4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

#### 4.2.1a

**Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?**

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that there is a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs [1,2]. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture websites describes such a protocol [3,4]. The Rarotonga Hospital Laboratory is the Cook Islands' only national laboratory, but it does not have its own website [5]. The Cook Islands Pharmaceutical Country Profile 2013 outlines procedures for distributing pharmaceuticals, but not acquisition of medical supplies or laboratory equipment, reagents or media [6]. The Ministry of Health has a Central Medical Store which distributes pharmaceuticals, but it is not clear whether it is also involved in procuring medical supplies or lab equipment, reagents or media from overseas [7]. The Head of Laboratory is responsible for managing laboratory supplies, which are logged with QuickBooks software. The Chief Pharmacist manages pharmacy supplies using software called TONIQU. [8]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health [<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/MOH-Pharmacy-and-Therapeutic-Products-Regulation-2013.pdf>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health [[https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai\\_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf](https://policycookislands.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/takai_anga-angaanga-tutara-a-te-marae-ora-2017-2021.pdf)]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Hospital Laboratory Services." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/hospital/hospital-laboratory-services/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[6] Cook Islands Ministry of Health and World Health Organisation (WHO). “Cook Islands Pharmaceutical Country Profile.” June 2013. [<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s21358en/s21358en.pdf>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[7] Cook Islands Ministry of Health and World Health Organisation. 2012. “Health Service Delivery Profile: Cook Islands.” [[http://www.wpro.who.int/health\\_services/service\\_delivery\\_profile\\_cook\\_islands.pdf](http://www.wpro.who.int/health_services/service_delivery_profile_cook_islands.pdf)] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[8] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. December 2012. “Finance Policies and Procedures.” [<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ministry-of-Health-Finance-policy-and-Procedures-2012.pdf>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

### 4.2.2a

**Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands has stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. Although the Code Yellow alert during the COVID-19 pandemic phase mentions one of the measures to be taken as stocking up on PPE kits, there is no evidence to suggest that a stockpile must be maintained at all times irrespective of national public health situation [1,2,3]. There is no evidence to suggest that the country maintains a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency. The 'National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021' states that the country should always aim to have “a regular supply of medicines at favourable prices and that meet recognised standards of quality” but there is no specific mention of stockpiling to prepare for a public health emergency. [4] Neither the New Zealand Defence Force nor New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade appear to share any relevant information on their websites. [5,6] No relevant information could be found on the Ministry of Health website [7].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. Code Yellow Alert. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/cook-islands-move-to-code-yellow-alert/>]. Accessed 17 March 2021.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 17 March 2021.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<https://agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 17 March 2021.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. “Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021.” [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 17 march 2021.

[5] New Zealand Defence Force. [<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/>] Accessed 17 March 2021.

[6] New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. [<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/>] Accessed 17 March 2021.

[7] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 6 April 2021.

### 4.2.2b

**Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Cook Islands maintains a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 states that the country should always aim to have “a regular supply of medicines at favourable prices and that meet recognised standards of quality” but there is no specific mention of stockpiling to prepare for a public health emergency. [1] The Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan says that in if a pandemic alert is triggered, health managers should “acquire resources for some surge capacity” suggesting that the Cook Islands would stockpile resources if the need arises, but not at all times. [2] Neither the New Zealand Defence Force nor New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade appear to share any relevant information on their websites [3,4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. “Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021.” [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. “Influenza Pandemic Action Plan.” [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[3] New Zealand Defence Force. [http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[4] New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. [https://www.mfat.govt.nz/] Accessed 14 August 2020.

#### 4.2.2c

**Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands does conduct an annual review of stockpile of medicines, medical equipments and other biomedical devices. The "Cook Islands Pharamceutical Country Profile 2013" report, prepared by the Ministry of Health in collaboration with WHO, however does mention that "The Pharmacy Department, MoH has a Central Medical Store (CMS) at National Level which distributes pharmaceuticals nationally" and it has a process (Reports of stock on hand, Expiry dates management, Reports of products out of stock) to assess stock on an annual basis although it is unclear if this is maintained in the context of a public health emergency [1]. Furthermore, the "Cook Islands National Health Strategy 2012-2016" report mentions as one of its key objectives: To strengthen institutional arrangements, procedures, processes and financial resources to purchase and distribute medical products and technologies. And to further this objective it lays down certain processes such as: Essential Medicine List reviewed and updated annually, Number of reported incidence of drug shortages, Annual Audit Report on the use of SOPs by clinicians, Number of Biomedical equipment procurement, repairs and maintenance carried out, etc. [2] No relevant information could be found on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites [3,4].

[1] World Health Organization. "Cook Islands PHARMACEUTICAL COUNTRY PROFILE" [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjz3PzfornvAhX2zTgGHRZOBIGQFjABegQIAhAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.who.int%2Fmedicines%2Fareas%2Fcoordination%2FCookIslands\_PSCP\_NarrativeFeb18.pdf%3Fua%3D1&usq=AOvVaw1CnONdPznNOBsCuk7LKfLT] Accessed 18 March 2021.

[2] International Labour Organization. "Cook Islands National Health Strategy 2012-2016" [https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjz3PzfornvAhX2zTgGHRZOBIGQFjACegQIARAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ilo.org%2Fwcmsp5%2Fgroups%2Fpublic%2F---ed\_protect%2F---protrav%2F---ilo\_aids%2Fdocuments%2Flegaldocument%2Fwcms\_536444.pdf&usq=AOvVaw2SjRm3xfhIJ\_NxA6-Vel-\_] Accessed 18 March 2021.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

### 4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce or procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 states that the country should always aim to have "a regular supply of medicines at favourable prices and that meet recognised standards of quality" but there is no mention of leveraging domestic manufacturing capacity or procurement of medical supplies [1]. Furthermore, The Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan 2008 says that if a pandemic alert is triggered, health managers should "acquire resources for some surge capacity" suggesting that the Cook Islands would stockpile resources if the need arises, but not at all times. It does not specifically mention production or procurement of medical supplies [2]. Neither the New Zealand Defence Force nor New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade appear to share any relevant information on their websites [3,4]. No relevant information could be found on the Ministry of Health website [5].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 17 March 2021.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 17 March 2021.

[3] New Zealand Defence Force. [<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/>] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[4] New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. [<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/>] Accessed 6 April 2021.

[5] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 6 April 2021.

### 4.2.3b

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Cook Islands has a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies or to procure the same during a public health emergency. The National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 states that the country should always aim to have "a regular supply of medicines at favourable prices and that meet

recognised standards of quality" but there is no mention of production or procurement of laboratory supplies to prepare for a public health emergency [1]. The Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan says that if a pandemic alert is triggered, health managers should "acquire resources for some surge capacity" suggesting that the Cook Islands would stockpile resources if the need arises, but not at all times. It does not specifically mention about production or procurement of laboratory supplies [2]. Neither the New Zealand Defence Force nor New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade appear to share any relevant information on their websites [3,4]. No relevant information could be found on the Ministry of Health website [5].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[3] New Zealand Defence Force. [http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[4] New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. [https://www.mfat.govt.nz/] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/]. Accessed 14 August 2020.

## 4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

### 4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

#### 4.3.1a

**Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a plan, program or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures for national use during a health emergency. Neither the Influenza Pandemic Action Plan nor the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management addresses any such process. [1,2] There is no relevant information on the Ministry of Health website and the website of the Emergency Management Office of the Cook Islands does not appear to be active. [3,4] There is no relevant information on the New Zealand Ministry of Defence website. [5]

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan." [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Emergency Management Sector. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023." [https://reliefweb.int/report/cook-islands/strategic-roadmap-emergency-management-cook-islands-2018-2023] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] Emergency Management Cook Islands. [http://www.emci.gov.ck] Attempted access 13 August 2020.

[5] New Zealand Ministry of Defence. [https://www.defence.govt.nz/] Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

### 4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest the Cook Islands has a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries in the event of a public health emergency. The Cook Islands Influenza Pandemic Action Plan does not address this issue [1]. The Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan outlines agreements with New Zealand and Australia to send health care specialists to the Cook Islands, but does not specify whether this mechanism would be used in public health emergencies [2]. The Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in the Cook Islands 2018-2023 also does not address this issue [3]. There is no relevant information on the Ministry of Health website and the website of the Emergency Management Office of the Cook Islands does not appear to be active [4,5]. There is no evidence of a plan on the New Zealand Ministry of Defence website [6].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Emergency Management Sector. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023." [<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[5] Emergency Management Cook Islands. [<http://www.emci.gov.ck>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[6] New Zealand Ministry of Defence. [<https://www.defence.govt.nz/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

### 4.4.1 Access to healthcare

#### 4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: -

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

#### 4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

**Current Year Score: 100**

1999-2018

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

#### 4.4.1c

**Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 43.64**

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 4.4.2 Paid medical leave

#### 4.4.2a

**Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?**

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

### 4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

#### 4.4.3a

**Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is limited evidence the Cook Islands plans to prioritize healthcare services to healthcare workers in the event of a public health emergency. The Influenza Pandemic Action Plan says the Ministry of Health and other agencies should “develop guidelines for management of patients, prioritization of healthcare service, staff mobilization and related issues” [1]. Neither the National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021, nor the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023 mention the need to prioritise healthcare for healthcare workers in a public health emergency [2,3].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. “Influenza Pandemic Action Plan.”

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. “Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021.” [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)]

Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

### 4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

#### 4.5.1a

**Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a system to help public health officials and healthcare workers communicate in a public health emergency in the Cook Islands. Both the Cook Islands National Strategic Plan 2017-2021 and the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023 talk about the need to improve communication between public health officials and healthcare workers [1,2].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

#### 4.5.1b

**Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of a system to help public and private health officials and healthcare workers communicate with each other in the public and private sector during a public health emergency in the Cook Islands. Both the Cook Islands National Strategic Plan 2017-2021 and the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023 talk about the need to improve communication between public health officials and healthcare workers [1,2].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [[https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf](https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf)] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 13 August 2020.



## 4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

### 4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

#### 4.6.1a

Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Cook Islands is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections that take place in healthcare facilities. The Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021 describes a target to keep post-operative infection rates (POIR) below 20% of the 2016 figures -- suggesting that instances of healthcare-associated infections are tracked. However, this data does not appear to be publicly available and there is no confirmation that monitoring is taking place [1]. There is no other relevant information on the Ministry of Health website and the national laboratory does not have its own website [2].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck] Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

### 4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

#### 4.7.1a

Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient public evidence that there is a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial in the Cook Islands. Although the Cook Islands does outline procedures for obtaining research approval, it is not clear if ethical reviews are a part of this procedure. The Ministry of Health has published a document outlining the policies and procedures for conducting health research in the country. The document states that "it is recommended that approval from the Cook Islands Ministry of Health Research Committee (CIMOHR) and the Cook Islands National Research Committee is obtained before commencement of any research". Although the policy also states that "all researchers or individuals/organisations intending to carry out health research activity, must communicate with and abide by the administrative procedures and decisions of the Cook Islands Ministry of Health Research Council (CIMOHR)," it is not clearly stated that ethics approval is

mandatory to conduct clinical trials in the country [1].

[1] The Ministry of Health and Health Research in the Cook Islands "Policy and Procedures" [<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/MOH-Research-Policy-Procedures.pdf>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

#### 4.7.1b

**Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures to treat ongoing pandemics in the Cook Islands. It is recommended that any research that takes place in the Cook Islands be approved by the Cook Islands Ministry of Health Research Committee and Cook Islands National Research Committee before work commences, however the policy document does not specifically address clinical trials [1]. Neither the Influenza Pandemic Action Plan nor the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management address research or clinical trials to treat ongoing pandemics [2,3].

[1] The Ministry of Health and Health Research in the Cook Islands "Policy and Procedures" [<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/MOH-Research-Policy-Procedures.pdf>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Emergency Management Sector. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023." [<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

### 4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

#### 4.7.2a

**Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

All medicines provided in Ministry of Health hospitals, clinics and pharmacies in the Cook Islands must be approved by the Cook Islands Ministry of Health Drug and Therapeutics Committee. The Committee maintains an Essential Medicines List (EML). Only medicines listed in the EML are recommended for use and are available in Ministry of Health pharmacies and hospitals [1]. The head of the Ministry of Health is responsible for controlling the availability of therapeutic products in the Cook Islands. No therapeutic products can be made available in the Cook Islands unless the product "has been approved by a recognised regulator and is on the Cook Islands Medicine Schedule as an approved product" [2].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. November 2017. "Cook Islands Essential Medicines List."

[<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s23518en/s23518en.pdf>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2013. "Ministry of Health (Pharmacy and Therapeutic Products) Regulations 2013."

[<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/MOH-Pharmacy-and-Therapeutic-Products-Regulation-2013.pdf>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

#### 4.7.2b

Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence of an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures for human use during public health emergencies in the Cook Islands. Neither the Influenza Pandemic Action Plan nor the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management address any such process [1,2]. The Ministry of Health publishes an Essential Medicines List which says that all medicines provided in Ministry of Health hospitals, clinics and pharmacies in the Cook Islands must be approved by the Cook Islands Ministry of Health Drug and Therapeutics Committee [3]. The Committee does not appear to have a website, and there is no further information on the Ministry of Health website [4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Emergency Management Sector. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023." [<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. November 2017. "Cook Islands Essential Medicines List."

[<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s23518en/s23518en.pdf>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 14 August 2020.

## Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

### 5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

#### 5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

##### 5.1.1a

Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

## 5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

### 5.1.2a

**Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that pandemics are integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or that there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for pandemics. The Cook Islands has an Influenza Pandemic Action Plan. While it does incorporate some elements of planning for an influenza pandemic, it is primarily a plan to coordinate response. Furthermore, the plan has not been updated since 2007, and it is not clear whether the plan is currently implemented. [1] The Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023 does not address pandemics in detail, and is largely focused on environmental disasters such as cyclones or tsunamis. [2] There is no other relevant evidence on the Ministry of Health website, and the Emergency Management Office website does not appear to be active [3,4].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf)] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[<https://reliefweb.int/report/cook-islands/strategic-roadmap-emergency-management-cook-islands-2018-2023>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[4] Emergency Management Cook Islands. [[www.emci.gov.ck](http://www.emci.gov.ck)] Attempted access 11 August 2020.

## 5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

### 5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

#### 5.2.1a

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Cook Islands has cross-border agreements with neighbouring countries with regard to public health emergencies. The Cook Islands is part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network, and has close ties to both New Zealand and Australia for the provision of specialist medical services [1,2]. However, the Cook Islands Influenza Action Plan says that in the event of human to human transmission of disease with pandemic potential in the Cook Islands or in neighbouring countries, the Cook Islands would close its borders. If New Zealand closes its borders, then the Cook Islands would also do the same and would restrict inter-island travel. [3] There is no other additional evidence on the Ministry of Health website, and there is no Ministry of Defence [4,5].

[1] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). "Outbreak Reports."

[<https://www.pphsn.net/Outbreak/Reports/Intro.htm>] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. "Cook Islands National Health Strategic Plan 2017-2021." [<https://www.health.gov.ck/wp->

content/uploads/2017/06/170606-Ministry-of-Health\_Final-Cook-Islands-NHSP-2017-2021\_Inside-Pages-PROOF.pdf] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. 2007. "Influenza Pandemic Action Plan."

[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/27076\_cookislandspandemicactionplanfinal0.pdf] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 11 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [http://www.ck/govt2.htm] Accessed 11 August 2020.

### 5.2.1b

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Cook Islands has cross-border agreements with neighbouring countries with regard to animal health emergencies. The Cook Islands is part of the Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network, which monitors animal disease outbreaks as well as human disease outbreaks, and the Pacific Community (SPC). However, there is no specific mechanism for supporting response to animal health emergencies [1,2]. There is no other evidence on the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture websites, and there does not appear to be a Ministry of Defence [3,4,5].

[1] Pacific Public Health Surveillance Network (PPHSN). April 2015. "Pacific Outbreak Manual."

[http://phs.spc.int/PPHSN/Publications/Pacific\_Outbreak\_Manual\_April\_2015.pdf] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Pacific Community (SPC). "SPC Members." [https://www.spc.int/our-members/] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [http://www.ck/govt2.htm] Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

### 5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

#### 5.3.1a

**Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?**

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1b

**Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

### 5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

### 5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

## 5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

### 5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

## 5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

### 5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

#### 5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

#### 5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5 FINANCING

### 5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

#### 5.5.1a

Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence to suggest that the Government of Cook Islands has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. The annual financial statements of the country mentions the aim to "provide quality health services to tackle NCDs (Non Communicable Diseases) and communicable diseases" but there is no mention of epidemic threats or specific budget allocations for that purpose [1,2,3,4]. The Ministry of Health website does not mention any such fund allocation [5].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Finance. [<http://www.mfem.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Finance Appropriation Bill 2019-20 Part 1

[[http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/MFEM\\_Documents/Treasury\\_Docs/Budget\\_Documents/2019-2023\\_Budget\\_Book\\_1\\_FINAL\\_Revised.pdf](http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/MFEM_Documents/Treasury_Docs/Budget_Documents/2019-2023_Budget_Book_1_FINAL_Revised.pdf)]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Finance Appropriation Bill 2019-20 Part 2 [[http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/2019-2023\\_Budget\\_Book\\_2\\_FINAL\\_Revised\\_20190618.pdf](http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/2019-2023_Budget_Book_2_FINAL_Revised_20190618.pdf)]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Finance Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Update 2017-18

[[http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/2018\\_Cook-Islands\\_Pre-election-Economic-and-Fiscal-Update.pdf](http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/2018_Cook-Islands_Pre-election-Economic-and-Fiscal-Update.pdf)]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

### 5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

#### 5.5.2a

Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021



### 5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

### 5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence of special emergency public financing mechanisms and funds that the Cook Islands can access in the face of a public health emergency. Cook Islands is not listed as eligible to borrow from the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) [1]. Nor is the Cook Islands eligible to borrow from the World Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) [2]. There is no other publicly available evidence that Cook Islands has a dedicated national reserve fund. The Ministry of Health does not share relevant information on its website [3].

[1] International Development Association. "Borrowing Countries". [<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility. December 2017. "Operational Brief for Eligible Countries". [<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Ministry of Public Health. [<http://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

## 5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

### 5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that senior leaders in the Cook Islands have made a public commitment to either improve its own capacity or to support other countries to improve their capacity to address epidemic threats. There are policy documents, however, which indicate that it will request more funding to expand its own capacity to address epidemic threats. In the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in the Cook Islands 2018-2023 the government lists identifying sources of sustainable funding to respond to emergencies as a key challenge that must be addressed. [1] There is no other evidence of public statements requesting or offering funding or support to address epidemic threats via the Ministry of Health website or the United Nations or World Health Organisation websites [2,3,4]. Although there is evidence of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Immigration, it does not appear to have its own website though its Facebook page appears to be active [5].

[1] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [https://www.health.gov.ck/]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Cook Islands." [https://www.unocha.org/office-pacific-islands/cook-islands] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] World Health Organisation. "Cook Islands." [https://www.who.int/cookislands/our-work] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[5] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [http://www.ck/govt2.htm] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[6] Cook Islands Government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Immigration [https://www.facebook.com/mfaicookislands/] Accessed 13 August 2020.

**5.5.4b**

**Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:**

**- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?**

**- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?**

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Cook Islands has invested finances or provided support to other countries to improve their capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. There is also insufficient evidence to suggest that the Cook Islands has requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. The Asian Development Bank provided a \$10 million loan to the Cook Islands in 2016 to fund the Cook Islands Disaster Resilience Program, but this is primarily to address natural hazards such as cyclones, floods and tsunamis [1]. In the Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands, the government lists identifying sources of sustainable funding as a key challenge that must be addressed [2]. The Global Health Security Tracking Dashboard does not report any grants specifically geared toward improving the Cook Island's capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years [3]. There is no other evidence of funding or support to address epidemic threats via the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Finance website or the United Nations or World Health Organisation websites [4,5,6,7]. Although there is evidence of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Immigration, it does not appear to have its own website [8].

[1] Asian Development Bank. "Cook Islands Disaster Resilience Program." [https://www.adb.org/projects/50212-001/main] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Government. "Strategic Roadmap for Emergency Management in Cook Islands 2018-2023."

[https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Cook-Islands-SREM-final.pdf] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Global Health Security Tracking Dashboard. "Cook Islands". [https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/50/recipient].

Accessed 13 August 2020.

[4] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[5] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Cook Islands." [<https://www.unocha.org/office-pacific-islands/cook-islands>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[6] World Health Organisation. "Cook Islands." [<https://www.who.int/cookislands/our-work>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[7] Cook Islands Ministry of Finance. [<http://www.mfem.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[8] Cook Islands Government. "Structure." [<http://www.ck/govt2.htm>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

### 5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## 5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

### 5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

#### 5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, epidemiological data, clinical specimens, or isolated specimens (biological materials) with international organisations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. Neither the Ministry of Health nor the Ministry of Agriculture have relevant information on their websites [1,2] There is no evidence of such a plan in media, academic studies, or other external documentation.

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] Cook Islands Ministry of Agriculture. [<http://www.agriculture.gov.ck/>] Accessed 13 August 2020.

#### 5.6.1b

Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no public evidence that Cook Islands has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past year. There is no relevant information on the Ministry of Health website and there have not been any reports of Cook Islands not sharing samples in either national or international media. [1] The latest External Evaluation of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Partnership Contribution, published in 2016, does not refer to Cook Islands not sharing samples, nor does it list Cook Islands as a priority country for improving the "national ability to detect, monitor and share novel influenza viruses" [2,3].

[1] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<http://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2016. "External Evaluation of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Partnership Contribution—High-Level Implementation Plan 2013-2016". [[http://www.who.int/about/evaluation/pip\\_evaluation\\_report.pdf](http://www.who.int/about/evaluation/pip_evaluation_report.pdf)]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework BIENNIAL PROGRESS REPORT 1 January 2018 - 31 December 2019. [<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/332171/WHO-WHE-GIH-PIP-2020.1-eng.pdf?ua=1>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

**5.6.1c**

**Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?**

Yes = 0 , No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no public evidence that Cook Islands has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years. There is no reference to sharing pandemic pathogen data on the Ministry of Health website and there have not been any reports of the country not sharing samples in either national and international media [1]. There are not reports in international media of pandemic pathogen outbreaks in Cook Islands in the last two years. The World Health Organisation Disease Outbreak News site reports no recent outbreaks of reportable diseases [2]. As of 1st September 2020, there have been no cases of COVID-19 in the country [3].

[1] Cook Island Ministry of Health. [<http://www.health.gov.ck/>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). "Disease Outbreak News: Cook Islands". [<http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/cok/en/>]. Accessed 13 August 2020.

[3] Cook Islands Ministry of Health. [<https://www.health.gov.ck/covid19/>] Accessed 1 September 2020.

## Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

### 6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

#### 6.1.1 Government effectiveness

##### 6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 74.17

2020

Transparency International

### 6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

### 6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

#### 6.1.3a

**What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?**

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

#### 6.1.4a

**How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?**

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

**Current Year Score: 3**

2021

Economist Intelligence

#### 6.1.4b

**What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?**

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

#### 6.1.4c

**How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?**

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.5 Armed conflict

### 6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.6 Government territorial control

### 6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.7 International tensions

### 6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 4

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

### 6.2.1 Literacy

#### 6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 88.1

2008-2018



United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);  
The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.2 Gender equality

### 6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

**Current Year Score: 0.55**

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.3 Social inclusion

### 6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

**Current Year Score: 0.23**

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

### 6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

Relevant data could not be found at the recommended sources. However, a government report titled "Economic Activity and Labour Force" published in February 2015 states that in the Cook Islands, around 10 per cent of the employed population are in forms of work that fall outside of formal work arrangements. These include, for example, self-employed workers and unpaid family workers.

[1] Cook Islands Government. Ministry of Finance & Economic Management. February 2015. "Economic Activity and Labour Force". [[http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/New\\_Stats\\_Website/12.Other\\_Content/Labour/UNFPA-Economic-activity-and-labour-force-of-the-Cook-Islands\\_Reduced.pdf](http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/New_Stats_Website/12.Other_Content/Labour/UNFPA-Economic-activity-and-labour-force-of-the-Cook-Islands_Reduced.pdf)] Accessed 17 September 2020.

### 6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

**Current Year Score: 2**

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.2.4 Public confidence in government

### 6.2.4a

**Level of confidence in public institutions**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.5 Local media and reporting

### 6.2.5a

**Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.6 Inequality

### 6.2.6a

**Gini coefficient**

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

**Current Year Score: 0.43**

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

### 6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

#### 6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

#### 6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

#### 6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

### 6.4.1 Urbanization

#### 6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 75.5

2020

World Bank

## 6.4.2 Land use

### 6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2005-2015

World Bank; Economist Impact

## 6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

### 6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

### 6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

#### 6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 76.2

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
World Factbook

#### 6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 666.23

2019

WHO

### **6.5.1c**

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 13.37

2019

World Bank

### **6.5.1d**

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 28.94

2018

World Bank

### **6.5.1e**

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 55.9

2016

WHO

## **6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation**

### **6.5.2a**

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 99

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### 6.5.2b

**Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 97.63**

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

## 6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

### 6.5.3a

**Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 1280.88**

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

## 6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

### 6.5.4a

**Trust medical and health advice from the government**

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

### 6.5.4b

**Trust medical and health advice from medical workers**

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018