

# Congo (Brazzaville)

This document is a compilation of all questions, justifications, and sources used to determine the 2021 Global Health Security Index scores for Congo (Brazzaville). For a category and indicator-level summary, please see the Country Profile for Congo (Brazzaville).

<b>CATEGORY 1: PREVENTING THE EMERGENCE OR RELEASE OF PATHOGENS WITH POTENTIAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCERN</b>	<b>4</b>
1.1 Antimicrobial resistance (AMR)	4
1.2 Zoonotic disease	8
1.3 Biosecurity	15
1.4 Biosafety	23
1.5 Dual-use research and culture of responsible science	26
1.6 Immunization	29
<b>CATEGORY 2: EARLY DETECTION AND REPORTING FOR EPIDEMICS OF POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL CONCERN</b>	<b>30</b>
2.1 Laboratory systems strength and quality	30
2.2 Laboratory supply chains	32
2.3 Real-time surveillance and reporting	34
2.4 Surveillance data accessibility and transparency	37
2.5 Case-based investigation	42
2.6 Epidemiology workforce	45
<b>CATEGORY 3: RAPID RESPONSE TO AND MITIGATION OF THE SPREAD OF AN EPIDEMIC</b>	<b>47</b>
3.1 Emergency preparedness and response planning	47
3.2 Exercising response plans	51
3.3 Emergency response operation	53
3.4 Linking public health and security authorities	55
3.5 Risk communications	56
3.6 Access to communications infrastructure	59

3.7 Trade and travel restrictions	60
-----------------------------------	----

**CATEGORY 4: SUFFICIENT AND ROBUST HEALTH SECTOR TO TREAT THE SICK AND PROTECT HEALTH WORKERS 61**

4.1 Health capacity in clinics, hospitals, and community care centers	61
---	----

4.2 Supply chain for health system and healthcare workers	65
---	----

4.3 Medical countermeasures and personnel deployment	70
--	----

4.4 Healthcare access	71
-----------------------	----

4.5 Communications with healthcare workers during a public health emergency	73
---	----

4.6 Infection control practices and availability of equipment	74
---	----

4.7 Capacity to test and approve new medical countermeasures	75
--	----

**CATEGORY 5: COMMITMENTS TO IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY, FINANCING PLANS TO ADDRESS GAPS, AND ADHERING TO GLOBAL NORMS 77**

5.1 International Health Regulations (IHR) reporting compliance and disaster risk reduction	77
---	----

5.2 Cross-border agreements on public health and animal health emergency response	78
---	----

5.3 International commitments	79
-------------------------------	----

5.4 Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services Pathway (PVS)	81
--	----

5.5 Financing	82
---------------	----

5.6 Commitment to sharing of genetic and biological data and specimens	85
--	----

**CATEGORY 6: OVERALL RISK ENVIRONMENT AND VULNERABILITY TO BIOLOGICAL THREATS 87**

6.1 Political and security risk	87
---------------------------------	----

6.2 Socio-economic resilience	90
-------------------------------	----

6.3 Infrastructure adequacy	92
-----------------------------	----

6.4 Environmental risks	93
-------------------------	----

6.5 Public health vulnerabilities	94
-----------------------------------	----

## Category 1: Preventing the emergence or release of pathogens with potential for international concern

### 1.1 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR)

#### 1.1.1 AMR surveillance, detection, and reporting

##### 1.1.1a

**Is there a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens?**

Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, and it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 2, Yes, there is evidence of an AMR plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it covers surveillance, detection, and reporting = 1, No evidence of an AMR plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection, and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. The World Health Organization's Library of National Action Plans does not include a national AMR plan from the Republic of Congo nor has the country completed a WHO Self Assessment for AMR [1, 2]. Furthermore, the WHO's Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that while the Republic of Congo committed itself to drawing up a national AMR Action Plan at the WHO's 68th Assembly in 2015, the plan is still in its draft stage and has yet to be approved [3]. In addition, there is no available information on the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment and the National Laboratory for Public Health websites about the status of the national AMR plan for the surveillance, detection and reporting of priority AMR pathogens. [4, 5, 6, 7]

[1] World Health Organisation (WHO). Library of national action plans. [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2018. "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self-Assessment. [<https://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[6] Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Congo (Ministère du Tourisme et de l'environnement de la République du Congo). [<http://www.tourisme-environnement.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[7] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

##### 1.1.1b

**Is there a national laboratory/laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens?**

All 7 + 1 priority pathogens = 2, Yes, but not all 7+1 pathogens = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national laboratory or laboratory system which tests for priority AMR pathogens. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country lacks laboratories capable of performing AMR testing in human and animal health [1]. Furthermore, there is no available information regarding a national laboratory or system which tests for priority AMR pathogens on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment and the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5]. In addition, the WHO's Library of National Action Plans does not include a national AMR plan from the Republic of Congo nor has the country completed a WHO Self Assessment for AMR [6, 7]. However, academic sources indicate there are some domestic laboratories capable of testing for E. coli, K. pneumonia, S. aureus, S. pneumonia, and Mycobacterium tuberculosis [8, 9, 10].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [http://www.sante.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Congo (Ministère du Tourisme et de l'environnement de la République du Congo). [http://www.tourisme-environnement.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [http://www.Insp-cg.org/]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[6] World Health Organisation (WHO). Library of national action plans. [https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[7] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2018. "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self-Assessment. [https://amrcountryprogress.org/]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[8] Nowak, Kathrin et al. 2017. "Highly diverse and antimicrobial susceptible Escherichia coli display a naïve bacterial population in fruit bats from the Republic of Congo". PLoS ONE 12

[7] : e0178146. [https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0178146]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[9] Okoko, A.R. et al. 2017. "Pneumonia of Children under 5 Years of Age in Brazzaville (Republic of Congo)". Open Journal of Pediatrics 7

[3] : 178-191. [https://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=78951]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[10] Malm, Sven et al. 2017. "New Mycobacterium tuberculosis Complex Sublineage, Brazzaville, Congo". Emerging Infectious Diseases 23

[3] : 423-429. [https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2303.160679]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

**1.1.1c**

**Does the government conduct environmental detection or surveillance activities (e.g., in soil, waterways) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the government of the Republic of Congo conducts detection or surveillance activities (e.g. in soil, waterways, etc.) for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms. Although the World Health

Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that there exists water and environmental codes, it does not mention that the country conducts environmental detection or surveillance activities for antimicrobial residues or AMR organisms [1]. There is no available information regarding such a detection or surveillance on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environment nor the Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3, 4]. In addition, the WHO's Library of National Action Plans does not include a national AMR plan from the Republic of Congo nor has the country completed a WHO Self Assessment for AMR [5, 6].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Congo (Ministère du Tourisme et de l'environnement de la République du Congo). [<http://www.tourisme-environnement.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[5] World Health Organisation (WHO). Library of national action plans. [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

[6] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2018. "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self-Assessment. [<https://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

## 1.1.2 Antimicrobial control

### 1.1.2a

**Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans. Although a 2006 report by the World Health Organisation and the Republic of Congo's Ministry of Health on the country's pharmaceutical industry indicates that there are prescriptions written for antibiotics, it does not mention any national legislation or regulation that requires prescriptions for antibiotic use for humans [1]. Furthermore, there is no relevant information on the website of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4]. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country's prescription system is "anarchic" and antibiotics are bought in the streets. [5] This lack of legislation or regulation was highlighted in a 2014 study on the use of antibiotics in the Republic of Congo in which the report states that 49% of dispensers sold antibiotics without a doctor's prescription [6]. While the JEE praises the Republic of Congo's political will to fight the circulation of illegal medicines, it recommends that the country put legislation in place on the proper use and quality of antibiotics [5]. In addition, the WHO's Library of National Action Plans does not include a national AMR plan from the Republic of Congo nor has the country completed a WHO Self Assessment for AMR [7, 8].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo / World Health Organisation (WHO). July 2006. "Evaluation of the Pharmaceutical Sector of Congo (Evaluation du Secteur Pharmaceutique du Congo)".

[[https://www.who.int/countries/cog/resources/evaluation\\_secteur\\_pharmaceutique.pdf](https://www.who.int/countries/cog/resources/evaluation_secteur_pharmaceutique.pdf)]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

- [2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.
- [4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.
- [5] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.
- [6] A. S. Samba Mylla et al. 2014. "Consumption of Antibiotics on an Outpatient Basis in Brazzaville (La consommation des antibiotiques en ambulatoire à Brazzaville)". [<https://www.annalesumng.org/index.php/ssa/article/view/62>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.
- [7] World Health Organisation (WHO). Library of national action plans. [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.
- [8] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2018. "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self-Assessment. [<https://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 28 October, 2020.

### 1.1.2b

#### Is there national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals?

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in enforcement = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national legislation or regulation in place requiring prescriptions for antibiotic use for animals. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, although veterinary clinics and pharmacies exist, the country's prescription system is "anarchic" and the JEE recommends "establishing a national legal framework on the appropriate use and quality of antimicrobials in human and animal health" [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of this type of legislation or regulation on the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture nor on the National Laboratory for Public Health websites [2, 3, 4]. In addition, the WHO's Library of National Action Plans does not include a national AMR plan from the Republic of Congo nor has the country completed a WHO Self Assessment for AMR [5, 6].

- [1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.
- [4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.
- [5] World Health Organisation (WHO). Library of national action plans. [<https://www.who.int/antimicrobial-resistance/national-action-plans/library/en/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.
- [6] World Health Organisation (WHO). 2018. "Global Database for Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self-Assessment.

[<https://amrcountryprogress.org/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

## 1.2 ZONOTIC DISEASE

### 1.2.1 National planning for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

#### 1.2.1a

**Is there national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has national legislation, plans, or equivalent strategy documents on zoonotic disease. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country has national plans in place for Ebola, Rabies, Yellow Fever and Monkeypox [1]. For example, the national plan for Ebola was last updated in October 2019 and plans for Rabies, Yellow fever and Monkeypox include national awareness and vaccination campaigns [2, 3, 4, 5]. However, the JEE also states that the Republic of Congo lacks the capacity to "respond effectively and rapidly to more than 80% of zoonoses" and that the country does not have "a strategy or plan to respond to zoonoses in the country's animal and human health sectors" [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any such national plan or legislation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [6, 7, 8]. In addition, in January of 2019, the Republic of Congo completed its first-ever evaluation mission as part of the World Organization for Animal Health's (OIE) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway. In its evaluation, the OIE notes that the next step is a PVS Gap Analysis Mission to help determine the country's "priority goals and activities, identify their resource needs and develop a long-term strategy" [9].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[2] Central Africa Information Agency (Agence d'Information d'Afrique Centrale). 14 October, 2019. "Public health: the Congo adopts a national Ebola response plan (Santé publique: le Congo se dote d'un plan national de riposte à Ebola)".

[<http://adiac-congo.com/content/sante-publique-le-congo-se-dote-dun-plan-national-de-riposte-ebola-107074>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[3] Global Alliance for Rabies Control. 27 September, 2018. "Congo-Brazzaville: World Rabies Day (Journée mondiale de la rage)". [<https://rabiesalliance.org/node/7271>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[4] Les Echos du Congo-Brazzaville. 30 August, 2020. "Congo - Health: Yellow Fever epidemic declared at Point-Noire and in Kouilou (Congo - Santé : Une épidémie de fièvre jaune déclarée à Pointe-Noire et dans le Kouilou)". [<https://lesechos-congobrazza.com/societe/5132-gabon-un-des-presumes-assassins-de-chanelle-tchibinda-arrete-2>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[5] Les Echos du Congo-Brazzaville. 14 March, 2017. "Congo - Health: Monkeypox epidemic declared in Likoula (Congo - Santé : L'épidémie de « Variole du singe » s'est déclarée dans la Likouala)". [<https://lesechos-congobrazza.com/societe/2675-sante-l-epidemie-de-varirole-de-singe-s-est-declaree-dans-la-likouala>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[6] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[7] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[8] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 30

October, 2020.

[9] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). 17 February, 2019. "Committing to capacity building of Veterinary Services and improving animal disease surveillance in the Republic of the Congo". [<https://rr-africa.oie.int/en/news/committing-to-capacity-building-of-veterinary-services-and-improving-animal-disease-surveillance-in-the-republic-of-the-congo/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020

### 1.2.1b

**Is there national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has national legislation, plans or equivalent strategy document(s) which includes measures for risk identification and reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country shares information through meetings of zoonoses control committees and conducts the "One Health" approach on the surveillance of the Ebola virus in animals. However, the JEE also notes a lack of a strategy or plan to respond to zoonoses in the country's animal and human health sectors [1]. The Republic of Congo does have a national center for the control of epizootic diseases which includes a steering committee responsible for the surveillance of animal diseases. However, there is no mention that this center is part of a national plan which includes measures for risk identification or reduction for zoonotic disease spillover events from animals to humans [2]. Furthermore, in January of 2019, the Republic of Congo completed its first ever evaluation mission as part of the World Organisation for Animal Health's (OIE) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway. In its evaluation, the OIE notes that the next step is a PVS Gap Analysis Mission to help determine the country's "priority goals and activities, identify their resource needs and develop a long-term strategy" [3]. In addition, there is no evidence of any such legislation or plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture [4, 5].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[2] Official Journal of the Republic of Congo (Journal Officiel de la République du Congo): Order n° 9191 of November 22, 2010 on the creation, attributions and organization of the national center for the control of epizootic diseases (Arrêté n° 9191 du 22 novembre 2010 portant création, attributions et organisation du centre national de contrôle des épizooties). [<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/con105875.pdf>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[3] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). 17 February, 2019. "Committing to capacity building of Veterinary Services and improving animal disease surveillance in the Republic of the Congo". [<https://rr-africa.oie.int/en/news/committing-to-capacity-building-of-veterinary-services-and-improving-animal-disease-surveillance-in-the-republic-of-the-congo/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020



### 1.2.1c

**Is there national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national legislation, plans, or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, while the country has national plans in place for Ebola, Rabies, Yellow Fever and Monkeypox, it has not established a joint list of priority zoonoses and it lacks a national multi-sectoral committee for the surveillance of zoonoses. The JEE recommends that the Republic of Congo develop a list of priority zoonoses based on risk mapping as well as a multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary system for the monitoring of priority zoonoses [1]. In addition, there is no available evidence of any legislation, plans or guidelines that account for the surveillance and control of multiple zoonotic pathogens of public health concern on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

### 1.2.1d

**Is there a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a department, agency, or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries. The Republic of Congo has a national epizootic disease control center (created by Order No. 1919 of 22 November 2010) housed within the Ministry of Agriculture. Its responsibilities include, among other things: setting up a national epidemiological surveillance network for animal diseases and ensuring its functioning; fighting against diseases with high epizootic potential; creating and managing an animal health database and popularizing the legislative and regulatory texts relating to the control of animal diseases. However, there is no information as to whether this body functions across ministries [1]. Furthermore, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that while the country does have an inter-ministerial committee for the control of rabies, it lacks a national multi-sectoral committee for the surveillance of zoonoses [2]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a department, agency or similar unit dedicated to zoonotic disease that functions across ministries on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4].

[1] Official Journal of the Republic of Congo (Journal Officiel de la République du Congo): Order n° 9191 of November 22, 2010 on the creation, attributions and organization of the national center for the control of epizootic diseases (Arrêté n° 9191 du 22 novembre 2010 portant création, attributions et organisation du centre national de contrôle des épizooties). [<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/con105875.pdf>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

## 1.2.2 Surveillance systems for zoonotic diseases/pathogens

### 1.2.2a

**Does the country have a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national mechanism (either voluntary or mandatory) for owners of livestock to conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency. The Republic of Congo has a national epizootic disease control center (created by Order No. 1919 of 22 November 2010) housed within the Ministry of Agriculture. Among its responsibilities, it is legislated to "ensure the protection of the health of animal species and to prevent or alert the risks of invasion by enzootic, epizootic or panzootic diseases". However, there is no specific mention as to whether owners of livestock need to conduct and report on disease surveillance to this center [1]. Furthermore, while the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country has a surveillance system for public and animal health it also states that the Republic of Congo lacks a joint list of priority zoonotic diseases. The JEE does, however, note the existence of a regulation "making it mandatory for the prophylaxis of bovine tuberculosis and the control of meat from tuberculous bovine animals" but there is no mention of whether owners of livestock conduct and report on disease surveillance to a central government agency through a national mechanism [2]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a mechanism on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4].

[1] Official Journal of the Republic of Congo (Journal Officiel de la République du Congo): Order n° 9191 of November 22, 2010 on the creation, attributions and organization of the national center for the control of epizootic diseases (Arrêté n° 9191 du 22 novembre 2010 portant création, attributions et organisation du centre national de contrôle des épizooties). [<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/con105875.pdf>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la

Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

### 1.2.2b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has of legislation and/or, regulations, that safeguard the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals (for owners). The Constitution of the Republic of Congo states, in Article 26, that "the secrecy of correspondence, telecommunications or any other form of communication cannot be violated except in the cases provided by law." There is no mention, however, of safeguards for information generated through surveillance activities for animals [1, 2]. Law No. 9-2009 of 25 November 2009 regulates the electronic communications sector, including the protection of users' privacy. Article 125 prohibits surveillance, recording, and storage of communications data without users' consent. Here, as well, there is no mention of protection for information generated through surveillance activities for animals [3]. Furthermore, while the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes the existence of indicator-based monitoring systems and mechanisms for data collection, it does not mention any legislation or regulation safeguarding the confidentiality of information generated through surveillance activities for animals [4]. In addition, there is no available evidence of any general data protection acts or confidentiality laws on the websites of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture nor on the UNCTAD data protection database [5, 6, 7].

[1] "Republic of the Congo Constitution of 2015".

[[https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo\\_2015.pdf?lang=en](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015.pdf?lang=en)]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[2] Global Information Society Watch (GISWatch). "Civil society and cyber surveillance in the Republic of Congo".

[<https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/republic-congo>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[3] President of the Republic of Congo. Law No. 9-2009 of 25 November 2009. "On regulating the electronic communications sector (Loi N. 9-2009 du 25 Novembre 2009 portant réglementation du secteur des communications électroniques)".

[<https://economie.gouv.cg/en/content/law-n%C2%B09-2009-24-novembre-2009-regulating-electronic-communications-sector-french>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[6] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 30 October, 2020.

[7] UNCTAD Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Database. [<https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide>]. Accessed 30 October.

### 1.2.2c

**Does the country conduct surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife (e.g., wild animals, insects, other disease vectors)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo conducts surveillance of zoonotic disease in wildlife. The Ministry of Health has partnered with the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) to conduct community-based wildlife disease surveillance programs that samples wildlife carcasses (mostly gorillas, but also chimpanzees) The surveillance network, which was launched in 2006, is comprised of hunter-gathers, park rangers, and WCS-affiliated project personnel who report great ape and mammal carcasses they encounter to a trained response team [1]. In the latest report on this surveillance programme, released on June 4, 2020, "over 6,660 hunters and thousands more women and children are now aware of the risks associated with coming into contact with dead animals where the cause of death is unknown". The network covers more than 30,000 km<sup>2</sup> of remote forest which is home to more than 60 percent of the world's gorillas [2]. Furthermore, in December of 2019, the Republic of Congo participated in a five-day workshop, sponsored by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), for the development of integrated protocols for the surveillance of hemorrhagic viral fevers including Ebola Virus Disease in wildlife [3].

[1] Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS): "Community-based wildlife carcass surveillance is key for early detection of Ebola virus in Central Africa". 28 August, 2019. [<https://newsroom.wcs.org/News-Releases/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/12986/Study-Community-based-wildlife-carcass-surveillance-is-key-for-early-detection-of-Ebola-virus-in-Central-Africa.aspx>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

[2] Dr. Alain Ondzie, "One Way to Prevent Epidemics: Monitoring Wildlife Mortality". PBS. 04 June, 2020. [<https://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/blog/covid-wildlife-mortality/>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

[3] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). December, 2019. "Joint training of selected Focal Points on wildlife monitoring protocols in Central Africa (Formation conjointe d'une sélection de Points Focaux sur les protocoles de surveillance de la faune en Afrique centrale)". [<https://rr-africa.oie.int/fr/trainings/formation-conjointe-dune-selection-de-points-focaux-sur-les-protocoles-de-surveillance-de-la-faune-afrique-centrale-francais/>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

### 1.2.3 International reporting of animal disease outbreaks

#### 1.2.3a

Has the country submitted a report to OIE on the incidence of human cases of zoonotic disease for the last calendar year?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2019

OIE WAHIS database

### 1.2.4 Animal health workforce

#### 1.2.4a

Number of veterinarians per 100,000 people

Input number

**Current Year Score: -**

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

### 1.2.4b

**Number of veterinary para-professionals per 100,000 people**

Input number

**Current Year Score: -**

No data available

OIE WAHIS database

## 1.2.5 Private sector and zoonotic

### 1.2.5a

**Does the national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national plan on zoonotic disease or other legislation, regulations, or plans include mechanisms for working with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country has national plans in place for Ebola, Rabies, Yellow Fever and Monkeypox. However, there is no mention in the JEE that these plans include working with the private sector [1]. The Republic of Congo has a national epizootic disease control center ((created by Order No. 1919 of 22 November 2010) housed within the Ministry of Agriculture. Its responsibilities include, among other things: setting up a national epidemiological surveillance network for animal diseases and ensuring its functioning. However, there is no mention that this center works with the private sector in controlling or responding to zoonoses [2]. In addition, there is no evidence that these plans include such a mechanism for working with the private sector on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture [3, 4]. Furthermore, in January of 2019, the Republic of Congo completed its first-ever evaluation mission as part of the World Organization for Animal Health's (OIE) Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway. In its evaluation, the OIE notes that the next step is a PVS Gap Analysis Mission to help determine the country's "priority goals and activities, identify their resource needs and develop a long-term strategy". However, there is no mention if these resource needs include working with the private sector. [5].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

[2] Official Journal of the Republic of Congo (Journal Officiel de la République du Congo): Order n° 9191 of November 22, 2010 on the creation, attributions and organization of the national center for the control of epizootic diseases (Arrêté n° 9191 du 22 novembre 2010 portant création, attributions et organisation du centre national de contrôle des épizooties). [<http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/con105875.pdf>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

[5] World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). 17 February, 2019. "Committing to capacity building of Veterinary Services and improving animal disease surveillance in the Republic of the Congo". [<https://rr-africa.oie.int/en/news/committing-to-capacity-building-of-veterinary-services-and-improving-animal-disease-surveillance-in-the-republic-of-the-congo/>]. Accessed 31 October, 2020.

## 1.3 BIOSECURITY

### 1.3.1 Whole-of- government biosecurity systems

#### 1.3.1a

**Does the country have in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has in place a record, updated within the past five years, of the facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed, including details on inventories and inventory management systems of those facilities. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes the country's "lack of active surveillance for pathogens through the maintenance of a record and an updated inventory of pathogens within structures that store or handle dangerous pathogens and toxins". The JEE also notes the lack of a laboratory audit system. [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a record on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Scientific Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. ] In addition, there is no legislation or regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database regarding the storage or processing of dangerous pathogens and toxins [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc->

ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

### 1.3.1b

**Does the country have in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has in place legislation and/or regulations related to biosecurity which address requirements such as physical containment, operation practices, failure reporting systems, and/or cybersecurity of facilities in which especially dangerous pathogens and toxins are stored or processed. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country lacks an adequate legal framework or a management program for biosafety or security. The JEE does note, however, that the National Laboratory for Public Health (LNSP) and the National Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory (LNDV) have been externally evaluated and the implementation of best practices in the field of biological safety and security are in progress [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a legislation or regulation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Scientific Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. ] In addition, there is no evidence of such a legislation or regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database regarding the storage or processing of dangerous pathogens and toxins [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

### 1.3.1c

**Is there an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has an established agency (or agencies) responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country lacks an adequate legal framework or a management program for biosafety or security [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such an agency on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Scientific Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. ] In addition, there is no evidence of such an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosecurity legislation and regulations listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

### 1.3.1d

**Is there public evidence that shows that the country has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has taken action to consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country has an inadequate legal



framework for biosafety or biosecurity and lacks a laboratory audit system as well as an "updated inventory of pathogens within structures that store or handle dangerous pathogens and toxins" [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the country has taken action consolidate its inventories of especially dangerous pathogens and toxins into a minimum number of facilities on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Scientific Research, nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. ] In addition, there is no evidence of such an action to consolidate its inventories listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database regarding the storage or processing of dangerous pathogens and toxins [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo).

[<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

### 1.3.1e

**Is there public evidence of in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has in-country capacity to conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola, which would preclude culturing a live pathogen. According to a World Health Organization study conducted from July to December 2019 on "Regional Ebola Preparedness", the WHO reported that the Republic of Congo's PCR capacity was in its development stages [1]. Furthermore, in another study on long-term wildlife surveillance in the northern part of the country carried out in conjunction with the Wildlife Conservation Society Congo Program, the National Laboratory for Public Health and several NGOs, and published in August of 2019, the report reveals that PCR-based diagnostic testing for Ebola was used on animal carcasses but there is no information as to whether these tests were part of an in-country capacity or brought in from the participating NGOs [2]. There is no publicly available evidence regarding the capacity to conduct PCR-based diagnostic testing for anthrax and/or Ebola on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Scientific Research nor on the one of

the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In addition, there is no mention of this capacity in the WHO's Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019. The JEE only mentions that the Republic of Congo has the capacity to conduct testing for cholera [8].

- [1] World Health Organization (WHO). July-December 2019. "Regional Ebola Preparedness, Overview of Needs and Requirements. [<https://www.who.int/ebola/preparedness/regional-ebola-preparedness-overview-june-dec2019.pdf>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [2] Eeva Kuisma et al. 12 August, 2019. Royal Society Publishing. "Long-term wildlife mortality surveillance in northern Congo: a model for the detection of Ebola virus disease epizootics". [<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6711308/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [7] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [8] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

## 1.3.2 Biosecurity training and practices

### 1.3.2a

**Does the country require biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo requires biosecurity training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. Although the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 notes that the country has established an academic training program which includes training personnel responsible for storing and handling dangerous pathogens and toxins, it also states that the country lacks a plan for training staff in all the structures that house or handle dangerous pathogens and toxins [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a training requirement on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Scientific Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. ] In addition,

there is no evidence of such a biosecurity training requirement listed in the VERTIC BWC [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

### 1.3.3 Personnel vetting: regulating access to sensitive locations

#### 1.3.3a

**Do regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?**

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks = 3, Personnel are subject to two of these checks = 2, Personnel are subject to one of these checks = 1, Personnel are not subject to any of these checks = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has regulations or licensing conditions which specify that security and other personnel with access to especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential are subject to the following checks: drug testing, background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks. There is no mention of such a regulation requiring background or other checks in the country's labor and work law no. 45/75 of March 15, 1975 (updated in 1996) [1]. Furthermore, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 notes that the country lacks an adequate legal framework or a management program for biosafety or security [2]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a regulation or licensing conditions on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Scientific Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [8]. ] In addition, there is no evidence of such a regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC database [9].

- [1] International Labor Organization (ILO) database: "Law no. 6-96 of 6 March, 1996 amending and supplementing certain dispositions of the law no. 45/75 of 15 March, 1975 establishing a Work Code in the Republic of Congo (Loi no. 6-96 du 6 mars 1996 modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions de la loi no. 45/75 du 15 mars 1975 instituant un Code du travail de la République populaire du Congo)". [<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/WEBTEXT/43085/64990/F96COG01.htm>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [2] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [5] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [6] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [7] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [8] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.
- [9] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

### 1.3.4 Transportation security

#### 1.3.4a

**Does the country have publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Republic of Congo has no publicly available information on national regulations on the safe and secure transport of infectious substances (specifically including Categories A and B). The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 notes that the country lacks national regulations on the safe and secure transport of pathogen agents [1]. Furthermore, there is no publicly available information on such regulations on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In addition, there is no available information on the Facebook page of the Ministry of Transport (it does not have an official website) [7]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [8]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [9].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [http://www.sante.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [https://defense.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo Facebook page (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo).

[https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [http://www.lnsp-cg.org/]. Accessed 02 November, 2020.

[7] Ministry of Transport, Civil Aviation and the Merchant Navy of the Republic of Congo (Ministère des transports de l'aviation civile et de la marine marchande de la République du Congo). [https://www.facebook.com/mtacmm/]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[8] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[9] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

## 1.3.5 Cross-border transfer and end-user screening

### 1.3.5a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has legislation and/or regulations in place to oversee the cross-border transfer and end-user screening of especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, and pathogens with pandemic potential. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country lacks national regulations on the safe and secure transport of pathogen agents [1]. Furthermore, there is no publicly available evidence of such a legislation or regulation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy and Industry nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In addition, there is no available information on the Facebook page of the Ministry of Transport (it does not have an official website) [7]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the BWC, there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [8]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [9].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du

Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Economy, Industry and Public Portfolio of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Economie, de l'Industrie et du Portefeuille Public de la République du Congo). [<https://economie.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Ministry of Transport, Civil Aviation and the Merchant Navy of the Republic of Congo (Ministère des transports de l'aviation civile et de la marine marchande de la République du Congo). [<https://www.facebook.com/mtacmm/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[9] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

## 1.4 BIOSAFETY

### 1.4.1 Whole-of-government biosafety systems

#### 1.4.1a

**Does the country have in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has in place national biosafety legislation and/or regulations. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country lacks an adequate legal framework for biosafety or biosecurity and it recommends that the Republic of Congo "develop and implement a national legal framework for biosafety and biosecurity". [1] Furthermore, there is no evidence of a national biosafety legislation or regulation on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] Although the Republic of Congo is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports. [7] In addition, there is no evidence of such a regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database. [8]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo).

[<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

### 1.4.1b

#### Is there an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country lacks an adequate legal framework for biosafety or biosecurity and it does not have a biosafety or biosecurity management program [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of an established agency responsible for the enforcement of biosafety legislation and regulations on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Défense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09

November, 2020.

## 1.4.2 Biosafety training and practices

### 1.4.2a

**Does the country require biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo requires biosafety training, using a standardized, required approach, such as through a common curriculum or a train-the-trainer program, for personnel working in facilities housing or working with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, or biological materials with pandemic potential. Although the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country conducts some training within the implementation of certain projects, it also reports that the Republic of Congo lacks a plan for "biosafety training of staff in all the structures that house or handle dangerous pathogens and toxins" [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a training requirement on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a biosafety training requirement listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>].

Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo).

[<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.



## 1.5 DUAL-USE RESEARCH AND CULTURE OF RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE

### 1.5.1 Oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research

#### 1.5.1a

Is there publicly available evidence that the country has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has conducted an assessment to determine whether ongoing research is occurring on especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. There is no evidence of such an assessment in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, which notes that the country lacks supervision and regular inspections of its laboratories in all sectors [1]. Furthermore, there is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has conducted such an assessment on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. In addition, there is no evidence of such an assessment for ongoing research of this type listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

### 1.5.1b

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has legislation and/or regulation requiring oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. No information on such a legislation can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Furthermore, there is no evidence that such a legislation exists in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, which notes that the country lacks supervision and regular inspections of its laboratories in all sectors [6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a legislation or regulation listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [8].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo Facebook page (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[6] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020. [<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

### 1.5.1c

**Is there an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no available evidence that the Republic of Congo has an agency responsible for oversight of research with especially dangerous pathogens, toxins, pathogens with pandemic potential and/or other dual-use research. No information on the

existence of such an agency can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Furthermore, there is no evidence that an agency responsible for the oversight of this type of research exists in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 which notes that the country lacks a national biosafety and biosecurity management program as well as supervision and regular inspections of its laboratories in all sectors [6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. In addition, there is no evidence of legislation for such an agency listed in the VERTIC BWC legislation database [8].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[6] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

## 1.5.2 Screening guidance for providers of genetic material

### 1.5.2a

**Is there legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has legislation and/or regulation requiring the screening of synthesized DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) against lists of known pathogens and toxins before it is sold. There is no mention of such a legislation or regulation in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, nor on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. Although the Republic of Congo is party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there is no public evidence that it has submitted Confidence Building Measures reports [7]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a legislation listed in the VERTIC BWC

legislation database [8].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[7] Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Electronic Confidence Building Measures Portal. "Congo". [<https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/congo>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[8] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Republic of Congo. 2020.

[<https://www.vertic.org/programmes/biological-weapons-and-materials/bwc-legislation-database/c/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

## 1.6 IMMUNIZATION

### 1.6.1 Vaccination rates

#### 1.6.1a

##### Immunization rate (measles/MCV2)

Immunization rate (measles/MCV2), 95% or greater = 2, 80-94.9% = 1, Less than 80%, or no data = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2019

World Health Organization

#### 1.6.1b

Are official foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) vaccination figures for livestock publicly available through the OIE database?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

OIE WAHIS database

## Category 2: Early detection and reporting for epidemics of potential international concern

### 2.1 LABORATORY SYSTEMS STRENGTH AND QUALITY

#### 2.1.1 Laboratory testing for detection of priority diseases

##### 2.1.1a

**Does the national laboratory system have the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests?**

Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and these tests are named = 2, Evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests and the tests are not named = 1, No evidence they can conduct 5 of the 10 core tests = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo's national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, although the diseases with epidemic potential (polio, cholera, measles, rabies, yellow fever, meningitis, chikungunya, tetanus, shigellosis, MVE, Monkey Pox, human pandemic influenza and avian influenza) are subject to diagnostic tests, only the diagnostic test for cholera is carried out by the network of laboratories at several levels. [1]. Furthermore there is no publicly available evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health that the Republic of Congo's national laboratory system has the capacity to conduct diagnostic tests for at least 5 of the 10 WHO-defined core tests [2, 3]. The country does not have a national institute for public health.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 05 November, 2020.

[3] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

##### 2.1.1b

**Is there a national plan, strategy or similar document for conducting testing during a public health emergency, which includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing?**

Yes, there is evidence of a plan, and it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 2, Yes, there is evidence of a plan, but there is insufficient evidence that it includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens, scaling capacity, and defining goals for testing = 1, No evidence of a plan = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national plan for conducting testing during a public health emergency. The country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no2020-105 April 9, 2020) outlines a national strategy to strengthen and increase the national and regional laboratories' capacities for testing. In terms of testing, the plan

mentions the amount of funding allocated to implementation of laboratory capacity improvement for testing[1]. This increase was also highlighted in an article published in 'Allo Docteurs Africa' on April 29, 2020 which reported that the Republic of Congo had scaled its capacity for testing by adding a laboratory in the city of Pointe-Noire to conduct Covid-19 testing [2]. However there is no mention in either the national plan or this article as to whether this includes considerations for testing for novel pathogens. Furthermore there is no evidence of such a plan on testing for novel pathogens on the Ministry of Health's website, the government's main portal nor on the National Laboratory for Public Health's website [3, 4, 5].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 19 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[2] Arnaud Ntchapda, Allo Docteurs Africa, 29 April 2020. "To better fight the coronavirus, Congo-Brazzaville creates a new laboratory for biomedical analysis (Pour mieux lutter contre le coronavirus, le Congo-Brazzaville s'offre un nouveau laboratoire d'analyses biomédicales)". [<https://alldocteurs.africa/actualites/epidemie/covid-19/pour-mieux-lutter-contre-le-coronavirus-le-congo-brazzaville-s-offre-un-nouveau-laboratoire-d-analyses-biomedicales>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

## 2.1.2 Laboratory quality systems

### 2.1.2a

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited (e.g., International Organization for Standardization [ISO] 15189:2003, U.S. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments [CLIA])?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is accredited. According to the the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country's National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Public (LNSP)) is designated as a reference laboratory for all diseases under surveillance and HIV but it is not accredited [1]. Furthermore in the Republic of Congo's main law (no. 009/88 of 23 May, 1988) which sets up the country's health code framework, there is no mention of an accredited laboratory [2]. In addition, there is no available evidence that the LNSP is accredited on the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture or the National Laboratory for Public Health websites [3, 4, 5].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[2] Congo: Law 009-88 of May 23, 1988 instituting a Code of Ethics health and social professions (Congo: Loi 009-88 du 23 mai 1988 instituant un Code de Déontologie des professions de la santé et des affaires sociales).

[<https://www.cesbc.org/congo/Lois/Loi%20009-88.pdf>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

### 2.1.2b

**Is there a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national laboratory that serves as a reference facility which is subject to external quality assurance review. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country lacks a national program of external quality assessment (evaluation or audit of skills) [1]. Although the Republic of Congo is a member of the CDC's Integrated Regional Surveillance and Laboratory Network for Central Africa, (Rislnet), there is no specific mention that the member countries' national laboratories are subject to external quality assurance review [2]. In addition, there is no available evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture or the National Laboratory for Public Health (3, 4, 5).

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[2] ADIAC - Congo, 10 November, 2018. "Republic of Congo elected to head CDC's Regional Integrated Surveillance and Laboratory Network for Central Africa (La République du Congo a été élue à la tête du Réseau régional intégré de surveillance et de laboratoire du CDC pour l'Afrique centrale (Rislnet)). [<http://adiac-congo.com/content/afrique-centrale-le-congo-elu-la-presidence-du-reseau-regional-de-surveillance-et-de>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

## 2.2 LABORATORY SUPPLY CHAINS

### 2.2.1 Specimen referral and transport system

#### 2.2.1a

**Is there a nationwide specimen transport system?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has nationwide specimen transport system. Although the country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no 2020-105 April 9, 2020) includes plans to put into place a safe specimen transport system, there is no evidence that this has been done [1]. Furthermore, there is no information available on such a system on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture or the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4]. In addition, although the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that there exists a pool of agents trained in infectious specimen transport techniques (four in the LNSP), the JEE also notes the lack of a nationwide system for the transport and transfer of specimens [5].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 19 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[5] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

## 2.2.2 Laboratory cooperation and coordination

### 2.2.2a

**Is there a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak?**

Yes = 2 , Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has a plan in place to rapidly authorize or license laboratories to supplement the capacity of the national public health laboratory system to scale-up testing during an outbreak. The country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no2020-105 April 9, 2020) outlines a national strategy to strengthen the national and regional laboratories' capacities for testing. [1]. Furthermore, while the minister of health announced, on April 28, 2020, that the Republic of Congo had scaled its capacity by authorizing a laboratory in the city of Pointe-Noire to conduct Covid-19 testing, there is no mention that a plan existed before the coronavirus pandemic and no further details are provided [2]. In addition, there is no available evidence of such a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the government's main portal nor the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5, 6].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 19 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[2] Arnaud Ntchapda, Allo Docteurs Africa, 29 April 2020. "To better fight the coronavirus, Congo-Brazzaville creates a new laboratory for biomedical analysis (Pour mieux lutter contre le coronavirus, le Congo-Brazzaville s'offre un nouveau laboratoire d'analyses biomédicales)". [<https://alldocteurs.africa/actualites/epidemie/covid-19/pour-mieux-lutter-contre-le->



coronavirus-le-congo-brazzaville-s-offre-un-nouveau-laboratoire-d-analyses-biomedicales]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[5] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

## 2.3 REAL-TIME SURVEILLANCE AND REPORTING

### 2.3.1 Indicator and event-based surveillance and reporting systems

#### 2.3.1a

**Is there evidence that the country is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease?**

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance and evidence that the data is being analyzed on a daily basis = 2,

Yes, there is evidence of ongoing event-based surveillance, but no evidence that the data are being analyzed on a daily basis

= 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo is conducting ongoing event-based surveillance and analysis for infectious disease and it is published on a weekly basis. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country has two event-based surveillance systems for human and animal health as well as indicator-based surveillance systems and mechanisms for data collection [1]. Furthermore, the Ministry of Health publishes a weekly surveillance bulletin on diseases with epidemic potential which includes data on the number of cases, their location and mortality status [2, 3].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[2] Epidemiological Bulletin of Comprehensive Disease Surveillance and Response in the Republic of Congo, Week n° 49 (Bulletin épidémiologique de surveillance intégrée des maladies et riposte de la République du Congo Semaine n° 49 (du 02/12/2019 au 08/12/2019)). [<https://rpubs.com/Rubo/Bulletin-Congo>]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

[3] Epidemiological Bulletin of Comprehensive Disease Surveillance and Response in the Republic of Congo, Week n° 52 (Bulletin épidémiologique de surveillance intégrée des maladies et riposte de la République du Congo Semaine n° 52 (du 30/12/2019 au 05/01/2020)). [[http://rstudio-pubs-static.s3.amazonaws.com/567212\\_c4401f61413e46aba1d1b10c1ab79f8f.html](http://rstudio-pubs-static.s3.amazonaws.com/567212_c4401f61413e46aba1d1b10c1ab79f8f.html)]. Accessed 10 November, 2020.

#### 2.3.1b

**Is there publicly available evidence that the country reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo reported a potential public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) to the WHO within the last two years. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Disease Outbreak News page, on February 9 2019, the government of the Republic of Congo officially declared an outbreak of chikungunya virus disease. According to the report, the first suspected case was a symptomatic 49-year-old woman who presented on 7 January 2019 to a health facility in Diosso town, 25 kilometres north of Pointe-Noire. From 1 January to 14 April 2019, a total of 6,149 suspected cases of chikungunya had been recorded in the country with approximately 54% of reported cases being female. There were no deaths reported and it was the second outbreak of since 2011 [1]. No further evidence of a reported outbreak is available on the WHO 2019 and 2020 disease outbreak pages. [2, 3]. The Republic of Congo declared its first case of COVID-19 on March 14, 2020, after the WHO declared it a PHEIC on January 30, 2020. [4, 5]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 1 May 2019."Disease outbreak news: Chikungunya - Congo".

[<https://www.who.int/csr/don/01-may-2019-chikungunya-congo/en/>]. Accessed 10 November 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). 2019."Emergencies preparedness, response: 2019".

[<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2019/en/>]. Accessed 24 May 2021.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 2020."Emergencies preparedness, response: 2020".

[<https://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/year/2020/en/>]. Accessed 24 May 2021.

[4] Garda World. March 15, 2020. "Congo: Authorities confirm first COVID-10 case March 14 /update 1".

[<https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/322926/congo-authorities-confirm-first-covid-10-case-march-14-update-1>]  
Accessed 24 May 2021.

[5] World Health Organization (WHO). 27 April 2020."Archived: WHO Timeline - COVID-19".

[<https://www.who.int/news/item/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19>]. Accessed 24 May 2021.

## 2.3.2 Interoperable, interconnected, electronic real-time reporting systems

### 2.3.2a

**Does the government operate an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo's government operates an electronic reporting surveillance system at both the national and the sub-national level. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, notes that while an EWARS (Early Warning, Alert and Response System) using android phones connected to the internet exists in four departments, the JEE also notes that the country lacks an electronic reporting surveillance system at the national level which is interconnected and interoperable [1]. Furthermore, on March 11, 2019, the general secretary of the Ministry of Health announced that it was launching the installation of the District Health Information Software 2 (DHIS2) [2]. However, there is no information available on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health that this has been completed [3, 4].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>].  
Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[2] "Launch of DHIS2 installation in Congo Brazzaville, with the presence of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Health (Lancement de l'implémentation du DHIS2 au Congo Brazzaville, avec la présence du Secrétaire Général du Ministère de la

Santé)" 11 March, 2019. DHIS2 Educational Research Center Facebook page.

[https://www.facebook.com/dhis2/posts/2154749224614540/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [http://www.sante.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [http://www.Insp-cg.org/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

### 2.3.2b

#### Does the electronic reporting surveillance system collect ongoing or real-time laboratory data?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has an electronic reporting surveillance system that collects ongoing or real-time laboratory data. According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019, the country has an EWARS (Early Warning, Alert and Response System) in four departments which uses android phones connected to the internet. However, the JEE also notes that the country lacks an electronic reporting surveillance system at the national level which is interconnected and interoperable and recommends that the Republic of Congo "scale up its national electronic surveillance system using the 'One Health' approach" [1]. In addition, although the Ministry of Health publishes a weekly surveillance bulletin on diseases with epidemic potential which includes data on the number of cases, their location and mortality status, there is no evidence that this is done using electronic reporting surveillance [2]. Furthermore, on March 11, 2019, the general secretary of the Ministry of Health announced that it was launching the installation of the District Health Information Software 2 (DHIS2) [3]. However, there is no information available on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health that this has been completed [4, 5].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[2] Epidemiological Bulletin of Comprehensive Disease Surveillance and Response in the Republic of Congo, Week n° 52 (Bulletin épidémiologique de surveillance intégrée des maladies et riposte de la République du Congo Semaine n° 52 (du 30/12/2019 au 05/01/2020)). [http://rstudio-pubs-static.s3.amazonaws.com/567212\_c4401f61413e46aba1d1b10c1ab79f8f.html]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[3] "Launch of DHIS2 installation in Congo Brazzaville, with the presence of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Health (Lancement de l'implémentation du DHIS2 au Congo Brazzaville, avec la présence du Secrétaire Général du Ministère de la Santé)" 11 March, 2019. DHIS2 Educational Research Center Facebook page. [https://www.facebook.com/dhis2/posts/2154749224614540/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [http://www.sante.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [http://www.Insp-cg.org/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

## 2.4 SURVEILLANCE DATA ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

### 2.4.1 Coverage and use of electronic health records

#### 2.4.1a

##### Are electronic health records commonly in use?

Electronic health records are commonly in use = 2, Electronic health records are not commonly in use, but there is evidence they are used = 1, No evidence electronic health records are in use = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that electronic health records are commonly used in the Republic of Congo. There is no available information on the World Health Organization's (WHO) 2016 'Atlas Publication on eHealth' as to whether the country has an e-Health strategy [1]. Furthermore, according to a study published by ICTworks on December 4, 2019, the Republic of Congo is one of the countries which did not respond to a survey request by the WHO Global Observatory for eHealth [2]. There is no information regarding whether the Republic of Congo uses electronic health records on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4]. In addition, OpenClinic GA, an open source integrated hospital information management system that includes administrative, financial, clinical, laboratory, x-ray, pharmacy, meals distribution and other data, is being used in the Republic of Congo, but there is no indication that it has been widely adopted [5].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO) Atlas of eHealth country profiles 2016.

[https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204523/9789241565219\_eng.pdf?sequence=1]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[2] Wayan Vota, ICTworks, 4 December, 2019. "Every African Country's National eHealth Strategy or Digital Health Policy".

[https://www.ictworks.org/african-national-ehealth-strategy-policy/#.X7LrJtNKjwd]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [http://www.sante.gouv.cg/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [http://www.lnsp-cg.org/]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[5] Wright, Graham. 2018. "Some Thoughts about Health Informatics in Africa". European Journal of Bioinformatics 14[1] :75-76. [https://www.ejbi.org/scholarly-articles/some-thoughts-about-health-informatics-in-africa.pdf]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

#### 2.4.1b

##### Does the national public health system have access to electronic health records of individuals in their country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo's national public health system has access to electronic health records of individuals in their country. There is no information regarding this on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the National Laboratory for Public Health's website [1, 2]. Furthermore, there is no available information on the World Health Organization's (WHO) 2016 'Atlas Publication on eHealth' as to whether the country has an e-Health strategy which would include using electronic health records [3].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[2] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO) Atlas of eHealth country profiles 2016.

[[https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204523/9789241565219\\_eng.pdf?sequence=1](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/204523/9789241565219_eng.pdf?sequence=1)]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

### 2.4.1c

**Are there data standards to ensure data is comparable (e.g., ISO standards)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has data standards to ensure data is comparable. Although the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 states that the country conducts data analysis exercises at all levels, there is no mention of the existence of data standards to ensure data is comparable [1]. Furthermore, there is no available evidence of such data standards on the Ministry of Health's website nor on the one for the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3]

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

[3] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 11 November, 2020.

## 2.4.2 Data integration between human, animal, and environmental health sectors

### 2.4.2a

**Is there evidence of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data (e.g., through mosquito surveillance, brucellosis surveillance)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has established mechanisms at the relevant ministries responsible for animal, human, and wildlife surveillance to share data. Although the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 notes that the country has two event-based surveillance systems for human and animal health as well as indicator-based surveillance systems and mechanisms for data collection, there is no mention of established mechanisms at the relevant ministries to share data [1]. Furthermore there is no evidence of any such mechanisms on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of the Environment nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Tourism and Environment of the Republic of Congo (Ministère du Tourisme et de l'environnement de la République du Congo). [<http://www.tourisme-environnement.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

## 2.4.3 Transparency of surveillance data

### 2.4.3a

**Does the country make de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient available evidence that the Republic of Congo makes de-identified health surveillance data on infectious diseases publicly available via reports (or other format) on government websites. Although the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 notes that the country publishes epidemiological bulletins, the most recent one available dates from end of December 2019 [1, 2]. Furthermore, since the end of April 2020, the Ministry of Health and the National Laboratory for Public Health post on their websites the number of Covid-19 cases as well as the number of recoveries and deaths. However, this only concerns coronavirus cases and not other infectious diseases [3, 4].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

[2] Epidemiological Bulletin of Comprehensive Disease Surveillance and Response in the Republic of Congo, Week n° 52 (Bulletin épidémiologique de surveillance intégrée des maladies et riposte de la République du Congo Semaine n° 52 (du 30/12/2019 au 05/01/2020)). [[http://rstudio-pubs-static.s3.amazonaws.com/567212\\_c4401f61413e46aba1d1b10c1ab79f8f.html](http://rstudio-pubs-static.s3.amazonaws.com/567212_c4401f61413e46aba1d1b10c1ab79f8f.html)]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

### 2.4.3b

**Does the country make de-identified COVID-19 surveillance data (including details such as daily case count, mortality rate, etc) available via daily reports (or other formats) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo make de-identified Covid-19 surveillance data available via daily reports on government websites. The National Laboratory for Public Health publishes reports on its website of the number of overall Covid-19 cases since March 14, 2020 as well as the number of recoveries, deaths and active cases. They are updated on a daily basis [1]

[1] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/#>]. Accessed 12 November, 2020.

## 2.4.4 Ethical considerations during surveillance

### 2.4.4a

**Is there legislation and/or regulations that safeguard the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo has legislation that safeguards the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities. On 10 October of 2019, the Republic of Congo adopted Law 29-2019 on the Protection of Personal Data. Among the Law's main objectives is to "set up a framework that ensures the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, namely their privacy, regarding the processing of personal data". In addition to the Law, there are other legal documents that include data protection provisions such as the Law N 27-2020 which states that the provisions of this law "shall apply to all persons, whatever their nationality, who have committed an offense through information and communication technologies in Congo, including offenses concerning personal data protection". In this regard, Law N 17-2020 provides for the following: imprisonment for one to five years and/or a fine between one to ten million CFA Francs (approx. €15,270) for offenses which include "anyone who processes personal data for health research without informing the persons concerned of the terms of the processing operation and without obtaining their express consent" [1].

[1] Data Guidance. September 2020. "Republic of Congo - Data Protection Overview". [<https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/republic-congo-data-protection-overview>]. Accessed 27 November, 2020.

### 2.4.4b

**Is there legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, include mention of protections from cyber attacks (e.g., ransomware)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo has legislation and/or regulations safeguarding the confidentiality of identifiable health information for individuals, such as that generated through health surveillance activities, which include mention of protection from cyber attacks. On 10 October of 2019, the Republic of Congo adopted Law 29-2019 on the Protection of Personal Data. Among the Law's main objectives is to "set up a framework that ensures the protection of the fundamental

rights and freedoms of natural persons, namely their privacy, regarding the processing of personal data". In addition to the Law, there are other legal documents that include data protection provisions such as Law No. 26-2020 dated 5 of June 2020 regarding cybersecurity. The Law No. 26-2020, provides a framework for cybersecurity in Congo. Specifically, it identifies measures that must be put in place "to guarantee the integrity, confidentiality, and security of data, such as authentication mechanisms and other recognized cybersecurity standards. Additionally, it also states "the need to ensure the security of information systems and networks in light of legal and regulatory obligations and standards applicable in the country" (including for the purpose of protecting personal data) [1].

[1] Data Guidance. September 2020. "Republic of Congo - Data Protection Overview".

[<https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/republic-congo-data-protection-overview>]. Accessed 27 November, 2020.

## 2.4.5 International data sharing

### 2.4.5a

**Has the government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region?**

Yes, commitments have been made to share data for more than one disease = 2, Yes, commitments have been made to share data only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo's government made a commitment via public statements, legislation and/or a cooperative agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region for one or more diseases. Although the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country signed, on March 18, 2011, a Memorandum of Understanding on cross-border health issues with Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia and Zambia, there is no mention that this includes sharing surveillance data during a public health emergency. Furthermore, the JEE recommends that the Republic of Congo strengthen cross-border collaboration [1]. Moreover, on September 20, 2019, the Republic of Congo was one of several African countries which applied for a credit to as part of the Regional Disease Surveillance systems Enhancement project (REDISSE) in Central Africa. However, there is no evidence that this project has come to fruition [2]. In addition, there is no mention of such an agreement to share surveillance data during a public health emergency with other countries in the region on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4]. The Republic of Congo is part of the Central Africa veterinary laboratory network for Avian Influenza and other transboundary diseases (RESOLAB-CA) and the regional network of national epidemiology surveillance systems for Avian Influenza and other priority animal diseases in Central Africa (RESEPI-CA). However, neither network includes an explicit commitment to share surveillance data during a public health emergency [5, 6].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[2] World Bank: Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement Project (REDISSE) in Central Africa, Phase IV. 20 September, 2019. [REDISSE

<https://www.gtai.de/resource/blob/163660/df6037a611bda59acde65c81dd4b7203/pro201910095001-data.pdf>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.



[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[5] Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). "FAO hands over Coordination of Animal Networks to Regional Coordinators in West and Central Africa".

[[http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/news\\_201213b.html](http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/news_201213b.html)]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[6] Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). "Recent developments on regional epidemiology & laboratory networks activities in Africa". Joint EARLN/EAREN Annual Coordination Meeting 16 - 19 July 2013, Bujumbura, Burundi. [[http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/eufmd/docs/Meeting\\_Earln/FAO\\_ECTAD\\_-\\_Update\\_on\\_Regional\\_networksEntebbe.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/eufmd/docs/Meeting_Earln/FAO_ECTAD_-_Update_on_Regional_networksEntebbe.pdf)]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

## 2.5 CASE-BASED INVESTIGATION

### 2.5.1 Case investigation and contact tracing

#### 2.5.1a

**Is there a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level (e.g. training, metrics standardization and/or financial resources) to conduct contact tracing in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, there is evidence that the national government supports sub-national systems, but only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national system in place to provide support at the sub-national level to conduct contact tracing in response to an active public health emergency nor in preparation for future public health emergencies. Although the country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no2020-105, 9 April 2020) outlines plans to train teams to follow up on travelers and contacts, there is no mention of how it is being financed and whether it includes support at the sub-national level. It only mentions the creation of a 24 hour hotline [1]. Furthermore according to a 2014 World Health Organization (WHO) report on contact tracing during an outbreak of Ebola virus disease, the Republic of Congo was among a number of African countries who participated in this contact tracing training. However, there is no evidence that this was part of a national system that included support at the sub-national level [2]. In addition, there is no available evidence of such a national system on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Laboratory of Public Health nor on the government's main portal [3, 4, 5].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO), September 2019, "Contact tracing during an outbreak of Ebola virus disease". [<https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/contact-tracing-during-outbreak-of-ebola.pdf>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[5] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

### 2.5.1b

**Does the country provide wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention?**

Yes, both economic support and medical attention are provided = 2, Yes, but only economic support or medical attention is provided = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo provides wraparound services to enable infected people and their contacts to self-isolate or quarantine as recommended, particularly economic support (paycheck, job security) and medical attention. Although the country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no2020-105, 9 April 2020) states that the government will cover the medical costs of Covid-19 cases, and that suspected ones should be self-isolated, there is no mention of wraparound services that included economic support nor that this is applicable to other public health emergencies [1]. Furthermore, in a report by africanews on the first Covid-19 case detected in the country on March 15, 2020, there is mention that the person and his family were isolated but there is no mention as to whether they were provided with any wraparound services [2]. In addition, there is no mention of such services on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance nor of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[2] Africanews, 15 March, 2020. "Covid-19: first case confirmed in the Republic of Congo (Covid-19: premier cas confirmé en République du Congo)". [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mqQd-kU-Wc4>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Finances and Budget of the Republic of Congo (Ministère des Finances et du Budget). [<https://www.finances.gouv.cg/fr>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

### 2.5.1c

**Does the country make de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 (including the percentage of new cases from identified contacts) available via daily reports (or other format) on government websites (such as the Ministry of Health, or similar)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo makes de-identified data on contact tracing efforts for COVID-19 available via daily reports or other another format on government websites. Although daily reports on the case count, the number of recoveries as well as the mortality rate are available on the country's National Laboratory for Public Health website, there is no data on contact tracing efforts [1]. The Ministry of Health and the government's main portal also provide de-identified Covid-19 surveillance data but again there is no information on contact tracing efforts [2, 3].

[1] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/#>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du

Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 13 November.

[3] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 13 November, 2020.

## 2.5.2 Point of entry management

### 2.5.2a

**Is there a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in the event of a public health emergency?**

Yes, plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place to prepare for future public health emergencies = 2, Yes, but plan(s)/agreement(s) are in place only in response to active public health emergencies = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has a joint plan or cooperative agreement between the public health system and border control authorities to identify suspected and potential cases in international travelers and trace and quarantine their contacts in response to an active or future public health emergency. On March 27, 2020 during a Council of Ministers meeting, the Minister of Health announced the closing of all land, river, road, sea, air, national and international borders due to the Covid-19 pandemic [1]. Furthermore, in the country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no2020-105, 9 April 2020), the government announced that all individuals coming from high-risk countries would be placed in quarantine. However, there is no mention of this being part of a joint plan or agreement between the public health system and border control authorities [2]. There is no evidence of such a plan or cooperative agreement on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense, the National Laboratory for Public Health nor on the Ministry of Transport's Facebook page (the latter does not have a website [3, 4, 5, 6]).

[1] Republic of Congo, Council of Ministers report: 27 March, 2020. (Compte rendu du Conseil des Ministres de la République du Congo). [<https://www.sgg.cg/ccm/compte-rendu-cdm-2020-03-27.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[6] Ministry of Transport, Civil Aviation and the Merchant Navy of the Republic of Congo Facebook page (Ministère des transports de l'aviation civile et de la marine marchande de la République du Congo). [<https://www.facebook.com/mtacmm/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

## 2.6 EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKFORCE

### 2.6.1 Applied epidemiology training program, such as the field epidemiology training program, for public health professionals and veterinarians (e.g., Field Epidemiology Training Program [FETP] and Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians [FETPV])

#### 2.6.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Applied epidemiology training program (such as FETP) is available in country
- Resources are provided by the government to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP)

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has either applied epidemiology training programs such as FETP or that the government provides resources to send citizens to another country to participate in applied epidemiology training programs. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that while there exists some general epidemiology training in the country, there is no FETP program. Furthermore, the JEE also states that the country does have some bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding certain programs, however, there is no mention of the Republic of Congo providing resources to send citizens abroad to participate in applied epidemiology training programs [1]. In addition there is no mention on the Ministry of Health's website of FETP options, either domestic or international, available to relevant professionals in the Republic of Congo [2]. The Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN) has conducted a training program in the Republic of Congo that includes at least some FETP topics, but there is no evidence that this is a recurring program [3]. The Republic of Congo is not a member of TEPHINET or AFENET [4, 5]. Moreover, there is no indication that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC) has conducted any FETP in, or for, the Republic of Congo [6].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN). "The GOARN Training Programme". [<https://recon-gathering-march2018.netlify.com/files/talk-renee-anne-christensen.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[4] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) [<https://www.tephinet.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] African Field Epidemiology Network. [<http://www.afenet.net/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] U.S. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC). "Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP)".

[<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fetp/index.htm>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

#### 2.6.1b

Are the available field epidemiology training programs explicitly inclusive of animal health professionals or is there a specific animal health field epidemiology training program offered (such as FETPV)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has any applied epidemiology training programs (such as FETP) nor of specific animal health field epidemiology training program (such as FETPV). According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, the country has some general epidemiology training but does not have a FETP program [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a FETP or FETPV program on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture [2, 3]. In addition, the Republic of Congo is not a member of TEPHINET or AFENET [4, 5]. Moreover, there is no indication that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC) has conducted any FETP or FETPV in, or for, the Republic of Congo [6].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>].

Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020

[4] Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) [<https://www.tephinet.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] African Field Epidemiology Network. [<http://www.afenet.net/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[6] U.S. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (US CDC). "Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP)".

[<https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/healthprotection/fetp/index.htm>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

## 2.6.2 Epidemiology workforce capacity

### 2.6.2a

**Is there public evidence that the country has at least 1 trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 people?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

Completed JEE assessments; Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## Category 3: Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic

### 3.1 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLANNING

#### 3.1.1 National public health emergency preparedness and response plan

##### 3.1.1a

**Does the country have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential?**

Evidence that there is a plan in place, and the plan is publicly available = 2, Evidence that the plan is in place, but the plan is not publicly available OR, Disease-specific plans are in place, but there is no evidence of an overarching plan = 1, No evidence that such a plan or plans are in place = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

The Republic of Congo does not have an overarching national public health emergency response plan in place but there is evidence that the country has some disease-specific response plans in place. On April 9, 2020, the government enacted its National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no2020-105, 9 April 2020) yet there is no mention that it addresses planning for communicable diseases other than the coronavirus [1]. The Republic of Congo also has a national response plan in place specifically for the Ebola virus which it updated in October of 2020 [2]. The lack of an overarching national public health emergency response plan is noted in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, which states that the country lacks a "comprehensive, multi-sectoral emergency response plan that integrates health dangers including those that could potentially cause a public health emergency of international scope [3]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the National Laboratory for Public Health [4, 5], The Republic of Congo does have a 2017 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) that covers public health emergencies and specifically mentions Ebola, cholera, measles, and yellow fever, but it focuses on risk reduction as opposed to response measures [6]. The Republic of Congo has a National Office for Risk and Disaster Management, but it does not have a website.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Journal de Brazza. 7 October, 2020. "Congo: reform of national Ebola response plan (Congo: réforme du plan national de riposte contre Ebola)". <https://www.journaldebrazza.com/congo-reforme-du-plan-national-de-riposte-contre-ebola/>. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[6] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)".

Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

### 3.1.1b

**If an overarching plan is in place, has it been updated in the last 3 years?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has an overarching plan in place. The only plan it has in place that has been updated in the last 3 years is its national plan in response to the Ebola disease which was updated in October of 2020 [1]. The country also has a national plan in response to Covid-19 but it is only for the coronavirus and was only enacted on April 9, 2020 [2]. The lack of an overarching national public health emergency response plan is noted in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, which states that the country lacks a "comprehensive, multi-sectoral emergency response plan that integrates health dangers including those that could potentially cause a public health emergency of international scope [3]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the National Laboratory for Public Health [4, 5], The Republic of Congo does have a 2017 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) that covers public health emergencies and specifically mentions Ebola, cholera, measles, and yellow fever, but it focuses on risk reduction as opposed to response measures [6]. The Republic of Congo has a National Office for Risk and Disaster Management, but it does not have a website.

[1] Journal de Brazza. 7 October, 2020. "Congo: reform of national Ebola response plan (Congo: réforme du plan national de riposte contre Ebola)". <https://www.journaldebrazza.com/congo-reforme-du-plan-national-de-riposte-contre-ebola/>. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[6] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

### 3.1.1c

**If an overarching plan is in place, does it include considerations for pediatric and/or other vulnerable populations?**

Yes = 1 , No /no plan in place= 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has an overarching plan in place. Though the country has two specific disease plans in place, one for Covid-19 and the other for Ebola and neither one includes considerations for pediatric

and/or other vulnerable populations. The Covid-19 plan briefly mentions broadcasting information for the benefit of vulnerable population but it neither defines vulnerable populations nor includes more information on health considerations for these groups [1, 2]. The only mention of relief or aid for the most vulnerable is in an article by the World Food Program in April of 2020 which announced it had signed an agreement with the Ministry of Health to provide food for those hardest hit by the coronavirus outbreak [3]. The lack of an overarching national public health emergency response plan is noted in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, which states that the country lacks a "comprehensive, multi-sectoral emergency response plan that integrates health dangers including those that could potentially cause a public health emergency of international scope" [4]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of an overarching national public health emergency response plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the National Laboratory for Public Health [5, 6]. The Republic of Congo does have a 2017 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) that covers public health emergencies and specifically mentions Ebola, cholera, measles, and yellow fever, but it focuses on risk reduction as opposed to response measures [7]. The Republic of Congo has a National Office for Risk and Disaster Management, but it does not have a website.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Journal de Brazza. 7 October, 2020. "Congo: reform of national Ebola response plan (Congo: réforme du plan national de riposte contre Ebola)". <https://www.journaldebrazza.com/congo-reforme-du-plan-national-de-riposte-contre-ebola/>. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] World Food Program (WFP) Republic of Congo Country Brief, April 2020. [<https://reliefweb.int/report/congo/wfp-republic-congo-country-brief-april-2020>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[4] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[7] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

### 3.1.1d

**Does the country have a publicly available plan in place specifically for pandemic influenza preparedness that has been updated since 2009?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2020

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH)



### 3.1.2 Private sector involvement in response planning

#### 3.1.2a

**Does the country have a specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has specific mechanism(s) for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response. There is no evidence of such a mechanism on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the National Laboratory for Public Health nor in the the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo conducted in March of 2019 [1, 2, 3]. Furthermore, while the country's Covid-19 Task Force has had several meetings with UNICONGO, the Employers and Inter-professional Association of Congo (Union Patronale et Interprofessionnelle du Congo), there is no mention that this is part of a national mechanism for engaging with the private sector to assist with outbreak emergency preparedness and response [4]. In addition, the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention from 2017 indicates that engaging the private sector in disaster and health emergency management efforts is an important objective, but does not mention any specific mechanisms for doing so [5]. There is a National Office for Risk and Disaster Management, but it does not have a website.

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[4] UNICONGO. Meeting between UNICONGO and the Covid-19 Task Force. 30 May, 2020. (Rencontre entre UNICONGO et la Task-Force-Riposte à la Covid-19). [<http://www.unicongo.org/rencontre-entre-unicongo-et-la-task-force-riposte-covid-19/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[5] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

### 3.1.3 Non-pharmaceutical interventions planning

#### 3.1.3a

**Does the country have a policy, plan and/or guidelines in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic?**

Yes, a policy, plan and/or guidelines are in place for more than one disease = 2, Yes, but the policy, plan and/or guidelines exist only for one disease = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that that the Republic of Congo has a plan in place to implement non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during an epidemic or pandemic but it only exists for one disease. In its National Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree no2020-105, 9 April 2020), the government stated that due to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, NPIs would be

implemented. These NPIs include but are not limited to: the closing of schools and places of worship, social distancing of at least one meter apart in public places, the respect of hygiene measures such as washing hands [1]. There is no further evidence of NPIs on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[3] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

## 3.2 EXERCISING RESPONSE PLANS

### 3.2.1 Activating response plans

#### 3.2.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has activated their national emergency response plan for an infectious disease outbreak in the past year?

- Is there evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise (either with WHO or separately) in the past year?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for both = 1 , Yes for one = 1 , No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo activated its national emergency response plan for an infection disease outbreak in the past year and there is evidence that the country has completed a national-level biological threat-focused exercise in the past year as well. The Republic of Congo activated its National Response Plan to address COVID-19 (Decree no2020-105), which was published on April 9, 2020 [1]. In addition, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) Simulation Exercise Program, the country participated in a simulation exercise in December of 2019 which was conducted jointly by the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention and the West Africa Health Organization [2]. The Republic of Congo, along with 16 other African countries responded to a an outbreak of a potentially deadly communicable disease in a fictitious country in Eastern Africa which was later revealed to be Ebola. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the readiness of the Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) in the WHO African region to respond to a public health emergency. [3].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 19 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] WHO Simulation Calendar December 2019. [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise#top>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] OCHA services, relief web. 4 December, 2019. "Seventeen African Countries Conducting Exercise to Test Readiness of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers". [<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/seventeen-african-countries-conducting-exercise-test-readiness-public-health-emergency>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

### 3.2.1b

**Is there evidence that the country in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices in response (either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise) and developed a plan to improve response capabilities?**

Yes, the country has developed and published a plan to improve response capacity = 2 , Yes, the country has developed a plan to improve response capacity, but has not published the plan = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo in the past year has identified a list of gaps and best practices, either through an infectious disease response or a biological-threat focused exercise, and developed a plan to improve response capabilities. The country participated, in December of 2019, in a World Health Organization (WHO) simulation exercise to assess the readiness of the Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) in the WHO African region to respond to a public health emergency [1, 2]. However, there is no evidence that this led to an after review to identify a list of gaps and best practices [3]. There is no available information of such a list on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [4, 5]. Furthermore, although the Republic of Congo has a PHEOC, its operational capacities were reportedly criticized in July 2020 as it ran out of sample inputs such as swabs and reagents, halting Covid-19 tests in the country [6].

[1] WHO Simulation Calendar December 2019. [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise#top>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] OCHA services, relief web. 4 December, 2019. "Seventeen African Countries Conducting Exercise to Test Readiness of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers". [<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/seventeen-african-countries-conducting-exercise-test-readiness-public-health-emergency>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO) After Action Review. [<https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/after-action-review/en/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[6] africanews. 24 July, 2020. "Congo: screening for coronavirus suspended due to lack of supplies (Congo: le dépistage du coronavirus suspendu faute d'intrants)". [<https://fr.africanews.com/2020/07/24/congo-le-depistage-du-coronavirus-suspendu-faute-d-intrants/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

## 3.2.2 Private sector engagement in exercises

### 3.2.2a

**Is there evidence that the country in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo in the past year has undergone a national-level biological threat-focused exercise that has included private sector representatives. Although the country participated, in December of 2019, in a World Health Organization (WHO) simulation exercise to assess the readiness of the Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) in the WHO African region to respond to a public health emergency, there is no evidence that it included private sector representatives [1, 2]. There is no evidence of such an exercise that included private sector

representatives on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5].

[1] WHO Simulation Calendar December 2019. [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise#top>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] OCHA services, relief web. 4 December, 2019. "Seventeen African Countries Conducting Exercise to Test Readiness of Public Health Emergency Operations Centers". [<https://reliefweb.int/report/world/seventeen-african-countries-conducting-exercise-test-readiness-public-health-emergency>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

## 3.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATION

### 3.3.1 Emergency response operation

#### 3.3.1a

**Does the country have in place an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo has an an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), also referred to as a Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC). According to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, the country has one Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) with an available contact point and a 24 hour hotline to manage the national response strategy to public health emergencies [1]. There is now sufficient information that the PHEOC is fully operational. On March 27, 2020 during a Council of Ministers meeting, the Minister of Health announced the "establishment of a PHEOC" to help with the response to the Covid-19 outbreak [2]. Furthermore, although there is evidence of a PHEOC in the Republic of Congo, it came under criticism in July of 2020 when it had to stop coronavirus testing due to a lack of supplies such as swabs and reagents [3]. The PHEOC does not have a website.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] Report on meeting of Council of Ministers of the Republic of Congo (Compte rendu du Conseil des Ministres). 27 March, 2020. [<https://www.sgg.cg/ccm/compte-rendu-cdm-2020-03-27.pdf>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] africanews. 24 July, 2020. "Congo: screening for coronavirus suspended due to lack of supplies (Congo: le dépistage du coronavirus suspendu faute d'intrants)". [<https://fr.africanews.com/2020/07/24/congo-le-depistage-du-coronavirus-suspendu-faute-d-intrants/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

### 3.3.1b

**Is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year or is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is required to conduct a drill for a public health emergency scenario at least once per year nor is there evidence that they conduct a drill at least once per year. The World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country has a Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) with an available contact point and a 24 hour hotline to manage the national response strategy to public health emergencies. However there is no mention that it is required to conduct a public health drill at least once a year [1]. Furthermore, although the Republic of Congo participated, in December of 2019, in a World Health Organization (WHO) simulation exercise to assess the readiness of the Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) in the WHO African region to respond to a public health emergency, there is no evidence that this is a yearly requirement [2]. In addition, there is no evidence that the country's PHEOC conducts a drill at least once per year on the websites of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4]. The PHEOC does not have a website.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] WHO Simulation Calendar December 2019. [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise#top>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

### 3.3.1c

**Is there public evidence to show that the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that the Republic of Congo's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) has conducted within the last year a coordinated emergency response or emergency response exercise activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency/scenario. Although the country's Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020) includes the further setting up of its EOC (also referred to as a Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC), there is no evidence that it conducted a coordinated emergency response which was activated within 120 minutes of the identification of the public health emergency [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such an exercise on the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defense websites, nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4]. The PHEOC does not have a website.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 14 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

## 3.4 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

### 3.4.1 Public health and security authorities are linked for rapid response during a biological event

#### 3.4.1a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there public evidence that public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

- Are there publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event (i.e., bioterrorism attack)?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no public evidence that the Republic of Congo's public health and national security authorities have carried out an exercise to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. Nor is there any evidence that the country has publicly available standard operating procedures, guidelines, memorandums of understanding (MOUs), or other agreements between the public health and security authorities to respond to a potential deliberate biological event. There is no evidence of such an exercise or MOU in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019 which recommends that the country put in place a detailed planning for all types of simulation exercises [1]. In addition, there is no public evidence of an exercise carried out to respond to a potential deliberate biological event nor evidence of an MOU between public health and security authorities on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4]. The Republic of Congo did participate in December of 2019, in a World Health Organization (WHO) simulation exercise to assess the readiness of the Public Health Emergency Operations Centers (PHEOCs) in the WHO African region. However, this was in regards to a public health emergency and not a potential deliberate biological event such as a bioterrorism attack [5]. The PHEOC does not have a website.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)".

[<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo).

[<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[5] WHO Simulation Calendar December 2019. [<https://extranet.who.int/sph/simulation-exercise#top>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

## 3.5 RISK COMMUNICATIONS

### 3.5.1 Public communication

#### 3.5.1b

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) outline how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs (eg different languages, location within the country, media reach)?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo's risk communication plan outlines how messages will reach populations and sectors with different communications needs. In the country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105 of 9 April, 2020), the government outlines its risk communication strategy which includes "broadcasting information to limit the stigmatization of vulnerable populations, distribute communication and support tools in the country's 12 departments, communicate information throughout the country via media outlets on the risks of the disease, reach out and inform local village and religious leaders and women support groups". [1]. Furthermore, the Republic of Congo's 2017 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention does not include a risk communication plan for use during a public health emergency [2]. There is no relevant information on the Ministry of Health website nor on the government's main portal [3, 4]. The National Office for Risk and Disaster Management does not have a website.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

### 3.5.1 Risk communication planning

#### 3.5.1a

**Does the country have in place, either in the national public health emergency response plan or in other legislation, regulation, or strategy documents, a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

The Republic of Congo has, in its National Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105 of 9 April, 2020), a section detailing a risk communication plan that is specifically intended for use during a public health emergency. The strategy includes, among other things: the distribution of communication and support tools in the country's 12 departments, communication of information throughout the country via media outlets on the risks of the disease, monitoring of social media and networks, conducting community outreach through surveys, awareness building specifically for local village and religious leaders and women support groups, and other information campaigns on the risks of Covid-19 [1].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

**3.5.1c**

**Does the risk communication plan (or other legislation, regulation or strategy document used to guide national public health response) designate a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo's risk communication plan designates a specific position within the government to serve as the primary spokesperson to the public during a public health emergency. The country's Minister of Communication and of Media is the official spokesperson for the government and his briefings on the Covid-19 situation are posted both on the government's main portal and the on the Ministry of Communication's Facebook page [1, 2]. However, the risk communication plan does not specifically designate him as the primary spokesperson during a public health emergency. The Republic of Congo's risk communication plan in response to Covid-19 does call for appointing a spokesperson, but only a "technical" one for the Ministry of Health regarding their risk communication strategy [3].

[1] Official web portal of the Republic of Congo. Coronavirus: Press release from the Government spokesperson. 28 July, 2020. [<https://gouvernement.cg/coronavirus-information/>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2]. Ministry of Communication and Media of the Republic of Congo Facebook page (Ministère de la Communication et des Médias). <https://www.facebook.com/MinistereComCG/>. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[3] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

**3.5.2 Public communication**

**3.5.2a**

**In the past year, is there evidence that the public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms (e.g. social media, website) to inform the public about ongoing public health concerns and/or dispel rumors, misinformation or disinformation?**

Public health system regularly shares information on health concerns = 2, Public health system shares information only during active emergencies, but does not regularly utilize online media platforms = 1, Public health system does not regularly utilize online media platforms, either during emergencies or otherwise = 0



**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that, in the past year, the Republic of Congo's public health system has actively shared messages via online media platforms. However, there is only evidence that the country shares information during an active emergency (also to dispel rumors, misinformation and disinformation) and not enough evidence that it regularly shares information on health concerns. The country's Ministry of Health uses its Facebook page to post information about Covid-19 as well as on the Ebola virus [1]. Furthermore, the Minister of Communication, who is also the government's spokesperson, posts via his Facebook and Twitter account both information about Covid-19 as well as dispelling rumors and misinformation such as a rumor that the Minister of Health had the coronavirus [2, 3]. In addition, one of the Republic of Congo's main media outlets 'Les Echos de Congo-Brazzaville' uses its website to both inform and dispel rumors regarding public health concerns. One such example is on January 28, 2020, it posted on its website that 'despite rumors on social media, there were no cases of Covid-19 at that time in the Republic of Congo [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of Republic of Congo Facebook page (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population). [https://www.facebook.com/MSP-CONGO-636601070057194/]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[2] Twitter: Thierry Mougalla, Minister of Communication of the Republic of Congo. [https://twitter.com/thmougalla/status/1251522632681426952]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Communication and Media of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Communication et des Médias) Facebook page. [https://www.facebook.com/MinistereComCG/]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[4] Les Echos du Congo-Brazzaville. "Congo: no, there is no coronavirus case, according to the government (Congo: non, il n'y a pas de cas de coronavirus, selon le gouvernement)". [https://lesechos-congobrazza.com/societe/6636-congo-non-il-n-y-a-pas-de-cas-de-coronavirus-selon-le-gouvernement]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

**3.5.2b**

**Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers) have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years?**

No = 1, Yes = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence the Republic of Congo's senior leaders have shared misinformation or disinformation on infectious diseases in the past two years. There is no such evidence in the country's main media outlets such as "Agence Congolaise d'Information", "Les Echos de Congo-Brazzaville", "Les Dépeches de Brazzaville", and the "Journal de Brazzaville" [1, 2, 3, 4]. The country's radio and television station (Radio-Télévision nationale congolaise) does not have a website. It should be noted that, according to Reporters Without Borders, almost all of the Republic of Congo's media are either state-owned or owned by government allies and that many journalists are under pressure to censor themselves [5].

[1] Agence Congolaise d'Information [https://www.aci.cg/]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[2] Les Echos de Congo-Brazzaville. [https://lesechos-congobrazza.com/]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[3] Les Dépeches de Brazzaville. [http://www.lesdepechesdebrazzaville.fr/]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[4] Journal de Brazzaville [https://www.journaldebrazza.com/]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[5] Reporters without Borders - Congo. [https://rsf.org/en/democratic-republic-congo]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

## 3.6 ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

### 3.6.1 Internet users

#### 3.6.1a

Percentage of households with Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 8.65

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.2 Mobile subscribers

#### 3.6.2a

Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Input number

Current Year Score: 95.34

2019

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

### 3.6.3 Female access to a mobile phone

#### 3.6.3a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to a mobile phone

Input number

Current Year Score: 4.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

### 3.6.4 Female access to the Internet

#### 3.6.4a

Percentage point gap between males and females whose home has access to the Internet

Input number

Current Year Score: 7.0

2019

Gallup; Economist Impact calculation

## 3.7 TRADE AND TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS

### 3.7.1 Trade restrictions

#### 3.7.1a

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of medical goods (e.g. medicines, oxygen, medical supplies, PPE) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that, in the past year, the Republic of Congo issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export or import of medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. According to the International Trade Center (ITC) for Transparency in Trade which monitors temporary trade measures enacted by government authorities in relation to COVID-19, the Republic of Congo has neither imposed restrictions on exports nor on imports of medical supplies in the past year [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of such a restriction on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture nor on the government's main portal [2, 3, 4]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs website was not accessible at the time of conducting this research [5].

[1] ICT Transparency in Trade: COVID-19 Temporary Trade Measures [<https://www.macmap.org/covid19>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 18 November,

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Congo (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères [[www.diplomatie.gouv.cg](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.cg)]). Accessed 18 November, 2020.

#### 3.7.1b

**In the past year, has the country issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export/import of non-medical goods (e.g. food, textiles, etc) due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no available evidence that the Republic of Congo, in the past year, issued a restriction, without international/bilateral support, on the export or import of non-medical goods due to an infectious disease outbreak. According to the International Trade Center (ITC) for Transparency in Trade which monitors temporary trade measures enacted by government authorities in relation to COVID-19, the Republic of Congo has neither imposed restrictions on exports nor on imports of non-medical goods (such as food) in the past year [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence of this type of restriction on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture nor on the government's main portal [2, 3, 4]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs website was not accessible at the time of conducting this research [5].

[1] ICT Transparency in Trade: COVID-19 Temporary Trade Measures [<https://www.macmap.org/covid19>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020. Accessed 16 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 18 November,

[3] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Congo (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères [[www.diplomatie.gouv.cg](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.cg)]). Accessed 18 November, 2020.

## 3.7.2 Travel restrictions

### 3.7.2a

**In the past year, has the country implemented a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 0**

The Republic of Congo has implemented, in the past year, a ban, without international/bilateral support, on travelers arriving from a specific country or countries due to an infectious disease outbreak. On March 23, 2020, the prime minister announced, due to the Covid-19 pandemic and until further notice, the closing of all land, river, sea and air borders which included a ban on all commercial air flights [1]. This ban was also announced in the government's National Action Plan in Response to Covid-19 (Decree n°2020-105, 9 April, 2020) [2].

[1] Africa 24. Congo, Covid-19, Border closings (Congo-Covid-19, Fermeture des frontières). 23 March, 2020.

[<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=my4gTeUr3zo>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[2] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

## Category 4: Sufficient and robust health sector to treat the sick and protect health workers

### 4.1 HEALTH CAPACITY IN CLINICS, HOSPITALS, AND COMMUNITY CARE CENTERS

#### 4.1.1 Available human resources for the broader healthcare system

##### 4.1.1a

Doctors per 100,000 people

Input number

**Current Year Score: 16.45**

2011

WHO; national sources

#### 4.1.1b

**Nurses and midwives per 100,000 people**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 62.71**

2018

WHO; national sources

#### 4.1.1c

**Does the country have a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a health workforce strategy in place (which has been updated in the past five years) to identify fields where there is an insufficient workforce and strategies to address these shortcomings. There is no evidence of such a strategy in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019 which recommends country "develop and implement a public health human resources strategy taking into account the "One Health" approach and based on updated mapping" [1]. Although the Republic of Congo does not have a strategy it does have a health human resources (HRH) plan for 2011-2020 (Plan National de Developpement des Ressources Humaines Pour la Sante (PNDRHS), 2011 - 2020) aimed at improving the production system, recruitment, and management of health workers. Specific objectives include: strengthening capacities of health worker educational institutions and on- the-job training to meet the health needs of the population and those identified in the current health sector policy; strengthening capacities of the directorate in charge of HRH in terms of health worker planning, career management, skills development, and HRH remuneration; and implementing motivational measures and incentives to ensure health worker availability and quality. The full text of this workforce strategy plan is not available online, but a summary is available through the World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Health Workforce Alliance. [2] There is no information, however, to indicate that the Republic of Congo's HRH plan for 2011-2020 was updated in the past five years on the websites of the WHO Global Health Workforce Alliance, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4, 5]. The Ministry of Labor does not have a website.

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[2] World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Health Workforce Alliance. "Congo". [<https://www.who.int/workforcealliance/countries/cog/en/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education and Literacy of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'enseignement primaire, secondaire, et de l'Alphabétisation de la République du Congo). Accessed 18 November, 2020. [<http://www.enseignement-general.gouv.cg/>]

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

## 4.1.2 Facilities capacity

### 4.1.2a

#### Hospital beds per 100,000 people

Input number

**Current Year Score: 160**

2005

WHO/World Bank; national sources

### 4.1.2b

#### Does the country have the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has the capacity to isolate patients with highly communicable diseases in a biocontainment patient care unit and/or patient isolation room/unit located within the country. Although the country's National Plan in Response to Covid-19 called for the creation of isolation units, there is no evidence they have been put in place nor that they are biocontainment ones [1]. There is no evidence of such biocontainment patient care units or patient isolation units on the websites of the Ministry of Public Health nor the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3]. In addition, no evidence could be found that the country's two largest hospitals, Central University Hospital of Brazzaville and General Hospital Adolphe Sicé, have biocontainment patient care units and/or patient isolation facilities. In fact, both hospitals have come under criticism in the past year for their lack of capacity to treat and/or isolate patients [4, 5].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 19 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] R.P.D.H. Amelin Chrystel Basongisa, 7 April, 2020. "Letter of indignation and especially a complaint about putting my life in danger by at the isolation center of CHU Brazzaville (Lettre d'indignation et surtout plainte pour mise en danger de ma vie au

centre d'isolement des maladies du Covid-19 au CHU de Brazzaville)". [<https://www.rpdh-cg.org/news/2020/04/07/lettre-dindignation-et-surtout-plainte-pour-mise-en-danger-de-ma-vie-par-les>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[5] Africanews. 7 January 2020. "Pointe-Noire: the Hospital A. Sicé needs to be saved (Pointe-Noire: il faut sauver l'hôpital A. Sicé)" [[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MK8wuGv\\_S8k](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MK8wuGv_S8k)]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

#### 4.1.2c

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence that the country has demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

- Is there evidence that the country has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years?

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has either demonstrated capacity to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years nor that it has developed, updated or tested a plan to expand isolation capacity in response to an infectious disease outbreak in the past two years.

Although the country's National Plan in Response to COVID-19 called for the creation of isolation units, there is no evidence they have been put in place [1]. In addition, there is no evidence of either criteria on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, the government's main portal nor on the one for the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, no evidence could be found that the country's two largest hospitals, Central University Hospital of Brazzaville and General Hospital Adolphe Sicé, have expanded their isolation capacity in the past two years nor that they even have isolation facilities. In fact, both hospitals have come under criticism in the past year for their lack of capacity to treat and/or isolate patients [5, 6]. The country's Emergency Public Health Operations Center does not have a website.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 19 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.

[3] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.

[5] R.P.D.H. Amelin Chrystel Basongisa, 29 April, 2021. "Letter of indignation and especially a complaint about putting my life in danger by at the isolation center of CHU Brazzaville (Lettre d'indignation et surtout plainte pour mise en danger de ma vie au centre d'isolement des maladies du Covid-19 au CHU de Brazzaville)". [<https://www.rpdh-cg.org/news/2020/04/07/lettre-dindignation-et-surtout-plainte-pour-mise-en-danger-de-ma-vie-par-les>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.

[6] Africanews. 7 January 2020. "Pointe-Noire: the Hospital A. Sicé needs to be saved (Pointe-Noire: il faut sauver l'hôpital A. Sicé)" [[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MK8wuGv\\_S8k](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MK8wuGv_S8k)]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.

## 4.2 SUPPLY CHAIN FOR HEALTH SYSTEM AND HEALTHCARE WORKERS

### 4.2.1 Routine health care and laboratory system supply

#### 4.2.1a

**Is there a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs?**

Yes for both laboratory and medical supply needs = 2, Yes, but only for one = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national procurement protocol in place which can be utilized by the Ministries of Health and Agriculture for the acquisition of laboratory supplies (e.g. equipment, reagents and media) and medical supplies (e.g. equipment, PPE) for routine needs. The Republic of Congo has a Regulatory Authority of Public Procurement, but there is no mention on its website of national protocol for the acquisition of laboratory or medical supplies [1]. Furthermore, although there is evidence that there have been call to tenders for laboratory supplies in answer to the Covid-19 pandemic, there is no evidence that this is part of a national procurement protocol [2]. There is no evidence of such a protocol for either laboratory or medical supplies on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5]. In addition, a report published in 2020 by the Chambers Global Practice Guides notes that while the Republic of Congo is introducing reforms in its legal framework on public procurement, the system is still plagued by corruption [6].

[1] Regulatory Authority of Public Procurement (Autorite de Regulation des Marches Publics). [<http://www.armp.cg/fr-fr/home.aspx>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] Procurement Plan. Information on the Project: Republic of Congo, COVID-19 Emergency Response Plan, P173851 (Plan de Passation des Marchés. Information sur le Projet : République du Congo, Projet de Riposte d'Urgence au COVID-19, P173851). [<http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/593491588864164856/pdf/Congo-Republic-of-AFRICA-P173851-Republic-of-Congo-COVID-19-Emergency-Response-Project-Procurement-Plan.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[6] Chambers Global Practice Guide: Public Procurement & Government Contracts 2020: Congo Brazzaville (Last Updated April 06, 2020). [<https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/public-procurement-government-contracts-2020/congo-brazzaville/trends-and-developments>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

### 4.2.2 Stockpiling for emergencies

#### 4.2.2a

**Does the country have a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0



**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a stockpile of medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, medical equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency. Law 26-2015 of 29 October 2015 created a central purchasing centre for essential medicines and health products, but the law does not mention a stockpile of medical supplies available for national use during a public health emergency [1]. Furthermore, the most recent public list of essential medicines available in the Republic of Congo dates back to 2013 and there is no mention of having a sufficient amount to be used during a public health emergency [2]. Moreover, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that the country has one Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) with an available contact point. However, the JEE notes as well that the PHEOC lacks supplies, including medical ones. The JEE also mentions that while the country procures (assisted by UNICEF) quality vaccines at competitive prices, it lacks an effective inventory management system at department level [3]. In addition, there is no evidence of a stockpile of medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense nor on the one for the National Laboratory for Public Health [4, 5, 6]. This lack of supplies was further highlighted in recent reports by the fact that during the Covid-19 pandemic the country received donations of medical supplies which included ventilators and PPEs due to a shortage [7]. The country's Emergency Public Health Operations Center does not have a website.

[1] President of the Republic of Congo. Law 26-2015 of 29 October 2015. "On the creation of a central purchasing centre for essential medicines and health products (Loi 26-2015 du 29 octobre 2015 portant creation de la centrale d'achat des médicaments essentiels et des produits de santé)". [<http://sante.gouv.cg/loi-26-2015-du-29-octobre-2015-portant-creation-de-la-centrale-dachat-des-medicaments-essentiels-et-des-produits-de-sante/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] WHO list of essential medicines: Republic of Congo, National List of Essential Medicines 2013 (Liste Nationale des Médicaments Essentiels). [[https://www.who.int/selection\\_medicines/country\\_lists/Congo\\_EML\\_032013.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/selection_medicines/country_lists/Congo_EML_032013.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[5] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[7] French Embassy in Congo, Donation of medical supplies from France to the Congo (Don de matériel médical de la France au Congo). 7 June, 2020. [<https://cg.ambafrance.org/Don-de-materiel-medical-de-la-France-au-Congo>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

#### 4.2.2b

**Does the country have a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is limited evidence about what the stockpile contains = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a stockpile of laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. Law 26-2015 of 29 October 2015 created a central purchasing centre for essential medicines and health products, but the law does not mention a stockpile of laboratory supplies available for national use during a public health emergency [1]. Furthermore, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019, notes that while the country has created one Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC), it has yet to implement purchasing procedures for obtaining reagents necessary for conducting the main laboratory tests [2]. In addition, there is no information of a stockpile of laboratory supplies for national use during a public health emergency on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense and the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5]. This lack of such a stockpile was highlighted in a report by Africanews in July of 2020 that the PHEOC had to stop Covid-19 testing due to a lack of laboratory supplies such as reagents [6].

[1] President of the Republic of Congo. Law 26-2015 of 29 October 2015. "On the creation of a central purchasing centre for essential medicines and health products (Loi 26-2015 du 29 octobre 2015 portant creation de la centrale d'achat des médicaments essentiels et des produits de santé)". [<http://sante.gouv.cg/loi-26-2015-du-29-octobre-2015-portant-creation-de-la-centrale-dachat-des-medicaments-essentiels-et-des-produits-de-sante/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[6] Africanews. 24 July, 2020. "Congo: coronavirus testing on hold due to lack of materials (Congo : le dépistage du coronavirus suspendu faute d'intrants)" [<https://fr.africanews.com/2020/07/24/congo-le-depistage-du-coronavirus-suspendu-faute-d-intrants/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

#### 4.2.2c

**Is there evidence that the country conducts or requires an annual review of the national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo conducts or requires an annual review of its national stockpile to ensure the supply is sufficient for a public health emergency as there is no evidence that it has a national stockpile. Although the country's Law 26-2015 of 29 October 2015 created a central purchasing centre for essential medicines and health products, it does not mention a national stockpile for use during a public health emergency nor that it requires an annual review of what is available [1]. Furthermore, the most recent public list of essential medicines available in the Republic of Congo dates back to 2013 and there is no mention of having a sufficient amount to be used during a public health emergency or that any kind of review has been conducted [2]. Furthermore, there is no mention of such a requirement in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo of March of 2019 nor is there any evidence of such an annual review on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defense nor on the one for the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5, 6]. The country's Emergency Public Health Operations Center does not have a website.

- [1] President of the Republic of Congo. Law 26-2015 of 29 October 2015. "On the creation of a central purchasing centre for essential medicines and health products (Loi 26-2015 du 29 octobre 2015 portant creation de la centrale d'achat des médicaments essentiels et des produits de santé)". [<http://sante.gouv.cg/loi-26-2015-du-29-octobre-2015-portant-creation-de-la-centrale-dachat-des-medicaments-essentiels-et-des-produits-de-sante/>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.
- [2] WHO list of essential medicines: Republic of Congo, National List of Essential Medicines 2013 (Liste Nationale des Médicaments Essentiels). [[https://www.who.int/selection\\_medicines/country\\_lists/Congo\\_EML\\_032013.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/selection_medicines/country_lists/Congo_EML_032013.pdf?ua=1)]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.
- [3] World Health Organization (WHO). 10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.
- [4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.
- [5] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.
- [6] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 29 April, 2021.

## 4.2.3 Manufacturing and procurement for emergencies

### 4.2.3a

Does the country meet one of the following criteria?

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?
- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a plan or agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies (e.g. MCMs, medicines, vaccines, equipment, PPE) for national use during a public health emergency nor that it has a plan or mechanism to procure medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency. Although the Republic of Congo's Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020) calls for establishing inventories on equipment, medicines and supplies needed in response to the pandemic, there is no evidence that this includes a plan to either leverage or procure medical supplies [1]. Furthermore, no evidence of such plans can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense nor in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019 [2, 3, 4]. This lack of such a plan to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce medical supplies for national use during a public health emergency is highlighted in an article in April of 2021 by a non-profit agency called French Committee for International Solidarity (Comité Français pour la Solidarité Internationale) which noted that due to a lack of medical supplies and high prices of those available in the country during the Covid-19 pandemic, it worked with severe local organizations to produce face masks [5]. In addition, a report published in 2020 by the Chambers Global Practice Guide notes that while the Republic of Congo is introducing reforms in its legal framework on public procurement, the system is still plagued by corruption [6]. The country's Emergency Public Health Operations Center does not have a website.

- [1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.
- [2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.
- [3] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.
- [4] World Health Organization (WHO).10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.
- [5] French Committee for International Solidarity (Comité Français pour la Solidarité Internationale), April 2020:.. In Congo-Brazzaville: access to essential goods and masks, a priority (Au Congo Brazzaville : l'accès aux biens essentiels et aux masques, une priorité). [<https://www.cfsi.asso.fr/thematique/congo-brazzaville-l%E2%80%99acc%C3%A9s-aux-biens-essentiels-et-aux-masques-priorit%C3%A9>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.
- [6] Chambers Global Practice Guide: Public Procurement & Government Contracts 2020: Congo Brazzaville (Last Updated April 06, 2020). [<https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/public-procurement-government-contracts-2020/congo-brazzaville/trends-and-developments>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

#### 4.2.3b

**Does the country meet one of the following criteria?**

- Is there evidence of a plan/agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

- Is there evidence of a plan/mechanism to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a plan or agreement to leverage domestic manufacturing capacity to produce laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. Nor is there evidence that the country has a plan or agreement to procure laboratory supplies (e.g. reagents, media) for national use during a public health emergency. There is no available evidence of either type of plan, agreement or mechanism for leveraging or procuring on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense nor in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Joint External Evaluation (JEE) for the Republic of Congo, conducted in March of 2019 [1, 2, 3]. In addition, this lack a production or procurement of laboratory supplies has been criticized during the Covid-19 crisis; in one article published on the website of VOXTV, the report states that although the government announced financial investment to procure laboratory supplies, there is such a shortage of reagents that Covid-19 tests cannot be conducted on a large scale [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO).10-15 March, 2019. "Joint External Evaluation of IHR Core Capacities of Republic of Congo (Evaluation externe conjointe des principales capacités RSI en République du Congo)". [<https://extranet.who.int/iris/restricted/bitstream/handle/10665/325527/WHO-WHE-CPI-2019.60-fre.pdf?sequence=1>].

Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] VOX TV. Dina Ngouela: "As long as there isn't mass testing, we will know nothing about Covid-19 (Tant qu'il n'y a pas de tests de masse, on en saura rien de Covid-19). 15 June, 2020. [<https://www.vox.cg/2020/06/tant-qu'il-n'y-a-pas-de-tests-de-masse-on-en-saura-rien-de-covid-19/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

## 4.3 MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES AND PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT

### 4.3.1 System for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) during a public health emergency

#### 4.3.1a

**Does the country have a plan, program, or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency (i.e., antibiotics, vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics)?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a plan, program or guidelines in place for dispensing medical countermeasures (MCM) for national use during a public health emergency. Although the Republic of Congo's Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020) calls for establishing inventories on equipment, drugs and supplies needed in response to the pandemic, there is no mention of any guideline or program on how they will be dispensed [1]. In addition, while the Minister of Health denied, in a June 2020 statement, that there was a rupture in stock of such MCMs as antiretroviral or antimalarial drugs, there was no mention of how they were being dispensed in the country [2]. Furthermore, there is no mention of such a plan or program on the website of the Ministry of Public Health, nor on the one of the Ministry of Defense [3, 4]. The country's Emergency Operations Center for Public Health does not have a website. Moreover, in a report carried out by the World Health Organization (WHO) published in October of 2019 on African countries preparedness to react to a public health emergency, the WHO noted that one of the main gaps was a lack of medical countermeasures [5].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] [<http://adiac-congo.com/content/covid-19-jacqueline-lydia-mikolo-les-respirateurs-sont-en-quantite-suffisante-117256>]. ADIAC (Agence d'Information d'Afrique Central). 27 June, 2020 Covid-19. Jacqueline Lydia Mikolo : "there is a sufficient quantity of ventilators (les respirateurs sont en quantité suffisante)". Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[5] Europe MPC: "Joint external evaluation of the International Health Regulation (2005) capacities: current status and lessons learnt in the WHO African region". 31 October, 2019. [<https://europepmc.org/article/med/31798983>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

## 4.3.2 System for receiving foreign health personnel during a public health emergency

### 4.3.2a

Is there a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has a public plan in place to receive health personnel from other countries to respond to a public health emergency. Although the Republic of Congo's National Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020) calls for organizing international missions to share information and get support from international experts, there is no mention that this plan is officially in place [1]. Furthermore, although a team of Chinese health experts on Covid-19 arrived in the Republic of Congo in May of 2020 to train doctors and healthcare workers, there is no available evidence that this was part of a public plan to respond to a public health emergency [2]. In addition, there is no evidence of such a plan on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Defense [3, 4].

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] CIDCA: Chinese medical experts arrive in Republic of Congo to help fight COVID-19. 23 May, 2020 [[http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2020-06/01/c\\_496926.htm](http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2020-06/01/c_496926.htm)]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Defense Nationale de la République du Congo). [<https://defense.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

## 4.4 HEALTHCARE ACCESS

### 4.4.1 Access to healthcare

#### 4.4.1a

Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to medical care?

Guaranteed free = 4, Guaranteed right = 3, Aspirational or subject to progressive realization = 2, Guaranteed for some groups, not universally = 1, No specific provision = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

#### 4.4.1b

Access to skilled birth attendants (% of population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 94.4

2015

WHO/World Bank/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

#### 4.4.1c

**Out-of-pocket health expenditures per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP; current international \$)**

Input number

**Current Year Score: 79.78**

2017

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 4.4.2 Paid medical leave

#### 4.4.2a

**Are workers guaranteed paid sick leave?**

Paid sick leave = 2, Unpaid sick leave = 1, No sick leave = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2020

World Policy Analysis Center

### 4.4.3 Healthcare worker access to healthcare

#### 4.4.3a

**Has the government issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo's government has issued legislation, a policy, or a public statement committing to provide prioritized healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency. Although the Republic of Congo's Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020) states that 'all personnel involved in the surveillance of Covid-19 will be taken care of', the terminology is vague and there is no explicit mention that healthcare workers who become sick will be provided with prioritized healthcare services [1]. Furthermore, in the Republic of Congo's Action Plan against the Ebola virus, enacted in 2019 and updated in October 2020, while it mentions providing the necessary personnel to respond to an eventual outbreak, there is no public policy or statement saying it will prioritize healthcare services to healthcare workers who become sick as a result of responding to a public health emergency [2]. There is no mention of such a legislation, policy or public statement on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the government's main portal [3, 4]. Moreover, no evidence was found on online resources.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] MSN News. 7 October, 2020. Congo: reform of the national Ebola response plan (Congo : réforme du plan national de riposte contre Ebola). [<https://www.msn.com/fr-xl/afrique-centre-et-est/other/congo-r%C3%A9forme-du-plan-national-de-riposte-contre-ebola/ar-BB19N1cL?li=AADNyR0>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

## 4.5 COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEALTHCARE WORKERS DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY

### 4.5.1 Communication with healthcare workers

#### 4.5.1a

**Is there a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. The Republic of Congo's National Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020) calls for a strategy to organize series of briefings for healthcare personnel and political authorities on COVID-19 in the 12 departments of the country. However, there is no evidence that this has been put in place nor that this applies to health emergencies other than the coronavirus [1]. Furthermore, there is no mention in the Republic of Congo's 2017 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention of a system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency. [2] In addition, there is no available evidence of such a system on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the government's main portal [3, 4]. The country's Emergency Public Health Operations Center does not have a website.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.



#### 4.5.1b

**Does the system for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during an emergency encompass healthcare workers in both the public and private sector?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has a system in place for public health officials and healthcare workers to communicate during a public health emergency that encompasses healthcare workers in both the public and private sector as there is no evidence of a system for public health officials and healthcare workers in the country. The Republic of Congo's Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, (Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020) calls for a strategy to organize series of briefings for healthcare personnel and political authorities on COVID-19 in the 12 departments of the country. However, there is no evidence that this has been put in place nor is there any mention that it encompasses healthcare workers in the private sector. [1]. Furthermore, there is no mention in the Republic of Congo's 2017 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention of a system for public health officials and healthcare workers (both public and private) to communicate during a public health emergency. [2] In addition, there is no available evidence of such a system on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the government's main portal [3, 4]. The country's Emergency Public Health Operations Center does not have a website.

[1] Congo: Nation Plan in Response to Covid-19, Decree no2020-105, 9 April, 2020. (Congo: Plan national de riposte au coronavirus (Covid-19) Décret n°2020-105 du 9 avril 2020). [<http://www.droit-afrique.com/uploads/Congo-Decret-2020-105-plan-riposte-coronavirus.pdf>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[2] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

## 4.6 INFECTION CONTROL PRACTICES AND AVAILABILITY OF EQUIPMENT

### 4.6.1 Healthcare associated infection (HCAI) prevention and control programs

#### 4.6.1a

**Is there evidence that the national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo's national public health system is monitoring for and tracking the number of healthcare associated infections (HCAI) that take place in healthcare facilities. On September 17, 2020, (which is World Patients' Safety Day) the Minister of Health announced a national program for the fight against nosocomial diseases whose mission would include, among other objectives, "the prevention and control of nosocomial diseases, the promotion of good hospital hygiene practices and the coordination and supervision of nosocomial infection-control activities". However,

there is no available evidence that this program has been put into place [1]. Furthermore, a plan to establish a national program for the fight against nosocomial infections had already been published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Congo on 13 August, 2019 (Decree n° 2019-227). Yet there is no further evidence that this program has been enacted [2]. In addition, there is no available information of such a system on the Ministry of Health's website [3].

[1] World Health Organization, Africa (WHO). 17 September, 2020. "Creating a safe health environment, a requirement amplified by Covid-19 (Créer un environnement sanitaire sécurisé, une exigence amplifiée par la Covid-19)".

[<https://www.afro.who.int/pt/node/13369>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Official Journal of the Republic of Congo, 13 August, 2019 - Decree 2019-227 on the creation of a national program for the fight against nosocomial infections (Journal Officiel de la République du Congo, 13 août Décret n° 2019-227 portant création, attributions et organisation du programme national de lutte contre les infections nosocomiales).

[<https://www.sgg.cg/JO/2019/congo-jo-2019-35.pdf>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 19 November, 2020.

## 4.7 CAPACITY TO TEST AND APPROVE NEW MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES

### 4.7.1 Regulatory process for conducting clinical trials of unregistered interventions

#### 4.7.1a

**Is there a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a national requirement for ethical review (e.g., from an ethics committee or via Institutional Review Board approval) before beginning a clinical trial. There is no mention of a national requirement for ethical review before beginning a clinical trial on the websites of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Scientific Research [1, 2]. The Republic of Congo has a Ethics Committee for Health Sciences Research (Comité d'éthique de la recherche en sciences de la santé), but it does not have a website. [3] There have been international donor-funded projects to strengthen the capacity of domestic ethics committees, but the most recent available one dates back to 2010 which took place at the Marien Ngouabi University [4].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO). "List of National Ethics Committees".

[[http://apps.who.int/ethics/nationalcommittees/NEC\\_full\\_web.pdf](http://apps.who.int/ethics/nationalcommittees/NEC_full_web.pdf)]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[4] European & Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership (EDCTP). "The Mzadi project: strengthening research ethics capacity in the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)".

[[http://www.edctp.org/annualreport2010/ethics/02\\_mupenda.html](http://www.edctp.org/annualreport2010/ethics/02_mupenda.html)]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

#### 4.7.1b

**Is there an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCM) to treat ongoing epidemics?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has an expedited process for approving clinical trials for unregistered medical countermeasures (MCMs) to treat ongoing epidemics. No evidence of such an expedited process can be found on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [1, 2, 3].

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.Insp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 18 November, 2020.

### 4.7.2 Regulatory process for approving medical countermeasures

#### 4.7.2a

**Is there a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures (MCM) for humans?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a government agency responsible for approving new medical countermeasures for humans. A review of National Medicines Regulatory Authorities (NMRAs) in Africa indicates that the Republic of Congo has a Directorate of Pharmacies, Medicines and Laboratories (DPML) [1]. Although the DPML does not have a website, the Directorate of Pharmacies and Medicines (DPM) does have one. On its website it states that under chapter 7 of the decree 2018-270 of 2 July, 2018 on the organization of the general directorate for health services and treatments, the DMP is responsible for the "dispensation and fabrication of medicines". However, there is no evidence on its website that it is responsible for approving new MCMs for humans [2]. Furthermore there is no available information on the existence of such an agency on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Research, nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [3, 4, 5].

[1] Ndomondo-Sigonda, Margareth et al. 2017. "Medicines Regulation in Africa: Current State and Opportunities". *Pharmaceutical Medicine* 31

[6] : 383-397. [<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5691122/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Directorate of Pharmacies and Medicines in the Republic of Congo (Direction de la Pharmacie et de la Médecine de la République du Congo (DPM)). [<https://www.dpm-congo.net/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[5] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

#### 4.7.2b

**Is there an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCM) for human use during public health emergencies?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has an expedited process for approving medical countermeasures (MCMs) for human use during public health emergencies. The country has a Directorate of Pharmacies and Medicines (DPM). Under chapter 7 of the decree 2018-270 of 2 July, 2018 on the organization of the general directorate health services and treatment, the DPM is responsible for the "dispensation and fabrication of medicines". However, there is no evidence on the DPM's website that there is in place an expedited process for approving MCMs for human use during public health emergencies [1]. Furthermore there is no available information on the existence of such an expedited process on the websites of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Research, nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public Health [2, 3, 4].

[1] Directorate of Pharmacies and Medicines in the Republic of Congo (Direction de la Pharmacie et de la Médecine de la République du Congo (DPM). [<https://www.dpm-congo.net/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique. [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

## Category 5: Commitments to improving national capacity, financing plans to address gaps, and adhering to global norms

### 5.1 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (IHR) REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

#### 5.1.1 Official IHR reporting

##### 5.1.1a

**Has the country submitted IHR reports to the WHO for the previous calendar year?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2020

World Health Organization

## 5.1.2 Integration of health into disaster risk reduction

### 5.1.2a

**Are epidemics and pandemics integrated into the national risk reduction strategy or is there a standalone national disaster risk reduction strategy for epidemics and pandemics?**

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

There is evidence that epidemics and pandemics are integrated into the Republic of Congo's national risk reduction strategy. The country has a disaster risk reduction plan in place which addresses planning for multiple communicable diseases with pandemic potential. The Republic of Congo's 2017 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) covers public health emergencies and specifically mentions Ebola, cholera, measles, and yellow fever [1]. The country has a National Office for Risk and Disaster Management, but it does not have a website.

[1] Republic of Congo. October 2017. "National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention (SNPRRC) of the Republic of Congo (Stratégie Nationale de Prévention et de Réduction des Risques de Catastrophes (SNPRRC) de la République du Congo)". [<http://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC179646>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

## 5.2 CROSS-BORDER AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH AND ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE

### 5.2.1 Cross-border agreements

#### 5.2.1a

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to public health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 2

There is publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has a cross-border agreement as part of a regional group with regards to public health emergencies. The Republic of Congo is part of the Central Africa Regional Collaborating Centre of the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). Regional Collaborating Centers are technical support institutions for the Africa CDC that work with member states to develop capacity in surveillance, laboratory systems and networks, information systems, emergency preparedness and response, public health research, and fighting major public health outbreaks [1, 2].

[1] Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). "Central Africa establishes the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Regional Collaborating Centre to improve surveillance, preparedness and response to infectious and non-communicable diseases". [<https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170803/central-africa-establishes-africa-centres-disease->

control-and-prevention]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). [<https://africacdc.org/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

### 5.2.1b

**Does the country have cross-border agreements, protocols, or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies?**

Yes = 2, Yes, but there is evidence of gaps in implementation = 1, No = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has cross-border agreements, protocols or MOUs with neighboring countries, or as part of a regional group, with regards to animal health emergencies. There is no mention of regional or bilateral agreements with regards to animal health emergencies on the websites of the Ministry of Health nor on the one of the Ministry of Agriculture [1, 2]. The Republic of Congo is part of the Central Africa Regional Collaborating Centre of the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). Regional Collaborating Centers are technical support institutions for the Africa CDC that work with member states to develop capacity in surveillance, laboratory systems and networks, information systems, emergency preparedness and response, public health research, and fighting major public health outbreaks. However, there is no explicit mention that the work of the Africa CDC or its regional collaborating centers include animal health emergencies [3, 4.]

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, of Livestock and of Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). "Central Africa establishes the Africa Center for Disease Control and Prevention Regional Collaborating Centre to improve surveillance, preparedness and response to infectious and non-communicable diseases". [<https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170803/central-africa-establishes-africa-centres-disease-control-and-prevention>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[4] Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). [<http://www.africacdc.org>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

## 5.3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

### 5.3.1 Participation in international agreements

#### 5.3.1a

**Does the county have signatory and ratification (or same legal effect) status to the Biological Weapons Convention?**

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) = 2, Signed = 1, Non-compliant or not a member = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

#### 5.3.1b

**Has the country submitted confidence building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention in the past three years?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

### 5.3.1c

Has the state provided the required United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

### 5.3.1d

Extent of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 implementation related to legal frameworks and enforcement for countering biological weapons:

Very good (60+ points) = 4, Good (45–59 points) = 3, Moderate (30–44 points) = 2, Weak (15–29 points) = 1, Very weak (0–14 points) or no matrix exists/country is not party to the BWC = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Biological Weapons Convention

## 5.3.2 Voluntary memberships

### 5.3.2a

Does the country meet at least 2 of the following criteria?

- Membership in Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA)
- Membership in the Alliance for Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR Implementation (JEE Alliance)
- Membership in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)
- Membership in the Australia Group (AG)
- Membership in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Needs to meet at least two of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure. , Yes for five = 1 , Yes for four = 1 , Yes for three = 1 , Yes for two = 1 , Yes for one = 0 , No for all = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Global Health Security Agenda; JE Alliance; Global Partnership; Australia Group; PSI

## 5.4 JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION (JEE) AND PERFORMANCE OF VETERINARY SERVICES PATHWAY (PVS)

### 5.4.1 Completion and publication of a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.1a

Has the country completed a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) or precursor external evaluation (e.g., GHSA pilot external assessment) and published a full public report in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

#### 5.4.1b

Has the country completed and published, within the last five years, either a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to address gaps identified through the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) assessment or a national GHSA roadmap that sets milestones for achieving each of the GHSA targets?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.4.2 Completion and publication of a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment and gap analysis

#### 5.4.2a

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) assessment in the last five years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

OIE PVS assessments

#### 5.4.2b

Has the country completed and published a Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis in the last five years?



Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5 FINANCING

### 5.5.1 National financing for epidemic preparedness

#### 5.5.1a

**Is there evidence that the country has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years?**

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is insufficient evidence that the Republic of Congo has allocated national funds to improve capacity to address epidemic threats within the past three years. Although on March 25, 2020 the minister of health announced the government's first allocation of national funds in the amount of 1,5 billion francs CFA (\$2.7 million) in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, there is no available evidence that these funds could apply to other epidemic threats [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the website of the Ministry of Health nor on the government's main portal regarding legislature on national budget priorities that any national funds have been allocated within the past three years to address epidemic threats [2, 3].

[1] MSN Central Africa. 25 March, 2020. "Congo-Covid-19: seven new suspected cases (Congo-Covid 19: sept nouveaux cas suspectés)". [<https://www.msn.com/fr-xl/afrique-centre-et-est/actualite/congo-covid-19-sept-nouveaux-cas-suspect%C3%A9s/ar-BB11KVRL>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

### 5.5.2 Financing under Joint External Evaluation (JEE) and Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) reports and gap analyses

#### 5.5.2a

**Does the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) report, National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS), and/or national GHSA roadmap allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?**

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a JEE = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

WHO Strategic Partnership for IHR and Health Security (SPH); Global Health Security Agenda

### 5.5.2b

Does the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) gap analysis and/or PVS assessment allocate or describe specific funding from the national budget (covering a time-period either in the future or within the past five years) to address the identified gaps?

Yes = 1 , No/country has not conducted a PVS = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

2021

OIE PVS assessments

## 5.5.3 Financing for emergency response

### 5.5.3a

Is there a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism and funds which the country can access in the face of a public health emergency (such as through a dedicated national reserve fund, an established agreement with the World Bank pandemic financing facility/other multilateral emergency funding mechanism, or other pathway identified through a public health or state of emergency act)?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is a publicly identified special emergency public financing mechanism from which the Republic of Congo can borrow if facing a public health emergency. The Republic of Congo is an International Development Association (IDA) eligible borrowing country, so it is eligible for the World Bank pandemic financing facility. [1, 2]

[1] International Development Association (IDA). "IDA Borrowing Countries". [<http://ida.worldbank.org/about/borrowing-countries>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] World Bank. "Pandemic Financing Facility". [<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/119961516647620597/PEF-Operational-Brief-Dec-2017.pdf>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

## 5.5.4 Accountability for commitments made at the international stage for addressing epidemic threats

### 5.5.4a

Is there evidence that senior leaders (president or ministers), in the past three years, have made a public commitment either to:

- Support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support?
- Improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 0**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo's senior leaders have, in the past three years, made a public commitment to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats by providing financing or support. Nor is there sufficient evidence that they made a public statement to improve the country's domestic capacity to

address epidemic threats by expanding financing or requesting support to improve capacity. The Republic of Congo has requested financial support to improve its capacity to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic from such institutions as The World Bank (\$11.3 million) or the European Union through the French Red Cross (€1.5) to name but a few. However, this financing was announced by the World Bank and the EU and not by a senior leader in the Republic of Congo's government [1, 2]. The country also partnered with the World Health Organisation (WHO), International Coordination Group on Vaccine Provision (ICG), and GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance, on a yellow fever vaccination campaign in response to a laboratory-confirmed yellow fever case in August 2018. [3] However, there is no available evidence that any of these projects to improve capacity through expanded financing were announced through a public commitment on the websites of the Ministry of Health nor on the government's main portal [4, 5].

[1] "World Bank allocates \$11.3 million to the Republic of Congo to respond to the coronavirus pandemic (La Banque mondiale alloue 11,3 millions de dollars à la République du Congo pour répondre à la pandémie de coronavirus)". World Bank. 23 April, 2020. [<https://www.banquemonde.org/fr/news/press-release/2020/04/23/the-world-bank-provides-113-million-to-support-the-republic-of-the-congos-response-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] European Union Congo-Brazzaville Facebook page: "Response to COVID-19 epidemic: the European Union committed alongside Congo (Riposte à l'épidémie du COVID-19: l'Union européenne engagée aux côtés du Congo)". 9 April, 2020. [<https://www.facebook.com/notes/union-europ%C3%A9enne-au-congo-brazzaville/riposte-%C3%A0-l%C3%A9pid%C3%A9mie-du-covid-19-lunion-europ%C3%A9enne-engag%C3%A9e-aux-c%C3%B4t%C3%A9s-du-congo/2867625413327327/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organisation (WHO) Regional Office for Africa. 26 September 2018. "The Republic of Congo to vaccinate more than one million people against yellow fever". [<https://afro.who.int/news/republic-congo-vaccinate-more-one-million-people-against-yellow-fever>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[4] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[5] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

### 5.5.4b

Is there evidence that the country has, in the past three years, either:

- Provided other countries with financing or technical support to improve capacity to address epidemic threats?
- Requested financing or technical support from donors to improve the country's domestic capacity to address epidemic threats?

Needs to meet at least one of the criteria to be scored a 1 on this measure., Yes for both = 1, Yes for one = 1, No for both = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is evidence that the Republic of Congo has invested finances from donors to improve its own domestic capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. However, there is no evidence that the country has invested resources to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. According to the Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking database, the Republic of Congo has received technical and financial support to improve its domestic capacity to address epidemic threats in each of the past three years; for enhancing prevention capacity and for detection. The country received \$10.5 million in 2017, \$16.5 million in 2018 and and \$11.5 million in 2019 to improve its domestic capacity to address epidemic threats. Among the main donors were the the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and France [1]. Furthermore, on April 23, 2020, the World Bank announced a financial package worth \$11.3 million to the Republic of Congo to help it improve its domestic capacity to address the coronavirus pandemic [2]. However, there is no evidence on the websites of the Ministry of Health nor on the government's main portal that the Republic of Congo invested finances or provided technical support to help other countries

combat epidemic threats [3, 4]. The funder page for the country on the the Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking website does not include any evidence that the country has invested resources to support other countries to improve capacity to address epidemic threats in the past three years. [5]

[1] Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking database. "Recipient profile: Congo".

[<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/916/recipient>]. Accessed 24 May 2021.

[2] "World Bank allocates \$11.3 million to the Republic of Congo to respond to the coronavirus pandemic (La Banque mondiale alloue 11,3 millions de dollars à la République du Congo pour répondre à la pandémie de coronavirus)". World Bank. 23 April, 2020. [<https://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/press-release/2020/04/23/the-world-bank-provides-113-million-to-support-the-republic-of-the-congos-response-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic>]. Accessed 21 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 21 November, 2020.

[4] Official web portal of the government of the Republic of Congo. [<https://gouvernement.cg/>]. Accessed 21 November, 2020.

[5] Georgetown Global Health Security Tracking database. "Funder profile: Congo".

[<https://tracking.ghscosting.org/details/916/funder>]. Accessed 24 May 2021.

#### 5.5.4c

Is there evidence that the country has fulfilled its full contribution to the WHO within the past two years?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Impact analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country

## 5.6 COMMITMENT TO SHARING OF GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SPECIMENS

### 5.6.1 Commitment to sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) in both emergency and nonemergency research

#### 5.6.1a

Is there a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza?

Yes = 1 , No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

There is no evidence that the Republic of Congo has a publicly available plan or policy for sharing genetic data, clinical specimens, and/or isolated specimens (biological materials) along with the associated epidemiological data with international organizations and/or other countries that goes beyond influenza. There is no evidence of such a plan on the websites of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Scientific Research nor on the one of the National Laboratory for Public

Health [1, 2, 3, 4]

[1] Ministry of Health and Population of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Santé et de la Population de la République du Congo). [<http://www.sante.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de l'Agriculture, l'élevage et de la Pêche de la République du Congo). [<https://www.agriculture.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] Ministry of Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Republic of Congo (Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation Technologique de la République du Congo). [<https://www.recherchescientifique.gouv.cg/>]. Accessed 09 November, 2020.

[4] National Laboratory for Public Health (Laboratoire National de Santé Publique). [<http://www.lnsp-cg.org/>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

### 5.6.1b

**Is there public evidence that the country has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has not shared samples in accordance with the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) framework in the past two years [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the website and press release pages of the World Health Organization (WHO) nor are there any media reports by the WHO of any non-compliance by the Republic of Congo in the past two years [2, 3].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Virus Sharing." [[http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus\\_sharing/en/](http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus_sharing/en/)]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). [<http://www.who.int>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO) newsroom. [<https://www.who.int/news-room>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

### 5.6.1c

**Is there public evidence that the country has not shared pandemic pathogen samples during an outbreak in the past two years?**

Yes = 0, No = 1

**Current Year Score: 1**

There is no publicly available evidence that the Republic of Congo has not shared pandemic pathogen samples including for Covid-19 during an outbreak in the past two years [1]. Furthermore, there is no evidence on the website and press release pages of the World Health Organization (WHO) nor are there any media reports by the WHO of any non-compliance by the Republic of Congo in the past two years [2, 3].

[1] World Health Organization (WHO). "Virus Sharing." [[http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus\\_sharing/en/](http://www.who.int/influenza/pip/virus_sharing/en/)]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[2] World Health Organization (WHO). [<http://www.who.int>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

[3] World Health Organization (WHO) newsroom. [<https://www.who.int/news-room>]. Accessed 20 November, 2020.

## Category 6: Overall risk environment and vulnerability to biological threats

### 6.1 POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISK

#### 6.1.1 Government effectiveness

##### 6.1.1a

Policy formation (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1b

Quality of bureaucracy (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1c

Excessive bureaucracy/red tape (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

##### 6.1.1d

Vested interests/cronyism (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1e

Country score on Corruption Perception Index (0-100, where 100=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 19

2020

Transparency International

### 6.1.1f

Accountability of public officials (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 0

2020

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.1g

Human rights risk (Economist Intelligence score; 0-4, where 4=best)

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2020

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.2 Orderly transfers of power

### 6.1.2a

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Very clear, established and accepted = 4, Clear, established and accepted = 3, One of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) is missing = 2, Two of the three criteria (clear, established, accepted) are missing = 1, Not clear, not established, not accepted = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.3 Risk of social unrest

#### 6.1.3a

**What is the risk of disruptive social unrest?**

Very low: Social unrest is very unlikely = 4, Low: There is some prospect of social unrest, but disruption would be very limited = 3, Moderate: There is a considerable chance of social unrest, but disruption would be limited = 2, High: Major social unrest is likely, and would cause considerable disruption = 1, Very high: Large-scale social unrest on such a level as to seriously challenge government control of the country is very likely = 0

**Current Year Score: 1**

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.1.4 Illicit activities by non-state actors

#### 6.1.4a

**How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption?**

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

**Current Year Score: 3**

2021

Economist Intelligence

#### 6.1.4b

**What is the level of illicit arms flows within the country?**

4 = Very high, 3 = High, 2 = Moderate, 1 = Low, 0 = Very low

**Current Year Score: 3**

2020

UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

#### 6.1.4c

**How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country?**

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

2021

Economist Intelligence



## 6.1.5 Armed conflict

### 6.1.5a

Is this country presently subject to an armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict in the future?

No armed conflict exists = 4, Yes; sporadic conflict = 3, Yes; incursional conflict = 2, Yes, low-level insurgency = 1, Yes; territorial conflict = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.6 Government territorial control

### 6.1.6a

Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?

Yes = 1, No = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.1.7 International tensions

### 6.1.7a

Is there a threat that international disputes/tensions could have a negative effect?

No threat = 4, Low threat = 3, Moderate threat = 2, High threat = 1, Very high threat = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

### 6.2.1 Literacy

#### 6.2.1a

Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, both sexes (%)

Input number

Current Year Score: 80.3

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);  
The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.2 Gender equality

### 6.2.2a

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index score

Input number

**Current Year Score: 0.42**

2018

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); The Economist Intelligence Unit

## 6.2.3 Social inclusion

### 6.2.3a

Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)

Input number

**Current Year Score: 15.4**

2011

World Bank; Economist Impact

### 6.2.3b

Share of employment in the informal sector

Greater than 50% = 2, Between 25-50% = 1, Less than 25% = 0

**Current Year Score: 2**

The BTI Transformation Index Atlas 2020 Country Report for the Republic of Congo states that the share of employment in the informal sector is 81.5% of total employment [1].

[1] BTI Transformation Index Atlas: Congo, Rep. Country Report 2020. [<https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report-COG.html>]. Accessed 28 November, 2020.

### 6.2.3c

Coverage of social insurance programs (% of population)

Scored in quartiles (0-3, where 3=best)

**Current Year Score: 1**

2016, or latest available

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.2.4 Public confidence in government

### 6.2.4a

Level of confidence in public institutions

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.5 Local media and reporting

### 6.2.5a

Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?

Input number

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence Democracy Index

## 6.2.6 Inequality

### 6.2.6a

Gini coefficient

Scored 0-1, where 0=best

Current Year Score: 0.49

Latest available.

World Bank; Economist Impact calculations

## 6.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ADEQUACY

### 6.3.1 Adequacy of road network

#### 6.3.1a

What is the risk that the road network will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.2 Adequacy of airports

#### 6.3.2a

What is the risk that air transport will prove inadequate to meet needs?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 3

2021

Economist Intelligence

### 6.3.3 Adequacy of power network

#### 6.3.3a

What is the risk that power shortages could be disruptive?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 1

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.4 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

### 6.4.1 Urbanization

#### 6.4.1a

Urban population (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 67.37

2019

World Bank

### 6.4.2 Land use

#### 6.4.2a

Percentage point change in forest area between 2006–2016

Input number

Current Year Score: -0.36

2008-2018

World Bank; Economist Impact

### 6.4.3 Natural disaster risk

#### 6.4.3a

What is the risk that the economy will suffer a major disruption owing to a natural disaster?

Very low = 4, Low = 3, Moderate = 2, High = 1, Very high = 0

Current Year Score: 2

2021

Economist Intelligence

## 6.5 PUBLIC HEALTH VULNERABILITIES

### 6.5.1 Access to quality healthcare

#### 6.5.1a

Total life expectancy (years)

Input number

Current Year Score: 64.29

2018

United Nations; World Bank, UNICEF; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
World Factbook

#### 6.5.1b

Age-standardized NCD mortality rate (per 100 000 population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 642.9

2019

WHO

#### 6.5.1c

Population ages 65 and above (% of total population)

Input number

Current Year Score: 2.72

2019

World Bank

### **6.5.1d**

Prevalence of current tobacco use (% of adults)

Input number

Current Year Score: 16.1

2018

World Bank

### **6.5.1e**

Prevalence of obesity among adults

Input number

Current Year Score: 9.6

2016

WHO

## **6.5.2 Access to potable water and sanitation**

### **6.5.2a**

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic water infrastructure

Input number

Current Year Score: 73.22

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### **6.5.2b**

Percentage of homes with access to at least basic sanitation facilities

Input number

Current Year Score: 20.17

2017

UNICEF; Economist Impact

### 6.5.3 Public healthcare spending levels per capita

#### 6.5.3a

Domestic general government health expenditure per capita, PPP (current international \$)

Input number

Current Year Score: 46.08

2018

WHO Global Health Expenditure database

### 6.5.4 Trust in medical and health advice

#### 6.5.4a

Trust medical and health advice from the government

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from the government , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018

#### 6.5.4b

Trust medical and health advice from medical workers

Share of population that trust medical and health advice from health professionals , More than 80% = 2, Between 60-80%, or no data available = 1, Less than 60% = 0

Current Year Score: 0

2018

Wellcome Trust Global Monitor 2018